

THE 60th ANNIVERSARY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

Duško Dimitrijević and Jovan Čavoški (eds)



Belgrade, 2021



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

by Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ

THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT - SIXTY YEARS SINCE THE BELGRADE SUMMIT	13
---	----

HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

Jovan ČAVOŠKI

THE EVOLUTION OF NAM'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS DURING THE COLD WAR DECADES	23
---	----

Ljubodrag DIMIĆ

JOSIP BROZ TITO AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	51
---	----

Aleksandar ŽIVOTIĆ

YUGOSLAVIA, MIDDLE EAST AND CREATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	75
---	----

Amit DAS GUPTA

INDIA AND NONALIGNMENT - FORMATIVE YEARS	95
--	----

Robert B. RAKOVE

APPREHENSION, ENGAGEMENT, AND WITHDRAWAL: THE U.S. APPROACH TO COLD WAR NON-ALIGNMENT	109
--	-----

<i>Ruslan VASILIEVICH KOSTIUK, Ekaterina PETROVNA KATKOVA</i>	
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	125
<i>XINYAO Liu, HONGWEI Fan</i>	
CHINESE POLICIES TOWARDS THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	147
<i>Arno TRÜLTZSCH</i>	
NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA	163
<i>Lorenz M. LÜTHI</i>	
RELATIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WITH OTHER REGIONAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANISATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR	179
<i>Sanja JELISAVAC TROŠIĆ</i>	
THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FIGHT FOR THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER	193
<i>Duško LOPANDIĆ, Ratomir MILIKIĆ</i>	
THE IMPACT OF POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT ON YUGOSLAVIA'S STATUS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS	209
REFLECTIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT - 60 YEARS AFTER THE BELGRADE SUMMIT	
<i>Živoadin JOVANOVIĆ</i>	
60 TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT - INVITATION TO REASON, DIALOGUE AND COEXISTENCE	227

<i>Dragan BOGETIĆ</i> YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	239
<i>Ezzat SAAD</i> EGYPT AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT	255
<i>Leyde Ernesto RODRÍGUEZ HERNÁNDEZ,</i> <i>Dariana HERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ</i> CUBA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: 60 YEARS BEING PART OF THE THIRD WORLD	263
<i>Thomas PREHI BOTCHWAY,</i> <i>Akwasi Kwarteng AMOAKO-GYAMPAH</i> THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, GHANA AND THE EARLY DAYS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY: REFLECTIONS ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY	289
<i>Sue ONSLOW</i> TANZANIA, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND NON ALIGNMENT	305
<i>Chris SAUNDERS</i> THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA OVER SIXTY YEARS	333
<i>M. Faishal AMINUDDIN</i> 60 YEARS AFTER BELGRADE: PASSION, REFLECTION AND CHALLENGES FROM INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE	345
<i>Kamal MAKILI-ALIYEV</i> THE ROLE OF AZERBAIJAN IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY	359

Beatriz BISSIO

BRAZIL AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT:
PARALLEL PATHS, COMMON GOALS 371

**REVITALISATION OF THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

István TARRÓSY

2021, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA:
GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
AND REAFFIRMED NEEDS IN A MULTIPOLAR SETTING 387

Dragan BIŠENIĆ

AN EXIT FROM CONTRADICTIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT 399

Amr ALJOWAILY

ADJUSTING THE NAM TO NEW GLOBAL REALITIES:
EMPLOYING INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY
AND EXPLORING BEST PRACTICES 417

Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ

THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT
AND REFORM TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS 429

Yayan Ganda HAYAT MULYANA

INDONESIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT:
BEING CUSTODIAN OF A PRINCIPLED WORLD
AND NAVIGATING THROUGH THE CHALLENGES
OF FUTURE RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE 463

Jozef KUNIĆ

THE NON-ALIGNED POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - A VIEW FROM SLOVENIA 475

*Madhusudan BANDYOPADHYAY,
Amitava BANDOPADHYAY*

THE NAM S&T CENTRE - A SUCCESSFUL MECHANISM
FOR CAPACITY BUILDING IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
AND ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

483

FOREWORD

THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT – SIXTY YEARS SINCE THE BELGRADE SUMMIT

In the modern period of development of international relations, the international community is going through extreme uncertainties and dangers of re-regrouping and military-political polarisation, which increases the negative effects on a number of aspects of interstate relations. The hotbeds of the crisis are deepening again, and new ones are emerging, just as they were during the Cold War between the two military-political blocs of the West and the East. Internal turmoil with uncertain outcomes is intensifying, and the increased tension between the United States and its allies on the one hand and Russia and China and their allies on the other does not contribute to a positive and balanced constellation of international relations, but rather to its imbalance and destabilisation. The lack of unity in solving crucial economic problems in the relations between the countries of the North and the South also does not contribute to general development, but to social stagnation, poverty and decline. This situation presented the international community with a slew of additional problems, including environmental, health and cultural issues, which, combined with the negative consequences of revolutionary technical and technological changes, leave the world without perspective, i.e. without concrete answers and achievable and sustainable solutions. In the changed geopolitical circumstances and with the abundance of contradictory economic tendencies leading to the globalisation of the world economy and the multipolarisation of international political relations, the preservation of international peace and security remains the most important “objective necessity” of further progress and prosperity of all mankind.

The Non-Aligned Movement, in this sense, is once again becoming an important factor in the international community’s efforts to build a fairer and more democratic international order. Created as an antithesis to the politics of power and bloc division of the world, the Non-Aligned

Movement in modern international conditions independently or within the United Nations system, actively participates in solving general issues of human progress related to solving crucial economic and social problems such as poverty, pandemics, natural disasters, environmental pollution, nuclear disarmament, migration, terrorism, international crime and interstate and internal conflicts. As one of the progressive and democratic political forces that are ready to fight together with other political forces in solving these problems, the Non-Aligned Movement is also deeply engaged in affirming the protection of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms generally associated with respect for human dignity, equality, solidarity, tolerance and social justice.

Regardless of the fact that not only its full members participate in the Non-Aligned Movement, but also other states and international factors that express equal or similar interests with the interests of the Movement, and even though there are differences between the member states in terms of socio-political and economic systems, the Non-Aligned Movement in the breadth of the socio-historical process that embodies it has remained driven by solidarity and common interests in achieving social progress and improving general living conditions which, after all, determines the directions of its development and activities until today.

The policy of non-alignment that the Non-alignment Movement propagates arose as a consequence of the historical development of international relations. From the very beginning, the policy of non-alignment has considered the basic tendencies of the development of the contemporary world, formulating goals that coincide with the directions of necessary changes in the international community. Despite the crises that the Non-Aligned Movement went through in its entire development during and after the Cold War, its real role in the implementation of non-alignment policy undoubtedly proved that the Movement remained a long-term perspective of humanity.

As it is known, at the very beginning, non-alignment represented the foreign policy orientation of certain non-aligned countries in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. On the European continent, Yugoslavia was the leading socialist state that accepted and developed a policy of non-alignment. The non-alignment policy manifested not only opposition to the world's bloc division, but also the aspiration of former colonial and enslaved peoples to achieve full emancipation and independence, which was to ensure free development according to their own choice without retaining any form of dependence on superpowers,

that is, the centres of military, political and economic power. The emancipation of the people, which took place in the conditions of the Cold War and the bipolar international community, took place in parallel with the processes of decolonisation and building a new system of international relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The principles of peaceful coexistence that generally derive from the principles and goals of the United Nations were originally systematically formulated in the Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation adopted at the Conference of Asian and African States in Bandung on April 24, 1955. The “Bandung Principles” represented a progressive ideological platform of peaceful active coexistence or a political doctrine of non-alignment that highlighted peaceful and lasting international cooperation of all countries of the world, regardless of differences in socio-political and economic systems, cultural, religious and other characteristics. These principles were profoundly designed to democratise international relations, ensure lasting peace and the general security of states. Considering the contradictions that characterised the then-international relations, which included a discrepancy between the states of the capitalist and socialist socio-political system, as well as between highly developed countries and developing countries, the inclusion of the principle of active peaceful coexistence in international political practice meant, *inter alia*, the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter such as the prohibition of the use of force or threat of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states, the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of other states, the prohibition of using collective defence agreements to pursue special interests other states, then accepting the obligation to respect basic human rights, including respect for equality and the right of peoples to self-determination, accepting the obligation to resolve international disputes by peaceful means, accepting the duty of advancement of international cooperation and consistent implementation of international obligations. Consequently, the principles of active peaceful coexistence could only meet the needs of those states that demanded an independent and completely equal international position outside of the previous, largely ossified hegemonic and overcome bloc divisions.

After the meeting of the presidents of Yugoslavia, Egypt and India (Tito, Nasser and Nehru) in 1956 in Brioni, when a platform for non-alignment was established outside Asia and Africa, and after a unique speech at the XV session of the UN General Assembly in 1960, there was

a conceptualisation of the idea of joint cooperation in resolving open international issues. Cooperation among the non-aligned countries has since transcended narrow regional frameworks, gaining more and more importance over time at the universal international level. This shift also meant the determination of the non-aligned countries to build and develop their policy towards the world based on the goals and principles of the United Nations, which include more active participation in resolving all open world issues, especially those related to preserving international peace and security, as well as economic, social and cultural progress and development.

From the moment when the goals and methods of non-aligned politics were clearly profiled at the First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in 1961, through a kind of neutrality based not on abstinence or distancing from active participation in international relations, but *vice versa*, active participation in international relations both in times of peace and in times of war, the demands of the non-aligned countries for a positive transformation of the world developed and spread in parallel with the development of the Non-Aligned Movement whose formal institutionalisation began in the early 1970s, to last and develop to this day.

A wide range of issues that the Non-Aligned Movement has faced over the past decades, and which have been discussed additionally more at eighteen conferences of Heads of State or Government: in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) – 1961; in Cairo (Egypt) – 1964; in Lusaka (Zambia) – 1970; in Algiers (Algeria) – 1973; in Colombo (Sri Lanka) – 1976; in Havana (Cuba) – 1979; in New Delhi (India) – 1983; in Harare (Zimbabwe) – 1986; in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) – 1989; in Jakarta (Indonesia) – 1992; in Cartagena (Colombia) – 1995; in Durban (South Africa) – 1998; in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) – 2003; in Havana (Cuba) – 2006; in Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt) – 2009; in Tehran (Iran) – 2012; in Porlamar (Venezuela) – 2016, and in Baku (Azerbaijan) – 2019, can be sublimated to one general question: How to transform the world on a just and democratic basis?

The evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement in the last sixty years, despite occasional crises (the so-called *crisis of continuity and authority*), but also the rise (the so-called *golden age of non-alignment*), indicates that the Movement had a real role in creating and building a new and fairer international order. In this sense, the influence of ideas and doctrines of non-alignment in the domain of international politics demonstrates the progressive power of the Movement, which assimilated universal values

such as striving for independence, equality and self-determination of peoples, then preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly independent states in their struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism, that is, against all kinds of aggression, occupation, racism, domination and torture. In terms of the development and transformation of international economic relations, the strategic orientation of the Non-Aligned Movement was and remains a struggle to bridge the growing tendency for “the rich to become richer and the poor to become poorer”. In this regard, closing the gap between the industrialised North and the underdeveloped South was the leading paradigm in the conception and implementation of the strategy of the New International Economic Order, which under the auspices of the United Nations led to the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. This international legal act, along with other subsequent reform acts adopted at the international level on the initiative or with the active participation of the Non-Aligned Movement, enabled a more successful and non-discriminatory integration of the non-aligned countries into the international division of labour and world economic flows. The non-alignment movement was thus recognised at the universal international level, which was the impetus for its further work on the development and restructuring of international economic relations between developed and developing countries (North-South), and within developing and less developed countries gathered within the South-South platform and the Group of 77. Consequently, the Non-Aligned Movement has become an indispensable instrument of international cooperation which articulates the needs and demands of “Third World” countries to strengthen their economic independence and achieve full economic freedom.

Hence, today, in addition to the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement is the only cohesive political factor that is called to increase the efficiency of its external actions as well as the effectiveness of its internal functioning in achieving world peace and solving the world’s most important political, economic, social and humanitarian problems. Although due to inherited relations in the world, embodied in irreconcilable aspirations of developed and underdeveloped countries and uncoordinated interests of great powers, the Non-Aligned Movement moved away from its original ideas, this does not mean that the Movement did not remain committed to its original goals and principles. The core of his philosophy remained permanent, and the principles that form the basis of his political doctrine remained unchanged. In the new conditions, the idea has matured that the fulfilment of the goals and

principles of the Non-Aligned Movement can be achieved exclusively through the collective strategy of all its member states. Since the 120 member states of the Non-Aligned Movement make up almost two-thirds of the United Nations membership, it is clear that this strategy can be implemented not only by anticipating the new ideological paradigm of multilateral international relations but also by rationalising the use of existing United Nations institutions in the realisation of common goals and principles.

As a legitimate representative of developing countries, the Non-Aligned Movement has the historic task of contributing actively to reaffirming and strengthening the democratic role and place of the United Nations in preserving international peace and security and in promoting the economic and social development of the world. Given the changes that have taken place in international relations since the end of the 20th century, it is clear that for the consistent realisation of such a task, it is first necessary to reform the United Nations, but also to reshape the Non-Aligned Movement itself. The re-actualisation and reactivation of the Non-Aligned Movement, therefore, presupposes a structural and functional reorganisation of the world organisation that would take place in parallel with its institutional transformation that would be more in line with the current political reality. In that sense, the Non-Aligned Movement should be acknowledged, as it has not lost its determination to pay attention to these issues, despite all the turbulence that has befallen the international community since the end of the Cold War.

Finally, the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, especially the principles of peaceful coexistence that have become part of the international legal order, should not be marginalised because these principles remain important in establishing an ideal and more just international community whose values should be shared by all humanity. In this regard, the Republic of Serbia pays special attention to the development of cooperation with the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement as the protagonists of such progressive ideas and goals. This is evidenced by the fact that the Republic of Serbia has launched an initiative to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries. In an effort to use its political prestige gained as the successor state of socialist Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia uses traditional ways of cooperation with the non-aligned countries and "Third World" countries, based on the principles of solidarity, coexistence and mutual respect. It also represents its

comparative advantage and positive determinant in the development of political and economic cooperation with the countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and America, which does not jeopardise its other foreign policy priorities and goals in terms of developing interdependence and integration into European and wider international processes.

In order to expand this foreign policy orientation and to raise the status of the Republic of Serbia to a higher and long-term sustainable level, the Institute of International Politics and Economics from Belgrade (IIPE) prepared a thematic proceeding dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this way, the IIPE makes its modest contribution to the improvement of cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as to the strengthening of the international position and reputation of the Republic of Serbia in international relations.

Last but not least, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the authors of this thematic proceeding for the diligence they have invested in writing articles and analyses dedicated to this important jubilee of the Non-Aligned Movement. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my colleague Dr Jovan Čavoški from the Institute for Recent History of Serbia and the Co-Editor of this thematic proceeding, as well as to the members of the international Editorial Board. I express special gratitude to Professor Branislav Đorđević, Director of the IIPE, for the trust shown in the preparation of this internationally important scientific publication.

Duško Dimitrijević
Editor in Chief

HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT



Naser, Tito, Nehru in Brioni, 1956 (Source: Public domain images)

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAM'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS DURING THE COLD WAR DECADES

Jovan ČAVOŠKI¹

Abstract: This chapter deals with the evolution of the international role of the NAM during the Cold War years, a historical period when the movement's influence was at its apex and its worldwide presence was fully recognised and embraced by both great powers and small countries. The strategic choice of non-alignment, boasting its strong non-bloc credentials and independent streak, had evolved from a loose non-aligned group of the 1960s, which brought together a number of countries on a more ad hoc basis, into a fully-fledged and permanent international organisation that, through overwhelming numbers of its member states and a well-defined global agenda, succeeded in securing the place right at the very centre of world affairs during the 1970s. In many ways, the NAM had become the third pole of international relations during those decades, one aspiring to represent the interests and needs of the world standing between the two blocs while also seeking corresponding advantages in strengthening its individual and collective security and propelling its economic prosperity. Along this arduous path, the NAM would experience many ups and downs, nonetheless, acquiring a more positive and lasting legacy than not.

Key words: non-alignment, the NAM's evolution, the Cold War, security, development.

Introduction

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), officially established at the 1970 Lusaka Conference, also preceded by a less formal non-aligned group which

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had launched its global presence at the 1961 Belgrade Conference, represents one of the significant global political phenomena emerging in the past 60 years – an international organisation encompassing four different continents and the majority of the United Nations (UN) members (120 nowadays), a strong voice of the post-colonial and non-bloc world since 1945, a byproduct of the East-West conflict of the 1950s and 1960s and a chief protagonist of the North-South conflict of the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, the NAM remains one of the major institutional relics of the Cold War today, still very much active and present in world affairs, though with a somewhat diminished global role and influence as compared to the heyday years of the 1960s and 1970s, but, nonetheless, one of the relevant institutional instruments through which the Third World, i.e. Global South, still exercises a tangible collective role in international politics in general and inside the UN in particular. In many ways, these strivings for setting up a non-great power alternative inside the dominant Cold War bipolar structure, as it was the case with the NAM, were primarily driven by a long-standing desire of many lesser powers to launch a comprehensive political and economic overhaul of the existing world order, one that would be ultimately more in line with the needs and aspirations of the post-colonial, non-bloc, and developing nations. On the other hand, what has remained as one of the remarkable features of the NAM, both during the Cold War decades and afterwards, was its significant capacity to, as far as it was possible and not without certain contradictions, absorb and level out many of the outstanding geographical, historical, cultural, religious, political, social, and economic differences between its member states, thus gradually transforming them into an independent collective actor in world affairs, one dedicated to pursuing key global issues, primarily the ones pertaining to the preservation of sovereignty, strengthening of regional and global security, as well as boosting the balanced socio-economic development of the underdeveloped part of the world. However, what really constituted the essential criteria of being a genuinely non-aligned country and becoming a full-NAM member afterwards was the non-bloc character of its international stance, irrespective of all the above-mentioned specific differences.

This article will follow the evolution of the non-aligned group and the subsequent NAM through four distinct phases. The first phase was the one related to the emergence of the non-aligned group in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the convening of the Belgrade Conference, which was the very first non-aligned summit in history and the starting point for the process of the gradual establishment of the movement. The second phase was marked by confrontation and crisis plaguing the non-aligned group, personified in

the struggle for international recognition with the competing Afro-Asian group, especially during the 1964 Cairo Conference, after which the non-aligned group had entered into a protracted crisis until the late 1960s when no major non-aligned events were convened. The central part would be dedicated to the third phase, one encompassing most of the 1970s, the apex years of its global influence, when the NAM was officially established and its general orientation was directed towards the creation of a new world political and especially economic order, thus putting the movement at the very centre of the North-South conflict. The last phase of this period was related to the NAM's protracted internal crisis and rapid decline, mostly coinciding with the end of the Cold War, when the movement, despite many different events being organised at that time, was still not able to effectively tackle major historical changes occurring in the world.

The Emergence of the Non-Aligned Group and the 1961 Belgrade Conference

The downfall of European colonial empires and the parallel rise of the Cold War bipolar world order served as a general background against which sweeping global changes had been introduced, ultimately serving as an impetus for the emergence of a distinctive group of countries actively pursuing non-bloc policies. The sounding majority of these uncommitted nations were post-colonial and underdeveloped ones, Yugoslavia being a notable exception as a bloc renegade and a modestly developed nation, primarily seeking preservation of their political and economic independence from any bloc encroachments, together with an intention of elevating their respective international positions, while also strongly advocating a more just and equitable world order that would eventually prove to be more in line with their basic needs and demands. The egalitarian character of the UN served as useful surroundings for launching any collective actions of these nations while providing them with a stage where they could, on an equal footing, conduct dialogue with the great powers on the issues of preservation of peace, lessening of international tensions, and pursuance of economic modernisation (Tadić, 1976, pp. 50-70). Historically speaking, non-alignment was all in one – a political doctrine, a practical foreign policy orientation, and an international movement, one fully tailored to suit the interests of small and lesser powers in world affairs, providing them with a sense of purpose, certainty, and predictability in their international dealings, thus eventually becoming an instrument for initiating collective actions that any of these nations could not successfully pursue individually on the world

stage. Furthermore, non-alignment was primarily driven by strong opposition to any permanent identification or affiliation with any of the blocs or great powers, as well as by a clear necessity to put up continuous resistance to any external ideological, political or economic subjugation while actively promoting peace, equality, and development in international relations (Petković, 1974, pp. 18-23). Non-alignment was rather a pragmatic, morally neutral concept devoid of any ideological rigidity or dogmatic interpretation, regardless of its strong anti-imperialist and anti-colonial sentiments, mostly stemming from the general perception of insecurity and the overall burden of backwardness characteristic for many non-bloc countries, thus putting preservation of hardly-won independence and maintenance of freedom of action as its paramount goals (Mates, 1970, pp. 78-80). Ideas of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, often embodied in their pan-Asian or pan-African forms, stood at the very foundation of the strategic choice newly liberated countries had made for non-alignment, observing such a foreign policy course as the justification of their intensive aspirations to remain independent and persevere in world affairs. These individual strivings had acquired their collectivist impulses very early on, thus creating institutional precedents for the initial emergence of the non-aligned group and eventually also the NAM. One of them was the Asian Relations Conference convened in soon-to-be independent India in March-April 1947, while also meeting again within this specific format in January 1949 over the issue of the Indonesian independence struggle, where ideas about regional and inter-regional solidarity, as well as non-bloc adherence were already looming large (Jansen, 1966, pp. 51-74, 83-101). Despite being a failed format, this initiative served as a springboard for setting up an Arab-Asian, later on, an Afro-Asian group in the UN, to which Yugoslavia also informally acceded, which acted as a predecessor to the future NAM voting bloc in the international organisation. This was primarily a collective response staged by small and recently liberated countries against the increasing pressure exercised by the great powers continuously seeking alignment with their respective interests, while also this group was offering third-party mediation services to the increasingly hostile blocs, especially during the Korean War (Kimche, 1973, pp. 35-39).

Initially, Afro-Asia was spearheading initiatives for gathering at least some non-aligned countries in one place, although this format often also encompassed countries from both continents which were already nurturing strong political and military ties to the two blocs, thus eventually pushing the non-aligned and Afro-Asian discourses along two different historical tracks. Following stabilisation of the security situation on the continent and

the parallel détente in inter-bloc relations, during their respective meetings in Colombo and Bogor in 1954-55, prime ministers of five Asian nations (India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan) decided to convene the first Asian-African Conference in the Indonesian town of Bandung in April 1955 (Ewing, 2019, pp. 1-19). This was the first groundbreaking summit where leaders of 29 nations from the two continents discussed major international issues and they offered corresponding solutions, a truly defining moment in the history of the Third World when Afro-Asia was largely speaking in one voice. The famous “Ten Principles” adopted in Bandung had left a lasting imprint on Third World politics and non-alignment in general by actively promoting racial and national equality, human rights, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference, wider cooperation, etc. In fact, the summitry format and strong anti-colonial drive had also become something characteristic for the non-aligned discourse afterwards (Dinkel, 2018, pp. 42-83). However, the indiscriminate presence of both bloc and non-bloc countries at this event, poorly defined geographical framework, regional isolationism, playing up of differences between the Afro-Asian majority and “white” minority in world affairs, all contributed to the limited effect the Bandung discourse produced internationally, pushing many authentic non-aligned countries, both on these two continents and beyond, to seek for an alternative format outside these artificially imposed regional and ideological constraints (Čavoški, 2009, pp. 79-80). In fact, Yugoslavia, as a European country, was highly interested in charting a separate collective non-aligned path, different from the Bandung one, which would raise high the non-bloc criteria for participation, as well as stress security and developmental issues, irrespective of the regional adherence of certain nations. In this effort, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito was actively joined by his Indian and Egyptian counterparts, Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser, as it was already demonstrated during the first tripartite meeting they held at the Brioni Isles in July 1956, sometimes nicknamed “Third World’s Yalta”. The three leaders would be charting ways to strengthen cooperation between key non-aligned countries, with Tito and Nasser opting more for a new non-aligned conference and Nehru being largely reluctant to back them up in this respect (Prashad, 2007, pp. 97-100). By the end of the 1950s, relations between the superpowers were at their lowest ebb in years, creating new frictions and additional confrontation in a number of places, like Berlin, Congo, Cuba, Laos, Algeria, etc. As a means of mitigating the burgeoning superpower conflict, five leading non-aligned countries – Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Ghana decided to launch a collective initiative at the 15th UN General Assembly session in

September 1960, aspiring to set off a new round of top-level dialogue between Moscow and Washington with an intention of further lessening already escalating tensions. Despite everything, this seemed like quite an auspicious moment since Cyprus and 16 West and Central African nations had recently gained their independence, thus joining the flock of the non-aligned. With Nehru still being reserved over the feasibility of any collective actions, Tito and Nasser, nonetheless, backed by Indonesian and Ghanaian leaders Ahmed Sukarno and Kwame Nkrumah, headed this diplomatic effort to which the Indian prime minister had to eventually subscribe. Even though the non-aligned resolution, the so-called the "Initiative of the Five", did not ultimately receive enough votes since it was largely subverted by Western diplomatic manoeuvres, it still stood as a clear signal that the role of the non-aligned countries was on the rise and their opinion was being increasingly taken into consideration by other relevant international factors (Bogetić, 2006, pp. 343-348). Regardless of this temporary setback, Tito decided to use his subsequent trip to a number of West and North African countries in early 1961 to feel the pulse of the non-aligned world and garner enough support for convening a new non-aligned conference. This entire initiative fell on right ears, with a number of influential Arab and African leaders, primarily Nasser and Nkrumah, standing firmly behind Tito's idea that the time was ripe enough for the non-aligned nations to hold their first summit, one where they could openly and actively address all pressing world issues. Sukarno, although engaged in his own attempts to have a second Bandung conference first, nonetheless, soon decided to opt for a non-aligned meeting, thus expressing his full backing for the Yugoslav-Egyptian initiative (Bogetić, 2006, pp. 349-362). However, Nehru still held on to his old reservations, considering that the time for a new summit was premature, while any such gatherings, in his mind, could only bring to the surface old divisions existing between many potential participants, thus eventually not rendering any desirable effect on the superpowers. Therefore, Tito's and Nasser's primary task was talking Nehru into finally attending the future summit while also soliciting his constructive contribution to its ultimate success. (Čavoški, 2015, pp. 60-66) When the Preparatory Meeting finally met in Cairo in June, the preliminary list of participants was put together, while the fundamental criteria of non-alignment were effectively laid down, thus clearly establishing a strict benchmark for any future membership, one which would not undergo any significant changes throughout the Cold War period (Jackson, 1983, pp. 43-44). Since the non-aligned were entering the centre stage of world politics, it was natural that the great powers would be quite eager to either influence the final outcome of the forthcoming summit

or at least swaying some of the individual participants in their favour as a means of forestalling any excessive criticism of their respective positions. This was largely the case with the US and the USSR, with the Kennedy administration aspiring to have as many Western-leaning participants in Belgrade as possible while also exercising an influence on some Latin American nations from staying out of this event altogether, namely Brazil. On the other hand, Moscow was primarily interested in the future conference shoring up its position on Berlin, with the unexpected resumption of nuclear tests on the very day of the conference opening serving as Khrushchev's unhidden attempt at stealing Tito's international limelight (Bogetić, 2006, pp. 363-367). As for China, it was primarily interested in holding the second Afro-Asian conference, and it was using Indonesia as its back-channel ally since Beijing could not participate in any non-aligned format as still being formally aligned to Moscow, therefore the bulk of China's criticism was directed against Yugoslavia and its, in their mind, revisionist policies (Čavoški, 2021, pp. 88-90). The Belgrade Conference, as the very first non-aligned summit in history, took place in September 1961, with 25 participants and three observers from four different continents being officially present in the Yugoslav capital. This was a solemn event where, in Tito's words, the "consciousness of mankind" had gathered aspiring to transform themselves from objects into subjects of international affairs, sounding out their own respective position vis-à-vis major world issues that often undermined their own stability and future of the world at large (Government of Yugoslavia, 1964, pp. 17-22). Unlike the conference in Bandung, despite a certain amount of anti-colonial rhetoric still being present, with Sukarno leading the way in this respect, the issues pertaining to the East-West conflict and economic development had gradually gained the upper hand during the general debate, with many non-aligned countries seeking ways to lessen international tensions, while also being inclined to add more economic substance to the discourse on the future of newly liberated countries. Tito was particularly insisting on putting emphasis on this economic dimension of non-alignment, together with securing safer international surroundings, considering them the central issues for the future existence of the non-aligned world. In addition, he also saw this conference as the initial step in stimulating a more permanent and better organised collective action of all non-bloc factors in the world though still short of forming anything resembling an international organisation (Čavoški, 2014, pp. 197-200; Bogetić, 2006, pp. 368-376). In the conference's final documents, issues of peace and development were marked as the paramount responsibility of the entire world, not just the two blocs, and

they were closely mirrored by the proclaimed goals of eradication of imperialism, colonialism, racism, oppression, instability, and inequality, while promotion of wider international cooperation, further adjustments between the bloc and non-bloc actors, as well as peaceful co-existence going beyond just the two dominant socio-economic systems were also put on the same footing. However, the most immediate effect of the Belgrade Conference was the initiation of the dialogue between the blocs and the non-aligned countries over the crucial issues of disarmament and economic development, particularly when the UN 18 Nations Disarmament Committee was set up in 1962 (with 8 neutral and non-aligned members), soon to be followed by the establishment of the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, a platform where the developed and developing countries would equally conduct discussions regarding the potential overhaul of the entire international economic system (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 295-297; Dinkel, 2018, 110-111). As pointed out before, the Belgrade Conference was not the true birthplace of the NAM since the movement was officially established later on, but this was the starting point of a new tide in global history where new alternatives to great power politics, this one primarily being a non-bloc and intercontinental one, had started to forcefully emerge on the world stage, carrying forward the collective voice of this group of nations with respect to some of the central international issues, in parallel also shaping their political consciousness that any joint action might improve their overall position inside the existing international system, with a long-term aim of gradually changing the rules of the current global game. Furthermore, the basic topics of the non-aligned discourse, marking the next 30 years of its evolution, had also been carefully defined in Belgrade, thus making this event the true watershed and a point of origin in the history of global non-alignment, the non-aligned group, and the subsequent NAM.

Confrontation and Crisis

The period until the end of the 1960s represented a specific time for the non-aligned group when only one summit was held, the 1964 Cairo Conference, an ad hoc gathering similar to the one in Belgrade, and there were no other corresponding events until 1970, with only one ministerial conference taking place the year before. This was also a time when a number of core non-aligned leaders had disappeared from the historical scene, some of them passing away due to a shock caused by national defeat (Nehru and Nasser after the wars with China and Israel), while others were overthrown

in a string of military coups, some of them even being sponsored by outside forces (U Nu, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Algerian leader Ben Bella, Malian leader Keita), thus fundamentally transforming the global landscape of non-alignment (Lüthi, 2020, 298-299). These sweeping global changes were also taking place in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the two superpowers were increasingly opting for the spirit of accommodation in bilateral relations, primarily in Europe, while still actively pursuing their respective interests in the Third World, thus increasing their military involvement into that part of the world, like the US intervention in Vietnam, while carefully avoiding any direct confrontation. In this respect, external pressure on different non-aligned countries was on the rise, thus contributing to their increasing internal radicalisation. Besides, further escalation of the Sino-Soviet ideological and political split was also contributing to the rising tensions in Asia and Africa (Leffler, 2007, pp. 182-233). In parallel, a profound political and ideological rift was also emerging among the non-aligned, between the “moderate” and “radical” members of the group, with the first ones (represented by India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt) pursuing moderation, pragmatism, realism, and balance in their dealings with the great powers, also considering issues like peace, security, and economic development as the paramount ones, while the others (represented by Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, also closely backed by China) advocated a relentless crusade against imperialism, colonialism, and oppression represented in the face of Western powers, thus gradually eroding the non-bloc character of non-alignment in favour of militant escapades directed at convening second Bandung in the place of another non-aligned conference. (Čavoški, 2021, pp. 92-94; Lüthi, 2020, pp. 298-299) In time, this period would mark the final conceptual divorce between the distinct regionalist “Afro-Asianist” path initiated in Bandung and the specific non-aligned independent course shaped and galvanised in Belgrade.

Before and especially after India’s defeat in the border war with China in late 1962, Indonesia, strongly backed by China, had started actively pushing for convening another Afro-Asian conference that would, since it would raise high the banner of dedicated struggle against imperialism and colonialism, make the competing non-aligned conference format, one marked by less militant spirit, largely redundant and ultimately obsolete. In this respect, both Jakarta and Beijing were intensively trying to gain wider consent from different Asian and African nations, dispatching numerous high-profile delegations, like Premier Zhou Enlai’s major Africa tour in 1963-64 that would lobby for a new regional gathering during these official visits (Zhou, 2019, pp. 145-149). This kind of activity had triggered great concerns

in India and Yugoslavia. Both of them then engaged in a conflict with China since Beijing and its allies would obviously dominate any new regional format, while Yugoslavia, as a European country, would be completely left out from any conference encompassing only these two continents. Therefore, these two core non-aligned nations, also enjoying overt Egyptian support, had become ardent proponents of the new Belgrade-type conference considering it the only format authentically representing the interests of non-bloc nations (Čavoški, 2021, pp. 95-98). This race for convening either of these two conferences first would almost split the non-aligned world in half, causing great harm to the general cause, also casting a shadow of a doubt whether non-alignment with its less militant and more pragmatic approach was still the adequate means of constructing a new role for the post-colonial nations under existing international conditions. Strangely enough, both the US and the USSR stood in favour of the new non-aligned conference since none of the superpowers was quite keen on seeing Beijing taking control over the Third World. In order to outmanoeuvre its competitor, leaders in Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt had found a way to skilfully adopt some of the "Afro-Asianist" discourse regarding anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and carefully merging it with non-alignment demands for strengthening peace, increasing international stability, and promoting economic modernisation. This new diplomatic tactic was also accompanied by demands for expanded participation of as many non-bloc countries as possible, from four different continents, thus largely offsetting any potential "radical" regionalist takeover of the non-aligned gathering (Jansen, 1966, pp. 363-383). The Cairo Conference was convened in October 1964, with 47 full participants and 10 observers attending this event. Right from the start, the above-mentioned conceptual conflict had come to the forefront, with Tito and Sukarno embodying these two increasingly conflicting approaches, thus triggering a heated debate between them on the role of peaceful co-existence in international affairs and whether it was possible to maintain constructive relations with the great powers, while also striving for the preservation of individual interests and gradually pushing forward the specific non-aligned agenda. Sukarno was convinced that the global rules were fundamentally rigged and newly liberated nations had to struggle with arms for their rightful place in the Cold War world order. For Tito, this was indeed a dangerous line of thinking since it clearly implied imposing a new racial and class division on the world which would substitute the existing ideological blocs – the poor against the rich, coloured against the white or similar. In the end, with certain adjustments made as a concession to African countries with respect to the struggle against imperialism and colonialism since for them

that was a more real threat than a nuclear war, it was basically Tito's line that had succeeded in gaining the upper hand at this summit, thus creating a more or less general consensus on all major topics by creating a tentative linkage between the two concepts. Nevertheless, both Yugoslavia and Indonesia had also become aware that not everything they were advocating was acceptable to all participants. Therefore, compromises were painfully necessary, while the non-aligned group still remained a loose and non-permanent form of mutual cooperation (Bogetić, 2019, pp. 115-128). The evident success of the Cairo Conference, regardless of many of its limitations, together with the continuous postponement of the Afro-Asian conference, which ultimately never took place, clearly indicated that the non-aligned discourse, with its specific set of ideas and values, had remained the only viable framework for joint political action of all forces standing outside the blocs. Nevertheless, this intensive struggle between the two conference models had largely exhausted the vitality of the non-aligned group, shifted its focus, and dimmed its prospects, thus compelling many nations to reduce their enthusiasm for launching any new global initiatives. The obvious failure of the non-aligned Vietnam War mediation stood as a stark reminder of the lack of resourcefulness these nations suffered from in the years following the Cairo Summit (Rakove, 2013, pp. 225-231). For almost five years after that event, the non-aligned group underwent a profound organisational and ideological crisis which resulted in no new non-aligned gatherings being summoned, with many new initiatives for collective action experiencing lack in wider response or readiness to engage beyond only verbal messages. The internal turmoil in many non-aligned countries, one that swept away from the historical scene many prominent leaders, wedded together to this total diplomatic paralysis of the entire group, seemed to indicate that non-alignment was experiencing increasing irrelevance (Westad, 2005, pp. 107-108; Lüthi, 2020, 300-302). While the superpowers were slowly constructing détente that would start dominating global affairs during the 1970s, the Third World was entering a period of rising instability and expanded bloc interventionism. Besides the escalation of the Vietnam War that locked the attention of both Washington and Moscow to Asia, Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel, one also closely associated with the superpower policies in the region, had produced a destructive effect on the cohesion and future of the non-aligned group, since after those tragic events Nasser was forced to seek protection under the Soviet tutelage, expressing less and less interest in spearheading any new non-aligned initiatives or organising any new major events of that sort. Yugoslavia and India were quite disturbed with such negative developments that had fractured the very core of global non-

alignment, while their individual attempts at mediating this new conflict in the Middle East also proved to be without any durable effect, further contributing to Nasser's growing isolation from other non-aligned countries (Bogetić, Životić, 2010, 131-209). Under the influence of the deteriorating situation in the Third World, Yugoslavia decided to launch its own initiative for convening another non-aligned summit in 1968, one that would address all key international issues, especially the ones pertaining to inequality and problems of economic development, thus also introducing new vigour into the group, while also serving as a potential incentive to different disenchanted bloc allies around the world into eventually defecting into the non-aligned flock. This entire idea was greeted with significant enthusiasm in countries like India, Ethiopia, Zambia and others, but there was still not enough willingness present to transform this kind of verbal eagerness into any concrete action (DAMSPS, PA, 1968, f-145, 418435). Therefore, Yugoslavia, India, and Ethiopia decided to assume leadership and actively court a few dozen non-aligned countries into holding at least a consultative meeting in 1969 since that would signal to the rest of the world that the non-aligned alternative was still very much alive and active, even if a new summit was not at hand. Without such an event taking place, irrespective of its true scope or relevance, global non-alignment would have totally lost its credibility and continuity, and very soon it would have ceased to exist (TNA, FCO 28/868). This first major event since the Cairo Conference was the Belgrade Consultative Meeting in July 1969, where representatives of 44 non-aligned countries and 7 observers, actively strived to define a new platform for collective action, one primarily dealing with stabilisation and democratisation of international relations, creation of a more equitable and just world economic system, together with the stressed centrality of the UN as the crucial forum where different non-aligned initiatives could be successfully presented and ultimately implemented by becoming binding for all member states, including the great powers (Institute, 1970, pp. 29-174). Although this was a meeting of a limited impact, without a new summit being anywhere near on the horizon, nonetheless, this new gathering reaffirmed the vitality and continuity of non-alignment, raising its international profile again, thus also emphasising, even more, the permanent character of this still informal group of nations. In fact, that was Yugoslavia's chief contribution in this respect, bringing non-alignment out of a protracted internal crisis that could have ultimately proved to be fatal, even before the NAM was officially established. Soon enough, it was decided to hold the next summit in the Zambian capital Lusaka in September 1970, announcing a

major comeback for the non-aligned option in world affairs, now transforming itself into a fully-fledged international organisation.

The Golden Years of the NAM

During the 1970s, the world at large was undergoing fundamental political, economic, and social changes that had created an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, not only at the level of superpower interactions, like the initiation of an inter-bloc détente, but also in the domain of relations between the developed and developing nations as part of the general trend of creating more stable and prosperous societies. In many ways, unlike in the previous period, the spirit of cooperation, irrespective of its scope and goals, while encompassing all members of the international community, was also permeating international relations in many areas, leaving the ominous shadow of nuclear confrontation in the past, at least in a more general sense, since regional conflicts affecting some non-aligned countries were still widely present (Garthoff, 1994, pp. 27-73, 227-294, 325-403). While the superpowers were reaching accommodation at the strategic level, gradually reducing tensions in the world, the non-aligned were also undergoing a transformation from a loose group of nations perceiving non-alignment only as a verbal conceptualisation of a practical foreign policy course into a globally recognised and institutionalised movement that perceived non-alignment as a sovereign international doctrine following a set of well-defined ideas and principles. Besides, during this period, the NAM was also rearranging its global agenda along these new lines, going well beyond the issues dominating the discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, such as bipolar confrontation and decolonisation, thus shifting its focus more to economic and developmental problems, preaching of the restructuring of the existing world economic system as to serve more the needs of the underrepresented majority, while also advocating tighter political and economic integration of the Global South (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 429-436, 446-451). This rising trend among the non-aligned primarily directed at completing the movement's institutionalisation, promoting continuity, and emphasising economic orientation as its new strategic goal was already evident during the Preparatory Meeting for the Lusaka Summit held in Dar-es-Salaam in April 1970, when Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere publicly proclaimed that socio-economic development should dominate the non-aligned agenda from then afterwards, but one primarily relying upon collective self-reliance represented in the radical expansion and diversification of South-South relations, namely through boosting economic

and technical cooperation and exchanges between the developing and non-aligned countries themselves, while also carefully introducing collective protective economic mechanisms from any future predatory encroachments of the industrialised world (Nyerere, 1970). Such new developments would become even more evident during the fourth summit in Lusaka in September 1970, when 54 attendees and 10 observers largely debated issues pertaining to the non-aligned countries themselves, like independence, development, and self-reliance, as well as the future of the movement, while major global issues, like bloc confrontation, arms race, and world peace, would continue to loom large in the background but without ever taking the front seat in any deliberations. The general economic orientation of the movement was strongly reiterated again, while the first permanent institutions of the NAM were then established, like the Standing Committee, more a technical than a political body representing the movement on the world stage, which served as a catalyst for the perpetuation of the continuity of action now personified in regular summits being held every three years, with ministerial conferences also being convened in the meantime (NAI, MEA, WII/128(2)/70). Essentially, only after Lusaka, we can mention an organised international institution and not any time before, while the NAM was rapidly transforming itself into an agency of the North-South and not only the East-West conflict as it used to be the case, with principles like collective self-reliance, agreed the programme of action, and raising high the overall moral authority acting as propellants of any future activities, particularly inside the UN. Therefore, further institutionalisation, as well as strengthening of any collective mechanisms for launching corresponding actions, had become the guiding thought of any new undertakings assumed by the NAM in the following years (DAMSPS, PA, 1971, f-190, 44854). In many ways, a significant shift in leadership was also occurring during this period, with Yugoslavia and India still preserving their somewhat special position inside the NAM, although often being compelled to share their leadership responsibilities with others, while Egypt was participating at a reduced capacity due to its active involvement in the Middle Eastern conflict, similar to countries like Indonesia and Ghana, while some other African nations, primarily Algeria, Zambia, and Tanzania, as well as some Asian and Latin American ones, like Sri Lanka or Cuba, were also gaining more weight, influence, and respect inside the movement (CREST, CIA-RDP85T00875R001500020044-2). While directing the bulk of its efforts into pursuing this new economic agenda of restructuring the world system, the NAM was also dedicated to promoting global détente as a more universal endeavour, one that would, as they perceived it, went well beyond the two

blocs and it would produce a lasting impact on all other nations in the world, thus correspondingly strengthening international security and boosting economic prosperity, while gradually breaking up the existing global status quo that very much petrified the current level of inequality between the developed and developing nations (DAMSPS, PA, 1972, f-142, 424377). This line of thinking was very much present during the Ministerial Meeting in the Guyanese capital Georgetown in August 1972, a first major event after the Lusaka Conference, one not only dedicated to the preparations for the next summit in Algiers. In fact, the NAM was then seriously deliberating international situation, searching for ways in which it could successfully expand the superpower détente into other regions of the world, while in parallel also strengthening the role of the UN where the great powers could be still held accountable for any of their actions and where the collective action capacity of the NAM could produce the most tangible effect on both blocs. In addition, at this gathering a comprehensive programme for a more intensive economic cooperation among the non-aligned and developing countries was charted, one that would produce a clear set of guidelines and a list of specific measures, more concrete than the ones adopted at Lusaka, that would directly assist the NAM in its struggle for the top-to-bottom overhaul of the international economic system (Bogetić, 2019, pp. 219-230). Even during the preparations for the Algiers Summit, it had become evident to different observers and participants that this event would become another watershed moment in NAM's evolution, a true "conference of action", largely driven by an overarching idea of reshaping the NAM into an effective tool of the non-bloc and developing countries in their continuous efforts to vociferously oppose hegemonic activities of both blocs. This was a specific moment when new, more adequate and more efficient means of staging any collective undertakings would be implemented to guarantee a more viable and enduring political and especially economic co-existence between the developed and developing worlds. The Algerian side was particularly interested in utilising this event as a stage where the account for incessant Third World pauperisation and suffocating backwardness would be unanimously presented to the Global North as a new incentive for re-launching the global dialogue which had remained stalled at different UNCTAD sessions (DAMSPS, PA, 1973, f-132, 432576). When the Algiers Conference finally took place in September 1973, already 75 nations attended as full members, with many others being present as observers and guests, thus making this event the largest congregation of nations after the UNGA. Essentially, the process of NAM's institutionalisation, initiated at Lusaka, was finally completed during this summit, when the Coordinating Bureau

(CB) was founded as a kind of its executive body, while the political and economic goals of the movement were better ascertained or even redefined, thus stimulating additional concentration of all non-aligned resources through establishing new mechanisms of mutual cooperation and coordination. In many ways, one of NAM's major assets, its undeniable moral strength, was then transformed into a more concrete one, embodied not only in the overwhelming numbers in the UN but also present in the immediate control many members exercised over key raw materials, like oil or similar (AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/15; Bogetić, 2019, pp. 243-264). These strivings were encapsulated in the new concept launched at this event – the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a call for the establishment of a more balanced, inclusive, and mutually beneficial world order, one closely linking security and economic issues, diminishing foreign interference and inequality, recognising sovereign rights of all nations, while also being more attuned to the needs of its most deprived members, who were themselves continuously subjected to unfair trading practises by the developed world (Prashad, 2007, pp. 67-70; Dinkel, 2018, pp. 202-204). The NIEO would represent the most serious structural challenge posed to the Western economic hegemony in the 20th century, one that would, despite its eventual failure, rock the very foundations of the post-war economic and financial system and try to shift the balance between the Global North and Global South more in favour of the latter one, thus promoting a more profound and diversified level of socio-economic interdependence and tighter international integration between these two major parts of the world (Garavini, 2012, pp. 174-183). One event which served as a direct trigger for restarting the global dialogue between the developed and developing worlds was the OPEC oil embargo introduced as a response to the next Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, subsequently causing the worldwide economic crisis, recession, inflation, and significant drop in industrial production. This precarious turn of events only demonstrated that the developing world had also gained its muscles, particularly in the sphere where it still maintained leverage – raw materials, thus gradually starting to dictate some of its own terms to the Global North (Venn, 2002, pp. 7-21, 154-163). As a means of taking over the global initiative while the West was still recuperating from this shock, the NAM decided to call for the 6th UNGA Special Session in April 1974 where the economic and developmental issues, especially raw materials and inequalities, would be discussed in-depth, thus further promoting Third World economic solidarity vis-à-vis the developed world, while the struggle for a new face of the world economic system would be only intensified, especially by setting up fresh international

financial institutions. The NIEO was globally introduced at this event through two concurrent UNGA resolutions (TNA, FCO 59/1231). Naturally, such demands for an obvious redistribution of the global wealth were bound to stir trouble among the industrialised powers, forcing the US and its allies to close in the ranks and try to adamantly oppose any such initiatives, perhaps not on all accounts but the majority of them definitely, while also trying to drive a wedge between the rich and poor non-aligned countries. Since the NAM was acting more and more as a disciplined voting bloc in the UN, this caused even more frustration in Washington since it was contributing to the growing US isolation in this international institution (Garavini, 2012, pp. 215-224). This newly found strength in numbers was already evident during the 29th UNGA session when, through the overwhelming majority of NAM votes, the PLO was accorded an observer status, while South Africa, due to its apartheid policies, was expelled from this body, regardless of harsh Western criticism of both these moves (DAMSPS, PA, 1974, f-174, 461984). Even though the Western powers were gradually consolidating their former grip on the world economy, it seemed as if the NAM was still on the offensive, almost at the tipping point of radically changing the existing world order. During the Ministerial Conference in the Peruvian capital Lima in August 1975, the movement had again proclaimed its strong commitment to the full implementation of the NIEO, concurrently extending its hand of cooperation and conciliation to the developed world. However, a majority of the NAM members also denounced any outside accusations that the nationalisation of natural resources in the Third World stood at the origins of the current economic crisis, thus emphasising that the dominant position of the developed world, its obvious lack of enthusiasm or willingness for extending additional assistance, easing the debt burden or sharing the responsibilities for running the world economy were more to be blamed for such an outcome than any other reasons. This conference also radically redefined and expanded areas of South-South cooperation while also establishing the new NAM bodies that would deal with issues such as raw materials or mutual financial assistance (AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/20; Bogetić, 2019, pp. 329-336). The NAM's clear position and different active measures also significantly influenced the Western position during the 7th UNGA Special Session in September 1975, when the developed countries proved to be more prone to offering some tangible concessions on a number of issues but still without tackling the more fundamental ones, thus essentially waiting for the non-aligned to lose some of their initial momentum and start to doubt their own strength (DAMSPS, PA, 1975, f-198, 443405). On the other hand, besides these

attempts at implementing the NIEO, at that time, the NAM also launched another significant global initiative that aimed at restructuring the great power monopoly on information collection and broadcasting, thus creating a new pool of non-aligned news agencies that would supplement the work of their major counterparts in the North (AP, AFP, UPI, Reuters, DPA, TASS), which eventually heralded the so-called “New International Information Order” (NIIO) actively promoted by countries like Yugoslavia and India (Dinkel, 2018, pp. 196-201). Due to all these complex international developments, as well as the concurrent completion of the national-liberation struggle in Indochina and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the Colombo Conference in August 1976, together with its 86 full members attending, with more than two dozen observers and guests also being present, seemed like a prime moment for the NAM in global affairs, while moderation and spirit of cooperation largely permeated the discussion. This was a summit where the direct link between the political and economic dimensions of international relations was stressed even more, with the NIEO standing at the forefront of a struggle for the general overhaul of the entire world order in which the non-great power alternative would legitimately exist alongside the two blocs and other great powers. Nevertheless, all participants agreed that more needed to be done in order for such a radical idea to eventually become a reality, especially in the sphere of reshaping the global trading rules and the reorganisation of global production. In this respect, the new movement’s bodies dealing with different economic issues were set up, while the CB membership was also significantly expanded to make the NAM more adept at rapid responses to sudden changes in the international situation. On the other hand, this summit was also the very first time when the results of the superpower *détente* were openly brought into question, considering them as being put only into service of immediate interests of the superpowers and not the wider world (AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/26; Bogetić, 2019, pp. 359-378).

The second half of the 1970s was clearly marked by the deteriorating situation in the superpower dealings, which eventually resulted in the total dissolution of *détente* by the end of that decade and the initiation of a new intensive round of bloc confrontation. Not only that superpower interventionism, direct or proxy one, was on the rise in places like Indochina, Angola, Ethiopia, Lebanon, South Yemen, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, but conflicts between the non-aligned countries themselves, especially territorial ones, were also escalating in many different regions, particularly in Africa, thus also affecting the NAM’s unity and cohesion, while also adding another nail into the coffin of global *détente*. (Garthoff, 1994, pp. 623-685, 732-824,

829-912) As for the movement itself, while it was still rapidly expanding its membership and convening a growing number of events, it was also undergoing increasing internal destabilisation as part of these different bilateral conflicts, thus signalling NAM's decreasing effectiveness on the world stage and its incapacity to timely react to these new developments. This negative trend was also accompanied by rising factionalism between the "moderate" and "radical" members, with the first group striving to preserve the movement's original non-bloc orientation, while the latter ones, both leftist and rightist ones, were opting for closer alignment of the NAM with one of the two blocs. Since the US was experiencing a strategic retreat at that time, while the Soviets were gaining ground in different parts of the world, the leftist faction (Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen and others) was correspondingly gaining strength while trying to refashion the NAM into becoming a "natural ally" of the Soviet bloc (Singham, Hume, 1986, pp. 167-171). These attempts at taking control over the movement by a small group of radicalised nations, openly leaning towards one bloc, would trigger a serious conflict between the two factions for leadership, with Yugoslavia and Cuba standing at the helm of each side, especially since the next summit was scheduled to be held in Havana (NARA, RG 59, CFPF, 1973-1979, ET, 1978USUNN01534). This profound internal crisis of the NAM, manifesting itself in the shape of decreasing levels of mutual solidarity, spurring many dilemmas about the basic goals, fundamental character, and general practices of the movement, often resulted in different countries opting more for passivity and maintaining a low profile, thus in return creating a significant breach a group of proactive countries could then try to utilise and to impose its own agenda on others, while concurrently assuming more direct control over the entire organisation. At the same time, this sombre scenario could have also triggered a harsh Western response in which the NAM members close to the US could strive for splitting the movement in order to save it from Soviet domination, with Cuba acting even more radically in response to that, thus spelling the effective end of the movement (DAMSPS, PA, 1978, f-187, 427404). These were worrisome tendencies indeed, which largely preoccupied countries like Yugoslavia, India, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Egypt, Zambia, Tanzania, Indonesia and many others. The Ministerial Conference in Belgrade in July 1978, although expected to become a showdown between the Yugoslav and Cuban delegations, finally ended in a tentative compromise more along the Yugoslav lines, reaffirming again the basic principles of non-alignment, regardless of the fact that ideological polarisation was not fully removed from the non-aligned ranks. In fact, the

majority of members had emphasised once again the non-bloc and independent character of the NAM, with less emphasis being put on the anti-imperialist struggle as the Cubans aspired (AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a/30; Bogetić, 2019, pp. 443-456). Nevertheless, a new trial of strength between Yugoslavia and Cuba was scheduled for the Havana Summit, with Belgrade somewhat altering its overall diplomatic tactics by transforming the Yugoslav-Cuban bilateral confrontation into a wider conflict between the respective Cuban ideological agenda and the silent majority of the NAM over the movement's fundamental principles. On the other hand, Cuba also intended to present itself to the wider public as being far more constructive than before, but behind the scenes, it was also pedalling even harder in promoting the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial essence of the movement (DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-184, 47123). This new round of confrontation especially manifested itself during the discussion over "Agenda Item 15", an attempt at improving the decision-making process inside the NAM and the CB by implementing more the spirit of democracy, openness, and solidarity, thus further limiting the role of Cuba's future chairmanship, while also expanding the executive role and membership of the CB over which Havana could not assume control after the summit (DAMSPS, PA, 1979, f-205, 423375). Despite growing concerns and a somewhat pessimistic atmosphere among many members, it was becoming increasingly evident that the summit agenda was shifting more in the direction of the "moderate" group. The Havana Conference in September 1979, with 92 full members and dozens of observers and guests being present, was the last major international event attended by Tito who, despite his advanced age and feeble health, decided to travel across the globe in order to ensure that the movement would survive him in the same pristine condition as it had been before, especially since both superpowers were overtly trying to influence the proceedings and outcome of this event. Tito then served as a rallying point for the entire "moderate" group, also succeeding in patching up some of the differences with Castro right on the eve of the summit (Petrović, 2010, 263-269). Nevertheless, in their respective speeches, both Castro and Tito were still pursuing their own lines of argument regarding the NAM's present and future, although without any zeal expressed to impose their own views on other participants, which was, despite everything, bound to stir certain controversies among other speakers. However, despite an unsuccessful attempt at materialising the "radical" onslaught, the sounding majority of participating leaders opted for Tito's ideas, openly backing his agenda, while also sidelining some other attempts at redirecting summit deliberations. Even when it came to the drafting of final documents, the

Cubans were compelled to seek compromises with countries like Yugoslavia, India, Algeria and many others, thus bringing more balance into their content, both in a political and economic sense. In general, the majority of participants ultimately succeeded in reiterating the independent, non-bloc, and democratic character of the NAM, while successfully sidelining the Cuban thesis on the “natural alliance” and revolutionary character of the movement (NAI, MEA, HI/162/11/79; Bogetić, 2019, pp. 499-526). Nevertheless, this confrontation between the two factions in the movement had largely drained out its vitality and purposefulness at one of the most dangerous moments in recent history when the superpower conflict was raging again, even though the Cuban chairmanship assiduously tried to maintain a more reserved and balanced approach to the NAM affairs. Since Tito soon passed away, thus ending the “golden years” of non-alignment, many feared that Cuba would use that rare opportunity to try to impose its own views again, but that did not happen either. Neither Castro nor the movement had any strength to wage a new round of struggle over the issue which had already become an outmoded one. Cuba’s open endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a NAM member, primarily a result of Havana’s significant dependence on Moscow, eventually did more to harm Cuban prospects inside the movement than any Tito’s undertakings ever could. All in all, the movement was entering a period of a comprehensive crisis from which it would be very hard to extricate itself.

Crisis and Decline

The onset of the Second Cold War, as well as the growing conceptual rift between the different NAM members, had soon plunged the movement into further disarray, increasingly contributing to its decline in world affairs throughout the 1980s. While the international political and economic situation was on a downward spiral, with the calls for the NIEO remaining effectively dead in the face of an emerging neoliberal alternative of free markets, foreign investments, and private initiatives, many non-aligned countries had started to seek individual solutions to their own problems, especially with respect to bilateral conflicts, acting well outside the NAM’s scope, thus signalling a serious loss of confidence in movement’s ability to find adequate solutions. This complicated nexus of external and internal pressures largely contributed to NAM’s subsequent unwillingness to take the lead, spurring growing pessimism among its many members, thus clearly indicating that the movement had lost much of its original orientation

and penchant to act as an independent global mediator (Westad, 2005, pp. 334-338, 357-362; Prashad, 2007, pp. 245-259). Many influential members were already openly talking about “fragmentation”, “dislocation” or “regression” of the movement, labelling the early 1980s as the most serious crisis the NAM was facing in the previous 20 years (DAMSPS, PA, 1980, f-217, 416387). Therefore, since many concrete issues could still trigger new disagreements between different member states, renewed insistence on the global context could have served as a means in redefining and reinventing the long-term goals of the movement, gradually introducing more balance into its handling of global, regional, and local interests pursued by individual members, thus ultimately revitalizing non-alignment and the NAM and correspondingly strengthening the role of the “moderate” wing (DAMSPS, PA, 1980, f-178, 49458). This has been particularly true since the Cuban chairmanship, due to Havana’s open support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was facing a growing deadlock and Cuba was no longer able to bridge this chasm in a constructive way that could preserve the movement’s unity and purpose unscathed. For the majority of the NAM members, great power interventionism had become the greatest threat to the very existence of particular countries, with Cuba continuously pushing justified grievances under the carpet, thus preventing the NAM to fully exercise its mandate and reach a meaningful consensus. This only further contributed to NAM’s growing paralysis (DAMSPS, PA, 1981, f-202, 41251). Even though it could not resolve many of the existing controversies, the Ministerial Conference in New Delhi in February 1981 still managed to push the NAM back from the brink of dissolution, somewhat minimising the damage, and levelling out some of the disagreements, while also reintroducing a certain level of accommodation into mutual dealings, at least with respect to specific issues (Jain, 2000, pp. 244-252). While the NAM was still trying to facilitate de-escalation between the superpowers, together with promoting a new agenda pertaining to the issues of security and development, the Iran-Iraq War, the bloodiest conflict between the two non-aligned countries during the 1980s, had become the greatest obstacle not only to the unhindered functioning of the movement but also to the successful organisation of the next summit which was originally planned to be held in Baghdad. Furthermore, countries like Yugoslavia, India, Sri Lanka, Algeria and many others clearly aimed at transforming the next summit into an event where four years of a protracted internal crisis would finally end, thus bringing the NAM back to its original track (DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-159, 421223). It took a lot of diplomatic haggling throughout 1982 to induce Iraq to renounce its credentials as a host and transfer them to India,

with Yugoslavia and Cuba leading the way in holding direct negotiations with the Iraqi leadership and offering corresponding incentives to save their faces and accept a compromise (DAMSPS, PA, 1982, f-160, 439929). In many ways, the strength of the “radicals” had clearly started to fade away, while India’s future chairmanship seemed to offer a much-desired opportunity for the “moderates” to significantly reduce tensions between the conflicting factions, thus creating some breathing space for initiating the revitalisation of the movement. In fact, India opted for the middle-of-the-road tactics directed at creating a meaningful consensus that would keep any radical proposals out of the summit proceedings and final documents while holding steadfast with respect to some of the more fundamental issues. It seemed to different participants that the New Delhi Conference, held in March 1983, was the last chance for ending the protracted crisis and restoring some of the international prestige the NAM used to have. In her opening speech, Indira Gandhi was emphasising points on which the majority of participants could easily agree. She emphasised the basic values and strategic goals of the movement (peace, independence, security, development), while she dedicated most of her attention to the economic issues as still being the central ones for the future of the NAM and the developing world in general, thus bringing back the constructive discussion to the ideas previously promoted at the Colombo Summit. Many of the old political and economic messages of the previous summits were reiterated again in the final documents, with the stress being laid on the issue of interdependence, implying equal participation of big and small, rich and poor countries in running the world, while the Third World indebtedness was particularly singled out as the key factor leading to its excessive instability (DAMSPS, PA, 1983, f-153, 411263). India’s subsequent chairmanship had managed to restore balance into NAM’s ideas and practices, moderation had become the mainstream once again, and fundamental principles had been reaffirmed again, with the radicalisation drive initiated in the late 1970s effectively ending. This sudden shift in NAM’s posture had succeeded in preserving the movement’s unity and continuity, saving it from an almost imminent withering away although its previous dynamism had still remained diminished. Nevertheless, many of the pressing global challenges needed to be properly addressed by the movement to secure its future progress (Singham, Hume, 1986, pp. 330-335). On some occasions, India was often acting timidly, trying to avoid any new internal splits or adverse superpower reactions, but such an approach only led the NAM into further stagnation, justifying the sense of helplessness among many members. The NAM meetings were being regularly held, producing different documents,

but no corresponding action ever came out of these gatherings. In many ways, the NAM had started to lag behind major world events, failing to formulate a strong and coordinated response with respect to different conflicting situations. The “radicals” from both sides were still launching attempts at turning the tables on others, although without achieving any tangible success, while the dominant “moderate” majority had lost the willpower to act regardless of any extreme opposition (Jain, 2000, pp. 262-268; Dinkel, 2018, 238-242). Despite seminal changes taking place in the world with the initiation of the high-level dialogue between the superpowers after Gorbachev’s ascendancy to power, the NAM was still mired in old ideas, not fully comprehending what was taking place around it, very much losing its old momentum, as well as its capability to innovate and adapt to the world of the future. Many members were just passively going along with the current, being aware that beyond the NAM there were no similar organisations representing their collective interests, while, on the other hand, they had also become painfully aware that the movement was no longer acting as the chief advocate or protector of their individual needs. This situation was more than evident during the Harare Conference in September 1986 when there were no new members joining the NAM, far fewer heads of state were present, while the superpowers were almost totally ignoring this event. Furthermore, for the very first time, it was not ascertained where the next summit would be held, leaving that decision to be made in the future (Rajan, 1990, pp. 85-104). Yugoslavia, although experiencing profound internal crisis by the end of that decade, still accepted to host the next summit in Belgrade in 1989, aspiring to find new ways in which the NAM would reinvent its global role beyond the Cold War world, integrate itself more successfully into an emerging world order, while also establishing a new social, economic, humanitarian, and ecological paradigm for the movement, one revolving around issues like sustainable development and further global integration in terms of markets, capital flows, and technology transfers. In fact, particular stress was laid by the Yugoslavs on environmental issues, ones equally affecting both the developed and developing worlds, thus finding a new common denominator for rebooting the North-South dialogue. By that time, the old rallying cry of the NIEO was laid to rest (Srivastava, 1995, pp. 125-131). Due to such new pragmatic guidelines, the NAM has managed to prolong its existence until nowadays, with nine more summits following the one in Belgrade, experiencing many ups and downs along the way, still striving to redefine its global presence in the post-Cold War world, one being clearly marked by both the unipolar moment of the US and growing multipolarity

gradually supplanting it. Only the future will tell which path the NAM would take in the following years, one of a newly found dynamism or growing irrelevance, primarily taking into account the rapidly changing international situation, as well as the game-changing economic and political rise of different nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that would gradually start to dominate the international landscape.

Conclusions

As we have seen in this chapter, the NAM's international role during the Cold War decades should not be observed as either an epic narrative where the Third World was successfully struggling against the West, nor should it be treated as an outright failure without any corresponding achievements as it has been usually presented from the vantage point of the post-Cold War years. It is fair to say that the movement, during the decades at stake, had undergone many ups and downs, experiencing both successes and failures, often circulating between the East-West and North-South conflicts, stressing the political or socio-economic issues depending on the global situation, with different member states assuming the leadership role in accordance with the specific historical circumstances. Despite these evident fluctuations, the NAM was still one of the major multilateral political phenomena that had left a lasting imprint on world history after 1945, side-by-side with the superpower blocs. In fact, one of NAM's key achievements during that period was the successful completion of the process of decolonisation, together with the socio-economic agenda becoming the central topic of the non-bloc and developing worlds, especially with respect to issues like building a more democratic, just, and egalitarian world order that would eventually eradicate poverty, underdevelopment, and social insecurity. Until nowadays, these have remained the chief aspiration of the Global South. In essence, NAM's lessons from the Cold War period have not outlived their usefulness in today's world, with many developing nations rapidly losing confidence in any potential alignments with the great powers, while pursuing independent foreign policy and boosting South-South cooperation has still remained their clear priority as it used to be the case in the past, together with the UN preserving its role as the centre stage for any new initiatives being launched by these countries. Furthermore, maintaining a viable multilateral alternative outside the UN framework might seem like a winning ticket for the NAM in finding its new role in the 21st century.

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JOSIP BROZ TITO AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: In the present paper, the author examines the evolution of the foreign policy orientation of socialist Yugoslavia at the very beginning of the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. The analysis uses primary and secondary sources, based on which it can be concluded that the foreign policy stance of Yugoslavia in the time of Josip Broz Tito had a clear ideological basis to answer the key problems of the then world. At the same time, Yugoslavia had the political power to actively and peacefully take over the role of a leader in a movement whose outlines were only in sight at the time of the Belgrade Summit of non-aligned countries. At that moment, non-alignment seemed to the author to be “politics with the future”.

Key words: Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the Non-Aligned Movement, foreign policy.

Introduction

In September 1961, the Yugoslav State and Party leadership viewed the future with optimism. Both the East and the West respected Yugoslavia's borders and its territorial integrity and tolerated its foreign policy, albeit somewhat begrudgingly. What was the essence of this foreign policy with regard to Asia and Africa? Judging by Josip Broz Tito's political speeches and statements, Yugoslavia's foreign policy posture, which possessed clear ideological bias, was founded on several important premises:

- That the belief in the ability of the Great Powers to find a peaceful solution to the key problems of the post-war world was a delusion;

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- That it was erroneous to dismiss “small” and especially “non-engaged” countries as incapable of participating in World politics and contributing to the resolution of international problems.
- That the fate of the world is universal (everyone would bear the consequences of a clash between the Great Powers) and that as a consequence “large” and “small” countries share a deep common interest, obligations and responsibilities.
- That conservative regimes have no future, that their time has run out and that the true aims of the armament race and the Cold war were to stop the defeat of capitalism and the spreading of socialism (“...the triumphant march of progress and world transformation...” in Tito’s words) by the use of military force.
- Those international relations should be viewed realistically in the age of nuclear weapons, space exploration, accelerated technological development, scientific achievements and unprecedented life opportunities.
- That the concentrated efforts should be directed towards the triumph of “permanent peace” over the catastrophe caused by a war between the Great Powers. These principles represented the foundation of the policy of “coexistence” (peaceful and active) which implied more than a bare acknowledgement of other countries’ existence. It represented a template for international relations based on lasting norms and principles, including non-interference into internal affairs of other countries, empowering nations to decide their domestic and foreign policy, opposition to aggressive wars and spheres of interest, promotion of peaceful political, economic and cultural cooperation irrespective of the political system (Tito, 1955, 1959, 1962; AJ, KPR, 837, 1960, 1961).

The policy of Non-Alignment, whose main proponents gathered in Belgrade in September 1961, was not an abstract concept. It was directly influenced by the direction of international relations. The sources of the philosophy of Non-Alignment were in the process of decolonisation and struggle for development. At the same time, Non-Alignment represented a response to the prevalent characteristic of the international relations marked by the presence of military blocs and consequent divisions as well as the resultant politics of force. The opposition to the division of the world into power blocs was the signature characteristic of the policy of Non-Alignment. This was based on the estimate that world peace would be endangered for as long as the politics of force and the existence of blocs were present and as long as the powerful countries were allowed to impose their will on the weaker ones. Siding with one of the blocs would represent an abrogation of

the newly won sovereign rights, independent political course, active participation in international politics, cooperation with other peaceful countries and tailoring policies to suit their own interests (Bogetić, 1981, 1990; Mates, 1970; Vestad, 2009).

Anti-colonial revolutions made the Non-Aligned Movement possible. The striving for independence *vis-a-vis* foreign policy that emerged from these revolutions was superseded by the need for regional coming together for the purpose of a common foreign policy posture. This regionalism was eventually challenged by the universal significance of the problems that needed to be tackled. The policy gradually changed from individualism to regionalism to universalism. This process was assisted by the political principles which developed over a number of years within certain Asian countries. These principles were articulated by the Bandung Conference held in April 1955 and affirmed by all subsequent meetings of the leaders of the Non-Aligned countries. Unanimous demands for a radical change in international relations – characterised by the Cold War polarisation, economic inequality and nuclear holocaust threat – were made from the very beginning. Awareness that active participation on the international scene strengthened the independence of individual countries and made them an important factor in international political and economic relations did not immediately result in coordinated joint action. The main obstacle lay in the differences between individual countries' interests which, as would transpire later, were difficult to overcome. The universal validity of the principles of Non-Alignment was not always sufficient to heal divisions and resolve conflicts. The right of these countries to be treated as equals in tackling international problems was not granted but wrested through struggle. This was demonstrated by the Initiative of Five (Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Sukarno and Tito) submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 1960, which demanded that the leaders of the US and the USSR restore their contacts and find solutions for the pressing problems through negotiations. The Belgrade Conference represented a concrete application of the right to equitable participation in solving international problems. (Bogetić, 1981, 1990; Mates, 1970; Vestad, 2009).

The Yugoslav policy of peaceful and active coexistence

Several factors critically influenced the formulation of the Yugoslav policy of "peaceful and active coexistence". Experience gained through an indigenous revolution had a direct impact on the idiosyncrasies of domestic

political developments and international activities. Conflict with the Soviet Union and members of the Cominform forced the leadership to abandon old priorities and define new foreign policy aims. According to the judgment of the Communist Party leadership, the cooperation with the West, although grudging, represented the only way of protecting the country from the pressures coming from the Soviet Union and "Popular democracies". Additional incentives for cooperation were provided by the dire economic situation caused by the blockade, a large military budget, poor harvests (especially in 1951) and general poverty. The real prospect of the attack forced Yugoslavia to "tone down" its foreign policy, abandon the revolutionary rhetoric and draw closer to the West. Although "not conditional on political concessions", this unequal collaboration with the West bothered Tito. Steps such as the liberalisation of the economy, change in the principles of social development, switch from the heavy to light industry, the democratisation of governance, and a diminished role for the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as well as the gradual rapprochement with, and the inclusion into the Western military alliance – all of this fundamentally meant abandoning socialist principles. In the opinion of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, finding a political alternative and a new international direction would provide a way out of the deadly embrace of the East and the West, which brought into question the survival of the country and the Communist Party rule. The knowledge gained about developments in Asia, Africa and Europe contributed greatly to the charting of this new course (Bogetić, 2000; Bekić, 1988; Gavranov and Stojković, 1972; Jovanović, 1985; Jakovina, 2002; Krempton, 2003; Laker, 1990; Petković, 1985; Vukadinović, 1983).

The Yugoslav public paid a great deal of attention to the activities of the colonial powers. Of special interest was the liberation struggle fought by various anti-colonial movements. The news concerning the situation in Iran appeared in the Yugoslav press as early as the late autumn of 1944. Gradually, political vistas broadened to include Egypt, Syria and Lebanon all the way to China and Japan. The focus was on India and the Levant, but Indonesia, Vietnam (Indochina), Ethiopia, Iraq and Palestine were also of interest. From early on, the public learned about the likes of Nehru, Sukarno and Mao Zedong. Information given in the newspapers and on the radio was steeped in an ideology that guided the interpretation and evaluation of international events. The bulk of the information originated from the "Soviet sources" – telegraph agencies, radio stations and the press. From mid-1948 onward, the sources changed, but the interpretations remained the same. Political information dominated the discourse. News concerning the

exploitation of natural resources and cheap labour, strikes, state terror, passive resistance, armed struggle, conservative regimes “tottering” under the onslaught of freedom, social justice, racial and class equality, the moral bankruptcy of wars fought by the colonial powers, a “wildfire” of anti-colonial movements and revolutions – contributed to the emergence of a convincing and precisely defined (and disseminated) ideological view of colonialism. Divisions and conflicts reported in the media reflected a critique of the policy of spheres of interest, the division into blocs, armament race, technological boom, misuse of nuclear energy, all forms of exclusion and politics of force. Similar to the information fed to the public was the (ideologically coloured) information entering the country through diplomatic channels and the Party contacts from China (from 1945), Korea (1946), Iraq (1946), Lebanon (1946), Syria (1946), the Republic of South Africa (1946). The conflict with the Soviet Union compelled Yugoslavia to redefine its foreign policy. The Principles of the UN Charter were placed at the forefront of Yugoslavia’s posture. Already viewed by the Yugoslav politicians as an upholder of peace, guarantor of the application of International Law and the platform for dialogue between the Cold War rivals, the OUN served as the sole forum for expressing their views. Although Yugoslavia had already held well-defined positions on numerous international questions, it was noticeable that it followed the Soviet lead and adapted its views to suit the policy of the “First Land of Socialism”. This undoubtedly resulted from a “genuine commonality of interests” prompted by the ideological and political closeness to the Soviet Union as well as the acceptance of the Soviet experience and “solutions” in all spheres of life. In addition, international opinion was automatically polarised in line with the views of the Great Powers. The Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union ratified in Moscow on 11 April 1945 ensured a common stance in the spirit of “sincerest cooperation in all international activities aimed at securing peace and security”. Between 1945 and 1948, Yugoslav diplomacy occasionally acted independently on what was considered to be the crucial issues, notwithstanding moderate levels of engagement and superficial understanding of the functioning of the UN. Such acts were informed by the indigenous nature of the Yugoslav revolution, “own understanding and independent estimates” of the current situation. The specificity of the Yugoslav internal development and “independent spirit” was also coloured by “the repeated insistence on strengthening peace”, independence, autonomy, sovereignty, equality and cooperation with all countries prepared to accept these principles (Jovanović, 1985, 1990, 2011; Dimić, Milošević et al. 2010; Dimić and Životić, 2012). Reduced diplomatic activity

and pronounced agreement with the views of the Soviet delegation during 1948 reflected attempts to eliminate foreign policy differences. The approach Yugoslavia was forced to adopt following the clash with the Soviet Union and "Popular democracies" contained several important characteristics. It became realistic and pragmatic (making use of international divisions), elastic (rather than dogmatic), active (based on the understanding that small countries have their place in the international political arena) and cautious (predicting future outcomes, evaluating different scenarios and eliminating the element of surprise). The principles of the UN Charter were at the forefront of Yugoslav foreign policy. Differences with the Soviet Union not only brought into question the nature of the relations between socialist countries, but also offered a way forward for Yugoslav foreign policy. Following the decision by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (September 1949), the Yugoslav diplomats at the UN were to act independently, in the interest of the state and world peace (Jovanović, 1985; Rubinstein, 1970; AJ, CK SKJ, III/42 i 43, 1949). This new foreign policy stance became visible at the Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly in 1949 in which the Yugoslav side made public its dispute with the Soviet Union – receiving support from the majority of the members in the process. On this occasion, the Yugoslav delegates asked a question that would later serve as a basis for the policy of "peaceful coexistence". The question was: Is it possible for countries with different systems to coexist and cooperate peacefully, thus ensuring peace in the world? As a direct consequence, the Soviet Union abrogated the Friendship, Mutual Cooperation and Post-War Assistance Treaty and a Second Resolution of the Cominform was published two months later (29th November 1948). The Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was held at the end of December 1949. These pressures were characterised as "Cold War tactics" used by the USSR against Yugoslavia, and the "battle for independence" fought by Yugoslavia as the "most important battle for socialism in the world" (Jovanović, 1985, pp. 45-46). From that point on, Yugoslavia voted in accordance with its international interests and convictions. This new policy was based on stressing the importance of small countries in world politics, opposing outside interference in domestic affairs and pointing out the dangers of military blocs (Jovanović, 1985, pp. 43-44; Dimić, Milošević et al. 2010, pp. 511-521, 524-531, 554-560; Kardelj, 1949; AJ, CK SKJ, II/7, 1949). One year later, Yugoslavia became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Addressing the General Assembly, the Head of the Yugoslav delegation Edvard Kardelj rejected the imperative according to which, "(...) the only

choice for Mankind is between the hegemonies of two Powers". As an alternative, he offered a "second way" to all free and equal nations – the way that leads to permanent peace through the establishment of democratic relations between nations, non-interference, striving for equality and comprehensive international cooperation. This new position signalled a toning-down of dogma-laden views of irreconcilable fronts and a life-and-death struggle between conservatism and the forces of progress that had hitherto hampered Yugoslavia's international standing. Rejection of the politics of force and the risks of bloc alignment represented another premise of the new course. Yugoslavia saw this policy as a way of defending its endangered existence (at the UN, Yugoslavia was fighting a diplomatic battle for independence, territorial integrity and the right to self-determination), shape its own position *vis-a-vis* the crucial questions of world order and build a new international role. Such an approach meant abandoning the role of a "second-rate player" that necessarily befell small and economically and militarily weak countries. It indicated that Yugoslavia was now pursuing a mature policy based on the understanding of the broader political context. Speeches by Yugoslav delegates to the UN soon brought to light the outlines of a "new diplomatic course" which consisted in principled cooperation with all countries (irrespective of their system), struggle for world peace and a world of free and equal nations, as well as the opposition to any form of outside interference into domestic affairs (AJ, CK SKJ, III/54, 1951; Jovanović, 1985, pp. 85-89).

The Korean War brought about another change in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. At the time the Korean War broke out, it became possible for Yugoslavia, as a member of the Security Council, to add a number of universally valid principles to a foreign policy hitherto marked by a high degree of tension provoked by the clash with the Cominform. These principles brought Yugoslavia closer to the countries such as India, Burma, Egypt and Indonesia and made possible common action with regard to important international issues. The commonality of views was reflected in the conviction that the polarisation of the world was pushing small and newly liberated countries towards neutrality. According to Tito, alignment with one of the sides meant "clearly endangering one's own country". The calls for the defence of peace, peaceful conflict resolution, abolition of artificial trade barriers and spheres of interest, rejection of all forms of aggression, as well as opposition to hegemony and outside interference and support for the natural and historic striving of the peoples of Asian and African countries to be free and independent – these were not just elements of an attractive foreign policy platform, but also a means of defending one's

own independence. The superpower conflict and the developments within the UN made Yugoslavia, Burma, India, Egypt and Indonesia part of the same historical process. The journey from the vote against allowing the UN troops to cross the 38th Parallel in 1950, via first economic policy consultations, to permanent contacts maintained during the UN General Assembly Sessions, was a substantive one. It articulated resistance to the bloc-inspired polarisation of the world (Bogetić, 1981, 1990; Bekić, 1988; Gavranov and Stojković, 1972; Jovanović, 1985; Petković, 1985; Vukadinović, 1983; Rubinstein, 1970; Min, 2002; Vestad, 2009; Mates, 1970).

Non-aligned politics and broadening the foreign policy perspective

The first contacts Yugoslavia made at the UN led to the “broadening of the political perspectives” through which a Eurocentric policy was replaced by the forging of global links among the Non-Aligned countries. Such cooperation in the period from 1950 to 1951 stemmed from common views on the current international situation. It emerged from the unique positions of individual countries *vis-a-vis* various political questions. According to Tito (February 1952), the policy of “active neutrality” implied a struggle for peace and protest against aggressive wars and spheres of interest, opposition to all forms of outside interference into domestic affairs, maintenance of neighbourly relations and comprehensive development of peaceful economic, political and cultural cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual understanding. In this period, Yugoslav diplomacy acted continually at the Sessions of the UN General Assembly in accord with countries holding similar positions. At the Seventh Session held in 1952, the “non-engaged” countries raised the issue of underdevelopment and the urgent need to overcome it. The following year saw a demand for the establishment of an International Development Fund. In 1954, the focus was on colonialism. The Tenth Session (1955) highlighted the problems of disarmament. Joint interventions demonstrated the degree to which non-alignment was already built into the international doctrine of the countries of South-East Asia. Resisting pressures to join the blocs, seeking a peaceful resolution to conflicts with neighbours, fiercely protecting national sovereignty, a common position on decolonisation, opposition to racial discrimination, actively neutral posture, poverty and underdevelopment and non-alignment – all of these elements characterised the international stance of countries such as India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. Similar developments took place in the Middle East and African countries such as Egypt, Syria (later the UAR) and Ethiopia as well as the states that gained

independence in the second half of the 1950s – Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, the Congo and others (Jovanović, 1985, pp. 165-177, 223-235, 237-248). Beginning with 1952, the Yugoslav Press started to analyse the problems of Asian and African countries. At the end of 1952, Yugoslav diplomats were given strict directives to “strengthen contacts” with representatives from Asian and African countries. This coincided with the moment in which Yugoslavia, burdened by the relationship with the West, sought a new foreign policy direction. The brief foray into regional cooperation with Greece and Turkey (The Balkan Pact was formed in 1953 and became a military alliance in 1954) as well as the formulation of the policy of active neutrality opened the road for a new approach marked by Tito’s journeys (of which there were seven: 1. Turkey, 12-18 April 1954; 2. Greece, 2-6 June 1954; India and Burma, 16 December 1954 – 5 February 1955, including the meeting with Nasser on board the yacht *Galeb* on 5 February 1955; 4. Ethiopia and Egypt 11 December 1955 – 6 January 1956; 5. The UAR, Indonesia, Burma, India, Ethiopia and Sudan, 5 December 1958 – 5 March 1959; 6. 15th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York; 7. Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and the UAR, 28 February – 22 April 1961). These trips represented the first opportunity for Yugoslavia to connect with countries that followed a similar foreign policy course. The crucial point was Tito’s visit to India and Burma (Bogetić, 2005; Dimić, 2004). Addressing the members of the Indian Parliament on 21 December 1954, Tito pointed out the importance of coordinated international activity on the part of Yugoslavia and the countries of South-East Asia. Tito listed inequality, outside interference, spheres of interest and colonialism as the greatest “evils” faced by Mankind. He pronounced “active peaceful coexistence” to be the only path towards world peace. In his Rangoon speech, Tito contrasted attempts to bring the principle of coexistence to the regional level with the strategy of connecting and organising on a global scale. These two principles – regionalist and universalist – would clash often in years to come (Tito, 1959, 1955). At the end of his first journey, Tito realised that the quality of information gained through personal contacts represented political capital, which placed him ahead of other Communist leaders traditionally unwilling to travel. Visits, meetings, talks and exchanges of views became permanent features of Tito’s and Yugoslavia’s international strategy. Conflict mediation not only shaped the policy of peaceful coexistence but also ensured a role for Yugoslavia in global politics. Maintaining existing contacts was complemented by the deepening of newly forged ties. Yugoslavia’s foreign policy posture was well-thought and carefully organised, leaving no room for improvisation. A hitherto remote and poorly

understood part of the world became a subject of deep analysis and systematic study. This was based on a sound understanding of world politics and its principal protagonists. Yugoslavia constantly exchanged union, party, parliamentary, economic, youth, scientific, military, cultural and expert delegations with a large number of countries. The most capable and creative Yugoslav politicians travelled constantly to Africa and Asia, bringing back many impressions, information and ideas. Yugoslavia started sending its best diplomats to Africa and Asia (J. Djerdja, J. Vilfan, D. Kveder, V. Popovic, M. Nikezic, D. Vidic and others) and developing a highly professional press service which monitored the media, reviewed literature and provided a daily analysis of political and economic events. A special unit was formed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tasked with analysing the incoming information. Economic and Foreign policy institutes also contributed to a better understanding of the prevailing trends in world politics. Such an analytical approach yielded a truthful image of the "other". This required a sound understanding of both historical (studying the historical development and especially anti-colonial movements) and general facts (area, population density, social structure, institutions, geopolitical and geostrategic importance, political system, political, economic and cultural personalities). These two subjects made up 10-12% of the information gathered and analysed through diplomatic channels. The conclusions arrived were necessarily mutable and were continually updated with new information. Economic analysis, exchange of expertise, knowledge and technology transfer and the strengthening of economic ties meant that 20-25% of the information gathered by diplomats and correspondents concerned the economy. Political information, which involved analysis of internal and external circumstances with a focus on key underlying processes, comprised 50-60% of all collected information. All of this information was used in formulating optimal state interests. The result was a complex yet reliable picture of the "other" as well as of Yugoslavia's own interests. This represented a cognitive shift from a superficial (relying on perception and hearsay) to a deeper, scientific, level of understanding of foreign policy issues.

The Bandung Conference

Although Yugoslavia did not participate in the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung (April 1955), the conclusions stated in the Final Communiqué were close if not identical to its position (AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, 1970). The very fact that 24 countries with diverse systems and views gathered in one

place was considered a success. In the opinion of Yugoslav diplomats, the most important result of the Conference was the principle according to which "(...) the right of all nations to individual and collective defence in accordance with the UN Charter should be respected". Another principle stated that "(...) countries should refrain from entering into collective defence arrangements which further interests of either Superpower" (AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, 1970). The stress was placed on the solidarity between Asian and African countries in pursuing world peace as well as their common determination to "(...) decide their own fate and tackle their own problems" (AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, 1970). The Bandung Conference was considered a crossroads in terms of awakening and bringing together of Asian and African nations as well as expressing the will for independence, belief in self-reliance and the increasing role in world politics. Importance was given to the agreement on furthering economic development based on mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty as well as the conviction that cultural cooperation represented one of the most powerful ways of furthering international understanding. These principles were followed by concrete demands for the improvement of cultural and educational cooperation through knowledge and information exchange, the revival of national cultures and rejection of all forms of cultural and racial discrimination. The unanimous condemnation of colonialism and discrimination and the proclamation of the principle of self-determination and freedom to choose a political and economic system were considered important victories. Branding colonialism as an evil that breaches fundamental human rights and that should be urgently eliminated fitted in with the Yugoslav policy of anti-colonialism. Condemnation of aggression, demands for universal disarmament and a ban on the production of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons were considered a great success. It was stressed that the Bandung Principles contributed to detente and created a platform for solving current issues through international cooperation based on equality. In Belgrade, the Bandung Conference was judged to represent a "historic crossroads" heralding a "new political landscape", the triumph of non-alignment and improvement in the global situation for Tito himself, the determination of the peoples of Asia and Africa to "decide their own fate as far as possible" was of primary importance. The same was true of the fact that "the conception dominating the Conference is in complete accord with our own" (AJ, KPR (837), I-4-e/1, 1970). The Principles of Bandung were confirmed in the meeting between Tito, Nehru and Nasser, held in July of 1956. The Joint Declaration insisted on the principle of "peaceful and active coexistence". Notable were demands for disarmament and acceptance of China into the UN. It was pointed out that the "...conflicting interests of

Superpowers” hindered the resolution of the Middle Eastern conflict. It was concluded that the efforts of the Algerian people to gain independence should be supported. Colonialism was condemned in principle and the Bandung position *vis-a-vis* Palestine was endorsed. The meeting abounded in misunderstandings, difficulties in reconciling widely differing views, reserve and attempts to diminish its importance. Nevertheless, the Brioni Meeting contributed significantly to the convergence of Nehru’s, Nasser’s and Tito’s views. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the ensuing Suez Crisis prompted Tito and Nehru to open regular channels of communication in order to coordinate views and act jointly in resolving the crisis. These were the outlines of the core of the movement personified by Nehru, Tito and Nasser (Mates, 1970, pp. 388, etc).

Joint actions at the UN and preparations for the First Summit of Non-Aligned Countries

The contacts between Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah and Nehru at the 15th Annual Session of the UN General Assembly (September 1960) were motivated by the conclusion that the superpowers were not capable of reaching a compromise with respect to the key issues of world peace. Presented in a separate resolution, “The Initiative of Five” represented an attempt by the Non-Aligned countries to mediate between the opposing Superpowers and their leaders. Even though it failed to gain sufficient support, the Resolution signalled future realignments in the UN, charted a course for the joint action by the Non-Aligned countries and contributed to the formation of close ties between countries with similar agendas. The “detente line” achieved a moral victory over the “politics of force”. 41 countries voted for the Resolution and 37 US allies voted against it. 17 members close to the USSR abstained. The Non-Aligned countries started to view themselves as a positive, peaceful factor in world politics. The speeches by the above statements focussed on the issues of disarmament and colonisation to be followed by more trips, meetings and talks. One of the topics was the organisation of a conference of the Non-Aligned countries as well as placing their cooperation on a formal footing. The idea of a Non-Aligned summit to be held in Belgrade was taking shape (AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, k-202, 1961; Mates, 1970). The obstruction of the work of the UN, which resulted from the superpower conflict added urgency to the need for a conference of the Non-Aligned countries. The conclusion that the superpowers and aligned countries were not capable of maintaining world peace and ensuring the running of the UN led to the idea that these tasks should become the responsi-

bility of the numerically dominant Third World countries. In Tito's opinion, the first step towards strengthening their international clout would be a conference of the Non-Aligned states. The aim was to reach an agreement on important issues such as the preservation of peace, abolition of colonialism, disarmament, a ban on nuclear testing and the unobstructed work of the UN, before the 16th Annual Session of the UN General Assembly. An additional aim of the gathering was to formulate a common stance at the UN through which the Non-Aligned countries could contribute to the resolution of the crises directly imperilling world peace (DA, 1961, f-116, dos.1, dos. 2, dos 8; K41). Tito presented his views to some of the Non-Aligned leaders – King Hassan II, Prince Al-Hassan and President Bourguiba (AJ, KPR (837), I-2/13, 1961).² They discussed how cooperation between all countries and peoples “regardless of their internal systems and ideological differences, and based on the principles of independence, equality and non-interference” could be achieved. Such important topics as the prevention of economic exploitation, the abolishment of colonialism and racial discrimination were also debated. In Tito's words, colonialism “was brought back to life” and it needed to be fully liquidated, as a precondition for bringing millions of people onto the world stage as “equal members of mankind”, and as “progressive elements”. Josip Broz especially emphasised the importance of equal participation of “all peoples, small and big alike” in the debates about world peace and the future of mankind. He also stressed the obligation of the international community and highly developed countries to help the newly independent states and ensure their economic and technological development. His stances were in line with the foreign political conceptions of other non-aligned countries. They all shared the view that the fates of newly liberated countries could not be determined by foreigners (AJ, KPR (837), I-4-a, k-202, 1961; AJ, KPR (837), I-2/13, 1961). At a meeting held at the same time, Nasser gave his support to the need to organise a Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and reach a common position on all key issues. The diplomatic push was immediately joined by the President of Indonesia Sukarno, the governments of Afghanistan and Ghana, and after some equivocation, by the Prime Minister of India Nehru. This opened the way to a gathering of representatives of the Non-Aligned countries on a global scale (DA, 1961, f-116, dos.1, dos. 3, dos. 5). Already in March, Yugoslav diplomats were aware that the Indonesian Government attempted to organise a new

² Between 28 February 1961 and 22 April 1961 Josip Broz Tito visited Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic.

“Bandung Conference”. Sukarno’s envoys had visited Cambodia, Burma, Ceylon, the UAR, and Sudan, as he was convinced that the new Afro-Asian conference had to take place before the XVI Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly. In Sukarno’s mind, Yugoslavia was the ideal venue for convening the conference of independent countries, which was to be dedicated primarily to the issue of Algeria (DA, K-15, 1961).³

During the months which preceded the Belgrade Conference, Yugoslav diplomats attempted to neutralise Indian diplomatic initiatives. Delhi’s “conservative”, “pro-western”, and “opportunistic” stances differed radically from the views of African countries (Ghana, Guinea, and Mali) and Cuba. As the host, Yugoslavia attempted to avoid unnecessary and embarrassing quarrels at the Conference. Especially important were the drafts of the Final Document, as India demanded there be as few as possible binding clauses, especially those which targeted any of the great powers, whereas the more radical participants demanded sharp and condemning formulations. Belgrade also attempted to disprove the rumours that the *Third bloc* was about to be created (DA, 1961, f-117, dos. 15). In July of 1961, Tito and Nehru exchanged letters in which Nehru demanded assurances that no such initiative would take place. In his response, Tito stated that the creation of the Third block would be “opposite to our understanding of the policy of non-engagement” (AJ, KPR (837), I-1/374, 1961; DA, 1961, f-117, dos. 27, dos. 20). Tito also expressed the wish to cooperate with Nehru closely in the organisation of the Conference and seconded his opinion that the non-engaged were incapable of solving existing world problems, but that they could contribute to the lessening of world tensions (DA, 1961, f-117, dos. 25). After a short deliberation, both the Prime Minister of India and the governments of Afghanistan and Ghana confirmed their participation at the forthcoming conference. The universal doctrine triumphed over the regional one. The Preparatory Meeting held in Cairo in June 1961 represented an important step in that direction.⁴ There, a common policy core was

³ In January of 1961, Sukarno came up with the idea of convening a summit of the non-aligned, devoted solely to the situation in Algeria. Koča Popović considered such a meeting useless, as he believed that neither Nehru nor U Nu would accept to participate in it. However, he advised that the reply to the Indonesians be balanced, before other countries’ stances were checked.

⁴ The following states participated in the Preparatory Meeting in Cairo: Afghanistan, Cuba, Guinea, Indonesia, Mali, Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Cambodia, Yemen, India, Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Brazil (observer).

formulated *vis-a-vis* international issues. The principal goal of the Conference was, in Yugoslav eyes, “to emphasise the positive effects of the non-engaged on the lessening of world tensions”. Belgrade claimed that the non-engaged were “neither against the West nor the East”, and that they “refused to acknowledge such [bipolar] criteria”. Yugoslavs admitted that the principled anti-colonialism “could be seen as anti-western”, but insisted that “it should not be interpreted as taking the other side”. Similar stances should be taken on other major international issues as well (DA, 1961, dos. 25).

The great powers were highly interested in the forthcoming conference of the non-aligned. American diplomats attempted to leave an impression of the US affinity towards the conference, should the participants abstain from condemning imperialism. Internal American analyses reveal their conviction that Yugoslavia, despite being led by “convinced Marxists”, would not sacrifice its independence. Nevertheless, they were troubled by the fact that Belgrade expressed rather pro-Soviet stances on the most international issues. The rapidly increasing Yugoslav influence on other non-engaged countries did not fly under the radar of American intelligence analysts. They were aware of Yugoslav endeavours to position itself as the leader within the Afro-Asian flock and to establish contacts with Latin American countries. On the other hand, London attempted to downplay the importance of the Conference, as they were uneasy with the anti-colonial rhetoric. The Yugoslavs assessed that the UK would not be passive and that they would attempt to further the existing divides between the participants in order to prevent any meaningful conclusions. The British were especially concerned about the possibility of the emergence of a Third bloc. The Soviet diplomats, on the other hand, praised the Conference as a great and useful initiative, but attempted to influence its outcome and support anti-western resolutions. Moscow did not approve of the non-engagement as a principle because it hindered the “grouping of progressive forces around the Soviet Union”, and decreased Soviet influence among the newly liberated countries. The Eastern Bloc countries even proposed to the Yugoslavs to coordinate foreign policies towards African and Asian countries (DA, K-41, 1961; DA, 1961, f-117, dos. 1). On the other hand, Beijing was convinced that the aim of the Belgrade Conference was to divide the Asian peoples. The western media took a wait-and-see approach (DA, f-116, dos. 17, dos. 1, dos. 36, dos. 23, dos. 34; Pavlović, 2009, pp. 217, etc.). The agreed criteria used in selecting the Conference participants defined the essence of Non-Alignment. Belgrade was chosen to be the host city by the majority of participants. Bandung, Brioni, New York and Cairo represented important signposts to the Belgrade Conference. During that time, views on international issues

matured, aims and principles were formulated and Yugoslavia's international position was defined. This position informed the proposals put forward by the Yugoslav delegation at the Belgrade Conference.

Decolonisation and Yugoslav foreign policy

The process of decolonisation which gained momentum at the beginning of the 1960s had a strong impact on Yugoslavia's foreign policy through a number of universal premises (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). The demand for immediate and comprehensive decolonisation brought Yugoslavia closer to the newly liberated countries of Africa and Asia and enabled a coordinated international activity on their part. Submission to foreign domination and exploitation was deemed to represent "abnegation of basic human rights" and the primary obstacle to international peace and cooperation. The right to self-determination was demanded enabling them to decide freely on the form of political system they would adopt as well as the direction of their development. Cessation of military interventions and repression by the colonial powers was considered a necessity. It was demanded that the power be immediately handed over to subjugated nations so that they could enjoy the fruits of freedom and independence. Any possibility of endangering the territorial unity and integrity of these new nations was rejected a priori. Yugoslav politicians were of the opinion that these goals necessitated strengthening "independent and non-engaged forces" and arrive at a blueprint for the permanent dismantling of power blocs. Until such time, it was important to detach the process of decolonisation from the Cold War and prevent the countries in Asia and Africa from becoming entangled in the superpower contest. Consequently, attention was directed towards tackling the current crisis hotspots. The UN General Assembly was deemed responsible for overseeing the process of decolonisation in order to "ensure the transfer of power to the hands of genuine representatives of the people" (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). Decolonisation revealed the tragic chasm between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world and highlighted the question of the future direction. Yugoslav politicians thought that the economic policies of the developed countries were tainted by the exigencies of the Cold War, resulting in the transformation of military blocs into closed economic groupings. The danger of the Cold War spilling over into the economic arena was reflected in the conditions attached to aid which required access to domestic markets, profit export, and demands for changes in the political systems. The conclusion was that the economic backwardness represented a permanent source of international instability and a generator

of new conflicts. In addition, inequalities in economic development precluded active and equitable cooperation and, consequently, world peace and stability. For these problems to be resolved, economic aid had to become an international obligation, especially for the industrially developed countries. The levelling of inequalities necessitated an increase in long-term aid which in turn would enable accelerated development, decoupling economic aid from political and military demands through a clear definition of conditions for receiving international development grants and an awareness that new political relationships required new economic relationships. Those same problems raised the awareness of common interests and the need for joint action in overcoming poverty (AJ, KPR (837), 1961).

Attitudes towards the issue of disarmament and the Berlin crisis

With regard to the problem of disarmament, Yugoslavia's view was that a new approach to negotiations was necessary. As opposed to the zero-sum game approach adopted by the Great Powers, it demanded that disarmament talks be joined by the entire international community and especially by the Non-Aligned countries. General, comprehensive and monitored disarmament was considered the ultimate aim (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). Until this was achieved, freezing of arms budgets, stopping the arms race and nuclear test ban treaties were considered the more realistic steps. The alternative was the continuation of the propaganda war, the spread of hopelessness and fear and the ability of the great powers to hijack the international discourse for their own selfish ends. The crisis over Berlin and Germany was another sensitive issue directly related to the issues of disarmament, bloc confrontation, and world peace. The Yugoslavs were aware that Berlin and Germany were not of primary importance for the most African and Asian countries. However, they insisted on treating these problems as global and not regional European issues. They further believed that East and West alone were incapable of solving the German Question peacefully and that the non-aligned could contribute to regulating the "abnormal" situation in the German capital, and normalising the international situation (AJ, KPR (837), 1961).

The First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade and open world issues

In mid-August, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry once again gave instructions to the diplomats throughout the non-bloc world in order to

ensure the Conference's success. The instructions clearly defined the main aim of the Conference: "lessening of tensions between East and West, and in the world in general". Yugoslav diplomats were therefore supposed to suggest to the conference participants' governments that their approach to international problems should be "realistic and objective, i.e. balanced and constructive, and supportive towards all positive tendencies and stances" (DA, 1961, f-117, dos. 29). In this way, the Yugoslavs attempted to prevent expressions of radicalism and extremism, and to avoid "open critique of negative tendencies and acts in international relations". The conference participants should be guided by the interests of world peace. Their approach to international problems should not be determined by concerns whether the conference would appear as East- or West-leaning. Yugoslav diplomats predicted that the conference participants would be united with regards to the "issue of colonialism" and in their condemnation of "neocolonialism" (especially in their assessment of the situation in Algeria, Congo, Angola, West Irian, Tunisia, Goa, and racial discrimination in the Republic of South Africa), as well as in exerting moral and political pressure on the great powers to reduce nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the necessity to change the existing economic gap between developed and developing countries was also deemed uncontroversial (DA, 1961, f-117, dos. 29). At the time of the Belgrade Conference, the Cold War was in full swing. The super-power confrontation over Berlin resulted in the construction of the Berlin Wall. The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Peace was threatened by the colonial and Superpower interventions in the Congo, Angola, Vietnam and Laos. The nuclear moratorium was disregarded. All of these issues tested the statesmanship of the politicians gathered in Belgrade.

"We have gathered here today in order to coordinate our efforts to help the world, which is constantly being pushed towards the brink, to see at this late hour the danger it faces, to invest its moral strength and energy in strengthening peace and furthering a comprehensive and equitable international cooperation." With these words from his opening speech of 1 September 1961, Josip Broz Tito greeted the delegates from 25 participating countries, three observer countries and 40 liberation and progressive movements. His political convictions were shared by the likes of Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno, Nkrumah, Sihanouk, Makarios, Selassie, U Nu, Bourguiba, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Keita and other statesmen attending the conference from Asia, Africa, South America and Europe. The Conference agenda proposed an exchange of views regarding the world situation, strengthening

of world peace and security and the problems of economic inequality and underdevelopment (AJ, KPR (837), 1961).

The Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries were in complete agreement that world peace could only be achieved with complete eradication of colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism “in all their forms”. They brooded over the realisation that the superpower rivalry could lead to a “global conflagration”. Peaceful coexistence which involved an active effort in removing historical injustices and subjugation and encouraging individual development was seen as the only alternative to the Cold War and a sound platform for international relations. They condemned the politics of force and the armament race. War was considered not only an anachronism, but a crime against humanity. They rejected the view that the Cold War was unavoidable as well as the policy of permanent racking up of the tension which had brought the world to the brink of a global war. Differences in the social organisation were not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to international cooperation. The imposition of political systems by force was considered unacceptable. They rejected outside domination and interference and supported self-determination, independence and free choice of modes of economic, cultural and social development. They believed that the conduct of the foreign policy should shun ideology as a weapon for waging a Cold War, exerting pressure and imposing one’s will. They insisted on responsibility, realism and a constructive approach to world politics. They indignantly rejected accusations that one of the aims of the Belgrade Conference was the creation of a new bloc. They believed that Non-Aligned countries should play a major role in world politics. Population growth was seen as a significant contributor to the process of “narrowing the gap between the blocs” (AJ, KPR (837), 1961).

Results of the Belgrade Conference

The Belgrade Conference adopted two documents: A Declaration by Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and a Statement Concerning the Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace. At the same time, copies of an identical letter were sent to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. In contrast to the Declaration, which had a strategic character, the other two documents referred to the current political situation (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). Pointing out acute problems the world was facing, the Declaration insisted on an unconditional, complete and final abolition of all forms of colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism. Cessation of military actions

and repression against "...dependent nations" as well as their right to independence and respect for their state territory were considered important. Wholehearted support was given to the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Algeria and Angola against French and Belgian colonial forces. Solidarity with the people of the Congo and the condemnation of the Belgian intervention were expressed equally strongly. The French massacre in Bizerte (Tunisia) directly influenced the demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all "dependent" countries. The policy of Apartheid in South Africa and other forms of racial discrimination were condemned unanimously. Support was given to the right of ethnic and religious minorities to protection, especially against genocide. Wholehearted support was also given to the people of Palestine. The building of foreign military bases, especially against the will of the people, was considered a gross violation of sovereignty. Disarmament was considered an "imperative and the most urgent task facing humanity". The economic inequality inherited from the age of colonialism and imperialism was to be eliminated and the economic, industrial and horticultural development accelerated. Developing countries were advised to increase their economic and trade cooperation. A separate World Economic Conference dedicated to the issue of underdevelopment was deemed necessary. The Declaration reaffirmed the deep conviction of the delegates that all nations had the right to independence and self-determination (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). The Belgrade Conference agenda covered all the important international questions. The participants exhibited a high degree of agreement (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). At the same time, debates on various issues clearly indicated the presence of divisions and differences. Besides, the advocates of pro-Soviet policies and those who were not ready to criticise the West, there existed countries that lacked well-formed views on international issues. Subsequent analyses by Yugoslav politicians revealed the existence of an "Arab faction" which focussed on "Arab demands". The West labelled the Belgrade Conference an anti-Western and anti-American gathering (DA, 1961, f-118, dos. 9, dos 12; DA, 1961, f-125, dos. 12; AJ, KPR (837), 1961). The reactions were heated and inimical. Moscow reacted by restarting nuclear tests. The Conference was ignored by the Soviet and Eastern European public (AJ, KPR (837), 1961). Nevertheless, the reverberations of the summit as well as the worldwide publicity it received exceeded expectations. The Yugoslav leadership assessed the Conference to be a "major event" which signalled the "victory of the Yugoslav conception" which put paid to the regionalist strategy calling for a "second Bandung".

The Non-Aligned movement was not born in Belgrade. The gathering of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries did not

necessarily imply a movement. Nevertheless, the decisions reached in Belgrade clearly demonstrated that the idea which had brought these statesmen together represented an alternative to power blocs and the world polarisation. The frequently spoken words at that time, such as "peace", "independence", "equality", "development", "law" and "justice", resonated in the minds of the peoples who had for centuries existed on the margins of history and which were trying, through anti-colonial struggle, to ascend the ladder of global power. In 1961, Non-Alignment seemed like a "policy with a future".

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YUGOSLAVIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND CREATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: In the years after World War II, the Middle East had a very important place in Yugoslav foreign policy. There are three phases in the evolution of Yugoslav foreign policy in that region. During the first phase which lasted from the end of World War II to 1948, Yugoslavia had certain reservations in relations with this region. The long period which started with the foundation of the Jewish state was marked with the development of close political, military and economic relations with Israel and approach to Egypt after the gradual solution of the problems in mutual relations caused by Yugoslav contacts with banished Egyptian communists. The Egyptian military revolution in 1952 and the beginnings of the orientation of Yugoslav foreign policy towards the creation of a wider movement of non-aligned countries caused Yugoslav decision to develop closer relations with Arab countries. The improvement of relations with Arab countries worsened the contact with Israel. These were the beginning of Yugoslav Middle Eastern policy which was one of the determining characteristics of Yugoslav foreign policy. The Middle Eastern crisis in 1967 left severe consequences on the relations with the Middle East and global international relations. However, the emerging of crisis in the socialist world in 1968 and the confrontations in the Far East, especially because of the war in Vietnam, along with the transition of the problem-solving process of the Middle Eastern crisis in a slower negotiating phase, led to lesser Yugoslav interest in the sanitation of the consequences of the Middle Eastern crisis.

Key words: Yugoslavia, Middle East, Egypt, Israel, nonalignment.

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Traditions of Presence in the Middle East Region

In the years immediately following the end of World War II, the Middle East played a very important role in the complex international relations that were characterised by strong Cold War tensions. A series of low-intensity local Arab-Israeli conflicts, a strong movement to strengthen Arab unity, the creation of a Jewish state, as well as a mutually conditioned process of strengthening anti-colonial movements and withdrawing colonial powers from the Middle East determined the region's special place in global events. Yugoslavia, as a country that went through a process of drastic revolutionary changes during the war and immediately after its end, created its foreign policy by relying on the Soviet Union. The turbulent termination of relations in 1948 caused Yugoslavia to turn towards Western countries. However, since 1953, Yugoslavia was gradually approaching the idea of distancing from the bloc organisation as a permanent foreign policy commitment. In this context, as the region where the interests of two superpowers, the old colonial powers and the young nation-states that aspired to independence, intersected, the Middle East had a special significance for Yugoslav foreign policy. During the period between 1945 and 1956, regarding the Yugoslav state's attitude towards countries and problems in the Middle East, three periods characterised by varying degrees of Yugoslav political, economic and cultural presence in the region and interest in the region's problems could be distinguished, which was directly conditioned by Yugoslav priorities of the foreign policy immediately after the end of the war: resolving the issue of Trieste, defining state borders, complications in relations with Western countries and developing relations with Eastern European countries and the USSR. The first period lasted from 1945 to 1948. This period, which coincides with the period of intensive Sovietization of the Yugoslav state and society, is characterised by the almost complete absence of Yugoslav diplomatic and economic presence in this area and interest in the Middle Eastern problems exclusively within international organisations. This period, which coincided with the period of intensive Sovietization of the Yugoslav state and society, was characterised by the almost complete absence of the Yugoslav diplomatic and economic presence in this area and interest in the problems of the Middle East exclusively within the activities in international organisations. During that period, the first indications that the Yugoslav party leadership was thinking about the need to intensify political and economic relations between Yugoslavia and the countries of the Middle East, and especially with Egypt, could be noticed. Yugoslav envoy in Cairo, Ešref Badnjević, was

expelled due to disputes over the issue of extradition of war criminals and maintaining intensive ties with banned communist groups, while his successor in office, Shahinbasic, barely escaped a similar fate thanks to his diplomatic skills. Yugoslav homes were closed and activists of emigrant associations were arrested, which affected the overall level of Yugoslav-Egyptian diplomatic relations. The second period began with the Yugoslav recognition of the newly created state of Israel in 1948 and lasted until the establishment of closer relations with Egypt at the end of 1954. During that period, the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict took place, and then rapprochement with the West and the formation of the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey followed. During that period, Yugoslavia developed very close political and economic ties with Israel. At the same time, relations with Egypt were very tense until 1952 due to the actions of Yugoslav political emigration in Egypt and the persecution of Egyptian communists, which the Yugoslav government sharply criticised. A shift in relations happened in 1950 when a special trade agreement was concluded. However, the emerging of crisis in the socialist world in 1968 and the confrontations in the Far East, especially because of the war in Vietnam, along with the transition of the problem-solving process of the Middle Eastern crisis in a slower negotiating phase, led to lesser Yugoslav interest in the sanitation of the consequences of the Middle Eastern crisis (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-b/UAR).

Yugoslav Opening to the Middle East

It was only with the change of the regime and the state and social system in Egypt in 1952 that the state of Yugoslav-Egyptian relations began to improve, but by 1954 there were no visible results. The relations with other Arab countries had not yet been established or were in the process of being established. The third period began in late 1954 and lasted until mid-1956. This period was characterised by the maintenance and development of good relations with Israel and the sudden improvement of relations with Egypt after Nasser's takeover of power from General Naguib. During this period, two visits of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito to Egypt and the visit of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to Yugoslavia took place. The relations between Yugoslavia and Egypt were on the rise after the overthrow of King Farouk. The relations that were strained due to Egyptian tolerance and aiding the anti-communist propaganda of Yugoslav emigration on its territory and the persecution of the Egyptian Communist Party membership with which Yugoslav diplomatic officials maintained close contacts, gradually, although still very heavily, turned into a good and then extremely

close one. It is not possible to give a valid answer to how the sudden Yugoslav-Egyptian rapprochement took place and who was the creator of such a foreign policy doctrine on the basis of available sources. Nevertheless, the dynamics of that cooperation can be reconstructed, and through the analysis of the events that followed, a number of important questions can be answered. An important role in establishing closer relations between Yugoslavia and Egypt had the young and agile Yugoslav ambassador to Cairo, Marko Nikezić, who managed to come into closer contact with the young Egyptian Prime Minister, Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. In a series of long and meaningful conversations, Nasser was interested in Yugoslav revolutionary experiences, economic and social reforms, the development of the armed forces, not hiding his admiration for Yugoslav foreign policy and Josip Broz. In the situation of increasing British pressure regarding the evacuation of British troops from the zone of the Suez Canal, still trying to keep Egypt away from the Soviet Union, he tried to get closer to Yugoslavia in a way, seeing it as a model in the process of creating a new foreign policy direction (DASMIP, PA, 1953, f. 21). On the other hand, Nikezić, assessing the level of Egyptian foreign policy problems and Yugoslav efforts towards a more active policy of non-alignment, paved the way for Yugoslav politics and economy in Egypt, and indirectly in the entire Arab world, which sought to free itself from colonial powers.

The first meeting between Broz and Nasser took place in February 1955 during Broz's return from Burma and India. At the moment when Josip Broz went to visit India and Burma, a visit to Egypt was not planned. Josip Broz's escort only passed through the Suez Canal on its way to the Far East. How and why the original plan was changed is very difficult to determine on the basis of the available sources. It can be assumed that Broz realised in his meeting with Nehru that the policy of the Indian Prime Minister was limited to Asia and that at that time the Middle East was not part of India's foreign policy aspirations, so Egypt simply imposed itself as a regional partner in building foreign policy whose doctrinal postulates were based on the rejection of force and military power as a decisive factor in international relations. Besides, regular reports by envoy Marko Nikezić sent during Josip Broz's visit to India and Burma indicated that Prime Minister Nasser had a strong will to expand ties. This meeting, although it was short, was crucial in the process of Yugoslav-Egyptian rapprochement. Nasser was not hiding his admiration for the Yugoslav president and the Yugoslav social and political system. The personal closeness between Broz and Nasser especially affected interstate relations (AJ, 837-KPR, I-2/4-4). Yugoslav-Egyptian relations improved especially after Josip Broz's visit to Egypt in late 1955

and early 1956. The cooperation was developing especially through joint actions in international organisations on the issues of national liberation movements of the colonies, equal cooperation between nations and technical assistance to non-developed countries. Egypt supported the Yugoslav candidacy for election to the Security Council in 1955. On 30 July 1955, the Yugoslav mission in Cairo was raised to the level of an embassy. There were some disagreements on Yugoslav relations with Israel, especially in the case of the Yugoslav position on the necessity of free navigation of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, but this did not, to a greater extent, affect the general level of Yugoslav-Egyptian relations. At the beginning of 1953, the Yugoslav attitude towards the Jerusalem Mufti softened, as a high-ranking Arab League official pointed out the issue as one of the preconditions for the development of Yugoslav-Arab relations. At the beginning of 1953, the Yugoslav attitude towards the Jerusalem Mufti softened, as a high-ranking Arab League official, Hurry, pointed out the issue as one of the preconditions for the development of Yugoslav-Arab relations. The development of good political relations was accompanied by the development of economic relations. In the structure of Yugoslav exports to Egypt, the most important place was occupied by the export of food products. Products of the wood and chemical industries were also exported to a lesser extent. Due to the drought in 1953, the structure of Yugoslav exports changed, and since then the export of wood and chemical industry products has prevailed. Yugoslavia also provided technical assistance to Egypt, especially in the field of the development of hydro construction and fisheries. Initially, Egyptian exports to Yugoslavia were very small in size and had a very unfavourable structure. Yugoslavia imported from Egypt, mainly cotton, and, to a lesser extent, flax, fabric softeners and sea salt. Despite Yugoslav efforts to increase its own exports to the Egyptian market, Egyptian exports to Yugoslavia grew steadily, while Yugoslav exports to Egypt declined rapidly. Since 1953, Egypt and Yugoslavia have established mutual military cooperation. After the regime change in Egypt, relations in the field of cultural cooperation also improved. Yugoslav cultural and artistic ensembles, an exhibition of contemporary Yugoslav painting, as well as the Belgrade Philharmonic Orchestra at the Alexandria Biennale were guests in Egypt. There were also several mutual visits of sports teams. The Egyptian military, economic and cultural delegations that visited Yugoslavia also visited Reis ul Ulema Fejić, the supreme leader of the Yugoslav Muslims. The dynamics of the reception of Egyptian delegations clearly indicated the importance of the role that this religious community played in the period of establishing closer Yugoslav-Egyptian cooperation.

Undoubtedly, in the period after 1953, the Islamic religious community and its dignitaries played a significant role in establishing close ties between Yugoslavia and the Arab countries, but based on the available source material, the nature of these ties cannot be reconstructed (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-b/UAR). Yugoslavia also developed very good relations with other Arab countries. Very good relations were established with Syria, although there were several incidents in interstate relations in the first post-war years. Namely, several thousand Yugoslav Muslims who fought on the side of Germany during the Second World War arrived in Syria through Italian refugee camps, where some of them were accepted into the Syrian army. Many were given officer ranks in the Syrian army. After 1952, Yugoslavia and Syria developed political, economic and military relations. Several Yugoslav construction companies participated in the construction of the Syrian port of Latakia. Yugoslav special-purpose industry companies exported large quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition to Syria. Immediately after visiting Egypt, a Yugoslav military delegation led by Lieutenant General Radovan Vukanović visited Syria and on that occasion concluded new business arrangements for the export of Yugoslav weapons to Syria. However, very good relations with Syria were damaged by the Syrian-Turkish border conflict, which threatened to escalate into a wider regional conflict because Syria's rival Turkey was in allied relations with Yugoslavia as a member of the Balkan Pact. Yugoslavia's gradual and discreet distancing from the Balkan Pact, and its increasingly pronounced insistence on a policy of non-alignment and the development of relations with Arab countries, had a positive effect on the general level of Yugoslav-Syrian relations (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-b). Diplomatic relations with Jordan were established in 1953 only after the death of King Abdullah, who publicly invited Yugoslav political emigrants to immigrate to Jordan without hiding hostility towards the new regime in Yugoslavia. Since then, mutual relations were very good. However, despite the efforts of the two governments, mutual economic exchange remained at a very low annual level. Economic and political relations with Lebanon were also relatively developed, which, due to the character of the Lebanese society and the priorities of the Lebanese foreign policy, did not experience a serious momentum. Diplomatic relations with Iraq did not exist due to Yugoslavia's good relations with Israel. Only after the regime change in Iraq in 1958, the conditions were created for the establishment of Yugoslav-Iraqi relations (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-b).

Defining Yugoslav Policy in the Middle East

Active Yugoslav policy in the Middle East experienced a major manifestation during the Suez Crisis in 1956. The Yugoslav participation in resolving the Suez dispute had multiple and multi-layered aspects. Apart from the political and diplomatic engagement that manifested itself in the daily monitoring of the situation and maintaining contacts with the parties to the conflict and other interested parties, as well as the peace initiative within the United Nations, Yugoslavia also engaged in the military, economic and media activities. Yugoslavia sent its pilots to the Suez Company and thus helped the Egyptian government to temporarily ensure unhindered navigation through the Suez Canal (DASMIP, PA, 1958, f. 3). The Yugoslav media, by unwaveringly representing the views of the Egyptian government, greatly contributed to the affirmation of such a policy in the world. Certainly, the most significant, extensive and longest one was the Yugoslav military engagement within the United Nations peacekeeping force. The Yugoslav detachment within the UNEF carried out tasks in the area of Sinai throughout the whole duration of this peacekeeping mission until 1967. Such a Yugoslav attitude affected the relations between Yugoslavia and Great Britain and France, but also the relations between Yugoslavia and the two superpowers, leaving at the same time consequences on the stability of the Balkan Pact. During the Suez Crisis, the Yugoslav government demonstrated its new foreign policy doctrine, based on the principles of political distancing from the Western and Eastern blocs and the formation of a broader movement of non-aligned countries. By acting in order to resolve a major international conflict such as the Suez Crisis, Yugoslavia was also taking preventive actions to preserve its own national security. At the same time, by sending a contingent to the international peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations, Yugoslavia secured for itself one of the ways of international presence in the region. Also, during the Suez Crisis, Yugoslavia presented the basic principles of its Middle East policy, which fully expressed itself in the following decades, and which was one of the basic tenets of its foreign policy until the collapse of the state in 1991.

A New Culmination of the Middle Eastern Crisis

The Arab-Israeli conflict did not subside after the wars of 1948 and 1956. Frequent border incidents, Egypt's ban on the navigation of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, as well as the Arab blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba

and unresolved border issues made the Middle East conflict permanent and unsolvable. The Israeli government tried to influence the Egyptian government by broader action and by asking for Yugoslav mediation to give up the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Due to the Egyptian rigidity in the positions taken, this initiative did not give results. The constant tension on the Arab-Israeli borders culminated in the spring of 1967. In May 1967, the President of the United Arab Republic, Nasser, requested the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping force from the area of Sinai, so that Egyptian troops could take control of that area. This created the conditions for the beginning of a new war. The Israeli side feared a possible joint Arab attack on Israel. In such conditions, the Israeli state and military leadership decided on preventive military action. The Israeli attack was very violent. It began on 5 June at 7:45 a.m. with a simultaneous Israeli air force attack on ten Egyptian airports. In the first three hours of the war, three air raids were carried out on 19 airports, during which about 300 Egyptian planes were destroyed at the airport stands. The surprise effect was fully achieved. Already on the third day of the war, 7 June, strong Israeli armoured mechanized units reached the Suez Canal. On the same day, the Israeli army took over the old part of Jerusalem and reached the Jordan River. Until the establishment of the armistice through the United Nations on June 10, Israeli troops took control of the entire area of the Golan Heights on the Syrian part of the front. The defeat of the United Arab armies was complete. It is estimated that the Arab armies lost about 70% of weapons and military equipment worth about one billion dollars, or a total of about 1,000 tanks, while Egypt lost 336, Jordan 29, Syria 60, and Iraq 25 fighter planes. Total human losses were estimated at about 30,000. The Yugoslav government reacted very quickly. The speed of reaction was conditioned not only by close relations with the Arab world, but also by the fact that a Yugoslav detachment within the UNEF was stationed in Sinai, as well as a large number of Yugoslav construction companies, but also by the fact that the Yugoslav People's Army was supplied with oil from the Middle East, which could greatly jeopardise the country's defence capability in a very sensitive foreign policy situation. After several days of negotiations with the Israeli government, a Yugoslav detachment within the UNEF was evacuated through territory controlled by the Israeli army. Yugoslav workers who found themselves in that area were evacuated in the same way. Immediately after the beginning of the war, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito issued an official statement on 5 June in which he designated Israel as an aggressor, at the same time appealing to the United Nations to stop the aggression (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). The next day, on 6 June, at a meeting with the president of

the Federal Executive Council, it was decided to urgently evacuate Yugoslav citizens from the areas directly affected by the war, to strengthen the security of diplomatic missions of the warring parties in Yugoslavia and to issue orders to local Communist League organisations to organise protests. Besides, it was decided to send emergency aid in food and medicine to Arab countries. It was also decided to meet the request sent by the military envoy of the United Arab Republic in Belgrade the day before, asking for the urgent delivery of anti-tank mines, cans of beans and beef and field kitchens. *Jugoimport* was ordered to determine the methods of delivery of the requested material to the United Arab Republic (AJ, 1967, 837-KPR, I-5-c). The next meeting with the President of the Federal Executive Council was held on 7 June. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the military leadership, Generals Rudi Petovar and Ivan Kukoč. The decision was made to deliver the requested quantities of anti-tank mines and cans of beef and beans to the United Arab Republic as soon as possible, while regarding the delivery of the requested field kitchens, it was found that the Yugoslav People's Army was also lacking them, so it was decided to deliver only a smaller quantity. These funds were delivered to the United Arab Republic by ship within 15 days. Taking into account the urgency of the situation and the purchasing power of the United Arab Republic, it was decided not to raise the issue of payment for goods. At the same meeting, General Petovar stated that the war in the Middle East endangered the supply of fuel to the Yugoslav People's Army which had the reserve for only about 30 days. In addition, he demanded that the government urgently provided funds for the purchase of batteries, tires and spare parts for trucks and ban the export of drugs necessary for the functioning of the army. The Yugoslav military leadership used the existing nervousness of the state leadership caused by the war to provide for the missing funds (AJ, 1967, 837-KPR, I-5-c). In addition, the rapprochement of Yugoslavia and the Arab countries was especially influenced by the Yugoslav decision of 13 June 1967 on the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel. It was very difficult to determine how this decision was made. However, it can be said with certainty that this decision was influenced by a number of factors. Namely, the relations between Yugoslavia and the Arab countries had previously reached a very high level, and any further maintenance of good relations with Israel would leave permanent negative consequences on the relations between Yugoslavia and the Arab world (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). On the other hand, other socialist countries did the same, which also influenced the decision of the Yugoslav state leadership. Also, relations between Yugoslavia and Israel were in a latent crisis since 1956 due to Yugoslavia's

closeness to Arab countries. Immediately after the severance of mutual diplomatic relations, it was agreed that Austria would represent Yugoslav interests in Israel, and Belgium Israeli interests in Yugoslavia. Immediately after the cease-fire, an emergency shipment of 7 tons of medicine and medical supplies was sent by plane. During the summer of 1967, 30,000 tons of corn, 10,000 tons of sugar, 1,000 tons of canned fish, 200 tons of powdered milk, 500 tons of cheese, 500,000 pairs of shoes and a larger quantity of medicines and other food products were delivered (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). At the same time, readiness for the realisation of favourable credit arrangements was expressed. Besides, at the meeting of representatives of the socialist countries in Moscow, Josip Broz tried to provide wider assistance to the United Arab Republic by Eastern European countries. Soviet military planes that transported Soviet military aid to the armies of Arab countries were also allowed to fly over Yugoslav territory. In talks with Soviet representatives, the need for urgent military assistance to Arab countries was emphasised in order to renew their military arsenals and regain the offensive power of their armies as soon as possible. The Vice President of the Republic, Koča Popović, was immediately sent to Cairo and met with President Nasser (² AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). He informed Nasser about Yugoslav attitudes, asking for urgent information about Egypt's needs. Also, Popović was especially interested in the attitudes of the Arab world regarding the solution to the crisis. The information was necessary to shape Yugoslav attitudes. On that occasion, in addition to talks on further diplomatic and economic assistance, the modalities of Yugoslav military assistance to the United Arab Republic were also discussed. During the visit of Josip Broz Tito to the United Arab Republic from 10 to 15 August 1967, the head of Broz's military cabinet, General Petar Babić, a man of exceptional Broz's confidence, talked about the possibilities of military assistance to the UAR with Egyptian military officials. A list of priorities was also determined and submitted to the State Secretariat for National Defence through diplomatic channels (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). The delivery of a larger quantity of means of transportation, means of communication, medical supplies, infantry weapons, as well as anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons was requested. The Yugoslav General Staff immediately compiled a list of funds that it could provide immediately. On that occasion, a visit of a special military delegation of the UAR to Yugoslavia was agreed, which was supposed to prepare a detailed framework of Yugoslav military assistance. The military delegation of the UAR arrived in Belgrade on 3 September. As a part of the protocol, they visited the Secretary of State for National Defence and the President of the Federal Executive Council, while concrete talks

were held with the delegation of the General Staff led by the Chief of Staff - Colonel General Miloš Sumonja. The official talks began on 4 September. They discussed the concretization of the agreement on military assistance, the conclusion of an agreement on the Yugoslav loan to the UAR and the purchase of weapons and military equipment in Yugoslavia. In addition, they discussed scientific-technical cooperation and cooperation in the production of weapons and military equipment, as well as the prospects for further cooperation between the armies. The military delegation of the UAR was especially interested in means of communication, means of transport, anti-armour weapons and anti-aircraft artillery (VA, AJNA, GS-1, k. 10, f. 7). Immediately before their arrival, an agreement was concluded on the Yugoslav delivery of rounds for artillery ammunition (DASMIP, PA, 1967, f. 182). According to the lists of priorities submitted by the Egyptian military authorities to the Yugoslav colleagues, the means that were produced in the factories of the domestic special purpose industry or were in the warehouses of the war reserve were immediately delivered. Either many of the offered means had already been withdrawn from operational use and originated from Western military aid programs to Yugoslavia in the mid-1950s, or it were weapons and military equipment obtained from the Soviet Union immediately after the end of the Second World War. During the talks, the tendency of the Yugoslav military leadership to get rid of a surplus of obsolete weapons and military equipment under the guise of aid to a friendly country was clearly present. Certainly, the most important form of military support to the UAR was the sale of Yugoslav weapons and military equipment under very favourable conditions, which was agreed upon during Josip Broz Tito's visit to Cairo in August 1967. Namely, the Yugoslav government approved a loan to the UAR with a low-interest rate and a longer repayment period for the purchase of Yugoslav products. The loan was repayable with clearing. In this way, the credit policy supported the export of products of the domestic special-purpose industry and indirectly ensured the import of necessary goods from the UAR. The rest of the Yugoslav loan was spent on the purchase of goods in third countries, but through Yugoslav foreign trade companies, which was an additional benefit. Significant quantities of domestic weapons and military equipment and smaller quantities of old Soviet weapons were sold through the credit arrangement (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). Yugoslav military assistance to the UAR and the sale of weapons and military equipment on favourable financial terms were not only of military and economic importance. This was one of the important aspects of Yugoslav foreign policy, especially its segment concerning relations with non-aligned countries. Yugoslav military

assistance to the UAR was an integral part of widespread and organised political action in the field of comprehensive assistance to Arab countries in order to repair the consequences of the catastrophic political and military defeat suffered during the Third Arab-Israeli War. In addition, it was an introduction to a new phase of mutual political and military relations. The new course of Yugoslav policy in that region was manifested in the first days after the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967.

Searching for a Solution

At the initiative of Yugoslavia and a group of non-aligned countries, a special session of the United Nations General Assembly was convened immediately after the end of hostilities. The proposal of a resolution by non-aligned countries to unconditionally condemn Israeli aggression was not adopted at the session as it did not receive the required two-thirds majority, as many non-aligned countries abstained from voting due to the pressure of the United States. However, the proposal received 53 votes, as the representatives of Japan and France also voted for it. Although this action did not yield the expected results, it greatly influenced the definition of the Yugoslav position in the Middle East problem. Appreciating the Yugoslav position in the Arab world and the influence that Josip Broz had with President Nasser, on 28 July and then on 9 August, American President Lyndon Johnson addressed special personal messages to Broz, explaining the US position and asking for assistance in mediating to resolve the crisis (AJ, 837-KPR, I-1/1104). The American position was based on the principles of a quick solution to the crisis while respecting Israeli interests and the recognition of the existence of the state of Israel by the Arabs. Immediately after the crisis subsided, Josip Broz Tito visited the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq from 10 to 18 August 1967. The purpose of the visit was to get acquainted with the views of the Arab countries and to present the Yugoslav platform for resolving the Middle East conflict. The Yugoslav platform was based on solving problems within the United Nations bodies with the urgent withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories while enabling Israeli ships to navigate freely through the Suez Canal. Broz introduced Nasser to the content of Johnson's messages. At the same time, he insisted on representing Arab interests, but tried to convince his interlocutors of the need to recognise the existence of the state of Israel. On the Arab side, Yugoslav views were not fully met with understanding. They insisted on passing a special resolution that would provide for the urgent withdrawal of Israeli military forces, while other disputes would be resolved

later through direct negotiations. An agreement was reached on the need for wider engagement of non-aligned countries that would come out with their new proposal of the resolution (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). Upon his return to the country, Josip Broz addressed American President Johnson on 24 August. He informed him about the positions of the Arab countries, emphasising that they did not consider the offered framework of the American-Soviet resolution to be a sufficient guarantee of their own security and the withdrawal of Israeli troops. At the same time, he informed him about the Yugoslav platform for resolving the crisis, which would contain five points: withdrawal of all troops from the areas occupied after 4 June 1967; guarantees for security and borders in pre-war form by the Security Council or four great powers until a definitive solution, with the possible stationing of the United Nations peacekeeping force on both sides of the border, free navigation on the Tyrrhenian Sea for all ships until the final decision of the International Court of Justice and navigation on the Suez Canal as before the war (AJ, 837-KPR, I-1/1104). On 19 September, President Johnson responded to Josip Broz by rejecting the Yugoslav proposal as outdated, insisting on accepting the draft US-Soviet resolution. He also firmly stuck to the position that a solution could not be reached without the Arab recognition of Israel and the signing of a peace treaty that would end the state of war that had existed since 1947 (AJ, 837-KPR, I-1/1104). As contacts between Presidents Broz and Johnson did not bring the positions between the United States and the Arab world closer, the Yugoslav leadership decided to take wider action among non-aligned countries in order to reach a solution to the conflict based on the five principles proclaimed in talks with Arab leaders. In addition to non-aligned countries, a special place in that diplomatic initiative was to be given to France, which was the only one among the great Western powers to condemn the Israeli attack on the Arab world. Josip Broz especially appreciated the French position on the issue of the Middle East dispute, and especially the new course of French foreign policy, which was based on distancing from American foreign policy. For that purpose, it was decided that Koča Popović would travel to Paris as a special envoy. Special envoys were also appointed for major non-aligned countries and non-permanent members of the Security Council. President of the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia Josip Djerdja travelled to Algeria, Mali and Guinea, Deputy State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mišo Pavićević to Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia and member of the Federation Council Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo to Chile, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. It was also planned to send several personal messages from President

Broz to the heads of state and government of all non-aligned countries and permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, as well as aide-memoirs of the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to other countries (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). The action of the Yugoslav president gave initial results. All his special envoys were received immediately with appropriate importance and treatment. During all contacts, it was stated that Yugoslavia was interested in initiating the process of resolving the Middle East dispute, regardless of different goals and interests. There was a general agreement that the great powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, could have a decisive influence on the resolution of the dispute, and that delaying the resolution of the problem was very dangerous. All the interlocutors pointed out the need to pay special attention to the real state of affairs (the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel, the need for recognition of Israel by the Arabs, freedom of navigation). In the international community, the Yugoslav initiative was described as very positive (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). The Yugoslav proposal was supported by U Thant, De Gaulle, Haile Selassie and Indira Gandhi and expressed their readiness to engage, but they did not hide their pessimism regarding the possibility of withdrawing Israeli military forces. They also doubted the readiness of the United States to engage in that direction, so they believed that it was necessary to take wider action and put pressure through the mobilisation of a larger number of countries. Representatives of Chile, Tanzania and Indonesia had similar views. On the same occasion, De Gaulle was particularly critical of the policies of the two superpowers, emphasising the crucial responsibility of the four great powers to resolve the conflict. American President Johnson particularly emphasised Yugoslavia's readiness to launch a discussion, but continued to insist on the views expressed in previous correspondence with Josip Broz. Yugoslav diplomats got the impression that Johnson was very dissatisfied with the rejection of the Soviet-American proposal. The Yugoslav initiative was not supported by a group of socialist countries. In the first reactions, there was even an undisguised tendency to qualify the Yugoslav action as part of the previously made plan at the counselling of the socialist countries in Budapest and Moscow. Only Romanian representatives expressed particular interest in Yugoslav proposals and showed broader understanding and support for such action (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). What brought unrest to Yugoslav diplomacy in a way was the fact that none of the world leaders, except Indira Gandhi, mentioned the role of non-aligned countries in the process of resolving the crisis in the Middle East. It was assessed that there was a collision between the use of the term itself and

concrete political action that was in line with these principles, which was considered to have found concrete support. Based on the first reactions of a number of world leaders, it was clear that the Yugoslav initiative had achieved a certain effect. This was confirmed by the conclusions of the Yugoslav representative to the United Nations, Anton Vratuša, who emphasised the importance of the Yugoslav initiative but also sublimated the problems that seemed insurmountable in the contacts between the interested parties. Thus, the initial Yugoslav position, which was based on unreserved support for the Arab world, was supplemented by a more detailed elaboration of the platform, which corresponded to the very complicated international situation that arose after the session of the United Nations General Assembly (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). Based on the experiences gained during that initiative, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs prepared an extensive study on possible directions for further action of Yugoslav diplomacy. It was assessed that the Yugoslav proposal was accepted as an action that restarted the process of searching for a solution, and these specific aspects of that plan were not considered, so it was thought that further discussions would follow. Further exchange of views within the framework of silent diplomacy was proposed, as it was considered that initiating a wider debate within the United Nations bodies without first securing wider support for the offered platform and harmonization of positions would be absolutely counterproductive. It was considered that in the process of finding a solution, Yugoslav diplomacy should focus on the analysis of reactions to the Yugoslav plan in order to more clearly determine the positions of individual countries in the coming period and the basis for further concrete actions and narrowing differences to create a platform that would be broadly acceptable (AJ, 837-KPR, I-5-c). It was also proposed to continue the dialogue with the Arab world in order to determine the limits to which the Arab world was ready to go to reach a compromise. Also, it was insisted on the dialogue within the United Nations bodies and the expansion of contacts to the whole range of interested countries, which, above all, referred to the Nordic, Western European, Latin American and African countries. It was particularly insisted on the involvement of India in that process as the future chairman of the United Nations Security Council and on the mediating role between the Arab countries and the opposing Western world. Particular emphasis was placed on the belief that any proposal of a new resolution containing a plan or platform for resolving the crisis should be refrained from. The basic idea was therefore to continue negotiations and exchange of opinions in order to find a solution that would have wider support. In later considerations, such a formulation became the

basis for further action of Yugoslav diplomacy (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). However, the sharp opposition between the conflicting parties, the great powers and the smaller, mostly non-aligned countries over the directions of future actions in order to reach a solution made the dispute more serious and complicated. However, such a Yugoslav effort was often misunderstood by representatives of Arab countries. Thus, the Egyptian ambassador to Yugoslavia, Abuzeid, in a conversation with Yugoslav diplomats, complained about the lack of Yugoslav understanding of the problems of the Arab world. He criticised Yugoslav diplomacy for insisting on political realism (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). It was unacceptable for him to seek a purely political solution. Such a tone in the speeches of the representatives of the Arab countries brought unrest to Yugoslav-Arab relations. The diplomatic action that lasted for several months inside and outside the United Nations bodies culminated in the decision of the Security Council of 22 November 1967. The adopted resolution did not represent a solution to the crisis, but it offered a suitable framework for resolving the crisis. It envisaged the engagement of a special representative of the Secretary-General, who was supposed to enable concrete steps and talks for finding a favourable and acceptable solution. The resolution was based on the accumulation of all submitted proposals and represented a compromise between the various efforts of the directly interested parties. Common to all proposals, including the Yugoslav one, was that the issues of free navigation through the Suez Canal and Palestinian refugees were left for a later stage of the talks. However, what clashed with the Yugoslav proposals was the fact that the adopted resolution did not imply the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the occupied territory. At that stage of the talks, a special limiting factor for the Yugoslav side was the fact that Yugoslavia was not a member of the Security Council, which greatly limited its diplomatic room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav representatives in the United Nations maintained daily contacts with the representatives of the Arab countries, India and the member states of the Security Council (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). The prevailing opinion in Yugoslav diplomatic circles was that the adopted resolution provided a realistic framework for reaching a solution, but that it was very far from a final solution. Although the Arab countries did not accept the Security Council resolution, their position was strengthened, among other things, thanks to the Yugoslav engagement. This was stated by Egyptian President Nasser in a conversation with Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Marko Nikezić in Cairo on 28 December 1967. Nasser highly appreciated the Yugoslav military, economic and diplomatic assistance to the Arab world during the crisis. He especially

emphasized the usefulness of Broz's advice. On the same occasion, Nikezić advised the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, and maximum flexibility and offered a new joint diplomatic action. In that way, the crisis in mutual relations was overcome very quickly, caused by opposite views on possible directions for resolving the crisis (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). The beginning of 1968 marked a new stage in the process of seeking a solution to the Middle East conflict. The negotiations entered a new and very long phase. The United Nations Special Envoy, Ambassador Jarring, conducted slow negotiations with stakeholders that did not yield more serious results. This type of negotiation was gradually leaving Yugoslavia and its diplomacy aside. During that period, the scope of work of Yugoslav diplomacy on this issue was reduced to constant consultations with representatives of Arab countries (AJ, 837- KPR, I-5-c). Josip Broz reiterated Yugoslav support for Arab countries, especially Egypt, in his personal messages to President Nasser on 26 February 1968 and 31 May of the same year (AJ, 837- KPR, I-1/1304 and I-1/1305). The messages insisted on a further search for a compromise. Despite his influence and Nasser's undisguised admiration for his political greatness, Josip Broz Tito failed to soften extremely rigid Arab attitudes. With the outbreak of the crisis in the socialist world in the spring of 1968 and the strengthening of tensions in the Far East with the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, the Middle East crisis gradually fell into the background of Yugoslav foreign policy engagement due to certain limitations of Yugoslav foreign policy capacities. The death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the gradual Arab rapprochement with the Western world, the Yugoslav turn to European politics and the start of Middle East peace talks mediated by the United States led to an accelerated Yugoslav withdrawal from the region with the persistent representation of Arab interests in international forums. Nasser's death and the coming to power of his close associate Sadat, Sadat's "flirtation" with the USSR, and then the United States, conditioned Yugoslavia's distancing from Egypt and orientation towards Iraq with which it developed close military and economic ties. The internal crisis in Yugoslavia, the reduction of its foreign policy capacity and reputation in the world conditioned its reduced interest in that region in the moments before its disintegration. The renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1991 symbolically marked the collapse of Yugoslav pro-Arab Middle East policy. In the years following the conflict with the Soviet Union and its satellites, the Middle East gradually gained an increasingly important place in Yugoslav foreign policy. Leaning on the traditions of the presence of the Kingdom of Serbia and Yugoslavia in that area, under a new ideological spirit in the changed circumstances of international relations,

Yugoslavia sought to establish closer contacts with Middle Eastern countries on the way to creating a wider movement of non-aligned countries and countries that were not part of the blocs. The character of relations between the Middle Eastern countries themselves, as well as their foreign policy priorities, determined the character of Yugoslav policy in that region, constantly conditioning and tracing the contours of interstate relations.

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INDIA AND NON-ALIGNMENT - FORMATIVE YEARS

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Abstract: Prior to India's independence, Jawaharlal Nehru declared non-alignment to be the guiding principle of Indian foreign policy. The same approach is taken by the current government of India, which adheres to this tradition. This chapter shows that non-alignment meant very little right from the start, as it was neither defined nor did it give any practical guidance for a general course or individual cases. On the contrary, a rivalling concept for an aligned foreign policy, authored by the Ministry of External Affairs first Secretary-General G.S. Bajpai, was based on a quarter-century of experience on the international floor and breathed deep realism. While Nehru over the years left it mostly with commonplaces, Bajpai's realism occasionally surfaced both in the prime minister's statements and Indian foreign policy. Early decision-making, decisions and non-decisions in the cases of China and Germany show confusion in the upper ranks of the Indian Foreign Service. Finally, national interest was pursued for pragmatic or economic motives, although the term was strictly avoided in the public as it contracted the Nehruvian idea of uniqueness and idealism.

Key words: India, Non-alignment, Realism, national interest, Cold War, Germany, China, Nehru

Introduction

No analysis of the foreign policy of independent India can skip over the term non-alignment. Many studies on the country's foreign affairs celebrate non-alignment as a genuine, smart Indian concept and a major contribution to global affairs, especially during the Cold War, allowing a more or less

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independent course in years of economic underdevelopment and relative military weakness. By all means, non-alignment has been used as a synonym for Nehruvian foreign relations. Until today, it officially defines Delhi's course in international affairs. Therefore, India has always been ascribed a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement. The difficulty arises when one attempts to find a closer definition of Indian non-alignment, then and today. Apart from staying away from military pacts, Indian non-alignment has always been open for interpretations. As Keenleyside shows, there have been various attempts to give some meaning to it. Indeed, if the term ever was defined, it was by scholars and retired diplomats, mostly belatedly and more than once rather unconvincingly trying to explain that whatever course India had taken in a particular constellation, it remained non-aligned (Keenleyside, 1980, 461-483). One early explanation was to choose a stand by the merit of every individual case. Later, equidistance to both power blocs was considered essential, although establishing such a position stood clearly against the claim of maximum freedom of decision. Indeed, it forced India to balance any step that might be considering favouring one Cold War camp. Whenever the country was considered too close to the West, some leading representative would issue some anti-Western statement in Moscow; notably, no such pattern was seen in the reverse. Such ambiguity rooted in Nehru's often complained Hamletian vagueness. The prime minister never formulated a doctrine of non-alignment. In the internal communication of the MEA, until deep into the 1950s, neutralism or neutrality were used synonymously to non-alignment.

The problem starts with the term itself: Precluding any military alliance – the essence of being non-aligned – leaves many options open and is not tantamount to pursuing a definite course. A non-policy is not a policy yet. To no surprise, there has been, and is, little discussion whether it was wise to choose non-alignment as the guiding principle of foreign affairs, after all. In a lucid criticism of non-alignment, Jayanta Kumar Ray has summarised references of various Indian governments regarding their understanding of the term: Nehru wanted to preserve, first, political independence, second, world peace and, finally, independence of opinion and action on every issue. Ray analyses that an aligned foreign policy pursues the first two aims as well. Furthermore, no government will ever admit that alignment might hamper their full freedom of decision. Moreover, “no country, aligned or non-aligned, can enjoy absolute independence in any case” (Ray, 2011, p. 25). Ray concludes that non-alignment is nothing but *realpolitik*, be it India or other countries (Ray, 2011, *Ibid*). Historians of South Asia are well advised to accept this explanation. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and

Cooperation of 1971 came dangerously close to a military alliance, allowing Indira Gandhi to fight a blitzkrieg in then East Pakistan. Earlier, after India's military defeat in the war against the People's Republic of China in 1962, the immediate, as well as the ongoing military threat emanating from Beijing, could be countered only due to support from both Moscow and Washington. Finally, India's development policy could not have been pursued without essential financial and technical support by industrialised countries in Western Europe and North America, even without a military alliance creating an enormous economic dependence on donor countries, which were nearly all members of the Western military pacts. It would be easy to name numerous similar well-known examples in Indian history throughout the Cold War. This chapter looks into the formative years of Indian non-alignment when a debate on realpolitik versus non-alignment took place. On the basis of lesser-known cases, it further shows how India in the years shortly after independence pursued its national interest while knowingly ignoring the principles and morale. It concludes with a short overview of the later years of the Nehruvian foreign policy.

Alignment versus Non-alignment

The concept of not aligning a country's policy with others can be traced back to the Congress of Vienna of 1815 when the neutrality of Switzerland was recognised by the European powers. It meant that the country would keep out of the conflicts of others under all circumstances. Such a policy found much sympathy in late colonial South Asia. Indian soldiers had fought the British wars in Asia throughout the 19th century. During the First World War, they formed the largest freelance army in history. All this had been financed by the Indian taxpayer. Furthermore, European affairs and colonial policy between 1914 and 1945 abhorred Indian nationalists. Influenced by Marx and Lenin, they saw imperialism and the pursuit of national interest as the main sources of tensions and war. Allegedly, the Western civilisation was driven by materialism, whereas Asia and, in particular, India stood for superior spirituality. M.K. Gandhi held that India had little to learn from Western modernity. Against the background of the downfall of Europe in ruinous wars, India was considered to have a civilising mission for mankind as a whole. This, combined with the country's size, population and a strategic position, made nationalists consider India a potential great power. Therefore, all ideas on a future Indian foreign policy were based on the assumption of strength (Keenleyside, 1980, 461-483). Much of this can be found in the thinking of Jawaharlal Nehru already

before he became India's first prime minister. Historiography proves, however, that the utterances of politicians on foreign affairs while not yet having any influence on their formulation or implementation count little. Only the experience of exercising actual power with the establishment of the Indian Interim Government in September 1946, led by Nehru as vice-president, set practical considerations in motion. It turned out that, notwithstanding various earlier statements on global and Indian foreign affairs, India's new leader had hardly any idea on the subject. On 5 December 1946, he admitted that "our policies . . . seem to be rather confused, and there is a tendency to adapt ourselves to this or that varying policy initiated by others. To some extent this is inevitable, but this should not be allowed to go far". In any case, India should not be party "to British foreign policy or the old methods of the British Foreign Office . . . Our policy will be determined by us later" (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), M.O. Mathai Papers, Correspondence with K.P.S. Menon. Letter, Nehru to K.P.S. Menon, 5 December 1946 (NMML, 1946). Indeed, India inherited much of British policy, and not only politics in the areas neighbouring the subcontinent. Early that year, on the other side of the globe, another Indian had authored a comprehensive foreign policy concept, which stood in sharp contrast to the ideas of Indian nationalists as outlined above. Girja Shankar Bajpai, agent-general of British India in Washington D.C., looked back to a quarter-century in international diplomacy. An officer of the elite cadre of the Indian Civil Service from 1921, he had attended numerous international conferences and meetings of the League of Nations, pursuing a comet-like career mostly in the context of the policy around Indians overseas. He was the first Indian official to be appointed secretary and later head of a department (Das Gupta, 2021, pp. 28-34). Due to his extraordinary skills as a negotiator, he, among others, had made racist South Africa participate in two round table conferences, which, for the time being, ended the discrimination of people of Indian origin (Das Gupta, 2021, pp. 47-71). In 1942, his transfer to Washington was actually degradation. Nevertheless, it also brought him in close touch with nearly every conference shaping the early stages of the Cold War (Das Gupta, 2021, pp. 150-169). Therefore, India's leading foreign policy expert at the eve of independence was not Nehru, lacking practical experience in diplomacy and international affairs. It was Bajpai, ironically, heavily engaged in anti-Congress propaganda during the world war. In the interwar period, Bajpai had represented a political entity unable to exercise any pressure. Unlike South Africa, British India enjoyed no dominion status. Furthermore, it could not impose any economic sanctions, let alone threaten with force. *Vis-à-vis*

Pretoria, therefore, Bajpai's strategy was much of a continuation of Gandhi's: Distinguished Indian individuals convinced their European counterparts that they conversed on eye level. Like civil rights activists, they had to appeal to their sense of fairness. (Das Gupta, 2021, p. 4). What Bajpai had learned by heart was diplomacy from an inferior position. Notwithstanding all Nehruvian rhetoric, this proved to be realistic for the decades to come; but it stood diametrically against the nationalist belief that India would conduct its foreign affairs from a position of strength. Accordingly, Bajpai's concept of 1946, formally a quarterly report from Washington, started from the assumption that independent India needed strong partners or allies. "A combination of the weak", i.e., with China or the Middle East countries would not provide "the complimentary strength that India will need", he argued. Delhi had to consider a close partnership with one of the great powers – the US, the USSR or the UK. The Soviet Union, however, would undermine Indian democracy, whereas Washington was incalculable and immature. Whatever wrongs in the past, only the British Commonwealth offered a partnership at eye level and to mutual benefit. "Sentiment must serve, not master the national interest" was the concluding sentence, the credo of a realist (BL, 1945). This model concept of realist thinking and even more the term "national interest" should have been anathema to Indian nationalist politicians and Nehru. Many of the later prime minister's statements and actions in international affairs were driven less by logic, but rather by predispositions and emotions, often pride. Whether Nehru ever read the analysis is unknown. Though the head of the External Affairs Department from September 1946, he was overburdened as a party leader, manager of the transfer of power and the failed effort to establish cooperation with the Muslim League in order to prevent the split-up of British India into the Indian Union and Pakistan. It was the combination of too many tasks, the disappointment about the performance of Indian representatives among others at the United Nations, and, finally, the lack of a concept of foreign policy that made Nehru ask for Bajpai's services. The very same day he admitted that he had no clue which course to pursue, he called back India's highest-ranking civil servant to establish the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Indian Foreign Service (SWJN, 1946, pp. 549-550). From the spring of 1947, the two very protagonists of antagonistic schools of thinking on foreign affairs came to work together closely. Nehru's ideas on foreign affairs remained vague, as his first speech on the issue to the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947 shows. The prime minister admitted that nothing much had been achieved that far. A year ago, it was stated that "we will not attach ourselves to any particular group". He

elaborated that “ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy”, but until India “has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will rather grope about”. To say that India stood for peace and freedom that far was a commonplace, found with every country. India should pursue a course “what is most advantageous to her”, though no “narrow national policy . . . We propose to look after India’s interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace” and make friends with other countries “unless they themselves create difficulties”, including the US and the USSR (SWJN, 1946, pp. 549-603). Though the term itself was avoided, there surfaced national interest, which was clearly defined by economic policy, a key consideration for any developing country. Three years later, he confirmed that ideologies had no actual relevance. India should look after its own interests (Nehru, 196, pp. 135-136). Nehru struggled with his insight that India needed to pursue its national interest on the one hand and his idealistic beliefs on the other. More than once, this clashed with Bajpai’s straightforward realism. Having been trained in the Indian Civil Service, the new secretary-general of the MEA made it a point to give in whenever there was open dissent (Gundevia, 1984, pp. 89-90). Due to his and his confidants’ influence, the tendency towards realpolitik and alignment regularly surfaced throughout the Nehruvian Era, though often thwarted by the emotional decisions of the prime minister. Nehru wanted to be an innovator in international affairs, a claim closely linked with his general idea of modernity (Zachariah, 2004, pp. 7-10). Apart from rhetoric, however, initially, there was little innovation.

Non-aligned Vagueness versus Realism

When during the world war a Japanese invasion of India had appeared imminent, Gandhi had suggested that the Japanese would not enter the subcontinent if the British left and the Indians laid down their arms (Puri, 1977, pp. 44-45). Nehru did not go that far and maintained armed forces. At the same time, he was convinced that aggression could best be prevented by staying out of military pacts. In his eyes, the best defence policy was to establish a friendship with a potential rival (Das Gupta, 2021, pp. 45-246). When in 1950 Bajpai wanted to forge a military alliance with Burma, whose border was challenged by the People’s Republic of China, too, Nehru turned the initiative down. He held that there was “no urge for the Chinese to go to war with a neighbouring country unless that country deliberately joined a power which is hostile to China” (MEAA, 1950). The following year,

guided by the terms of the peace treaty, the prime minister declared that "Japanese security can best be secured by disarmament." (NAUK, 1951). There seemed to be an obvious contradiction in this approach: If a country needed to prepare its defence, why should it not increase its strength by finding allies? Nehru obviously referred to European military alliances before the First World War. Their mutual assistance clauses had led to the automatism of military mobilisations and a global war. Nehru wanted to secure the maximum freedom of decision, avoiding exactly such automatism. The military defeat in the war with the PRC in 1962 showed that there was more to military alliances: Any signatory could be pulled into a conflict which had been initiated between others on the one hand; on the other hand, in the case of a military attack on India, an alliance would also have guaranteed immediate support by the allies. This was dearly lacking in late 1962. The Nehruvian idea of non-alignment was essentially based on the belief that India was strong enough to defend itself against any aggressor. The logical conclusion that this precondition made the Indian idea of non-alignment incompatible for other, weaker countries was never drawn by the prime minister. On the contrary, he urged others to follow the Indian example. As early as 1951, the realist Bajpai warned Nehru "that there was such a thing as tempting providence", though to no avail (NAUK, 1951). The early years of Nehruvian non-alignment were hardly characterised by the principles and morale, let alone decisiveness. Delhi avoided committing itself to major Cold War questions. Among them, the recognition of divided states was highly relevant. Scholars have praised Indian equidistance to both Koreas and both Vietnams, Delhi recognising none (Misra, 1966). It appears, though, that Delhi was rather happy not having been asked to take a stand and, therefore, being able to remain an observer. This is indicated by the two cases when India recognised one party in China and Germany respectively. With the second Asian giant an immediate neighbour, Delhi simply could not stay aloof ((Das Gupta, 2021, p. 230). Over many years, the bonds between the Indian National Congress and the Guomindang had been as close as those between Nehru and Chiang Kai-Shek. Therefore, since 1942, British India maintained an agency general in Chungking and later Nanking, which was upgraded to an embassy in 1946. Over his 5-year term, Ambassador K.P.S. Menon met Mao Tse-dong at least once, and that at the San Francisco Conference in the US (NMML, 1945). The staunch support of Nationalist China vanished the moment when it was evident that the Communists would win the civil war. Notwithstanding the initial hostile attitude of the future rulers towards foreign diplomats, Menon's successor K.M. Panikkar was ordered to stay

on and establish contact with the new government. On 30 December 1949, India recognised the People's Republic of China. This was a deeply pragmatic decision. Notwithstanding severe criticism of corruption and mismanagement of the Guomindang Government, the Nehru government had no sympathies for communists. Indeed, the Communist Party of India was considered the very enemy of the new political order. Furthermore, new China was an unknown quantity on the global floor, its foreign policy unpredictable. There was no lack of warnings among Indian China experts that the PRC would soon occupy Tibet and revive traditional Chinese claims regarding the southern slopes of the Himalayas (Das Gupta, 2017, pp. 267-270). Bajpai and Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel suggested linking the recognition with an acceptance of the border as India defined it. They further wanted to secure the border areas with a military build-up. The prime minister, however, turned those suggestions down, holding that the best defence against possible conflicts would be to make friends with the new leadership in Beijing (Dasgupta, 2014, pp. 717-724). Believing in non-violent solutions was truly Nehruvian. It was less Nehruvian principles, though, to drop a close friend (Chiang Kai-shek). Finally, to take sides between two deeply antagonistic Chinese governments was not in line with non-alignment. The truth was that other than the PRC, far-away Taiwan was of no concern to India. Pragmatism overruled principles. This can be seen even better with another recognition issue the same year. The creation of two German states was of little immediate concern for Delhi, which in those days pursued but economic interests in Europe. In 1948, India concluded a trade agreement with the western occupation zones, whereas it had met indifference in the Soviet occupation zone. Like China, India had inherited a military mission in the British sector of Berlin. When in September the Federal Government established itself in Bonn, on request of the Western Powers, India opened an office there. However, India continued to accredit a representative to the Allied High Commission, officially the highest body of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). What within a few months later was considered the recognition of the new country was then handled as a mere bureaucratic act, approved by Bajpai, whereas the prime minister had not been involved. When the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created in the East of Germany in October, neither East Berlin nor Moscow asked Delhi for recognition of the GDR. Non-action like in Korea or Vietnam would have been sufficient (Das Gupta, 2019, pp. 101-117). It was India's representative in Berlin, Khub Chand, who authored the document which clarified where India's interests lay in divided Germany. A junior former officer of the colonial ICS with no experience in international

affairs and even less standing in Delhi, he hit the nail on the head, though in a manner that was never permitted to become public. He brushed away principles, legal arguments or the question of the legitimacy of the East German government, had India and the Western Powers well recognised the puppet regimes in the Soviet satellite states. Instead, he emphasised the taboo term “national interest”, even linking it with close cooperation with the US: “All the logic and all the loyalty to principles in the world will defeat their own ends if the country goes under. We are deeply interested in financial and technical assistance from the United States; otherwise, we run the risk in ten or fifteen years of an internal revolution fed on hunger and distress. We must not, therefore, turn Congress and private American businessmen from the task of Indian reconstruction by premature and ill-considered political moves in Europe”. India should establish trade relations with East Germany, but otherwise pursue a policy of wait and see. Even if the new regime has gained a popular mandate, India should act here when it has to (NAI, 1949). The MEA approved, Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon considering the analysis “sound” (NAI, 1949). It was British comments which finally triggered a discussion among MEA officials on the merits of the case. London let Delhi know that it did not consider the newly installed regime heading a proper state. Whereas the FRG enjoyed far-reaching, though not complete sovereignty, the Soviets kept on controlling everything in East Germany, where no elections had taken place. Therefore, the UK repudiated the East German claim to represent the whole of Germany (NAI, 1949). Only the freely elected Federal Government spoke for all Germans, including those in the Soviet occupation zone, currently truncated from the rest of Germany (NAI, 1949). In a formal reply, Menon informed that India pursued a wait-and-see strategy, would promote trade and deal with East German authorities on an ad hoc basis “without getting involved in questions of formal recognition” (NAI, 1949). Though nothing was patronising in the letters of the former colonial power, they definitely hit a nerve. The Indian internal discussion remained inconsequential, but it revealed that two years after independence, nobody in the MEA had a concrete idea of what exactly non-alignment meant or how to implement its alleged meaning into practical politics. Deputy Secretary S.K. Banerji understood it as a “policy of neutrality between the two blocs”. Therefore, “when necessary”, India “should be prepared to give equal recognition to the Democratic Govt. of East Germany as well” (NAI, 1949). Menon came to the same conclusion, though emphasising logic: “We have not been exactly logical in recognising the West German Government, set up under the Allied High Commission while refusing to recognise the South Korean

Government, which has been set up under the aegis of the United Nations. We do not want to commit a further illogicality by recognising the West German Government and refusing to recognise the Government of East Germany" (NAI, 1949). Joint Secretary C.S. Jha, finally, considered equidistance to both blocs the essence of non-alignment. He held that India could not subscribe to the British arguments "without laying ourselves open to a charge of partisanship with the western bloc" (NAI, 1949). Later on, Bajpai formulated internal guidelines for India's Germany, which have kept valid for more than two decades: "However illogical this may sound, our exchanging diplomatic representatives with East Germany will not only be misunderstood by the West German Government . . . but will retard rather than hasten the process of unification, which is the rational and natural objective. The more powers give formal recognition to the existence of two German Governments by accrediting diplomatic representation to each, the greater will be the tendency for the two German states to continue as separate entities" (NAI, 1954). This argumentation, used in public as well, referred to the right of self-determination, only too naturally a sacred cow for a former colony. It lacked logic, however, as Deputy Secretary A.J. Kidwai noted in another internal note in 1955: "Our recognition of West Germany is as much recognition of the division of Germany, and if we wanted to take a stand on German unification, we should not have recognised West Germany. Therefore, it seems to me that we have taken a wise action for the wrong reason, or perhaps, very wisely, given the world the wrong reasons for it. We avoid recognising East Germany not because of principle but on grounds of expediency" (NAI, 1954). In sum, India's policy regarding Germany tried to maintain a façade of moral high ground and principles. Indeed, economic and financial considerations, correctly translated as national interest, a term disdained by Indian nationalists, stood in the background of the decision to recognise West but not East Germany in 1949. It tells a story that the term was well used in internal communication – no reasonable official could deny Indian dependency on trade and aid from the West – but was strictly avoided in public statements. Non-alignment as understood by leading officials of the MEA de facto played no role at all: India's stand was neither logical nor neutral – indeed, the country in one of the highly relevant issues of the early Cold War clearly opted for the Western bloc. This was in full harmony with India's European policy throughout the Nehru years. Due to a similar political system, personal experiences of its elites, particularly in France and the UK, and a partly similar mindset thanks to British education, India, mostly with much sympathy, closely cooperated with West European countries, including

most of the colonial powers. On the contrary, the governments of the people's republics in the Soviet sphere were despised. Reports from Prague, where India for a long while maintained the only embassy apart from the one in Moscow, even after Stalin's death regularly saw brutal dictatorships using Stalinist methods.

Conclusions

Indian foreign affairs won some more shape in the mid-1950s. After the country played an extraordinary role in the context of the Geneva Peace Conference on Indochina, non-alignment seemed to come to fruition. Delhi also found some closer cooperation with the two other countries promoting a non-aligned foreign policy, Egypt and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Nehru only hesitatingly joined the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955, only to be outsmarted by his Chinese counterpart Zhou En-lai. When the Non-aligned Movement came into being at the Belgrade Conference in 1961, India, once again, played a rather defensive part, preventing too radical resolutions. India's border conflict with China has de facto ended its non-aligned position. The UK and the US offered immediate support and military hardware, not much later the USSR became the major provider for the Indian Air Force. After China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri was after a nuclear umbrella by both superpowers, often termed double-alignment. Finally, the Bangladesh War in December 1971 could not have been fought and won without Moscow counterbalancing threats from Beijing and Washington. Nevertheless, Delhi had also assured the tacit support of Western European countries, which went on providing substantial loans for India's economic development and quickly recognised Bangladesh, thereby allowing Indira Gandhi to reduce her dependence on the USSR. This decade of Indian foreign affairs was clearly characterised by *realpolitik*. If non-alignment still meant staying away from military alliances, it played a subordinated role at best. Every time Delhi clearly left a position of equidistance from the blocs, accepting military aid and more, Indian governments declared to be keen to recalibrate the country's stand in global affairs. Nevertheless, they had learned the lesson that when things came to a close like in 1962, they could not count on their non-aligned friends (Čavoški, 2017, pp. 160-178). Nevertheless, Nehruvian non-alignment remained the key term in every Indian government's statement, and this is true until today. As this chapter shows, non-alignment had little meaning in the formative years of the foreign affairs of independent India. The Nehru government was rather clueless as to what line to pursue and shy to use the

term 'national interest'. The result was indecisiveness on many levels of the administration and in many relevant issues.

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APPREHENSION, ENGAGEMENT, AND WITHDRAWAL: THE U.S. APPROACH TO COLD WAR NON-ALIGNMENT

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Abstract: Although the United States (US) was a traditional practitioner of neutrality, the experience of the two world wars led American Cold War creators to take a sharper approach to non-alignment. This chapter charts Washington's response to non-alignment in the early and middle Cold War years, with special attention to efforts by the Kennedy administration to engage the leading states of the Non-Aligned Movement, particularly at the Belgrade Conference. Despite initial successes in the Kennedy years, the policy of engagement foundered during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, amid the acrimony of the Vietnam War.

Key words: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Baines Johnson, Non-alignment, Belgrade Conference

George Kennan, Foreign Aid

Introduction

A stark paradox confronts those considering the often sceptical, sometimes hostile U.S. response to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the broader phenomenon of non-alignment: the extensive American history of neutrality and outspoken support of neutral rights. Whereas the Cold War-era U.S. administrations often expected and at times demanded solidarity in the global struggle against Soviet communism, their predecessors had celebrated a national tradition of engaging in commerce

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with all while allying with none. So jarring a transition may seem a generational process, but it could occur with remarkable swiftness, against the backdrop of a global conflagration. Twice, in fact, before the emergence of the Cold War, U.S. administrations pivoted away from neutrality, towards the habitual suspicion of a belligerent power. Although President Woodrow Wilson defended neutral rights for nearly three years, his government's April 1917 entry into the Great War effectively transformed U.S. policy. Alongside its British ally, the United States neutralised powers to limit their trade with the Central Powers. Not even neutral property rights proved sacrosanct; at a stroke in March 1918, London and Washington seized 137 Dutch merchant vessels for their own use. A more tolerant U.S. attitude emerged in 1919 at the Paris peace talks, reinforced by Wilson's failure to achieve ratification of the ensuing treaty and his country's retreat from explicit involvement in European affairs. An almost manic embrace of neutrality on the part of isolationists in the 1930s even entailed the abandonment of previously asserted rights. Foreign observers could be forgiven for believing that the republic had returned to its traditional outlook, but the events of 1917-18 proved more predictive of future conduct (Abbenhuis, 2006, pp. 132-134). Indeed, during the Second World War, the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt sought to terminate neutral commerce with the Axis powers. He and his allies could exert little leverage against neutral powers before the course of the war shifted decisively in favour of the Allies, but once it did, Washington made its preferences plain. Secretary of State Cordell Hull solemnly warned the neutrals in April 1944 against further trade with the Axis; sustained pressure on Sweden and Switzerland followed the June 1944 Normandy landings. Tellingly, the United States tended to deal more severely with the neutrals than did its British ally (Acheson, 1969, p. 55). In this instance, the experience proved formative. Unlike their Wilsonian predecessors, who largely decamped from Washington by 1921, officials who rose to prominence during the Second World War would remain in positions of influence, thereafter carrying a more jaundiced view of neutrality. Thomas Finletter, a future U.S. ambassador to NATO, reflected after the postwar trials of the Nazi leadership: We must, I think, regard Nuremberg as striking down finally the premise of international law that the trade of neutrals with aggressor nations is a right. We may perhaps go even further and assert that now that aggressive war is a crime, it is the positive duty of nations not to be neutral, but to do their fair share in suppressing the criminality (Gabriel, 1988, pp. 64-65). The Second World War conditioned the ascendant policy elite to regard neutrality sceptically: as an expression of timidity or avarice.

Invocations of traditional rights or protestations of vulnerability to Axis retaliation rang hollow in the ears of combatants engaged in a worldwide struggle. Perhaps a sustained interlude might have allowed this belligerent outlook to recede, but the onset of the Cold War presented Americans with a new global struggle and scant opportunity to reconsider the issue.

The United States and non-alignment in the early Cold War

To the extent that U.S. policymakers contemplated uncommitted states in the early Cold War years, familiar European neutrals constituted their primary concern. The globalisation of the Cold War by the turn of the 1950s, as well as the ongoing decolonisation of Asia, forced them to contend with an expanding group of states intent on avoiding alignment. Of these, India held singular importance: as a potential counterweight to China, as the largest state in South Asia, and as the most active neutral power at the United Nations. The June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War heightened India's international importance. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru directed his representative at the United Nations to condemn the North Korean invasion but went no further. India abstained from the critical UN resolution asking member states to contribute to the defence of South Korea, and steered an independent course thereafter (McMahon, 1994, pp. 82–86). Nehru had made his views on the Cold War plain to the U.S. government, notably during a visit to Washington the previous year. The Indian prime minister sought geopolitical independence, even as the Cold War divided much of the world into mutually hostile camps. He had declared, in September 1946, "We propose . . . to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to two world wars, and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale." (Raghavan, 2018, p. 148). Wary of great power entanglements so soon after attaining independence, Nehru also perceived responsibility and opportunity to arbitrate between hostile blocs. His government acted as an indispensable mediator during the Korean conflict: conveying warnings from China to Washington as the UN armies drove north, and subsequently helping to resolve the knotty problem of prisoner of war repatriation (Madan, 2020, pp. 39–46). In the nuclear age, Nehru's aversion to blocs and enthusiasm for mediation had much to commend it, but the Indian experience during the Korean War illustrated abundantly how such a stance would be received by other parties. Even as they sometimes admitted the utility of India's actions, Americans chafed at Indian criticism, ascribing a lack of moral courage to Nehru and his government (Rotter, 2000, pp. 211–

213). Bitterness lingered after the combatants finally reached an armistice in 1953. "When the chips were down," declared Republican Senator William Knowland afterwards, "India was not there (McMahon, 1994, pp. 179-180)." The Korean War offered divergent lessons to combatants and neutrals alike. To the outgoing Truman administration and its successors, it confirmed the necessity of waging the Cold War on a global basis, of recruiting allies to aid in the struggle. Washington's foremost adversary in the conflict, the People's Republic of China (PRC), derived validation. Success in battling the Western coalition to a standstill affirmed that the PRC stood to play a distinctive role in the spread of revolution in Asia. India, meanwhile, could rightly claim to have been validated: both in its eschewal of alignment and its efforts to mediate the conflict. Henceforth, Washington sought partners, Beijing sought to broaden its international reach, and New Delhi continued to seek a middle course in the Cold War while positioning itself as a leader among the decolonised states. A potential collision loomed: between U.S. pact-building on the one hand; and Indian resistance to the spread of the Cold War and Chinese efforts to diplomatically outflank Washington, on the other. The intersecting agendas of the latter two powers evoked mounting concern from the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower had come to office amid mounting public frustration with his predecessor's conduct of the Korean War, growing anxiety about the broader course of the Cold War, and the demagogic anti-communist campaign of Senator Joseph McCarthy. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, lamented that the West appeared to be on the defensive everywhere. A deep concern with the mounting fiscal cost of containment galvanised their search for allies willing to shoulder the burden. Eisenhower and Dulles viewed the Cold War as a stark, moral struggle, but sought to wage it pragmatically. Although Dulles was prone to moments of self-righteousness, Eisenhower quietly understood that states - particularly those just freed from the shackles of colonialism - might prefer some form of neutrality. Incentives for the affirmation of the right to non-alignment were downplayed due to the feverish political climate of the 1950s and the ongoing pact-building project. Thus, the spectre of the April 1955 Asian-African Conference at Bandung Indonesia alarmed U.S. policymakers. The fruit of a five-country initiative, pursued fitfully from the spring of 1954 onward, Bandung presented fretful U.S. policymakers with the spectre of an emerging Asian bloc. China's presence at the conference especially unnerved the Eisenhower administration, which briefly entertained acting in some way to disrupt the gathering. With evident resignation, Dulles concluded that sabotaging Bandung would be counterproductive. To stave

off the emergence of a Chinese-led Asian bloc, Dulles's government sought to enlist the support of friendly governments (Fraser, 2003, 118-33). A necessary clarification should be tendered at this point: Bandung did not constitute a non-aligned conference. The core organising principle of the meeting, African and Asian solidarity, entailed proffering invitations to states on a geographic basis, without regard for their Cold War alignment. Nevertheless, a substantial, visible core of the Bandung delegations, including the Indonesian host government, espoused a form of Cold War non-alignment, and declarations of regional solidarity stood to undermine the emerging Western network of alliances. Meticulous U.S. preparation for the summit appeared to pay off. Although Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno offered extensive arguments against Cold War alignment, and China's Zhou En-lai made visible diplomatic inroads, Washington's allies delivered a stalwart defence of their choices to align. No visible bloc, organised along Afro-Asian or non-aligned principles, emerged from the meeting (Parker, 2016, pp. 79-91). Any sense of relief was short-lived. The U.S. alliance-building project had achieved, at best, mixed results by the middle of the decade. The Baghdad Pact and South East Asia Treaty Organisation were shaky imitations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which drew scorn from the emerging leadership of the postcolonial world. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser – another Bandung attendee – criticised the Baghdad Pact for dividing the Arab world and denounced his Iraqi counterpart, a signatory, as an “Anglo-American stooge”. U.S. policy towards Egypt in the eighteen months following Bandung amply demonstrated the competing concerns felt by Eisenhower and Dulles in their approach to the non-aligned world. Seeking to capitalize on Nasser's development ambitions, they offered him a loan towards the completion of the Aswan High Dam. The Egyptian leader's recognition of the PRC, acceptance of Czechoslovak-made arms, and rejection of an Arab-Israeli peace plan proposed by Eisenhower suggested bad faith on his part to the White House. Indignant, Eisenhower withdrew the loan offer in July 1956 (Hahn, 1991, pp. 180-210). The news of the loan withdrawal broke hours after Nasser joined Nehru and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito on the Dalmatian island of Brioni (a meeting sometimes associated with the inception of organised non-alignment). The Brioni Summit drew little notice from an Eisenhower administration intent on dealing with the separate problems posed by independent-minded leaders like Nasser. Eisenhower and especially Dulles nursed the sentiment that the Egyptian had been ungrateful or, worse, was playing the two blocs off against each other. The previous month, at a university commencement in Iowa, Dulles had termed

non-alignment an “immoral and shortsighted conception”. After renegeing on the loan, Dulles asked rhetorically, “Do nations which play both sides get better treatment than nations which are stalwart and work with us?” The answer went without saying. Even as subsequent events – Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Anglo-French campaign to recapture the waterway, and Eisenhower’s furious efforts to rein in his NATO allies – briefly thrust Egypt and the United States into the same corner, the suspicion lingered in Washington. Over the ensuing two years, Eisenhower endeavoured to check the spread of Egyptian influence in the void left by the retreating colonial powers (Lüthi, 2016; Rakove, 2012, pp. 10–12; Yaqub, 2004). Concurrently, he endorsed covert action against the government of Indonesia. In his final year in office, he supported the ouster of Congolese national leader Patrice Lumumba, while the Central Intelligence Agency assisted in Lumumba’s apprehension by his enemies and, thus, his murder in early 1961 (Kahin & Kahin, 1995; Kalb, 1982). The Eisenhower approach to non-alignment can easily appear principally hostile and Manichean: borne of a rigid, ideological conception of the Cold War. Yet, on close inspection, apparent exceptions emerge. The administration set aside anti-communist principles to support Tito’s Yugoslavia, which had broken away from the Soviet bloc in the previous decade. Despite the initial friction with Nehru, U.S. economic aid to India grew in both extent and range over the decade. Privately and publicly, Eisenhower spoke of the prudence of neutrality in the Cold War, reflecting that his own country had once adhered to that policy. In the closing years of his administration, he pursued more conciliatory policies toward Egypt and Indonesia. Before the formal emergence of the NAM, U.S. policy struggled to grapple with a diverse, growing caucus of states averse to alignment. The challenge became more complex at the dawn of the following decade, as efforts to organise the non-aligned world attained critical mass (Brands, 1989).

Kennedy’s road to Belgrade

John F. Kennedy ran for office assailing the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration as outdated, dogmatic, and ineffectual. Denunciation of Eisenhower – and, by extension, his opponent, Vice President Richard M. Nixon – served electoral purposes, to be sure. In the absence of a concrete plan to exercise the civil rights of black voters, and promising a foreign policy that would respond more to the concerns of the new African states, Kennedy appealed to black voters. He thus reaffirmed his concern about waging the Cold War in non-aligned countries. His

concurrent criticism of Eisenhower policy toward India could not have been tendered with voters in mind. Few American voters in 1960 could have cast their ballots on the basis of policy towards Nehru or Sukarno, and a majority would have been at least sceptical of states professing non-alignment in the Cold War (Meriwether, 2008; Rakove, 2012, pp. 30–32). “We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view,” Kennedy noted in his inaugural address, speaking of newly decolonised states, adding: “But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom.” As president, he hoped to capitalize on an established record of support for Third World nationalism, cultivated rhetorically, interpersonally, and through acts of legislation. Algerian nationalists celebrated his emphatic and politically hazardous 1957 speech endorsing independence for their country. Guinean President Sekou Touré warmly recalled his 1959 meeting with Kennedy at Disneyland. Indians, meanwhile, could take heart from Kennedy’s resolution, submitted with Republican colleague John Sherman Cooper, calling for an increase of aid to India, as well as Kennedy’s choice to send prominent economist John Kenneth Galbraith to represent his government in New Delhi (Connelly, 2002, pp. 144–145; Muehlenbeck, 2012, pp. 27–28; Rakove, 2012, p. 29; Siegel, 2020, pp. 221–226). Amid the tumultuous atmosphere of Kennedy’s first year, such gestures appeared necessary to stave off, or at least reduce the possibility of conflict between the United States and the leading states of the non-aligned world. Kennedy inherited a world convulsed by chaotic decolonisation and the Cold War conflict. The divided city of Berlin remained a Cold War flashpoint, communist insurgencies wracked South Vietnam and Laos, while the new administration confronted a revolutionary government in Cuba. Other conflicts lacked explicit Cold War valence but could easily become proxy battles between Washington and Moscow. Indonesia sought the cession of the western half of New Guinea, still occupied by the Netherlands. Portugal’s determination to retain the colonies in South Asia and southern Africa drew the ire of India and a number of African states. Lastly, most dangerously, Lumumba’s death outraged African leaders like Touré and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and risked the implosion of the UN peacekeeping mission in the sprawling African country. It also helped to reinvigorate previously dormant efforts by non-aligned states to organise on the international level (Jansen, 1966, pp. 271–277). Until 1961, save during the ambiguous months preceding Bandung, U.S. policymakers had not confronted the possibility of a cohesive non-aligned bloc. They did not relish the prospect. U.S. alliances with European imperial powers had complicated the project of containment since the very beginning of the Cold War. A

coherent organisation of non-aligned powers, galvanised into existence by anti-colonial sentiment and a shared desire to attain rapid industrialisation, was far more likely to find agreement with the Soviet Union while supporting China's bid for admission into the UN. Yet early signals did not provide cause for alarm. Significant differences separated the outlook of a Nehru, on the one hand, from a Sukarno on the other. While his peers, notably Nasser, Sukarno, and Tito, supported the June 1961 planning conference in Cairo in advance of a non-aligned conference later in the year, Nehru remained wary of creating a new bloc and distrustful of the agendas of his peers. India sent a delegation to the Cairo planning meeting, but its embassy in the Egyptian capital worked to keep U.S. and British diplomats informed about the likely nature of the conference, likely with the goals of informing Western expectations, distinguishing Nehru's government from its peers, and encouraging moderate states to attend (Jansen, 1966, pp. 278–290; Rakove, 2014). Inasmuch as they were mutually compatible, India's first two goals proved more attainable than its third. Embassy cables from Cairo reinforced a deep institutional pessimism within the U.S. State Department towards the upcoming non-aligned conference, scheduled for the end of the summer in Belgrade. Senior diplomats, noting that an invitation had been extended to Cuba, took Indian counsel to mean that any effort to influence the upcoming conference was doomed to failure. Despite mounting discontentment among Kennedy's White House staff, the State Department held to this view until the very eve of the Belgrade Conference. Several factors ultimately combined to overturn the "hands off" policy over the summer. A ham-handed effort by the U.S. ambassador in Rio de Janeiro (a holdover from the Eisenhower administration) to preclude Brazilian attendance drew an angry rebuke from President Janio Quadros and gave the broader impression that Washington sought to undermine the conference. A violent July clash between French and Tunisian forces in the vicinity of the French naval base at Bizerte further agitated African and Asian opinion. Lastly, although the ongoing Berlin crisis served to distract President Kennedy in the early summer, the construction of a barrier across the divided city drove JFK to wonder whether the crisis might be employed as a "good propaganda stick" against Moscow across the Third World (Hershberg, 2007; Parker, 2016, pp. 141–148; Rakove, 2012, pp. 69–74). This confluence of events lent momentum to a group of Kennedy's aides as they staged an eleventh-hour effort to overturn the "hands off" policy. Harvard historian and special advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr succeeded in obtaining JFK's approval to dispatch a special presidential message to the Belgrade Conference attendees. The choice of Soviet General Secretary Nikita

Khrushchev to resume atomic testing on the very eve of the summit further bolstered the hopes of the Kennedy administration that the summit would yield outcomes favourable to the West. Yet disappointment lay ahead for the Kennedy White House. The ongoing Berlin crisis and Khrushchev's ill-timed decision bolstered the hand of non-aligned leaders like Nehru, who wanted the event to address questions of war and peace. Nehru and Nasser each condemned the Soviet decision, but others shied away from the following suit. Hosting the conference, Tito appeared to echo the Soviet position on the German question while excusing Khrushchev's testing resumption. This especially angered U.S. Ambassador George Kennan, whose cables from Belgrade offered the Kennedy administration its main source of information on the conference (Rakove, 2012, pp. 77-80). Kennedy's circumstantial decision to send Kennan to Belgrade, made well before the announcement of the conference, proved both consequential and unfortunate. The choice of the famous diplomat could be understood as a demonstration of Kennedy's concern for his relationship with Yugoslavia. At the best of times, Kennan brought an eloquent pen and a discerning eye to his diplomatic assignments, and his host government could be confident that his cables would be read closely. At his worst, however, Kennan could fall into spasms of emotion that were as intense in expression as they were selective in focus. Well before the conference opened, Kennan showed signs of disaffection and alienation from his host government. A nostalgist who held, at best, disparaging views towards non-European peoples, he was ill-prepared to listen to a conference that would deal substantially with the evils of the empire. Tito's speech sent Kennan into ill humour from which he did not recover before the conference concluded. He was heard vowing afterwards that he would use his influence to obtain the end of U.S. aid to Yugoslavia (Costigliola, 1997; Rakove, 2014, pp. 13-18). At this Kennan failed, ultimately changing his mind, but his spate of angry cables had their intended effect within the Kennedy White House. Worn down by the Berlin crisis, Kennedy responded to the Belgrade Conference with, by Schlesinger's account, "great and acrid profanity". The mood passed. Nehru had largely succeeded in orienting the conference towards the threat of nuclear war, and as a closing gesture, the attendees dispatched delegations to Washington and Moscow. Kennedy grumbled about receiving Sukarno and Malian President Modibo Keita but proved a receptive and gracious host. A memorandum submitted to him by his advisors Robert Komer and Walt Rostow argued emphatically that those attendees who received U.S. aid had acted with greater moderation, reinforcing Kennedy's earlier inclination to

engage non-aligned states on a bilateral basis (Rakove, 2012, pp. 80-82; Schlesinger et al., 2007, p. 133).

Engagement after Belgrade (and Kennedy)

A bilateral emphasis played to Kennedy's strengths: his proficiency at presidential diplomacy; his interest in postcolonial issues; and his commitment to foreign assistance. Throughout his presidency, JFK remained committed to engagement. Interpersonal bonds with non-aligned leaders, ranging from Sukarno and Touré to Tanganyika's President Julius Nyerere, strengthened U.S. relations with non-aligned governments. So, too, did Kennedy's adamant defence of foreign assistance, and the development theories of Walt Rostow, who found a receptive audience in the Third World. Kennedy's willingness, at times, to endorse non-aligned positions in colonial and regional conflicts also earned his government political capital. His support of Congolese integrity and labour leader Cyrille Adoula earned him some credit from African non-aligned leaders. In 1962, he effectively sided with Sukarno against his NATO ally, the Netherlands, over the nettlesome West New Guinea question. The 1961 vote to condemn Portugal for suppressing a revolt in Angola also pleased non-aligned opinion. Yet these stances came at a real cost to existing alliances. "What are the prudent and practical limitations on our traditional view of colonialism?", a weary Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote. "One or two more Congos – and we've had it." Simultaneously, however, contemplating a recalcitrant Portuguese empire in Africa, and white redoubts in Rhodesia and South Africa, non-aligned states hoped for and expected more (Muehlenbeck, 2012; Noer, 1985, pp. 61-95; Simpson, 2008, pp. 52-61). An upsurge in regional conflicts further complicated Kennedy's efforts. While a cordial relationship with Egypt helped to tamp down Arab-Israeli tensions, Nasser became entangled in a war of counterinsurgency in Yemen. China's autumn 1962 assault on India's northern frontier offered Washington a new opportunity in South Asia, but Pakistani objections to Kennedy's plans to arm India and warming ties between Rawalpindi and Beijing the following year evoked concern and some hesitation in the White House. Kennedy had hoped that Sukarno would focus on domestic matters after his victory in the West New Guinea dispute, but the mercurial Indonesian leader promptly plunged into another dispute: this time against the newly formed federation of Malaysia and its ally, Britain. Congressional foes of foreign assistance, meanwhile, cited all of these emerging conflicts as they staged an unprecedented assault on Kennedy's final foreign aid bill, which remained mired in Congress when

Kennedy flew to Dallas on November 22, 1963 (David & Holm, 2016; Jones, 2001, pp. 125–149; Orkaby, 2017, pp. 47–57). Kennedy’s assassination in Texas sparked eloquent and profuse expressions of grief across the non-aligned world. His successor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, held no stated objection to engagement as a policy. Facets of engagement could have appealed to LBJ, especially in the realm of foreign aid. He inherited Kennedy’s advisory team, which largely remained committed to the policy. Yet other factors gradually inclined Johnson away from the same approach to the non-aligned world. Already preparing an ambitious program of domestic reform, he was wary of the political costs of aiding uncommitted governments. Regional conflicts that had tested Kennedy – in Yemen, Malaysia, and South Asia – worsened visibly in Johnson’s early months in office. His own deepening commitment to Vietnam posed a potentially fatal obstacle to the further pursuit of engagement. In the end, however, Johnson’s own outlook and temperament made successful implementation of engagement unlikely. He was easily irked by criticism, especially on the part of states receiving U.S. largesse. While his past experience as a Senate majority leader served him well in his approach to the NATO alliance, it left him ill-prepared for the large and growing non-aligned caucus (which had no equivalent on Capitol Hill). Confronting the burdens thrust upon him and the challenges of an election year, LBJ wanted no further complications (McGarr, 2013, pp. 301–344). No single, official act undid a policy that remained fundamentally informal in nature. Key advisors, notably Komer, Chester Bowles, G. Mennen Williams, and Walt Rostow remained committed to tenets of engagement. Yet in the crisis year of 1964, comparably little attention was afforded the second non-aligned conference in Cairo. Johnson dispatched, with apparently no internal objection, a message addressing the attendees. Yet Cairo unfolded in a changed world. Nehru had died earlier in the year, and the addition of a number of African delegations, renewed upheaval in the Congo, and the relative lack of Cold War tensions produced an event with little resemblance to Belgrade. A more militant, anti-colonial tenor emerged from Cairo, which featured more extensive criticism of the United States than had been heard three years earlier. U.S. efforts to dissuade Latin American states from attending the conference contributed to the acrimony. “Here were 44 countries and 11 observers (virtually all recipients of US aid in one form or another) and not a really friendly reference to the US,” Komer fumed. Aid was not buying votes – although not for a lack of trying (Rakove, 2012, pp. 192, 220–224). Kennedy had not given aid altruistically, but he had been wary of seeking leverage explicitly or openly. His successor operated by a code of reciprocity that likely made greater sense in a legislative context. Johnson

proved willing to link further foreign assistance to the foreign and domestic policies of the recipients. At times he proved able to outdo Kennedy in the realm of aid; LBJ's response to the prospect of famine in India was impressive and systematic. The continual use of "short-tether" tactics, however, undermined whatever gains the provision of aid achieved. Advisors noted the risks of recipient backlash, yet Johnson kept his own counsel, and the use of this tactic continued as he committed U.S. troops to the defence of South Vietnam (Ahlberg, 2008, pp. 106–146; Byrne, 2016, pp. 231–244; Engerman, 2018, pp. 227–272). Vietnam proved the final straw. With the exception of Indonesia, which now endorsed an Afro-Asian model of organisation, non-aligned states responded cautiously to Johnson's war. A group of seventeen non-aligned delegations, gathering in Belgrade in March 1965, issued a carefully worded statement calling for immediate negotiations. The Johnson administration, at pains to appear willing to talk, offered rhetorical support to non-aligned countries seeking a diplomatic solution. A pause in the U.S. bombing at the end of 1965 raised hopes in non-aligned capitals, but the resumption of the aerial campaign at the end of the following January suggested the bombing pause had largely been for show (Rakove, 2015). Non-aligned criticism of the United States grew in intensity as Johnson's war continued to escalate. Within the United States, the intense and persistent disapproval of postcolonial states elicited its own backlash, which coincided with a rightward turn in U.S. politics after the election of Richard Nixon. The implosion of Chinese diplomacy within the Third World and the overthrow of more radical governments in Indonesia, Ghana, and Algeria further diminished the perceived need for broad outreach (Brazinsky, 2017, pp. 214–230). Although engagement lingered as a periodic impulse for the remainder of the Cold War, pursued at times by Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and even Ronald Reagan, its heyday had passed. Americans looked with anger or bemused indifference at the NAM which endured, even as it proved too disparate and unwieldy to act with the cohesion desired by its founding generation and was superseded in part by other organisations. Belgrade in 1961 had witnessed the historic intersection of U.S. interest in non-alignment and non-aligned anxiety about the direction of the Cold War. As both sentiments waned, as the NAM pursued a more expansive, less Cold War-centric agenda, possibilities for mutual comprehension waned. Americans thought little of the NAM when many of the sentiments that undergirded it – opposition to imperialism, fear of war, and pursuit of economic self-sufficiency – should have been readily recognisable. Six decades after Belgrade, reconsideration remains to be achieved.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: The chapter is devoted to the evolution of relations between the USSR (Russian Federation) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The authors show that the ideology and context of the Cold War, as well as the anti-imperialist and anti-neocolonial strategies and rhetoric of most non-aligned countries, played an important role in determining the Soviet Union attitude towards the NAM. From 1961, Soviet diplomacy considered the NAM an ally on the world stage and a friendly international organisation. A high level of relations along the USSR-NAM line was also maintained thanks to the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the countries that were the Movement leaders. The authors emphasize that the Soviet Union played a decisive role in defining the strategy of the entire “world socialist system” in relation to the non-aligned countries. The approaches and assessments of Moscow and the NAM regarding most world’s political problems and “hot conflicts” on the planet were similar until the collapse of the USSR. The chapter also shows the two sides positions similarities regarding the need for international economic order democratization. During the “perestroika” period in the USSR, relations with the NAM reached an even higher-quality level. After the USSR’s collapse, the NAM was practically “forgotten” in Russian foreign policy. However, in recent

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years the Russian Federation has become very active in developing relations with the non-aligned states.

Key words: Soviet Union, Non-Aligned Movement, foreign policy, international relations, Communist Party of Soviet Union, similarities, positions.

Introduction

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) turned 60 years old in 2021. The historical paradox is that exactly half of this period (before 1991) is associated with Soviet policy towards this Movement, while the other half falls in the Russian period. However, we believe that from a geopolitical point of view, these two halves are not equal. Taking into account the role that the Soviet Union played in the international relations system during the Cold War era, it seems to us that the first period was more important and rich in historical events. It is not surprising that in the late Soviet decades, especially in the 1980s, a large number of academic works were published in the USSR on the subject, including monographs (in particular, *The Non-Aligned Movement* (1985), *The Non-Aligned Movement in the Modern World* (1985), *World socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement* (1988), Utegenova D. K. *The UN and the Non-Aligned Movement* (1991)), while in the post-Soviet period, at best, articles appeared on certain aspects of the NAM's activities. Even before the NAM creation, Moscow began to pay significant attention to the developing countries problem. The Soviet Union in the international arena actively advocated the elimination of all colonialism and dependence forms, which strengthened its authority in the liberated countries. On the other hand, during the 1950s, Soviet diplomacy was quite loyal to the development of integration processes among non-aligned countries, supporting, in particular, the ideas of the Bandung Conference. The fact is that from the very beginning of the NAM functioning, the Soviet leaders viewed the Movement as a privileged partner. Welcoming the First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in 1961, Moscow expressed support for the goals of the new Movement: "We know that the peoples of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America who have awakened and straightened their mighty shoulders, who were previously in the chains of colonial bondage, together with other peoples raise their voice in favour of peace, national independence and freedom." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1979, p. 52). It was especially important for Moscow's communist foreign policy that NAM "originated in the atmosphere of the struggle against colonialism" (*World Socialism and the Non-Aligned*

Movement, 1988, p. 7). It should be pointed out here that the important role of NAM in world politics, in the system of international relations was emphasized by the Soviet leaders throughout the 1960-1980s. Obviously, during the Cold War, especially during the years of its aggravation, it was extremely important for Soviet diplomacy to have, if not support, then a minimum of loyalty to the developing countries, which constituted the vast majority of all states on the planet and the clear majority of members in the United Nations Organisation (UN). In this regard, the Soviet leadership in relation to NAM discourse has always been emphatically friendly and respectful. The USSR leaders argued that "since the Soviet Union always opposes political blocs and military alliances and is an active supporter of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the refusal of the liberated countries to join both military-political alliances does not mean that they are hostile to the USSR and other socialist countries." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 5). At the same time, the USSR's leaders and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) each time "stressed the existence of objective political conditions for maintaining solidarity with the countries that made up the NAM: for the practical implementation of non-aligned processes" (The Non-Aligned Movement in the Modern World, 1985, p. 3). Holistically and globally, the Soviet foreign policy proceeded from the fact that the specific historical conditions of the Non-Aligned Movement can be viewed as an important ally of Moscow and the entire "world socialist system", not only due to the fact that most of the Movement's member countries belong to the postcolonial world but also due to political and ideological factors. Thus, in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the XXVI Congress (1981), it was noted that the strength of the NAM consists "in the direction against imperialism and colonialism, against war and aggression. We are confident that the key to further enhancing the role of the non-aligned movement in world politics - which we would welcome - is in its loyalty to these fundamental principles." (Materials of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, 1981, p. 15). In fact, after the end of World War II, that is, even before the creation of the NAM, the communist leadership of the USSR made a bet on a frontal confrontation with the capitalist West in the struggle for influence in the postcolonial world. This stake implied support for revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces in the Third World. But if in the late Stalinist period this meant tactics primarily to support local communist and Marxist-Leninist parties, then, starting from the mid-1950s, Moscow's position on internal processes in developing countries has become more flexible, allowing interaction with various areas of "progressive" forces. From the point of view of the Soviet

leaders, "the non-aligned movement ... maintains unity with a significant expansion of its ranks, proving its stability as an interstate formation of developing countries and, on the whole, has confirmed its anti-imperialist, democratic, anti-militarist character." (The Non-Aligned Movement in the Modern World, 1985, p. 18). This point of view was cultivated by Soviet propaganda during the first quarter of a century of the Movement existence when it was important for the Soviet leadership to obtain solidarity from the NAM, or at least most of its members, on certain world politics problems and conflicts, in which the positions of the USSR fiercely clashed with the United States of America (USA) or Western European countries. Later, in the Gorbachev's period, Soviet researchers pointed out that "the fundamental ideas of non-alignment provide the widest opportunities for the movement to effectively implement the new order of peace laid down by its founders - from creating a moral climate of intolerance to violence to promoting and implementing practical measures to the creation of a "new world order." (Dmitrieva, 1990, p. 39). Of course, Moscow was interested in changing the balance of forces within the NAM in favour of the socialist camp. But even American experts admitted, speaking of the NAM, that "... this is an independent trend, and not the result of long-term growth or Moscow's diplomatic initiatives." The interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of the Non-Aligned Movement basically coincided with the challenges of the post-war international order established by the United States and the rest of the West (Jackson, 1983, p. 19).

The Non-Aligned Movement remains an important factor in international relations

Both for the Soviet foreign policy ideological doctrine and in terms of its practical implementation, the role of the postcolonial and non-aligned countries in the 1960s-1980s was very significant and principled. The documents of the CPSU congresses invariably emphasized that "the non-aligned movement was and remains an important factor in international relations" (Materials of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, p. 15). Soviet leaders constantly emphasized the progressivism of NAM and its uniqueness in the world political arena. It is important to note that Soviet leaders themselves regularly talked about the existence of a "common foundation" or proximity of Moscow and the NAM positions. This is especially characteristic of those years when the Movement was headed by countries that were active partners and even allies of the Soviet Union on the international stage. Throughout the 1960s-1980s, those were Yugoslavia, Egypt, Algeria, Cuba,

India, Zimbabwe, that is, more than half of all the presidency countries that came during the Cold War. All of these countries were separate varieties of the left, including Marxist, political regimes. Of course, this circumstance contributed to the USSR's foreign policy cooperation not only with them, but also with the NAM. But, of course, not only purely ideological and political closeness determined the nature of Moscow's interaction with the Movement. In particular, the leaders of the USSR regularly said that "the coincidence of positions or proximity, both in the general assessment of situations that pose a threat to peace and international security, and in the approach to the ways and methods of resolving specific conflicts, is an objective basis for active interaction between world socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement. Implementation of efforts is aimed at the peaceful settlement of conflict situations." (World Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement, 1988, p. 64). The Soviet media covered the NAM summits every time, while the materials of congresses and other events of the CPSU invariably noted the high and positive role of the Movement in the international relations system, and the NAM itself was "systemically" assessed as positive and friendly to the Soviet Union and the "world socialist system" subject. For example, it can be noted that the Political Declaration adopted at the Delhi NAM Conference in 1983 was assessed very positively in the USSR, since it showed that "the quintessence of the non-alignment policy is the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zionism, and against all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference, hegemony, as well as against the great-power politics of blocs." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 7). It should be pointed out here that at the official level in the USSR, they have always denied accusations of "hegemony" coming from China or Western capitalist countries; just as the Soviet Union did not recognize that it had any "great-power politics". Of course, in the Soviet Union, they were fully aware that among the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement there are a wide variety of states whose political and socio-economic system is very far from the ideas of "scientific socialism" and is neocolonial, primitive capitalist, if not semi-feudal in nature. However, "globally" this circumstance did not bother either the leaders of the USSR or those Soviet scientists and researchers who were specifically dealing with the problems of developing and non-aligned states. In the collective monograph "Non-Aligned Movement" (1985), the following thesis was affirmed on this score: "Despite all the socio-economic diversity of the countries participating in the Non-Aligned Movement, they all share the similarities of historical destinies, an unequal position in the world economy,

the incomplete struggle for economic independence, the desire to escape from age-old poverty and backwardness. This creates a fairly stable basis for uniting their efforts in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid, increasing their role in world affairs." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 5-6). Accordingly, the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet leadership proceeded not only from the thesis about the presence of common elements of the world political vision between the socialist camp and the non-aligned countries, but also from the understanding that between the imperialism of the US and their Western European allies and the aspirations of the countries that joined the NAM, there is a deep divide and antagonism. At the same time, Soviet ideologists always emphasized that alone, without the USSR's and its allied states' support and solidarity, the non-aligned countries would not be able to achieve their goals of democratizing international political and economic relations. Until its collapse, the USSR continued to be an "ideological" state, the centre (though no longer indisputable) of the international communist and revolutionary movement. The foreign policy aspirations and motives of the CPSU leadership - taking into account the dynamics of world politics and geopolitical realities - largely obeyed ideological postulates and principles. From this point of view, it is fair to conclude that the foreign policy of the USSR during this period continued to be essentially leftist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and internationalist. If we take into account this moment, then the principled attitude of Moscow towards the non-aligned countries and also towards the NAM becomes clearer. This attitude cannot be perceived through the prism of a mercantile, "market" foreign economic and trade dimension. By the end of the USSR's existence, one could conclude that this was the weakness of the Soviet international strategy. However, during the period of the USSR's power as one of the two superpowers, such a line of behaviour contributed to the growth of the international prestige of the Soviet state and the strengthening of its position just among the non-aligned countries. For the Soviet and communist foreign policy discourse, the belonging of one or another international or political force to the anti-imperialist camp already made this force at least a potential USSR's ally. From the Soviet communist's point of view, "Non-Aligned Movement... is the main anti-imperialist association of developing countries, advocating national liberation at the intergovernmental, interstate level on a global scale. The emergence, development and strengthening of such an international association became possible only under the conditions of a new, changed in favour of socialism, the balance of power in the world arena..." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 378). In fact, the very principles that the NAM

shared from its very inception (anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, rejection of apartheid, racism, etc.) were fully applicable to the content of the Soviet foreign policy. For the CPSU's ideology, the appeal of the NAM, which had been repeated many times since the first declaration of the countries participating in the Movement, on the need to abolish colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism in all its forms, was perfectly suited. Of course, the interpretation of these enemies of "progressive humanity" by the international communist movement and most of the non-aligned states was not identical. However, the very principled rejection of imperialism in all its manifestations, in fact, brought the Soviet Union and the NAM closer together. As international relations evolved and the ranks of the Non-Aligned Movement expanded, the very perception of imperialism within its ranks became more "flexible"; in the NAM documents, concepts and interpretations of "economic imperialism", "information imperialism", and "cultural imperialism" appeared. All of this was welcomed in the Soviet Union and interpreted as examples of the NAM's involvement in the broad international anti-imperialist movement. Since the NAM from the very first years of its existence actively supported the national liberation movement, this factor also brought the Movement closer to Moscow; as you know, the very foreign policy strategy of the Soviet state, even at its debut stage, was distinguished by tough anti-colonialism and full support for the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa. After 1945, the USSR played an extremely important role in the UN in advancing the peoples of dependent countries to full-state independence. During the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, if we take a variety of historical examples (the anti-colonial struggle of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, the situation in South Africa, the Palestinian question, etc.), the positions taken by Soviet diplomacy and most of the countries that adjoined to the NAM turned out to be very close. The views of the international communist movement and most of the non-aligned countries on racism and Zionism in these decades were also fairly close. As noted in the foreign policy sections of the materials of the XXV and XXVI Congresses of the Soviet Communist Party, among the most important international goals should be considered "the complete elimination of all remnants of the system of national oppression... all hotbeds of colonialism and racism" (Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU, 1978, p. 26). Once again, it should be emphasized that Soviet diplomacy in the 1960s-1980s approached the problem of non-aligned countries in a differentiated manner. Thus, the general internationalism of Soviet policy was not abstract and de-ideologized. Particular attention was paid to countries whose governments pursued an anti-American direction in foreign and

revolutionary-democratic policies in the domestic sphere, that is, the countries of "socialist orientation". Since such states often held leading positions in the NAM, this factor worked in favour of expanding the complex relationship between Moscow and the Movement and strengthening the USSR's prestige among the non-aligned countries. Another instrument of the Soviet Union's policy towards progressive or socialist-oriented countries was the treaties that Moscow concluded with these states. Only in the 1970s, the USSR concluded a series of similar agreements on friendship and cooperation with such non-aligned countries as India, Iraq, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Vietnam, South Yemen, Syria. It can be stated with all certainty that it was precisely the states of "socialist orientation" in the 1960s-1980s that acted within the NAM as a key pillar of Soviet influence on the non-aligned countries. And above all, this concerned those socialist countries that were strategic allies to the Soviet Union (in particular, within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) - Cuba and Vietnam. Taking into account the fact that Cuba's chairmanship in the NAM coincided with another round of escalation of the Cold War (1979-1983), such an event could not but affect the climate of relations between the USSR and the Non-Aligned Movement member countries. In general, Soviet statesmen followed with particular interest and attention the preparation and course of those NAM conferences. In particular, from the official Moscow point of view, the Havana Conference (1979) showed that "the world socialist system countries and the states participating in the non-aligned movement face a number of common tasks related to countering the aggressive policy of imperialism, the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism, the restructuring of an unequal discriminatory system of international economic relations..." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 380). At the same time, the Soviet leadership paid great attention to the chairmanship of the NAM countries, with the authorities of which the CPSU did not have strong ideological solidarity, but these countries at one time received independence and international recognition thanks to the principled position of the USSR and, in addition, the Soviet Union maintained friendly and respectful relations with these states (India, Zambia). In these cases, Soviet diplomacy has always also welcomed the chairmanship of such states within the framework of the NAM. For example, in the welcoming message of the Soviet authorities to the Movement Delhi Conference, it was noted that "in the Soviet Union, the efforts of the non-aligned movement in the struggle for peace and security of peoples, for ending the arms race and disarmament, for restructuring international economic relations on a just

democratic basis, for full and comprehensive decolonisation have been and are being found.” (Greetings from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR .., 1983, p. 2).

The Period of Détente

In the conditions of detente in international relations, as well as the escalation of the international situation, the line on strengthening the strategic partnership of the USSR with the non-aligned countries was explained by the firmly anti-war position, which the Movement defended on the world stage. The Soviet press regularly emphasized that the Movement is one of the active fighters for strengthening relations of peaceful coexistence and easing tensions on Earth. At the same time, they also emphasized that within the framework of the world community, in the UN, the positions of the Soviet Union and the NAM countries on the most important issues of world politics significantly coincide. So, in the late 1970s-early 1980s “the Soviet Union and other socialist countries voted against the US proposals in 80.8% of cases, the bulk of developing countries - in 87.8% of cases.” (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 395). As you know, during the period when Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) was the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet state came up with a series of proposals aimed at strengthening international security, eliminating weapons of mass destruction and qualitatively reducing conventional weapons. Since Soviet peace initiatives were generally global in nature, these ideas had a direct bearing on the developing world as well; and so they met positively in the Non-Aligned Movement. In addition, the Soviet concept of security in the political field put in the first place “unconditional respect in international practice for the right of each people to sovereignly choose the paths and forms of their development.” (World Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement, 1988, p. 60). Even if this thesis was not always fully implemented in practice (Afghanistan, the countries of the Eastern bloc), doctrinally the NAM was in solidarity with this approach. Within the framework of the UN and at other international forums, Soviet diplomats have consistently defended the rights of the peoples and countries of the developing world - in the face of the West’s neocolonial policy. For its part, the Soviet Union supported all the key ideas of the NAM aimed at abandoning nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction and for creating nuclear-free zones. “The idea of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in the world was first put forward by the Soviet Union in 1956 when the Soviet government, in order to change the military danger in Central Europe, proposed to ban the deployment of nuclear weapons on its

territory. The Soviet Union has always been a resolute supporter of the creation of nuclear-free zones in other regions as well - in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, on the African continent as in Latin America." (Non-Aligned Movement in the Modern World, 1985, p. 208). It should be noted that during the "symbolic" votes at the UN General Assembly on issues related to the creation of such nuclear-free zones, the Soviet Union always clearly and definitely supported the majority of the non-aligned countries' point of view. Another fact that confirms the similarity of the NAM and the USSR approaches stems from the fact that on key aspects of world politics and, in particular, on the most serious conflicts of the Cold War in the Third World, the NAM positions were quite friendly to Soviet policy at that time (Kostyuk, 2018, p. 160). Indeed, if we compare the positions that the Non-Aligned Movement defended during the Vietnam War, the struggle of the Portuguese colonies in Africa for independence, the conflicts of the racist regime of South Africa with neighbouring liberated countries, regarding the Arab-Israeli confrontation, internal political conflicts in Central America, individual interventions by the United States, it can be concluded that the views of Moscow and the NAM as a whole were very close to each other. For the Soviet Union, this was all-important because dozens of the NAM member countries, many of which did not adhere to a "revolutionary-democratic" worldview, in key UN's votes made a choice in favour of the position defended by the USSR. Moreover, the NAM's "systemic" rejection of neocolonialism, racism and Zionism made the Movement an objective "ideological" ally of Moscow in determining its position in relation to specific "hot spots" of the Cold War. However, it would be historically incorrect to talk about the complete approaches coincidence of the Soviet diplomacy and non-aligned countries on various conflicts or disputable situations, especially during the escalation in the late 1970s - first half of the 1980s. So, in these years, consistently advocating the rejection of a foreign military presence, most of the Movement member countries supported the idea of withdrawing the Soviet military contingent from Mongolia. Since Moscow actively supported the actions of the Vietnamese side to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, the NAM member countries, for the most part, demanded an end to the Vietnamese military presence and the formation of a coalition inter-party government in Cambodia (Kampuchea). Taking into account the fact that in Asia it was the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that acted as the main and strategic ally of the USSR, the "Cambodian issue" turned out to be quite painful and unpleasant for Moscow. However, the Afghan issue, which directly concerned the Soviet Union, became the most acute and difficult for Soviet diplomacy in its relations with the NAM during

the entire Cold War period. An analysis of decision-making during the 1980s on the Afghan issue at the UN indicates that most NAM member states were inclined to condemn the USSR in the Afghan conflict (Kostyuk, 2018, p. 161). In particular, most of the Asian and African Muslim countries unambiguously demanded the early and urgent Soviet armed contingent withdrawal from the Afghan territory. "In general, the Non-Aligned Movement on the issue of the Afghan conflict did not agree with the USSR's position... but with the UN's position taken with regard to the situation in the country." (Kostyuk, Rabush, 2020, p. 118). The "Afghan factor" in the early 1980s played a role in the process of weakening Moscow's foreign policy prestige among the non-aligned states, and only a change in the course in the Afghan direction under Mikhail Gorbachev changed the situation for the better for the Soviet Union. Considering the Soviet leadership approach to the Non-Aligned Movement and its activities, we must always remember that in an era of relative bipolarity in international relations, the USSR did not act only as a powerful military power, but it headed the "world socialist system", the Warsaw Pact Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in turn, played a primary and priority role in the international communist movement. The internationalist and communist foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union in the global arena, respectively, predetermined the approaches of Moscow-oriented international associations towards the NAM. And the leading role in defining these approaches belonged, of course, to Soviet diplomacy. The representatives of the socialist countries in their totality stated: "The Non-Aligned Movement draws inspiration from the fact that its ideals find understanding and support from world socialism, all world progressive forces. The USSR and other socialist countries have always attached great importance to the Non-aligned Movement, considering it one of the important factors in modern international relations." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 11). We can immediately add that in the Declaration of the state's heads of the Warsaw Pact Organisation (1978) it was noted that the socialist countries "consider the Non-aligned Movement as a positive factor in international politics, noting its increased role in the world arena." (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 11). As already noted, the "world socialist system" was represented in the Movement by Cuba and Vietnam, which enjoyed considerable authority within the NAM. Later, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was admitted to the Movement, which also corresponded to Moscow's international interests. Laos that was ruled by the Marxist-Leninist party also took part in the Movement. Of course, the fact of the participation of Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea in the NAM did

not mean that in those decades they were in fact non-aligned nations: in the framework of the Cold War, all these countries clearly belonged to the “socialist community” and were the USSR’s loyal allies. Since the Khrushchev period, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also viewed by Soviet leaders as a socialist country. So the factor of Yugoslavia’s active participation in the NAM has been seen very positively by the Soviet side. Moscow’s Eastern European allies also welcomed the activities of the Movement in every possible way. Thus, at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Bucharest (1976), it was stated that “the Fifth Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries State and Government Heads once again demonstrated their positive role in international relations.” (Warsaw Pact Organisation, 1980, p. 206). Such countries as the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Romania willingly built their own relations with the NAM, without questioning, however, the leading foreign policy positions of the Soviet Union. As a rule, at the summits of both the Warsaw Pact Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the 1970s and 1980s documents, which emphasized the positive significance of the NAM for the cause of peace and security and for the current world politics in general, were regularly adopted. At the same time, both of these USSR-led international organisations invariably maintained that their strategic course towards the non-aligned countries was consistent with the principles of proletarian internationalism, which favourably distinguishes the approach of “real socialism” from capitalist neocolonialism. In particular, the statement of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organisation (1978) declared: “In no parts of the world do socialist countries seek privileges for themselves, do not covet bases, do not hunt for concessions. While in principle opposed to the imperialist policy of creating spheres of influence, they themselves never participate in the struggle for such spheres.” (Warsaw Pact Organisation, 1980, p. 236). At the suggestion of Moscow, all the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact proceeded from the thesis of the need to strengthen the versatile relations of the “world socialist system” and the postcolonial countries on the basis of common anti-imperialist principles and commitment to the international relations democratization. For example, such slogans have been consistently used by countries such as Hungary and Romania. But here it is important to remember that, after all, they originally came from Moscow. From the communist countries’ point of view, “the closer the relations of individual participants in the movement with the socialist community, the more opportunities they have to resist imperialist pressure, ensure their independent development, and overcome economic dependence.” (The Non-Aligned Movement in the Modern World, p. 7).

Since within the UN Moscow's Eastern European allies voted in solidarity with the Soviet Union every time, a similar vote on most world politics issues with most of the NAM member states also worked to strengthen mutual relations along the "socialist countries - Non-Aligned Movement" line. Together with the USSR, the allied countries welcomed the anti-war dimension of the NAM's activities, believing that the Movement is making a significant contribution to the cause of detente and the international situation "unfreezing". As noted by the Warsaw Pact countries, "a growing contribution to the elimination, prevention of crisis situations is being made by the Non-Aligned Movement, whose practical steps in this direction deserve recognition and support from all states." (Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact Organisation, 1983, p. 5). To some extent, it is legitimate to talk about the "developed socialism" international associations states "division of functions" in relation to the NAM. So, if the Warsaw Pact Organisation focused more attention on the positions similarities with non-aligned countries in relation to world politics pressing problems, international crises, global security, disarmament, the need to renounce weapons of mass destruction, then the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in turn, paid more attention to the proximity of positions with non-aligned countries on the theme of the struggle for a new just economic order. In this regard, it is useful to cite an excerpt from the 1984 Declaration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Member States: "Noting with satisfaction the increased importance of the Non-Aligned Movement as a powerful factor in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism - the forces of war and aggression, the participants in the Meeting express their solidarity with the decisions and message of the Seventh Conference of Non-Aligned Countries State and Government Heads in Delhi, aimed at solving the fundamental problems of our time: the struggle to consolidate world peace, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, national independence, ensuring the economic and social development of each country." (Declaration of the CMEA member countries .., 1984, p. five).

Realistic perception of the relations between the Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement

Today one could say that the perception in the Soviet Union of the Non-Aligned Movement's strategy and activities had a clear "romantic" connotation. However, we must take into account the real historical past events and the fact that the Soviet leaders proceeded not only from their own

ideological predilections. In particular, already at the founding conference of the NAM in Belgrade in 1961, it was emphasized: "The non-aligned countries represented at the conference do not want to create a new bloc and sincerely want to work with other governments committed to promoting trust and peace around the world." (Two Decades of Non-Alignment, 1983, p. 6). Undoubtedly, this message coming from the young Movement was heard and favourably received by the leaders of the USSR and the CPSU. Moscow attentively followed how *the NAM* summits positively react to Soviet initiatives on nuclear and conventional disarmament, peaceful conflict settlement, how they assess the Soviet position on overcoming the remnants of the colonial system. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union actively promoted the idea of fighting for a new, fairer international order. This topic played an important role in the "menu" of Moscow's relations with the countries of "socialist orientation", Socialist International, and neutral states. But for relations with the *NAM*, this issue was very relevant. It should be pointed out here that the bulk of the Movement members, and above all the *NAM* "natural leaders", also in principle shared the thesis about the need to move towards a more just world. Countries such as Yugoslavia, Cuba, and India openly supported the very principle of a radical international political and economic relations restructuring. Within the UN's framework, socialist countries and non-aligned states regularly voted for resolutions supporting the transition to a just new world economic order. In turn, all these points were drawn to the attention of political leaders and the media of the US and their Western European allies, who often saw the *NAM* as a kind of Moscow's "tail" and believed that the Movement played the role of a Soviet hidden ally in world politics. However, the Movement's leaders themselves rejected this interpretation. For example, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reasoned: "We do not attach importance to how many times the Soviet Union, the US or any other state votes with us. We vote in the UN on the basis of certain principles that we consider to be correct and justified." (World Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement, 1988, p. 76). Thus, R. Gandhi, like other left and centre-left Movement leaders, made it clear that non-alignment, in fact, does not mean "sterile" neutrality and total equidistance from the key poles of international relations. Even more vividly and directly positive role of "the USSR factor" was emphasized by those *NAM* leaders whose countries were clearly involved in the world socialist system. As the chairman of the Cuba State Council, Fidel Castro noted, "if there were no the Soviet Union, it would have been impossible even to imagine the measure of independence enjoyed by small states, or the peoples' successful struggle to regain control of natural resources, or the fact that their voice would sound

significant in a concert of nations.” (Starushenko, Bochkarev, 1983, p. 30). The leaders of Vietnam and North Korea made similar statements about the Soviet Union. As we have already noted, the relations of the USSR with developing and non-aligned countries were of a complex nature. Of course, much of Moscow’s attention was paid to political and ideological similarities, foreign policy closeness, cooperation in the military sphere, as well as humanitarian and cultural aspects. But even if for the Soviet Union and its allies the economic dimension of interstate relations in the 1960s-1980s was not the most important, yet this aspect of the relationship cannot be completely ignored. It should be borne in mind here that “the share of developing countries in the foreign trade of the CMEA members reached 12%. The total share of loans provided to them by the CMEA states for the economic and social development purposes has more than doubled in the 70s.” (Non-Aligned Movement, 1985, p. 389). The volume of Soviet loans to non-aligned countries also grew. In essence, the economic and trade relations of the USSR with the countries participating in the *NAM*, indeed, were of equal and mutually beneficial nature; they were realized at the same time outside the capitalist logic of profit. Concluding long-term interstate economic and trade agreements with non-aligned countries, the Soviet Union especially emphasized that these agreements are directed against any form of discrimination and exploitation. The Soviet Union actively assisted developing countries in laying the foundations for heavy industry, building large industrial facilities, developing transport and infrastructure, and creating hydroelectric power plants. Certainly, the closest trade and economic relations were built with those countries whose governments proclaimed their socialist orientation. In this case, Soviet specialists and experts provided these states with very impressive, often gratuitous assistance, however, in the final analysis, the economic system of such states was built according to Soviet recipes - with all the pros and cons of such “copying”. At the same time, the USSR actively maintained trade and economic relations with those non-aligned countries that remained in the “capitalist paradigm”, but at the same time tried to maintain partner relations with Moscow in foreign policy. Here the “red line” was the attitude of the non-aligned states to the democratizing international economic system idea, for which the Soviet Union and the world socialist system countries did not stop advocating during the Cold War era. It was especially appreciated in Moscow that at the “organisational” level, the *NAM* welcomed this idea and considered it necessary and useful. In one of the Soviet Council of Ministers’ statements in the mid-1970s was noted: “The Soviet Union, guided by its unchanging course to consolidate peace, to improve the entire system of international

economic relations, consistently advocates their restructuring on a democratic and just basis. At the same time, he proceeds from the fact that the fundamental interests of the socialist countries and developing states in this area basically coincide." (Statement of the Soviet government "On the restructuring of international economic relations", 1976, p. 1). Thus, we see that in the socio-economic dimension the ideological component in relations along the *USSR-NAM* line was of no small importance. Of course, the topic of the struggle for a new international economic order was the most popular among the leftist regimes of non-aligned states although it was not limited to them alone. It is known that in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union "promoted" the essential principles of this order not only among the countries of "socialist orientation". From the Soviet leaders' and party ideologists' point of view, it was necessary to prioritize those moments that brought Moscow's and the non-aligned states' opinions closer to the qualitative restructuring of international economic relations. The following are the fundamental provisions that were close - for the USSR and the non-aligned countries: "The thesis of the developing countries unequal position in the world order as a colonial past and the continuing neocolonial exploitation consequence; ascertaining the growing gap in the level of developing and industrialised countries economies; emphasis on curbing the financial exploitation of developing countries, capital outflow; the provision on the need to reduce the cost of weapons in the economic development interests." (World Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement, p. 85). Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary post in 1985, on the one hand, contributed to the international tension relaxation and, on the other, to an even greater extent focused the official Moscow's attention on the Non-Aligned Movement activities, which continued to be perceived as an important and strategic partner of the Soviet Union. Justifying the principles of new political thinking, M. Gorbachev pointed out that the *NAM* "contributes to the construction of new-type international relations - with all the nuances and peculiarities of it... Non-Aligned Movement realizes the liberated people desire for equal cooperation, recognition by others exclusive rights and interests, to the exclusion of manifestations and diktat from international life claims to hegemony. The Soviet Union understands the Non-Aligned Movement's goals and agrees with them." (Gorbachev, 1988, p. 186). In Soviet and Russian scientific literature in the late 1980s-early 1990s, emphasis was placed on the need for de-ideologization of international relations; after 1987, Moscow markedly weakened the scale of political and military support for its allies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Belonging to a communist or revolutionary-

democratic ideology is gradually ceasing to be the fundamental link connecting the USSR and the "third world" countries. At the same time, the NAM is viewed by Russian experts as "a new type of interstate cooperation, coordination and consolidation of different policy courses, development of a collective platform on many major international problems." (Utegenova, 1991, p. 19). Under the influence of state foreign policy and international situation changes, we find a revision of the NAM and its activities' specific perception in the late Soviet academic literature. At the same time, the attitude towards the very concept of non-alignment was changing - in line with the approach of de-ideologization, a break with the class component. As the researcher D. Utegenova points out in her work "The UN and the Non-Aligned Movement" from 1991, "the concept of non-alignment opens the way to the restructuring of international relations on the basis of political equality and economic justice not through confrontation but through the international cooperation development and strengthening before all on the principles of multilateralism, active use of the UN system." (Utegenova, 1991, pp. 108-109). In the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet Union actively promoted the disarmament and renunciation of lethal weapons slogans, while at the same time advocating the military-political bloc's renunciation in various parts of the world. These thoughts were quite consonant with those advocated by the NAM member countries. We also note that the specific practical actions of Gorbachev leadership (the Soviet military contingent withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Soviet unit's withdrawal from Mongolia, encouraging Vietnam to withdraw its contingent from Cambodia, direct or indirect assistance from Moscow in resolving the long-term conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America) were also welcomed at the Non-Aligned Movement level. The Soviet Union, in turn, during Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, solidified with the "zones of peace" concepts, which were promoted by the non-aligned countries. In particular, this applied to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean areas. The USSR's position regarding the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace was "based on the comprehensive international security system concept" (Utegenova, 1991, p. 89). Note that in 1986 the Non-Aligned Movement addressed Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan with a Disarmament Appeal, which called on both superpowers to take concrete steps to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. "The USSR's response showed full solidarity with the Non-Aligned Movement on this issue." (World Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement, 1988, p. 21). It can also be noted that in 1986 the Soviet Union and India, following the summit, adopted the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent

world; this document was actively supported at the NAM level as well. As M. Gorbachev noted, "our philosophical and political approaches to building a nuclear-free, non-violent world are aligned with the approaches not only of India, but also of the billions of people represented by the Non-Aligned Movement." (*World Socialism and the Non-Aligned Movement*, 1988, p. 32).

Changes towards the NAM in the post-Soviet era

The USSR's dramatic collapse led to powerful consequences and, in particular, to an objective decrease in the geopolitical influence of its main legal successor, the Russian Federation. We can say with all confidence that during the "Yeltsin" period of Russian history, the new Russian leadership almost completely ignored the existence of the NAM, while the interstate relations of the Russian Federation with the leading non-aligned countries in political or economic areas have been reduced to zero. In this regard, it is logical that the Russian international prestige among the majority of non-aligned states has sharply decreased compared to the Soviet era. It is hardly a coincidence that in all versions of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept for the entire post-Soviet period (including its latest edition of 2016) nothing is said about the NAM. Contrast with the period of the 1960s-1980s is more than obvious. For Russia in the 21st century, non-aligned and developing countries in their integrity are not a geopolitical priority. However, the Kremlin's course towards maintaining multipolarity in the system of international relations and the confrontation with the "collective West", which has intensified especially since 2014, objectively led to the intensification of actions by Russian diplomacy in relation to the Non-Aligned Movement. This became a reality in the late 2010s also because in this decade the Movement was headed by countries (Egypt, Iran, Venezuela, Azerbaijan) with which Moscow maintains friendly foreign policy relations. Let us also remind that within BRICS Russia closely interacts with such extremely influential countries in the NAM as India and the Republic of South Africa. Taking into account the fact that in the world arena the NAM continues to advocate multilateralism, strengthening the role of the UN, and democratizing international relations, it is not surprising that the Russian leaders see the Movement as an authoritative international association that should be viewed as a partner of the Russian Federation and as a force or the oppositional perspective of the complete "collective West" and its institutions' domination in modern international relations. This point of view is all the more justified since today a number of states of the post-Soviet space - Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan - are included in the

ranks of the Movement. With all these countries, Moscow is determined to build multi-directional relations. Even if today the role and place of the NAM in world politics do not seem as convincing and obvious as it was in the 1960s-1980s, for the Russian state the “Non-Aligned Movement factor” in the system of international relations seems important and promising. It is in this vein that the Russian Federation’s request for observer status in the NAM, voiced in October 2020, should be viewed (Russia has requested observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement, 2020). The latest NAM conferences were invariably attended by official delegations representing the Russian Federation, which also confirms the significance and importance of the Movement for the Russian current foreign policy. So, at the Eighteenth meeting of the NAM Head of State and Government in Baku (2019), Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Vershinin said: “We are ready to further build up cooperation with the Movement in the interests of strengthening international stability, for the benefit of our countries and peoples, the entire world community.” [Speech by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Vershinin, 2019]. The NAM, from Moscow’s point of view, is the most active in promoting the principles of multipolarity in modern international relations. The theme of Moscow’s approaches and of the countries which are part of the NAM to promote a multipolar system is reflected in the Russian president’s position. In his message to the Baku NAM conference, Vladimir Putin noted that “Russia consistently supports the efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement aimed at building a multipolar system of world order, at developing equal international dialogue and cooperation based on generally recognized legal norms and taking into account the legitimate interests of partners.” (Speech by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Vershinin .., 2019). It is obvious that in today’s contradictory and difficult international conditions for the Russian Federation, the Non-Aligned Movement is indeed capable of becoming a serious foreign policy partner for Moscow.

Conclusions

Summing up the general results of this chapter, we can state that in the initial period of the NAM existence, it was perceived by the Soviet leadership as a positive factor in the international relations system. Moscow immediately saw NAM as an ally in the general anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle, in the confrontation on the international arena of racism and Zionism, appreciated the anti-militarist potential of the Movement. At

the same time, the “most favoured nation” regime on the part of the USSR extended to those non-aligned countries that developed in the spirit of socialist orientation. On the most topical issues of world politics and military-political conflicts, the positions of the Soviet Union and the NAM coincided or turned out to be very close. At the same time, disagreements over the situation around Afghanistan turned into a serious problem in relations between the USSR and the NAM. In the framework of the discussions at the UN General Assembly on the world politics key problems, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the bulk of the countries participating in the NAM voted with the Soviet Union. Moscow also defined and coordinated the overall strategy of relations with the NAM on the part of the Warsaw Pact Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. During the period of detente and in the 1980s great importance on the part of Soviet diplomacy was attached to the interaction with the NAM in the struggle for a new, more just and democratic economic order. The “Gorbachev” period became, in fact, the apogee in terms of the Moscow’s and the Movement’s approaches convergence. After the USSR’s collapse, interest and attention to the activities and the factor of the NAM in the international relations system dropped dramatically. In recent years, under the influence of geopolitical motives, the Russian Federation has noticeably intensified its relations with the Movement, as evidenced by the request for observer status in the NAM in 2020.

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CHINESE POLICIES TOWARDS THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: China has always been supportive and sympathetic to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and its main initiatives over six decades. Very little scholarly attention was accepted by the history of China-NAM relations and the understanding of Chinese foreign policy towards the NAM since its inception in 1961 remains incomplete. Based on *People's Daily (Renmin ribao)*, China's most influential official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), this article tends to fill the gap between scholarly works on the PRC's diplomatic history. By tracing the dynamics of China and NAM interactions under each demarcated period, this article aims to generate a brief review of the evolution of Chinese policies towards the NAM from 1961 to 2021.

Key words: Non-Aligned Movement; NAM Summit; Cold War; Third World.

Introduction

Before the formal launch of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, China worked closely with the troika of the NAM and contributed to the Five Principle of Peaceful Co-existence, which illuminated the setting of the NAM's principles of independence, self-determination, and non-grouping. As the largest forum for developing countries, the NAM has attracted China's attention since its inception. China identified the potential of the

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NAM for furthering its foreign policy goals. Although China had not become a NAM observer until September 1991, Beijing sent congratulatory telegrams to each NAM Summit Conference in support of the NAM's proactive role in promoting the fight against colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, hegemony and ensuring national independence and sovereignty of the Southern hemisphere in the Cold War. China and the NAM relations reached their heyday in the first decade since the end of the Cold War, during which China was officially granted as an observer and the direct interactions between the two sides mushroomed. China has always affirmed the important role of the NAM in representing developing countries in international affairs, but the NAM has been progressively moving out of China's attention from 2000 onwards.

The stranglehold of American imperialists and India (1961-1969)

The period of the 1960s witnessed the radicalisation and revolutionisation of China's foreign policy. After Mao Zedong came back from the visit to the Soviet Union in 1957, he criticised the Soviet Communist Party's general foreign policy line of peaceful co-existence. For proletarian internationalism, Mao believed the general foreign policy line of socialist countries should involve more contents, including supporting the world revolution, anti-colonialist, and anti-imperialist movement (Wu, 1999, p. 152). In the Lushan Meeting of 1959, Zhang Wentian, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs was classified as a member of "Peng Dehuai Anti-Party Group" and a "Right opportunist". After the meeting, the "Anti-Rightist Movement" was launched again. As a result, in September, Zhang's proposal of a peaceful co-existence foreign policy line labelled as the rightist opportunist line was further criticised at the National Foreign Affairs Conference. In October, the Foreign Minister held a special meeting to continue criticising Zhang's peaceful co-existence foreign policy thinking (Zhang, 2000, pp. 1156-1157). Zhang's prominent position in the CCP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs was associated with the criticism over his peaceful co-existence foreign policy thinking during those two meetings, resulting in the interruption of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence that defined China's pragmatic and moderate foreign policy line in 1954 (Niu, 2019, p. 320). In 1962, Wang Jiaxiang, the Chief of the CCP International Bureau was fiercely attacked by Mao because Wang advised that China should endeavour to search for a stable relationship with major powers (Niu, 2019, p. 348). In the 1960s, Beijing began to pursue less pragmatic, calculated but more ideological or radical foreign policy. The general radicalisation and revolutionisation of China's

foreign policies could be seen from China's policy towards the NAM. China's perception of post-colonial Asian-Afro-Latin American developing countries, where the NAM members came from, had its origins in Mao's philosophy of the "intermediate zone". In the 1960s, the concept of the "intermediate zone", was gradually evolved into a line of strategic thinking that aimed to unite both intermediate zones to form an anti-imperialist international united front.² As the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian dispute deteriorated, Beijing began to shift its attention to the post-colonial Afro-Asian-Latin American developing countries that could be potential new allies in an international anti-imperialist united front against the U.S. and India. In the 1960s, China demonstrated its rhetorical support for the newly emerged international organisation - NAM by means of congratulatory telegrams, through which China defined the nature of the NAM as anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. All the congratulatory telegrams were sent by Premier Zhou Enlai, in which he advocated the NAM's further contributions to Asian-Afro-Latin American people and their national independence and their struggle of anti-(neo-) colonialism and anti-imperialism (People's Daily, 1961a; People's Daily, 1964a). China thus praised the countries which shared the same clear-cut anti-(neo-) colonialism and anti-imperialism viewpoints, such as Indonesia and Egypt, and criticised India because of its apathetic to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Nehru asserted that the conference should not condemn any country and defined the NAM as a mediator of two superpowers. Nehru believed not colonialism and imperialism, but war and peace should be the primary concerns for the NAM member states (People's Daily, 1961b). What made China most dissatisfied was that neither India nor Yugoslavia mentioned American imperialism (People's Daily, 1961b). On 9 September 1961, the Vice Prime Minister Chen Yi rebutted that "The people of Asia, Africa and Latin America have deeply realised that without independence and freedom, there can be no talk of defending peace and without breaking the chains of imperialism and colonialism, there can be any talk of coexistence." (People's Daily, 1961c). He criticised that "those who attempt to shift the important goals of the conference cannot win people's support and are therefore isolated." (People's Daily, 1961c). Between 1961 and 1966, China attempted to isolate Yugoslavia and India in the NAM,

² In 1963, Mao believed there were two intermediate zones, the first zone included Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the second zone represented Europe, Canada, Japan and Oceania. The first zone constituted the main force to overwhelm American imperialists. The countries in the second zone, such as Britain, France and Japan could be the indirect allies of people to counter American imperialists.

especially India, because Beijing perceived India abandoned non-alignment policy and allied with the U.S. to fight with China over a border dispute. In addition, the Sino-Indian border war attracted the attention of some NAM members in 1962. They tried to mediate the conflict to ease Sino-Indian border tensions. Ceylonese Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike initiated the Colombo Conference to resolve the crisis. Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Egypt, and Ghana participated in it. On the first day of the Colombo Conference, Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to the leaders at the conference and claimed that the Sino-Indian border dispute should and could be resolved through peaceful negotiations between China and India and hoped that the conference could make positive contributions to promoting the resumption of negotiations between China and India (People's Daily, 1962a). However, the final mediation plan initiated by the Colombo Conference failed because Beijing regarded it as tilted towards India (Lüthi, 2016, pp. 96-97). In an address to the second NAM Summit Conference in 1964, Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri stated that "although we accepted all proposals proposed by the Colombo Conference, we have not received a positive response from China" (People's Daily, 1964a). In response, China asserted that India "imposed various preconditions to prevent China and India from holding direct negotiations on the border issue" (People's Daily, 1964b). Moreover, Beijing also excerpted the numerous pro-Communist comments from the NAM member countries and created an atmosphere that China garnered more supports than India among the NAM countries over the Sino-Indian border conflict. The editorial of *People's Daily* on 23 December 1962 listed the military cooperation between India and the U.S. after the Sino-Indian border ceasefire and stressed that it started earlier (People's Daily, 1962b). China attempted to demonstrate that India had given up its neutral stance, and it was not a representative of "emerging Asian and African forces" (People's Daily, 1962c). China contrasted itself with India to highlight its unflagging resistance to imperialism and depicted the latter as a stooge of American imperialism. In the 1960s, Beijing built support for the restoration of the lawful seat of the PRC in the United Nations (UN) from the NAM member states. Beijing's appeals were included in the Belgrade Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. During the First and the Second NAM Summit Conference, the NAM member states, including Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Cambodia, Ceylon, and Ghana, unanimously advocated that the UN should accept the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China in the UN. From 1967 to 1969, the NAM was hardly mentioned in the *People's Daily* primarily because of China's domestic dramatic upheaval as well as no conference held by the NAM

during this period. Although the participants in the second Cairo Conference had not arranged to hold a further non-aligned Conference, from 1964 onwards, influential personalities such as Tito, Nasser and Indira Gandhi vigorously attempted to bring about further non-aligned Conferences. Nonetheless, the majority of non-aligned governments reckoned that it was no sense in holding additional meetings because they had reached their most important common foreign policy goals - eliminating colonialism and gaining independence, or were seemingly well on their way to doing so (Dinkel, 2016, p. 110). The chaotic Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, and Beijing pursued a more radical foreign policy. As a result, China became one of the world's most isolated countries at the time. Between 1966 and 1969, China failed to establish diplomatic relations with new countries. Nearly 30 of the 53 countries that established diplomatic relations or half-diplomatic relations with China successively went into diplomatic disputes with China. Five countries, including Indonesia, had terminated their diplomatic relations with China (Yang, 2007, p. 5). Under such circumstances, the NAM was not in China's interests.

Opposing two hegemonies and anti-Soviet hegemony in particular (1970-1979)

In the 1970s, China's radicalism was de-escalated, and Beijing shifted to a more moderate course. It improved its relations with numerous developing countries that had previously regarded it with suspicion. In particular, reintegrating into the international community, Beijing replaced Taiwan as China's representative to the UN in 1971. Meanwhile, Mao Zedong set forth his strategic thinking of the division of the Three Worlds in 1974 under the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict and Sino-American rapprochement. According to the theory, the First World including America and the Soviet Union were the biggest oppressors and exploiters. The Second World countries were dominated by two hegemons to varying degrees and some of them still colonised the Third World countries. Although the Third World was oppressed and exploited, they were the main force of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Officially, Chinese statements called for a struggle against the hegemony of the First World, but largely against the Soviet Union, which was perceived as the biggest threat by Beijing. As the largest Third World forum in the mid-1970s, China tried to seek support from the NAM member states to form an international united front against the Soviet Union. As more and more Asian-Afro-Latin American countries gained independence and joined the NAM in the 1970s, the main task for the NAM

progressively evolved into maintaining their national independence and sovereignty and preventing the hegemonic powers' intervention. Furthermore, the NAM demanded a new international economic order. Dinkel (2016, p. 117) argues that "the demands the NAM voiced together with G77, calling for the establishment of a new global order of both the economy and the information media, culminated in the North-South conflict that profoundly characterised the decade." Some Chinese scholars hold the view that China's focus towards the NAM shifted to the economic sphere in the 1970s (Gao, Cheng and Wei, 2018, p. 15). Although China also noticed the NAM's growing focus on economic issues and support its appeal of restructuring the global order of economy in the 1970s, in general, political and ideological issues remained China's NAM policy priorities. One of the cases in point was Cambodia. On 20 May 1970, Mao Zedong issued a statement of "People of the World, united and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs", which fiercely condemned American involvement in Cambodia, praised Sihanouk's spirit of fighting American imperialists, and supported the establishment of Sihanouk-led Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1994, p. 584). On 21 May, the Chinese government held a mass rally of half million people in Beijing to support the people of the world in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and Mao's statement issued the day before (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1998, p. 367-368). Sihanouk and his wife also attended the rally. In addition to domestic support measures in favour of Sihanouk, Beijing sought to use the NAM for debating American intervention in Cambodia's internal affairs. The Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC) headed by Sihanouk seized every opportunity to create and reinforce its legitimacy among the NAM member states and China also helped the RGNUC to attend a series of NAM Conferences. In August 1972, during the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held in Georgetown, the Chinese leaders instructed the diplomats of the Chinese Embassy in Guyana to "actively cooperate with [RGNUC] in the struggle of destroying the conspiracy of the Lol Nol clique and restoring the seat of the legitimate Cambodian government led by Prince Sihanouk in the NAM" (Xu, 2007, p. 210-211). As a result, the RGUNC was recognised as the sole legitimate authority within Cambodia at the Georgetown Conference. *People's Daily* provided a lengthy report to the Conference and its resolutions which proclaimed that the Indochina and Cambodian representative issues were "not only a victory of the Cambodian peoples, but also a common victory in defence of justice of the people of the world." (*People's Daily*, 1972). In the 1970s, both China and the NAM

emphasised the anti-imperialist position. Comparatively speaking, the latter began to focus its agenda on opposing hegemony. Also, economic issues had gradually taken over from anti-colonialism as the major concern for the NAM states during this period. In the congratulatory telegrams to the NAM Summit Conferences in 1970 and 1973, Zhou Enlai encouraged the NAM to promote the unity and struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and hegemony (People's Daily, 1970; People's Daily, 1973). In the 4th NAM Summit Conference, the wording, "against hegemony" and rejection of "any form of subordination or dependence and any interference or pressure" were enshrined in the Political Declaration of the Conference for the first time (Documents of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 1973, p. 9). However, due to the Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s, Beijing mitigated criticism of the U.S. while Chinese verbal attacks on the Soviet Union and Vietnam increased mainly because of the growing division and worsening relations between the Soviet Union and China, and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. "The Soviets supported the Vietnamese invasion primarily through grants of economic and military aid, including the airlift and sealift of Soviet materiel, shuttling of Vietnamese troops and equipment to the Cambodian theatre, and the dispatch of Soviet military advisers to Vietnam to train air force personnel." (Stoecker, 1989, p.7) The Vietnamese invasion and the Soviet-Vietnam alliance posed a threat to Chinese security and exacerbated the regional situation. The NAM's tune of counter-hegemony posed challenges for the Soviet hegemonic expansion in the Third World. Since the 5th Summit Conference in August 1976, on the one hand, the Soviet Union preached that it was a natural ally of the NAM, trying to persuade the NAM to oppose imperialism rather than hegemonism. On the other hand, the Soviet Union sought to reinforce its dominance within the NAM. Although Beijing condemned the Soviet influence in the NAM, the host country Cuba was particularly assertive in defending Soviet interests within the NAM during the 6th Summit Conference in Havana in 1979. Under the leadership of Fidel Castro, the Summit discussed the concept of an anti-imperialist alliance with the Soviet Union and tried to prevent the NAM from opposing hegemony (People's Daily, 1979a). Cuba attempted to move the NAM closer to the Soviet camp. The Chinese Government attached great importance to this Conference and promptly demonstrated once again its support for maintaining the NAM unity. Premier Hua Guofeng sent a message of congratulations on its opening. Hua claimed that the Chinese government strongly believed that "the vast number of NAM countries can rely on their solidarity (...), and eliminate the interference of imperialism and

hegemonism" (People's Daily, 1979b). On the surface, the final Political Declaration of Havana conference reaffirmed the fundamental goals and purposes of the Movement which has guided it since its inception in 1961, including "independence of non-aligned countries from great-Power or bloc rivalries", "non-interference and non-intervention in internal and external affairs" and "elimination of all forms of hegemony" (Documents of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 1979, p. 11-12). In the 1970s, it appeared that the non-aligned movement was tilting towards the Soviet Union.

**Less politics, more economy:
A non-aligned China and the NAM (1980-1990)**

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China's economic pragmatism began to temper ideology which shaped and influenced foreign policy-making. At the political level, China continued to support the NAM's struggle against hegemony in the 1980s. According to Deng Xiaoping, China faced three major tasks in the 1980s. They were to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace, to strive for China's unification and particularly for the return of Taiwan to the motherland; step up socialist economic modernisation. (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji weiyuanhui, 1983, p. 239). In the 1980s, Beijing continued to push the NAM to make further contributions to the struggle against hegemony (People's Daily, 1983a; People's Daily, 1986a). Furthermore, China recalibrated its foreign policy and established an "independent and self-reliant foreign policy of peace" without leaning to any side in the early 1980s. Consequently, Beijing believed that the friendship and cooperation between the two sides would be undoubtedly deepened because both shared a common value orientation (People's Daily, 1986b; People's Daily, 1989a). "By the mid-1970s, economic development among the non-aligned had replaced many of their original goals." (Lüthi, 2016 b, p.100) However, Beijing did not start to focus more on the NAM's efforts in the economic sphere until the 1980s, supporting the NAM's positive role in building a fair and equitable international economic order and promoting North-South and South-South cooperation. In the opening address at the 12th National Congress of the CCP in 1982, Deng Xiaoping articulated that economic construction was at the core of three tasks, and it was the basis for the solution of our external and internal problems. (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji weiyuanhui, 1993, p. 3). As China shifted the focus to economic construction, its foreign policy was designed to serve its economic transformation and development. In the

spring of 1985, Deng Xiaoping concluded that “the two great issues confronting the world today, issues of global strategic significance are: first, peace, and second, economic development. The first involves East-West relations, while the second involves North-South relations.” (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji weiyuanhui, 1993, p.105). Premier Zhao Ziyang in June further explained that “the essence of the North-South problem is the widening economic gap between the developing countries and the developed countries. The most important reason for this situation is the existence of the unfair and unreasonable international economic order” (People’s Daily, 1985). The NAM first put forward the slogan of establishing a new international economic order in 1964, and at the 4th NAM Summit Conference in 1973 formally adopted it as the NAM’s programme of action and formulated a series of strategies to achieve this goal since then. Although China supported this advocacy in the 1970s, it was not until the 1980s that replacing the existing international economic order became an aspiration shared by both NAM and China. By the early 1980s, Chinese foreign policy was increasingly shaped by economic interests. Beijing’s political discourse of development and cooperation defined the basic tones of Chinese policies towards the NAM and the other developing countries. In the summer of 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang announced that “China will take South-South cooperation as the foothold for its foreign economic cooperation” (People’s Daily, 1983b). In 1984, Deng Xiaoping claimed that China would always belong to the Third World, which was the foundation of China’s foreign policy. China shared a common destiny with all the Third World countries and supported the North-South dialogue. Meanwhile, the cooperation among the Third World countries, South-South cooperation should be stepped up. (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianjishi, 1993, p. 56). At the opening ceremony of the 9th NAM Summit Conference, the chairman of the Conference, Janez Drnovsek, stated that the most important issue of non-aligned countries was the issue of development (People’s Daily, 1989a). On 10 September 1989, Beijing emphasised again that the NAM placed special emphasis on strengthening South-South cooperation and advocated the development of unity and long-term cooperation within non-aligned countries. China supported this advocacy (People’s Daily, 1989b).

From an outsider to an observer (1991-1999)

During the Cold War, Beijing’s overriding challenge was to ensure a relatively weak China’s security in the face of pressing threats from the Soviet Union and the U.S. As a result, the priority was clearly to address core survival

concerns and the imperatives for Chinese diplomacy were correspondingly straightforward. (Goldstein, 2001, pp. 835-836) The end of the Cold War lifted the curtain on new China's foreign relations. In the last decade of the 20th century, China expanded the breadth and depth of its foreign relations, particularly regarding Southeast Asian countries. In 1991, for the first time, normalized relations existed between China and all ASEAN countries, and China was invited to attend an ASEAN summit. In 1996 China became the ASEAN's dialogue partner. At the end of the Cold War, the relationship between China and the NAM also entered a new era in which China was to become an observer in 1991, a status granted in 1992. For the NAM, the Chinese presence as the permanent member of the Security Council and the largest developing country in the world meant expanding the NAM's influence in international society. China growingly recognised multilateral diplomacy as a crucial means to secure state interests and shape international rules to create an enabling environment for development. In the 1990s, Beijing, therefore, joined various regional and international accords and increased the quality of its participation in multilateral organisations. Beijing's embrace of multilateral institutions represented one of the most dramatic shifts in its foreign relations. (Medeiros and Fravel, 2003) Beijing viewed participation of the NAM as a venue to increase its influence in international affairs. In October 1992, President Jiang Zemin declared "China is a developing country. Strengthening unity and cooperation with the third world is the cornerstone of China's foreign policy. China and the developing countries will continue to support each other in safeguarding independence and sovereignty and strengthening exchanges in economic and cultural aspects. China has become an observer of NAM and will reinforce cooperation with it in the future" (zhonggong zhongyang wenxian bianji weiyuanhui, 2006, pp. 243-244). The new circumstance changes in the post-Cold War rendered the utility and relevance of the NAM doubtful. Beijing rejected the redundancy and irrelevance of this movement and insisted that the NAM was still relevant. In the 1990s, China sent high-level delegations to attend a series of NAM summit meetings and reiterated its support to the relevance of the NAM in the post-Cold War period. At the 1992 NAM Summit Conference, Qian Qichen, China's Foreign Minister, speaking as an observer, emphasized that the NAM "will still play an important role in international affairs" (People's Daily, 1992). The issues China talked about in the NAM during this period encompassed from building a fair international political and economic order to promoting South-South cooperation and reinforcing multilateralism. In order to find and promote solutions to the problems that the NAM and China faced, apart from rhetorical support, a surge of cooperation between the NAM and China

emerged in the 1990s. China and the Non-Aligned Coordination Bureau headquartered in New York had close consultations on current major international issues (Ding, 1994, p. 132). In 1999, China worked closely with the NAM under the UN structure in the fields of human rights, disarmament, and economics (zhonghua renmin gongheguo wajiaobu zhengce yanjiushi, 2000, p. 745).

Gradually moving out China's attention (2000-2021)

Despite China continued to express its support to the NAM, the 21st century has been witnessing China's diminishing interests for the NAM. There are only 35 reports about the NAM in the *People's Daily* over the past twenty-one years. In contrast, 111 reports were published in the 1990s. In addition to shorter and shorter attention span, the level of the Chinese delegations to the NAM Summit Conferences gradually declined. Chinese delegations to the 13th, 14th and 15th NAM Summit Conferences were led by the Vice Foreign Minister from 2003 to 2009. In 2012, the Assistant Foreign Minister headed the Chinese delegation to participate in the 16th NAM Summit Conference. In 2016 and 2018, China's Special Representative for Latin America and Chinese Ambassador to Azerbaijan led a delegation to the 17th and 18th NAM Summit Conference, respectively. This partly stemmed from the NAM's lowered status and importance in Beijing's calculation of foreign relations, and partly resulted from the movement's inherent defects. As Chen argued, "The NAM has no headquarters or permanent body and its resolutions adopted by the summit Conferences lack binding force. The NAM is facing the test of continuous differentiation and reorganisation among developing countries. The current NAM needs to keep pace with the times, strengthening its competitiveness, and increase its voice in responding to the international financial crisis, climate change, food and energy crises and other global challenges." (People's Daily, 2009) In general, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NAM has been a movement adrift. Given its complex make-up, it is no surprise that the NAM faces increasing problems of coherence and cohesion. The NAM summits tend to be glorified gabfests. (Patrick, 2012)

Conclusions

In conclusion, China has always been sympathetic and supportive to the NAM and its main initiatives since its inception. During the Cold War,

China and the NAM shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonism, and the New International Economic Order. However, China had not joined the NAM before the end of the Cold War.

Beijing found it more useful to stay outside of the NAM because China was wary of such a forum as a venue that India and the Soviet Union would criticise and constrain itself. Thus, China selectively participated and supported the NAM initiatives, according to its national interests and ideology. In the post-Cold War era, China became an observer country to the NAM in 1992 and acted more proactively to woo the Third World countries. Overall, Beijing still adopts a modest attitude towards the NAM. China remains in observer status by now. Beijing attempts to leave policy space to address risks, rejecting the pursuit of narrow interests or specific ideology. The 21st century witnesses that China attaches less importance to the NAM largely because the movement fails to grasp contemporary relevance.

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NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

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Abstract: After its dismissal from the Socialist camp, Yugoslavia became one of the instigators, main drivers and pioneers of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this context, Yugoslavia sought to strengthen the only recently established system of the United Nations (UN) for solving international conflicts, particularly through binding norms of international law. The external pressure, triggered by repositioning the country between “East” and “West” amidst the Cold War, contributed to a new understanding of “active peaceful coexistence”, peacekeeping and disarmament, seeking to strengthen the international law’s role in general. In this vein, Yugoslav protagonists initiated an increasing number of draft resolutions within the organs of the UN, often together with their non-aligned partners (esp. India and Egypt). Still, these initiatives had only little impact on Cold War realpolitik. Yugoslav actors thus dealt with the global injustices imminent in the existing Cold War world order, which harmed the consequent application of international legal principles. Among many others, the most significant contributions concerned disarmament, the peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful coexistence/friendly relations and economic justice, especially linked to the human rights discourse. In the paper the reasons and motivations for this involvement will be clarified, drawing on opinions and interpretations of Yugoslav legal experts and politicians of the time.

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These initiatives on an international level may have contributed to an increasing legal certainty in international affairs. However, these demands and proposals for codification were often contorted by the Cold War complexities and the ongoing East-West competition on the meanings and political implications of “international law”.

Key words: non-alignment, Yugoslavia, international law.

Introduction:
**Socialist Yugoslavia, the Cold War
and the international system**

After its dismissal from the Socialist camp in 1948, Yugoslavia became one of the instigators, main drivers and pioneers of the later called Non-Aligned Movement (Bogetić 1990; Dinkel 2015, 102–5, p. 111). In this context, Yugoslavia sought to strengthen the only recently established system of the United Nations (UN) for solving international conflicts, particularly through binding norms of international law. The external pressure, triggered by repositioning the country between East and West amidst the Cold War, contributed to a new understanding of *active peaceful coexistence*, peacekeeping and dispute settlement, seeking to strengthen the international law’s role in general. In this vein, Yugoslav protagonists initiated an increasing number of draft resolutions within the organs of the UN, often together with their non-aligned partners (esp. India and Egypt). In general, these initiatives had only little impact on the Cold War realpolitik. However, a scrutinising analysis of Yugoslav UN initiatives and doctrines of international law reveals that Yugoslavia’s UN delegation and its legal experts worked on a number of projects to reform and strengthen the UN system and to establish a solid “international rule of law”. Yugoslav actors thus dealt with the global injustices imminent in the existing Cold War world order, which harmed the consequent application of international legal principles. I will try to highlight the specific legal and political discourse that Yugoslav actors and legal experts drew upon for establishing their vision of a just world by the means of the progressive development of international law, outlined by Art. 15 of the Statute of the UN International Law Commission (Avramov 1973, p. 46). I am going to use several examples of pressing international issues from the 1950s to the early 1980s and the Yugoslav proposals for solving them. Among many others, the most significant proposals concerned the peaceful settlement of disputes, diplomatic intercourse, peacekeeping and disarmament as well as the complex issue of *peaceful coexistence*. In conclusion, I will also briefly touch

upon several human rights-related issues, particularly the non-aligned countries' focus on economic justice. However, many of these draft resolutions were connected with the complexities of Yugoslav foreign policy and with Communist ideological preconceptions rather than tangible liberal convictions on the impact and potential of international law. I will highlight that these initiatives on an international level may have contributed to an increasing legal certainty in international affairs, nonetheless. These demands and proposals for codification were often contorted by Cold War complexities and the ongoing East-West competition on the meanings and political implications of "international law".

International law in history and its implications for Yugoslavia's role in the UN

Research on the Yugoslav involvement in the making of the post-war international order yields insightful new perspectives on this "experiment of a state" (Sundhaussen 1993), both in respects to regional and global historiography. My approach focuses on the development of (public) international law in the course of history, applying a critical stance in order to counter a linear and at times the teleological narrative of its historical development. Legal norms, in general, are never absolute. They are subject to social, political and cultural change through time and space. These dynamics are a lot more intensive when it comes to the international system. Its norms and values, both codified and ceremonial, are constantly changing within the multitude of interests, actors and entanglements, all embedded in rather flat hierarchies of legislation and decision-making. In such a setting, the legal validity and normativity depend much more on political circumstances than in a domestic setting with clear legal hierarchies and codes. The historical study of international legal norms must therefore include their limitations and failures. From such a perspective, codification initiatives of certain states and actors, independent of their motivation and success, need to be included in such a critical historical account of international law. Nevertheless, I do not challenge the basic existence and fundamental function of international law as a particular set of norms or rather a "regime of knowledge" (Foucault 1984) in the international sphere. Despite its close entanglement with politics and economics, and the partial imprecision of its contents, international law has its justified place in international affairs. Thus, I am highlighting how Yugoslav initiatives and pushes for codification in the United Nations contributed to the consolidation of a number of legal principles. Such a critical but affirmative

perspective accommodates for both political and social influences (i.e., the context) on the evolution of legal norms, without denouncing the trans-historical potential and consistency of international law (Koskenniemi 2014). However, the opposing views in East and West during the Cold War coincided with fundamentally different interpretations of international law and the international order, way beyond conflicting political interests. Legal categories were applied to describe and legitimate the global *status quo* and served an ideologically based moral impetus. The legal arguments were used to legitimate and describe the confrontation and its consequences, either in a liberal-democratic or a Marxist-Leninist paradigm (Dülffer 2010, pp. 260f.). Yugoslav scholars and experts of international law, influencing the foreign policy and diplomacy of their country, came up with innovative and sometimes synthesized approaches to assess and resolve this confrontation. A very illustrative example is the rendering of the declaration on the rights and duties of states by the eminent scholar and diplomat Milan Šahović (Šahović 2008, pp. 81–88).

The centrality of the UN system in Yugoslav legal and international affairs scholarship

Embedded in a socialist state and society, Yugoslav doctrines and international law teaching differed starkly from respective Soviet tenets, especially after 1948. This, of course, relates to the post-war establishment of the so-called “Democratic Yugoslavia” and the factual continuation of statehood, whereas the Soviet Union started from a total revolution, negating any legal state succession of Tsarist Russia in the first place, which resulted in an ideological barrier to establish normal relations with “bourgeois” or “imperialist” states. This resulted from the early Leninist notion that the Soviet state would be the outset of a coming proletarian world revolution, abolishing states and borders. In the Yugoslav case, no such “total break” in foreign relations happened. To a certain degree, we can rather speak of élite continuity in professional and academic levels. So, “bourgeois specialists” and “corrected clerks” could continue their professions (Stefanov 2011, p. 53), as long as they showed willingness to support socialism and the one-party state led by Tito. Still, leading issues of diplomacy and foreign relations were decided solely by the Partisan command. Likewise, only loyal communists were to become the new heads of diplomacy and foreign policy, i.e., people who fully enjoyed Marshall Tito’s confidence. Socialist Yugoslavia’s Foreign Service thus evolved from military diplomacy, which had brought about the allies recognition of the

new order in the Western Balkans (Terzić 2012, pp. 23–29), while being supported by bourgeois academia, both in its lower ranks and in legal expertise. In such a setup, Yugoslav diplomacy and legal experts stuck to “classic” tenets of international law while combining them with progressive approaches. Anti-imperialism and a Marxist sense of mission from Communist ideology were combined with traditional readings of a universal law among nations. This combination became the decisive characteristics of Yugoslav readings of the right to self-determination, sovereignty and non-interference. Yugoslav legal scholars insisted that international law and foreign policy are two separated realms, though linked by their goals and shared issues, opposed to the Soviet concept, which framed both arenas as part of the struggle for world communism (Tunkin 1972 as quoted in Fritsche 1986, p. 182). From a Yugoslav perspective, active peaceful coexistence and intensive international cooperation were the goals of their foreign policy in the first place, which were turned into normative guidelines of international law in a second step, but they did not presuppose duties that would limit state sovereignty. The same holds true for the explicit political orientation of non-alignment, which Yugoslav scholars and politicians have never regarded as an institute of international law (Bilandžić and Nick 1982, pp. 170ff.), in contrast to later Soviet renderings that non-alignment or “positive neutrality” is a legally binding concept, at least for Socialist states like Yugoslavia (Fritsche 1986, pp. 191–205). However, Yugoslav scholars shared a similar view with Soviet theory concerning the “dogma of sovereignty”, as they considered any violation of sovereignty as a potential threat of Socialist “planned management”, as economic, political and administrative activity were entangled and linked in their social system (Janković 1984, p. 117). Politically, anti-imperialism was still a very important field of action and orientation, especially in the non-aligned efforts and demands for complete decolonisation and self-determination of all oppressed peoples. Still, Yugoslav scholars did not doctrinally link the state’s socialist orientation and its rights and duties under international law (Nord 1974, p. 63; Janković 1984, pp. 72ff.). Likewise, human rights were framed as being primarily a domestic issue, i.e., legal guarantees by the state/socialist society towards its citizens. In this vein, collectively addressable rights, e.g., cultural, economic and social rights were given larger weight than individual rights (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 98f, 296f.). In the Yugoslav view, the UN system was the main promoter and political arena for demands of less powerful states, either due to their smallness, newly gained independence or economic weakness – often all these criteria applied. Both Yugoslav political elites and scholars saw a big chance in

turning the UN organs into independent arbiters and subjects of international law in order to maintain peace (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 180ff.; Šahović 1987, p. 42). Non-aligned initiatives strove for a lasting effect on international legal rules, which ought to be binding for all UN member states. In this vein, many endeavours were made to establish an alternative.² The Yugoslav CP leaders argued that “correct political attitudes” were more important than legal training (regarding jurists, judges and legal scholars). Still, certain professionalism was maintained and not sacrificed for ideology (Ramet 2006, p. 170). Mechanism of creating so-called *hard law* through the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and other UN bodies like the ECOSOC, considering the bias of power in the Security Council (UNSC) in favour of Great powers and the political blocs (Jovanović 1990, pp. 193ff.).

The UN initiatives of Yugoslavia concerning peaceful conflict settlement, peacekeeping and disarmament

One of the prime examples, and even an early one, was the de facto non-aligned initiative – although the term was not yet used back then – for an alternative peacekeeping mechanism through the UNGA. In 1950, due to the stalemate in the UNSC where the Soviet Union effectively vetoed all decisions concerning the war in Korea, the United States initiated the resolution *Uniting for Peace* in 1950 in order to reprimand the unilateral invasion of Chinese troops on the Korean Peninsula. The outcome was an UNGA document that by its wording could be used for concrete measures, as the resolution openly urged the UNSC to act, otherwise, the UNGA would take matters into their hands (Jovanović 1990, pp. 218–21). The Yugoslav delegation contributed greatly to the final text and was one of its prime supporters, openly opposing the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia added corrective amendments concerning the applicability of these collective measures only in the mentioned cases, and made sure that these measures were only to be taken in regard to the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of the concerned nation (Jovanović 1985, p. 157). Actually, the Yugoslav position was at first to avoid such a parallel mandate, being a non-permanent member of the UNSC at the time. Yugoslav diplomat Aleš Bebler even presided over the UNSC and did everything to find a solution

² The Yugoslav CP leaders argued that “correct political attitudes” were more important than legal training (regarding jurists, judges and legal scholars). Still, certain professionalism was maintained and not sacrificed for ideology.

integrating Communist China, which remained outside the UN until 1971, into the negotiations, though without success. Yugoslavia eventually joined the initiative (Jovanović 1990, p. 204). Despite the overall political and advisory character of UNGA resolutions (besides the consensually agreed conventions), this was the first time they could not be regarded as sheer soft law any longer (Andrassy as paraphrased in Jovanović 1990, pp. 212f.). Such *hard international law through the back door*, then formed the basis for a projected alternative and more democratic UN decision-making mechanism. However, this undertaking largely failed in the long run, although the initiatives were numerous. Still, the resolution led to further initiatives by Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries in the design of peacekeeping mechanisms, the deployment of UN-mandate forces and a thorough definition of wrongful acts under international law, first of all on aggression and intervention. In the following, a committee for collective measures was set up, in which Yugoslavia had a decisive role in defining what measures were to be taken to maintain peace (Jovanović 1990, pp. 215f.). The mechanism was used several times since then, most prominently for the resolution of the Suez Crisis in 1956, where Yugoslavia initiated the deployment of peace troops applying the principles of *Uniting for Peace* (Jovanović 1990, pp. 260–66; Trültzsch 2021, pp. 224ff.). Yugoslavia remained a moderate supporter of the mechanism since it depended on the UNGA, where the non-aligned states soon formed a stable majority of the voting power (Jovanović 1990, pp. 220–23). Therefore, Yugoslavia further adhered to the leading role of the UNSC in regard to legally binding decisions concerning peace and security, and refrained from proposals that called for a complete revision of the UN charter concerning these mechanisms. The aftermath of the resolution led to new questions. The international community needed to clarify which wrongful acts were actually a threat to peace and which ones qualified for being sanctioned or reprimanded. In these efforts on codification, Yugoslavia again had a decisive influence. Consequently, codification and juridification of international affairs and UN mechanisms stayed at the centre of Yugoslav activities (Blichner and Molander, 2005, pp. 4f, 8, 19f).³ The definition of aggression, being a major

³ “Juridification” is an ambiguous term, comprising processes of legalisation, formalisation and the actual application of the law, both in the domestic and international spheres. Therefore, it is a useful concept for explaining certain trends in international politics that prefer legal frameworks above sheer diplomacy or power politics.

dispute between the two power blocs, was one of these issues that often hindered a peaceful conflict settlement within the UN system. Since the 1950s, Yugoslavia has repeatedly put this problem on the agenda. Thus, they initiated Resolution 378 – “Duties of States in the event of the outbreak of hostilities” – which formed the basis for further consideration of the matter by the International Law Commission and a special committee (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 262f.). Although the UN Charter clearly provided the framework for further elaboration, declaring illegal both war and the use of force, and even the threat to use force against sovereign states, Yugoslav scholars and diplomats found it necessary to further define acts of aggression to clearly distinguish them from the right to self-defence. As this was a crucial point of disagreement among the big powers in the 1950s, the UN bodies in charge could not successfully provide an acceptable solution (Trültzsch 2021, p. 264). International events like the perceived aggression against Non-aligned allies like Egypt and the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War made Yugoslavia resume its efforts. Likewise, fears of a Soviet intervention – stemming from the 1956 Hungarian case – grew again after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, which Yugoslavia wholeheartedly condemned, as the Soviet Union saw the country as the prime example of a “renegade” that had left the Socialist camp to pursue its own path of socialist development (Trültzsch 2014, pp. 93f.; Fritsche 1986, p. 79). During the second half of the 1960s up to the 1970s, Yugoslavia pushed again for a clearer definition of what constituted acts of aggression, both relating to open warfare and indirect means of pressure, espionage and blackmailing. Starting in 1965, Yugoslavia stood at the forefront of a combined non-aligned effort which led to UNGA Res. 2330 of 1967. It established a special committee to elaborate a generally accepted legal concept of aggression, after the preparatory work of the International Law Commission and the former committee on the problem. Several drafts went by unnoticed, and the continued bloc confrontation hindered progress, although Yugoslavia and its partners agreed on many compromises, like the partition of the definition into “war of aggression” and “aggression”, denoting all other forms of pressurizing sovereign states and its representatives in international affairs. These efforts were finally rewarded in 1974 when the UNGA adopted Res. 3314 “Definition of Aggression” (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 262–68). As its contents relate directly to the UN Charter, they can be considered at least customary international law and may be used as a valid resource for making legal arguments on warfare (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 269f; Kemp 2016, pp. 134f.). Connected to the definition of aggression, which also encompasses the threat to the use of force, were questions arising

around a clearer codification of diplomatic immunities. For Yugoslavia, this question was linked openly to the national interest and hailed from the low-intensity conflict with the Soviet Union after being expelled from the Cominform and the Socialist camp. In 1951, Yugoslavia initiated a resolution that mandated the International Law Commission to specify diplomatic security and immunities, most of which were largely customary international law until then. The initiative was Yugoslavia's reaction to a series of violations, illegal arrests and other grave infringements against Yugoslav embassies and diplomatic personnel in several Eastern European states and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia officially complained about these hostile acts before the UNGA (Šahović 2008, pp. 93–98; Jovanović 1985, pp. 93f.). After thorough refinement and numerous minor amendments, the Yugoslav draft was almost completely adopted in 1952 as Resolution 685 and made way for a thorough codification of diplomatic law (Šahović 2008, pp. 92ff.). The resolution connected the overall political tasks of the United Nations with a profound evolution of interstate laws, i.e., international law in its basic meaning (Jovanović 1985, pp. 95). This successful effort was one of the building blocks of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1964. One of the most significant contributions to modern international law is the codification of the principle of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of states. Although outlined already in the UN Charter, the course of the hegemonic power relations during the Cold War era needed to be tackled by a clear convention that bound all states and actors to certain rules in their international bearing and relations. Yugoslavia, openly under pressure during its first years outside the Soviet bloc, made this codification effort one of the prime interests of its foreign policy at the UN and within the emerging Non-Aligned Movement. The concept of "peaceful coexistence" has its roots in Lenin's theory of revolution on a "pause" in the revolutionary action in order to regain strength, a "pause" in which "peaceful coexistence" with the outside capitalist world is required in order to build up socialism (Meissner 1963, p. 20). Stalin turned this concept into one of the pillars of Soviet foreign policy and, with slight adaptations, it remained a central provision of Soviet ideology, explicitly of its international legal doctrine, until the 1980s. In the Yugoslav context, the principle changed its name and character, becoming "active peaceful coexistence", one of the pillars of Yugoslav foreign policy and a basis for its non-aligned orientation. It used to be a political concept in the beginning, backed by founding principles of international law like sovereignty and equality of all states. In a way, it reflected the profound application of the provisions of the UN charter into Yugoslavia's foreign relations. Put another way, Yugoslav diplomats and

legal experts (Šahovič 1969, p. 14), pushed for an all-encompassing application of the principle in international affairs in order to secure the country's delicate position and its independence in a divided Europe. The trade-off was codification or power politics. As the bloc powers could rely on the latter, the non-aligned states like Yugoslavia chose to engage in codification, this time with the support of the Soviet bloc (Šahovič 1969, p. 11). The Cuba Crisis opened a window of opportunity not just for serious steps on disarmament, but also helped Yugoslavia to convince many UN delegations to engage in the efforts to specify the rules of the UN charter on friendly relations and cooperation. After several resolutions and debates in the V and VI committees (both addressing legal issues), only Res. 1815 of 1962 and Res. 2103 of 1965 led to the formation of a special committee that worked on a draft for a convention. Despite the almost unanimous support for Resolution 2103, the special committee soon became an arena of heavy discussions and clear bloc formation between Eastern/non-aligned and Western states, with factions even inside these blocs (Šahovič 1969, pp. 14f.). The US delegations eventually showed openness to a clearer legal expression of "friendly relations" – the compromise formula to avoid open "socialist" wording in the forthcoming Declaration, negotiated, among others, by Yugoslavia's representative in the UNGA legal committee, Đuro Ninčić (Trültzsch 2021, p. 234; Šahovič 1969, p. 13). The United Kingdom, however, refused to accept any legal validity of duty to cooperation beyond the UN Charter. The Soviet Union often patronised the positions of the non-aligned states while refusing to accept their proposals on side aspects of peaceful coexistence, like weapon control or sovereignty over natural resources. The drafts and the later declaration relied on seven principles of the UN Charter: the prohibition of unilateral use of force or its threat, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the principle of non-intervention, and the duty of states to cooperate and to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the UN Charter, as well as sovereign equality and peoples' self-determination. These centrepieces were agreed on early, whereas the resulting obligations and the consequences were subject to dispute and disagreement, as they touched on a wide range of international problems: disarmament, self-determination, sovereignty, peacekeeping and the future evolution of international law in the UN system, which was a central concern of Yugoslavia. The resulting *Friendly Relations Declaration* of 1970 could only be passed after a series of informal talks and tough negotiations in thematic groups that later gathered to propose a common wording for the declaration (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 238–42). In the end, the Yugoslav and non-aligned efforts both paved the way for codification and helped to reach

a compromise for the final content of the *Friendly Relations Declaration*. The non-aligned states were also known for their permanent calls for disarmament, seeing to the ongoing bloc rivalry and the threat of a nuclear war. Usually, these efforts were framed as mere political messages and a means of uniting a large number of members of the Non- Aligned Movement under the banner of “world peace” (Dinkel 2015, pp. 349f.; Mates 1972, pp. 344f.). Although most of these UN initiatives clearly bore this political message, especially the Yugoslav delegations greatly pushed for subsequent nuclear disarmament, contributing greatly to the conclusion of both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (NACT) that greatly limited the number and deployment options for nuclear warheads. Throughout from 1957 to 1970, Yugoslavia urged the nuclear powers to resume negotiations about a testing stop and a limitation of nuclear weapon sticks by handing in various memoranda and draft resolutions, convincing the other UN members to act decisively (Trültzsch 2021, 276–84). These efforts were rewarded only after a series of setbacks and crises when the NPT and NACT were passed in 1970 (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 284f.; Krneta 1989, p. 124). The tangible influence of Yugoslav and other Non-aligned diplomatic efforts is also traceable in the process of banning biological and chemical weapons. Yugoslav legal experts in the UN diplomatic corps pushed for a general prohibition early on; however, the continued political struggles between East and West only yielded a convention banning biological weapons in 1971/72. In the relevant negotiation body, the Commission of the Conference on Disarmament (CCD), Yugoslavia’s representatives made sure that all working documents, follow-up resolutions and declarations leading and commenting the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prejudiced the still outstanding ban of all related materials, i.e. primarily chemical agents used in warfare (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 287f.). Thus, Yugoslav efforts greatly contributed to the eventual ban of chemical weapons through a binding international convention in 1992 (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 289f.).

Conclusions: Between prestige in international affairs, clashing interests and legal validity

Which traces did the Yugoslav initiatives leave in international law and the UN system? As I have already mentioned, many of these draft resolutions were connected with the complexities of Yugoslav foreign policy and were linked to originally Communist ideological preconceptions. Some initiatives came about in a vein of ideologically framed rhetoric concerning

“active peaceful coexistence”, the strife for disarmament and peacekeeping, for these issues were presented as both foreign policy goals of Yugoslavia and as pressing matters for juridification. Still, compared to the Socialist Bloc states, neither Yugoslav foreign policy nor legal scholarship was following strict ideological dogmata. Yugoslav legal scholars explicitly underlined the separation of legal reasoning and the norms of international law and international politics (Janković 1984, p. 8). Concerning palpable initiatives at the United Nations though, Yugoslav diplomats were sometimes merely using the universalistic language of international law for first and foremost political goals, regardless of the chances for implementation or other long-lasting effects. As I referred to this in my introduction, the main goal of Yugoslav efforts was to secure one’s own position in Europe, keeping a kind of equidistance between East and West while actively cooperating with third states – in a way “non-alignment” in its original sense. In this orientation, binding rules and codes of conduct could help the smaller and newly independent states immensely in establishing relations and securing their positions in the world system. These convictions can explain Yugoslavia’s heavy reliance on international law and its treaty framework as represented by the UN, as long as it served the country’s own aspirations and interests, despite arguing that legal codification of these issues served universal goals. One way or another, all of the presented UN codification initiatives were rooted in Yugoslav experiences and its drastic re-orientation in the 1950s. Especially the codification efforts on *peaceful coexistence*, *the definition of aggression*, *diplomatic intercourse* are all aspects of state responsibility in international law. The interest to codify these principles ultimately stems from the break with the Soviet Union and its troublesome aftermath. The various infringements on Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and diplomatic immunity and all the other negative experiences, like the cancelling of vital treaties with the Socialist countries, could not be tackled by retributive acts or by using force. The only feasible response to hold the Soviet Union and its allies accountable and to prevent similar breaches in the future, regardless of which bloc or state, lay in the UN system and the establishment of written and valid legal rules. Yugoslav diplomat and legal scholar Milan Šahović, who was deeply involved in the drafting of the *Friendly Relations Declaration*, actually hoped that all these efforts would contribute to a new international legal order, where these rules of state conduct would evolve into *jus cogens*, i.e., peremptory norms that no actor in the international sphere could ignore or declare invalid (Šahović 1969, p. 25). Šahović directly acknowledged that the efforts arose from the very principle of Yugoslav foreign policy called “active peaceful coexistence” since the 1950s (Trültzsch 2021, 231f.). He

wished them to become part of the basic rules of international order in order to tackle power politics and the use of force (Šahovič 1969, p. 27). The changes in agenda-setting in these efforts went along with a shift in Yugoslavia's own international position and interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, Yugoslav diplomacy and foreign policy engaged mainly in matters of state responsibility and diplomatic conduct, then disarmament, peace and security. In the 1970s the focus gradually shifted to socioeconomic global equality and the North-South dimension, applying a specific reading of human rights in international legal and political discourse, which Daniel Whelan has convincingly put as "postcolonial revisionism" (Whelan 2011, p. 137, 139 ff; Trültzsch 2021, p. 409ff.).⁴ In this vein, Yugoslav diplomacy acted as a mediator with legal experts and diplomats like Milan Bulajić, Leo Mates or Branko Gosović, who greatly helped the non-aligned countries and later the Group of 77 to present questions surrounding economic justice as human-rights-related issues. Prominently pioneered by UNGA Res. 1514 on the "permanent sovereignty over natural resources", which was greatly supported by Yugoslavia, the follow-up process leading to the foundation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) culminated in the passing of UNGA Res. 3281 in 1974, the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States* that proposed a *New International Economic Order* (NIEO) (Bulajić 1993, pp. 90–97). The documents linked the economic demands of developing nations with overall racism and discrimination, even proposing a *right to development* as eventually postulated in UNGA Res. 41/128 in 1986 (Trültzsch 2021, pp. 382–86). The UN initiatives presented had their starting point in political demands on an international scale, which then yielded several resolutions, agreements and legally binding mechanisms. They went beyond the usual recommendations, so they did not constitute just *soft law*. Still, Yugoslav diplomats largely relied on direct political means to change the rules of international relations, first and foremost via the UNGA (Janković 1984, pp. 72ff.). The wording of Yugoslav documents and speeches thereby heavily used rhetoric appealing to universal principles and international law as a normative and evolving

⁴ In general, human rights issues always concerned Yugoslav diplomacy and legal scholarship. Based in a Marxist state/community-centred interpretation of human rights, with a focus on social and economic needs, Yugoslav diplomacy adhered to the ideal of indivisibility of all kinds of human rights, sometimes blurring the scope of particular demands and over-stretching the human rights discourse into outright political controversies, with "economic justice" just being one of them. The others concerned the Middle East conflict, apartheid policies and also minority rights.

system for global peace and justice. I termed this approach “politics of international law” or “international legal politics”, i.e., using the language and the codes of conduct provided by established international law in order to defend own interests, positions and aims. In conclusion, Yugoslavia’s non-aligned commitment for codification was thus limited to specific fields of activity in the UN, despite the universal appeal of many demands. The initiatives for codification had a mixed outcome, albeit I have presented some of the more successful ones. Nonetheless, the overall impact of these Yugoslav actions on international law remained limited, yet still significant.

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RELATIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WITH OTHER REGIONAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANISATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

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Abstract: Despite overlapping agendas, the Non-Aligned Movement entertained awkward relations with the major regional movements and organisations outside of Europe and North America during the Cold War. The movement consisted of an ever-growing number of Asian, Arab, African, and Central and South American members that shared an increasingly disparate list of interests and goals. Hence, the Non-Aligned Movement itself often lacked a clear direction in its own policies and also in its relations with other regional movements and organisations. Conversely, these movements and organisations also pursued goals that sometimes were diametrically opposed or, at least, hardly incompatible with the Non-Aligned Movement. Organisations in South East Asia and the Americas were mostly Cold War creations that clashed with the fundamental block-free outlook of Non-Alignment. In other cases, the internal Cold War conflicts within the Bandung Movement and the Arab League carried over into the Non-Aligned Movement. And the Organisation of African Unity did not seek closer collaboration, despite friendly relations and similarity of interests, largely because it directed its diplomatic efforts towards another international organisation – the United Nations. Ultimately, during the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement faced an uphill struggle in collaborating with like-minded organisations.

Key words: Non-alignment, Bandung, ASEAN, SEATO Arab League, Organisation of African Unity, Organisation of American States.

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The NAM from its Foundation in 1961 to its Decline in the 1980s

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emerged in 1961 among neutralist nations that sought greater influence in global affairs through a collective voice. The basic condition for membership was block-free status in the world, i.e., non-membership in any of the Cold War alliances. Yet, the member states did not agree rigidly on one single definition of non-alignment. Some like India refused military aid from either superpower, at least until 1962; others like Saudi Arabia or Vietnam were in quasi-military alliance with the United States or the Soviet Union, respectively (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 288-91). The NAM was one of many movements of states in the 20th century that worked for world peace on the basis of similar agendas and shared interests – i.e., anti-imperialism, block-free status, and economic development. Since these movements often had overlapping memberships, observers have occasionally confused them. For instance, historians and even participants merged the Non-Aligned Movement with the Bandung Movement (Asian-African Internationalism), although the two were distinct and even ended up as bitter rivals in the early 1960s (Jansen, 1966; Dinkel, 2015). The Non-Aligned Movement was not a regional movement, even if many of its members were from the decolonised Global South, particularly from Asia, the Arab world, and sub-Saharan Africa. Despite a number of neutral states in Europe during the Cold War, only one European state was Non-Aligned – founding member Yugoslavia. As a result, the movement pushed for goals that often represented the poorer majority of the world's state system. Nevertheless, the Non-Aligned Movement entertained thorny, and in some cases even competitive, relations with many of the regional movements and organisations that emerged in the world outside of Europe and North America. This was related, on the one hand, to the diversity and increasing internal paralysis of the NAM in the 1970s, but also, on the other hand, to the Cold War nature of some of these regional organisations. Intellectually, India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first to define non-alignment in the late 1940s. From late 1954 to mid-1956, Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser agreed with Nehru's ideas of neutralism in the Cold War, although both leaders had sought alternatives to superpower-led block formation for some years before. Against Nehru's strident opposition, Tito and Nasser then pushed for the formal launch of the NAM. By 1961, they succeeded with the convocation of the first Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, followed by another one in 1964 in Cairo (Lüthi, 2016, pp. 203-10). The movement attracted much international attention, particularly in terms of nuclear arms

limitation in the early 1960s. Yet, its lack of institutionalisation, its increasing and diverse membership, and its generally amorphous political agenda meant that it achieved its influence mostly on the basis of charismatic leadership by some of its founding fathers. Nehru's death in 1964 and Nasser's passing in 1970 drove home the necessity to think harder about institutionalisation (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 302-6). The Non-Aligned Movement entered troubled waters as early as 1964. On the basis of its successful nuclear test in October 1964, Communist China tried to seize political leadership of the rival Bandung Movement. Even if it destroyed that movement within one year by its own radicalism, its poisonous discourse undermined the internal unity of the NAM as well, largely because a significant number of states were members in both. The June War in the Middle East in 1967 further paralysed the movement, as did Tito's subsequent attempts to seek closer collaboration with the Socialist World, which floundered with the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 297-300). Non-Alignment entered the following decade shaken by the 2nd Vietnam War (1964-75) and the Jordanian crisis in September 1970. In their wake, the movement introduced both greater institutionalisation and regular three-year schedules of recurrent meetings that would end with a summit in changing host countries. Nevertheless, the growth of member states made consensus finding more and more difficult. As the movement was increasingly leaning towards the Socialist World over the course of the 1970s, Communist states like Vietnam and North Korea, which were quasi-allied with the Soviet Union, entered and then tried to seize leadership in cooperation with other radical members, like Cuba. Founding members, who were committed to the original ideas of non-alignment, found it increasingly difficult to contain the emerging leftist radicalism, which often assumed an anti-American penchant. The peak of this development occurred at the Havana Summit in 1979, which Cuba had prepared in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Disappointed by these developments, founding member Burma left the movement (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 302-6, 531-33). Hence, at the turn of the decade, the Non-Aligned Movement started to fall on hard times. With the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in late 1978, two Non-Aligned members went to war for the first time. A year later, the Soviet Union intervened in Non-Aligned founding member Afghanistan. And in the fall of 1980, with the Iraqi attack on Islamic Iran, another two member states went to war against each other. Paralysed by its pre-existing internal conflicts, the NAM failed to find a common voice in condemning all three conflicts. To make matters worse, Iraq had been chosen to host the 1982

Summit while it continued its war with Iran. Under Indian pressure, the summit was postponed and then moved to Delhi in 1983. Poignantly, India, thereby assumed leadership of a movement, the creation of which it had fought only a quarter of a century before. Yet, the internal conflicts of the previous ten years had lastingly damaged the moral reputation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Its annual meetings and triennial summits no longer attracted the high-ranked representatives of member states as it had in the 1960s; the charismatic founding fathers Tito, Nasser and Nehru all had died between 1964 and 1980. The movement was led by leaders of lesser stature and lesser international influence. And with the end of the Cold War by the late 1980s, the main reason for its very existence—block-free status—vanished. The NAM has survived until today, but it is merely a faint shadow of its former standing in the world (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 533-35). Non-alignment drew both strength and competition from a variety of regional movements and organisations. Asian-African Internationalism (the Bandung Movement), which, mostly based on Asian and Arab participation, had a major intellectual and political impact on early Non-Alignment became a major competitor by the early 1960s. The South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) were mostly anti-Communist rivals to the NAM, which triggered mutual conflict throughout the whole period. As the Cold War split the Arab League, neutral members, with Nasser's Egypt in the lead, were crucial in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement, but thereby ensuring a difficult relationship between the two. In Africa and the Americas, personal rivalries and ideological clashes prevented closer collaboration of Non-Alignment with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Organisation of American States (OAS).

Asian-African Internationalism

Asian-African Internationalism (a.k.a. Afro-Asianism, or the Bandung Movement) preceded the Non-Aligned Movement, although both have Indian roots and hence are often conflated. As future Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru prepared India for independence in the late 1930s and throughout much of the 1940s, he pondered how his independent country should position itself in global affairs. At independence, he had endorsed non-alignment as a positive force for peace. Non-Aligned India would actively engage in international affairs but neither belongs to a military block nor relies heavily on military aid from another major power. India's non-alignment was based on engagement with but equidistance to the

superpowers (Lüthi, 2016, pp. 203-10). This was also the position which Nehru hoped the Asian-African Movement would adopt at its famous conference in Indonesia's Bandung in April 1955. Nehru had been sceptical since 1953 about Indonesia's plans to call for such a conference. However, once the United States had established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 in the wake of the Korean War (1950-53) and the Geneva Conference on Korea and Vietnam (April to July 1954), he not only changed his mind but also decided to take the lead in shaping the Bandung Conference (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 275-78). However, the Afro-Asian Movement was not based on common political goals but on a shared geography. Most of its 29 members were Asian and Arab states, with only three African states (Ethiopia, Liberia, and Gold Coast/Ghana) attending. While two participants (China and North Vietnam) were communist, five were outright US allies (Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines) and some more clearly pro-Western (Libya, Jordan, Iran and South Vietnam). In this context, Nehru faced strong opposition to his rigid definition of non-alignment. Despite many compromises made in the preparations beforehand and during the conference to ensure the gathering would be a success, Nehru left Bandung disillusioned about the power of international conferences and movements. Given the flickering internal disagreements within the Global South, Nehru subsequently rejected calls for another Asian-African conference or for the creation of a Non-Aligned alternative, which Egypt's Nasser and Yugoslavia's Tito hope to launch (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 278-83). Despite their Nehruvian roots, the sibling Bandung and Non-Aligned Movements emerged as strident rivals in the first half of the 1960s. As Communist China radicalized its domestic and foreign policies, particularly after 1962, and Indonesia assumed pro-Chinese and anti-Indian positions, their repeated calls for convening a new Bandung Conference around the tenth anniversary of the first one clashed with the non-aligned preferences of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Egypt, and Yugoslavia. The People's Republic of China (and the Soviet Union) had already tried to subvert the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, which emerged as an Egyptian-led off-shot of the Bandung Movement in 1957. The conflict between Asian-African Internationalism and the NAM came to the fore in late 1962 when Afro-Asian Non-Aligned members tried to mediate in the Sino-Indian conflict in the Himalayas. The rigid Chinese position and Indian fears of Chinese attempts to undermine its standing in the Afro-Asian world greatly deepened the antagonism between the two sibling movements (Čavoški 2017). In early 1963, Nehru himself decided to give up on Asian-African Internationalism and instead endorse the Non-Aligned Movement

wholeheartedly. Subsequently, Ceylon, Egypt, and Yugoslavia won the race for the 2nd conference against China and Indonesia convening a gathering in Egypt in early October 1964. China's attempt to exploit its nuclear test shortly thereafter to seize the Bandung Movement failed by mid-1965 when the scheduled 2nd Afro-Asian conference in Algiers was first delayed after Ben Bella's overthrow and then eventually cancelled. Yet, Communist China's anti-American, anti-Soviet, and anti-Indian rhetoric in 1963-65 not only destroyed the Bandung Movement but also deeply damaged cohesion in the Global South, at large, and within the Non-Aligned Movement, in particular (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 283-85, 297-300).

Southeast Asia

Non-Aligned relations with the SEATO (1954-79) and its *de facto* successor ASEAN (since 1967) were greatly affected by the Cold War. Nehru had failed in imposing his non-aligned visions on the Bandung Movement in 1955 in the wake of the creation of the SEATO. Yet, a less rigid version of his ideas – block-free status – came to fruition with the Yugoslav-Egyptian foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1961. Unlike India, Yugoslavia and Egypt both had entertained close military supply relations with one of the superpowers for years. Nehru's strict rejection of such relations eventually faltered in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962. Be it as it may, even the less rigid definition of non-alignment helped to improve the NAM's relations with the SEATO (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 289-90, 307). India was deeply troubled that its regional arch enemy and neighbour Pakistan was allied with the United States via the SEATO and its Middle Eastern pendant CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation), while Egypt equally disliked American-led Cold War alliance making in the Middle East (for both, see also the section on the Arab World below). As the SEATO's central purpose was to deter Communist aggression against the non-member states Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the alliance was automatically drawn into the 2nd Vietnam War after 1964. Four SEATO members – the United States, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines – sent troops to Vietnam, and some of the other SEATO members provided political and logistical support. Yet, ultimately, the SEATO turned out to be more wobbly scaffolding than sturdy concrete during the Vietnam War (Eckel, 1971). Faced with the Communist threat emanating from Indochina to the north, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand decided to establish the ASEAN in 1967. The new organisation was not a Cold War military alliance, but its political agenda (economic growth, social

progress, cultural development, promotion of regional peace, collaboration and mutual assistance, and mutual assistance) still had a very strong anti-Communist bend. The regional organisation eventually found a greater sense of political purpose a dozen years after its foundation, in the wake of Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 (Jones & Smith, 2007, pp. 150-51). However, since both the SEATO and the ASEAN were strongly anti-Communist during the Cold War, their overlapping goals were evidently antagonistic to Non-Aligned visions. As Non-Aligned founding member Cambodia was drawn into the 2nd Vietnam War against its own will, the NAM needed to show colours with regard to that conflict. India had given up its neutralist position in Indochina by 1965 and eventually would recognise North Vietnam in early 1972. In August that year, the Foreign Ministers conference in Guyana faced requests to decide on the membership of Cambodia, which had become pro-American in a coup in March 1970, and membership of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG; North Vietnam's puppet government in South Vietnam). The decision to award membership to both the Cambodia's exile government in Beijing and the PRG alienated the ASEAN-affiliated Non-Aligned members so much that the Guyana conference ended in a diplomatic éclat. The Non-Aligned decision in 1975 to award membership to recently unified, communist Vietnam and to North Korea (but not South Korea) did not help to bridge differences between the Non-Aligned Movement at large and its ASEAN-affiliated members (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 302-6). The rupture deepened when the NAM failed to condemn Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia in 1978 and the Soviet intervention in Non-Aligned Afghanistan a year later (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 531-35). By 1979, the ASEAN had forged a strong identity and cohesion among its own members that had developed clearly outside of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAUK, FCO 58/1574).

The Arab World

Despite overlapping memberships, relations between the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab League were fraught with political disagreements and partially mutually exclusive goals. Since its foundation in 1945, the Arab League had experienced major internal conflicts along ideological lines that foreshadowed the Cold War. Some of its members – like Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia – were strongly anti-Communist, while others were neutralist – like the royal and then Nasserite Egypt – even if they initially were pro-Western. Yet, as the American alliance building in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 extended the Cold War from

Europe and East Asia to the entire periphery of the Socialist World, the superpower conflict had a major impact on the Arab League. With the Iraqi signature of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO since 1959) in February 1955, the league threatened to split into a pro-Western and a neutralist wing. Until early 1957, Saudi Arabia sided with Nasserite Egypt but eventually joined – never formally, though – the pro-Western members. Poignantly, Iraq exited from the Baghdad Pact in 1959, in the wake of its leftist coup against the monarchy the year before. Still, despite changing associations with the one or the other wing, the Arab League remained internally split until the early 1970s (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 26-33, 52-66). It is in this context that neutralist Nasserite Egypt, together with Tito's Yugoslavia, strove to establish the Non-Aligned Movement. Ultimately, the NAM was strongly affiliated with the neutralist wing within the Arab League, even if pro-Western Saudi Arabia was also a Non-Aligned founding member. This asymmetric entanglement between the Arab League and Non-Alignment turned into a major problem during and after the June War in the Middle East in 1967. While all Arab states lined up behind non-aligned Egypt in the struggle against Israeli aggression, the Non-Aligned Movement was paralysed. Nasser's decision to lean heavily towards the Soviet Union during and after the war meant that the NAM suffered a major obstacle to keep and even enhance its influence in Middle Eastern and global affairs. Tito's decision to work closely with the Soviet Union in the 14 months after the war and his nascent attempts to form a quasi-alliance between Non-Alignment and the Socialist World further undermined the movement. The Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia cured his pro-Soviet leanings, but the damage to the Non-Aligned Movement was difficult to undo (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 300-2). Many members criticised Tito's policies at the Belgrade consultative meeting in mid-1969, even if the Yugoslav leader had called the gathering to re-emphasise the NAM's basic non-alignment positions (NAUK, FCO 28/868). Conflict in the Arab world once more intruded on the 3rd Summit in Lusaka in September 1970, which most Arab leaders did not attend on short notice due to the ongoing civil war in Jordan between the monarchy and Palestinian groups (PAAA-MfAA, C 522/72). While Nasser had pushed for the establishment of the NAM out of frustration of the Cold War division of the Arab League, his successor Anwar Sadat exploited in 1973 a re-unified Arab League and the NAM for political mobilisation in view of the October War against Israel. In the wake of Nasser's death in September 1970, Sadat had tried to switch sides in the Cold War. Yet, after he expelled Soviet military advisers in mid-1972, the United States did not respond to Sadat's desire to use US help to resolve the Arab-

Israeli conflict. Frustrated, in October 1972, he decided on war against Israel. Unlike Nasser in 1956 and 1967, he sought—on the basis of Saudi political and diplomatic support—unity within the Arab League for renewed military conflict. Moreover, Sadat also realised the central importance of political backing from the world at large. This is why he and Saudi King Faisal used the 1973 Non-Aligned Summit in Algiers to convince African states to cut relations with Israel. As a result, Sadat went to war against Israel, which languished isolated except in the Western world, with unified Arab League and Non-Aligned support (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 230-38, 304). The concomitant Arab oil boycott targeted Western nations supporting Israel, while Saudi Arabia supported financially African Non-Aligned members that faced high world market oil prices as a result of the Arab boycott (PAAA-MfAA, C 486/77). Yet, the Egyptian-formed unity of purpose between the Arab League and Non-Alignment did not last. Frustrated by the American reluctance to address the basic problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Sadat's Egypt reached out unilaterally to Israel in 1977 to seek a peace deal. Afraid of being shut out, the United States finally engaged by helping the conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty in March 1979 (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 496-502). The Arab League, including Saudi Arabia, retaliated swiftly by excluding Egypt from its ranks (NAUK, PREM 16/2170). Furthermore, the league demanded a similar step from the NAM, which the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana in September 1979 rejected (NAUK, FCO 28/3923). Eventually, the Non-Aligned Movement faced one of its major Middle Eastern crises in September of 1980 when its member Iraq, supported by much of the Arab League, went to war against another Non-Aligned member, the Islamic Republic of Iran (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 534-35).

Sub-Saharan Africa

As Sub-Saharan Africa underwent decolonisation in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was more likely to join the Non-Aligned than the Bandung Movement. Although Asian-African Internationalism was explicitly committed to anti-imperialism, the attempts by radicalized China to seize the Bandung Movement in the first half of the 1960s alienated many recently decolonised states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, unlike the Bandung Movement, the NAM counted a large number of African members virtually since its foundation (Mathews, 1987, p. 44). Yet, relations between the Non-Aligned Movement and Pan-Africanism were difficult. In his attempt to increase Egypt's international standing after the Bandung Conference, Egypt's Nasser tried to mobilise sub-Saharan Africa (Matthies, 1977, p. 189).

He also agreed to Tito's proposal to launch the NAM in early 1961 when the Yugoslav leader visited Cairo at the end of a long trip through Africa (AJ, KPR I-4-a/1). Hence, Nasser and Tito launched the new project with their eyes clearly fixed on a continent that was in the process of achieving independence from European colonialism. However, both faced African resistance to their plans of incorporating the continent's newly independent nations into Non-Alignment. Ghana's independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah, sought post-colonial African unity primarily on the basis of Pan-Africanism. Nasser tried to rival Nkrumah's All-African People's Congress in Accra in December 1958 by staging a rivalling Afro-Asian Economic Conference (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 283). As a result of this rivalry, Nkrumah's Ghana was more interested in good relations with Egypt's arch enemy Israel than with Nasser's Egypt itself (Levy, 2003). While Nkrumah turned out to be an important voice in the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, he was one of the major promoters of the creation of the Organisation of African Unity, established in Addis Ababa in Non-Aligned founding member Ethiopia (Legum, 1975, p. 208). Although the OAU adopted the idea of non-alignment in its charter in 1963, and Egypt and other Arab states in North Africa joined the new organisation, the rivalry between Nkrumah and Nasser continued until the Ghanaian leader was overthrown in a coup in early 1966. Despite its generally friendly relations with the NAM and the engagement of individual African states like Mali and Zambia in the NAM, the OAU focused more on working closely with the Group of 77 (G-77) at the United Nations, in which many members were Non-Aligned (Matthies, 1977, pp. 190-91; Mathews, 1987, p. 47-48).

Central and South America

In the American double continent, the Non-Aligned Movement faced obstacles to mobilising members that were similar to those in Europe. Only one country from that region became a member at the founding conference in 1961 – Fidel Castro's Cuba, which was about to turn to the Soviet Union. Nine smaller and medium-sized states joined over the course of the 1970s and another six in the early 1980s. But none of the large countries – like Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico – joined, though some sent observers to various summits. There is a variety of reasons for this anomaly in Non-Aligned History. First, the American double continent – with exceptions mostly in the Caribbean – had undergone decolonisation long before the Cold War, which meant that few countries saw a need to join a movement that, among some of its goals, promoted formal decolonisation. Second, the Americas

also established the world's seminal regional organisation in 1948. At its foundation, the well-funded and well-run Organisation of American States brought the 21 mostly larger of the 35 American countries together under U.S. leadership (Meek, 1975). Third, many of the smaller Central and South American countries that were not founding members in the OAS decided to join the Non-Aligned Movement before joining the OAS over the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. And finally, just as the NAM emerged in the 1960s, Central and South America descended into a period of US-aligned right-wing military dictatorships in a number of its countries, particularly Brazil, Argentina, and Chile (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2014). In this context, only a reduced number of the double continent's countries—mostly from the Caribbean—joined an organisation that was founded by a Communist (Tito) and a controversial Third World leader (Nasser). Hence, the OAS and the NAM coexisted in the 1960s and 1970s in rivalry. Some of the mostly smaller countries that decided to join the NAM before the OAS, like Guyana, Jamaica, or Nicaragua, had leftist and even pro-Soviet governments anyway. As one of the most prominent American countries, Cuba was a Non-Aligned founding member in 1961 but was suspended from the OAS a year later as a result of its Cold War alignment with the Soviet Union. Starting in the mid-1960s, Fidel Castro's leftist Cuba promoted revolution in Central and South America and Africa (Connell-Smith 1979). In the 1970s, the Caribbean country was also a central actor among the NAM's anti-imperialist left that tried to seize the movement, together with Vietnam and North Korea, in an attempt to turn it into an anti-American tool. As mentioned above, Cuba prepared the Havana Summit in 1979 in close cooperation with the Soviet Union, to the chagrin of moderate Non-Aligned members and the condemnation of many OAS members. The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in late 1978 and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 undermined Cuba radicalism, damaged the Non-Aligned Movement, and made engagement in the OAS more attractive to many American countries than a commitment to the NAM (Lüthi, 2020, pp. 304-6, 532-35).

Conclusions

In general, the Non-Aligned Movement did not manage to establish close relations with many of the other regional organisations during the Cold War. This happened for a number of sometimes interrelated reasons. The overarching ideological superpower conflict was responsible for the creation of a number of rival organisations in various world regions

(SEATO/ASEAN, CENTO, and OAS). Throughout the 1970s, the NAM was moving to the left, which foreclosed good relations to regional organisations that were pro-American (ASEAN and OAS). Neutralist Egypt carried the inner conflict of the Arab League into the Non-Aligned Movement. Personal rivalries or political conflict between the individual NAM leaders (Nasser and Castro) and leaders of other organisations (OAU and OAS) prevented the establishment of good relations as well. But the NAM also operated in the larger context of an increasing number of international and regional organisations, some of which were better suited or managed. Much of the NAM's agenda found a hearing anyway within the parallel United Nations system. The ASEAN formed much stronger cohesion because its smaller number of members shared a greater number of interests. As a non-regional movement, the NAM faced another two problems. First, its membership grew over time, which meant that the movement suffered from paralysis of an increasing number of opposing voices. Second, it was established on the basis of charismatic leadership by its founding fathers Tito, Nasser and Nehru, and suffered from a relatively weak institutionalisation even once it had decided to build up internal structures. In this context, the member states could choose to pursue their interests in parallel and even rival organisations. As the NAM faced internal conflict in the 1970s and the ensuing reputational damage in the early 1980s, for many members it ceased to be a prime venue of political engagement. Non-Alignment went into slow decline within a competitive global organisational environment, and eventually with the end of alliance blocks as the superpower conflict was winding down.

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THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT FIGHT FOR THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

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Abstract: The New International Economic Order (NIEO), conceived as an idea and need among Non-Aligned countries, formalized through the United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, proposed a revolutionary reform of the world economic order established after the Second World War. The crisis of the functioning and development of the world economy during the 1970s led to negative consequences, especially for underdeveloped countries and countries that have just freed themselves from colonialism, and in a world full of divisions, there were thoughts and plans to resolve the general crisis in the world economy and international relations in general. The NIEO called for reformist interventions in international institutions, economic structures and mechanisms to stop treating developing countries as passive subjects of the international economic order, as well as measures to reduce the growing economic gap between developed and developing countries. After the initial success and enthusiasm that reigned among the Non-Aligned Movement, the whole initiative began to fade and give way to new current world crises. Part of the many demands for change that constituted the essence of the NIEO continued their individual lives and with more or less success, with more or less modifications, they found their place in the regulation of economic

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relations among states. However, each new crisis, which is spreading more and more rapidly among the countries of the whole world, already makes this forgotten initiative modern again.

Key words: Non-Aligned Movement, New International Economic Order (NIEO), developing countries, world economy.

Introduction

The Non-Aligned Movement was formed during the Cold War as an organisation of states that did not seek to formally align themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. This movement developed gradually in the post-war years until the first complete platform was drawn up at the Conference in Belgrade in 1961 on the basis of which the Non-Aligned Movement acted from then on (Mates, 1985, p. 73). At the beginning of the 1970s, when the world economy already suffered from a series of grave crises, member states of the Non-Aligned attention focused on the need to change the existing and establish a new economic order in the world. The Non-Aligned Movement leaders met for the Fourth Summit Conference in Algeria in September 1973, and among other issues, measures have been formulated to build the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The conference adopted the Political Declaration, the Economic Declaration, the Action Program for Economic Cooperation, the Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation and several other resolutions on current world issues. Because of the globalisation of the world economy and a significant intensity of economic relations between countries in the world, the effects of the crisis quickly spread to other countries (Bjelić, Jelisavac Trošić, Popović Petrović, 2010. p. 347). The clash of the economic crises with the existing global economic system, which had devastating consequences, especially on the developing countries, developed an interstate activity in order to reach a global agreement. The New International Economic Order, as defined at the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, was finally formulated at the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN). The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, together with the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order in practice, was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in May 1974 (United Nations, 1974a, 1974b). The New International Economic Order required major and substantial changes, but Non-Aligned countries have shown great maturity in formulating this initiative because the obligations of the developed countries to the NIEO did not imply that only industrialised

western countries should carry the burden of obligation. Even though the major responsibility rests upon them, all developing countries, from East to West, have the obligation for ending inequality and poverty internationally. The quality of life of people on this Earth is not only an economic or social concern but a moral issue that concerns us all. A large section of humanity has poor living conditions, and this should be an issue of global survival (Ramphal, 1975, p. 12).

Literature review

Most of the research papers dealing with the topic of the new international economic order were written during the 1970s and 1980s when this topic was very relevant. During that period, there were several projects, proceedings, conferences, round tables and other types of research on the NIEO. Special attention should be paid to the final study *New International Economic Order Pathways of Realisation and Perspectives* (Popović and Štajner, 1981), and to the collections of papers from the scientific gathering on the economic aspects of the policy of Non-alignment (Adamović, 1985.). There are also opinions that the NIEO is a result of a view on the economic order from the socialist corner (Zurawicki, 1982). International trade, industrialisation, political institutions and institutions of the New International Economic Order were explored in the policy studies, like Lozoya and Green (1981) and Laszlo and Kurtzman (1981). Different opinions from the scientific gathering dedicated to the NIEO can be found in Raičević and Popović (1977). In the book, Singh Shankar traces the evolution of the NIEO (1977), step by step and the events that have begun to transform the idea into reality. It is worth mentioning another study by Jagdish Bhagwan (1977) that studied the NIEO from the specific point of view of its impact on resource transfers, international trade, world food problems, technology transfer and diffusion. We must not forget the official Non-Aligned Movement and UN documents, primarily the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI): Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI): Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. With the decline in interest in the new international economic order and the questions it raises, the number of papers and conferences dealing with these issues has fallen sharply. We are now witnessing the reshaping of the global economic and political order once again, and it would be good to recall the once-great ideas and initiatives, among which we can certainly consider the NIEO.

This paper will focus on the New International Economic Order, its beginnings within the Non-Aligned Movement, postulates and institutionalisation through the UN. It will assess the content of this initiative as well as the fate it has experienced.

The role of the Non-Aligned Movement in conceiving the New International Economic Order

The global economic system, represented by the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - IBRD (which today is part of the World Bank Group), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - GATT, was established after the Second World War through the negotiations of the Western developed countries. The United States were the leader in this newly established Bretton Woods system while developing countries remained outside the negotiations and the creation of the international economic system. The post-war period was difficult for all countries, but especially for those who only freed themselves from colonial rule in the years following the end of the Great War. It was a time when many countries were liberated from colonialism, but the benefits of economic development and technological progress were not shared equitably in the world. In the divided world, from North to South, from developed to underdeveloped, divided by military or political blocks, the Non-Aligned Movement pointed to a set of universal objectives reflecting aspirations to an overall change of international political and economic relations, pushing the boundaries of the world order to be acceptable for all countries, without the matter of their individual political, economic, cultural or social systems. As a new factor in international relations, the Non-Aligned Movement was pointing not only to the major problems of the post-war world, political, economic, and social and others, but also was offering ways of solving them. The Non-Aligned Movement from the very beginning emphasised the growing need to solve key economic problems (Frangješ, 1985, p. 259). The issue of the establishment of the NIEO was formally first expressed in a political declaration adopted at the Fourth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Algiers, the capital city of Algeria, from 5 to 9 September 1973. This Declaration invited the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a sixth special session of the General Assembly which would be devoted to the development and international economic cooperation. The principles of the NIEO were gradually developed within the Non-Aligned Movement and were laid down as original principles by

these member countries. There are many principles on which the NIEO is based, but here we will point out four:

1. The principle of non-reciprocity of benefits in trade and development between the underdeveloped and developed;
2. The principle of non-discrimination among countries;
3. The principle of one-sided preferential treatment of developing countries by the developed and,
4. The expansion of the general scheme of preferential treatment (Mrkušić, 1985, p. 248).

It is important to point out that the economic policy of the Non-Aligned Movement existed before the concept of the NIEO appeared, and that the economic policy of the Non-Aligned Movement will be necessary also in the future, irrespective of the NIEO's fate. (Kovač, 1985, p. 265).

The UN Declaration on the establishment of the New International Economic Order

The many problems that face individual and groups of countries cannot be successfully solved separately from the major world problems. The United Nations as a universal organisation is the right place for dealing with international economic and social problems in order to ensure equality for all. The UN, among others, is devoted to the consideration of the most important economic problems facing the world community. Algeria, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, by communications of 9 October 1973 and 22 November 1973, transmitted the documents of the Conference to the Secretary-General, requesting him to issue them as an official document of the General Assembly under several items on its agenda. At the 229th plenary meeting in May 1974, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. These documents were adopted bearing in mind the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations to promote the economic advancement and social progress of all people in the world. According to the United Nations, the NIEO should be "based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and

the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations” (UN, 1974a). The formation of the NIEO stemmed from the understanding that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts - the developing countries and the developed countries, both. The NIEO rests on respect of many principles in order to secure the prosperity of developing countries and better cooperation between developed and developing ones. The principles call upon the adoption of special measures in favour of the least developed, landlocked and island developing countries. The principles of the NIEO acknowledge the right of every country to self-determination, sovereignty, non-interference, choosing an economic and social system, real participation in solving the world economic problems, right of liberalisation from apartheid, right to restitution, and many others. This initiative is trying to secure favourable conditions in the economic and social areas for developing countries. The United Nations Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order confirms that action needs to be taken regarding the severe economic imbalance between the developed countries and developing countries. This Programme was adopted with the aim to ensure the application of the Declaration on the Establishment of the NIEO. All efforts should be made to:

- solve fundamental problems of raw materials and primary commodities as related to trade and development;
- reform the international monetary system;
- encourage the industrialisation of the developing countries;
- encourage the transfer of technology;
- formulate, adopt and implement an international code of conduct for transnational corporations;
- expand co-operation among developing countries at the regional, subregional and interregional levels (United Nations, 1974b).

This Programme includes measures to encourage the above-mentioned for the developing countries, especially for the least developed and landlocked countries. The UN, also under this Programme, launched a Special Programme to provide emergency relief and development assistance to the developing countries most seriously affected by the economic crisis to help them overcome their present difficulties and achieve self-sustaining economic development. The UN Programme also refers to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which shall constitute an effective


instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States arose out of necessity to establish generally accepted norms to govern international economic relations systematically. The Charter acknowledges the urgent need to evolve a substantially improved system of international economic relations, and establishes the fundamentals of international economic relations. The Charter covered the economic rights and duties of states and common responsibilities towards the international community. (United Nations, 1974c). "All States have the duty to contribute to the balanced expansion of the world economy, taking duly into account the close interrelationship between the well-being of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and the fact that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts" (United Nations, 1974c, Article 31). As we see, establishing the NIEO has as a general goal to bring about maximum economic co-operation and understanding among all countries based on the principles of dignity and sovereign equality between them regardless of the chosen model of internal state organisation. All UN Member States have pledged to make full use of the UN system in the implementation of the Programme of Action on the Establishment of the NIEO, and in working for the establishment of the New International Economic Order and thereby strengthening the role of this organisation in the field of world-wide cooperation for economic and social development.

The Importance of the New International Economic Order

The proposal of the New International Economic Order was a very brave and radical move. The transnational governance reform initiative of this sort was the number one initiative from that period and accordingly was the most widely discussed topic among politicians, scientists and the general public. The fundamental objective of the NIEO - to transform the governance of the global economy - and the number of countries that supported that idea was the power that could not be ignored. It was a proposal for a radically different future than the one we actually live in. On the eve of completing the geopolitical process of decolonisation, the NIEO initiative brought ideas that would benefit more to the international integration, and it should be redirected towards the developing countries. From a moral point of view, it was an attempt to equalise the starting positions of the

countries as much as possible before entering the market competition. Although it was a new, fresh and inspiring idea of the 1970s, it started to fade from global discussions during the second part of the 1980s and was replaced by other topics that were considered urgent and more important. By the late 1990s, the North has dismissed this idea as irrelevant, and today in most parts of the world the initiative of the NIEO is almost completely forgotten (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Mentioning the term “New International Economic Order” in Google Ngram, 1970-2019



Source: <https://books.google.com/ngrams>, Accessed 27/04/2021.

The initiative for the NIEO tackled many questions and economic problems and was not a coherent entity. Inside of the NIEO, we can find several agendas which were loosely compatible. The most important goal of the NIEO was to improve the economic position of developing countries in the international economy. The basis of the NIEO is an agenda on how to reform the international economic order in order to enable balanced progress of developing countries as well. “In particular, the NIEO Declaration called for:

- an absolute right of states to control the extraction and marketing of their domestic natural resources;
- the establishment and recognition of state-managed resource cartels to stabilise (and raise) commodity prices;
- the regulation of transnational corporations;
- no-strings-attached technology transfers from North to South;
- the granting of preferential (nonreciprocal) trade preferences to countries in the south; and

- the forgiveness of certain debts that states in the south owed to the North" (Gilman, 2015, p. 3).

But it was not just the economic objectives of the NIEO that were important. What is also important to note with the NIEO is that there were new tools that sought to implement their economic goals through new mechanisms of international law. Advocates of the NIEO felt that existing international law is unsuited to promote structural reform, which was necessary for the development of this initiative. Therefore, in order to establish the NIEO, it was necessary to change the existing international legal order in a way that takes into account the unfavourable position of developing countries in relation to developed countries. Therefore, the correction of economic inequalities would be achieved, not only directly, but also indirectly through the correction of legal inequalities. Apart from the fact that the NIEO was primarily an economic initiative in terms of its content and goals, it was also a political initiative. The NIEO was more than just a set of technical economic-legal proposals, it was also an attempt to extend the realignment of international power that the process of decolonisation had begun. At the level of political identity, the G-77 and the NIEO claimed to embody the idea that the developing countries formed a coherent political group, one whose common political identity rested on a shared history of resistance to colonialism and imperialism (Ferguson Jr, 1977, p. 147). It was a very strong political message to the countries of the former colonisers.

Success or a failure for the New International Economic Order?

The Non-Aligned Movement has identified economic underdevelopment, poverty, and social injustices as growing threats to peace and security. There are opinions that to get rid of neocolonialist aspirations and to utilise the natural wealth of one's own country in order to promote national socio-economic development is considered to be the first economic principle of non-alignment (Bekić, 1985, p. 87). At the time when the idea was born and when the principles were formed, the New International Economic Order caused a big international interest. Countries that wanted the NIEO initiative to be implemented have made efforts to activate and implement as many proposals as possible in various UN bodies, other international institutions or forums, such as the WB, IMF, GATT, through regulations or practices of these institutions. On the other hand, although they declaratively supported the NIEO, as well as global sovereign equality of states and the need to help the

poorest, developed countries have taken a few steps to make this initiative really begin to live and grow in reality. The energy and hope that brought together countries around the NIEO started to disappear as rapidly as it was clear that developed countries were unwilling to respond with any major and tangible concessions. Western Europe was expected to take measures in the spirit of the new economic order, and they did that. There is, of course, a dilemma as to whether the measures taken are far-reaching enough or remain in the dimension of a gesture. The willingness or unwillingness of adequate actions will enable the developing countries to appraise the sincerity and cooperativeness of their partners, their wisdom and the ability to put their wisdom into practice (Mandi, 1975, p. 10-11). It was immediately clear that the materialisation of the NIEO, due to the very large volume of changes required, is a long process since the problems are many and accumulated. The gradual realisation of the NIEO required dialogue and negotiations between developed and developing countries. The world economic system is weighted against the weak and in favour of the strong. Developed countries with their measures, which may not even be directed against developing countries, often harm the interests of the same. Many of today's developed industrial countries used various mechanisms to spur the growth of markets in their early stages of development. Many developing countries pursued ill-considered trade, credit, and industrial policies with poor results (Jelisavac Trošić, 2018, p. 278). The fight against poverty, against the uneven distribution of the bounty of our planet among its entire people, is important. How to fight against poverty – to equalise mechanisms for disadvantaged and depressed regions of the world, persisting on the economic and social rights, by helping the poor and disadvantaged, to fight inequality in all places and all areas of life and human activities. Ensuring that every person on this planet is guaranteed the minimum tolerable conditions of human existence, of food, of health, of the habitat. To achieve this, we must move towards the NIEO. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order inspired a certain degree of confidence in the developing countries, but the confidence lasts only from the formulation of the principles to the switch over to action. After a while, if the statements and promises are not followed by actual agreements and effective measures, optimism turns into pessimism and frustration (Mandi, 1975, p. 11). The progress towards the creation of the NIEO has generally been slow, mostly as a result of the reticence of the developed countries. Developed industrialised countries refrained from any disturbance in the long-established world economic mechanism which has thus far given them considerable benefits and enhanced their advantageous position. The post-war period has been a period of rapid expansion of economic activity

and interaction among an unprecedented number of subjects, and the volume of international trade raised to an unpredicted level. (Mates, 1985, p. 73). The Bretton Woods system was developed on the basis of agreement among the developed industrialised countries, and the less developed countries were left behind. So, the Non-Aligned Movement geared towards a revision of already established rules, regulations and relations in the political and economic order. The UN considers that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution 70/1), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Resolution 69/313, annex), and the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, decision 1/CP.21, annex) carry forward many of the ideas and recommendations of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (United Nations, 2018). Also, the realisation of the NIEO was a condition for a developing country support for the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations, and after that for the Uruguay Round. The Doha Round of negotiations, the first round in the WTO, would not even start before developed countries were obligated to do much more of a substance for developing countries, hence the informal name the Doha Development Round (Jelisavac Trošić, 2015, p. 175).

The North-South relationship is a relationship between the developed industrialised countries and the less developed countries, referred to as the developing countries. The differences in the level of development and the problems of North-South relations cannot be resolved solely by removing the barriers resulting from administrative and other state actions. The problems are much more complex (Mates, 1985, p. 75). The developed countries cannot be forced to change their attitude and lift barriers or introduce any kinds of preferential treatment for the less developed countries. The abolition of administrative barriers, facilitation of trade, encouraging exports, preferential treatment and the like, increase chances for the improvement of the balance of payments of the less developed countries, and foreign exchange earnings and to some extent employment increased. But it would be naive to believe that such limited and marginal effects can produce such changes which would lead to a narrowing of the gap between the North and the South (Mates, 1985, p. 76-8). The developing countries, which constitute 70% of the world's population, account for only 30% of the world's income in the 1970s. Today, economic advances around the world have led to the situation that while fewer people live in extreme poverty, almost half the world's population – 3.4 billion people – still struggles to

meet basic needs. While rates of extreme poverty have declined substantially, falling from 36 per cent in 1990, 26.2 per cent of the world's population (over 1.9 billion people), were living on less than \$3.20 per day, and close to 46 per cent of the world's population was living on less than \$5.50 a day, in 2015 (World Bank, 2018). It is painfully obvious that the challenge in eradicating poverty still exists today despite the all-encompassing progress of the human race, and that world hunger does not exist because we cannot feed the poor but because we cannot feed the rich. Today we hear that we should focus our efforts on building equal, inclusive and sustainable economies and societies. The UN Sustainable Development Goals are a call for action by all countries to promote prosperity while protecting the planet. They start from the notion that ending poverty must go hand-in-hand with strategies that build economic growth and address a range of social needs, including education, health, social protection, job opportunities, and others while tackling climate change and environmental protection. The most important sustainable developmental goal is to end poverty. Globally, the number of people living in extreme poverty declined from 36 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2015. But new research warns that the economic fallout from the global COVID-19 pandemic could increase global poverty by as much as half a billion people or 8% of the total human population. This would be the first time that poverty has increased globally in thirty years since 1990 (United Nations, 2021). The newest crisis, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, has brought to the fore the need to build states, economies and societies to be more resilient in the face of pandemics, climate change or many other global challenges we face today and will face in the future. The world also needs to further the reform of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation to adapt to changes in the global economy (Jelisavac Trošić, Todić, Stamenović, 2018, p. 254). The New International Economic Order is a goal that moves, strives for, and changes over time. Basic, fundamental principles remain, but the ways in which they can be achieved are constantly changing, complementing, new steps are being introduced, or technological advances and easier communication are being used to achieve them. It was not a surprise that the negotiations on concrete problems proved much more flexible and yielded new ideas and more pragmatic methods of resolving them than in the past. Today's reality is some mixture of the elements of the old and new international economic order. Today, common and usual global calls for a more sustainable economic growth and recovery, and recognising the achievement of this goal through inclusive multilateralism and the equal participation of all countries, very much resembles the UN Declaration on the NIEO.

Conclusions

The New International Economic Order is almost a noble notion. The principles of the NIEO are not easy to implement, and the constant reminders and repetition of these basic principles are needed in order to counter resistance. It is also important to create a climate and systematic need for the implementation of these principles. Even today, there is a need for reminding on these basic NIEO principles in order to put them into practice, and even today there is a struggle for the same universal goals, as the removal of the disequilibrium that exists between the developed and the developing countries, progressive economic, political and social changes and others. The New International Economic Order demanded deep and fundamental reforms in the economic sphere, primarily international finance, investment in the world, relations in trade and credits, but in addition to these significant changes in the economic sphere, it also required significant changes in international law and world politics. It was a vision of what the world should look like in relation to the current situation and tendencies that prevailed at the time. However, this idea and initiative, when viewed from today's perspective, is still relevant and its essential proposals for change still sound fresh today. Is it because, in the meantime, the world has moved in another direction or because only a small part of this initiative has come to life in practice? But it can still be a platform for developing countries to fight for their common interests. Especially bearing in mind that all crises, those from the last century that gave birth to this initiative, as well as the global financial crisis and the current COVID-19 crisis, have the most devastating effects on the least developed countries.

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THE IMPACT OF POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT ON YUGOSLAVIA'S STATUS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS

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Abstract: The authors are discussing a Cold-War evolution of relations between post-war Yugoslavia and two Western European regional organisations, the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community. The two relationships appear to have been meaningful, yet of fluctuating intensity. What substantially shaped them was a strategic focus on non-alignment by the Yugoslav government and the country's president for life, Josip Broz. While relations with the Council of Europe unfolded largely in the political sphere, ties and contractual relationships between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and European communities were linked closely to the country's economic interests (trade, finances, etc.). Together with the internal system, it constituted a considerable limiting factor when, after the death of Tito, global changes across Europe prompted a debate on the prospects of Yugoslavia's potential membership of those organisations.

Key words: Non-Aligned Movement, Council of Europe, European Community, Tito, Cold War, European integrations.

Introduction

Yugoslavia's foreign policy after the Second World War went through several stages. After an intense yet short-lived rise in cooperation with the

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the countries of the Eastern Bloc, there came the 1948 Cominform Resolution, a breaking point in the relationship that left Yugoslavia standing isolated by the socialist countries. Perhaps the best illustration of Belgrade's approach to the West in the early 1950s was the conclusion of the 1953 Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey – essentially an indirect link between Yugoslavia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This period, too, was fairly short. After the death of Stalin, from the mid-fifties onwards, Yugoslavia simultaneously normalized relations with the USSR and gradually built closer political ties with Asian and African states, which culminated in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement. After its first conference hosted by Belgrade in 1961, both under Tito and after his death, the country's foreign policy revolved around its leading position within the Non-Aligned Movement until the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The 9th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Belgrade in 1989 was the proverbial swan song of Yugoslav foreign policy, sung on the eve of an ultimate crisis and the disintegration of the country. During the Cold War, with Europe divided by the Iron Curtain, Yugoslavia was a country outside the blocs that could lead an active foreign policy through the Non-Aligned Movement, and advocate changes in international conditions during the period of decolonisation and development of a New Economic Order. It does not mean though that Yugoslavia's foreign policy did not have a European dimension. As Leo Mates pointed out, *"Yugoslavia's European policy has been inspired since the beginning of the post-war period by an active attitude and aspiration to contribute to the unification of Europe."* (Mates, 1976, 168). In that sense, Yugoslavia's foreign policy achievements in a global context (within the Non-Aligned Movement) facilitated a more active and flexible Yugoslav policy in the early 1960s, as regards various forms of European regional cooperation and integration. Efforts were made to make sure that, in addition to active bilateral relations with almost all European states, Yugoslavia developed multilateral ties in Europe as well. *"The intensification of relations with European countries coincided with the beginning of Yugoslavia's activities in developing relations with non-aligned countries ... In fact, the successes of the policy of connecting with less developed countries outside Europe enabled increased Yugoslav activity in Europe. That activity was objectively made possible by the development of relations on the continent."* (Mates, 1976, 169). As early as 1955, Yugoslavia secured observer status in the OECE/OECD (an agreement with the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation – OECD was signed in 1961). The first contacts with the European Economic Community (EEC) were established in the early 1960s. Yugoslavia established diplomatic

relations with the EEC (opened a diplomatic mission in Brussels) in 1968, having concluded a trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries in 1967. As pointed out by some historical studies, Yugoslavia's focus on agreements with Western European regional economic organisations (OECD, EEC, EFTA) was associated with the development of economic and trade relations with Western Europe on the one hand, while on the other the Yugoslav leadership was concerned that the emergence and expansion of regional economic integrations might produce considerable protectionist consequences threatening the position of Yugoslav exports. Accordingly, Yugoslavia was trying to conclude an agreement with the EEC since the organisation was established. At the same time, the SFRY entered into a special agreement on cooperation (1963) with the Eastern European Organisation for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), thus attaining a special status in both Western and Eastern European regional organisations in the early 1960s. With a détente unravelling and preparations underway for the Helsinki Summit (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe – CSCE) in the early 1970s, Yugoslavia became very active (in a group of neutral and non-aligned European countries) with a view to implementing successfully this initiative. Further below the authors will examine the development of ties between the SFRY and two Western European regional organisations – the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Economic Community (EEC) – in a time span of over three decades. Whereas relations with the Council have always developed in a predominantly political context, the ties and contractual relationships with the European Communities centred on Yugoslav economic interests (trade, financial, etc.). In either case, though, the prospects of deepening the relations and even changing the potential status of Yugoslavia in these organisations were tied to its strategic orientation in the Movement. Together with the internal system, it constituted a considerable limiting factor after Tito's death; global changes across Europe prompted a debate on the prospects of Yugoslavia's potential membership of those organisations.

Yugoslav Foreign Policy and the European Economic Community (1960-1991)

Relations between the SFRY and the European Economic Community could be divided into several phases:

A period of establishing and improving relations, with the conclusion of the first trade agreements between the SFRY and the EEC (1965-1980);

A period of intensification of cooperation, which began with the conclusion of a very important *Cooperation Agreement* (1980-1989);

The final phase: as the SFRY crisis deepened, an attempt was made to improve cooperation, as well as a fairly short-lived effort by the EEC to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1989-1991).

*The period of establishing, improving and institutionalizing
SFRY-EEC relations*

Relations between the SFRY and the European Economic Community can be viewed from different angles, involving interconnected factors such as political and diplomatic, economic and institutional (contractual).³ Although the EEC was founded to bring about economic integration (customs union), it always had both a political background and implicit yet important political goals (Dinan, 2010, 17; Šmole, 2003, 245). During the 1960s and 1970s, the industrialisation and urbanisation of Yugoslavia gained momentum. The process involved considerable Western technology imports, also creating a need for markets in Western Europe to be open to Yugoslav exports, especially in the sectors of agriculture and food production. Consequently, the creation of the customs union and the Community's pronounced agricultural protectionism directly affected Yugoslav economic interests. This process encouraged the pragmatic Yugoslav leadership to regulate trade relations with Brussels. A third of Yugoslavia's foreign trade partners were the EEC members, with the occasional spike in the ratio to around 40% (1970). A trade deficit aside, total trade between the SFRY and the EEC grew rapidly over the two decades between 1958 and 1980, increasing 19 times.⁴ From a political angle, it is important to note that the USSR and the Eastern Bloc countries treated the EEC as an emanation of the Western Bloc's Cold-War policy. As a result, the socialist countries refused for a long time to accept the international legal

³ The EEC had six members until 1973 when the number increased to nine, and after 1981 to 10. The EEC had 12 members in the early 1990s when Yugoslavia entered a fatal crisis.

⁴ Yugoslavia's trade with the EEC increased from \$387 million in 1958 to \$7.4 billion in 1980.

subjectivity of the Community (as a customs union). Not a single member of the Eastern Bloc (except for Romania) would sign an economic agreement with the EEC until the late 1980s. Yet the socialist and non-aligned Yugoslavia has conducted a very different policy in that respect. As early as 1968, Yugoslavia opened a diplomatic mission to the EEC at an ambassadorial level in Brussels. The rapid development of contractual relations to handle trade-related problems (especially in the field of agricultural and food products) that affected Yugoslav exports was marred by severed diplomatic ties between Belgrade and Bonn (the Holstein Doctrine).⁵ The problem was not resolved until 1968, when relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were re-established. It is equally important to note that EU-SFRY relations were institutionalised (mission, agreement in 1970) during or after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The year 1970 was a watershed moment in the EEC-SFRY relationship, as the two parties concluded their first trade agreement. It had a great impact at that time, primarily because of its implicit political significance. It was the first agreement that the EEC concluded with a socialist country. The agreement was non-preferential in nature, and the two parties agreed on a most favoured nation clause. A mixed commission for cooperation was formed as well. The following years saw further progress. In 1971, Yugoslavia was included in a scientific and technical cooperation initiative, the COST programme. In addition, the EEC extended to Yugoslavia a very important system of generalised customs preferences. Shortly after, in 1973, a somewhat broader trade agreement was signed between the two sides, which contained the so-called evolutionary clause, i.e., a possibility to expand contractual economic cooperation to other issues (in addition to customs and bilateral exchange regime). In 1976, a special agreement on trade in textile products was signed as well.

*Development of relations in the context of a new Cooperation Agreement
– between the policy of non-alignment and the need to strengthen cooperation
further (1980-1989)*

As economic relations between the two sides developed and the EEC grew stronger in the 1970s, with an emerging prospect of Greece's accession

⁵ West Germany automatically severed diplomatic relations with the states that would establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic, abbreviated to GDR (East Germany).

to the Community, a growing need presented itself to solidify contractual relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia with a view to regulating the relationship on a broader and longer-lasting basis. This time a much more ambitious agreement was in the pipeline, taking into account the expansion of EEC preferential trade agreements for developing countries, especially within so-called association agreements for the Mediterranean countries, i.e., Algeria or Morocco (Samardžić, 2009).⁶ This issue, however, opened a political debate in Yugoslavia about the possibility of a non-aligned country being associated with the European Community. The question was whether the EEC association process was in contradiction with genuine non-alignment. In this context, the 1976 Joint Declaration signed in Belgrade by high-ranking representatives of the EEC and Yugoslavia (the drafting of which involved consultations with SFRY President J. B. Tito) was a very important step. The “non-aligned position” of Yugoslavia was noted in the document (and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in Helsinki, also known as the Helsinki Final Act) which was a kind of political confirmation of the Yugoslav status in relation to Western integration, i.e., the political limits of rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Community. The Declaration also provided a political framework for the conclusion of a very ambitious and comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia, signed in 1980, shortly after Tito’s death (Lopandić, 1985).⁷ In the eyes of the Community, the Agreement belonged to a group of so-called Mediterranean association agreements. Yet the term “association” was not mentioned in either the title or the body of the document, appreciating Yugoslavia’s sensitivity. From a political point of view, the Preamble that defined Yugoslavia as a “non-aligned, European, Mediterranean state and a member of the Group of 77” was particularly important, as it was those four terms that delineated a geopolitical framework of cooperation between the two parties. In the field of trade privileges, Yugoslavia was granted a so-called preferential position. Significant financial support was provided under

⁶ According to then Article 238 of the EEC Treaty, which provided for the possibility of an EEC accession agreement. The same article was used later as a legal basis to conclude association agreements with Eastern European countries, as well as stabilisation and association agreements with the Western Balkans.

⁷ This was no coincidence. Negotiations, which had been blocked due to some commercial issues, were abruptly unlocked by an EEC decision that coincided with the news of the Yugoslav president’s illness.

additional protocols to the Agreement as well. The document also covered trade, economic, technical and social cooperation. It was an indefinite duration contract, unlike previous bilateral arrangements between the two parties. A European Commission delegation was opened in Belgrade in 1980 as yet another confirmation of thriving bilateral ties. Additional protocols to uphold the development of cooperation were signed in the 1980s as the volume of favourable loans by the European Investment Bank to boost infrastructure in Yugoslavia grew constantly. Special mention should be made of a new EEC financial protocol signed in 1985, providing for favourable EEC loans worth 550 million ecus (today's Euros), which was the most extensive financial protocol that the EEC had ever concluded with a Mediterranean country (EEC-Yugoslavia cooperation council, Memo 90/64).

The closing era – the SFRY's existential crisis and an attempt to improve cooperation in the course of it, and a fairly short-lived effort by the EEC to prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1989-1991)

At the onset of a substantial geopolitical shift in Europe, prompted by cooperation within the CSCE, and even more, by two new policies in the USSR, "glasnost" and "perestroika," new ways of more dynamic cooperation and integration in Europe were launched. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the process of unification of Germany (1990), encouraging a complete recomposition of the European political architecture and the birth of a new Europe. The EEC grew in importance after a fresh step had been made in the process of economic integration – a single market programme referred to as Europe 1992. The appeal of the Community was made quite visible as new applications for membership arrived in the late 1980s (by EFTA members – Sweden, Norway, Austria and Finland).⁸ It was against such a backdrop that tensions grew and a political crisis deepened in Yugoslavia, sparking debates about the future of Yugoslavia's relationship with the EEC, more precisely, about "turning away from the Third World into Europe".⁹ "The deepening crisis and new disagreements

⁸ Norway signed an EEC membership agreement but decided against joining the Community in a national referendum.

⁹ Among other things, it is important to note the 8th session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1987, at which Slobodan Milošević defeated Ivan Stambolić's political line. In 1989, a grandiose event was held by S. Milošević in Gazimestan, Kosovo and Metohija. Early in 1990, the

have opened up the problems of relations with the EEC to the end, posing them not only as an economic but also as a distinct political alternative.” (Vukadinović, 1990, pp. 83-106). In principle, Yugoslavia’s further policy towards the Community crystallized into three options (Vukadinović, 1990):

- The continuation of the policy of non-alignment with no major changes as to cooperation with the EEC. Such views, among other things, were advocated by more conservative Yugoslav officials,¹⁰
- The idea of an “urgent entry” into the EEC, involving political and economic reforms the political decision would entail,¹¹
- Finally, there was a more limited idea suggesting so-called “functional cooperation” that would not be incompatible with the Yugoslav non-aligned position. The preferred type of cooperation would develop along the lines of Yugoslavia’s inclusion in the EFTA organisation, paving the way to ties within the group of neutral and non-aligned European countries while also avoiding political marginalisation in a new Europe. (Vukadinović, 1990).

The then Yugoslav government’s official policy mirrored the orientation that had taken into account global shifts and changes at home. Late in 1989, at the Ministerial Cooperation Council, a Yugoslav delegation led by the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs B. Lončar proposed that a new type of association agreement be signed with the EEC. The European Commission’s idea that a new contractual framework be prepared for the SFRY to include accession, stronger financial ties and Yugoslavia’s involvement in the Phare programme of support to Central and Eastern European countries was overshadowed by an exacerbated situation on the ground, as conflicts and wars spiralled in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In mid-

League held its last conference which was interrupted. It was at this last party Congress that the party organisations of Yugoslavia’s six republics split, heralding the disintegration of the country in the second half of 1991 and early in 1992. Finally, Slovenia held a referendum on independence in the late 1990s.

¹⁰ Like Branko Mikulić, the prime minister of the federal government from 1986 to 1989.

¹¹ According to Vukadinović (1990), this was advocated by some Slovenian and Croatian economists, who argued that admission to the EEC should be requested immediately. A Croatian economist, Marijan Korošić, was the most radical, and the Slovenian Social Democrats included this request in their political platform. It was later accepted by all newly formed parties in Slovenia and Croatia.

1991, the EEC members tried and failed to prevent or at least slow down the disintegration of Yugoslavia through political statements and actions on the ground by the Ministerial Troika mission the Community had sent to Yugoslavia. The so-called Carrington's Conference on Yugoslavia in September 1991, followed by the suspension and cancellation of the EEC-Yugoslavia Cooperation Agreement and Protocols two months later in November 1991, effectively ended the bilateral relationship. A new chapter was opened of EEC/EU involvement in the Yugoslav conflicts, including sanctions, diplomatic mediation, peacekeeping missions, conferences on the former Yugoslavia, etc.

Relations between Yugoslavia and the Council of Europe through the prism of cooperation with non-aligned states (1954-1991)

In the wake of the Cominform Resolution and the break with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the summer of 1948, a sudden convergence occurred between Yugoslavia and the West. Communist Yugoslavia was under constant pressure from yesterday's allies, the Eastern Bloc countries. Sabre-rattling, border disputes and skirmishes, often deadly, made Tito and his closest aides (most of whom remained loyal to him) to turn to the United States and the West. They first asked for food, then for arms. First consignments of U.S. large-scale aid were dispatched to the country, and it was a strategic priority for the newly-formed NATO (1949) to arm those Yugoslav units that defended two key geographic areas in Yugoslavia, the Ljubljana Gap and the Vardar Valley (EC Decision, 1991). The political relationship grew closer, too, bringing forth fresh political initiatives. Initially, it was regional cooperation governed by the Treaty of Ankara, signed in 1953, expanded shortly after the Bled agreement (1954). The two documents created regional fundamentals for the neighbouring states that until yesterday battled each other on political and military grounds – Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Greece and Turkey. Aside from a long and complicated history, exacerbated by wars, unresolved border disputes and millions of refugees on both sides, the last two had one more thing in common – NATO membership. It is noteworthy that the Balkan Alliance was actually a military regional organisation, as was the subsequent Balkan Pact, designed as a well-branched structure that should have been permanently headquartered in Belgrade. The North Atlantic Alliance was behind the organisation, militarily and politically (Milikić, 2008, pp. 622-624). A duty for member states to assist each other if attacked by a third party was an elegant way to place Yugoslavia under the NATO umbrella, without developing with the Alliance any deeper

institutional cooperation or any cooperation for that matter. What the new regional ties gave Yugoslavia was the country's sudden opening towards Europe, which Tito's travel to Great Britain in 1953 and Paris in 1956 testified to (Milikić, 2014, p. 235). As part of the regional cooperation, Tito travelled to Athens, Ankara and Corfu as well (The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1954). The Greek MPs acting as negotiators in building the Balkan Consultative Assembly suggested to the Yugoslav party that it should consider as a model the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (later the Parliamentary Assembly), an organisation Western European states had set up in Strasbourg in 1949 (Milikić, 2014, pp.137-140).¹² Since its inception, the focus of the Council has been on the protection of human rights, democratic values and the rule of law (Milikić, 2013, pp. 399-410).¹³ Owing to the Greek MPs, Yugoslavia developed substantial cooperation with the organisation, but it was short-lived. A decision by the Council of Europe in 1955 to reject Yugoslavia's request for the recognition of its observer status marred the ties between Belgrade and the Council, coinciding with some peculiar shifts in the country's foreign policy. The same year Nikita Khrushchev stunned Western diplomats with a visit to Belgrade, apologising for his predecessor Joseph Stalin's policy. In a skilful move, Tito turned his back on the West while remaining fairly independent from the Eastern Bloc and the USSR (Bogetić, 2006, pp. 29-30). From then on, Europe, the Council of Europe and regional cooperation were rare themes to come across in diplomatic dispatches. Not long before, with clear signals emerging that Yugoslavia should formalise closer ties with the Council of Europe, the situation in decolonised Asia and

¹² The initial vision of the Council of Europe was that of an umbrella political organisation for European cooperation of the "free world." It was based on the unity of the Western Allies led by Winston Churchill. Even at the earliest stages, a clash of views emerged between European federalists and sovereigntists, with repercussions on the development of the organisation in the future. When in the early 1950s France sabotaged a plan for a military component of European cooperation, the European integration took a different, economic turn towards European communities, lending the Council a strictly supervisory and advisory role it still has today.

¹³ Shortly before the establishment of the Council of Europe, the Hague Congress took place in 1948, attended by representatives of Western European states and some émigré organisations developed in the states behind the Iron Curtain. The Congress laid the cornerstone of not only the organisation but the subsequent European integrations, too. Milan Gavrilović, Živko Topalović and Juraj Krnjević were among the attendants.

Africa had become a recurrent theme in diplomatic correspondence. In the same context, the conferences in Colombo and Bandung, held in 1954 and 1955, respectively, were monitored very closely (Bondžić, Selinić, 2008, pp. 71-84). The exponent of a pro-European policy was Foreign Minister Koča Popović, while the Yugoslav speaker, Moša Pijade, was the architect of a proactive policy towards new states, first within the United Nations and then on a bilateral level. Shortly after, Tito's visits to India and Burma followed in 1954 and 1955, and a new chapter in Yugoslavia's foreign policy was opened, leaving the Western European pages, if not exactly closed, then certainly neglected. To facilitate an overview of Yugoslavia's relations with the Non-Aligned Movement on the one hand and the Council of Europe on the other, it is important to say that those relations moved along completely separated tracks, at varying levels of intensity, but that on occasion the two lines would come closer to each other. After the cold spell in the relationship with the Council in 1955 and 1956, Yugoslavia remained very passive until the end of the 1960s when, at the initiative of the Council, relations thawed again. Belgrade changed its foreign policy course, with a clear shift in the policy towards European states too. It was then that Yugoslavia articulated its interest in the Third World and became one of the leading members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Late in the 1960s, however, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Peter Smithers (Great Britain) arrived in Belgrade, bringing new warmth to the Belgrade-CoE relationship (Milikić, 2017, p. 88, 95-106). The sixties saw a sudden rise in power of the Non-Aligned Movement. It consistently supported national liberation movements in Africa, fighting for the restructuring of the global economy as well. At a summit conference in Algeria in 1973, the Movement laid down a series of measures to be taken to establish a new international economic order, requesting the Group of 77 to carry out the initiative within the UN General Assembly. Group 77 was formed as a coalition of Third World countries, and it was under the auspices of the group that the Joint Declaration of Developing Countries was passed in 1963. The declaration contained a call for reforms leading to a more balanced exchange in North-South trade (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997, p. 326).

In the early 1970s détente was negotiated to relax strained international relations, the Helsinki Final Act was signed and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was established. Yugoslavia has been very active in this organisation since its inauguration. Relations with the Council of Europe improved considerably as well, and a string of high-level visits and Yugoslavia's accession to three CoE conventions further deepened the relationship. The latter made Yugoslavia the first state behind the Iron

Curtain that entered a contractual relationship with the oldest pan-European organisation.

It came as a surprise to many international stakeholders to see the SFRY Federal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Miloš Minić, speaking before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 1975 during an equally unexpected visit to the Council. While presenting the priorities of his country's foreign policy, Minić placed special emphasis on the policy of non-alignment, but also shared Yugoslavia's openness to restoring the relationship with the Council. Using the parts of the session that were open to the public, as well as those behind closed doors, Minić discussed with members of the Parliamentary Assembly opportunities for non-aligned and other states to play a more active role in resolving global issues together with great powers, suggesting a round table conference where all European and many non-aligned states would be represented, making the idea of equal participation a reality (Milikić, 2017, pp.158-160; 188-189; 202-203). The Federal Executive Council adopted under item 20 of the agenda for a session of the Council on 13 March 1975 a brief on the visit to the Council of Europe by Miloš Minić, a vice-president of the Federal Executive Council and the federal foreign secretary. The Council found that the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs should continue to monitor development trends within the Council of Europe, especially potential initiatives for further contacts and exchange of opinions with Eastern European and non-aligned states on European and global cooperation, with a view to shaping a national stance in each particular case. Proceeding from the modes of cooperation that had been already established by the Council of Europe, *opportunities should be explored to expand it so as to include those areas and specific issues where mutual interests existed* (italicized text, R.M.) (The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975).

After Tito's death in 1980, enhanced cooperation was noted along both routes of Yugoslavia's foreign policy – within the Non-Aligned Movement and in European politics alike, especially with the Council of Europe and the European Community. In the eyes of the Council, Yugoslavia had been a bridge to the Movement since the early 1980s, as well as a link to certain non-aligned states. One of the many examples to illustrate the point was a visit to Strasbourg in 1984 by the SFRY's high-ranking parliamentary delegation led by the speaker, Vojo Srzentić.¹⁴ The plan was for the high-

¹⁴ Before the speakership, Srzentić was the secretary of the Bar Municipality, the president of the Central Committee of League of Communists of Montenegro and a member of the SFRY parliament.

ranking parliamentary delegation to travel at the invitation of the European parliament, but it was only at the insistence of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Strasbourg that talks at the Council of Europe were added to the itinerary (PACE Archives, 1983).¹⁵ The Yugoslav delegation was expected to meet with the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and its officials, as well as the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, which was the highest level the Yugoslav parliamentarians could have been welcomed at. The best illustration of how eager the consulate-general in Strasbourg was to promote the visit was a request for a joint communiqué after the talks and an announcement that a correspondent of the Tanjug state agency would be covering the meeting, aside from the Yugoslav delegation's agenda at the European parliament. It was noted during the talks about the visit between the Yugoslav consul-general in Strasbourg and Secretary-General of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly John Priestman that it was a general impression the visit would matter very much to the Yugoslav parliamentarians, and that any incentive for cooperation from the Council would be more than welcome. The Yugoslav diplomat suggested that it might be good to suggest to the president of the Assembly, Karl Ahrens, to support Yugoslavia's foreign policy ties with the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁶ He underlined that *the Yugoslav delegation would be more than pleased if it could return to Belgrade with a message that the Council of Europe had praised Yugoslavia's efforts over the past 30 years to reduce East-West tensions, as well as its active neutrality policy and leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement – more generally, the role of a mediator between Europe and the Third World* (PACE Archives, 1983). And that is what happened. New meetings in the future, as well as the role of Yugoslav MPs and other officials in the work of the Assembly until the end of the 1980s, often served as a sounding board for support to the Non-Aligned Movement and clarification of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. When a Council of Europe delegation visited Belgrade in 1988 as part of preparations to tighten ties with Yugoslavia, it was welcomed by the country's top-ranking officials. The president of the SFRY Presidency, Lazar Mojsov, briefed his guests from Strasbourg not only on the foreign policy course tied to the Movement, but also on a considerable conscious effort by the state to conduct an active Balkan policy to promote

¹⁵ The Parliament of the European Community, today's European Union, headquartered in Strasbourg and Brussels.

¹⁶ German Social Democrat, member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) from 1970 to 1991, the president of the Assembly from 1983 to 1986.

peace and tolerance and develop closer ties within the European policy, if not pervasively, than in the spheres that at least one of the six Balkan states did not find controversial ((PACE Archives, 1988). It gained momentum within and shortly after a summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in 1989, as well as after Yugoslavia was granted observer status at the Parliamentary Assembly the same year. The general situation changed shortly after that. East and West Germany reunited, the Iron Curtain came down and Yugoslavia lost an aura of exceptionalism; instead of accepting its request for membership, the Council of Europe turned into a stage where Slovenia first, and then Croatia, pleaded for independence. Other former Yugoslav republics soon followed the suit, and the Council would vigorously condemn the newly-formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until a democratic change in the country in 2000.

Conclusions

Yugoslavia's foreign policy after the Second World War went through several stages. After a short-lived rise in cooperation with the USSR and the states of the Eastern Bloc, the 1948 Cominform Resolution severed the relationship and left Yugoslavia isolated. Tito was steering Yugoslavia to the West to avoid hunger in the country, but also to compensate for military dispatches from the East, which he needed desperately to protect it against a potential attack by the Soviet Union and its allies. The next step was to create a new foreign-policy strategy targeted at pan-European organisations that existed on the other side of the Iron Curtain, where a democratic world was. Initially, it was cooperation with two neighbours, Greece and Turkey, under the Balkan Pact, after which contacts were made with the Council of Europe using the regional initiative. Relations with the European Community, too, were established in the aftermath of it. Even though relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were thawing, the pro-European foreign-policy tier was not fading away but instead progressed at a varying pace. From the mid-1950s on, in addition to the two existing foreign-policy tracks – one leading to the USSR and the Eastern Bloc and the other to the Western European states and their organisations – Yugoslavia developed one more policy – the policy of non-alignment. It appears the last one grew ever stronger in the subsequent years; so much that at a point it played a lead role. The culmination of the political course was the Non-Aligned Movement, whose first conference was hosted by Belgrade in 1961 when Yugoslavia revealed itself as the leader or at least one of the most prominent leaders of the new group. From then on, under

Tito and after his death, i.e., until the end of the last decade of the 20th century and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the country's foreign policy was based on her leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement. The Movement's summit hosted by Belgrade in 1989 was the swan song of Yugoslavia's foreign policy, sung shortly before a deep crisis engulfed the country, which disintegrated in a completely different international context.

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**REFLECTIONS
OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
- 60 YEARS AFTER
THE BELGRADE SUMMIT**



*First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, 1961
(Source: Public domain images)*

60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT - INVITATION TO REASON, DIALOGUE AND COEXISTENCE

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Abstract: Today, the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) consists of 120 countries, which is two-thirds of the total number of members of the United Nations. It is indisputable that the NAM played a historically significant role in four basic directions of global development – in decolonisation, reducing the bloc division of the world, strengthening solidarity among developing countries (South-South), as well as in democratising international relations. Today, among the members of the NAM are countries with extremely dynamic economies such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, and among the observers are China and Brazil – the members of the BRICS. Several members and observers of the NAM are also members of the Group of 20 most economically developed countries in the world. Almost all major countries producing and exporting oil, gas and other important strategic raw materials from Africa, Asia and Latin America are in the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite the essential changes that occurred after the end of the Cold War, and which led to the cessation of the bloc confrontation and the establishment of a new post-bipolar world order, the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in achieving a more just world order has not ceased. On the contrary, its role has been deepened and intensified through the development of multilateral cooperation that should eliminate various types of threats and risks to international peace and security. Since more balanced economic and technological development, reducing the gap between rich and poor, eradicating misery, hunger and poverty are some of the most important goals of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Movement remains a significant factor in

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modern international relations and a place to articulate the needs and attitudes of humanity.

Key words: the Non-Alignment Movement, principles and goals, South-South cooperation, contemporary international relations, Serbia.

Introduction

The founding Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held on 1-6 September 1961 in Belgrade, was an event of historical significance for the development of global international relations. The Summit was an expression of the deepest conviction that only peace, dialogue and coexistence have no alternative because a global catastrophe is not a rational option. According to Leo Mates, a well-known Yugoslav diplomat and director of the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Belgrade (IPE), the summit in Belgrade was “certainly the most prominent gathering of statesmen ever held, not only in Belgrade but in recent history” (Mates, 1964-1965, pp. 465, etc.). It was a time of growing ideological and bloc confrontation, accelerated arms races, the multiplication of serious incidents in relations between the two most powerful world powers – the US and the USSR, the spread of crisis hotspots and great dangers of global conflict, including nuclear, with unforeseeable consequences for humanity. The atmosphere that preceded the Belgrade NAM Summit can be somewhat evoked by the reminder that five months before its holding, that is on 1 May 1961, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the territory of the USSR. The immediate consequence of that event was the cancellation of the meeting of the four great powers, which was supposed to take place in Paris, a few days after the incident with the downing of U-2. A much more serious consequence is the drastic deterioration of US-USSR relations, the acceleration of the arms race and the escalation of the Cold War. The summit was followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis, which threatened a direct US-Soviet nuclear conflict. Despite great breakthroughs in science and technology, the unjust system of global economic relations has generated a deepening economic and social chasm between the developed north and the underdeveloped south of the planet. Countries just freed from the colonial yoke gained political independence, but that was not enough to initiate more serious economic and social development and reduce economic dependence on the former colonial metropolises. Disparities between the low prices of raw materials at the disposal of the newly liberated countries and the high prices of industrial products,

especially equipment, which had to be imported from the former metropolises, jeopardised the realisation of minimum expectations regarding the growth of living standards. Colonialism gave way to neo-colonialism. However, despite the resistance of the colonial powers and their structures in the former colonies, the process of decolonisation continued and intensified. The division into military-political blocs – NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955), with the roles of protectors of opposing ideologies and systems of socio-economic order, threatened to divide and drag the whole world into confrontation, especially the newly liberated countries. In this atmosphere, the leaders of 29 countries in Asia and Africa, including the leaders of India, China and Japan, at a conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, from 18-24 April 1955, adopted five basic principles of mutual relations, as follows: 1. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2. Mutual non-aggression; 3. Non-interference in internal affairs; 4. Equality and mutually beneficial cooperation; 5. Peaceful coexistence of countries of different socio-economic arrangements. According to many politicians and authors, these principles are the basis of non-alignment policy (Petković, 1974; Mates, 1974, p. 12). The fact is that most of the countries participating in the Bandung Conference later joined the Non-Aligned Movement.

Strengthening the role of the NAM since the founding Summit in Belgrade

The leaders of Yugoslavia – Josip Broz Tito, India’s – Jawaharlal Nehru and Egypt’s – Gamal Abdel Nasser, met on 19 July 1956 in Brioni, where they adopted the famous 12-point Brioni Declaration. In the Declaration, the leaders emphasised the importance of the Bandung Conference. At the same time, they advocated peace, disarmament and the implementation of a policy of active peaceful coexistence, which could contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. It is especially important that the leaders also advocated for providing assistance to underdeveloped countries. The Declaration in principle emphasised the position of non-alignment, i.e., non-compliance with any political bloc. The leaders also advocated for the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN.

The Declaration states, among other things: “Peace cannot be achieved by division, but by striving for collective security on a global scale and expanding the area of freedom, as well as ending the

domination of one country over another.” The views of the participants in the Brioni meeting, although adopted 65 years ago, still sound relevant today. The value of these messages is especially confirmed by the challenges, behaviours and inconsistencies revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic and the new economic crisis.

The first NAM Summit in Belgrade has been prepared intensively for several years. In these preparations, in addition to India, Egypt and Indonesia, an important role was played by the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, which enjoyed high respect and trust, among other things, for its unique contribution to the victory over Nazism and fascism in World War II. In April 1961, in a meeting between Presidents Tito and Nasser in Cairo, based on previous consultations with the leaders of other countries, it was agreed that the First NAM Summit would be held in Belgrade the same year. Somewhat later, a preparatory conference was held from 5 to 12 June 1961 in Cairo, with the participation of representatives of the countries that accepted the summit invitation at which the organisation and topics of the Summit were determined. Among other things, the Declaration underlines that: “Peace cannot be achieved by division, but by striving for collective security on a global scale and expanding the area of freedom, as well as ending the domination of one country over another.” (Mates, 1976; Piršl, 1977, p. 9).

The preparatory conference was held in Cairo in June, the same year at which the organisation and topics of the Summit were determined. From the beginning of the preparations, it was clear that the NAM did not intend to be a passive observer of the development and competition of great powers, but an active participant in the fight for peace, security, equality and economic development. Later, it will be publicly emphasised that the responsibility for the future of humanity cannot be in the hands of only a few states, no matter how big and powerful they may be. This rejected the division into blocks, as well as the creation of the so-called *Third block*. The first NAM summit in Belgrade was attended by 25 countries as full members and 3 countries as observers, as well as representatives of 38 liberation and progressive movements. The central global topics of the Belgrade NAM Conference were establishing international peace and security, overcoming uneven economic development and improving mutual economic cooperation of non-aligned countries.

After an extensive discussion, by consensus, as a rule of decision in the NAM, three documents were adopted: the Belgrade Declaration of

Heads of State and Government; A statement on the danger of war and an Appeal for peace, as well as two letters with identical content, one to the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, and the other to the President of the US, John F. Kennedy. The main attention of the participants in the debate as well as in the Declaration of the Summit is devoted to the following issues: 1. Respect for the right to self-determination, the fight against imperialism and the liquidation of colonialism; 2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; 3. Struggle to end racial discrimination and apartheid policies; 4. General and complete disarmament, Ban on nuclear tests, the problem of foreign military bases; 5. Active peaceful coexistence between countries with different socio-economic arrangements; 6. The role and structure of the United Nations and the implementation of its resolutions. The host of the summit, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, in his address to the Summit participants, pointed out that the Non-Aligned Movement was an independent factor in international relations, thus establishing a relationship with the blocs, which sought to put at least parts of the US under their influence. This attitude would later evolve into an even clearer warning that the NAM cannot be treated as anyone's reserve or a foothold for narrower geopolitical goals. Tito also pointed out that the Movement was the conscience of humanity, which made it known that the NAM also had a moral dimension because it fights for truth, peace and justice. In the preparations for the Summit, the criteria for membership in the NAM were crystallised: 1. Independent policy based on active peaceful coexistence; 2. Support for national independence movements; 3. The country is not a member of any military-political alliance aimed at confrontation; 4. There are no agreements with the great powers that serve the confrontation; 5. There are no foreign military bases on its territory. In the preparations and at the Summit itself, the following goals of the NAM were crystallised: the struggle for peace, security and independence; decolonisation, the abolition of racial discrimination and apartheid; the economic and social development through South-South cooperation and building a just world economic order; struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism; combating all forms of foreign interference, domination and hegemony; fight against all forms of foreign aggression and occupation; UN support; codification and respect for international law. The Summit accepted the principled position that non-alignment does not mean passivity, even neutrality in international relations, but an active relationship in finding principled and fair solutions

to all problems, as well as decisive support to developing countries through coordinated activities.

Institutionalisation and previous results of the NAM

In the previous period, the NAM achieved its set goals through cooperation within the Movement, especially through South-South cooperation, as well as through coordinated action throughout the United Nations system. In the latter case, the NAM acted primarily within the General Assembly, ECOSOC, UNCTAD, and G-77. As the NAM does not have a rigid organisational structure, high-level summits are held every three years, on the principle of rotation of chairpersons. As a rule, ministerial meetings are held before each summit, as well as every year during the regular sessions of the UN General Assembly. Expert meetings are held as needed. Initiatives of non-aligned countries are most often initiated by representatives of the country holding the presidency for a three-year period, and more recently by a troika consisting of the current, previous and future chairmen. Coordination is conducted through the Coordination Bureau at the level of Permanent Representatives to the UN in New York. The Special Council coordinates the activities of non-aligned states that are members of the UN Security Council. Today, the NAM has 120 members, which represents about two-thirds of the total number of UN members or over 55% of the world's population. China, as the most populous nation and the second strongest economy in the world, as well as Brazil, the largest country in South America and one of the five BRICS members, have observer status, which also speaks of the attractive strength of the NAM. The rapid growth of the NAM members was a consequence of the decolonisation process that took place from the Second World War onwards. The NAM was the most deserving international factor that colonialism as a deviation of civilisation handed down to history. Colonial countries and peoples, who for centuries have been victims of foreign domination and exploitation, by participating in the NAM have won freedom and the opportunity to participate equally in international relations. The strengthening of the role of the NAM was also influenced by the so-called G-77 countries made up mostly of non-aligned countries. A significant number of non-aligned countries are also part of the G-20 Group, which has become increasingly important since the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008. From the first summit in Belgrade in 1961 to the last summit held in Baku in 2019, the NAM contributed to the democratisation of the work of the General

Assembly and the entire UN system. The movement contributed to resolving local and regional disputes and crises, to the fight against racism and the end of the apartheid system (South Africa, Namibia). The NAM has a significant impact on raising awareness of the need to establish equal relations based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, sovereignty, including economic sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs.

South-South cooperation

South-South cooperation was one of the NAM's priorities. It greatly reduced the dependence of a number of non-aligned countries on former colonial powers and developed countries in general, as well as the danger of using economic levers to interfere in internal affairs. Yugoslavia, as one of the more developed members of the NAM, was one of the most desirable partners in that cooperation. It had relatively developed technologies in industry and construction, as well as in food production (seeds), which was of special importance for a large number of non-aligned countries. Among other things, Yugoslavia opened the door wide to the training of personnel from non-aligned countries, which were used extensively by many non-aligned countries. On the other hand, these cadres have contributed to a significant improvement in the understanding and cooperation of many non-aligned countries with Yugoslavia. The advantage of Yugoslavia was that it never interfered in the internal affairs of the partner countries, regardless of the wide involvement in all forms of cooperation from defence to the education of journalists and scientists. Yugoslav construction and design companies were among the best in the world in terms of capacities and quality of works and equipment, as well as in terms of prices. They built hydroelectric power plants, highways, airports, dams, ports, conference and trade centres, stadiums, hospitals, irrigation systems, complete cities. The "Jira Pjura" project in Peru worth one billion dollars, the contractor "Energoprojekt" from Belgrade, provided water to the desert area and enabled food production. In Algeria, a Yugoslav construction operative rebuilt the city of Oran after a catastrophic earthquake. In Tunisia, Yugoslav companies have installed water reservoirs, in Libya ports, in Angola Lubango Airport and oil concessions (NIS), in Zambia a conference centre, a hydroelectric power plant, as well as thousands of kilometres of roads of various categories. Also, the results of Yugoslav economic cooperation in Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Kuwait,

Qatar, Iraq, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sao Tome and Principe are significant. The relations of friendship and cooperation have led to exceptional results and the realisation of common commercial interests. We estimate that the relations between Serbia and non-aligned countries could even be improved today, as well as the cooperation between the South and the South in general, starting from the respect of mutual interests. The NAM arose as a factor in overcoming bloc divisions and overcoming the dramatic danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. The NAM was an important organised group that recognised this great danger, raised the voice of reason and demanded that the confrontation move to dialogue, concessions and a reduction of mistrust. The NAM has made a great contribution to easing tensions and eliminating the danger of conflict. Yugoslavia made a great contribution to the initiation and operation of a group of non-aligned and neutral European countries that played an important role in the process of creating the CSCE (OSCE). Yugoslavia played the role of a "bridge" in connecting Europe and the NAM. All these facts represent an extremely important legacy that can contribute to a better foreign policy positioning of Serbia, but also a more responsible attitude towards historical trends, which often represent a signpost for future relations.

The NAM in Contemporary International Relations

Europe and the world still face similar problems that the NAM faced at the time of its constitution, only at a higher level. The arms race has reached unprecedented proportions, with the world spending over \$ 1.5 trillion on arms annually. The confrontation and mistrust of the great powers raise concerns about future developments. Unilateralism, protectionism and economic sanctions are so widespread that one can speak of an ongoing economic war. Militarisation has affected large parts of the economy, infrastructure, education, the media, all the way to the system of political decision-making. Legal regulations in the field of arms control are in a kind of crisis either due to the cancellation of previously concluded agreements or due to the expiration of their validity. Mass military exercises often have a provocative character. Interventionism, expansionism and the so-called coloured revolutions threaten to destabilise entire regions. The pace of militarisation of the universe is worrying. The influence of universal organisations for security and cooperation, such as the UN and the OSCE, has been marginalised. There are more and more widespread analyses that indicate that Europe and

the world have entered a new cold war. On the other hand, the process of global warming continues, and the Covid-19 pandemic, in addition to a mass threat to human health, is causing a new crisis in economic relations. All this is more fraught with unpredictable dangers, as the entire system of the multinational neoliberal corporate system has entered a crisis, and there are no solutions on the horizon. The socio-economic gap has been frighteningly deepened both globally and within individual countries. We are witnessing the militarisation of many areas of the economy, infrastructure, politics, education and the media. Today, there are more foreign military bases in Europe than at the time when the Cold War was at its peak. Expenditures on weapons are higher than ever. The military-industrial complex, through its lobbies in state institutions, is asking for a further increase in the costs of armament. This situation threatens to take control. Valid arms control agreements are being violated and cancelled. All this is followed by the deployment of new weapon systems where they never existed. Also, there is more and more threatening incitement to war accompanied by massive military exercises (“Defender 20” and “Defender 21”), which are more provocative than in the era when the Cold War was at its zenith.

The military-industrial complex is persistently engaged in the production of the enemies of Europe and the Indo-Pacific, that is, the Far East, in order to offer them protection. The ongoing trade, economic and propaganda wars represent a revision of the historical results of the two world wars. This situation warns of the danger of even more dangerous types of warfare and revision of history. In such conditions, no one can and must be relaxed, frivolous and lulled by the naive belief that someone else, more responsible, will find a solution for peace, stability and progress. Today, a call to reason and a contribution to peace are equally needed. The voice of reason, peace and coexistence, the voice of the original NAM is even more needed today than it was 60 years ago. We believe that such a voice and invitation will again start from Belgrade this jubilee year. I believe that the danger of uncontrolled conflict, including the danger of the use of nuclear weapons, is no less today than in 1961 when the founding summit of the NAM was held in Belgrade. On the global factors – the US, Russia, China, the greatest responsibility is to find a mode for renewing mutual dialogue and partnership as soon as possible, which should be a possible easing of tensions and renewal of negotiations on arms control and refraining from any provocative activities. An integral part of such a course should be the acceptance of obligations to support the United Nations and strengthen respect for the basic principles of international law, whose

further erosion threatens the spread of the virus of arbitrariness and chaos in international relations. If we recall that one of the main goals of the NAM was to reduce the socio-economic gap between the group of rich and most poor countries, it can be concluded that this problem is far more acute today than it was in 1961. So, the needs for the NAM are even greater today than in the past. But, it should be said that there are factors that do not suit that, whose interest is a kind of pacification of the NAM. These factors sow doubts, divisions, and even direct conflicts within the NAM. These factors “play the card” of weakening any resistance to the policy of domination. These and similar actions should be identified in a timely manner so that actions can be taken that would contribute to a higher degree of freedom and independence, i.e., more equitable international relations. Adapting to profound changes in the distribution of global power, the struggle for equality, principles, partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation is one of the directions of modern international relations. The other direction is the pursuit of preserving privileges and hegemony, accelerating the arms race and increasing the danger of global conflict. We believe that one of the priorities, strategic goals of the NAM in the coming period should be to support the process of multi-polarization and build a new world order based on equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. The multi-polarization of global relations provides a chance for their democratisation. Multi-polarization alone is not an automatic guarantee and protection against attempts at domination. More centres do not mean that democratic international relations and equality are ensured. However, more centres of power open up space for democratisation that is easier to secure. This space should be filled and used for equality and independence. The NAM is the factor on which this new quality depends – democratic international relations based on equality, sovereignty and shared responsibility for a more humane and prosperous world.

Serbia's position in the NAM

Serbia inherits the great achievements of the NAM, not only because Belgrade is the place of the First Founding Conference of the Movement, but primarily because it has participated in a wide and intensive cooperation of the NAM for a long time. Serbia, as the successor of Yugoslavia, is recognized as a reliable, constructive partner, both in political and economic cooperation, transfer of technology and knowledge, education, security and defence, media development and many other areas. By far the largest number of bearers of cooperation between

Yugoslavia and the NAM came from Serbia. Even today, Serbia is unreservedly accepted as a priority partner of the NAM, which enjoys a great reputation and trust as a partner that consistently follows the original principles of the NAM – respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, active peaceful coexistence and cooperation for mutual benefit. Serbia is a desirable partner as a “bridge” of cooperation and understanding between the NAM and Europe and the NAM and third countries. Since Serbia has started reindustrialisation and is gradually entering the fourth industrial revolution, it can be an even more desirable partner for the NAM. On the other hand, the NAM members have huge natural and human, market resources, energy, raw materials, including strategic mines. Serbia will need all that on the path of development, modernisation and far wider access to the international market. One of the key principles of the NAM is respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the fight against terrorism and separatism. That is why Serbia has so far enjoyed and still enjoys understanding and the widest support in protecting its own sovereignty and territorial integrity when it comes to resolving the final status of the province of Kosovo and Metohija on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. It is certain that Serbia can count on even broader and stronger support for the NAM, especially within the UN system and in key bodies such as the General Assembly, the Security Council, UNESCO and other branches of the UN system. Due to all that, it would be necessary for the competent institutions to seriously consider the possibility of returning Serbia to full membership in the NAM instead of the current observer status. Serbia’s full membership in the NAM would bring significant benefits to Serbia in the political, security, economic and other fields and would not be in conflict with the status of Serbia’s candidate for EU membership, which, it seems, will last a long time. The current political circumstances in Europe and the world indicate that the mood within the EU for the expansion of membership is constantly declining. The EU has other and far more significant challenges and priorities. Therefore, Serbia’s full membership in the EU is not realistic in the foreseeable future.

Conclusions:

Perception of possible priorities and actions of the NAM

From the historical experience and international activities of the NAM so far, certain conclusions and predictions could be reported. Namely, the NAM today consists of 120 countries, which is two thirds of the total

number of members of the United Nations. Hence, it cannot be disputed that the Non-Aligned Movement continues to play a significant role in the development of international relations. This is all the more so because its historical role in the process of decolonisation, reducing the political division of the world, strengthening solidarity among developing countries (South – South), as well as in achieving a fairer world order has not stopped but has deepened and intensified through the development of multilateral cooperation to eliminate various types of threats and risks to international peace and security. Given that more balanced economic and technological development, reducing the gap between rich and poor, eradicating misery, hunger and poverty are some of the most important goals of the NAM, the Movement remains a significant factor in modern international relations and a place to articulate the needs and attitudes of humanity. According to our perception, in the current circumstances, the NAM could take appropriate actions related to: control and coordination of treatment of the Covid-19 pandemic; prevention of future pandemics and specific situations; participation in the reform of world and regional health systems; participation in food security system and the implementation of a plan to eliminate world hunger by 2040; establishing an urgent dialogue between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to address global issues such as the fight against pandemics, global warming, nuclear weapons control, global economic recovery, etc. ; initiating the reform of the international economic order; building a multi-polar world order as a condition for substantial democratisation; providing urgent assistance to the poorest countries to rehabilitate health and hunger problems, to write off debts; encouraging the development of multilateralism; execution of assumed international legal obligations and implementation of UN decisions. At the same time, the NAM should contribute to refraining from activities that increase global tensions, and in that sense take measures to strengthen trust at the global level.

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YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: The present paper analyses the process of shaping the policy of non-alignment, from its first manifestations in the form of individual foreign policy orientation of individual states to the creation of the first outlines of a broad movement that enabled joint organised and continuous action of these non-aligned states in the United Nations and wider international relations. A special place in this analysis is dedicated to socialist Yugoslavia, which played a key role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, in its development, but also its constant confrontation with serious temptations and overcoming frequent crises that called into question its continued survival. Based on the analysis of relevant archival material, the author came to the conclusion that the Non-Aligned Movement would never have achieved its global role in the Cold War polarized world without the continuous, skillfully designed and offensive performance of Yugoslav diplomacy and Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. On the other hand, socialist Yugoslavia could never have played such a significant role in that bloc-divided world without the constant, well-organised and efficient action of this broad and democratically organised Movement. Compared to other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, which undoubtedly could pursue their foreign policy interests within the existing regional Afro-Asian and Latin American organisations, Yugoslavia could ensure the stability of its internal order and national independence only through alliance and joint action within such a neutral international association. Hence, it is no wonder that Tito built a new world without which he himself could not survive, just as, after all, that world in its original version could not survive without Tito.

Key words: Non-alignment, Yugoslavia, blocs, Third World, decolonisation, United Nations.

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Introduction

At the beginning of the 90s of the last century, and after the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, the domestic public often asked questions: Why did Yugoslavia distance itself from Europe and why did it become attached to distant and foreign civilizations? Why were Afro-Asian and Latin American countries closer to Yugoslavia than the countries from its immediate neighbourhood? Why did Yugoslavia tie its destiny to the destiny of the Non-Aligned Movement? This Yugoslav foreign policy has often been criticized as a kind of “escape from Europe”. Such perceptions became especially relevant at the time of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War when the basic preconditions for the further survival of the bipolar world were finally eliminated. The Non-Aligned Movement represented a kind of antipode and alternative to such a world, in which non-aligned countries saw the main source and main generator of all international crises and all serious problems in the world. In that sense, the collapse of the bipolar system, in a way, has made meaningless the key political premises on which the platform of global action and the strategy of the Non-Aligned Movement were based. But, also, with the overthrow of that system, in a way, the foundations on which socialist Yugoslavia rested were destroyed, whose international prestige and solid international position arose precisely from that anti-bloc non-aligned policy. From today’s perspective, it seems that the biggest loser of the end of the Cold War was Yugoslavia – the country that advocated the most for a world free of bloc confrontation and Cold War tensions. The entire Yugoslav diplomatic history was marked by constant foreign policy wandering and manoeuvring between the East and West. Its ideology did not allow it to join the West, and billions of dollars and Western economic concessions did not allow it to join the East. Yugoslavia found a way out of such an intricate cycle in something that is neither East nor West – in the policy of non-alignment.

The emergence of the Yugoslav foreign policy strategy of non-alignment

With the formation of Yugoslavia’s new international strategy in the mid-1950s, a process of changing its foreign policy took place. This process included three directions: normalization of relations with the East (primarily with the Soviet Union), a continuation of cooperation with the West and opening to the newly liberated Afro-Asian states. Of course, the realization of the key political premises of this third direction was of special importance.

The stabilization of internal affairs and the strengthening of Yugoslavia's international position directly depended on the outcome of its efforts to form a movement of states pursuing similar foreign policies. There was an unbreakable connection between these two phenomena (consolidation of Tito's regime and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement). These phenomena ultimately conditioned each other. The Non-Aligned Movement enabled Tito's Yugoslavia to play the role of an important global player, and Tito's Yugoslavia provided the Non-Aligned Movement with a relatively influential and important factor in resolving numerous crises in the world and alleviating antagonisms between two opposing Cold War blocs. The Yugoslav insistence on the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement stemmed from a very simple foreign policy calculation led by Tito and his associates at a time when they faced the real danger of Yugoslavia being exposed to general international isolation. In such conditions, it was certainly necessary to secure the support of some powerful international factor when it was obviously necessary to seek somewhere outside the European space. According to the logic of the elimination system, such a factor could only be the newly liberated Afro-Asian states. Admittedly, the newly independent states alone could not play a significant role in international relations. But united in a broader international association, these countries could potentially become a significant international factor capable of parrying successfully bloc politics. Tito's commitment to non-alignment was a reflection of Tito's pragmatism and his extremely rational view of political reality. In the current situation, Tito did not see another political way out. For him, non-alignment was a kind of extortion and the only acceptable solution, but not a political alternative that generally fit into the ideological postulates he was guided by. He hated the very term "non-alignment" and did not use it at all during the first two summits of non-aligned countries in Belgrade and Cairo. He explained the inadequacy of the term, which was used by the leaders of all other non-aligned countries, by saying that it implied "equal distance" to the conflicting blocs and thus equated the policies of the socialist and capitalist countries, which, according to Yugoslav communists, led to suppressing and eliminating the "class aspect" within the Yugoslav foreign policy orientation. On the other hand, the term "non-alignment" seemed inadequate in Yugoslav political doctrine also because it implied a passive and neutral attitude towards dangerous crisis hotspots in the world.

The Yugoslav political doctrine considered that any passivity would be "immoral" and "short-sighted", and that the main determinant of non-aligned policy must be strong support for those forces that fight for world

peace and oppose the forces that threaten that peace. In practice, the mentioned reasoning was usually reduced to unreserved support for the bloc of pro-Soviet states and permanent condemnation of the policy of the Western powers. Such an approach was expressed until the moment when the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka (Zambia), in September 1970, finally provided the political and normative conditions for the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. From that moment on, Yugoslavia became the main advocate of a strictly balanced attitude towards the countries of the East and the West.² (Bogetić, 2012, pp. 33-34; 2019, pp. 81-82; Dimić, 2014, p. 129-131; Petković, 1985, pp. 31-35). Hence, for Yugoslavia, there were no more dilemmas about the necessity of realizing the stated political projection on the formation of a broad international association of non-aligned states. Potential members of such an association and desirable future allies from Asia and Africa, however, did not show excessive willingness or interest in following Yugoslavia in its ambitious efforts.

Foreign policy orientation on the non-alignment of Asian and African countries

Although they unwaveringly followed a non-aligned orientation in international relations, the most influential Afro-Asian statesmen and leaders of India, Egypt, Indonesia and Ceylon – Jawarharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sukarno and Solomon Bandaranaike – did not show much interest in working together. Thus, for example, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who was the leader of an important regional power that enjoyed a

² Until then, Tito used the terms: “coexistence”, “non-involvement”, “non-committed politics”, “coexistence politics”, “non-aligned politics”, and called countries that pursued such foreign policy “non-aligned”, “non-aligned” or “non-aligned” countries. According to his own account, Tito first heard of the term “non-alignment” from Nehru. The meaning of this expression was contained in the policy of equidistance, that is, avoiding any moves that would disrupt a balanced relationship with the confronted blocs. Therefore, Nehru’s policy, as well as the very content of the term “non-alignment”, was seen by Yugoslav doctrine as a kind of “static neutrality”, passive foreign policy and unwillingness to oppose any serious manifestations of force politics occasionally resorted to by opposing bloc groups. Tito and his associates felt the need to constantly emphasize that Yugoslavia was not a passive neutral, but an active factor in international relations. Therefore, the Yugoslav foreign policy of coexistence is not conciliatory and opportunistic, but creative and dynamic.

huge world reputation, did not feel threatened by the great powers nor did he express any great need to join the Movement in order to suppress their political activities. Namely, he believed that the newly independent states, due to their economic backwardness and political instability, could not play a significant role or achieve a greater reach within international relations. The backbone of Nehru's foreign policy conception was the strategy of maintaining strict equidistance towards the blocs. Tito's initiatives for the gathering and joint action of non-aligned countries were not in the spirit of Nehru's foreign policy strategy, as they could potentially lead to a deterioration in relations with the blocs (Čavoški, 2009, pp. 127-128; 240-242, 257-259; Stojković, 1983, pp. 63-68; DA MSP RS, 1956, PA, 415 765, 416 588; 1957, 395; 1958, 347, 360; 1959, PA, 431 697). With somewhat different political ideals, Egyptian President Nasser was one of the strongest proponents of the concepts of "Arab unification" and "Arab nationalism" in the mid-1950s. As an unifying leader of the Arab world in Africa and Asia, Nasser was guided by different goals that did not coincide with the ideas of creating the Movement of Non-Aligned and Non-Bloc States. Although the unification of Egypt and Syria and then the accession of Yemen, as well as the hint of possible unification with Iraq, were encouraging in that regard, the idea of creating a broad association of non-aligned states was reduced to Nasser's view of the concept of "pan-Arab solidarity" (Bogetić, 2006a, pp. 250-253; Hurani, 2016, pp. 437-439, 479, 490; Stojković, 1983, pp. 68-72; DA MSP RS, 1958, 58, 360; 1960, PA, 435 330; 50, 71, 180). Ahmed Sukarno and Solomon Bandaranaike, on the other hand, expressed interest in gathering and joint action of states outside the blocs but exclusively on a regional basis by forming a movement of Afro-Asian states in which China would play a crucial role. From this Asian power, they took the position on the inevitability of conflicts between "poor" and "rich nations", "new" and "old forces", "coloured" and "white". Thus, they advocated the concept of the inevitability and permanence of the international class struggle as the only path that leads to the resolution of accumulated international problems and antagonisms. Namely, they believed that peaceful coexistence between developing countries and imperial powers was impossible. The imperial powers will never accept something like that, considering that their main global goal is to use their economic and military superiority, brutally exploit Afro-Asian states and interfere in their internal affairs. Sukarno and Bandaranaike, therefore, highlighted the institutional connection of the new emancipated states as a priority goal, which is being done for the sake of an uncompromising fight against a common enemy – imperialism and colonialism. This class struggle

was to take place by applying all available means for the purpose of neutralizing them and removing them from the international scene. Ultimately, this concept propagated the use of force as a last resort against an unjust world order based on inequality and the domination of rich countries (Bogetić, 2006b, pp. 221-227; Dimić, Raković, Milošević, 2014, pp. 62-68, 85-88; Tadić, 1968; AJ, KPR, 1959, I-2/11-2; DA MSP RS, 1964, 872).

Tito's vision of the NAM

Tito knew that without the support of Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno and Bandaranaike, it was not possible to form an international movement whose core would be Afro-Asian states. He, therefore, opted for a tactic, popularly called in Yugoslav political circles "step by step" which soon led to the creation of a kind of informal group made up of these countries. At the same time, he forced more and more direct contacts with the officials of these countries. Increasingly frequent meetings with Afro-Asian statesmen soon resulted in the establishment of very cordial and close political and economic relations between Yugoslavia and most of the newly liberated countries in the area. In direct meetings with foreign leaders, the Yugoslav leader carefully and skillfully propagated the political premises of the Yugoslav projection of the new system of international relations. He was aware that international circumstances were increasingly moving in the direction that was in favour of the realization of the Yugoslav foreign policy concept (Bogetić, Dimić, 2013, pp. 15, 23-30, 33-34, 37-51, 56-80; Jovanović, 1985, pp. 48-50; Mates, 1976, pp. 102-113, 117-127). One of the turning points in the institutionalization of cooperation between non-aligned countries was undoubtedly the meeting of the three most influential statesmen – Tito, Nehru and Nasser in Brioni, in July 1956. The significance of this meeting stemmed from the fact that it was the first multilateral meeting of non-aligned countries and that for the first time a multilateral document of non-aligned countries was adopted – the Brioni Declaration (Čavoški, 2009, pp. 86-87; Petrović, 2010, pp. 130-137; Životić, 2008, pp. 74-80). The first initiatives to hold a summit of non-aligned countries came during Tito's overseas tour and a two-month visit to Asia and Africa in the spring of 1961. On that occasion, Tito visited Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and the United States. In the exchange of opinions with the heads of state of these countries, Tito initiated and developed the idea of establishing closer cooperation, that is, joint actions of non-aligned countries. Although none of these talks openly set out a concrete plan for holding the first non-aligned conference, everything indicated that they were moving

in that direction. After the end of the tour in Asian and African countries, Tito presented Cairo for the first time with a concrete proposal to convene a broad conference of heads of state and government of non-aligned countries. President Nasser unreservedly approved of Tito's initiative. At the end of the talks, Tito and Nasser agreed to draft the text of a letter sent to non-aligned countries inviting them to Cairo for a preparatory meeting for holding a conference of heads of state or government. Indonesian President Ahmed Sukarno joined the mentioned initiative of Yugoslavia and the UAR, despite the fact that his views on the modalities of joint action of non-aligned countries differed significantly from the strategy advocated by Yugoslav President Tito (Dimić, Raković, Milošević, 2014, pp. 62-68, 85-88).³ The joint appearance of Tito, Nasser and Sukarno created in a sense an axis – Belgrade-Cairo-Jakarta, which in some way shattered the myth of India's leading role in a non-aligned world and Nehru's inviolable authority in the process of decolonisation and emancipation of new "Third World" countries (Bogetić, 2006a, pp. 342, 361-362).⁴ In a relatively short period, the governments of Ghana and Afghanistan were among the first countries to be invited to attend the preparatory meeting, followed by Prime Minister Nehru (who was also the last of the exposed non-aligned leaders to agree to the idea.). Hence, after a kind of Yugoslav diplomatic offensive, the conditions were provided for the first time in modern diplomatic history to hold a global summit of states that did not belong to any of the existing military-political blocs (Bogetić, 2006a, pp. 349-362; Dimić, Raković, Milošević, 2014, pp. 61-68; AJ, KPR, 1961, I -2/13-7, 8).

³ Sukarno accepted the invitation to hold the First Summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade as an important stage which would be the introduction and preparation for holding a conference of Afro-Asian countries at which a regional movement would be formed. In that sense, for him, the Belgrade Conference was not a "replacement", but only a "supplement" to the activities in terms of organising such a regional movement.

⁴ Until the scheduling of the First Non-Aligned Summit, the Indian Prime Minister persistently opposed holding the meeting, believing that the summit would negatively affect the general situation in international relations and would "only make it harder for the great powers to solve international problems and contribute to easing international tensions." Aware of the extremely negative political implications of political abstinence, he decided, at the last moment, to participate in it.

The Belgrade Conference

The Belgrade Conference undoubtedly represented a very representative political gathering in which 25 non-aligned countries participated. The conference adopted a declaration that precisely defined the principles and goals of non-aligned politics as an alternative to bloc politics. However, contrary to the prevailing opinion, the Belgrade Conference was not the founding conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. Formally, that Movement was not formed in Belgrade. At the Belgrade Summit, there was a dilemma whether to form institutional mechanisms and bodies that would in the future ensure a continuous and organised joint appearance of non-aligned countries in international relations? Most of the participants in this Summit had a negative attitude on this issue. The most influential Afro-Asian statesmen opposed Tito's initiative, believing that the newly formed movement would take on the characteristics of a "third bloc", which would lead its members to an open confrontation with both the East and the West. In addition, this would seriously complicate relations with the great powers, from which they received extensive economic, financial and military assistance at the time. Supporting Nehru's position – that non-aligned countries by their individual foreign policy orientation create a positive climate in international relations and by their very existence have a positive impact on turbulent international events – most participants in the Belgrade Conference believed that mechanisms for resolving serious world crises were in the hands of great powers. Hence, non-aligned countries should be restrained so as not to unnecessarily complicate the otherwise complex negotiation process. This approach at the Belgrade Conference significantly diminished its contribution to the fight against colonialism and Cold War tendencies. The new gathering of non-aligned countries thus remained in question (Bogetić, Dimić, 2013, pp. 109-122).

Dilemmas in the NAM after the Belgrade Summit

The increase in the number of countries that have opted for a non-aligned policy with the intensification of the decolonisation process, meanwhile, has become a significant factor in the United Nations voting machinery. In such a changed international situation, there was a new meeting of the heads of state and government of non-aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964. This time, there was no longer any dilemma regarding the expediency of forming the Movement. However, the Summit

in Cairo imposed a new problem, without the solution of which it was not possible to go further. Namely, at that Cairo Conference, there was a sharp dispute between some participants over the question which countries should be members of that Movement? At the Cairo Summit, the dilemma had to be resolved, whether to accept Tito's concept of universalism or Sukarno's concept of regionalism? Then, should we decide to unite all non-aligned states, regardless of their geographical determination, or go in the direction of forming one regional Afro-Asian movement? As there was no consensus on these issues at the Cairo Conference, there was a stalemate in the regulation of open institutional issues. This crisis manifested itself through the interruption of the continuity of action or more precisely, as a "crisis of non-alignment". (Bogetić, 2017, pp. 101-118). This crisis was overcome only in the middle of 1970, at the Summit of the Non-Aligned in Lusaka (Zambia). At that Summit, which was marked as the "Third Conference of Non-Aligned Countries", an agreement was finally reached on taking concrete measures that would provide the necessary conditions for permanent and synchronized action of non-aligned countries in international relations. In this sense, the Lusaka Summit was also the founding summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. After that Summit, the idea of creating a body or body that would maintain the continuity of joint activities, take care of the implementation of adopted decisions and provide regular consultations, was constantly on the agenda of all major conferences of non-aligned countries. Therefore, after the Third Conference in Lusaka, there was a period that is often called the "golden age" of non-alignment. Such a name seems justified, given that it was a time when there was a sharp branching of institutional mechanisms of cooperation between the non-block countries and their increasingly frequent and increasingly offensive joint action in international relations (Bogetić, 2019, pp. 195-198, 209-211; Tadić, 1976, pp. 225, 238-242; AJ, KPR, I-4-a/9; DA MSP RS, 1970, PA, R, 432 028). In that sense, the formation of the key body of the newly formed movement – the Co-ordinating Bureau – was of special importance. Thus, for the first time in its history, the Non-Aligned Movement gained a kind of executive operational body, which potentially had the opportunity to ensure efficient and coordinated joint action of non-aligned countries, i.e., to implement summit decisions, which were previously reduced to a list of good wishes. Non-aligned countries are becoming more and more capable of reacting together, organised and energetically to sudden changes in the international community that directly endanger their security. Along with the rapid expansion of the area of the political activity of the Non-Aligned Movement and the constant increase in the number of its members, the need for the

creation of special coordination bodies in the economic, financial and information spheres has become more and more relevant. They are characterized as important levers within the general emancipatory aspirations of Third World countries. The starting point was that the political independence of non-aligned countries was not possible without their economic and financial independence, but also independence within the global system of telecommunications and information (Bogetić, 2014, pp. 165-180; Bogetić, 2019, pp. 317-319). Although the 1970s were undoubtedly the most prosperous period of the Non-Aligned Movement's global engagement, the end of that decade marked the end of such a positive trend. Increasingly sharp disagreements, even armed conflicts among non-aligned countries, manifested between the 1970s and 1980s, were a hint of a serious crisis of the Non-Aligned Movement. The outbreak of the crisis raised the question of whether the actions of the Movement contribute or harm their interests. At the Havana Non-Aligned Summit in September 1979, the host country sought, with the support of a small group of non-aligned countries, to impose its views on the need to radically change the future strategic commitment of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cuba has pledged to tie the Movement to the Eastern Bloc. The curiosity is that the Western media, reporting all the details from the heated debate at the Havana Summit, called this gathering a kind of "boxing match" between the gigantic, bearded Castro and the nailed, barely moving and decrepit Tito, which ended in a convincing victory for the latter. Since Tito died the following year - that was also his last victory on the international political scene (Bogetić, 2019, pp. 397-400, 501-509; Tadić, 1982, pp. 49-51; AJ, KPR, I-4-a/35). After the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana, the Movement faced growing domestic and international challenges. Tito's departure also meant the loss of authority and dynamism of the Movement. Practically, no non-aligned country has tied its destiny to the destiny of the Movement, nor has it considered that the Movement can still be of significant importance to help it realize its key internal and foreign policy priorities. Conflicts between the members of the Movement, which pretended to impose itself as the "conscience of humanity", became more frequent and sharper. At the Summits in New Delhi in 1983 and Harare in 1986, the leaders of some non-aligned states openly expressed the view that the Non-Aligned Movement should be dissolved. It was a serious sign that the time had come to make an objective balance of all domestic and political activities. Critically reviewing the role of the Non-Aligned Movement so far, the member states considered the possibility of continuing earlier actions to address key global issues, such as more efficiently addressing the economic development of

poor nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this sense, the Movement had to adapt to the new circumstances in the world and redefine the strategy of realizing its priorities and goals (Bogetić, 2019, pp. 530-532; Jazić, 1984, pp. 63-82; Tadić, 1988, pp. 466-475). All this required a turn towards the "three-continental concept", which represented a departure from Tito's idea of universalism.

Reaffirmation of the NAM after the Summit in Belgrade in 1989

The reaffirmation of the Non-Aligned Movement followed at the summit held in Belgrade in September 1989. On the eve of the summit, there were great fears about its success. Yugoslavia took on a difficult role as a key player in designing the Movement's modernization program. The conception of such a program required a gradual liberation from the ballast of ideological exclusivity and one-sided notions of oneself and others. After all, that was the prevailing position which contributed to the Movement being revitalized again and placed on a completely new basis. The new approach also marked the establishment of stronger cooperation with the countries that were involved in the political blocs. This course of the non-aligned was similar to the efforts of the Soviet leader Gorbachev to adapt to the spirit of the time and catch up with it (the so-called Perestroika). Hence, there was more and more talk about the "Perestroika of the Non-Aligned Movement". In "Perestroika", the main priorities were related to the fight to correct the injustices of the existing international economic system, as well as to solving the accumulated economic problems of developing countries. These problems were marked in the declaration from the Belgrade Conference as "much older and much deeper than the Cold War and the bloc confrontation". In that sense, the central place in the concept of modernization of the Movement was occupied by the struggle to bridge the gap between the rich North and the poor South and to eliminate the growing tendency for "the rich to become richer and the poor poorer". At the same time, all components of the reform economic policy in non-aligned countries were elaborated in detail, which were supposed to enable the most successful integration into the world division of labour and world economic flows. Economic issues thus became the main priority of the Movement, which formally confirmed the original principles of non-alignment. The direction of further development of the Movement is contained in the statement of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak: "that the road should start, but with a changed timetable" (Bogetić, 2019, pp. 531-533; Jakovina, 2011, pp. 621-622; Petković, 1989, pp. 2; Petković, 1995, pp. 86-89).

Perspective of the NAM – universalism or regionalism

After the Belgrade Summit, the concept of regionalism prevailed in the Non-Aligned Movement. This was somewhat natural because in the phase of ending the Cold War, Yugoslavia, which advocated universalism, disappeared from the political scene. After its disappearance, other European non-aligned countries such as Malta and Cyprus left the Movement (in 2004). In the recent history of non-alignment, the only European state in the Movement remained the former Soviet republic of Belarus. Today, the term “non-aligned countries” is increasingly giving way to the term “Third World countries” or “developing countries”, which indirectly indicates a shift of the Movement’s priorities from the East-West issue, towards a much more current preoccupation of international relations in the North-South direction. After the break-up of the SFR Yugoslavia, at the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Jakarta in 1992, the FR Yugoslavia was deprived of the right to chair the Movement, which had belonged to it until then due to its continuity and the fact that it hosted a previous non-aligned summit. In Jakarta, moreover, the membership of the FR Yugoslavia in the Movement was suspended, thus, officials from Belgrade were prevented from participating in the further work of the Movement. With the regulation of the FR Yugoslavia’s membership in the United Nations in 2000, at the meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries in 2001, its request for observer status in the Movement was accepted. It was verified at the ministerial meeting in New York in November 2001. At all subsequent summits of non-aligned countries, the FR Yugoslavia, and then its legal successor, the Republic of Serbia, participated as an observer and were represented at the level of foreign ministers. At the Summit held in Belgrade in 2011, a higher level of cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement was ensured. The Summit was organised on the occasion of marking the 50th anniversary of the First, Belgrade Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries. The fact that non-aligned people accepted the initiative to organise the mentioned jubilee in a country that is not a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, and that Belgrade is the only city in the world that hosted this Movement three times, indicates that our country is still a symbol of non-aligned political option.

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EGYPT AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is the second-largest international grouping after the United Nations. Today, the NAM represents more than 60% of the latter's members and more than half of the world's population. Thus, it forms a large voting bloc, especially as it includes many major powers in its membership, which play important roles in the regional and international arenas, and their decisions are taken into account in international issues. Therefore, the movement should take advantage of this great weight in favour of establishing justice and peace in the world, and there is no doubt that its role in this regard has begun to grow in light of the decisive developments and changes that are taking place in the international arena over the past few years.

On the other hand, Egypt is one of the founding countries of the Non-Aligned Movement; it has a recognized vital role in founding, building, and developing the movement. Egypt has attempted - in cooperation with its partners - to keep the survival and continuity of the movement, using the latter's regional and international weight, as it represents the most important framework as well as the broader scope to coordinate the positions of developing countries on various political, economic and social issues of the international system. Egypt also had a clear contribution to transforming ideas related to non-alignment into a tangible reality at the inception of the movement, and it also hosted its second summit in 1964 and the fifteenth high summit in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2009.

Key words: Egypt, the Non-Aligned Movement, developing countries, aims, vision.

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The Non-Aligned Movement: Aims and Aspirations

It is well known that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was born out of the womb of the post-World War II era and as a consequence of an ideological conflict between the East and West Camps. During that period, hundreds of millions of people got rid of colonialism and the leaders of newly independent States feared their countries would be the scene of competition between Socialism and Capitalism. Thus, they created a number of ideas with the purpose of steering away from a potential conflict zone. Therefore, the idea of “Non-alignment” was first conceived at the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Solidarity in Indonesia. And in 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement was established thanks to the efforts of such leaders as Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia) and Ahmed Sukarno (Indonesia). The preparatory meeting for the First NAM Summit Conference held in Cairo from 5-12 June 1961 had laid down the goals of the policy of non-alignment, which were adopted as criteria for membership. These came as follows:

- The country should have adopted an independent policy based on the coexistence of States with different political and social systems and non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy;
- The country concerned should consistently support the Movements for national independence;
- The country should not be a member of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts;
- If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a Great Power or is a member of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts, and
- If it has conceded military bases to a Foreign Power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.

However, the idea of non-alignment did not signify that a state ought to remain passive or even neutral in international politics. On the contrary, since the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, its stated aim has been to give a voice to developing countries and encourage their concerted action in world affairs. The NAM has sought to “create an independent path in world politics that would not result in member States becoming pawns in the struggles between the major powers”. It identifies the right of independent judgment, the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism, and the use of moderation in relations with all big powers as the three basic elements that have influenced its approach. On the other

hand, The Founding Principles of the Non-Aligned Movement had come to reinforce the above goals and criteria. These principles asserted on respecting fundamental human rights and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; recognition of the equality of all races and the equality of all nations, large and small; abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, and other peaceful means of the party owns choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; and promotion of mutual interests and co-operation.

It is worth mentioning that the NAM, based on its constructive role in supporting developing nations, is the parent-organisation of various groupings of these developing nations, which seek to defend their interests in the competition between rich and poor and North and South. And to cull the fruits of South-South cooperation, it is essential for these nations to promote solidarity and coordination between those groupings. Duality and conflict of role and interests should be avoided to prevent a weakened negotiating position facing advanced nations which hold control of international financial and monetary institutions. By the way, the collaborative efforts among the member States of the NAM are conducted through an ambassadorial-level body at the United Nations' Headquarter in New York, which reviews and facilitates activities between the working groups, contact groups, task forces, and committees, in order to strengthen the overall coordination and cooperation among the NAM States. Actually, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, great controversy was held both inside and outside the Movement over its present and future role. But, taking into account the accelerated and radical changes of the world order since the 1990s, the NAM is entitled to play a great role in the international arena as it will follow below.

Egypt's Vision on the NAM

Egypt played a major role in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, at the hands of the Egyptian charismatic revolutionist leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, with his Asian and African partners. Egypt pursued developing the idea of establishing the NAM from the very beginning till it

became a significant real entity at the 1955 Bandung Conference. President Nasser's vision called for a collective union consisting of developing nations that could freely work on their own problems, analysing them and finding solutions. Nasser advocated non-interference from the two power blocs when it came to the foreign policy of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. His vision and influence also spread to the rest of the Arab world as his adoption of a non-aligned policy encouraged other Arab nations to become neutral in their approach to diplomacy regarding the Western and Eastern blocs. Increasingly after 1955, Nasser and the Egyptian press emphasized the ideas of neutralism or non-aligned with either of the world-power blocs as the foreign policy most suitable for the newly liberated colonies of Africa and Asia. Subsequently, Cairo has hosted the preparatory meeting for the first NAM Summit of Belgrade from 5-12 June 1961, and then the Second Summit in October 1964, attended by forty-seven countries. Ruling Egypt from 1954 until his death in 1970, Nasser remains a symbol of dignity, anti-Zionism, decolonisation, pan-Arabism, and above all social justice for many. The sentiment expressed by President Nasser and his vision for the solidarity of developing countries is relevant even today.

In this context, it was clear that Egypt believed in the ability of NAM to be the most important and broader framework for coordinating stances of the developing countries regarding the various international political, economic, and social issues, including the agenda of the United Nations along with supporting collective action in the face of unilateral policies, which constitute a challenge facing the third world countries. This has already become the main characteristic of the role of the NAM, worldly. In 2009, the Egyptian Red Sea resort Sharm el-Sheikh hosted the Fifteenth Summit of NAM, where 118 countries participated in the activities of the movement, including 55 heads of state, with some other countries having the observer status. The final document of that Summit reiterated the necessity to attain the goals of the NAM, including achieving justice and equality between the two halves of the world (North & South); solving the international disputes peacefully; keeping stability and security of the States and promoting multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, etc. There is no doubt that the significance of those issues has increased in the last few years, taking into account the rapid international changes and challenges, especially in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the recent Summit of May 2020, the member states are set to coordinate their efforts to curb the spread of the novel virus and discuss ways to deal with the virus from the health, economic and social aspects. The Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi highlighted the need

for international cooperation and solidarity to immediately respond to the coronavirus crisis. He also called for supporting the economies of developing countries and curbing the impact of the crisis on food security. On the other hand, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry recalled, at the NAM virtual meeting held on 10 October 2020 on the sidelines of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, for establishing a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, applying the internet governance, and preserving the cyber security. He also confirmed Egypt's firm support for the political solutions to the conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, besides finding a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the international resolutions to end the occupation and establish a Palestinian independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital. At the end of the meeting, the participants adopted a political declaration regarding the NAM priorities which included addressing the economic and social repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, combating terrorism, and strengthening efforts to maintain international peace and security. Additionally, the meeting praised Egypt's initiative of "Cairo Road Map for Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations" in supporting the balanced implementation in the UN peacekeeping system. Actually, Egypt is very much interested in the movement and the need to preserve it for the NAM's international positive influence and continues to be an important active member within the NAM till the present day. The Non-Aligned Movement, in light of its rich cultural, geographical and political weights, constitutes the basis on which Egypt depends for supporting the NAM's objectives and mechanisms, currently and in the future, through intensifying joint efforts with many international parties, in order to make the movement more efficient in dealing with major political, economic and cultural changes in the global arena, particularly after the positive shifting from 25 nations participating at the first NAM Summit in 1961 to a large entity currently comprising 120 members from Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

Urgent Need in a Changing World

It has already been pointed out that a great controversy has been raised both inside and outside the Non-Aligned Movement since the 1990s, specifically after the collapse of the Soviet Union, about the legitimacy and the return of the continuation of the movement. Two completely different views evolved. The first maintained that the NAM became obsolete, particularly as its *raison d'être* was actually no more existent. The Cold War

had ended and several changes took place with regard to some of its founding members. Yugoslavia, for instance, disintegrated into several smaller states. Other countries entered strategic alliances with the US. Another view is that the Movement had more justifications to continue than to disappear. The NAM secured many achievements in the past. Numerous challenges arose, which called for revitalizing its role: e.g., the need to defuse tensions and solve international and regional problems which have lasted for a long time. The NAM could also help prevent developed countries from hegemonizing over developing ones, and from interfering in their affairs using such pretexts as the fight against terrorism, humanitarian intervention and the spread of democracy. The Movement seeks to achieve global economic reform, narrow the widening economic gap between North and South, end poverty and hunger and promote dialogue and coexistence between peoples and cultures. In this context, it is reasonable to stick to the side confirming the urgent existence of the NAM in order to address recent international changes. The NAM has already promoted international cooperation between its members and managed to attract many of them through its just, moderate and legitimate claims and visions. The end of the Cold War and the bipolar system did not succeed in putting an end to the imbalances the world was suffering from at the time, as previously mentioned. Hence, the continuation of the NAM and its role in the international system are justified, particularly in light of its enormous capabilities on all political, economic, cultural and geographical levels. Therefore, there is imperative to reaffirm the principles on which the Non-Aligned Movement was established, particularly in regard to non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect of their sovereignty, stability and independence of their decisions, besides the inadequacy of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity. More and above, internal affairs became a pretext for practising hegemony on others. Additionally, in light of the growing tensions between the United States and China, alongside Russia, the Non-Aligned Movement should keep declaring its members' neutral positions with clarity and courage to preserve their interests, which undoubtedly are affected by the strained relations of major powers in one way or another. All these massive challenges require maintaining the NAM, as well as intensifying efforts for rebuilding and promoting its capabilities, in order to defend a peaceful, cooperative and multilateral international equitable system. Hence, the NAM should reassess its identity and purpose in the post-Covid-19 era, exploiting its unique capabilities. A reformation program should be introduced in order to be more effective on the basis of common interests and mutual benefits. The movement should follow its long

speeches and documents by positive practical actions. In addition, according to his contribution to *Bandung Journal of the Global South*, S. Keethaponcalan proposes to upgrade the entity from a movement to an international organisation in order to give it the official and organisational lustre within which it can operate, alongside the rest of the international organisations, in an optimal and efficient manner. It is preferable to consider the idea of drafting a formal constitution, establishing a permanent secretariat, as well as convening annually due to the great changes taking place and the large number of its members who are affected by those changes.

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CUBA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: 60 YEARS BEING PART OF THE THIRD WORLD

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Abstract: Cuba's participation and leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) are analysed in the context of international politics from the time of its foundation in the twentieth century to the present. This work is a tribute to the sixtieth anniversary of the Organization. Likewise, the relevance of the Third World, particularly Africa, Asia and Latin America, in the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution is elucidated.

Key words: Cuba, Cuban Revolution, Non-Aligned Movement, Third World, Cold War, international system.

Introduction

Traditional studies of Cuban foreign policy have been focused more intensely on the history of Cuba's relations with the former Soviet Union, the abnormal state of diplomatic relations with the United States, as well as those with Latin America and the Caribbean, without paying much attention to the Non-Alignment. The island's membership in the Non-Aligned Movement has been seen as part of a comprehensive strategy pointed at increasing the influence of Cuban diplomacy, aiming at the ultimate goal of

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breaking the isolation imposed by the U.S. governments in power by strengthening its bonds with Africa and Asia.³ It should be recalled that when Cuba joined the Movement in 1961, its foreign policy was at a stage of strategic definition. It would be difficult to associate such an entry to an already existing and developed Third World; rather, the Cuban Revolution witnessed and contributed to forging a higher development of the Non-Alignment with an anti-imperialist and third-world front in international politics. Cuba's commitment to the Third World was a pillar of its internationalist behaviour, whether through the Movement or the Tricontinental Conference and the subsequent Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL). In the case of the latter region, different Latin American states began a decade later to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement, becoming in itself a new Third World paradigm whose roots had an impact on Latin American political thought and emancipatory culture. These influences also confirmed that the essential objective of the Cuban Revolution's foreign policy would be to contribute to the cause of socialism. It was categorically affirmed the decision to subordinate, in its development, the interests of Cuba to the general interests of the struggle for socialism and communism, national liberation, the defeat of imperialism and the elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism and all forms of exploitation and discrimination of peoples and men. This commitment required a simultaneous struggle for peace and was inserted with another of the strategic premises of the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution: internationalism (Rodriguez, 1983:374-375). This article is a tribute to the sixtieth anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its content is a visible sign of the relevance of the Third World, particularly the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, in the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution. We address Cuba's participation and leading role in the context of the international politics of the 20th century, characterized by the Cold War; as well as the current global situation, no less convulsive, turbulent and violent due to the existence of a broken, unequal and unjust international order.

³ Some authors, such as Dominguez, have shown concrete evidence of the positive results that such a strategy has brought to Cuba, mentioning, for example, Cuba's entry into Group 77 in 1971, thanks to Peru's initiative and the support of non-aligned countries.

Historical background

The rise of revolutionary and nationalist movements in Latin America was one of the consequences of World War II. This awakening of consciousness and democratic forces would also spread throughout other areas which would later become the Third World. Since at that stage there was no equality in social development between the regions of Latin America, Asia and Africa, the process of decolonisation and national liberation started with different characteristics and peculiarities in each place, which the U.S. foreign policy and its allies in the Western bloc of countries would oppose. In this regard, Cuban scholar Reinaldo Sánchez Porro, in his book "Africa: Lights, Myths and Shadows of Decolonisation", outlined that "After World War II, an acute contradiction arose between the two opposing blocs, that of the capitalist and socialist powers (...) involved in what was called the Cold War between the two leading powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their allied blocs (...)." In the midst of it, decolonisation developed fundamentally from the questioning of colonial relations of dependence at all levels by nationalist liberation movements. The anti-colonial struggles, such as that of Algeria, translated into hot wars behind which they tried to find the hand of Moscow. The liberation of the African continent took place in these conditions, and Africa was also "used as a stage for the confrontation of the two blocs" (Sanchez, 2016: XI). Thus, a large part of the countries of Asia and Africa, which had been colonies of the main European powers and accompanied them in the conflicts of World War II, at the end of the war began attempts to achieve autonomy or independent status. This was possible, among other factors, due to the economic, demographic and educational changes that had taken place in the colonial territories, which led to the emergence of homegrown organizations with independence aspirations, as well as the transformations generated by the conflict in the international scenario, especially the weakening of the metropolises (Díaz, 2007: 281). Important changes took place in the international system in the century that was par excellence revolutionary in international relations. First of all, sovereign states multiplied and thus large masses of the population of different third-world regions, largely impoverished and under capital control, merged into independent life, posing a challenge to the North American hegemonic project. Since the rupture of colonial ties opened new market opportunities for its products and capital, the country could not abandon the demands of its strategic alliance with the European metropolises, though. The incorporation of new actors on the international setting within the framework of the United Nations Organization (UNO)

was a noticeable fact that favoured the defence of the third-world political interests while diminishing the North American preponderance in the General Assembly due, to a great extent, to the votes of the Latin American countries and their Western allies. 59 independent countries made up the world political map in 1945, but the number rose to 113 by 1960, 64 of which belonged to the Afro-Asian region (Perez, 1998: 4-15). Within the framework of the decolonisation process and the North-South confrontation on the international political scene, the regions of Africa and Asia became theatres of the Cold War. In the face of this offensive, the USSR in order to gain sympathy and allies supported the decolonisation movement and the newly liberated countries, whilst the United States and its allies always argued the well-known fight against communism and strove to contain the radicalization of those processes. To do so, they submitted them to their control under the new label of neocolonialism, whose favourite instruments were conditional economic aid, blackmail and pressures of all kinds, and even the use of force and military intervention as happened in 1958 in the cases of Lebanon and Jordan, where British and American troops landed to support the internal reaction. From the socio-economic and political point of view, the newly liberated countries were not associated either with the western capitalist and industrialized countries or with those of the socialist area of Eastern Europe. Therefore, they initiated a Third World policy of their own⁴, which became an orientation of neutrality with respect to the confrontation between the two great ideological blocs of the period. The first practical manifestation of this approach was the First Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, which, with the participation of 24 independent nations from both regions, constituted the most direct precedent of what, six years later, would become the Non-Aligned Movement. It is important to emphasize that this exercise of collective independence was essentially a reflection of the use of the single state sovereignty of the participating countries, the emergence of a new pro-independence thinking

⁴ The term Third World was first used in 1952 in the article "Three Worlds, One Planet", published by Alfred Sauvy, French economist and sociologist, in the French newspaper *L'Observateur*. Originally the term was inspired by the conception of the three concurrent States during the French Revolution, of which the third would begin the same. Later it would refer to those countries that were not part of the world of developed capitalism, nor of the world of European socialism, therefore, the concept would regroup all underdeveloped or developing countries, regardless of their political structure, economic system or the participation in international communities.

and progressive currents of ideas that already precluded the anti-imperialist conceptions. All of which would guide the first decades of action of what would later become the Non-Aligned Movement. Among the countries of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia would play an important role in this conference since it was the only one in that region that did not accept the imposition and uniformity of the terms of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and advocated its socialism in the face of the aggressive policies of the imperialist powers. The Bandung Conference brought about the necessity to unite the countries of Asia and Africa recently liberated from the European colonialism in a movement whose central policy was Non-Alignment to any of the power blocs and that had sufficient strength to deploy a high militant profile that would allow them to defend their rights and national interests. Under the leadership of the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, of the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser and of Indonesia, Ahmed Sukarno, who were joined by the leaders of India, Jawaharlal Nehru and of Afghanistan, Mohammed Daoud Khan, the Non-Aligned Movement had its formal presentation at the I NAM Conference held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from September 1 to 6, 1961.

Cuba in the NAM

Cuba has the political-diplomatic and historical merit of having been the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean to participate in the foundation of the movement. The Cuban delegation to that founding act was led by Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, President of the Republic of Cuba. At a moment when the historical conflict with the United States increased due to its economic, political and military threats and aggressions, the Cuban Revolution reaffirmed its anti-imperialist character with profound economic and social changes. The presence of Chou en Lai, Nasser, Nehru, Pham Van Dong and other third-world leaders, who had made the struggle for national independence and against colonialism, the centre of the foreign policies of their nations conditioned the main political conceptions of the movement and the approval of the "Ten Principles of Bandung", which would become in their own right what would for many years be called the quintessence of Non-Alignment or the role of the Non-Aligned Movement, still in full force and effect in the 21st century. In the context of an international system in transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, but maintaining exacerbated power relations, U.S. hegemonism and unilateral Cold War-style actions of the great powers, these historical principles, in our view, remain relevant:

- Respect for human rights and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
- Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations,
- Recognition of the equality of all races and the equality of all nations, large or small;
- Refrain from intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of other countries;
- Respect for the right of every nation to defend itself, individually and collectively, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- Refrain from the use of collective defence arrangements to serve the particular interests of any of the great powers. All countries should refrain from exerting pressure on other countries.
- Not to make threats or acts of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any nation;
- Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or legal settlement, as well as through other peaceful means chosen by the parties, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- The promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; and
- Respect for justice and international obligations.

The triumph of the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the NAM

It is necessary to point out that in hindsight, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 set up a challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean and, in particular, for their relations with the United States, since the U.S. government decided not to recognize the revolutionary process and, by 1961, the island and its main leaders had already received numerous aggressions, sabotage, assassination attempts and was the target of a policy of war and isolation on the part of its powerful neighbour.⁵ The guiding ideas pronounced in numerous speeches by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, where he clarified the character and aims of the Cuban

⁵ In 1961, mercenary troops, trained by the CIA, landed in Playa Giron, in the province of Matanzas. This invasion was preceded by the attack on the San Antonio air base. At the burial of the victims of this attack, on April 16, 1961, Fidel Castro declared the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution.

Revolution had an enormous influence on the progressive and national liberation forces at the regional and international level because for the first time in human history a guerrilla movement had carried out a political revolution and confronted U.S. imperialism directly through far-reaching transformations in its socio-economic structure, totally opposing its interests of neocolonial domination. The result would be a logical comprehensive change in the dynamics of inter-American relations and the greater expression of popular struggles in the Western hemisphere in solidarity with the first socialist state in the Americas. In response to the hostile actions undertaken since 1959 by the U.S. government, which endangered the security and very survival of the Cuban Revolution, there were broad popular mobilizations in support of the process led by Fidel Castro Ruz and a group of charismatic guerrilla fighters, including Commandant Ernesto Che Guevara, also a standard-bearer of Third World and national liberation revolutions in the most exploited, backward and poorest countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In this context of regional isolation, the search for new political and economic alliances was essential. The historical coincidence between the process of Cuba's total liberation and independence, the intensification of the aggressive actions of the United States and the rise of the world decolonisation movement allowed the Cuban revolutionary government to turn its attention to the countries of the Third World, in line with its historical anti-colonial and emancipatory struggles. To initiate the necessary contacts, the revolutionary government sent the commander and minister Ernesto Che Guevara on a tour to Egypt, Morocco, India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma, Japan and Sudan, which began on June 12, 1959. These primary meetings gave a strategic orientation to Cuban diplomacy, in the sense of achieving unity of common interests in bilateral relations with most of the marginalized nations. The argumentation of the Cuban discourse corresponded to the principle of the revolutionary foreign policy of national interest's subordination to the general interests of the struggle for socialism, communism, national liberation, the defeat of imperialism and the elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism and all forms of exploitation and discrimination. The same year, the revolutionary government agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Morocco and to elevate the Legation of the United Arab Republic (Egypt, Syria and Yemen) to the rank of the Embassy, in addition to initiating relations with other African countries such as Tunisia and Ghana. Likewise, it was recommended to the Minister of State, Raúl Roa García, to also establish diplomatic relations with Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Republic of Guinea and Liberia. The following year,

the President of Indonesia, Ahmed Sukarno, visited Cuba, while Raúl Castro travelled to Egypt to participate in the July 26 celebration in Alexandria, where he held meetings with the leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. A transcendental event in the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution was the trip of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro to New York to participate in the XV Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which began on September 18, 1960. The multilateral background was the propitious framework chosen by Fidel to meet with the most influential Afro-Asian leaders of the time: Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Ahmed Sékou Touré of the Republic of Guinea. Thus began a very favourable political and diplomatic link so that in 1961 Cuba became the only Latin American country invited to the first Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement. From the historical point of view, Cuba has a close community of political interests with the Non-Aligned countries in terms of origin, heritage, adversaries and aspirations. The evolution and development of the Cuban nation are conditioned by colonialism, neocolonialism, military interventions and the illegal occupation of part of its territory by a military base in the eastern province of Guantanamo. Being a member of the Non-Aligned Movement symbolizes the Third World vocation of Cuba's foreign policy, which also includes the socialist character of its revolution, its feeling of belonging to the Caribbean with a deep integrationist sentiment that explains Cuba's policy designs regarding the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa, in general, and within the organization, in particular. Cuba's international performance was clearly in line with the criteria for the issuance of invitations to the Belgrade Summit Conference, which had been established at the Preparatory Meeting of the Conference of Heads of State or Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in June 1961, where the procedure for inviting a country was established. The prospective country must have adopted an independent policy based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems and non-alignment, or demonstrate a disposition in favour of this policy. In addition, such a country had to practise consistent support for liberation movements fighting for national independence (Report, 1961). Although by 1961, there was already a systematic communication and ideological, political and economic link between Cuba and the USSR, the fact of not being part of the Warsaw Pact and having well defined the principles that would govern Cuban foreign policy, allowed it to comply with this requirement and integrate the movement. This possible dichotomy between Cuba's link with the USSR and its natural aspiration to

belong to the organization of the Non-Aligned countries was explained in the speech of Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós at the Belgrade Summit, where he clarified Cuba's total independence in terms of non-membership and commitments of any kind with military blocs or pacts and that the military agreements with the USSR were limited to technical assistance. But he also stated that "this does not mean that we are not committed countries. We are committed to our own principles. And those of us who hold the honourable delegation of our peoples, who are peace-loving peoples, who struggle to affirm their sovereignty and to achieve the fullness of national development, are, in short, committed to respond to these transcendent aspirations and not to betray those principles (...)" (Dorticós. 1961). This is one point of major importance because it also outlined Cuba's legitimate right to be a socialist country at a time when critics of the revolution at the international level wielded Cuba's "alignment" to the USSR to discredit its early activism and membership in the Movement. Cuba also found at the Belgrade Summit fervent support and solidarity for its anti-imperialist and anti-colonial cause, in contrast to the policy of isolation exercised by Latin American governments dependent and subordinate to the United States. In this sense, Cuban diplomacy proposed several objectives, among them that the conference should condemn imperialism and that the fundamental weight of this measure should fall on US policy; to obtain solidarity support for the National Liberation Movements of Vietnam, Angola, Portuguese Guinea; to condemn the imperialist regimes and request the independence of Angola, South West Africa, Portuguese Guinea, British Guiana and Puerto Rico; to obtain a statement against military bases in foreign territories and to sanction the sitting of new bases; to proclaim the right of each nation to give itself the form of government it deems most appropriate; to condemn discrimination and aggression in the economic field, as well as subversive and harassment activities, directly or indirectly, through the use of mercenary elements, as it had been already deployed by the United States against Cuba. An important part of these proposals was included in the Final Declaration of the Summit, item 12 that explicitly stated: "The participating countries recognize that the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, to whose continuance the Government and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country."; and in item 13, paragraph b: "The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba and of all peoples to freely choose the political and social system that best suits their particular conditions, needs and possibilities should be respected." (Declaration, 1961). Thus, the main issues related to Cuba were included in a separate item in the Final Declaration. In

the regional framework, between the Belgrade and Cairo Summits, important events took place, such as the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962, the independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the coup d'état against Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic and the Missile Crisis or October Crisis, which brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. The year 1964 started with the coup d'état against Goulart in Brazil, a wave of governments and military dictatorships that would initiate a process of fascistization in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the president of Chile, Eduardo Frei, with the intention of giving impetus to the failed Alliance for Progress inaugurated by U.S. President John F. Kennedy in 1961, tried out the first Christian Democrat experience in Latin America in an unsuccessful attempt to present an alternative to the Cuban Revolution. This context meant that the Latin American issue was among the objectives that the Cuban delegation had to include in the agenda of the II Summit of the Movement. Among the guidelines received by the Cuban delegation for the preparatory meeting, held in Colombo, Ceylon, from March 23 to 28, 1964, was to encourage the invitation of Latin American countries which maintained relations with Cuba. As well as, to oppose with nuances to the invitation of countries that did not have relations with the island, particularly Venezuela. On the understanding that the countries that broke off relations with Cuba had alienated themselves with imperialism, followed its dictates and lent themselves to the development of Cold War policy in the region. The question of Panama should also be mentioned, and its right to the revision of the Treaty with the United States regarding the Canal Zone should be defended, as well as the support of the island for the struggle of the Panamanian people in favour of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Declaration, 1961). At the Cairo Conference in 1964, chaired by the President of the Republic of Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, the largest of the Antilles would also be the only Latin American country to participate as a member of the Movement. Nevertheless, nine out of ten observer countries attending the Conference were Latin American: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Unlike Ecuador, which had attended the previous conference as a spectator and was absent on this occasion. Similarly, the Movement for the Independence of Puerto Rico, later the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, was invited and present at the Cairo meeting. The Conference condemned the manifestations of colonialism and neocolonialism in Latin America and called for the application of the people's right to self-determination and independence. The conference

noted with regret that Guadeloupe, Martinique and other islands of the Antilles had not yet achieved their autonomy. In this regard, it drew the attention of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation to the case of Puerto Rico, with the request to examine the situation of these territories in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Resolution 1514, which demonstrated the Movement's greater interest in the Latin American and Caribbean problem. With respect to Cuba, as in Belgrade, the conference condemned the pressures and interference in the internal affairs of the island with the aim of imposing a change in the political, economic and social system chosen by its people. Without mentioning the Missile Crisis, a politically complex episode that put humanity in tension over the nuclear armament of the leading powers of the military blocs in the bipolar international system, hegemonized by the United States and the Soviet Union, the conference also requested the United States government to suspend the commercial and financial blockade imposed since 1961 and demanded the return of the territory illegally occupied by the United States in Guantanamo. This paradox can be explained by the fact that the installation of nuclear rockets in Cuba was an act of self-defence in the face of the real possibility of a military invasion of the island by the United States. However, the bilateral diplomatic channel between great powers used by John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev allowed an agreement between them without taking into account the Cuban position. For that reason, the Cuban government understood the place it occupied in the global power game of the time. On October 28, 1962, the agreement establishing the withdrawal of the rockets from Cuba was made public and Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, as well as the general public, learned about it from the international press. Relations between Cuba and the USSR would never be the same again, but they eventually improved and became excellent in different historical stages, practically until its disintegration, despite the fact that the last government of that country, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, detached from its allies, abandoning responsibilities and commitments and renouncing its internationalist interests with the socialist countries. However, the events of October 1962 contributed to the fact that the circumstances of the Cuba-United States conflict transcended the regional framework to become a world problem. In this regard, Raúl Roa García, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an interview with his counterpart from the United Arab Republic, held at the Cuban Embassy in Cairo, stated: "We did not aspire for the Cuba case to be the central point of the Conference, but we did aspire for it to be mentioned in some way in the final communiqué since this would strengthen our role within the United

Nations General Assembly. We stated that the case of Cuba was not local, not even regional, but of a global nature, as had been demonstrated on the occasion of the Caribbean Crisis. The Cuban problem is of equal interest to all, and we can say that the Western powers that maintain commercial relations with Cuba, of which there are many, are deeply concerned about the situation created by the policy of the United States in relation to our country since they themselves are being subjected to pressures of all kinds to prevent them from trading with our country (...)” (Declaration, 1961). On the one hand, after the October Crisis, the Cuban position in the Non-Aligned Movement was more difficult to defend, on the other hand, the policy towards Africa in the biennium 1963-1964, which would assume the risks of military support to Algeria against the Moroccan aggression, to the Lumumbists in current Zaire, and to the revolutionaries of the Portuguese colonies, helped the island win new sympathies, maintain and strengthen its prestige and influence the internationalist struggle, together with other peoples, against imperialism and in favour of their national independence.

This also happened with the support and cooperation to the guerrilla movements. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, they began to take shape in Latin America against colonialism and neocolonialism as a mechanism of domination established in this region. Cuba became the liaison between the most revolutionary Latin American sector and the Non-Aligned Movement, initiating a kind of link or integration that we believe contributed to the strengthening of Cuba’s recognition within the Non-Aligned Movement. A process whose antecedents can be identified from the II Summit held in Cairo from October 5 to 10, 1964. There, the anti-imperialist calling of the Movement was demonstrated at an early stage. Three of the chapters of the final document agreed upon by the Heads of State expressed the willingness to develop concerted actions for the liberation of dependent countries, the elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism; respect for the right of peoples to self-determination and condemnation of the use of force against the exercise of that right; the sovereignty of States and their territorial integrity. The struggle, during the first years of the Movement, focused on consolidating anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as the basic philosophy and the essential cornerstone of non-alignment.

The above criteria achieved practical realization and worldwide visibility with the holding of the First Tricontinental Conference in Havana, held from January 3 to 15, 1966. It was attended by more than five hundred representatives of political, trade union, student and women’s movements, international organizations and socialist countries, including Amilcar Cabral

of Cape Verde, Salvador Allende of Chile, Pedro Medina Silva of Venezuela, Luis Augusto Turcios Lima of Guatemala, Rodney Arismendi of Uruguay, Cheddi Jagan of Guyana, Nguyen Van Tien of South Vietnam, among others. At this important meeting, Cuba consolidated its undisputed political leadership in the internationalist alliance of Third World countries. This Conference set out to constitute a project of common struggle, since, as Said Bouamama, author of the book *“La Tricontinental: Los pueblos del Tercer Mundo al asalto del cielo”*, said in an interview to the *Diario de Nuestra América*, “(...) it is no longer a question of each dominated people confronting one and only colonial power, on the contrary, they must now face the imperialism, that is to say, a whole system of domination at world level; secondly, it is no longer only a question of fighting for the independence of a political type, but of fighting to achieve real economic independence; all these transformations of political consciousness allow the understanding of the struggles that are taking place in Latin America, where the peoples have been confronting for decades the new face of imperialist domination, so-called neocolonialism. All these battles are taking place at the same time on the three continents and, as a consequence of this; the project of a common Tricontinental struggle is constituted.” (Anfrus and Morgantini, 2017). With a transcendental political impact, the I Tricontinental Conference gave rise to the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAAL), whose objective was to promote and coordinate a common front of struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, North American imperialism and to support the national liberation movements, coinciding with those of the Non-Alignment. It was unique because, for the first time, leftist organizations from the three continents were meeting to discuss how best to make that struggle a reality. One of the OSPAAAL’s greatest achievements was the official publication of the Tricontinental magazine (*Revista Tricontinental*), its official voice. Published in several languages, it became a link between the militants of the three continents and a means of denouncing imperialism and standing up for national liberation movements. In its pages, many intellectuals, politicians and researchers reflected, through their works of art, published articles, analyses, visions, and diverse theoretical perspectives, the situation of the Third World and its most crucial problems. From the beginning, the United States and its allies saw in this movement a threat to their interests and dominant positions at the global level. Despite the counteroffensive unleashed by the imperialist forces, the policy developed by Cuba in this period facilitated the rapprochement and political agreement among the three continents involved in struggles for national liberation, in

defence of the free self-determination of peoples and against imperialism, which inevitably had repercussions on the increasingly active role that Cuba would assume in the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite the political forces within and outside the Movement that tried to simplify its objectives and circumscribe them to the identification of policies that could keep its members out of the Cold War or the rising Soviet-American bipolar confrontation, leaving aside the more radical principles identified in Bandung, the historical reality showed that the Non-Aligned Movement not only emerged with a strong anti-imperialist component, with a calling to fight colonialism, neocolonialism and apartheid, and as a vehicle for defending and promoting the guiding principles of international law. Besides, it also had a unique role in safeguarding the rights of sovereignty and independence, rejecting the use of force in international relations, condemning interference in the internal affairs of States and supporting the economic development of poor countries. The guiding force of the progressive movements and political parties admitted the transformation of the arguments and intentions of those who advocated "neutrality" in the face of the acute world problems of the time, but they also joined the vanguard principles when the Movement basically needed its members not to be part of the military alliances that U.S. imperialism began to foster in the Third World. This was the moment when the United States began its efforts to turn OTASO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty Organization, originally known as the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Treaty Organization) and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States), just to mention a few military groupings, into the pillar of a policy of containment that would prevent the spread of revolutionary, progressive and socialist ideas. When the Third Non-Aligned Conference of Lusaka was held in 1970, after a long period of preparation and decision as to where it would be held, Cuba already had an approximate idea of its international projection in the Movement. In addition to its declared desire to placate isolation, to place Latin American problems in the forum of the organization, to encourage the participation of the countries of the region, to influence the discussion of principles, to accumulate prestige, it has now added its activism as a strategic ally of the USSR within the organization. For example, taking into account the possibility that intervention in Czechoslovakia could have been mentioned in Lusaka, it was essential for Cuba to categorically reject any attempt to use the Conference as an anti-Soviet platform or against the socialist countries that were increasingly developing their political, economic and commercial links with Cuba, in the face of the criminal and unjust blockade imposed on the

island by The United States. It became clear that the Cubans had to assume a greater leading role if they really expected the Movement to advance in the desired direction. And it was in that African scenario of Lusaka where Cuban diplomacy deployed an intense activity and a positioning that was decisive for the coordination of the action of a group of more than twenty countries that played a decisive role in the final formulation of the different documents and resolutions approved by the Conference. The results of Lusaka were propitious to insufflate greater anti-imperialist content to the Movement, in the sense of the conception of Cuba as a whole with other countries, impacting international politics, since the members of the movement contributed to the expansion of the international system by constituting half of the UN membership. Therefore, this reflected a change not only quantitative but also qualitative in international relations in the sixties of the twentieth century, when there was a change in the correlation of forces favourable to the socialist countries and the progressive and revolutionary political forces. The IV Summit Conference of the Movement, held in Algiers from September 5 to 9, 1973, was a significant milestone and a new turning point for the movement. In the first place and despite strong disagreements, it definitively put an end to the ideas of “neutrality” that had continued to permeate the debates of some of the previous conferences by discussing and reaching agreements on the need to strengthen the natural alliance between the Non-Aligned Countries and the socialist community of the time. But it also took decisions that were transcendental for a new dimension in the actions of the Non-Aligned Countries in sovereignty matters. The Movement identified and took decisions on the permanent sovereignty of underdeveloped countries over their natural resources and the threat of transnational corporations to the exercise of that sovereignty. Undoubtedly, seen now in the 21st century, at a time when these global problems are becoming more acute, it reflects the advanced positions of the Non-Aligned policy. From Algiers emerged the ferment of what the following year would be the Declaration and Program of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, a theme introduced with great force in Cuba’s foreign policy discourse, and two years later the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, documents that guided multilateral discussion on the problems inherent in international economic relations for more than a decade and which, in addition to advocating a new type of system of international and economic relations, were based on the exercise of sovereignty by the countries of the South. Supported by the demand that such sovereignty should be respected, they focused not only on their natural resources but also on their economic activities. These new

dimensions would be consolidated six years later at the Sixth Summit in Havana, with the most complete and comprehensive document conceived by the Movement in terms of solidarity, anti-imperialism, cohesion and unity of all the progressive political forces of the world for the fulfilment of the principles of International Law, and with the request for global negotiations on Development and International Economic Cooperation. Even the Western press of the time could not avoid acknowledging Cuba's leading role from the very beginning of this meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Sixth Summit was a milestone too, just as the Algiers meeting in 1973 had been for the movement (Basterra, 1979). It was reported that the objective of Cuban leader Fidel Castro Ruz was to radicalize the Non-Aligned Movement, but that he was well aware of its heterogeneous character, and that in the movement there coexisted countries strongly "aligned" in pro-Western positions, for example, Morocco, Egypt, Zaire, among others. Cuba's initial position consisted of denouncing the Western manoeuvres supported by China while multiplying actions to strengthen the Non-Alignment with respect to all the existing tendencies in it. At the same time, the historical Cuban leader tried to reach an agreement with the Yugoslav President, Tito, the surviving founder of the Non-Aligned at that time, to persuade him of the need to convert the organization into a more active and militant factor without breaking its essential principles (Basterra, 1979). By 1979, the Cubans could feel more than satisfied with their foreign policy within the Non-Aligned Movement, since once they had obtained the presidency of the forum, they acquired an unprecedented power of influence. They had managed to bring together their multiple identities; indeed, their qualities as non-aligned, socialist, underdeveloped and Latin American countries were mutually reinforcing. All the dimensions of Cuba's foreign policy had been agglutinated around principled positions, with its anti-imperialism standing out as a common denominator that appealed to its socialist, non-aligned and Latin American peers with a similar persuasive force (Alburquerque, 2007). Cuba, a small island in the insular Caribbean, now had a foreign policy of power by combining all these dimensions and a revolutionary process that in the internal order was steadily increasing the concrete achievements of its population in social welfare, highlighting its indicators of health, education, sports and scientific achievements. The reinsertion of the Island in the Latin American diplomatic context, the presence of thousands of Cuban soldiers in African lands, the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement and the intensification of the Cuba-United States conflict during the Republican administration of Ronald Reagan, are some of the elements that allow us to classify this decade as one of the most

activistic in Cuban foreign policy, having repercussions, with all its magnitude and possibilities, on the political content and projections contained in the next summits and their final declarations. The Seventh Summit Conference, held in New Delhi in 1983, defined that the “common dedication” of the Movement was the struggle for peace, justice and international cooperation, the elimination of imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, the eradication of apartheid, racism, including Zionism, and all forms of domination, aggression, intervention, occupation and foreign pressures, the acceleration of the process of self-determination of peoples under colonial and foreign domination and the consolidation of national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and the social and economic development of their peoples. The Eighth Summit, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986, outlined how the role of Non-Alignment had been fulfilled over the years, including its principles and objectives, and also made it clear that in the Movement’s view non-intervention and non-interference in the internal and external affairs of States were fundamental principles to be strictly observed because violation of those principles was unjustifiable and unacceptable under any circumstances, affirming the right of all States to pursue their own political, social and economic development without intimidation, obstruction or pressure. However, at the end of the 1980s, the international situation began to change and the environment in which the Non-Aligned Movement had to act became more complex and contradictory. The imperialist and counterrevolutionary offensive of the United States in the last stage of the Cold War had taken its toll on the progressive, revolutionary and nationalist forces around the world.

The end of the bipolar world and the future of the NAM

Between 1989 and 1991, due to the self-destructive processes unleashed by the political leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, First Secretary of the Communist Party and one of the main ideologues of reforms that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the once-powerful bloc was in agony and the world geopolitical catastrophe that changed the international correlation of forces began. It turned in favour of the Western bloc of countries and the transition from bipolarity to a unipolar international system in the political and military order, characterized by the emergence of the hegemonic power of the United States and its militaristic oversizing in different regions and countries. The international situation inevitably affected the effectiveness and strength that we had observed in the Non-Aligned Movement. The Presidency of Yugoslavia, after the Ninth Summit of 1989 and its

commitments with the European Union conditioned by a future insertion in that grouping, the disappearance of the European socialist community and, above all, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, introduced variables of universal impact, with disastrous consequences for the Movement. The progressive forces that survived had to act quickly to try to prevent the Non-Aligned Movement from being a booming, thriving grouping, always on the offensive, to a grouping permeated by defeatism and indifference, and even to avert its disappearance (Moreno, 2006). An interesting and fallacious thesis began to emerge about the irrelevance of the Non-Aligned Movement in a world in which the Cold War and the discrepancy between the great powers had disappeared. Ideas were introduced about the creation of a large grouping of the countries of the South of the planet dedicated exclusively to economic cooperation. The quintessence of the Movement was questioned, its guiding principles were ignored, and it was weakened, almost rendered useless as a vehicle for defending the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of its members. The catalytic role that the Non-Aligned Movement had necessarily assumed for almost three decades was reduced to its minimum expression (Moreno, 2006). Although the Summits of Jakarta in 1992, Cartagena de Indias in 1995, Durban in 1998 and Kuala Lumpur in 2003 reaffirmed the guiding objectives of the Movement, the reality shows that, unlike in the past, these concepts were not reflected in bold and principled practical actions in the Non-Aligned Movement operational fields, despite the fact that the United States and its Western allies did not abandon their imperialist nature and that the motives that gave rise to the international political struggle of the Movement continued to exist.

For example, the principle of solidarity among its members, which played an important role in previous decades, became a dead letter. The Movement found it almost impossible to reach agreements involving confrontation with the great powers, and most particularly, with the United States. This was the case with the impossibility of reaching common positions on the war against Iraq, neither in the framework of the United Nations General Assembly nor in the Commission on Human Rights, among many other international conflicts that followed. Nevertheless, it is only fair to acknowledge the efforts of a group of countries, especially Asian countries and Cuba, to prevent the disappearance of the Non-Aligned Movement. Already in 2006, the performance of the Movement bore no resemblance to that of one or two decades earlier, but the XIV Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement would take place in September in Havana. The election of the island to chair the organization was a genuine

recognition of its trajectory and defence of the principles of International Law. It was also a tribute to the resistance of the Cuban people in their struggle against the economic, commercial and financial blockade of the United States and to the hundreds of thousands of Cuban doctors who have fulfilled honourable internationalist missions, saving lives in the Third World countries (Rodriguez, 2013). Cuba and other progressive forces faced a great challenge. The movement analysed the consequences of the bloody military occupation of the United States and its allies in Iraq, Afghanistan and the threats of new “preventive wars” against other countries of the South. It recognized the need to contribute to world peace by broadening the profile of its diplomatic initiatives in order to fully demand the immediate cessation of the imperialist war in the Middle East and to prevent, as far as possible, the United States from continuing with its belligerent strategy, which aimed at destroying the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of a significant group of the Non-Aligned countries. Consequently, the Movement made a critical and exhaustive analysis of North-South relations during the last decades of euphoric neo-liberal globalization promoted by the main hegemonic centres of capitalism, whose most notable results have been the increase of economic and commercial differences between rich and poor countries and the weakening of the capacity of the States that accelerated the opening of their economies to competition and depredation of natural resources by transnational and multinationals at the service of the capitalist powers. The immediate consequence was that the Third World, as a whole, has been affected by protectionist policies that hinder the entry of its products into the markets of the industrialized countries, remaining on the margins of the main financial, commercial and investment flows. Today, the largest volume of world trade takes place between countries located in the North. In short, together with the serious economic and social crisis of the underdeveloped world, migratory flows constitute another essential aspect of the tendency to marginalize the peoples of the South, and of the persistent discriminatory, xenophobic conceptions in the North, where walls are built to face the migratory avalanche without the political will to solve the causes that motivate this complex phenomenon. During Cuba’s second chairmanship in the Movement, its foreign policy took up the challenge of denouncing global problems and had the most active position on the evolution of international relations. As well, Cuba felt obliged to demand the design of a new international financial architecture accompanied by a New World Order, since believing that an economic and social order that has proven to be unsustainable can be maintained by force, is simply an absurd idea. The

Cuban presidency recalled that, as President Fidel Castro Ruz said in October 1979 before the United Nations General Assembly: "The sound of weapons, of threatening words and prepotency in the international arena must cease. Enough of the illusion that the world's problems can be solved with nuclear weapons. Bombs might kill the hungry, the sick and the ignorant, but they cannot kill hunger, disease, ignorance and the people's just rebellion." (Castro, 2006). But those hopes would only be achieved if the Movement undertook, at the same time, the resolution of its internal conflicts and divergences that conspired against the cohesion and consensus among its members; conflicts that in many cases have their origins in the centuries of colonial and neocolonial subjugation of imperialism. The Cuban presidency took place at a time of the rise of new revolutionary processes in Venezuela and Bolivia, with the possibility of extending to other countries, which together with the island represented the concerted advance of the South American pole towards the construction of several blocks of plural power and ideals that enable a change in the correlation of international forces within the interests of the Third World, represented in that tribune of the Non-Aligned countries which, for the second time in history, and the first in the 21st century, met in Havana led by the Cuban political leadership which, from Fidel to Raúl Castro Ruz, had the double privilege of doing so. Since then, four other summits have been held in Egypt (2009), Iran (2012), Venezuela (2016) and Azerbaijan (2019), all with the need to establish a coherent and reliable policy for the Non-Aligned Movement; and the challenge of leading its members to a higher sense of belonging to the grouping, and to the realization of political and diplomatic actions that not only lead to the defence of sovereignty, self-determination and territorial integrity of its members, but also to their economic and social development.

The challenge also lies in leading the Movement, in a united and coherent manner, to become involved once again in the search for solutions to the main global problems and to take an active part in the struggle between unilateralism and multilateralism for the defence at all costs of the principles of International Law and of the leading and democratic role that the United Nations must play, in the face of the treacherous attempts, to bond it more and more to the foreign policies of the great powers through reform processes tainted with partiality and conservatism. At the virtual Summit convened by Azerbaijan, in April 2020, to exchange on the urgent and necessary efforts to face the COVID-19 pandemic, the President of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez recalled that at the XVIII Summit in Baku, in October 2019, Cuba called for strengthening the Movement in the face of international challenges, in conditions of unity to save it and lead the actions

for the elimination of the unpayable external debt burdened by underdeveloped countries and for the lifting of the unilateral coercive measures to which some of its members are subjected, which together with the socio-economic effects of COVID-19 threaten the sustainable development of the peoples. Cuba reiterated that it was urgent to confront selfishness and be aware that aid from the industrialized North would be scarce; therefore, the Non-Aligned Countries should complement each other, share what they have, support each other and learn from successful experiences. A useful option could be to resume in the future the annual meetings of Ministers of Health of the Non-Aligned Movement, within the framework of the World Health Assembly (Díaz-Canel, 2020). The Non-Aligned Movement requires the implementation of a program of concrete and systematic actions by the member countries; it also consists of re-creating accurate mechanisms for the coordination of positions; and of knowing how to collectively resist the pressures, threats, blackmail and corruption to which imperialism subjects many of its members. The fact that in the 21st century there are forces within the Movement committed to its existence and revitalization is a source of hope. But that is not enough because it requires a new maturing of the political consciousness of the global south in the face of the problems that threaten the survival of our species and international peace and security to the point of collective self-destruction. Cuba remains committed to the principles and relevance of the Movement, in the search for and promotion of global unity, solidarity and international cooperation; in the elimination of unilateral coercive measures that violate International Law and the United Nations Charter and limit the capacity of States to effectively confront the Covid-19 pandemic. The proof of this affirmation is found in the Cuban government's congratulations to Uganda, which will assume the presidency of the Movement as of 2022, assuring it of the island's full support and wishes for success in its management (Díaz-Canel, 2020).

Conclusions

The factors that led to Cuba's rapprochement and its active membership in the Non-Aligned Movement are related to its condition as a sovereign actor founded by a group of countries, mostly from Asia and Africa, with the main objective of defending the independence of the countries that were part of it and contributing to other nations and territories subjected to colonial and foreign domination to become sovereign states. The period from 1961 to 1966 saw the first steps towards rapprochement between Latin America and

the Caribbean and the countries of Asia and Africa, in a context marked by the beginning and development of the Cold War, the readjustment of the international system impacted by the decolonization movement that emerged on the African and Asian continents after the end of World War II, and by the rise of decolonisation movements on the African and Asian continents after the end of World War II; and by the rise of revolutionary movements in Latin America, following the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, which endangered the system of imperial domination imposed by the United States on the region. This inter-regional link was fostered through the Non-Aligned Movement, and within this, the work carried out by Cuba was of vital importance. Thus, since the I NAM Summit held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961, the Cuban delegation supported the defence of national liberation movements, in general, and those of Latin America, in particular, with the initiative that this objective be reflected in the final document, as a way of contributing to the legitimization of these movements and condemning U.S. imperialism. This position taken by Cuba was in line with the principles of the revolutionary foreign policy, which define it as socialist, anti-imperialist, Latin Americanist and Non-Aligned. The principles of Non-Alignment were at the forefront of international relations for decades and are still relevant to Cuba's foreign policy in its relationship with the most progressive forces in the Third World. Non-Aligned thought, from 1973 on, definitively abandoned the ideas of "neutrality" that had permeated it since its foundation and expanded its sphere of action to international economic relations with much more force than in its previous period, in defence of a New International Economic Order, with Cuba, since the Havana Summit of 1979 and the influence of the leadership of Fidel Castro Ruz, having significant weight in the radicalization of its political conceptions in world diplomacy and the most progressive forums of the time. Although Cuba reiterated in multiple scenarios the validity of the principles of Non-Alignment, the Movement, after the disappearance of the socialist community and the hegemonic role of the United States, was not able to adapt to the new realities and to realize that its autonomous and principled action was even more necessary in a unipolar international system, in which unilateralism and disrespect for International Law that still prevails today were already beginning to take shape. Since then, unlike in the past when it was a global player, it has not been a major force in international relations; its scope of action has been reduced, silenced and its capacity to work in concert has diminished notably, despite the efforts of a group of Asian and Latin American countries, including Cuba, to revitalize and redirect it towards its strengthening, in recognition of the glories of the

struggle for the end of colonialism and Apartheid, and of a quintessence that galvanized the Third World and allowed it to act on the international stage in defence of its just causes and collective potential. Although it requires effort and struggle, there are reserves of dignity in the Non-Aligned Movement, which, even if they do not lead it to return to what it was in past decades in the immediate future, coordinated and concerted action would allow it to play a more influential role in today's international relations, in defence of the sovereignty and independence of its members, for which there are official statements by the Cuban government that express its commitment and internationalist disposition.

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**THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT,
GHANA AND THE EARLY DAYS
OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY:
REFLECTIONS ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY'S
FOREIGN POLICY**

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Abstract: This paper is an attempt at reviewing Ghana's foreign policy as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It examines the key tenets of the NAM and juxtaposes it with Ghana's foreign policy directions from the early days of Nkrumah till recent times when virtually all African states have taken sides with one world power or the other. It is about the reflections of what the NAM stands for and how its members have been conducting foreign policy, and the successes and failures in the developing world, and the lessons that can be learnt from its existence in the last six decades. We use Ghana as a case for trying to understand the NAM and the conduct of foreign policy. We realise that though the NAM members such as Ghana still believe in the core principles that underpin the Movement, the country's foreign policy orientation has not always been one of the total non-alignment. Instead, exigencies in the contemporary international system as well as leadership idiosyncrasy and other related matters by and large influence Ghana's foreign policy.

Key words: non-alignment, positive neutrality, foreign policy, Non-Aligned Movement, Ghana.

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Introduction

The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement and its application in diplomatic relations was the direct consequence of Cold War politics, which intensified after 1945, following the end of World War II. The end of World War II bequeathed to the global system two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the formation of the United Nations Organisation (UN) has offered hope for peaceful co-existence as it spearheaded the promotion of peace, international cooperation and human rights. Previously colonised countries gained their independence and global trade expanded significantly as the world became increasingly interconnected. On the other hand, the bipolarization of the global system into two ideological blocks, capitalist West and communist East, and the consequent Cold War rhetoric, punctuated by nuclear stalemate, threatened the world peace and, thus, dispelled dreams of peaceful co-existence. In the wake of Cold War developments, newly independent countries within the third world became highly coveted by the Western and Eastern blocks as they sought allies within the global space. Africa was particularly critical of the Cold War politics. As President of the US, J. F. Kennedy, clearly articulated in 1962, in the competition for allies between the communist and non-communist blocks, Africa was reckoned to be “the greatest open field of manoeuvre” (cited in Meredith, 2011, p. 143). With both the West and the East vying for African allies, some leaders of newly independent African states became skilful at playing one side against the other. Yet, others, such as Gamel Nassar of Egypt, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, joined hands with other newly independent leaders of third world countries, like Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India and Surka of Indonesia, to advocate for and fashioned out what became known as the Non-Aligned Movement. The Non-Aligned Movement, both in its ideological and practical manifestations sought to stay aloof from the sterile quarrels of the Cold War, and thus, provided “the buffer for African nations” (Dumor, 1991) to steer clear of the Cold War politics, safeguard their independence and yet have sufficient space for “independent political action” within the global system (Dumor, 1991). Without a doubt, non-alignment had significant consequences for the diplomatic and foreign policy direction of countries that advocated it. Kwame Nkrumah, who emerged as one of the most forceful advocates of non-alignment in Africa, contended that Ghana intended to adopt a neutralist position in its diplomatic relations, as well as “preserve its independence to act” within the global arena when it was necessary (Dumor, 1991). Subsequent leaders after Nkrumah have all

adopted non-alignment as a diplomatic tool in their foreign policy directives, albeit with significant variations in aims and goals. After six decades of “non-alignment”, questions still persist on whether members of the NAM such as Ghana and other developing countries are truly “non-aligned”. It is in view of this that we turn the light on Ghana’s foreign policy – starting from the days of the country’s first president who was a founding member of the NAM and end with the current president – a capitalist-legal practitioner with long years of experience in foreign policy. In effect, we seek to interrogate whether the NAM members are still staying true to their core principles; what challenges they face in their endeavours to be loyal to their core principles; what successes have they had and what lessons can be learnt from their situation? Specifically, what is Ghana’s current position as far as foreign policy is concerned (particularly in terms of being neutral in world politics)? Though not having a clear-cut or watertight position of how member states ought to conduct their foreign policy as a group, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is a forum of about 120 developing world states that are not formally aligned with or against any major power block (NAM S&T Centre, 2021), has some general principles that members are expected to exhibit in their dealings with “world powers”. The Movement advocated (and still does) for a middle course for states in the international system in their dealings with the Western and Eastern Blocs, particularly during the Cold War. Ghana is one of such states and has over the years been pursuing policies that seem to reflect (or at least have reflected) the ideals of the Movement (especially in the early days of the country’s independence). Generally, a country’s foreign policy can be defined as its policy orientation that pertains to how it relates and reacts to international issues and external events. These decisions are usually influenced by issues of history, security, and leadership idiosyncrasy, etc. They are also generally underpinned by the question of national interest. Ghana’s external or foreign policy objectives which entail opposition to any military alliance, apartheid, arms race, the establishment of foreign military bases on the territories of member states, the strengthening of the United Nations, the democratization of international relations, socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system all define the policy and ideology of the Non-Aligned Movement (Bluwey, 2003).

Though the NAM was founded on the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference of 1955, this paper focuses mainly on only three of these principles. It is a well-known fact that for most NAM members, the fears of further colonialism or future dependence on either of the two conflicting blocs in the Cold War was a major motivation for joining the Movement

(Strydom, 2007). In effect, the principles of “equality”, “non-aggression”, and “peaceful coexistence” were the centrepiece for the establishment of the NAM. These principles connote the idea of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in domestic affairs of other countries; equality and mutual benefit. It is partly based on this reason that this paper focuses on Ghana’s foreign policy orientation that pertains to these three principles. In the rest of this essay, we try to explore how and to which extent Ghana pursued these principles and what the current state of affairs is. In effect, we explore how Ghana’s foreign orientation reflects the principles of non-alignment in contemporary times as indicated above.

**Kwame Nkrumah:
Charting the Path of Non-Alignment & Positive Neutrality**

Nkrumah’s belief in the potential of a united and strong Africa formed during the 1930s. During this time, he started writing and giving speeches that usually critiqued colonialism and imperialism. His coming into contact with other like-minded scholars and Pan-Africanists who advocated an end to colonialism and imperialism greatly influenced his foreign policy orientation when he became the leader of independent Ghana. For instance, Nkrumah’s encounter with George Padmore in 1945 at a Pan-African Congress in Manchester was consequential for his adoption of the strategy of non-violent political action and advocacy for Pan-Africanism as an ideology. The activities of Nkrumah coupled with the writings and activism of other intellectuals of African descent, such as Cyril Lionel, Robert James, etc., transformed Pan-Africanism from a seemingly utopian concept into a political project, which after 1957 was projected to other parts of the African continent by Ghanaian public diplomats (Rooney, 2007; Allotey, 2015). That is to say, after independence, Ghana’s foreign policy directives towards other African countries were shaped and conditioned by Pan-Africanism. This foreign policy orientation would subsequently reflect in the aims and objectives of non-alignment, as Nkrumah and other leaders, who were committed to non-alignment, sought through their foreign policy to represent the interests and aspirations of other developing countries, but more so to refuse to be “dependent on the international status quo” and to remain undeterred by the ideological binary between the West and the East (see Dumor, 1991). Indeed, for Nkrumah and many other non-aligned leaders, non-alignment was an extension of the search for independence in alliance with other former colonial territories within the Third World. As

Nkrumah pointed out, “Ghana does not intend to play the role of a silent spectator in the affairs or in matters which affect our country’s vital interests and the destiny of the African peoples.” (Dumor, 1991 p. 53). Nkrumah remained a staunch advocate of non-alignment and pursued a position of positive neutrality in the global arena throughout the period of his reign as president of independent Ghana. In 1961, when he addressed the non-aligned Belgrade Conference, he articulated what seemed to him to be the “basic principles” of a “non-aligned” policy. In his speech, he urged the Conference attendees to “end colonialism, proposed a reorganisation of the United Nations (UN), and urged the participants to constitute a moral force to avoid war between East and West” (Gerits, 2015, p. 1). Non-alignment, used interchangeably with “positive neutrality”, was conceived as the Monroe Doctrine for Africa (Scarfi, 2020, pp. 541-555).² Nkrumah had, as a matter of fact, linked the idea of the Monroe Doctrine to the slogan ‘Africa for Africans’ in a speech in Congress on 24 July 1958 (Gerits, 2014). Thus, just as the United States wanted to keep the Europeans out of the American continent, Ghana (at least under Nkrumah) believed that the Blackman was “capable of managing his own affairs”. This was not simply a position of “non-involvement” that enabled Nkrumah to swing his preferences from East to West and back, as some have claimed (Gerits, 2015).³ We are of the view that this was a pragmatic and result-oriented approach that allowed a relatively young and less powerful country to rub shoulders with world powers without openly creating any avenues of strife, arrogance or confrontation. Consequently, inherent in the whole idea of non-alignment was the need for the member states to “stand on their own feet” instead of “being a plaything of others”. Indeed, none of these would have worked, considering all the odds involved, especially during the Cold War era. It was only proper that since isolationism was not a viable option, non-alignment and positive neutrality was the way to go. However, questions remain as to whether successive Ghanaian governments have been able to stay on the path charted by the country’s founding president and leading

² This doctrine recognizes the Latin Americas as the United States’ backyard and sphere of influence which should not be open to any other ‘World Power’, particularly Europeans and China.

³ For instance, Frank Gerits has argued that “Ghana’s public diplomacy tactics switched from targeting political activists to convincing people through a vociferously anti-colonial propaganda campaign, a modification that cast doubt on the sincerity of Ghanaian neutrality at a moment when non-alignment actually began to affect Ghanaian diplomacy on all levels”.

member of the NAM (especially in the latter days of the Fourth Republic). It is important to note that during the early years of independence, Nkrumah's ideology and personality were among the key ingredients that shaped the country's foreign policy orientation. However, some have also assumed that "even though Nkrumah publicly declared support for the Non-aligned Movement, his penchant for socialism led him and the nation, to a large extent, to forge closer ties with socialist economies" (Asare & Siaw, 2018, p. 201). Of course, there are divergent views on this issue. But one thing is certain – Ghana as a prominent member of the NAM stood by the principles and ideals of the Movement (if nothing at all in the days of Nkrumah). For people like Nkrumah, the whole idea of strict conformity to non-alignment was the effective tool that could uproot colonialism and enhance protection against neocolonial intrusions. It was for this reason that he sought the total liberation of the African continent while promoting non-alignment and positive neutrality.

At The Dawn of African Independence – The "Osagyefo" and the Redeemed⁴

As far as Nkrumah is concerned, it has been said that Ghana's leader shied away from exploiting the Cold War rivalry because he believed interference would only draw Africa into conflict since "When the bull and elephants fight, the grass is trampled down." (Gerits, 2015, p. 1) This simply implied that playing the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) against each other could only result in the destruction of the less powerful states and make it more difficult to attain unity (Asamoah, 1991). As indicated earlier, Ghana adopted an activist foreign policy – predicated on its extroversion politics immediately after independence. This included offering strong support for liberation movements; pursuing conflict resolution in West Africa; the promotion of African unity, etc. These policy orientations reflect the principles and ideals of the NAM which also sought to represent the interests and aspirations of developing countries. It is, therefore, no surprise when on the eve of Ghana's independence Nkrumah proclaimed that "The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up to the total liberation of Africa." (Armah, 2004). Since one of the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement is to promote

⁴ "Osagyefo" is an Akin word that literally translates as 'The Redeemer' or 'Warrior King'.

and encourage sustainable development through international cooperation, Kwame Nkrumah sought to project the notion that Africa's position in the international system was insignificant without African independence and African Unity – coupled with a common sense of direction. Thus, creating what we may refer to as an African identity tripod. The pursuits of these policies were consequently aimed not just at bringing independence to African countries that were still under colonialism but were also aimed at fostering peace, stability and cooperation of all people that believed in self-determination and equality of the human race. Positive neutrality and non-alignment were also proffered as a shield that protected one from the fiery darts and targeted arrows of the ideological conflict between the West and the East. Indeed, it was Nkrumah's strong and unflinching beliefs in the African personality, emancipation and decolonisation project that made Ghana's commitment to non-alignment and positive neutrality emblematic of the country's identity as the black star of hope and freedom (Botchway, 2018). As a statesman and Pan-Africanist, one of Nkrumah's core beliefs was to contribute to the effective consolidation of the Non-Aligned Movement and to spearhead the developmental needs of African states. He called for and led a common struggle against racism, colonialism, and neo-imperialism in all forms and at every corner. Despite these, some are of the view that Nkrumah's pursuit of non-alignment as "the centrepiece of Ghana's foreign policy turned out to be unrealistic", and that his foreign policy orientation tilted towards the East (socialist ideological bloc and communist countries) (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, pp. 328-329; Gebe, 2008).

Ghana's Foreign Policy Then and Now: Reflections on Foreign Policy in the Early Years of Independence & the 4th Republic

It has been said that Ghana's foreign policy (under Nkrumah) was guided by a set of systematically expressed ideas, rather than a set of narrow national concerns, and this makes known the non-aligned nature of Ghana. In effect, Nkrumah had very clear objectives as far as the country's foreign policy was concerned. His were not that of knee-jerk reactions that were narrowly conceived for only a season. The country was also believed to have been the author of in-depth proposals at a number of international conferences and gatherings. Moreover, though it is said that "African leaders were subjected to the Cold War order" and were consequently "unable to reconfigure the constantly changing set of alliances that constitute the international system", the evidence suggests that even in the midst of such a quagmire Nkrumah

“adopted a more flexible form of non-alignment to safeguard his pan-African objectives”. It has been equally argued that the whole idea of non-alignment “offered the only sure route to African unity” for Nkrumah and his dream for a united Africa (Gerits, 2015, p. 2). Over the years, scholars have argued that Ghana’s policy of non-alignment was adopted because Ghana’s first president – Nkrumah, felt that as a relatively small country (lacking both the military and economic wherewithal), aligning with one of the then great powers meant compromising the country’s independence and ability to act for peace. It was thus argued that the maintenance of world peace was attainable through positive neutrality and non-alignment, but not isolationism (Thompson, 1969) (Tieku & Isaac Odoom, 2013, pp. 323-345; Arrnah, 2004; Thompson, 1969). Available literature and official accounts reveal that Kwame Nkrumah developed and formulated Ghana’s foreign policies as “part of a broader nation-building exercise”. Such policies were accordingly “designed to help Ghana find an independent voice on the international stage”. The argument is that Ghana’s foremost president was “shrewd enough to realize that it was risky” for the country “to try to speak as an independent voice in the international system at the peak of the Cold War” – a period when the so-called superpowers were anxiously in search of unbolted allegiance from newly independent states in different parts of the globe (Tieku & Isaac Odoom, 2013, p. 337). It has thus been opined that the country’s contribution to the liberation of most countries on the African continent made it to experience both “the delight” and “the dangers of being wooed by both the Western powers and the Soviet bloc” (Tieku & Isaac Odoom, 2013, p. 337). When Nkrumah was overthrown by the National Liberation Council (NLC), the direction of the country’s foreign policy shifted – it was no longer in the middle ground – there was visible evidence of a shift towards the West. This shift continued when an elected government was ushered into office in 1969 under Kofi Abrefa Busia and the Progress Party. Some scholars are of the view that though Busia’s long years in opposition predisposed him to negate the Nkrumahist legacy, he did not alter the foundation of Ghana’s foreign policy (Chazan, 1984). The point is that there were visible elements of departure from the Nkrumah days and even from the erstwhile capitalist-oriented, western-inclined military junta (the so-called National Liberation Council - NLC) since at least the junta did not ask “non-Ghanaians” to leave the country. Thus, immediately after the overthrow of the Nkrumah administration in 1966, Ghana’s position of non-alignment was to some extent tilted as the military junta of the NLC and the successive Busia-led Progress Party was openly identified with the West and capitalism. Moreover, Busia’s policies such as the Aliens Compliance Order and the dialogue with Apartheid South Africa

to some extent betrayed the cause of non-alignment.⁵ Among the several foreign policy objectives of the Busia administration was the desire to help in efforts that targeted the liberation of colonial territories to full-independence status; offering support aimed at dealing with problems associated with imperialism in Africa by means of negotiation and agreement with the imperialists, and to help build high prestige for Ghana in the comity of nations. Though the Progress Party and the Busia administration were capitalist-oriented, these objectives were to some extent in tandem with some of the ideals and principles of the NAM. It is in this regard that some have even argued that the administration's Aliens Compliance Order, which gave all foreigners two weeks' notice to either process their immigration documents or leave the country, was not entirely against the ideals of non-alignment. Thus, among the rationale used in justifying the order was the argument that the aliens in Ghana at the time violated the country's immigration laws. Moreover, it was claimed that the undocumented foreigners were sabotaging the country's economy and that they were the major cause of crime in the country. All these reasonings aside, the policy defeated the purpose of African unity and made the "Osagyefo's" trailblazer – Ghana – a laughing stock in global politics. As indicated above, the Busia administration also sought to dialogue with the Apartheid South African regime. On the surface, this policy seems to be in tandem with NAM's principle of non-intervention or non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. It is, however, interesting to note that the policy at the time was a deviation from what most Pan-Africanist and the NAM members believed. It was even seen as a betrayal on the part of the country that under Nkrumah had fought imperialism and apartheid anywhere on the continent. It was, therefore, not surprising that the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council subsequently rejected the Busia dialogue policy with Apartheid South Africa and also reversed the Aliens Compliance Order with the view of regaining Ghana's lost image as a NAM member after the Progress Party was overthrown in a military coup. As indicated by Tiekue and Odoom (2013, p. 328), "Ghana, in fact, became extremely pro-West and anti-communist, especially under the Busia regime." However, the overthrow of the Busia administration by the National Redemption Council (NRC) in January 1972 meant a virtual u-turn to non-alignment and positive neutrality as the

⁵ Though the Apartheid regime also claimed to be a NAM member, we, like many people, question the true identity of its membership at the time since it was an oppressive occupying settler oligarch administration.

Acheampong regime favoured “Nkrumahism”. It is instructive to note that in the formation stages of Ghana’s foreign policy, the country under the first elected president – Nkrumah – was very pragmatic as far as the country’s foreign policy orientation was concerned. The need to preserve the country’s independence coupled with the president’s “desire to rid Ghana of outside influence and assert the persona of the Ghanaian state, made him choose a pragmatic, almost opportunistic, approach to foreign policy” (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, p. 331). Nkrumah thus seemingly leaned towards the East in terms of ideological orientation without abandoning the West (until in later years of his administration when he witnessed some skirmishes from the West that led him to also openly ‘attack’ western-oriented policies). Under Nkrumah’s regime, Ghana was actively involved in fostering and promoting African regional peace and security. This was underpinned by his strong belief in Pan-Africanism, which called for the total liberation of African states from any form of colonialism and neocolonialism – a policy orientation that has been continued by subsequent governments, despite changes in the strategies adopted. Thus, since independence, Ghanaian governments have persistently pursued policies that foster cooperation and integration among African states. Over the years, Ghana has also been supporting countries whose territorial integrity has been threatened in diverse ways (Birikorang, 2007). As far as Africa is concerned, Ghana’s foreign policy objectives are based on the belief in the promotion of friendly relations and good neighbourliness, as well as the commitment to maintain international peace and security which in effect ensures economic cooperation and diplomacy. It is common knowledge that “one ground rule” that usually “guides the formulation and conduct of foreign policy” is the notion that “foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy” (Birikorang, 2007, p. 3). This is generally true for all countries, including Ghana. Thus, national interest, as well as the politics and general conditions of domestic events, have been key determinants of Ghana’s foreign policy. Despite assuming the mantle of leadership on the continent of Africa in the early days of her independence, and being the trailblazer in African foreign policy and diplomacy, Ghana’s influence began waning with the overthrow of its charismatic founding president – the “Osagyefo” Dr Kwame Nkrumah – a scenario that eventually has led to the continuous marginalization of the country in global affairs.⁶ Since Nkrumah’s overthrow, Ghana has had several heads of state, including military administrations. The

⁶ This was Nkrumah’s title that had been conferred on him by the Ghanaian populace. It is an Akin word that literally translates “War Leader”/“Mighty Warrior” or “Redeemer”.

longest military regime was Rawlings's PNDC (1982–1992), which metamorphosed into the NDC, which ruled Ghana for two conservative terms under the Fourth Republic. After serving for eight years, the NDC lost power to the New Patriotic Party, marking the first smooth transition of power from an incumbent to the opposition under the Fourth Republic (Botchway, 2018; Botchway, & Hamid Kwarteng, 2018, pp. 1-12). Thus, the third successive general election in Ghana under the Fourth Republic saw the transition from the NDC to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Consequently, at the beginning of the new millennium, the country had a switch from a socialist-oriented⁷ military-trained president to a capitalist-inclined democratic president – John Agyekum Kufuor. This notwithstanding, available information indicates that though there was a change in power for the first time under Ghana's Fourth Republic from one political party to another, the change of government from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in January 2001 did not involve any significant changes in foreign policy orientation. This stems from the fact that both parties held similar worldviews despite the difference in “the perception of foreign policy implementation strategies”. Thus, whereas both parties were capitalist oriented, the NPP placed much emphasis on economic diplomacy than the NDC government (Boafo-Arthur, 2007).⁸ And all these are happening many years after the fall of Nkrumah. There is also the idea that with the end of the Cold War, economic imperatives have superseded and continue to trump everything as far as Ghana's post-Cold War relations and foreign policy towards non-African states, especially the developed western countries are concerned (Akokpari, 2005). This idea presupposes that despite its great intentions and achievements over the years, non-alignment and positive neutrality may just be popular slogans or empty shout outs in contemporary times. This view, however thwarted it may sound, cannot simply be glossed over. It is partly for this reason that after six decades of existence there is the need to interrogate the reality of non-alignment and positive neutrality (a daunting task that

⁷ Though Rawlings in his later years adopted a lot of capitalist-inclined policies, he remained a ‘socialist’ at heart as most of the supposed Western-sponsored programmes he pursued sought to alleviate the plight of the masses.

⁸ In the latter days of his administration, Rawlings and the NDC – though being social democrats – had implemented a lot of capitalist-directed policies from the World Bank and IMF. These include a number of poverty reduction strategies and the Structural Adjustment Programs. They still ironically remain ‘social democrats’ till this day.

cannot be achieved in a single piece such as this). Indeed, Ghana's foreign policy under the First John witnessed some of the strongest evidence of non-alignment in the country's history.⁹ Among other things, the Rawlings administration, which lived in the cold war era, formulated a policy of positive neutrality during those days. His administration also promoted South-South cooperation; called for the lifting of the US economic embargo on Cuba; and was the only African country that condemned the Reagan administration for attacking Libya in 1986. Whereas the Second John focused on rebranding Ghana's image through economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness, the Third John's major foreign policy orientation did not deviate much from that – though the administration was that of a socialist democracy (except for the 'dzi wo fie asem').¹⁰ The Fourth John, who was previously the vice president of the Third, continued with the foreign policy of his former boss. Thus, the Mills and Mahama administrations committed to the country's long history of non-alignment. Consequently, they promoted trade relations with the Breton Woods institutions to ensure the economic development of the country while also strengthening the country's relations with China and other bilateral and multilateral partners include the NAM member states.

Conclusions:

Ghana's Foreign Policy in Contemporary Times – Where We Stand Today As A Nam Member State

The fifth president of Ghana's Fourth Republic, Nana Addo-Dankwa Akufo-Addo, on the whole, has not deviated much from his predecessors, particularly the Kufuor administration. He has been focusing on economic diplomacy through the "Ghana beyond Aid" mantra. He had also initially

⁹ Under the Fourth Republic, Ghana has had four consecutive presidents all bearing the name John. The First John was the first president of the Fourth Republic – Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings. He was succeeded by John Agyekum Kufuor, followed by John Evans Atta Mills, and then John Dramani Mahama.

¹⁰ This policy basically sought to call on Ghanaians to literally "mind your own business". It was occasioned by questions on Ghana's response to election-related violence in the neighbouring Ivory Coast. The president at the time told Ghanaians that his concern was Ghana, and that we ought to address our problems as a people and stop poking our noses into other peoples' businesses. The implication of such a policy for a country like Ghana basically puts a question on the country's foreign policy orientation as compared with some previous administrations.

paid much attention to good neighbourliness and supported efforts aimed at finding suitable political solutions to the political impasse in neighbouring states including Togo. However, despite contrary views on the subject, the president's closure of borders, especially the land borders during the COVID-19 pandemic raises a number of questions for analysing good neighbourliness and the implications for international obligations (Hlovor & Botchway, 2021). Interestingly, despite being a "non-aligned", the Akufo-Addo administration is alleged to have expanded Ghana's military pact with the United States. This implies that US troops are to be stationed in the country for the so-called purpose of maintaining "peace and security" within the sub-region and also to enhance the country's defence capabilities. The so-called deal also allows US troops to use Ghana's airport and have access to the country's radio spectrum. Yes, these are indeed interesting days for "non-alignment" in the Osagyefo's Ghana – the former haven for positive neutrality. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that Ghana's foreign policy orientation has not always followed a "straight line" of non-alignment in the strictest sense. Thus, despite incessant efforts to stay true to the NAM, the country has over the years had an undulating path as far as non-alignment and positive neutrality are concerned. Ghana's foreign policy has not always been determined by non-alignment alone (though it is an essential determinant). Instead, what we see is pragmatism – examining the needs and aspirations of the Ghanaian and following the path that yields the best returns for the moment and for generations to come.

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TANZANIA, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND NON ALIGNMENT

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Abstract: This paper explores the ideology and agenda behind Tanzania's active membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the emergence of a dynamic interaction between the Tanzanian government's foreign policy strategy and the government's domestic policy and legitimacy. The chapter charts Tanzania's evolution "as a stable and important member of the non-aligned group" setting out Tanzania's particular contribution at the NA Meetings at the UN and in other multilateral fora. The paper sets out the importance of the liberation of South Africa from white minority rule. Emancipation of all African brothers from white domination could not be confined to individual nation-states; this was a transnational moral and psychological imperative that encompassed racial justice and social justice; it concerned the right of self-determination of small nations. For Nyerere and his fellow Tanzanians, this was not simply reactive support for liberation movements facing oppression; it was pro-active support. The decolonisation of Africa demanded the structural economic transformation and a corresponding dedication to enhance the African agenda in the workings of the international system, to correct the skewed international political economy and division into antagonistic ideological blocs. The Non-Aligned Movement and the practice of non-alignment were thus a vital counterweight to marginalisation, insidious bias and continued exploitation by the developed European world. The paper provides an analysis of Tanzania's position in the NAM in the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s after President Julius Nyerere stepped down from office. Also, the paper considers the relationship with the superpowers and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Key words: Tanzania, Africa, the Non-Aligned Movement, decolonisation, Nyerere.

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Introduction

During his time in office between 1961-1985, Julius Nyerere rose to be one of the most eloquent and influential voices in the Third World and a leading figure in the Non-Aligned Movement. Tanzania's advocacy and practice of non-alignment evolved as a result of historical and geographical factors, the particular trajectory of nationalism, and a series of international events in the early years of independence (Pratt, 1975).² Under Nyerere's leadership, his country's foreign policy came to embody the ideal of African non-alignment, cultivating international prestige to sustain its regional and continental strategy (Bjerk, 2011). This was not to be passive neutrality: realism and idealism went hand in hand. Indeed, by the mid-1960s, the international strategy of the state was increasingly shaped by and affected its domestic situation and developmental goals, which meant that ideological interests combined with transnational ethnic and economic ties. For Nyerere, these multiple layers of identity and community were moral imperatives, as well as necessary constructs of being part of something bigger - Tanzanian/East African/Pan African/Non-Aligned - to foster confidence and empowerment with which to confront the lasting structural inequalities of the 19th-century European system of imperialism. In short, it was a radical, emancipator, transformative project.

Nyerere's battle for independent Tanzania

Tanzania's particular decolonisation trajectory played an important part in defining the country's foreign policy strategy and outlook. African nationalism had become a political force with the creation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, and its leaders had neither been imprisoned nor its followers suppressed (Gifford & Louis, 1982). This comparative freedom to organise, combined with deeply unpopular and coercive colonial policies, were important spurs to nationalism. Tanganyika

² The country gained its independence from Britain as the Republic of Tanganyika in December 1961. Zanzibar became independent from the UK in December 1963 as a constitutional monarchy. In January 1964, the African majority rebelled in a violent uprising against the Sultan, establishing a revolutionary council that was immediately recognised by ten communist countries, including the GDR, USSR and PRC. This was paralleled by a Tanganyika Army mutiny. Following British military intervention at Nyerere's reluctant request, on 24 April 1964 Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to become the United Republic of Tanzania.

was also fortunate that as the United Nations Trust Territory, there was a limit on what the British and settler minority could foist on Tanganyika. Before achieving power, Nyerere was already a central figure in the Pan-African drive for independence (Bjerck, 2011). He had been one of the most prominent spokesmen for the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa and proponent of the East African Federation.³ He was fortunate that his highly diverse country (with over 120 different ethnic groups) had not experienced the violence and colonial repression of the liberation struggle in equally diverse, neighbouring Kenya. Sparse domestic resources meant the country was not in thrall to multinational corporate interests (as in Congo), and its diversity - without the dominance of one particular community - helped save it from toxic politicised ethnicity. Its geographical coastal position, yet lack of external strategic interest in naval facilities, proved another advantage. Indeed, Tanzania's very lack of importance since 1914 gave the new government extraordinary latitude in the post-independence era. There is a debate whether Nyerere should be the sole focus in any analysis of Tanzania's policy of non-alignment, as parliament, party and government ministries were also important actors (Nzomo, 2018). As government and party functions centred on the President, executive and political function, as well as the legacies of colonial authoritarian political culture and his intellect, charismatic personality and political skills, ensured Nyerere dominated his country's external affairs between 1961-1985 (Matthews & Mushi, 1983; Bjerck, 2017).⁴ In newly independent African countries, the small size of the state underlined the importance of leadership. Nyerere was one of extraordinary nationalist leaders who had led their countries to independence (Johnson, 2000). He possessed remarkable personal and political qualities: superior intellect, wit, sophistication, he was an excellent listener and projected an air of incorruptibility and intelligence (Mitchell, 2016). As an African version of Plato's "King of Philosophers", Nyerere reflected deeply on the issues and challenges facing the newly independent African states and published it extensively. He established excellent personal relations with other world leaders and a unique rapport with foreign diplomats.⁵ The role of other leading Tanzanian diplomats must also be acknowledged. Diplomats were

³ The proposal for an East African Federation faltered in 1965, thanks to opposition from Ghana, Kenyan nationalists and Tanzanian minority business interests.

⁴ There were eight different Foreign Ministers during Nyerere's time in office.

⁵ Sir Mervyn Brown interview, British Ambassador to Tanzania, BDOHP.

from a small pool of educated Tanzanians, many of whom already knew each other, which enhanced the network of small foreign service and the limited number of foreign missions in strategic capitals, such as Addis Ababa and Delhi (Bjerk, 2011). Nyerere was ably assisted by a series of key diplomatic appointments to the Organisation of African States (OAU), and its Liberation Committee⁶ based in Dar es Salaam (Yousuf, 1985; Temu & Tembe, 2014), and the Tanzanian representatives in New York and Geneva who proved adept at using structures and committees in the Organisation of the United Nations (UN) to further their government's foreign policy agenda. Salim Ahmed Salim played a particularly influential role as Tanzania's Representative at the UN between 1970 and 1980.⁷ Membership of the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau at the United Nations, which reviewed and facilitated activities between the NAM's committees and working groups, was also very important (Cilliers, 2015). Salim was Chair of the UNGA's Special Committee on Decolonisation (1972-1980), and chair of the UN Security Council Committee on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (1975). Tanzania was also Chair of the Drafting Committee of NAM meetings (1972 Georgetown and Colombo 1976). In the 1970s Tanzania's international prestige as a leading non-aligned state was further enhanced by the regionalism of the Front Line States (FLS), established 1975 and (post 1980) the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Limb, 2018).⁸ In addition to his overseas state visits, the OAU heads meetings and attendance of biennial summits, Nyerere met fellow NAM heads outside Africa every three years to debate and proclaim views on world affairs and the international economic order. The Tanzanian Foreign Ministers met other NAM foreign ministers more regularly, formed a caucus at the UNO, and would meet to discuss common challenges - most notably at the opening of each regular session of the UN General Assembly in

⁶ In 1972, Brigadier Hashim Mbita was appointed Chair of the OAU's Liberation Committee and proved an effective and energetic chair.

⁷ Salim Salim was backed by the NAM and the OAU as a rival candidate for the Secretary Generalship of the UNO in 1980. Despite winning the first round of voting, his candidacy was vetoed by the United States which regarded him as a dangerous radical.

⁸ The FLS was characterized by leading Zambian diplomat Mark Chona to 'a crisis management group': 'if it had not supported the national liberation struggle, we would have ended up like the Palestinians' when Pretoria and Salisbury pushed north.

September each year. Given the relatively small foreign service, and in an age when communications were reliant on the (expensive) telephone, telegram and telex, and international travel was onerous and expensive, this underlined the importance and public theatre of Nyerere's physical presence at the NAM summits or on state visits to fellow NAM capitals. Lacking hard power, like other non-aligned states, Tanzania "tried to achieve its foreign policy aims through symbolic performative actions, such as summitry, (visual) public propaganda geared towards a global media, turning NAM summits into media events". (Miskovic, Fischer-Tine & Boskowska, 2014, p. 207).

Tanzania's unique position in the Non-Aligned Movement

Nyerere exploited the political and ideological space for Tanzania to play a unique role in the Non-Aligned Movement. As a nationalist leader before independence, he had been a vocal critic of white settler rule in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, and apartheid in South Africa (in 1960 he threatened that Tanzania would not join the Commonwealth if the Republic of South Africa continued as a member), and had already proclaimed non-alignment in the Cold War, "refusing to bow to "the scarecrow of communism"". (Bjerk, 2011, pp. 243-244). In late 1961, Nyerere made a symbolic trip to Belgrade as a founder member and host of the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (Matthews, 1987).⁹ Almost immediately after independence, Nyerere "began the long search for more creative policies and institutions than those he had inherited." (Gifford & Louis, 1982, p. 280). Tanzania joined the UN and became an active member of its "Special Committee of Decolonisation" and the Special Committee against Apartheid. Tanzania also joined the Commonwealth with its expanding cohort of former British colonies. Furthermore, the country was a founder member of the Organisation of African States (1963), which espoused ideals of Pan-Africanism, equality, non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states, non-alignment and prosperity (Matthews, 1987). Membership of these organisations was seen as imprimaturs of sovereign independence and equality of status, as well as providing an invaluable matrix of diplomacy, advocacy and information. Like the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement was akin to "a club", where sensitive issues could be debated and thrashed out, or hotly contested, away from the prying eyes and leaks of the UNO (Graham, 1980). The NAM's consensus non-voting style, and lack of a Secretariat, meant that the network of Tanzanian ambassadors, diplomats,

⁹ Six independent African states attended the Belgrade Summit.

officials and their role in the preparatory meetings, and the presence and input of leaders and connectivity in other high-level fora provided the crossover of membership with the OAU and the Commonwealth.¹⁰ Thus, each organisation's particular patterns of meetings, political and personal networks of leaders, ministers and their officials fed into, and provide a platform for the articulation of Tanzania's stance of non-alignment and its advocacy for decolonisation, liberation, international economic transformation, and against imperialism. For the Nyerere government, membership in the NAM was a declaration of the boundaries and limits of the military balance of power, and that this group of sovereign states was not going to be willing participants in the Cold War struggle. (Nyerere, 1970). However, the impoverished state of Tanzania at independence made its pursuit of non-alignment under Nyerere "somewhat improbable". The new government faced a set of acute dilemmas: debilitating poverty and a political economy heavily skewed to primary commodities, an uncertain geopolitical environment, pressing need for international assistance and capital investment from the Western world and business community suspicious of radical socialism, and reliance on foreign administrative and professional skills. Tanzania was heavily dependent on the United Kingdom and Western financial assistance (Mawabukojo, 2019).¹¹ This close and dependent relationship "generated a tension and strain" for many Tanzanians, including Nyerere. Nyerere pursued a vigorous, assertive and credible non-aligned policy by incremental stages, despite his country's relative weakness (Nnoli, 1978). Immediately after independence, he withdrew Tanzania from the Royal East African Navy (on the grounds that continued membership would infringe the country's sovereignty and independence), refused proposed association with the EEC (because of the implied association with the West), and swiftly took a strong and highly public stance in the UN

¹⁰ The former Guyanaian Foreign Minister Shridath Ramphal, who had been a leading figure in the Caribbean group of Non-Aligned states in the early 1970s, was appointed Secretary-General of the Commonwealth in April 1975.

¹¹ In 1961, nearly 75% of the upper ranks of the civil service were British. (Pratt, 1975) In terms of net official developmental assistance, in the mid-1960s foreign aid represented more than 50% of government expenditure, primarily from the UK and the West. After 1967, there was a reduction, but Tanzania never stopped depending on foreign aid to finance government operations. In the 1970s, nearly 60% of the country's developmental budget came from foreign aid. Thus, despite Nyerere's declared agenda of self-sufficiency, Tanzania was a prime case of dependency theory. (Official Developmental Assistance in Tanzania, 1960-2006, using IMF, 2009).

on Southern African issues (Niblock, 1971). Through the astute use of ideological soft power, legitimacy and limited use of force, Nyerere sought to offset his country's post-colonial material deficiencies; indeed, the enactment of sovereign autonomy was "a major diplomatic accomplishment" (Bjerk, 2011, p. 217). In late 1963-1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai's tour of African countries included Tanzania and initiated Chinese medical, technology and economic support.¹² Nyerere also formed a close relationship with Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander and his adviser Olaf Palmer during his visit to Sweden in 1961, founded on their shared views on the decolonisation process in Africa, the role of solidarity and the possible role of Swedish financial and humanitarian support for Tanzania (Sellstrom, 2003). This personal relationship was backed up by strong links between the TANU and the Swedish Social Democrat Party (Sellstrom, 2003).¹³ Non-alignment reached a "high water mark" at the Second Summit in Cairo in 1964. African states constituted nearly 60% of the 47 participants and succeeded in "giving non-alignment an African outlook" (Matthews, 1987). As a loose affiliation of diverse countries, the NAM was valued as a reassertion of independence of power blocs, and as a forum for reiterating an independent view of world affairs. Increasing attention was given to eliminating colonialism and neocolonialism, and the principal concerns of the conference were decolonisation, self-determination and racism. In addition to its leverage as a coordinating lobbying tool in the UN system, the value of the NAM to Tanzania was the association's role as a focus for Third World pressure on economic and developmental issues of acute concern. The parallel work to set up the UNCTAD in 1964 as a quadrennial meeting of economic and development ministers to discuss programmes for LDCs was particularly valued, together with the associated creation of the Group of 77, in the hope that this would promote reconfiguration of the international political economy

¹² This was part of the PRC's drive to be recognised as China's sole representative at the UNO. This did not mean that the subsequent relationship between Beijing and Dar es Salaam was smooth: angered by Chinese recognition of the Boumedienne government, Nyerere rescinded his agreement that China could ship arms through Tanzania to Congolese rebels in 1965.

¹³ In 1966 Tanzania was one of four African countries selected as priority countries for Swedish development aid, and eventually became the principal recipient of Swedish bilateral assistance [20.3bn Kr]. 505 of Sweden's global bilateral aid were directed to southern Africa. Although a one-party state, Tanzania was regarded as democratic, non-aligned and concerned – and Nyerere's opinion carried considerable weight in Stockholm.

and address the structural problems inhibiting development in Tanzania (Williams, 1987). Nyerere was increasingly determined not just to issue declarations or support NAM communiqués, but to be at the vanguard of solutions to complex problems connected to colonialism and imperialism. Tanzania took a public standpoint on the Cold War issues that confronted and often wracked the Non-Aligned Movement: Germany, Indo-China, the Middle East conflict, and nuclear weapons commenting “Chinese nuclear weapons would make the world safer in general”, siding with the radical members of the NAM who were jubilant that the PRC had broken the superpower monopoly on nuclear weapons capability in October 1964 (Luthi, 2016). For Tanzania, non-alignment meant diplomatic freedom of choice and action to craft foreign relations, the autonomy of decision making on international assistance, and latitude to criticise in public foreign governments. This was combined with a determination to enhance and give an “effective voice” to less developed countries and smaller powers.¹⁴ A series of events between 1962 and 1967 demonstrated Tanzania’s lack of voice in international affairs which Nyerere was determined to rectify (Nzomo, 2018). This was in addition to a widely shared belief that a conscious ideology was necessary for governance in the form of a compelling transformatory agenda to win peasant loyalties. His moral and highly public stance on African liberation and associated support for nationalist movements formed part of his broader strategy of mass mobilisation at home and use of moral indignation as a nation-defining value using the diplomatic finesse and tactical prudence (Bjerk, 2011). Nyerere was profoundly disillusioned by the British failure to prevent Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence under white minority rule in November 1965 (Pratt, 1975). Tanzania led a number of radical African states in severing diplomatic relations with the UK in late 1965, although Tanzania did not withdraw from the Commonwealth.¹⁵ Nyerere also rejected a £7.5m loan from the UK - foregoing much needed foreign aid was indeed an extraordinary demonstration of Tanzania’s commitment to the anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle. The government in Dar es Salaam did not restore diplomatic relations

¹⁴ Tanzania also recognized secessionist Biafra in 1968, because of Nyerere’s doubts about the viability of the Nigerian federation as well as his profound concerns about the looming humanitarian disaster.

¹⁵ Nyerere stayed away from the emergency Commonwealth heads’ meeting in Lagos in January 1966 and the subsequent London summit in September 1966. Tanzania’s estrangement from Britain was exacerbated by disputes over the payments of pensions to retired British officials.

with the UK until July 1968 (BDEE, 2004, docs. 254, 275).¹⁶ In a further demonstration of non-aligned principles, Nyerere agreed that the GDR could maintain a quasi-diplomatic mission in Zanzibar (Pratt, 1975); this led to the withdrawal of substantial West German military assistance, whereupon Nyerere requested the withdrawal of all economic aid (US\$4m) and technological assistance (US\$3m). Relations with Washington had also soured. Whereas in 1963 Nyerere's bid for an East African Federation (a political and economic unit of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) had been praised by the US as a positive step for African development, Tanzanian pressure on the US Administration to resolve the problem of Portuguese colonialism in Africa had not achieved results, leading to an escalation of African efforts at the UNO, proposing an embargo against Portugal. Nyerere was also increasingly critical of the Johnson Administration's policy in Vietnam.¹⁷ American intervention in the Congo (Pratt, 1975), and the Tanzanian arrest of two American pilots for their alleged involvement in an attempted coup against Nyerere further soured relations with Washington. The ensuing diplomatic crisis saw both countries withdraw their diplomatic missions. The US and World Bank also refused to consider funding the TaZara railway project, linking Zambia to Dar es Salaam (Song, 2015). Consequently, the Tanzanian government embraced closer ties to Beijing, as well as to the Swedish and Canadian governments (Nugent, 2004). This shift also reflected the Tanzanian leadership's desire to escape perceived continued dependency on foreign aid, which compromised the government's freedom to manoeuvre. At home, Nyerere was deeply troubled that economic development policies followed since independence were failing to deliver the promised improvement in rural living standards (Nyerere, 1966). His philosophical outlook drew on a wide variety of African and European theories

¹⁶ Despite the rupture in diplomatic relations, British diplomats continued to Nyerere as a leader "just as trustworthy with selected secret information as are our Commonwealth colleagues like (Canadian Prime Minister Lester) Pearson, (Australian Prime Minister Harold) Holt and (New Zealand Premier Keith) Holyoake". The British had high regard for Nyerere's intelligence and sincerity ("even if not always agreeable to us") concern to maintain and strengthen the multi-racial Commonwealth, together with respect for his "importance as perhaps the most significant of contemporary African leaders because he may well remain ... Tanzania's president for the next dozen years or more, with increasing influence throughout Africa"; and because of the impact Nyerere's presence had on other African leaders, pushing them to be more engaged and constructive."

¹⁷ At the 1965 Commonwealth conference in London, heads decided to send a Commonwealth peace mission to Vietnam and Washington.

of societal development, developing a unique variant of African socialism in *ujamaa* [family-hood]. This was to be an ideology to unify the nation, to transform rural society and to prevent the emergence of ethnic or religious cleavages; its implication for governance was the integration of rural communities into a modern state, to foster democratic involvement and communal empowerment through an ethos of public service (Nugent, 2009). In the 1967 Arusha Declaration Nyerere set out a political strategy of “self-reliance”, founded on *ujamaa* as a fusion of socialist ideals and traditional African rural community values, embodying Maoist ideas of economic development. Nyerere’s vision of indigenous socialism as a new paradigm of development in Africa attracted a great deal of international attention and controversy (Bjerk, 2010). The model did not depend on foreign capital investment or economic diversification and industrialisation. Nyerere publicly rejected the idea that the Western models of development were appropriate for his country’s conditions; this included rejecting multi-party politics, on the grounds that traditional African political methods favoured consensus. Through the highly astute use of the nationalist card, Nyerere was able to persuade his domestic critics in the TANU of the benefits of socialism, the need for nationalisation of key industries, but reduced the emphasis on industrialisation since this produced “urban bias”. (Nugent, 2009; Bjerk, 2017).¹⁸ Nyerere accelerated the search for foreign links that would support his drive for economic self-reliance, a transition to a socialist society, and its profound commitment to African political liberation and economic emancipation. The construction of the 1000-mile TaZara railway used Chinese investment and labour to circumvent Southern Rhodesia’s stranglehold on Zambian trade (Yu, 1971, pp.1101-1117; Hall, 1969; Meneses and McNamara, 2018, p. 131).¹⁹ The railway finally opened in 1976 but was “plagued by problems” and only carried 20% of the anticipated freight (Mitchell, 2014, p. 55). The British government also paid close attention to Chinese involvement in the construction of a naval base in Tanzania, which together with the increased

¹⁸ While *ujamaa* helped to forge a communal sense of national identity, with the one-party system fostering political stability, Nyerere’s African socialist agenda failed to deliver rural regeneration and increase productivity of state-owned industries and business. Despite his commitment to participatory government and social equality, Nyerere’s efforts to create this unique brand of African socialism led to the creation of the police state, deepening economic problems and social compulsion.

¹⁹ When international oil sanctions were introduced against Rhodesia in December 1965, Zambia lost oil supplies which had previously transited through the

Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and Soviet activity in Aden and Somalia, appeared to be altering the strategic situation (FRUS, 2011, docs. 35, 87). Non-alignment was thus not a single foreign policy, but an attitude towards policy (Brown, 1966). To Nyerere, the choice confronting Tanzania “really amounts to offering to all countries genuine friendship based on equality or becoming reliable allies to certain large power groups and being therefore hostile to others”. Tanzania, therefore, rejected “reliability” in the Cold War international environment. Nyerere firmly believed Tanzania’s non-aligned foreign policy should be based on “an examination of what we do, more than what is said publicly” (Brown, 1966, p. 35). As foreign policy practice, non-alignment was also a political elite project in Tanzania, supported by more militant elements within the ruling party TANU (and as a means of party management), with broad public support for its ideals of anti-colonialism (decolonisation) and anti-imperialism (liberation and African solidarity) within the wider Tanzanian diverse population.²⁰ Thus, the philosophical and ideational appeal of non-alignment for Tanzania should be seen as a fusion of the domestic modernisation project and the determined pursuit of a fundamental recalibration of international relations in the post-colonial era. Nyerere strongly believed that Tanzania had a moral responsibility to assist other liberation movements achieve independence, and this proved a defining feature of his government’s foreign policy. The Non-Aligned Movement certainly provided an important platform and forum for discussion about the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. At Nyerere’s insistence, the OAU’s Liberation Committee (The Committee of Nine) was established in Dar es Salaam, with its remit of

territory; the governments in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka had originally approached the UK, but British officials doubted its economic viability and were deeply pessimistic that it would take years to build. At over \$401m, it was Beijing’s largest foreign and technical assistance programme. This venture was deemed deeply suspicious by South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia: their ALCORA Countries Military Strategy Concept claimed it formed part of a ‘joint plan against Southern Africa, to which Russia and China are committed’ in which infrastructure developments might be used to underpin a conventional conflict. Chinese investment in TaZara was seen as gaining leverage in Tanzania and as a future springboard for penetration into Mozambique, and Botswana, before targeting Rhodesia.

²⁰ Solidarity for other African liberation movements was more decentralized than in other Front Line states, borne out by the interviews carried out by the Hashim Mbita Research Project with army personnel, peasants, workers, intellectuals, educators and journalists who had contacts with exiled freedom fighters and refugees.

support to recognised liberation movements.²¹ This brought the leaders of most militant nationalist groups to Dar es Salaam. The Liberation Committee had a number of key objectives which echoed the agenda of the NAM: in addition to channelling financial and material support to recognised liberation groups, it was responsible for promoting coordination between the militants, as well as publicity. With the breadth of diplomatic representation in Dar es Salaam and the presence of most liberation movements' offices enabling contact between neutral countries, the coastal city became a crossroads of the Cold War and decolonisation movements (Roberts, 2016). The Soviet Union became the country's principal arms supplier, and Nyerere's government enjoyed excellent relations with Moscow. Tanzania's bilateral support for liberation movements was more significant than the OAU's rhetorical support for liberation (Somerville, 2015). All the African liberation movements – MPLA, FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, SWAPO, ANC and PAC – established offices and military camps in Tanzania (Johnson, 2000; SADET 2008; Sllstrom 2002; Sapire & Saunders, 2013; Ellis, 2012, p.84).²² Official sustained support for African liberation was popular in wider Tanzanian society, seen in regular donations of money or gifts in kind (Mazrui & Mhando, 2013), creating a virtuous circle for Tanzanian policy. Nyerere's parallel drive for African unity was made clear in Tanzania's contribution to the drafting of the Lusaka Declaration of 1969 (BDEE, 2004, docs. 277, 280).²³ Tanzania advocated negotiations between liberation movements and white minority governments, yet armed struggle

²¹ The work of the Liberation Committee improved after 1972 with the replacement of George Magombe by Hashim Mbita as Executive Secretary. See Mohamed Omar Maundi on how the membership and strategy of the Liberation Committee changed over time.

²² The historian Stephen Ellis speculated that perhaps 'the wily President Julius Nyerere fearing the Soviet influence that was transmitted via the ANC, wished ... to keep the movement at arm's length. It was probably for that reason that the Tanzanian government had earlier declared [Joe] Slovo to be a prohibited immigrant. 'The same factor ... caused the Tanzanian government to continue supporting the PAC as well as the ANC, so as to play off a Chinese-backed movement against a Soviet-backed one, whilst simultaneously flaunting its own liberation credentials.'

²³ Nyerere was equally determined to put a non-aligned stamp on the Commonwealth with his joint drafted Declaration submitted before the Commonwealth heads' meeting in Singapore in January 1971. This Declaration echoed the Lusaka Manifesto with its affirmation of international peace and order; individual liberty and equality, the need for social justice.

appeared inevitable given the intransigence of their opponents. As Nyerere pointed out, “they could hardly fight colonial armies – well-equipped by certain Western states – with bows and arrows. The Western countries simply gave them no option.” (Sellstrom, 2002, p. 137). The Declaration was later endorsed by the UNO and the OAU. The US State Department fundamentally misunderstood the motives behind Tanzania’s policies, believing these reflected “fear and suspicion deeply rooted in their colonial experience that southern African whites represent a genuine danger to their security; frustration over intractable internal political and economic problems; and deep concern about forces at work in the region which they are unable to control.” (FRUS, 2011, doc. 89)

The Non-Alignment Movement as an equal factor of World Affairs

Tanzania played a pivotal role in the NAM in the 1970s along with Yugoslavia, Algeria, Egypt and India. For Nyerere, non-alignment was not and had never been a question of neutrality. “Non-alignment is a policy of involvement in world affairs”. With this firmly in mind, Tanzania was one of the states working expressly to revitalise the NAM and inject new content into the organisation (Kochan, 1972). Together with Zambia, Tanzania was a driving force in the run-up to the Lusaka NAM meeting in 1970 to establish better methods of engagement and institutional machinery. This highlighted the frustrations and limitations of the NAM states in world politics, underpinned by the appreciation that the widening economic gap between North and South and acute frustration that the UNCTAD discussions were stalling (Kochan, 1972). The NAM states still saw their organisation as valuable – indeed indispensable – despite superpower detente: by the beginning of the 1970s, the UN resolutions on Namibia and apartheid South Africa were ignored by Pretoria, Portugal seemed firmly ensconced in its African colonies, and appeals for Western implementation of effective universal sanctions against Rhodesia were being ignored. Similarly, American military aggression in Vietnam was escalating. In his address to the preparatory meeting of the Non-Aligned countries in Dar es Salaam in February 1970, Nyerere acknowledged the forthcoming NAM conference was facing a more difficult task and a more challenging international climate than earlier summits. Further changes within and between the two blocs, and developments in the PRC, meant the Cold War was “less simple” with the emergence of a three-sided power game. “Those wishing to stand outside it have further complications to contend with.” (Nyerere, NAM Preparatory Meeting 1970). To Nyerere, the real and most urgent threat to the

independence of non-aligned states came from the economic power of big states, not the threat of military power or possible invasion; yet the need for injections of foreign capital was also fraught with difficulty since international assistance and developmental money was neither neutral nor unconditional. He, therefore, recommended avoiding, as far as possible, becoming dependent on any single big power - there lay "the great threat to freedom and non-alignment". Counteracting this required collaboration and cooperation for mutual benefit. In his powerful plea for South-South cooperation, Nyerere urged that the Lusaka meeting address specifically the question of how to strengthen non-alignment by effective economic cooperation and economic self-reliance. "It does not demand an economic strength which we do not have. It requires only a political consciousness and a political will." (Nyerere, 1970). His address summarised his outlook of the need to challenge international racial hierarchies and arguments for alternative visions of international relations, with the reconfiguration of regional economic federations in an egalitarian post-imperial world. Besides, apartheid and decolonisation, "fundamental African concerns were given topmost priority" at the Lusaka Summit, including greater and more efficient aid to liberation movements through the OAU (Matthews, 1987). It was also agreed at the Lusaka meeting that the NAM should have "a machinery of a flexible character which at the same time having no financial implications" (Kochan, p. 505). Along with other members attending the three-day conference, Tanzania reaffirmed its commitment to assist international efforts at disarmament; to combat colonialism, imperialism, and pledging their moral and material support for liberation movements, as well as to intensify efforts to achieve major structural change in the world economy (NAM, Final Document, Lusaka Declaration, September 1970). The influence of Nyerere and Tanzanian diplomats on the final Declaration's sections on NAM and Economic progress is evident, with the rhetoric of "cultivating the spirit of self-reliance", "ensuring that the external components of the Developmental progress further national objectives, and 'broaden[ing] and diversify[ing] economic relationships with other nations so as to promote true interdependence", as well as the elaboration of a specific Programme of Action, leading to a period of intense activity. The Lusaka meeting established a 16-member Standing Committee and agreed that the NAM Foreign Ministers would meet before the annual General Assembly to coordinate their positions. It was also hoped that there would be an annual meeting of Heads of State. However, opinion was deeply divided within the NAM on the merits of establishing a permanent Secretariat. Two other questions generated considerable controversy - the representation of the Cambodian government

and the admission of the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam. Tanzania joined a 5-member subcommittee to investigate the complex Cambodian situation and tasked to report back to heads (Singham & Hune, 1986). Supported by Tanzanian diplomats, Nyerere continued his efforts to revitalise the NAM structures and focus. In the summer of 1971, the Standing Committee of 16 NAM states was set up at Lusaka expressly to prepare for the next summit; this committee held a series of meetings in New York culminating in the Foreign Ministers' regular ministerial meeting at the UNGA in September. This was followed by preparatory meetings for the forthcoming summit in Georgetown (February) and Kuala Lumpur (May) 1972. As the governments in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka agreed, the NAM "was meaningless unless its members assumed a more active role in world affairs".²⁴ "They hold that the concerted action of the non-aligned countries should be directed towards the following objectives: first that they should challenge the developed nations who, in their opinion, are in possession of the world's wealth to the detriment of the less developed countries; second, that they should try to alter a situation in which the super-powers appear to monopolise decision making on all vital issues, both countries demanding (...), redistribution of representation in all UN organs and a more formal structure for the non-aligned movement; third, that greater emphasis should be placed on economic cooperation between Third World countries themselves, in order to reduce their present dependence on either West or East" (Kochan, p. 503). Although the NAM Foreign Ministers in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972 was held against a backdrop of relative international calm, there were furious debates over the decision to admit the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and recognition of the Sihanouk government in exile as the legitimate government of Cambodia (The NAM decision provoked acute displeasure in Washington.). The meeting also adopted an Action Programme for Economic Cooperation. In a series of resolutions, the meeting called for peace in the Middle East conflict, and Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, as well as decolonisation of Zimbabwe, Puerto Rico and Western Sahara.

Inconsistencies within the Non-Aligned Movement

Disagreements within the Non-aligned Movement reached a high point at the Algiers meeting in 1973, with the defeat of the moderates who argued

²⁴ Dodoma became the capital of Tanzania in 1974.

there should be criticism of both Western and Soviet imperialism. Tanzania was firmly in the radical camp and aligned with the G-77's demands for the New International Economic Order in the UN framework; the economic work of the non-aligned South focussed on the UNCTAD framework, with the political agenda directed through the NAM process. These converged with the call for a New International Economic Order at the summit (Alden, et al, 2010). The oil crisis and the realisation that developmental efforts had failed to bridge the widening gap between G-77 developing economies and industrialised countries obliged the conference to devote substantial attention to economic issues (Matthews, 1987, p. 46).²⁵ "Leaders of the NAM requested a special session of the UNGA to address issues associated with international trade in raw materials." Thanks to the G-77 Group, the Declaration and Programme of Action for the NIEO was adopted under UNGA Resolution 3201 in 1974. Tanzania played an active role in lobbying for the NIEO and North-South dialogue, firmly convinced that the presence of the NAM at the UN "played a key role in pursuing the agenda of developing countries and raising press and public attention of the challenges and injustices they faced" (Cilliers, 2015). However, the alternative proposed by Nyerere and other Third World leaders for the formation of a South-South "Trade Union of the Poor" failed to gain traction (Nzomo, 2018). The decision to establish a NAM News Agency Pool was a reflection of members' support for the New International Information Order, a parallel demonstration against the Western hegemonic influence over the media landscape. As the 1970s progressed and as the organisation itself grew to 86 member states (comprising two-thirds of the UN membership), the NAM debates and optimism about NEIO were increasingly frustrated. The 1976 Colombo NAM Summit took place against the backdrop of the international crisis, and issues on which Tanzania had taken a public stance: firstly, the South African intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and forced withdrawal. Although Nyerere was "a firm opponent of widening the conflict in Angola and of Soviet active involvement", he believed "that the South African intervention made external support for the MPLA necessary, although he expected it to come from African countries" (Filatova, 2013, p. 272; Kissinger, 1999). Deng also told President Ford on his visit to Beijing in December 1975 that Tanzania

²⁵ Most of the statements and resolutions of the Tenth OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in May 1973 'found their way into the resolutions and declarations of the Algiers summit.'

was refusing to allow Chinese shipments of arms to UNITA to pass through its territory because of South Africa's involvement (Shubin, 2006). In December 1975, Nyerere proposed to Washington that if "the US ceased support to FNLA/UNITA, restrained Mobutu from further intervention in Angola and applied public pressure on South Africans to withdraw back across their border, Tanzania, Zambia and other African governments could induce Neto simultaneously to refuse further Soviet assistance and expel Cuban and other foreign helpers." (FRUS, 2011, doc. 156). The Americans were sceptical and felt that the proposal (which they believed to have been heavily influenced by China) was too late. Secondly, the latter part of the 1970s saw repeated rounds of negotiations to resolve the long-running Rhodesia crisis, and intensification of the liberation war; domestic violence and oppression in South Africa, and continued stalemate in negotiations over South West Africa/Namibia's future (Wood, 2012; Kweke, 2015). Tanzania had consistently called for other African states to help generate new momentum for negotiations, urging leaders to pressure the foreign power with which they had particular links for the enforcement of sanctions and to increase support for liberation movements. As the Chairman of the Front Line States, Nyerere held a particularly influential position. Tanzania had been consistently at odds with the US Administration until 1976 when the Kissinger Initiative obliged Washington to pay greater attention to the country and court Dar es Salaam (Kissinger, 1999; Mitchell, 2014). Nyerere hoped to use Kissinger's agreement to attend the UNCTAD IV meeting in Nairobi in May 1976 to achieve a breakthrough in international economic collaboration. However, this conference proved a bitter disappointment to African developing countries. Nyerere was a vital diplomatic player in the Anglo-American initiative crafted between the British government and the Carter Administration to resolve the long-running Rhodesia UDI crisis (Mitchell, 2014). Although the Tanzanian government was deeply sceptical about Carter's efforts, it was recognised that Washington had an important role to play; "we need the United States (...), to make sure the British did Right in Zimbabwe" (Mitchell, 2014, p. 146).²⁶ For their part, the British knew that they had to get Nyerere's support on any proposals (Roberts, 2014;

²⁶ Nyerere was scathing about Rhodesia and South Africa's self-justificatory declarations that they were fighting communism in Southern Africa, warning American Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, 'If you want to fight communism in Africa, don't pick South Africa as your ally.'

Somerville, 2015).²⁷ Between the NAM leaders' meetings in Colombo (1976) and Havana (1979), negotiations and events in Southern Africa accelerated, with Nyerere and Tanzania at the forefront. The assembly of 17 African leaders in Zanzibar in February 1977 reflected Nyerere's convening power, all of whom met Ambassador Andrew Young on his African tour of Tanzania and Nigeria. Tanzania was less concerned than President Kaunda at the possible expansion of the Soviet and Cuban presence in sub-Saharan Africa. In March 1977, Fidel Castro visited Tanzania having toured Cuban troops in Angola on his way to Mozambique. "Cementing relations with southern African states" was swiftly followed by a large Soviet delegation led by Nikolai Podgorny (chair of the Soviet Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). Nyerere visited Washington in August 1977 – the first head of state from sub-Saharan Africa to visit the US since Carter's inauguration. The Americans hoped to persuade Nyerere to back the US version of "maintenance of law and order" in the transition period in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Nyerere was resolute and focussed in his discussions with the Americans: "One [army] will have to go, and that is Smith's army." "The army is key! Which of the two armies is to be the base army? This is a serious question... The Zimbabwean army must be the base army." (Mitchell, 2014, p. 311). Nyerere was consistent in his attempts to encourage unity and collaboration between the rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements, as well as Tanzania's and the OAU Liberation committee's efforts to persuade PAC to reconcile and unite with the ANC (early 1978). At the NAM meeting in Havana in September 1979, together with President Machel of Mozambique and Kaunda, Nyerere was forthright in discussion with the Patriotic Front that they should attend the London all-party conference on the future of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. ZANU's political leader Robert Mugabe was determined to continue the revolutionary war and was lobbying for a resolution from militant NAM states which would repudiate the Lusaka agreement. Nyerere and Machel sternly informed Mugabe that if he refused to go to London and explore the constitutional path, they

²⁷ Notwithstanding Tanzania's trenchant criticism of British policy towards Rhodesia, the Nyerere government did make private soundings of the British Embassy in mid-1978 to explore whether Britain might be prepared to intervene in neighbouring Uganda to overthrow the homicidal regime of Idi Amin. When the British declined, pointing out that if they were to do so, the Tanzanians would be the first and loudest in voicing objections, 40000 Tanzanian troops and Ugandan exiles invaded the country in January 1979, in violation of the OAU Charter (Sir Mervyn Brown interview, BDOHP).

would effectively close down the liberation war (Charlton, 1990). The final NAM declaration condemned the continued military, diplomatic, technological, economic support and other forms of aid "that imperialism gave the racist regimes", the alliance between the Zionist regime and racist regimes in Southern Africa, and called on states to increase their efforts to counter this danger". Just as he was publicly dedicated to the cause of African liberation, Nyerere was similarly consistently principled on the entitlement of the Palestinians to political representation and land. Before 1967 Tanzania had enjoyed a good relationship with Israel, which had provided a sizeable technological assistance programme. After the 1967 war, Nyerere switched support to Nasser. Like other African states who could not countenance Israel's occupation of Arab territory set against their own struggles against colonialism, Nyerere embodied the shift in thinking in the UN with his call for Israeli withdrawal and advocated peace based on mutual recognition. At the height of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, he closed the Israeli embassy in Dar es Salaam and authorised the establishment of a Palestinian diplomatic mission in the Tanzanian capital the following year. At the Havana meeting, Nyerere also strongly resisted the attempt by some Arab countries to eject Egypt from the NAM because of the Sadat government's peace deal with Israel, although Nyerere regarded the Camp David Agreements as "an American supported offensive" (The highly divisive issue split the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau which was unable to report on the issue (Rajan, 1982). His logic was Egypt was a member of the OAU and thus could not be expelled from the NAM - unity was paramount, despite profound differences of policy and outlook. (Nyerere, 2010). For Nyerere, unity was not merely a political slogan; it was a central pillar of his belief system and a domestic and international strategic imperative. In Havana, he declared "the Non-Aligned conference is not an organisation of neutrals bound in some kind of neutrality in international arguments. On the contrary, we have positive policy commitments of our own. First, we are a group of States committed to fighting against imperialism in all its forms. The non-aligned states are, by definition, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, and we are committed to the struggle against those forces" (Nyerere, 1979). The bitter experience of the UNCTAD IV reinforced Tanzania and other developing countries' preoccupation with economic matters and the NIEO, demonstrated at the non-aligned summits in Havana, Colombo and New Delhi. Strains had already emerged in the NAM with Cuba's claim that non-alignment could be equated with support for the Soviet Union. The choice of Havana as host for the Sixth Summit, and consequently Cuba's chairmanship for the next

three years, symbolised a dramatic shift to the left in the NAM's centre of gravity (LeoGrande, 1980), and the clearest manifestation of the NAM's anti-imperialist agenda (Matthew, 1987). The increase in membership further strained the practice of decision-making by consensus. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the NAM countries at the UN voted 56-9 to condemn the Soviet action, with 26 abstaining (Rajan, 1982). This vote in the UN General Assembly reflected the deep split in the movement (Afghanistan is a member of the NAM). At the subsequent NAM Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi, there were heated debates on a number of highly contentious issues: the Kampuchea question, Afghanistan, Egyptian membership, and the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone. Tanzania joined the four-member special Committee to prepare a final draft that reflected a consensus on the highly contentious issue of whether or not to mention the withdrawal of foreign troops. After intensive discussions, the position was reached, calling for a political settlement "on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops" and full respect for the territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan (Rajan, 1982).

Efforts to establish a New Economic Order and limit the Arms Race

Although multilateral negotiations around a New International Economic Order (NIEO) stalled in the Cancun meeting in 1981, the New Delhi NAM Foreign Ministers conference "served the main objective of the majority of members of the non-aligned movement of pulling it back into a more balanced and "equidistant" position between the two Cold War blocs" after the Havana Summit. (Rajan, 1982) Increasingly beset by economic problems at home and the failure of *ujamaa*, Nyerere was still committed to the NAM as the advocate of a new global political and economic order. At the outset of the decade, he was very optimistic about the prospects for Namibian independence and felt that apartheid South Africa was on the defensive. However, as Pretoria launched its counterinsurgency strategy, paralleled by the 1983 constitution granting a degree of broader racial representation and an accompanying diplomatic offensive, South Africa went "on the attack" against the FLS. Nyerere firmly believed that the Reagan Administration was backing Pretoria and was "jubilant" (Nyerere, 2010, p.10). There were modest advances: the NIEO stalemate led to a mini-NIEO between Nordic countries and the nine members of the new organisation the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC), of which Tanzania was a member. SADCC's declared purpose

was the fostering of regional economic cooperation and reliance against South Africa's economic and political domination of the Southern African region. The 1983 NAM meeting in New Delhi devoted considerable attention to the deteriorating economic situation in many developing countries and noted that the levers of power in the world economic system remained firmly in the hands of a few developed nations. There were renewed calls for a new international economic order through global negotiations, and the NAM members reaffirmed their solidarity and support for liberation struggles (Shaw, 1989). Nyerere also introduced a disarmament initiative in the NAM, supported by three other NAM countries (Argentina, Mexico, India). The Six Nations Initiative, founded in 1984, made an appeal at the UN and lobbied for disarmament together with Sweden and Greece. This appeal called for "the nuclear powers to cease all work on, to cease the production and dissemination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery". Founded at a time of stalemate in the US/Soviet disarmament discussions on nuclear arms and conventional force reductions, it was unanimously approved by the NAM in the Final Declaration adopted at the Luanda meeting in 1984. This led to an Indian initiative drawing together the six heads in Delhi in January 1985, who issued a Declaration called on all countries to adopt a resolute measure to end the arms race, to prevent it being expanded into space, and to conclude a treaty totally banning nuclear testing (Allison & Roy, p.103). In addition to Nyerere's work to try to coordinate a united front against South Africa in the early 1980s, Tanzanian diplomats were also active in the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned countries meeting in New York and subsequent convening of an extraordinary Ministerial meeting of the Bureau of Non-Aligned countries in New Delhi (April 1985). This was part of continuing work against the backdrop of South Africa's refusal to implement UNSC Resolution 435, to consider ways and means by which the Non-Aligned Countries could further intensify its solidarity with and assistance to [the Namibian freedom struggle. Meanwhile, Nyerere's vision of fundamental restructuring of the international economic system was dimming. The decade saw the rise of neoliberalism and faith in the "rational market", and associated termination of international assistance supporting African governments' drive to nationalisation, diversification and economic protectionism. Nyerere was not alone in his profound suspicions that this was a Western conspiracy to force African governments to abandon socialistic policies. These deprived sovereign governments of their independent power of decision making: The [IMF] has an ideology of economic and social development which it is trying to impose on small

countries irrespective of our own clearly stated policies. (McMahon, 2014, p.114). Although he resisted this counter-revolution in economic and developmental thinking, the acute economic crisis in Tanzania confronted the Tanzanian government with unpalatable but irresistible pressures (Southall, 2006): after Nyerere stepped down from power in 1985, the Tanzanian government accepted IMF strictures and fundamentally transformed the country's political economy (Holtom, 2005). The 8th Summit of the NAM was held in Harare in 1986, and crucial African issues dominated the speeches, resolutions and declarations: apartheid, the situation in Southern Africa, the critical economic situation. Although the international intellectual tide had moved inexorably against the NIEO, the new NAM chair, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, "put all the focus on sanctions against South Africa", which had long been one of Nyerere's key policies (Matthews, 1987, p. 47).²⁸

Conclusions

Tanzania's membership and activities in the Non-Aligned Movement was part of the Nyerere government's assiduous development of its position in a matrix of multi-lateral organisations and international institutions underpinned by personal networks of Tanzania's small foreign policy elite, and the growing reputation and standing of Nyerere and key highly capable officials. These were mutually reinforcing networks, providing platforms for public advocacy and private access. Thanks to Nyerere's activist foreign policy, Tanzania was "at the centre of the Third World struggle for the NIEO through the forums of the UN, the NAM, the Group of 77, the UNCTAD [and] the North-South dialogue" (Matthews, 1987, p. 49). Nyerere subscribed to the Non-Aligned Movement as a rejection of marginalisation in the international corridors of power, and a determination to enhance multilateral collaboration and pressure to address the economic structural inequalities of the mid-late 20th century. Non-alignment offered a multi-dimensional boost to Tanzania's soft power: domestically, to underpin the appeal of national independence, territorial integrity, and struggle against colonialism and imperialism; as a symbol of Third World unity, and the

²⁸ 'In addition to proposing a Non-Aligned "Solidarity" Fund for Southern African Liberation Movements, there was also discrete canvassing for a Southern African Defense Force which, at the disposal of Zambia and Zimbabwe particularly would provide the muscle to resist South African invasions.'

organisational manifestation of solidarity. With its emphasis on detente, disarmament, development, and determination that the countries of the global south would shape their own futures, Nyerere focussed on strengthening South-South cooperation and leverage in international affairs, “to have an effective voice (...)”. “Together we can reduce our separate weaknesses”. For the Tanzanian leader and his country, non-alignment was a global manifestation of demanded political, racial and social rights to equality, dignity and respect from former colonial powers which had sought to shape the world in their own image. Tanzania’s visibility in the NAM diminished in the 1990s, as a product of the changed international environment of the 1990s, the size of the organisation and its diverse membership which militated against swift coordinated action. Furthermore, after the departure of Nyerere from office in 1985, Tanzania was not as active in discussions and debates in the UNO.²⁹ The international visibility of the NAM was eclipsed with the dominance of the Washington Consensus and unipolar world, although now former President Nyerere continued to hold a prestigious position as chair of the South Commission, which was established to promote the case for fairer terms on international trade. The NAM also redefined itself, shifting its emphasis to multilateralism, equality and mutual non-aggression. There was renewed energy, focus and advocacy against imperialism and the needs of the Global South with the advent of the Millennium Goals and the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. With this realignment of the declared goals against foreign occupation, came a re-emphasis on absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs, the need to address the disadvantages of globalization and asymmetry in the international political economy and developmental needs of its members. However, unlike the 1970s, the NAM failed to establish a vigorous non-aligned coalition – the result of its growing size, and the death and loss of office of inspirational champions and charismatic trendsetters, such as Julius Nyerere.

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²⁹ The Commission’s Report was published in 1990.

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THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA OVER SIXTY YEARS

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Abstract: For much of the first 30 years of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)'s existence, the period of the Cold War, no part of what was then called the Third World featured larger on the NAM agenda than Southern Africa. This was because of the continuation of colonial rule and the system of formalised racial oppression known as apartheid, which was applied both in South Africa itself and in the country it occupied, Namibia. The NAM gave strong support to the main Namibian liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organisation, which was given full membership in 1978. South Africa's African National Congress gained observer status, and the NAM routinely condemned apartheid and called for international action against it. The NAM played only a minor role in the end of apartheid, but after South Africa became a full member in 1994, it was very active in the NAM for a time. Its involvement declined after 2006, as its priorities shifted elsewhere.

Key words: Apartheid, South Africa, Namibia, Non-Aligned Movement, African National Congress, South West Africa People's Organisation

The Non-Aligned Movement, Namibia and South Africa over Sixty Years

For much of the first 30 years of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)'s existence, the period of the Cold War, no part of what was then called the Third World featured larger on the NAM agenda than Southern Africa. This was because of the continuation of colonial rule and the system of formalised racial oppression known as apartheid. The NAM routinely called for the

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end of colonial rule and apartheid and denounced South Africa both for its notorious racial policies, which buttressed a white minority in power, and for its continued occupation of the neighbouring territory that South Africa called South – West Africa. From the late 1960s, following the usage of the country’s main liberation movement, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), the NAM knew the territory as Namibia.² In 1978, SWAPO was accorded full membership in the NAM, which was a status the main South African liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, did not achieve in the decades of struggle against apartheid. With the end of the Cold War came the independence of Namibia. The end of apartheid in South Africa followed soon after that. Under majority rule, the new South Africa became a full member of the NAM. With the ANC in power wishing to burnish its credentials in the Global South, South Africa played a major role in the NAM in the late 1990s. Though South Africa continued to be an active member in the early 2000s, South Africa’s priorities shifted elsewhere long before 2021.

Southern African leaders were active in the NAM from the establishment of the organisation. Two South African anti-apartheid activists, Molvi Ismail Cachalia of the South African Indian Congress and Moses Kotane of the South African Communist Party and the ANC travelled to Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 despite the apartheid regime denying them passports to travel. There they attended, as observers, the first Asian-African conference, which they saw as an opportunity to help internationalise the struggle against apartheid and to lobby support for that struggle among the countries in Asia and Africa then emerging from colonial rule. The Memorandum against Apartheid they presented to the assembled delegates received little attention (Lee, 2010). Six years later, the leader of the ANC in exile, Oliver Tambo, who was later to be its president, attended the inaugural meeting of the NAM in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, as an observer. Tambo, who had fled South Africa in March 1960, represented in Belgrade a short-lived United Front in which the ANC then participated, which brought together a number of liberation movements, including the South West African National Union (SWANU) (Thomas, 1996, p. 96). Another attendee at the Belgrade meeting was the founding president of SWANU’s rival, SWAPO, Sam Nujoma. He had also gone into exile in early 1960 and

² Fortuitously, the organisation and the territory came to share the same abbreviation, ‘Nam’, once ‘Namibia’ came into common parlance as the name for the country in the late 1960s.

had visited Belgrade in March 1961, where Josip Broz Tito promised him support. Nujoma then returned to the Yugoslav capital in September of that year to attend the first NAM conference (Nujoma, 2001, 114-115, 119). He had a different agenda from Tambo, for SWAPO was a nationalist movement, and Nujoma's aim was to rally international support for the campaign for an independent Namibia free of South African rule. Though South Africa applied similar apartheid policies in both South Africa itself and occupied Namibia, SWAPO always saw its struggle as separate from that against apartheid. From the NAM's inception, most of its members were countries that had recently emerged from colonialism and become members of the United Nations (UN). They were strong supporters of the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles in Southern Africa. As a body of countries that saw themselves as outside the bipolar world of Cold War rivalry, the NAM hoped to play a special role in promoting the interests of the Global South at the UN. Among the NAM's major concerns were Namibia and South Africa. Let us consider them in turn.

Namibia

Of all the territories that were in the 1960s still under forms of colonial rule – and in South Africa, under white minority rule, the black majority lived under a form of colonial rule – Namibia had a unique status, as the only territory for which the UN, as the successor to the League of Nations, claimed a “special responsibility” because Namibia had been a mandate territory under the League. For more than two decades the NAM paid special attention to the Namibian issue. While the campaign for Namibian independence cannot be divorced from, and was often seen as part of the campaign to end apartheid in South Africa, the Namibians in the liberation movement insisted that their territory was not part of South Africa and therefore that their concerns should not be subsumed in a broader struggle against white minority rule and apartheid. The NAM sought to advance the goal of Namibian independence and advance the legitimacy of SWAPO in the international community.

Nujoma attended all the three-yearly NAM summits of heads of state and governments throughout the almost three decades he spent in exile. Following the ANC, SWAPO took up arms to achieve its ends, and the second NAM summit accepted the right of people to take up arms in support of self-determination and independence (Saxena, 1989). In the 1970s, the NAM played a key role in internationalising the Namibian issue,

bringing it before both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council and generally supporting SWAPO in its diplomatic campaigns (Saunders, 2016; Karase, 1987; Džuverović, 1989). After the advisory decision of the International Court of Justice in 1971 that South Africa's rule of Namibia was illegal, and that South Africa should withdraw from the territory, the NAM lobbied the UN Security Council to take up the Namibian issue. In 1972, SWAPO was invited to attend a meeting of NAM foreign ministers in Georgetown, Guyana. The following year, as the NAM was becoming more institutionalised, the liberation movement was granted formal observer status (Singham and Hune, 1986, 76; Dinkel, 2018). From then on, SWAPO worked closely with both the NAM's main executive body, the Co-ordinating Bureau, which was usually made up of the ambassadors of the non-aligned countries that were members of the UN, and the much smaller NAM caucus, comprising those members of NAM who had been elected to the Security Council as non-permanent members. Before they were taken to the General Assembly or the Security Council, draft resolutions were approved by the Co-ordinating Bureau on which SWAPO served. While the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the first international body to recognise SWAPO as "the authentic representative of the Namibian people", a formulation the NAM accepted at its fourth summit in Algiers in 1973. This was a tribute to SWAPO's more active diplomacy than SWANU's and because alone among the Namibian liberation movements SWAPO had begun an armed struggle (Nujoma, 2001). The NAM successfully pushed for such recognition of SWAPO to be included in a resolution of the UN General Assembly later that year (UNGA Resolution 3111; Dobell, 1998, 42).³ The Western powers, led by the US, would not support this, but could not prevent the Namibian issue from coming before the Security Council, where the Soviet Union strongly backed the NAM's position on Namibia. From 1977 the Western powers on the Council took the lead in trying to negotiate a settlement of the Namibian issue, side-lining the NAM. In response, the NAM in October 1978, at an extraordinary meeting of its ministers in New York, accorded SWAPO full membership of the organisation. The NAM ignored a crisis in SWAPO that led to a break-away of those who founded SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D), and its ongoing support for SWAPO helped the liberation movement gain access to other international organisations (Singham and Hune, 1986, 27; Katjavivi, 1986, 339). In September 1979, Cuba became the NAM chair at a summit held in Havana

³ In 1976 this became "sole and authentic".

and sought to take the NAM in a more radical and activist direction. This was strongly backed by both SWAPO and the ANC. Then the “new Cold War” of the early 1980s gave the NAM scope to play a more active role in support of Namibian independence. In February 1981, the NAM foreign ministers, meeting in New Delhi, accused South Africa of duplicity for giving the impression of wanting Namibian independence but subverting the process that would lead to genuine independence (Džuverović, 1989). The NAM rejected the idea, introduced by the US, of linking the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban military force in Angola, and accused the US of attempting “to hijack the Namibian issue outside of the UN system” (Davies, 2007; Singham and Hune, 1986, p. 6).⁴ The NAM redoubled its efforts to exert pressure for an UN-led process to independence for Namibia to be implemented, accepting that this was the most likely way to achieve that goal. While the US and UK governments refused to deal with SWAPO, the NAM sought to advance SWAPO’s claim to be a virtual government-in-waiting.⁵ At the seventh NAM summit, held in New Delhi in March 1983 when it seemed that South Africa was about to install a client government in Namibia, Namibia was the main issue discussed. Linkage and “constructive engagement” with South Africa were roundly condemned, comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa demanded, and a call made that the Namibian issue be returned to the UN Security Council (Gorbunov, 1988).⁶ At the end of the conference, the member states issued a declaration mandating the chairman of the Co-ordinating Bureau to convey to the UN Secretary-General the NAM’s “deep concern” at “the continuing failure to bring about the independence of Namibia and the latest attempts by Pretoria to create a fait accompli” (Non-Aligned Conference, 1983). This message was reiterated when, after a series of attempts in 1984 to bring about a settlement failed, the NAM ministers met in Luanda, Angola, in 1985, and again when a NAM summit was held in Southern Africa for the second time, in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986 (Mandaza, 1986, p. 66). There too, Namibia was one of

⁴ The aim of the West, they say, was to make Namibia “a pro-Western dependent state”.

⁵ This was in the context of continuing South African attempts to demonise SWAPO. An example of this was the way it engineered hearings in the US Senate in 1982 that sought to establish SWAPO as a terrorist organisation.

⁶ The extraordinary meeting of the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau held in April 1985 was entirely devoted to Namibia.

the leading items on the agenda. That summit condemned the recently installed Transitional Government of National Unity in Namibia while praising SWAPO for stepping up its armed struggle. It was the winding down of the Cold War, in which the NAM played little role, together with events on the battlefield in southern Angola, that led to the agreement in December 1988 to proceed with the UN plan for a transition to independence in Namibia. In early 1989 the major powers proposed cutting back on the size of the UN mission to be sent to Namibia, and the NAM led the opposition to this, fearing it would embolden the South African government to try to manipulate the election to be held under UN auspices. After much discussion by the NAM's Co-ordinating Bureau concerning the Security Council resolutions on the implementation process of the UN settlement plan for Namibia, the Western permanent members of the Security Council reached an agreement with the three leading countries on the Co-ordinating Bureau, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe and Zambia, that the UN mission would be cut, but that additional personnel would be held in reserve (Tsokodayi, 2011, p. 620; Thornberry, 2004, pp. 38-40).⁷ The ninth NAM summit, held in Belgrade in September 1989, regretted this compromise, saying it prejudiced the ability of the UN to carry out its mandate to ensure independence through a free and fair election, but the NAM's demand that the reserves be deployed in Namibia got nowhere. The Belgrade NAM Summit claimed that the tragic events of early April 1989, when SWAPO fighters entered Namibia and were killed in large numbers by South African forces, would not have happened had the UN mission been deployed as it should have been, and it condemned the UN for allowing South African forces to act against the SWAPO fighters (Saxena, 1989, pp. 206-207).⁸ Later that year the NAM helped secure the disbandment of South Africa's paramilitary force in northern Namibia. The NAM continued to monitor the process leading to Namibia's first democratic election in November 1989, trying to ensure a free and fair election. After SWAPO won the election, Nujoma, in his inaugural speech as the first President of independent Namibia, did not single out the NAM but

⁷ Tsokodayi, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe to the United Nations in 1988- 89, was the Deputy Chairman of NAM's Co-ordinating Bureau. As his superior was often away from New York, he acted for the Bureau in the key international negotiations and decision-making process.

⁸ The controversy about 1 April turned partly on an interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of August 1988 and whether SWAPO had committed itself to observe it.

expressed the “most sincere gratitude to the international community for its steadfast support”. Though Nujoma attended the first NAM summit after Namibian independence in September 1992, his relatively small and under-resourced country did not, unlike South Africa, play a leading role in the NAM after independence (Speeches of the President of the Republic of Namibia, 1990).⁹

South Africa

After the initial Belgrade Summit, the ANC regularly attended summits of the NAM, but never acquired the same status as SWAPO because the NAM would only accept what the OAU had approved, and the OAU recognised both the ANC and its breakaway rival, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The ANC and PAC vied for international support, and though the ANC won the vast bulk of that support and attended the NAM conferences more frequently than the PAC, it never won recognition as South Africa’s only liberation movement. The rise of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa in the 1970s added to the reluctance of the OAU and the NAM to accord exclusive recognition to the ANC. As a result, the NAM spoke of South Africa’s liberation movements without mentioning any by name, until the final Declaration of the New Delhi Summit congratulated the ANC on Umkhonto weSizwe’s “spectacular victories in South Africa’s townships” (Thomas, 1996, pp.106-110). Though Tambo and other ANC officials were asked to address summit meetings, the ANC could not, as an observer, participate in discussions, and in the ANC there was some resentment at SWAPO’s success in attracting so much attention in the NAM. While the ANC was able to lobby at summits and influence debates, the NAM was less important for the ANC in exile than it was for SWAPO. While the ANC was grateful for the rhetorical support the NAM gave, it was often disappointed that the NAM did not go further. At the inaugural Belgrade meeting, the Sharpeville massacre was not mentioned in the final Declaration, while the Lusaka Declaration of 1970 made no specific reference to the armed struggle. While the Algiers Summit in 1973 did give strong support to that struggle in its Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in South Africa, the Solidarity Funds the NAM established

⁹ In 2013, Nujoma did call for a strengthening of the NAM “to withstand the onslaught of foreign forces”.

disbursed relatively little compared to the financial assistance the ANC and PAC obtained from, say, the UN or the government of Sweden (Thomas, 1996, pp.101-102; Singham and Hune, 1986, pp. 25-29; SADET, 2008, p. 1282, etc.). The ANC believed in being “non-aligned but committed”, and at NAM meetings in 1978 and 1979 in particular it strongly defended Cuba in its anti-Western and pro-Soviet posture, against the Yugoslav view that the NAM should be neutral in the Cold War (Thomas, 1996, pp. 98-100). At the Havana NAM Summit, Tambo spoke first on behalf of all the national liberation movements and then for the ANC. Though the ANC “tried to maintain a diplomatic balance by supporting Cuba and the Soviet Union without alienating the majority of non-aligned states”, its impact at the summit “was diminished by the ideological support it gave to Cuba and the Soviet Union” (Thomas, 1996). At the New Delhi Summit in 1983, Tambo again defended Castro, praised the Cuban role in Angola and denounced the US’s policy of “constructive engagement” with apartheid South Africa. In the 1980s the ANC became increasingly frustrated with the NAM’s impotence. While the NAM continued to denounce the apartheid regime, it played no significant role in South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, merely following the OAU in endorsing the Harare Declaration in August 1989, setting out the conditions for a negotiated settlement. Scott Thomas makes the point that this endorsement represented the first time that the NAM had supported the ANC’s specific goals; until then it had agreed with the armed struggle in general terms and followed the OAU in calling for South Africa’s isolation as a pariah nation because of its policy of apartheid and for the international community to impose mandatory economic sanctions. Though some Western countries imposed sanctions in the late 1980s, the most the UN did was agree, in 1977, to a mandatory arms embargo (Thomas, 1996, p. 105).

After apartheid

The ending of apartheid coincided with the ending of the Cold War. By the time South Africa joined the NAM as a full member on 31 May 1994, the “classic Belgrade to Belgrade period of non-alignment (1961-1989)” had passed (Fourie and de Villiers, 1998). Some now said that the NAM was anachronistic and irrelevant in the post-Cold War world (Mills, 1997, pp. 160-167). As South Africa joined the NAM, the new South African Foreign Minister, addressing the eleventh conference of the NAM foreign ministers in Cairo, made the somewhat exaggerated claim that the NAM had been “at the forefront of efforts by the international community to eradicate

apartheid”.¹⁰ Now in power, the ANC was keen to promote its anti-colonial credentials on the world stage. Having adopted a strong anti-Western ideological posture during the Cold War, the ANC now saw the NAM as representing the Global South against the industrialised Global North, and as a useful lobby group at the UN for a host of issues relating to developing countries. The new South African Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, who spoke at the 1995 NAM Summit, called the NAM “a like-minded organisation for joint thinking, planning and action, representing the majority of people and states in the world” (Landsberg, 2010, pp.101-102). Mbeki was keen to “give a new impetus to the NAM”, and South Africa was quick to offer to host a NAM summit of heads of state or government (Adebajo and Virk, 2018, p. 363). It then became the chair of the movement when that summit, the twelfth, took place in Durban from 29 August - 3 September 1998. The South African government hailed this jamboree, on which it spent the large sum of some R50 million, as a major success, but it was hardly the “seminal event in the history of North-South relations” that some had called for (Stremmlau, 1998, p. 76, 64). The forty-six heads of State or Government and 70 Ministers of Foreign Affairs attended, together with, for the first time at a NAM summit, representatives of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrial countries and the European Union, for South Africa had hopes of using the NAM to influence the Global North in, say, the future reform of the UN. To meet the concern about what the Nam’s priorities should be in the post-Cold War era, the summit mandated a process of identifying these, and, as the NAM chair, South Africa initiated the so-called Zimbali process to review the methodology and organisation of the NAM with the aim of revitalising the organisation (Monyae, 1998; Taylor, 2001, p. 144). After South Africa handed the chair to Malaysia at the NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003, it remained a member of the NAM Troika of past, present and future chairs until September 2006. When South Africa hosted a meeting of the NAM Troika in Cape Town in January 2006, the country’s Department of Co-operation and Development put out a statement that the NAM “with 114 member countries, remains the largest political grouping of countries outside of the United Nations itself. In this regard, South Africa has placed a high premium on the membership of this Movement in identifying areas of common concern and support for the implementation of the developmental

¹⁰ Statement by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, to the Eleventh Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement Cairo, 31 May-3 June 1994.

agenda of the South and the African agenda in particular” (Department of International Relations and Cooperations, 2021). But after 2006, as the role of the NAM in international affairs declined, South African interest in the NAM fell away. One sign of this was that after 2006 Dirco’s website on the NAM remained updated (Department of International Relations and Cooperations, 2021). South African representatives continued to attend summits and ministerial meetings, repeating the country’s gratitude “for the role NAM has played in the decolonisation of our continent and the struggle against apartheid”, but other international bodies, such as the Group of 77 developing countries, the India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue forum (IBSA) and from 2010 the Brazil-Russia-China group, which became the BRICS on South Africa’s accession, became more important. The BRICS, in particular, offered South Africa vast resource potential. Under Presidents Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, South African foreign policy also shifted to emphasise the country’s role on the African continent. A recent large study of South African foreign policy after apartheid barely mentions the NAM (Adebajjo and Virk, 2018).

Conclusions

The role of the NAM in relation to South Africa and Namibia has both been exaggerated and regarded with too much scepticism. It is an exaggeration to say that “No international grouping has played as significant a role in supporting the rights of the Namibian people and in promoting the independence of Namibia as the Non-Aligned Movement”, for the Front Line States, the UN and the OAU played larger roles (Singham and Hune, 1986, pp. 6, 16). But the NAM was not merely a talk-shop that passed resolutions that carried no weight (Crocker, 1992, p. 90).¹¹ The NAM summit documents influenced UN resolutions, with the NAM acting as a caucus in the General Assembly. The NAM was a cog in the wheel of international solidarity against apartheid and for the independence of Namibia, helping to inspire those engaged in those struggles to keep going when the odds against their success seemed remote. The moral backing it provided was more important than its modest financial aid. After South Africa became a formal member of the organisation in 1994, following the

¹¹ The American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the 1980s wrote dismissively of ‘the shrill, all-or-nothing antics of the African-Non-aligned camp, egged on by Moscow’s skilful diplomatic apparatus’.

independence of Namibia and the end of apartheid, there followed a decade in which South Africa played a leading role in helping to shape the organisation. After that South Africa's role became more peripheral, as the significance of the organisation waned, as it was eclipsed by others on the international scene.

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60 YEARS AFTER BELGRADE: PASSION, REFLECTION AND CHALLENGES FROM INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract: The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has developed into a large movement in terms of the number of members. But after 60 years of its birth and existence, to what extent does this movement have real significance and benefit all its members? This article proposes to review historically the contribution, problems, and prospects of Indonesia's interaction within the NAM. Three framework arguments will be explored more deeply. First, in the post-Cold War, the NAM has adopted the model called "ceremonial leadership" that is rotated from one country to another. This, however, did not bring much progress towards the ratification of the values and principles of Belgrade that can be formulated and implemented massively. Second, cooperative relationships that involve individual socio-economic mobility run very slowly and are still limited by technical problems. As a result, the transfer of research, science, and technology is not able to contribute to strengthening the economic and industrial structure amongst all members. Indeed, there has been progress despite discussions and interpretations of the changing world constellation followed by the information-sharing policies. From an Indonesian case and perspective, this article provides a critical note of the future of the NAM which is nothing more than an organisation of friendship.

Key words: The Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia, post-Cold War, challenges.

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Introduction

When I just graduated with a degree in history, it was the end of 2004, and various narratives about nationalism, the story of Sukarno's greatness and role in international progress, the Bandung Conference, and the establishment of the NAM in Belgrade began to stir in debates in the Indonesian public sphere. At the same time, Indonesia was a country that had an authoritarian military regime only a few years ago and was just stepping on the path to democracy. As a "new historian", the topic of the debate sparked curiosity while diving into the past. However, tracing historical Indonesia's contribution and progress, both the government or various other organisations and individuals in the NAM is still very difficult. Access to information sources, although improving, is still limited. In that year, I wondered if the NAM was still relevant. (Faishal, 2004). It could be that the founders of the NAM are only a group of daytime dreamers (Ajami, 1980). Nevertheless, I still have an optimistic view, which is probably the result of the impressions I gained reading the speech of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the AASROC Conference in August 2004. He said that the concrete agenda that the Asia-Africa region should immediately focus on should be concentrated on three things: poverty alleviation in order to catch up with the economy, increase of security cooperation in the face of terrorism and encouragement of the restructuring of global forces (Mbeki, 2004). When I look back at the Belgrade Conference of September 1961, I summarise two key messages: to protect peace and reject colonialism and imperialism. This issue was still on the main agenda at the NAM conference in Cairo in 1964. In the 1960s, Indonesia was one of the founding members with a major role of Sukarno after the Bandung 1955. Of course, as a newly independent country, Indonesia had strong reasons to be actively involved in the international stage to build solidarity among post-colonial nations to have a strong spirit to end this practice. A major campaign through international organisations is necessary as other member countries are in a marginal position politically. Indonesia is also economically weak; the NAM has become quite an effective tool in building diplomacy, in politics, culture, and economics. I observed that the Bandung 1955 was a milestone for affirming Indonesia's existence in campaigning for anti-colonialism and international sovereignty. Even though, it must be admitted that these claims are not real, pseudo, and one-sided because many things do not match between the desires and the operation of state machines to implement the various values and principles campaigned (Rubinstein, 1970). At that time, being

part of Europe, Yugoslavia was not yet a part of the Asian-African solidarity. However, after Tito visited India, Burma, Egypt, and Ethiopia from December 1955 to January 1956, he felt the need to build cooperation within the framework of “creative coexistence” (Jerkovic, 1956). At its climax, the seventh Congress of the Yugoslav Communist League in March 1958 affirmed his decision not to join the Soviet bloc and to anchor his choice to a non-aligned foreign policy (Rubinstein, 1970; p. 76). Marshal Josip Broz dared to leave the Soviet bloc and build new international cooperation through the NAM which was considered a subaltern in the international system (Miskovic et al., 2014). This decision then expanded the international solidarity network which was not only limited to the Asia-Africa region, but opened opportunities for countries in any region that agreed on the “non-aligned” principle. 60 years after Belgrade, in terms of quantity, the number of members is getting bigger (around 120 countries). However, the NAM solidarity is not well-institutionalised. We still see sharp disputes, military conflicts, human rights violations, poverty, and even serious ecological damage, which the NAM as an organisation has not been able to fully resolve. Cooperation in the economic sector has not been seen to be mutually beneficial. Each country member still has a high level of dependence on rich countries and maintains a stronger intensity of multilateral cooperation with them. This is what causes bias perspective when great power countries that have much greater power impose their will. Through this article, I see the macro narrative of the NAM in global politics by comparing the existence of the NAM from an Indonesian perspective. How is the portrait of the history and transformation of the NAM from the point of my passion, being an Indonesian who touches, observes and studies it? Indonesia’s experience within the NAM reflects many things. The most important of these is that each NAM member country has a sovereign right to make decisions. The NAM should be used to support national programmes from minimum to maximum.

The NAM in the Eyes of an Indonesian

I share three periodizations of the NAM’s narrative among Indonesian audiences. First, the 1955-1965 period became an era of euphoria in which Indonesian resistance to what was known as “neocolonialism” or *Nekolim* could be understood by the general public. Almost all political forces in this newly independent country warmly welcomed Sukarno’s initiative to involve Indonesia in the vortex of the global movement. It was the campaign against *Nekolim* that positioned Indonesia as a “Nefo” (*New Emerging Forces*)

who dared to face Western giants such as America and its Western allies. The campaign was supported by various constructions of high-cost lighthouse projects in the capital, Jakarta. Of course, the political, religious, and cultural elites did not support the campaign with a blank check. It is noted that they were involved in various meetings of Asia-Africa and the NAM in the fields of youth, religious organisations to the emancipation of women. The second is the period of the New Order military regime which has been in power since 1967 but effectively starting in 1970 and falling in 1998. In this era, the state took an absolute role as an authoritative source in socialising the NAM through the official government media and ministries. Practically, the NAM narrative was copyright and became the exclusive right of the government, which created a massive image that Indonesia had succeeded in continuing the relay as an important player. Especially when in 1992-1995 Indonesia held the leadership position. The third was the period after 1998. The democratic era provided wider space for synergy development between the government, the private sector, and the public to design and execute various foreign collaborations to accelerate the progress of cooperation. During this period, the task force team formed by the government began to organise the division of tasks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop aspects of diplomacy and international spokespersons. Then the Ministry of National and Development Planning was the executor of technical cooperation as a follow-up to diplomatic agreements with other countries. In the first period, Indonesia's entry as one of the founding members certainly provided benefits. The image of being a champion of anti-colonialism led to an increase in Indonesia's bargaining position against the domination of the United States in Southeast Asia. Simultaneously, it could also build a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. This made it easier for Indonesia to get access to weapons from both parties which were used to overcome the various separatist conflicts that had sprung up in the country from 1950 to the 1960s. Even though Indonesia was considered by the Soviets a non-socialist country but a nationalist democracy, they considered Indonesia a country that should be embraced. Bilateral relations were strengthened by Sukarno's mutual visits to the Soviet Union in 1956 and Khrushchev's to Indonesia in 1960. The relationship became more intimate when US President Dwight Eisenhower refused the Indonesian loan proposal in 1956. This served as a starting point for Indonesia to get closer to the Soviets. Then Khrushchev offered a loan of 100 million dollars with 2.5 per cent interest. A new \$ 250 million loan was subsequently taken. With this loan, Indonesia financed various lighthouse projects, national strategic industries, including agriculture, energy,

infrastructure and the military. At the same time, technology transfer was performed this way (Boden, 2008: p. 115-118). The Soviet support was not necessarily due to the orientation of Sukarno's foreign policy which was closer to them. An important factor that must be noted was the large support of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for the government. The PKI maintained a strong network with its Soviet counterparts and became a political guarantee that the Soviet interests in Indonesian politics were well-represented and trusted. This meant that the PKI could also give its commitment to encourage Sukarno to build strategic partnerships with the Soviets rather than the US or the Western bloc. In 1965, there were changes in the domestic political situation that led to the fall of Sukarno in 1966 and drastically changed the course of foreign policy. The strategic projects of the long-term Soviet loans requiring an average of 10-15 years of development also ended. By early 1965, only three of the 27 projects financed by the Soviet foreign debt had been completed. Even though they accounted for 10 per cent of total Soviet aid projects in Asia, the number that could be completed was the lowest, only four per cent. The contracts from 1956-1960 indeed only regulated economic and technical cooperation without any detailed conditions for spending money and supervision (Ibid, 119). The needs of the Sukarno regime to finance the operational needs of this newly independent state were almost entirely dependent on foreign loans and assistance. In addition, the parliamentary democracy model did not provide stability for the government. The protracted political conflict in the parliament between various parties and political factions was added to the problem of armed rebellion in the regions against Jakarta. As a result, supervision of debt funds was low and vulnerable to be allocated for other financing outside of the agreement. The vulnerability of budget misuse, either from own income or foreign debt, was evidenced by the emergence of major corruption cases, for example, the construction of the Conefo tower building in Jakarta, which was financed by loans from the United Arab Emirates and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Apart from accommodating loan funds from the Soviets, Indonesia also received a lot of support and economic assistance from the PRC, where one of the diplomatic supports was Indonesia's claim to Papua. Even though in the Papua dispute, Indonesia could also get support from the US. In June 1961, Sukarno visited China and was praised by President Liu Shaoqi for his role in promoting the "great project of Friendship Bridge between China and Indonesia." In addition, the slumping of domestic economic conditions has affected the country's already very small income. The reason for that was the fact that foreign debt was also used for short-term consumer financing.

During the Suharto military regime, the NAM was used as a means of garnering diplomatic support for the benefit of regime consolidation at home. At the same time, Indonesia needed a foreign policy strategy that was mutually beneficial. Indonesia has received support for its strategic interests in the UN forums. From 1970 to 1980, Indonesia was able to build international cooperation in strengthening food security, especially with African countries. In addition, trade diplomacy involved the entry of investment in natural resource management, modernisation of agricultural infrastructure and technology. Also, the issue of the annexation of Timor-Leste did not appear to be detrimental to Indonesia. From the 1990s to the present, Indonesia has received wider space, not only for its commodity markets in global trade, but also for efforts to transfer technology and exchange educational and cultural missions. The foreign policy of the Suharto regime was influenced by two important things.

First, foreign policy was close to that of the United States during the Cold War. The US interest in stemming the communist movement has required strong military support. Indonesia's proximity to the Western bloc was followed by the opening of its doors to foreign investment, mining concessions, and all infrastructures for the modernisation of weapons with US products. From economic liberalisation, Indonesia got a lot of financial income to drive its development. The political situation was also increasingly stable because the government operated in an authoritarian model where iron-fisted policies of the state could be implemented without resistance. Foreign loans could be controlled, and the focus of development was agriculture, education, and access to health as basic services for the community. This focus on improving basic services replaced the lighthouse project based on the prestige of the Sukarno era. The success in food security has given Indonesia greater confidence to campaign for an end to hunger and the global food crisis, especially for countries in Africa.

Second, the change in political direction caused by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Balkanization caused the world to move to multipolarity. At this point, the NAM was no longer considered solid. The multipolar world made each member country calculate the cost and benefit of their relationship with potential powers other than the US. During the US invasion of Iraq in 1991, the NAM was no longer solid as it was when it was faced with a choice of resolutions and arms embargoes in the Yugoslavian conflict. In this condition, China, which started to emerge as a world power, began to enter as an observer and was interested in consolidating its network with the NAM (Morphet, 1993). In

the following period, they played a key role in bringing about a new balance with their economic and military power. The large investment and dependence of developing countries in Africa have ultimately strengthened China's dominance in the region.

The Indonesian government sees changes in the global constellation, bringing new perspectives to the direction of the NAM cooperation which focuses on two things: the backdrop of rapid globalisation and deepening interdependence. The globalisation that is running fast and the world becoming borderless must be welcomed with open arms. Of course, the economic projections are designed based on the acceptance of the free-market system. The building of cooperation is not only the political aspect because interdependence is translated as "free will" of the state to cooperate with other countries in accordance with the agenda, issues, pressures, and the benefits obtained. Indonesia considers that strengthening economic cooperation, North-South dialogue, South-South cooperation, and reducing foreign debt are important international campaigns (Soeharto, 1995). The Indonesian campaign asks developed countries to set aside 0.7 per cent of GDP and give it to developing countries under various schemes, even though the then realisation of GDP was only 0.37 per cent. With limited funding, Indonesia sees solidarity as a form of concern. No matter how small, efforts to help countries in need must be made. Wealthy small countries such as the Kingdom of Brunei were asked for support in overcoming food shortages in Africa. Brunei financed a tour of a group of farmers from Africa to Indonesia to see traditional agricultural management practices firsthand and to learn about the role of farmers. At the 2019 Baku Summit, Indonesia conveyed important aspirations related to making more concrete cooperation and exemplifying South-South Technical Cooperation (SSTC) which already had significant results. Technical cooperation has direct benefit value, not only increasing capacity, sharing experiences, but also accelerating mobility among people. Of the many high-level meetings, declarations, political speeches, joint statements in other UN and international forums, political apathy to interfere in the domestic affairs of each NAM member is still maintained. The "heroic" event that was played repeatedly on the national television at that time was Suharto's visit to Zagreb and Sarajevo. He is considered brave because of the war situation that was very dangerous for the head of state to be present there. Even though the message was passive, it assumed that no other party could resolve the conflict other than their leaders. On the other hand, Indonesia has the uniqueness of being a NAM country with the largest Muslim population. This resulted in opinions that must be consistent in global issues

involving religion and the Islamic world in general. On the issue of Palestine, Indonesia hardly provided space for dialogue, even though President Wahid tried to initiate it in the 2000s. The same thing was emphasised again as an important agenda at the 2012 Tehran Summit, the Palestine Solidarity Declaration.

From the post-Cold War transformation, multilateral cooperation is based on national interests, especially economic interests. The rise of China as a world economic power is, in turn, currently seen by Indonesia as an alternative. Trade and economic cooperation are continuously forged and strengthened. At the same time, the tension in the South China Sea, which is always high, does not make it an important issue for resistance on the grounds of national sovereignty. Various countries were faced with domestic problems such as civil conflicts, separatism, and economic instability. In a multipolar world's political structure, each country has the ability to make more choices. Indonesia's position has changed. From 1950 to the 1960s, Indonesia's foreign policy was free and active. This means that Indonesia was free in determining the choice of partners for cooperation but active in pursuing world peace. This doctrine lasted until the end of the 1990s and experienced a shift during President Yudhoyono from 2004-2014 to become "thousands of friends, zero enemies" which means that all political risks that will be faced by Indonesia in the global political arena should be minimised wherever possible. In general, since 1970, the doctrine of foreign policy has been restored to conform to the original conception of Vice President Hatta in 1948, namely a commitment to independence and an active foreign policy (Leifer, 1973). After the 1990s, doctrines of foreign policy can be called passive pragmatism (Sukma, 1995). This is a portrait of other NAM countries occupying positions towards important world powers (Western Europe, the US, Russia and China).

Challenges and the Future of the Nam

The relevance of the existence of the NAM has long been questioned. Apathy for its future has emerged since the late 1960s. The NAM is considered a collection of speeches by heads of state and declarations that are not followed by practical action, where the procedures are complicated and often tedious so that they are inefficient with unclear results (Graham, 1980; Kochan, 1972). To that end, there are calls for organisation reform and policy changes. Even if necessary, replace the word "non-alignment" with the Southern Solidarity Movement (Keethaponcalan, 2016: p. 14). But in fact,

the membership is still standing and growing in terms of quantity. Many countries enter as observers and have an interest. In the context of multilateralism, the existence of the NAM is no less important than before (Jazic, 2005). Politically, the NAM will always be the vehicle of its members to fulfil their national interests. It depends on domestic political contestation. India, for example, tended to be America's friend in the Nehru era. Then the relationship strengthened in the era of Indira Gandhi where the principles of the NAM, which were in line with Indian interests, were only adhered to. In such a position, India will remain a part of the NAM based on a more symbiotic bond than consistently upholding the principles (Rauch, 2008: p. 31-33; Mohan 2003: p. 46). In the Second South Summit of the G-77 which produced the Doha Plan in 2005, it was known that economic development efforts through UN multilateral control had the potential to create separate problems for South-South cooperation. International trade, monetary, and banking instruments cannot simply and sustainably provide their support to developing countries. Multilateralism is ultimately a key phrase that requires an explanation of the value and rule of the game in the NAM. An important criticism that needs to be addressed in this regard is that the over-reliance on multilateralism as a tool to strengthen the political economy position of developing countries has failed. The reason is that developed countries also have stronger ties and are supported by an equal position of mutual need. For the multilateralism which is built to have an impact and benefit, it is necessary to carry out domestic reforms in the NAM countries to make it compatible with international values and then talk about institutional reform (Strydom, 2007: p. 44). In this condition, it is necessary to strengthen the North-South dialogue or better known as the triangular cooperation model. In making its contribution to the NAM, Indonesia manages cooperation affairs through its foreign ministry. This ministry is actively participating in various events both inside the UN and outside and is involved in lobbying and diplomacy for the delivery of technical assistance between countries. Meanwhile, other routine contributions are carried out in the annual cooperation program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic network. To the Indonesian leadership, the message conveyed at the Jakarta Summit in early September 1992 emphasised the transfer of technology and experience in the fields of food security, population, and foreign debt reduction (Jakarta Declaration, 1992). The Indonesian government was paying special attention. Therefore, it formed a task force team led by Nana Sutresna, an expert team led by Economist Widjojo Nitisastro, which coordinated strengthening effective cooperation with the full involvement of all president-men. They were

moving to reach out for cooperation with partner countries through Indonesian embassies in these countries. The team was an important figure around President Suharto, who was thought to be able to immediately conceptualise the programme up to the level of programme execution so that organisational obstacles at the ministerial level could be overcome. For Indonesia, concrete roles and contributions could be made after the establishment of the Centre for South-South Technical Cooperation (CSSTC) of the NAM in 2001, which acted to expand and accelerate the transfer of light technology and various advances in microeconomic tools. This institution could be called the most concrete manifestation of development cooperation within the NAM. In the era of Indonesian leadership in 1992-1995, economic cooperation was described as intensive South-South cooperation as well as redefining the NAM vision according to the 1995 Cartagena Declaration. The efforts included cooperation in the field of poverty alleviation, strengthening small businesses, using IT technology. Apart from that, Indonesia also has the opportunity to provide the Developing Countries Partnership (KPN) scholarship scheme for the NAM members, especially those from poor countries.

The SSTC is a tool for Indonesian cooperation with Asian-African countries which then develops more broadly in South-South and North-South cooperation. Indonesia's interests are no longer merely diplomatic matters, but how mutually beneficial cooperation can be carried out. Political value in the NAM is considered final where each country may not interfere in the domestic affairs of other member countries. Like Suharto, who managed the country in an authoritarian model, or also many other NAM countries where democracy is not something that should be well-established as a more just political system. The NAM was eventually reduced to a collaboration that focused on economic development affairs with common welfare goals. The 1992 Jakarta Summit became Indonesia's first post-Sukarno international stage where the opportunity was won because Nicaragua withdrew from its candidacy to host the 10th Summit (Syatauw, 1993). The implementation of the summit then underlies the strategy and implementation of Indonesian economic and technical cooperation in other NAM member countries.

South-South cooperation is also making progress as the NAM itself is expanding and intensifying various models of cooperation. The existence of Technical Cooperation for Developing Countries (TSDC) as a catalyst in regional cooperation then plays an important role before a permanent institution is formed. In 1995, after the NAM ministerial meeting, Indonesia

proposed the idea of establishing a South-South Technical Cooperation Centre as the centre for all cooperation activities, evaluation, and reporting of cooperation. However, until 2004, each ministry was still running the cooperation program separately and was no longer connected as a series of coordination. This is why the amount of contribution, the direction of foreign policy, and the diplomatic targets of the cooperation cannot be measured. In 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a technical cooperation directorate to ensure that the field of cooperation was more organised, not only limited to carrying out solidarity and mutually beneficial cooperation, but also in the context of supporting diplomacy. In that year, Indonesia has allocated 49.8 million USD to finance 700 cooperation programmes involving thousands of participants in 91 developing countries.

In the latest progress, there are two key words to explain Indonesia's hopes for the NAM. First, as stated by President Joko Widodo, it is important to translate the meaning of political solidarity into more concrete collaboration (Pinandita, 2020). This applies not only in the context of the accessibility of developing countries to vaccines and treatment to end the Covid-19 pandemic. As can be seen, access to better vaccines is only dominated by rich countries, and most of them are competing to save and appear selfish with what is called "vaccine nationalism". Second, in a speech, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, emphasised strengthening the spirit of multilateral cooperation, regulating the global economy through strong and balanced partnerships, and increasing internal cooperation through concrete collaboration. Thus the NAM will not become just a "talk shop" organisation (Paskalis, 2016). The concrete collaboration that Indonesia wants in economic cooperation and vaccine procurement has received a wide response from China, which can take advantage of the pandemic to position itself as a "helper god" by giving developing countries access to its vaccine production. The mentioning of a "talk shop" organisation also has implications for the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy which seems to have a stance that the NAM has not provided clear benefits for the needs of its member countries.

Conclusions

There are three urgent things to do in clarifying the future of the NAM. First, eliminating institutional problems by changing the ceremonial leadership model as has happened so far. The NAM needs to be a strong multilateral collaboration with a semi-permanent at a minimum on its

organisational system and infrastructure. Second, accelerating the pace of social, cultural and educational, and technological science mobility among the NAM members. Increasing the number of study scholarships, cooperation between universities, transfer of technology between strategic institutions, and ensuring high mobility can be done when each country opens its borders. Third, the NAM must have a global policy platform derived from the principles that are continuously updated according to the times. Without this platform, each member country will define its national interest which is often counterproductive to the interest of solidarity among the NAM members.

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THE ROLE OF AZERBAIJAN IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SECURITY

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Abstract: This research paper is an attempt to explain the role of Azerbaijan in the Non-Aligned Movement through a rarely used perspective or lens of international law and international security. In a scholarly discourse on Azerbaijan's ascension to the full membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, there are two distinct camps that argue either from the perspective of the non-relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement in the contemporary international community and subsequent low significance of Azerbaijan's move or from the perspective of the theory of international relations and present it as a foreign policy adjustment or a continued strategy. This study departs from the continued (albeit adjusted) relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement as a subject of international law and seeks to complement the existing theories proposed by the international relations scholars with an alternative view based on Azerbaijan's paradigmatic perceptions of international law and international security. By taking an alternative viewpoint, this paper utilizes a multidisciplinary angle to tackle so far only narrowly researched topic.

Key words: Azerbaijan, the Non-Aligned Movement, international law, security.

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Introduction

'History has shown that non-alignment is an idea that evolves but does not fade.'

Manmohan Singh, former Prime Minister of India

When Azerbaijan joined the Non-Aligned Movement on the 25th of May 2011, only three other post-Soviet states (Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) had full membership in the organisation. For many researchers and specialists in the Caucasus and post-Soviet studies, as well as for policy analysts, the move to formally advance from the observer status to a full membership seemed sudden and contextually peculiar, especially if taken through the perspective of the pragmatist view of Azerbaijan's foreign policy (Makili-Aliyev, 2013). An attempt was made to quickly connect and understand this rise in the perspective of the development of Azerbaijan's relations either with its larger regional neighbours (Russia and Iran) or with the United States and the West in general. Such views, however, if analysed in a larger context, reveal their relative shallowness, for they tend to largely ignore the development of Azerbaijan and its foreign policy both prior to the event, as well as its follow-up (Strakes, 2015, pp. 2-4). As the year 2021 comes with the 60th anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement, it seems appropriate to mark this event with a more comprehensive analysis that will explain the role of Azerbaijan in the Non-Aligned Movement, especially as it is the state that currently chairs this forum. This study is an attempt to shift the perspective on Azerbaijan and its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement from the strict confines of foreign policy analysis to adapt a zoomed-out view that covers the positioning of Azerbaijan during the years of its independence from the Soviet Union taken through the lens of international law and international security. The underlying hypothesis is that the basis for Azerbaijan's stance that led to the adoption of non-alignment as its principled position and subsequent ascension to the Non-Aligned Movement lies not within this state's considerations regarding its foreign policy or international relations in general, but in Azerbaijan's perceptions regarding international legal order and understanding of international security. This study's aim is not to evaluate such perceptions or the stance of Azerbaijan with regards to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Rather, it aims to analyse how Azerbaijan's paradigmatic perceptions of international law and international security are related to its concept of non-alignment and its role in the Non-Aligned

Movement. In order to come to overall conclusions, this study will analyse the contemporary relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement and the position of Azerbaijan in relation to non-alignment. It will then proceed to the discussion of international legal considerations and perspectives on international security as the general perceptions of Azerbaijan shaping its participation in the Non-Aligned Movement.

The contemporary relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement

The contemporary relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement as an organisation and a subject of international law and international relations is, naturally, a complex question that attracts a multitude of perspectives and different opinions and analyses. This study due to its limitations cannot seek to explore this question in-depth and only limits itself to positioning its own view to provide a reader with the perspective it takes on the Non-Aligned Movement. Such a perspective serves as a background for subsequent analysis of Azerbaijan in relation to the Non-Aligned Movement. The 1955 Bandung Conference is widely seen as a normative basis for the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. The creation of this forum of developing states within the framework of loosely defined organisation can be seen from two different historical perspectives. On the one hand, the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement cannot be viewed separately from the context of the fallen colonial system and the independence movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Non-Aligned Movement certainly played a special role in the decolonisation process and self-determination of peoples in many parts of the world. One of the indicators of such a strong connection to the decolonisation process can be seen in the Bandung Conference, which attracted post-colonial leaders of newly independent states that had a clear “third-world perspective” and needs in mind. During the preparatory conference to the Belgrade Summit in Cairo in 1961, the focus was exclusively on post-colonial agenda with the list of issues that included support of self-determination, national independence and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; non-adherence to multilateral military pacts and the independence of non-aligned countries from great power or block influences and rivalries; disarmament; rejection of the use or threat of use of force in international relations; non-interference into the internal affairs of States and peaceful coexistence among all nations; socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system; international cooperation on an equal footing; the strengthening of the United Nations;

the democratization of international relations; the struggle against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations; the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, foreign occupation and domination; and, finally, opposition to apartheid (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2012). On the other hand, the concept of the non-alignment central to the Non-Aligned Movement itself is certainly connected to the emergence of the bipolar world and rivalry between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact states. The usual explanation accounts for the position that the less developed newly emergent states of the "Third World" have found themselves in between two military blocks hostile to each other. Their unification in a movement is understood as a demonstration of their unwillingness to align themselves with either of the blocks and instead to direct their efforts towards peace and non-interventionism. The Non-Aligned Movement was seen as providing the platform for states that would like to avoid military pacts with either the US or the Soviet Union. The rationale behind the decision is often explained either by concepts of neutrality or classical realism. Nonetheless, whatever the rationale, the aim has always been to avoid the constraints of a Cold War alliance in one form or the other (Iskandarov et al., 2019, pp. 62-63). In line with this latter perspective, the Non-Aligned Movement is seen as the 'political arm' of the global South, where the 'economic arm' is assigned to the Group of Seventy-seven within the context of the attempts in the UN in the 1960s-1980s to push for global economic reforms and vision promoted by the global South. It is believed that under Cuba's leadership at the beginning of the 1980s the relevance of the movement begins to significantly weaken, especially due to the Cuban attempts to steer the movement into the direction of alignment with the Soviet Union and away from its original position (Cutler, 1997; Cutler 2020, p. 35). After this weakening and then further after the collapse of the socialist block, the relevance of the movement comes under question (Iskandarov et al., 2019, p. 64; Strakes, 2015, p. 2) as it faced a challenge of retaining its relevance in the face of the fall of the bipolar world. With the dissolution of Yugoslavia that assumed the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1989, the crisis deepened. Argentina left, while India, Cuba and Algeria lowered their involvement in the promotion of non-alignment. Moreover, Cyprus and Malta left the movement to join the European Union. The crisis of leadership, which was formerly based on charismatic leaders, has also affected the Non-Aligned Movement as the new leadership in the developing countries progressively relied on state structures rather than authoritarian charisma. Furthermore, the aggression of Iraq against Kuwait in 1991 has negatively affected the positions of the

movement and showcased its inability to mediate between these two states. However, the efforts of Indonesia that chaired the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992-1995 and then Columbia have proven largely successful in reforming the movement and averting its slide to the irrelevance of the Cold War relic (Krilov, 2018, pp. 28-30). Consequently, the Non-Alignment Movement has survived the years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while its principles and objectives are considered continuously valid, as the domination in international relations has not lost its strategic edge and continues to pose a threat to the interests of the less developed states. Thus, its contemporary relevance still lies in providing the developing countries with possibilities to select policies and practices in accordance with their national interests, as opposed to those that are determined by organisations or alliances ruled by the major powers (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2012; Ani, 2012; Krilov, 2018, p. 31).

Positioning Azerbaijan in relation to Non-Alignment

The ascendance of Azerbaijan to the full membership in the Non-Aligned Movement has been a clear formal embrace of the concept of non-alignment by this state. However, non-alignment as a concept was already previously integrated into Azerbaijan's vision of development, albeit informally. This may explain why the local scholars in Azerbaijan tend to understand non-alignment in classical terms of non-involvement in the conflict between third states and/or military alliances or blocks (e.g., Gurbanov, 2020, p. 9). At the same time, the scholarship knows several theories that have explained the development of Azerbaijan since its independence from the Soviet Union in relation to the concept of non-alignment. Most such developed theories will be discussed here in order to position Azerbaijan more accurately in relation to non-alignment as a concept. The most common theory revolves around the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, where Azerbaijan is the largest and most developed state in terms of economics and power. The geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus is explained as fragile and volatile, thus marked with uncertainty. The region itself is surrounded by larger powers such as Russia, Iran and Turkey (as an extension of the General West) which compete for dominance with various degrees of intensity. At the same time, Azerbaijan's neighbours in the region – Georgia and Armenia – are seen as states that made their geopolitical choices in the opposite vectors towards different power centres. Georgia is oriented towards the General West with ambitions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European

integration, while Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union which are firmly tied to Russia. In this light, Azerbaijan is seen as a proponent of the 'third way', relying on the bilateral relations built outside the framework of political and ideological constraints. It is then argued that because of the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, non-alignment becomes the most beneficial conceptual framing of Azerbaijan's foreign policy, heavily informed by pragmatism. At the same time, it is precisely because of the involvement of pragmatism that this theory ultimately rejects the notion of equidistance from major powers and blocks (that is usually seen as necessary for non-alignment). Instead, non-alignment is treated as a spectrum of different positions, where each state finds a comfortable spot within the parameters of its national interests. For Azerbaijan, reliance on separately built bilateral relations with major powers then becomes this spot of comfort and allows it to maintain its independent foreign policy while simultaneously control its distance from the major powers, without aligning itself with any of them (Iskandarov et al., 2019, pp. 66-69; Gurbanov, 2020, pp. 13-14). Another theory takes an informal realist perspective as a starting point and revolves around Azerbaijan's security problems, especially with neighbouring Armenia. The 'balanced' approach in foreign policy is explained by the hostile environment that Azerbaijan has faced since its independence from the Soviet Union. Armenia and regional powers are explained as ultimately hostile towards Azerbaijan, and in such an environment Azerbaijan's goals to preserve autonomy are synchronized with the possible beneficial resources that Azerbaijan could receive from the constructive engagements with major powers, namely the US, Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan's relation to non-alignment is then explained as deriving from the strategy of survival that was required to mitigate the acute crisis and immediate threats that the state has faced at the beginning of the 1990s. This is supported by the fact that such a strategy is not enshrined or explained in any official document, including Azerbaijan's Constitution. Furthermore, the theory explains that because such a strategy essentially worked (allowing Azerbaijan to gain regional leadership in terms of economics, development and power), this state subsequently developed non-alignment into a foreign policy principle. The intensive engagement of Azerbaijan with the global South during the 2000s is showcased as an indicator supporting such arguments (Strakes, 2015, pp. 3-4; Gurbanov, 2020, p. 16). The informal realist theory presents non-alignment as a conscious choice of Azerbaijan in developing workable strategies to turn the hostile environment into one comfortable for development, and not a

condition dictated by the geopolitical environment itself. One more theory that should be discussed here takes yet another perspective to explain Azerbaijan's positioning in relation to the non-alignment concept. Robert Cutler firmly criticizes neorealist and neoliberal explanations of Azerbaijan's behaviour through 'rational-choice methodology'. The critique is based on the failure to account for small and middle powers and their behaviour generally (setting Azerbaijan as an example). Cutler then bases his explanation of Azerbaijan's position on the 'regime theory' that utilizes a normative approach to certain areas of international relations where specific regimes (or specialized arrangements focused on well-defined activities, resources or geographical areas) (Krasner, 1982, p. 186; Young, 1989, p. 13) allegedly exist. In order to apply the concept to Azerbaijan specifically, Cutler utilizes a concept of 'strategic hedging' to explain the dynamics of Azerbaijan's foreign policy since its independence. Cutler's theory revolves around the understanding of strategic hedging as a mix of co-operative and confrontational elements of Azerbaijan's foreign policy in the geographical regime of the South Caucasus. In his view, the use of strategic hedging created the conditions for Azerbaijan to position itself as a 'middle power'. One of the features of such power is the ability to reduce tensions and limit conflict between major powers (Cutler, 2020, pp. 34-35, 41-42). In line with his logic, such a role of Azerbaijan then naturally benefits from a non-aligned positioning. While these main theories disagree on whether the position of Azerbaijan towards non-alignment is a product of the environment, a rational choice predefined by the challenges or a result of growing relevance, all of them agree that: 1) Azerbaijan is not pursuing static equidistant neutrality when it comes to major powers; 2) Azerbaijan's actions cannot be analysed exclusively within the boundaries of foreign policy or national interest, and 3) Azerbaijan's strategic choices are defined by its development as a state. This suggests that the formalization of Azerbaijan's non-alignment (in the form of full membership in the Non-Aligned movement) has a more paradigmatic nature which cannot be explained only by international relations theorists. Other views, such as international law and international security, may be useful in supplementing this pre-existing theory.

Linking international law and security perceptions of Azerbaijan with its role in the NAM

The Non-Aligned Movement as an international organisation with a very flexible structure has long proven itself to be a subject of international law. The movement continues to operate on the basis of the ten normative

principles proclaimed at the Bandung Conference in 1955. These principles are reaffirmed by each Summit organised by the movement. The Bandung principles consist of: 1) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter); 2) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 3) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small; 4) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; 5) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 6) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries; 7) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; 8) Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 9) Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; 10) Respect for justice and international obligations (Iskandarov et al., 2019, pp. 64-65). The Bandung principles in essence reflect fundamental principles of public international law enshrined in the UN Charter. First of the Bandung principles directly links fundamental human rights with public international law principles of human rights promotion as set out in the Preamble of the UN Charter. The second and third Bandung principles reaffirm the principles of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereign equality of every state as enshrined in articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the UN Charter. The third Bandung principle specifies that sovereign equality and racial equality should not be affected by the size of the nation. The fourth Bandung principle is a reaffirmation of the non-interference in the affairs of other states proclaimed by article 2.7 of the UN Charter. Moreover, the fifth Bandung principle reaffirms the position of article 51 of the UN Charter that any state can defend itself individually or collectively. However, the sixth Bandung principle rejects the interpretation of the same article 51 of the UN Charter as allowing collective defence in the form of special arrangements, especially if they serve the interests of major powers (NATO and CSTO can serve as examples of such arrangements). This principle also rejects hard power pressures as a tool in international relations. The seventh Bandung principle is a wider interpretation of the public international law principle of non-use of force enshrined in article 2.4 of the UN Charter. It ties the issue to the notion of aggression, which is considered an international crime. The eighth Bandung principle is a wider

interpretation of peaceful settlement of disputes principle of public international law as per article 2.3 of the UN Charter. The possible settlement tools tied to the notion of justice are proclaimed as possible options. The ninth Bandung principle is a more general version of the international cooperation promoted by the United Nations as per article 1.3 of the UN Charter. Finally, the tenth Bandung principle is a reaffirmation of the principles of justice and commitment to the international obligations arising from the Preamble of the UN Charter (UN Charter, 1945, art. 1-2).

This short analysis illustrates the legalism and firm basis of the Non-Aligned Movement in international law and respect towards its principles. The only notable exception here is the rejection of the notion of “collective defence arrangements” as deriving from the right of the state to collective self-defence. Moreover, such a conclusion is supported by a broader understanding of the aims of non-alignment as maintaining strategic autonomy and flexibility while formally and informally promoting the interests of developing states in political, economic and cultural fields (e.g., Brown, 1966; Crabb Jr., 1964). Consequently, non-alignment rejects sole reliance on power relations between states and assumes that international law should set standards for state conduct in their interactions (Strakes, 2015, p. 6). The grounding of Non-Aligned Movement in the formalistic and wide understanding of principles of international law and restrictive understanding of international security as dependent on international legal norms and right to individual and collective self-defence (not on politically motivated “collective defence” arrangements or measures), resonates starkly with the grounding principles of Azerbaijan’s development of its foreign policy. There is a consensus among scholars that the active participation of Azerbaijan in international organisations is connected not only to its state interests but also its will to uphold international security. At the same time, in building its external relations, Azerbaijan puts forward respect to the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders of other states. Moreover, the expectations of Azerbaijan in building such relations are that there will be peaceful co-existence and mutual non-interference in internal affairs. Another key principle is the avoidance of any overdependence on any third state in any sphere (Gurbanov, 2020, pp. 10-11; Iskandarov et al., 2019, p. 68). Such a perfect alignment of principles of Azerbaijan’s development of its foreign policy (based on the classical understanding of international law) with the grounding principles of the Non-Aligned Movement made the role of Azerbaijan in the movement predetermined on the paradigmatic level. In this sense, given the positioning of Azerbaijan in regards to non-

alignment as a concept taken together with the shared principles of international law led to a logical ascension of Azerbaijan to the full membership in the movement and then to the assumption of an active role in the development of its agenda that reflects both grounding principles of its foreign policy as well as the Bandung principles of 1955.

Conclusions

While the Non-Aligned Movement has been criticized for its alleged low relevance and ineffectuality as well as for the idealistic agenda that contradicts the realist views of many contemporary scholars, it still remains a relevant subject of international law and international relations, due to its flexible nature and the dedication to the interests of developing countries (small and middle powers) that remain a majority in the international community. Its position that recognizes the principles of international law as equally important for effective international relations as, for example, power considerations, has made it naturally attractive to the small and middle powers that rely heavily on the implementation of the principle of sovereign equality (or second and third Bandung principles). For Azerbaijan, the principles of the development of its foreign policy and its vision of building the relations with the international community reflect the same principles that the Non-Aligned Movement stands for as an organisation (all ground in the principles of public international law). Consequently, in the logical progression of its development, Azerbaijan ascended to full membership in the organisation that declares almost exactly the same principles and values. It then proceeded to take an active role in the organisation that translated into the presidency of 2019-2022. The analysis of the Baku Declaration adopted at the 8th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2019 reveals the priority areas that Azerbaijan's presidency in the movement chose to focus on. In line with its commitments to the principles of public international law, Azerbaijan directs the attention of organization *inter alia* to: 1) adopting the organisation to current geopolitical realities; 2) unification of its members to address challenges and threats to international peace, security and development; 3) support to the multilateralism in the international community and especially in the United Nations; 4) push for the reform in the United Nations and especially its Security Council to create a more representative organ; 5) strong commitment to the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states, territorial integrity, sovereignty, sovereign equality, political independence and

inviolability of borders; 6) combating terrorism and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; 7) prevention of politicization of peacekeeping operations; 8) sustainable development; 9) climate change; 10) promotion and protection of human rights; and 9) promotion of multiculturalism under the “Baku Process” (Non-Aligned Movement, 2019). The wide range of issues that Azerbaijan is targeting while heading the Non-Aligned movement reflects both its dedication to the aforementioned principles of public international law as well as willingness to continue developing with and within this organisation in line with its chosen position in non-alignment. While coming years will show to what degree such an ambitious agenda was addressed and the role of Azerbaijan in the Non-Aligned Movement will solidify, it already seems clear that such a role was not defined exclusively by the geopolitical situation or foreign policy considerations, but at least also by Azerbaijan’s paradigmatic perceptions of international law and security.

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BRAZIL AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: PARALLEL PATHS, COMMON GOALS

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Abstract: In the first post-war decades, in the second half of the 20th century, when anti-colonialist consciousness and the construction of new states was advancing in Africa and Asia, seeking their own autonomous space in the bipolar world of the time, Latin America turned to the study of the problems of underdevelopment and sought ways to overcome them. This gap in interests and the hemispheric security doctrine imposed by the United States partly explains the initial lack of support from Latin American countries for the Non-Alignment proposal. Brazil was no exception, but it always maintained an active and proactive stance on economic issues, which led to a de facto rapprochement with the NAM postulates. Brazil's boldest foreign policy stance was adopted in the 21st century when progressive governments led by the Workers' Party committed themselves to the BRICS strategy. That audacity explains much of what the country is experiencing at the moment due to the strong reaction that this initiative provoked in Washington and the domestic ruling classes.

Key words: Bandung, Non-Alignment, Latin America, Brazil, US hegemony, Monroe Doctrine.

Introduction

In this second decade of the 21st century, it is important to review some of the processes that marked the 20th century and analyse them in light of today's problems. Today we see a clear tendency towards the formation of

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a multipolar world, with Russia and China as major players. And, more than this, we are witnessing the progressive decline of the West that will lose more than half of its economic importance in the next 15 years. In the new geopolitical landscape, the Asian continent is emerging as the scientific and technological innovation world centre, with China as its locomotive, and this provoked what is being called the Cold War 2.0 in the media and some academic circles as a response from the United States. Although the concept is not entirely appropriate, it is useful for describing the growing confrontation between the United States and China, within the framework of a concomitant strong aggressiveness of the US establishment against Russia. With this framework in mind, it is interesting to review some episodes of the 20th century that allow us to evaluate the changes that are better understood if interpreted in a long-term perspective rather than a short-term view.

Historians and political leaders who study the 20th century have no hesitation in placing the Non-Aligned Movement foundation in Belgrade in 1961 as one of the milestones on the global stage. Neither do they have doubts in pointing out that the movement's embryo should be traced to the 1955 Bandung Afro-Asian Conference (18 to 24 April 1955) which brought together leaders from some thirty Asian and African nations, responsible for the destiny of 1.350 million human beings! These leaders were eager to make their voices heard for the first time, and they did so in the challenging context of an already evident Cold War scenario because they wanted to defend their interests while remaining independent of both ideological blocs. The Bandung stated aims were "to promote Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation to oppose colonialism and imperialism, particularly attempts by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend their influence over the Global South in the post-war global order". Bandung was more about that. It was an attempt to establish a common ideology among anti-colonial nations, which could replace the Cold War system dominated by the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism (Lee, 2011, p. 145). This diplomatic debut of the Global South had been patiently prepared through the articulations of young Asian countries within the also young United Nations. The UN Charter included the clause in defence of the nations' right to self-determination, which had been inherited from the failed League of Nations. In the context of the post-WWI period, it had had no meaning for the subjugated South because Great Britain and France, victors of the conflict, were also the two most important colonial empires. But in the post-World War II scenario, with the United States and the Soviet Union elevated to the status of dominant superpowers, this clause, together with

the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provided a solid legal underpinning for the decolonisation process. By consecrating the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement and the concept of the Third World, the Bandung meeting symbolically represented the moment in which a significant sector of humanity became aware of its role and made its voice heard. Richard Wright, a journalist who became well-known after his novel *Native Son* (1940), which became the first book by an African-American writer to be selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club, wrote *The Colour Curtain*. After attending a conference in Bandung, he wrote: "Despised, insulted, hurt, disenfranchised - in short, the informers of the human race met. Here were class and racial and religious consciousness on a global scale. Who had thought of organising such a meeting? And what did these nations have in common? Nothing, it seemed to me, but what their past relationship to the Western world had made them feel. This meeting of the rejected was in itself a kind of judgment upon the Western world!" (Wright, 1956). It was true that there were differences among the participants. But guided by the idea of creating a space of their own – an imagined community? – In the bipolar world of the period, this group of nations identified ten principles that guided their action in favour of the promotion of peaceful coexistence. And through these principles, the "spirit of Bandung" marked the process of liberation from the colonial world and determined the path for the international insertion of the countries that formed the Non-Aligned Movement, with an explicit condemnation of racism, colonialism, and imperialism and a clear definition in favour of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and, consequently, of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The "Ten Principles for Peace" were based on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" as defined in the declaration signed by India and China, with the presence of Myanmar, in 1954, to overcome their differences and focus on the defence of sovereignty and peace, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Bandung gave visibility to the struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia for their independence, and this visibility was transformed into a political and diplomatic force with the massive incorporation of new states into the UN, especially after 1960 when 16 African states were admitted. This new correlation of forces contributed to the adoption, in December of the same year, of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (GAR 1514), placing the world institution at the forefront of international support for the struggle of liberation movements. The work of African countries to unite and formulate common interests and demands proved effective with the creation of the

Organisation of African Unity in 1963, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which began to coordinate actions at the UN with the countries of the Arab League, which had been founded in 1945, and was particularly active when the rights of the Palestinian people were at stake. Efforts to achieve closer unity did not achieve the same result in the case of Asia, as border issues maintained tensions between China and India. But despite some foreseeable differences, in a Cold War scenario between the two superpowers, the African and Asian countries were fighting for their structuring as forces with their agendas, independent of the two blocs. However, it was evident that many of these countries maintained a relatively high degree of dependence on one or the other super-power in various fields, especially economic and technological. Inspired by the Bandung success, two important African and Asian leaders, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru, of India, decided to follow up the conference determinations and began a series of meetings and negotiations. A lucky coincidence had brought Egypt and India closer to Yugoslavia, which was seeking to define its new status on the world stage in the aftermath of its break with the Soviet Union. In 1950 these three countries converged in the United Nations Security Council as non-permanent members. This conviviality paved the way for a long-term partnership, facilitated by Yugoslavia's intensive lobbying in the UN on issues of interest to African and Asian countries. It is interesting to remember that, "in the months following Bandung, Tito was visited by both U Nu and Nehru, and in December 1955 he made official state visits to Egypt and Ethiopia. Yugoslavia was also re-elected to the Security Council at the end of 1955" (Alden, Morphet and Vieira, 2013, p. 143).

Another important fact that had brought Yugoslavia closer to the leaders responsible for organising the Bandung Conference was Tito's visit to Southeast Asia in December 1954, when Yugoslavia subscribed to the principles of the Panch Shila - cited in the peace and security agreements signed between India and China, in the figures of Nehru and Zhou En-lai, in June of the same year. That rapprochement was strengthened after the success of the Bandung Conference and created the conditions for the meeting on the Brioni Islands between Tito, Nasser, and Nehru in June 1956, shortly before the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

This relationship which strengthened through the work at the United Nations and on various visits enabled Tito, Nasser and Nehru to succeed in their aim to call for the Heads of State Summit Conference to be held in the city of Belgrade, 1-6 September 1961. Six years after the Bandung Conference, this meeting formally launched the foundations of the Non-

Aligned Movement, which was born with a broad representation as new countries had gained independence in the period. There were 28 countries represented in Belgrade, of which 25 were full members and three had observer status; among the full members there was only one Latin American country, Cuba, whose revolution triumphed two years earlier. The self-determination of people, the rejection of multilateral military pacts, the condemnation of apartheid, the struggle against imperialism in all its manifestations, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, the strengthening of the UN, have been strategic themes in the Non-Aligned Movement agenda since its founding in Belgrade.

Latin America and Non Alignment

This introduction allows us to understand the reasons for Latin America's absence from the Bandung Conference and its very limited participation in Belgrade - a situation that was repeated in the following conferences, only partially altered in the 1970s. Latin America's history and geography have placed some constraints on its performance on the world stage. Let us not forget that since the early days of its life as an independent nation, the United States considered Latin America as its "backyard", an ideal space in which to exercise its dominion. The Mexicans have an amusing expression in this respect: "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States!" The expression "Manifest Destiny" illustrates the perception of the United States as having been elected by God to expand its influence and to govern the world. Originally used in political propaganda in the 19th century, "Manifest Destiny" ended up becoming synonymous with the US global ambitions. A specific example of this notion is the Monroe Doctrine, declared by President James Monroe in his annual message to the US Congress on 2 December 1823. This doctrine expressed in diplomatic terms old aspirations of the North-American society and has had enormous influence on American foreign policy since then. The author of this doctrine was Monroe's Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. The doctrine declared: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers". A formula more succinct and direct of the Doctrine is "America for the North Americans". Coherent with this perception of their manifest destiny to dominate the whole American continent, the governments of the United States, even when

having different opinions on internal policy, have over time agreed on their external policy, and have done everything to keep Latin America subjugated. One of the ways of implementing this has always been to impede the integration of Latin American nations that would have made them more able to resist US incursions (militarily and economically). Another way has been to maintain a “hemispheric defence policy”, according to the Monroe Doctrine, expressed in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, IATR, signed in 1947, in the city of Rio de Janeiro. IATR is a mutual defence treaty between the United States and the Latin American countries, whose central principle was that an attack against one of the members will be considered an attack against all. In its origin, the hypothesis of a conflict was designed according to the parameters of the Cold War, with the USSR as the enemy par excellence. But with the victory of the Cuban revolution in 1959, the US gave new content to the concept of hemispheric security: the enemy was inside the countries of the region, and the Latin American Armed Forces would no longer fight against the Soviet army, helping the US in the hypothetical scenario of an invasion, but against the enemies (communists) infiltrated in their countries. Since then, all means – legal and illegal – were used to impede the initiatives of the Latin American people for change and to defeat the leaders and the progressive parties aiming to govern independently and, consequently, to define their sovereign position in the world. The dictatorship cycles in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, and the Cuba blockade are painful examples of this policy but certainly not the only ones.

Accordingly, Latin America’s international relations have sought to respond to three basic, closely related challenges: finding mechanisms to ensure autonomy (an issue that has led to the theorization of the centre-periphery relationship); the search for ways to ensure development and to achieve these two goals despite the difficult relationship with the United States. In this regard, it is important to remember that Latin America has been historically divided between elites who incorporate the worldview of the developed countries and peoples who fight for a sovereign insertion on the world map. This situation has provoked debates about the definition of the region’s own identity: does Latin America belong to the West or the Global South? This division, with political and diplomatic effects, can be observed when studying Latin America’s performance in the United Nations, particularly in the 1950s-70s when ECOSOC and the G-77, for example, were being organised. The complicated relationship with the US and the historical gap between Latin America’s colonial experience and the rest of the South

partly explains the cool reception of the Bandung message in the region and the slow incorporation of "Third Worldism", even among the most progressive governments. At a time when the Asian and African countries were taking their first steps towards independence and were beginning to discuss how to organise themselves to satisfy the repressed and fair aspirations of their populations, in the 1950s and 1960s, Latin America already had more than a century of experience in this field and was looking for answers to the challenges imposed by underdevelopment. Priorities were focused on economic issues, including regional economic integration, quite a realistic option in the face of the difficulty imposed by Washington on any kind of non-hemispheric alliance. However, between 1973 and 1983 eight Latin American countries - Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru - joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as full members. If that happened, it is because over a decade some changes had taken place in the region, and one of them was the growing mistrust of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which implicitly implied their acceptance of the military alliance with the United States. (When Cuba joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, it had already broken off diplomatic relations with the United States after the April 1961 Bay of Pigs or Girón Beach invasion, financed by Washington). On the other hand, it was not until the 1970s that the Non-Aligned Movement began to formally discuss economic issues on which Latin America had been working intensively, as aforementioned, through the Economic Commission for Latin America. This was an important factor in attracting the attention of some Latin American countries with progressive governments towards non-alignment. But the fact that the countries that joined the NAM sought, through this initiative, to show greater autonomy vis-à-vis the United States was also decisive. The historical experience of the hemispheric alliance had proved highly unsatisfactory to their interests. The definitive watershed for these governments was the support given by the United States to Britain in 1982 during the Falklands War (when Argentina tried to regain sovereignty over the archipelago it had always considered part of its territory). The attitude of the United States in that war was interpreted by Latin Americans as a betrayal of the doctrine of hemispheric security and as the de facto declaration of nullity of the TIAR, whose clauses indicated that the United States should stand by the Argentineans in defence of their sovereignty.

The Brazilian perspective – the First period²

In Brazil, where the colonisers did not find strongly structured societies, as in Peru or Mexico, the economy inherited from the colonial period remained almost unchanged for decades, external market-oriented. By choosing to adapt to the demands of the metropolitan centres and maintaining a neocolonial production structure, the country stagnated, despite its potential. But since the 1950s, new political and social forces were looking for ways to overcome underdevelopment. The debate on economic issues was centralised by the Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies (ISEB). Created by the government in 1955, ISEB was aimed at studying the Brazilian reality and allowing the incentive and promotion of national development. During the Juscelino Kubitschek administration, a stage in which Brazil accelerated its industrialisation with strong state investment, ISEB was responsible for the elaboration of a project that became known as “national-developmental”. The proposal was that a state-led revolution was needed to structurally transform the economy and enable the country to overcome underdevelopment. This period coincided with the intense activity of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (UNECLA), under the leadership of Raul Prebisch. Several Brazilians were prominent architects of UNECLA thinking, in particular Celso Furtado. And it is important to mention that the dependency theory was also developed by Brazilians, living in Santiago, Chile, at that time. Many Latin American countries were contributing at the UN level with the economic discussions. In 1961, Argentina sponsored a resolution at the summer meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) calling for international conferences to discuss solutions for trade problems faced by the less developed countries (Stanford, 1976).³ Some months later, in December 1961,

² Brasil as the South American “giant” was never a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, but in its diplomatic actions it defended positions close to those of the movement, particularly in relation to economic demands.

³ Latin American countries were challenged by the difficulties imposed by the global economic power structure on their aspiration to industrialise their raw materials. Latin America, like other Third World regions, continued to export mainly commodities. In the 1970s, raw materials account for more than 60% of developing countries’ exports, and some of them were heavily dependent on a single commodity. For example, in 1975, crude oil accounted for more than 90% of the exports of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia; more than 50% of those of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Kuwait, Syria, and Venezuela.

the UN General Assembly designated the 1960s as the “United Nations Development Decade” and international trade was defined as the “primary instrument for economic development”. In July 1962, eight Latin American countries attended the Cairo Conference on the Problems of Economic Development, four as the participants – Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico – and four as the observers – Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Cooperation among developing countries was a main issue during the conference and the participants “were invited to work closely in the UN and other international bodies to ensure economic progress” (Alden, Morphet and Vieira, 2013, p. 53). When the United Nations Secretary-General consulted governments on the advisability of holding an international conference on international trade problems, the favourable reactions were impressive. The first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) met in Geneva in March-June 1964 and was preceded by Asian, African, and Latin American regional conferences. Its chair was Raul Prebisch who defended the proposal of a permanent organisation based on periodical conferences. Latin Americans and Afro-Asian countries voted together in favour of the idea, confident that this new body would be vital for the defence of their common interests. The UNCTAD was established as an organ of the UN General Assembly, institutionalised by Resolution 1995 (XIX) to meet every four years, establishing a permanent secretariat based in Geneva and offices in New York and Addis Ababa. Since then, the political agenda of the South was promoted by the Non-Aligned Movement and the economic agenda was propelled by the newly organised Group of 77 (G-77)⁴ and the UNCTAD.

The role of leadership proved to be crucial in formulating the institutions and outlooks of the South, with Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt playing a seminal role in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement and Latin American states in the creation of G77. At the same time, through collective mobilization, Southern interests were embedded in specific policies (Alden, Morphet and Vieira, 2013, p. 27). Brazil has always felt more comfortable in taking its proposals to the G-77 and UNCTAD spaces, in which it had an outstanding performance than the option of joining the Non-Aligned

⁴ The group was founded on 15 June 1964 by the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” issued at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The first major meeting was in Algiers in 1967 when the Algiers Charter was adopted and the basis for permanent institutional structures was laid.

Movement. It is interesting to mention the fact that during the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development there has been a change of the political regime in Brazil since on 1 April 1964 the constitutional president João Goulart was deposed by a Military Junta. However, the new government, despite the ideological divergences with the previous administration, did not change Brazilian economic diplomacy. Therefore, at the UNCTAD, it defended essentially the previous regime proposals, which were searched for union with the other developing countries, in particular with the Latin-American group, seeking to manage the North-South conflict and to minimise the divisions with the developed countries. And, no less important, to ensure the continuity of the UNCTAD through an executive body that could implement the proposals approved in Geneva. The priorities of Brazilian diplomacy (including its relationship with the Non-Aligned) did not change much during the military regime concerning the previous stage, nor did it undergo fundamental changes after 21 years of the military regime, with the return of democracy, when it could have reviewed its choice. At the beginning of the 21st century (as we will explain later), great changes took place. It is interesting to highlight that by 1973 the G-77 and NAM agendas and parallel processes had converged. The IV Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was held from 5 to 9 September 1973 in Algiers, and it is considered one of the most important NAM meetings. The final declaration points to a critical international situation characterised by the “tensions in the peripheral areas, due to the deteriorating economic conditions in developing countries.” Among “the main causes of inequality, which increases permanently and afflicts the developing world” the statement mentions the “various methods of economic domination and neocolonial exploitation”. The document also denounces “the transnational’s and their monopolistic role in the commercial, financial and industrial plans.” The scenario required drawing up policies that would lead to “the establishment of a new type of international economic relations”. The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) united the G-77 and the NAM countries.

The Brazilian perspective - the Second period

The G-77 and UNCTAD experience placed Brazil in a prominent position among the South countries. Without having formally joined the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil was defending an economic agenda that had many points in common with those of the NAM. In the early years of the 21st century, after the first stage of the democratisation period

characterised by neoliberal governments, Brazil was one of the South American countries that experienced what has already begun to be called a “golden age”. Progressive governments with a broad popular base began to implement agendas aimed at overcoming the neoliberal economic legacy and strengthening regional integration, in a bold move towards autonomy concerning the historical dependence on North American hegemony. But the audacity of Brazil Workers’ Party governments proved even greater when, for the first time in history, the country formalized an extra-regional alliance, as one of the promoters of the BRICS. The BRICS group tally with the (somewhat frustrated) goals of the Non-Aligned Movement. The 1970’s proposal for a New International Economic Order depended, to a great extent, on agreements that could have been reached with the developed powers. In the early 21st century, the BRICS - taking advantage of the strength of the Chinese economy and the vastness of the areas represented, Latin America, Africa, Eurasia - began to modify the rules of the macro-economic game simply by using their resources and acting with a clear political will. For instance, instead of using the Breton Woods structures – in particular the IMF and the World Bank – the emerging powers chose to propose alternatives that did not involve an open dispute with the hegemonic powers, thus allowing them to create more inclusive conditions for global growth. This was the essence of the project of the Non-Aligned Nations when they advocated a new international economic order. The difference lies in the concrete possibilities of achieving these goals in the past and today’s world. The proximity of China and Russia to the Non-Aligned Movement was already a fact at the time of the Cold War, but the rationale of that historical moment made the coordinated action difficult. It is easy to understand that an equidistant relationship with both blocs was not the idea of the major part of the NAM members. Except for one or two countries which, for historical reasons, openly or implicitly defended an alliance with the West, most of the non-aligned countries were fully aware that their potential allies were in the socialist bloc and that they could not expect any similar support from the Western bloc, which included the old colonial powers. But they could not advance much further in that bipolar world system. Now we come to the point where the perspective of the long term enables us to understand the present. That is why we pointed out at the beginning of this article that in this second decade of the 21st century, it is important to review some of the processes that marked the 20th century and analyse them in the light of today’s problems. As aforementioned, strategies and methods used by the US to frustrate perceived challenges to its hegemony are various. In a moment defined as a New Cold War or, more

specifically, at a time when US National Security Strategy documents defined China and Russia as America's greatest enemies, it was not difficult to understand that one of the most immediate objectives of the US administration was to break the BRICS (NSS Archive, 2019-2021). In this game, Brazil was the weakest link and the main target. Because of its size, population, natural wealth, including strategic minerals, oil, agricultural potential, and important aquifers, Brazil is a key country in South America. Where Brazil goes, so do its neighbours. This was the case with the cycle of dictatorships, inaugurated with the 1964 coup d'état in Brazil, and it was also the case with the period of re-democratisation in the 1980s. And this became clear during Brazil's active participation in the BRICS. Taking advantage of the meeting in Fortaleza, Brazil (2014), President Rousseff invited the South American heads of state to a meeting in Brasilia with the leaders of China, Russia, India, and South Africa. The photo of that meeting marked the climax of Brazil's progressive governments' diplomacy. It is important to stress that by joining the BRICS experience, Brazil took a step it had never taken before, opting to join an extra-regional alliance with an emphasis on economic issues but with an undoubted geopolitical impact. A US reaction was to be expected, aiming to get Brazil back under its sphere of influence. This reaction was reinforced and articulated in Brazil with the support of important conservative political groups, representatives of the judiciary, business leaders, and the media, particularly the Globo Network oligopoly, as proven by official US documents that were eventually leaked. The Brazilian political crisis that led to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff must be embedded in the context of a broader project. It was in great measure linked to a strategy aiming not only to undermine the BRICS project, but also to make Brazil back off from strategic regional alliances (UNASUR, MERCOSUR). The second stage of this strategy was the candidacy and victory of Jair Bolsonaro, delineated within military circles, as was openly stated in the book of memoirs by General Eduardo Villas Bôas, Army commander between 2015 and 2019, published in February 2021 by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

The experience that began in Bandung, expanded in Belgrade in 1961 with the Non-Aligned Movement, and continued with the search to strengthen international alliances that would make it possible to redesign global economic structures and democratise world political structures, is not finished. Neither is it defeated. The evolution of human society is neither linear nor predetermined. It is the conscience of the people that marks the advancement. The challenge today is complex because, in addition to the economic, social, and political agenda, there is also the environmental one.

The legacy of past experiences is very rich. It is up to present and future generations to use it wisely.⁵

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⁵ The author of this analysis had worked for more than two decades as a journalist in the international arena, as a correspondent for various Latin American media outlets and as founder, editor and director of three magazines, *Third World* (1974-2005), *Ecology and Development* (1991-2005) and *Revista do Mercosur* (1992-2005). During her career as a journalist, the author personally interviewed personalities such as Nelson Mandela, Agostinho Neto, Fidel Castro, Yasser Arafat, Samora Machel, Saddam Hussein, Sean MacBride, Xanana Gusmao, Julius Nyerere, General Omar Torrijos, General Velasco Alvarado, Eduardo Galeano, Mahmoud Darwish, and collectively Muammar Gaddafi, alongside many others. She is the winner of numerous awards for journalism, including the Vladimir Herzog Prize (1987), the Golden Dolphin Award (2000) and the Victory Medal (2013), by the Brazilian Ministry of Defense.

REVITALISATION OF THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS



*Leaders of the non-aligned countries at the First Conference in Belgrade, 1961
(Source: Public domain images)*

2021, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN THE GLOBAL ARENA: GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REAFFIRMED NEEDS IN A MULTIPOLAR SETTING

István TARRÓSY¹

Abstract: This chapter offers an overview of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the modern global system using Dominique Moïsi's innovative geopolitical approach of emotions. It looks at how the place and role of the NAM have been changing in international relations since its foundations were laid down at the conferences of Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961). The analysis presents a number of questions for further debate over the changing global order and the issues and approaches represented by the NAM within it, centred around such key questions as human security and "development as freedom" along the theory of Amartya Sen. It deals with the 18th NAM Summit held in Baku, Azerbaijan, and draws upon several of the key statements of its final document in an effort to confirm the refined relevance of the Movement in the 21st century.

Key words: inter-polar, multipolar, geopolitics, spirits of Bandung and Belgrade, New Asian-African Strategic Partnership, emotions, human security.

The NAM and the global context on Moïsi's geopolitical map of emotions

The significance of the Bandung Conference of 1955 in global history is pivotal from a number of angles. In the bipolar setting of the Cold War, this milestone Asian-African conference provided a common ground for

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aggravation of ideas and hopes also stemming from “a culmination of connections and relationships that had crossed the Indian Ocean world for centuries” (Lee, 2010, p. 10). The hopes and aspirations articulated by the twenty-nine Asian and African countries were derived from the fact that, according to the words of President Soekarno’s opening speech, “For many generations, our peoples have been the voiceless ones in the world [...] the un-regarded, the peoples for whom decisions were made by others whose interests were paramount, the peoples who lived in poverty and humiliation.” (Soekarno in Kahin, 1955, p. 41). In his 2010 book, French scholar of geopolitics Dominique Moïsi pointed exactly in this direction in search of a better understanding of our international system, underscoring that, today, “quests for identity by peoples uncertain of who they are, their place in the world, and their prospects for a meaningful future have replaced ideology as the motor of history, with the consequence that emotions matter more than ever” (Moïsi, 2010, p. 4). He proposed an innovative geopolitical mapping of our global world in an *emotional way*, clearly acknowledging the difficulty to analyse and categorise countries according to his three basic types, i.e., primary emotions of fear, hope, and humiliation. Moïsi stated that these emotions “are closely linked with the notion of confidence, which is the defining factor in how nations and people address the challenges they face as well as how they relate to one another” (Moïsi, 2010, p. 5).

First, I wish to grab the emotion of *hope*, which, as Moïsi argues, “is about economic and social empowerment, and its chief dwelling place [today] is in the East.” (Moïsi, 2010, p. 31). This seems to be a recurring state, then, as it used to characterise the East in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when, in the post-Bandung years, after the institutionalization of non-alignment in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, countries of the region strived for policies along some clearly defined common denominators, including the eradication of unequal economic development in the world. Lorenz Lüthi is right in emphasizing that, “Through [such] international cooperation, the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, particularly the dominant countries – Yugoslavia, Egypt, Indonesia (initially), and India (later on) – wanted to increase their influence in international affairs.” (Lüthi, 2016, p. 99). This is exactly the focal item of our geopolitical investigation as we look at the place and role of the NAM, as well as the potential alternative its allied countries intended to present within the global system.

During the 60 years of its existence, the NAM did present many achievements and delivered or contributed to the successful execution of

crucial tasks, including the eradication of the “classical form of colonialism, [or being] instrumental in bringing about the end of apartheid in South Rhodesia and South Africa, [but also taking part in] the beginning of the North–South dialogue.” (Sen, 2005, p. 133). The movement consistently articulated the importance of “the right to development and sovereignty of the State over its natural resources” (Ibid), which have become cornerstones of world politics ever since. From a geopolitical perspective, natural resources (wealth) have always been subject to scramble, and to be able to utilize them for the sake of the development of the given state, right (good) governance needs to be attached. The prerequisite to this obviously is sovereignty, which surely is not sufficient as long as the practice of patronage and rent-seeking in numerous instances narrows the circle of beneficiaries to the governing (corrupt) elite. In addition, as Paul Collier explains, “resource rents gradually erode checks and balances” (Collier, 2008, p. 46), therefore, it is of paramount importance to improve the performance of the government for the wider societal good. In the multi-vector polycentric system of 2021, the Non-Aligned Movement remains a loud advocate in particular for the developing countries to first and foremost get hold of their own resources.

With their ascent sixty years ago in Belgrade, the non-aligned countries created new dynamics in the international political and economic landscape, which during the 1950s was largely overwhelmed by the security nexus of the two competing blocs of East and West. As Marianne Marchand underscored, in the context of North–South relations, “the South collectively attempted to define its relationship with the North around key economic issues.” (Marchand, 1994, p. 289). Their proposed New International Economic Order (NIEO) sought a restructured arena with newly defined processes to respond to the needs of the then Third World. Southern countries “focused primarily on the areas of trade, resource transfer, and the international financial system” (Marchand, 1994, p. 292), in particular, in a period when the Bretton Woods system dominated by the U.S. was collapsing. This restructuring was meant to be, as written in the Brandt Report, “a positive process”, in light of the “mutual interest of North and South” (Brandt et al., 1980, p. 35). However, due to several changes in the international system, including the “outbreak of the Third World debt crisis, the quest for a new international economic order came to a dead end.” (Marchand, 1994, p. 293). This, unfortunately, provided the ground for emotions such as humiliation, despair, and fears about the future to get strengthened across the South. According to Moïsi, humiliation can “reinforce the instinct of competition. It gives energy and whets the appetite.

[...]. To put it in another way, for humiliation to be “good humiliation” requires the least trust and favourable circumstances, such as a reasonably promising political and economic context and a national leadership up to the task.” (Moisi, 2010, p. 57). And we must not forget that gaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s came along with responsibilities for countries of the South. As Soekarno already stated at the Bandung Conference, “We have heavy responsibilities to ourselves, and to the world, and to the yet unborn generations. [...] The responsibilities and burdens, the rights and duties and privileges of independence must be seen as part of the ethical and moral content of independence.” (Soekarno in Kahin, 1955, p. 41) On this ground, for the NAM and the Global South, the ending of the Cold War presented several new geopolitical considerations, which basically drove their countries into the formulation of new strategies.

The NAM in the post-Cold War era: New geopolitical realities and considerations

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, first, the international community had the feeling to experience a “unipolar moment”, but gradually had started witnessing the “emergence of a more multipolar world” (Smith, 2012, p. 52), with the United States of America as undoubtedly still “by far the most powerful state on the face of the earth” (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 113), and with an increasing number of emerging powers exerting a growing influence in the global arena. Numerous centres of gravity started to rise. As Sally Morphet suggested, “the Movement instituted a new strategy of integration in the world in order not to be left out from the mainstream of economic and technological development. Instead of the unsuccessful concept of the New International Economic Order, priority was given to various forms of regional linkages with developing countries.” (Morphet, 2004, p. 528). This resonated well with what Samir Amin mentioned as one of the new forms of globalization, saying that “the Bandung project for Asia and Africa inscribed the industrialization of these countries in a newly negotiated and revised global interdependence.” (Amin, 2011, p. 102). Today’s international context, according to Giovanni Grevi, is best described as *interpolar* with the moment when “major global and regional powers cooperate to manage deepening interdependence, and build a viable and effective multilateral order.” (Grevi, 2009, p. 7). In a previous publication (Tarrósy, 2015a), I had already posed the question: Is there a chance for a newly defined (or rather re-confirmed) framework of solidarity and collaboration among Asian and African states

to get more attention and voice in this interpolar pragmatic globalism? How much can the “Spirit of Bandung” contribute to the rise of Asian entities in Africa, and how much African agency can get strengthened via the special Afro-Asian relationship and its New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), for instance? All these in light of the notion of *hope*, one of the emotions on the innovative geopolitical map drawn by Dominique Moïsi. Many have argued that with the end of the bipolar setting, the Non-Aligned Movement lost its relevance. Keethaponcalan stresses that “many of the economic issues of the NAM states, despite the organisation’s intervention to remedy them, still remain unresolved.” (Keethaponcalan, 2016, p. 3), such as external debt, for instance, therefore, to continue with the NAM in our 21st-century global system should be re-confirmed. I agree with Morphet that “The NAM still exists and has adapted to the end of the Cold War by seeking more pragmatic and ad hoc partnerships” (Morphet, 2004, p. 528) via an issue-based approach. This is also confirmed by Fall, who underscores that “Most of the NAM’s agenda and its demands are still relevant today notably: resisting the military control over the planet, advocating national and international policies for a more equitable management of resources for all people, safeguarding the rights of nations to choose their own independent development while ensuring peace and solidarity amongst nations.” (Fall, 2015, p. 307). From this perspective, the latest NAM Summit in Baku (October 25-26, 2019) strengthened the standpoint of the organisation that there is a constant “need for the international community, in particular the NAM Member States, to collectively redress situations [of global nature] in accordance with the UN Charter and the principles of international law” (NAM, 2019, p. 7). From a global governance aspect, it has been crucial that since the end of the bipolar world, the dominant actors of the international system have gradually acknowledged the demand of the Global South – in line with what the NAM has always been standing for – to be able to get on the leading bodies of the multilateral organisations, therefore, to be provided with a more sophisticated articulation of their voice. We saw the ascending of the developing and emerging countries of the Global South in successfully nominating experienced experts to lead these organisations – such as in the case of the World Health Organisation (WHO), as of today, led by Dr Tedros Adhamon Ghebreyesus as director-general, or the World Trade Organisation (WTO), led by Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as director-general since March 1, 2021. At the same time, Hennie Strydom makes a valid critical point about the responsibilities of these states (too), underlining that if “some members [of the NAM] in a multi-lateral arrangement remain internally weak and dysfunctional”, that may hamper

the “strategic interests of the members, individually or collectively” (Strydom, 2007, p. 47). Therefore, the constant effort to improve governance is a prerequisite to position the given country and the organisation better, thus, “there is a case made out for domestic reforms within [the respective] Members States first, before institutional reform at the international level will have the desired effects” (Ibid). Also, from this perspective on governance, NAM summits and high-level meetings continue to take place and the promotion of South–South cooperation has been put high on the political agendas all across the landscape. As Lee confirms, “In addition to the NAM, the Group of 77 – established within the UN in 1964 to aggregate the interests of developing countries – has since enlarged to include 134 countries. The NAM itself continues [...] to provide a forum for leaders and nation-states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” (Lee, 2010, p. 18). In 2021, the number of members counts this 134. How to position, re-position themselves in the global system of today, together with how to tackle global issues of insecurity and inequality, still offer sufficient ammunition for the Movement and the Global South to keep the *spirit* alive – obviously, in a revamped and reargued manner, as we acknowledge that with the end of the bipolar era, the “Bandung Spirit” lost its relevance from a political point of view.

Bandung 1955 and Belgrade 1961 undoubtedly resulted in some fundamental items and actors for the international system voiced more accurately and strongly under the umbrella of the “third way”. Panchali Sen suggests that “In formulating its agenda for the future, the Movement should incorporate in it both its traditional and emerging goals and objectives and should also take cognizance of other issues and priorities on the international agenda.” (Sen, 2005, p. 135). Among these, we find human rights, sustainable growth and development, global trade, debt relief, global peace, and social justice, to name some major items. A *voice of the South* representing a *southern way*, if you wish, over all these globally significant issues (basically, all of them are of global nature) articulated by countries aligned, however, still with the “spirits” of Bandung and Belgrade, is ever so needed. As I wrote in an article in the year of the 50th anniversary of the Bandung conference (Tarrósy, 2005), third-way politics, or politics of the former Third World successfully influenced the thematic setting of the global agenda already in the first years of the new Millennium. Today, in 2021, North–South relations and the issues connected with the development of countries of the South have become one of the main inertia systems of our global world, and in formulating potential answers to global challenges, it is unimaginable that Southern views and demands, for example, the

opinions and suggestions put forward by the non-aligned in the UN, are not taken into account per se. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that there is a need, ever-increasing, for such southern dialogue and cooperation, along the traditional network of non-alignment, in the sense of alliance formation and concerted efforts, and coupled with what Jazić proposes, “a fight for multilateralism, the central role of the UN and its Millennium programs [...] make the existence of the NAM no less necessary than before.” (Jazić, 2005, p. 66). I still think that to allow this third way, or better to say, southern way to find proper solutions to challenges of global nature – such as the rise of transnational terrorism, fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international migration, or the vulnerabilities of financial markets – unanimous, clear and strict reforms must be carried out by the respective countries. All these need again concerted efforts of the members of the NAM.

New institutionalized processes in the making - The importance of the Baku Summit of 2019

Already the 60th-anniversary Bandung Conference in April 2015 produced some re-encouraging rhetoric. Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo (having assumed office in October 2014) boldly declared before closing the conference: “This is [the] revival voice of Asian-African nations that cannot be replaced by anyone.” (Parameswaran, 2015). Under the motto “Strengthening South-South Cooperation to Promote World Peace and Prosperity”, one main objective was to make a commitment to the “Declaration on Reinvigorating the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership”, which basically reaffirmed support for the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership accepted at the 50th-anniversary event. The commitment to foster a “stronger, more inclusive and sustainable” partnership was again stated. However, when hearing such optimistic tones, also presented in the Declaration, it is better to stay critical, as does Ian Taylor in his book *Africa Rising? BRICS – Diversifying Dependency*, which rather raises attention about the extended group of entities that – as external forces – create more dependent linkages, for instance, for African actors. Taking trade as a major connecting thread, Taylor points out that the structures of emerging countries with Africa “do not exhibit any exceptionalism and are comparable to the relationships established by the capitalist core since the colonial period.” (Taylor, 2014, p. 147). Taylor also emphasizes that there are obvious opportunities for African states in diversifying their relations with all those “hungry for” natural resources and

new markets if the African agency can take control of its own resources. He also quotes Amilcar Cabral underscoring the “starting point for any true rise of Africa”: “national liberation takes place when, and only when, national productive forces are completely free of all kinds of foreign domination.” (Cabral, 1979, in: Ibid, p. 160). To be able to produce a new political vision and all the necessary capacities for something “different” though, signatories of the Declaration want to stick to the Spirit of Bandung and African-Asian solidarity. They are also “committed to develop an institutionalized process of the NAASP” (2005, p. 5), which at the same time is not an easy aspiration as far as the intergovernmental level is concerned. The text of the Declaration goes on to say that the already existing initiatives, such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), or the India-Africa Summit Forum (IASF) will be complemented the NAASP, it is hard to see in concrete terms how such an idea can really turn into a functioning operation for the benefit of all parties involved. Kenny Dlamini is right to underline that “The establishment of NAASP promised to formalise and strengthen regional cooperation between Asia and Africa, and to open more channels for economic, social and cultural relations. However, the purpose of NAASP has yet to be realised as a multilateral framework to coordinate relations between the two continents.” (Dlamini, 2019, p. 1). This is an issue for further deliberation for the entire Non-Aligned Movement. Under the chairmanship of Azerbaijan, the NAM held its 18th summit between 25 and 26 October 2019 in Baku. “The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed and underscored the validity and relevance of the Movement’s principled positions concerning the promotion and preservation of multilateralism and the multilateral process.” (NAM, 2019, pp. 18-19). Such a firm belief is basic to achieve many of the goals the NAM (and the numerous other stakeholders in our inter-polar setting) upholds. With regard to Moïsi’s thoughts about the future, what is needed is an “enlightened dream [which] indicates the direction the world could take under the guidance of the right leaders, armed with the right principles and having at their disposal the right institutional mechanisms” (Moïsi, 2010, p. 138). In particular, to ensure human security in the international system, the NAM stresses that “the national ownership, *leadership* and capacity building are essential elements” (NAM, 2019, p. 19), and underscores “the need for a strengthened and scaled-up global partnership for development, based on the recognition of national leadership and ownership of development strategies” (NAM, 2019, p. 166). In their final summit document, the NAM emphasized that “international cooperation must be enhanced; including the fulfilment of

commitments of internationally agreed official development assistance, debt relief, market access, capacity building and technical support, including technology transfer” (Ibid). As for the driving *principles*, the NAM firmly believes in the validity of its ten founding principles, as well as its role in the “present international juncture” deriving from their reaffirmation – as adopted at the 14th NAM Summit in Havana, in September 2016. Based on the “respect for the political, economic, social and cultural diversity of countries and peoples”, it remains crucial for the NAM that the “respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including the effective implementation of the right of peoples to peace and development” (NAM, 2019, p. 249.) is guaranteed in the international system. This seems to be closely associated with what Nobel-laureate Amartya Sen proposed about development, which “can be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. [...] development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.” (Sen, 1999, p. 3). The 5-element typology developed by Sen shows the “empirical connection that links freedoms of different kinds with one another. Political freedoms [...] help to promote economic security. Social opportunities [...] facilitate economic participation. Economic facilities [...] can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for social facilities. Freedoms of different kinds can strengthen one another.” (Ibid, p. 11). In Baku, the NAM confirmed its commitment to human security. The Baku Summit also reaffirmed “the importance of strengthening the current *institutional mechanisms* for South-South Cooperation and [NAM members] expressed their support for the principles on which South-South Cooperation is based.” (NAM, 2019, p. 181). The 2019 event is not only a landmark multilateral political action for the host country, Azerbaijan (especially in the expanding phase of its increasingly assertive foreign policy), but also for the changing global landscape with more emerging centres of gravity.

Conclusions

Given our initial assumptions to conclude from the work of Moïsi that, “there remain reasons for hope, [as] there is a new generation of leaders [...], so is the increasingly important role of women, [...] [together with] economic hope” (Moïsi, 2010, p. 133). Lumumba-Kasongo makes a valid point by emphasizing that the essential political issue is “to develop first the

state's welfarism as the foundation of African-Asian solidarity" (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015, p. 16). This is what may then contribute to a new type of "appreciation" of the new type of African-Asian solidarity and partnership initiative in the 21st century, which can serve as a reaffirmed basis for the Non-Aligned Movement in the new global arena. All the entities of the system of Afro-Asian partnership want a change envisaging a "caring Asian-African society where the people live in stability, prosperity, dignity and free from the fear of violence, oppression and injustice" (NAASP, 2005, p. 3). This looks to stay a true driving force for the coming years. The new interregional alliances and collaborations of the South-South context bearing the blessings of the "spirits of Bandung and Belgrade" can mean the way forward both in political, economic, as well as geopolitical terms. "We can define peace as the ensemble of functions, including emotions that resist war and violence. [...] humanitarian deterrence, a form of preventive medicine for the international system" (Moïsi, 2010, p. 153) may mean to the terrain of multilateral politics and activism for the Non-Aligned Movement in the unfolding multipolar setting of our century.

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AN EXIT FROM CONTRADICTIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

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Abstract: Six decades after the First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade and three decades after the end of the Cold War, we have the opportunity to summarise the development of the Movement in its two basic phases: during the bipolar Cold War confrontation and the turbulent period after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union. The very fact that the Non-Aligned Movement managed to survive in two rather contradictory environments – the one for which it was formed and the other which is its formal negation – is impressive enough. Like other multilateral treaties and organisations, the Non-Aligned Movement faces uncertainties and seeks a new identity. The same is now happening with NATO, the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe and the CSCE (OSCE). With the exception of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement is the broadest and most effective international political movement with as many as 120 member states.

Key words: the Cold War, George Kennan, Tito, modernisation of the NAM, Jakarta Summit, the crisis of the NAM, moral power, EU, pandemic, inequality, reshaping the Movement, 2030 Agenda.

Introduction

From the historical experience so far, it can be concluded that the end of the Cold War in Europe was partly due to the policy of the Non-Aligned Movement and the former Yugoslavia because both of these political actors sought to end the bloc division of the world through peaceful coexistence

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and a fairer economic system and to stop the arms race and to eliminate the domination of large countries over small ones, without, of course, disputes arising in that process, which should, in any case, be resolved by peaceful means. The main principles of the non-aligned countries – independence, peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems, refusal and renunciation of the use of force in international relations, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and equitable world economic order, have remained the legacy and enduring values of this movement, which are now seeking ways to be also applied in the contemporary world. Today, 53 African, 26 South American and 36 Asian countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Since 1998, Belarus has been the only European member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Malta and Cyprus were also its members until their accession to the EU. The organisation initially had two main goals: 1) non-alignment and 2) the national liberation or decolonisation of the Third World. The first two membership requirements were that 1) the country pursues an independent policy, based on the coexistence of states and non-alignment, or shows the tendency to pursue such policy and that 2) the country lastingly supports liberation movements.

Non-alignment can be discussed in terms of two related visions: as a foreign policy perspective for many new countries that gained political independence after the Second World War and as their broad international movement with the aim of achieving a substantial and structural change in international relations. While the first vision has already been achieved, the second still provides a strong basis for the survival and activities of the Movement. There are many who almost automatically argue that the Non-Aligned Movement was created at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955. In one of his critical analyses of non-alignment, Willetts contends that in this way the Movement is given “false roots” (Willetts, 1978). “(...) While I maintain non-aligned movement was not born until 1961 as a coherent group of ideas propounded by a group of relatively like-minded states, it has also been maintained by other people that non-alignment did not live beyond 1961”. Dinkel arrived at the same conclusion following anti-colonial, Afro-Asian and non-aligned conferences from Brussels in 1927, through Bandung in 1955 and Belgrade in 1961 to Jakarta in 1992 (Dinkel, 2018). Similar views can also be found in a comprehensive 12-volume collection of documents on non-alignment, which was published in 1978 (Jankowitsch, Odette, Sauvart, Weber, Jörg, 1978). Nevertheless, S.I. Keethaponcalan maintains that the “spirit of non-alignment” was created in Bandung: “Equally significant is the fact that Yugoslavia under Marshall Tito

played a major role in moving the initial solidarity into the Non-Aligned Movement, with a relatively clear ideology and purpose” (Keethaponcalan, 2016). As the Soviet Union failed to prevent Tito from taking on a leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement during the turbulent 1960s, divisions within the communist world were deepened. Tito’s actions and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement as a global power already disrupted the Soviet monopoly over communist ideology, which had been dramatically weakened by Stalin’s death in 1953 and the subsequent split between the Soviet Union and China (Niebuhr, 2011). The American Embassy in Belgrade analysed the First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, which was held in Belgrade in 1961 and recorded that the presence of a large number of prominent persons had a very exciting impact on the population, which greeted the delegates whenever they appeared on the streets, and this happened up to four times a day. The participants were certainly flattered and pleased with such a welcome, which also had a favourable influence on their opinion of Yugoslavia. It was also concluded that a strong impression Yugoslavia left on all delegates was a reward for the efforts and financial costs invested in the organisation of this conference. It presented itself as a country with an efficient and vigorous government that meets the needs of its people and enjoys its support by setting exceptionally high political and economic development standards. Tito’s criticism of the United States, although he promised he would not do that before the Conference, was experienced by the then American Ambassador in Belgrade and “father of the Cold War”, George Kennan, with a deep disappointment and even the feeling of being betrayed (Bisenić, 2011). Since then, the controversial US-NAM relations have alternated between acceptance and sharp differences (Rubinstein, A., 1978, p. 156). The turning point in the development of the Non-Aligned Movement took place at the end of the Cold War. When the 9th Summit was held in Belgrade in 1989, it became clear that the bipolar world was nearing its end and that the founding principles of the Movement’s existence were slipping away. Perestroika in the Soviet Union was in full swing, so it was expected that the Belgrade Summit would modernise the paradigm of the Movement. Yugoslavia, which hosted this meeting, was convinced that the Movement needed a similar change of its policy at the global level if it wished to survive the challenges of the new times. Hence, Yugoslavia pleaded for the “modernisation of the Non-Aligned Movement”, which actually implied the abandonment of the NAM’s repulsive attitude towards the world’s two power blocs (Syatauw, 1994). Instead, the NAM adopted a more tolerant and flexible position with an emphasis on cooperation and dialogue. The Yugoslav leaders were so

strongly convinced of the need to change this policy that they accused those members of the NAM who disagreed with them of being dogmatic, conservative and radical. The earlier assumptions of ideological exclusivity and one-sided postulates were omitted in the final documents. The central focus was laid on a struggle to bridge the gap between the rich North and the poor South. The economic policies of the non-aligned countries were elaborated in detail in order to enable them to fit into the world division of labour as successfully as possible. Thus, the formula based on the East-West confrontation became obsolete. It must be noted that this formulation was also advocated and imposed by the then Yugoslavia. That was the "European" orientation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Many members of the NAM did not share the Yugoslav views, nor were they convinced that international political changes were of a lasting nature, no matter how profound they were. During the formulation of the final documents of the Belgrade Summit, Yugoslavia's views were only partly adopted, that is, only where the NAM explicitly approved the policy of dialogue and cooperation. In the Belgrade Declaration, it was also stated that, despite the improvement of the global political climate and easing of tensions, peace was not stable and there was no reason for excessive optimism. In a speech before the US Congress on 11 September 1990, US President George W. Bush described what he called a "new world order" as "a new era freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony (...)" (Bush, 1990). The non-aligned countries did not adopt the idea of a "new world order". Before the Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Accra (Ghana) in September 1991, the world political situation had deteriorated further, including, among other things, the entire break-up of the Yugoslav federation. The report of the Accra Conference concluded that no consensus had been reached in support of the view that the Cold War had ended and that the New World Order had actually emerged (Accra Report, 1991). However, the meeting did reaffirm the earlier commitment to the policy of compromise and consultation (Accra Report, 1991, Para 1). This conference was attended by Živadin Jovanović, the then Yugoslav Ambassador in Luanda and later Minister of Foreign Affairs. He stated that he had received the instruction to discourage the formation of the Group of Friends of Yugoslavia within the Non-Aligned Movement because the solution of the Yugoslav problem had to be sought within the then European Economic Community (EEC). The other instruction was to invite Germany to attend the Ministerial Conference as a "guest" (Jovanović, 2020). It is paradoxical that immediately after the

Belgrade Conference both Yugoslavia and its orientation vanished. Or, in other words, with the end of the Cold War one of its pillars also ceased to exist. This certainly had an impact on the character and nature of the Movement in the years that followed. The Jakarta Summit (as the 10th Conference of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries is better known), which was held from 1 to 6 December 1992, began under rather difficult circumstances (Syatauw, 1994). The Jakarta Summit was attended by representatives of 100 countries and some 60 heads of state attended its sessions. Three years after the Belgrade Summit in September 1989, the post-Cold War world still failed to calm down. The disturbing effect of the collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and its drama teamed up with the turmoil in the Middle East when Iraq threatened Saudi Arabia and then attacked Kuwait. A large number of Arab non-aligned countries got involved in the conflict that the NAM alone could not resolve. The situation for the NAM worsened still further when the Balkan region was caught in the wave of political unrest in Yugoslavia, which held the chair of the NAM at that time. Some members argued that Yugoslavia had collapsed and no longer existed. Hence, it could no longer be a member of the NAM. However, there was also strong support for the opposite view that only some parts of the former Yugoslav federation had seceded and that the republics wishing to remain, Serbia and Montenegro, maintained the "state continuity and international and legal subjectivity of Yugoslavia" (Jovanović, 1993). Many African countries with a multi-ethnic population also favoured the latter view. There followed the debate on Yugoslavia's membership of the NAM in the broad outline and with the opposite views, which had been presented at the UN during a similar debate on Yugoslavia's membership of the UN (Blum, 1992). However, there was one fundamental difference. Unlike UN decisions, NAM decisions are taken by consensus, but due to so strongly divided parties, there was no consensus and, therefore, no decision could be achieved. Hence, the Yugoslav delegation was allowed to remain at the conference, pending the final decision on the legitimacy of its membership, which had to be taken at a special ministerial meeting of the NAM in New York in September 1992. Unfortunately, this meeting could not find the solution, so the resolution of this issue was postponed for an uncertain period of time. The then chairman, Indonesia, tried to resolve it, while the FR Yugoslavia agreed to suspend its participation in the NAM meetings and activities until its status in the international community is solved (Demian, 1993).

**The Burial of a “Dead Horse”:
A Discussion on the Survival of the Movement**

The discussion on Yugoslavia moved on, according to the same pattern, to another topic – the Movement itself. Since the end of the Cold War, two views on the vitality of the Movement in the contemporary world have been formulated:

- 1) According to the first view, the Non-Aligned Movement has survived the end of the Cold War, but has become superfluous because all countries now have different choices; moreover, there is a considerable number of those who argue that regardless of the number of the non-aligned countries, their influence is not felt in the world;
- 2) According to the other view, the values of the Non-Aligned Movement, especially its strong support for peace, the resolution of problems and conflicts by peaceful means, and the rejection of hegemony, still secure a place for it in the world today (Bisenić, 2020).

For now, it is enough to say that the Movement has survived and operates on the international scene. From 1989 to the present day, there were eight summits of the non-aligned countries. The fact that the Movement has survived as a form of action in the world shows that the majority of countries do not wish to repudiate the goals for which the Non-Aligned Movement has been fighting since its beginning. Giving an explanation of how and why the Movement managed to survive after the Cold War, Laura Hood states that non-alignment has got a new meaning vis-à-vis the attitude towards US politics and their Western allies (Hood, 2016). Over the past decades, some basic principles of non-alignment have been in collision with developments in international relations. This refers to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and respect for human rights. Analysing the changes in India’s foreign policy in 2008, Carsten Rauch realised that India “distanced itself (too) far from the once cherished ideal of a non-aligned, moral foreign policy rooted in peaceful cooperation” under the increasing influence of the neoliberal economy and under pressure from the United States. She argues that the overriding important goal of India’s foreign policy is to preserve its independence and ability to act, maximise Indian possibilities for influence and, put in quite general terms, make India into a global player “with a voice which will command attention in the shaping of the world order”. According to Raja Mohan, to India, a country with almost no real power that could be demonstrated on the international stage, the Non-Aligned Movement offered the best path for the promotion

of its diplomatic presence on the world stage (Mohan, 2004). "As long as India was very weak, non-alignment and involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement were perceived in New Delhi as a vehicle for drawing nearer to these goals. The stronger India becomes, the more any involvement in this movement loses its attraction" (Rauch, 2008). Since the very beginning, the Non-Aligned Movement has invoked its moral strength in international relations. Speaking in the Parliament in January 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru said that "... ultimately the foreign policy of every country is limited by the strength which that country possesses. Now, strength may be military or may also be, if I may use the word, moral. Obviously, India has no military or financial strength to go about interfering with other people, not that we want to. We have no desire to – and we cannot – impose our will on others." Consequently, there remained only moral strength as the basis for action in international relations. And moral strength was closely linked to the strict observance of international law from which the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement derived their basic principles. Due to the increasing non-observance of international law, that is, the rights of other countries, the non-aligned position is becoming increasingly attractive to many countries in the world today. Alvin Rubinstein has written a compelling book on Tito and non-alignment, where he presented three primary strategic goals: to reinforce Yugoslav efforts to end the country's position of relative diplomatic isolation, to link Yugoslavia to the progressive forces in the world, and to develop markets in the Third World for Yugoslav enterprises. In the post-Cold War period, critics predominantly used negative terminology to describe this movement. In the West, the terms like "anachronous", "irrelevant", "disgraced" and "substantially superfluous" were usually used to describe the Non-Aligned Movement. One of the most important arguments was that this movement had no reason to exist and should be dissolved. So, before the 13th Summit, which was to be hosted by Bangladesh in 2002, and after the autumn 2001 election, the new government cancelled the hosting of this meeting at its first session. The new finance minister said that non-alignment was a "dead horse" and that Bangladesh should not spend its money on "horse burial" (Štrbac, 2020).

The Gradual Irrelevance of the Goals

The end of the Cold War was indeed a major blow to the Movement because most of the problems, such as apartheid and colonialism, gradually disappeared. Thus, the goals of the Movement changed from one summit to the next because its initial goals gradually became irrelevant. In contrast

to Western political leaders, Third World leaders did not believe that it was necessary to dissolve the organisation only because its initial goals became irrelevant (Keethaponcalan, 2016). The new system, which was created after the Cold War, benefits strong and resource-rich countries, which cannot be said for any Third World country. Despite the problems faced by the Non-Aligned Movement, many countries wish to join it because they consider it a useful platform and support system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, one Western diplomat, who was observing the Jakarta Summit, expressed the opinion that “a lot of these tiny nations are praying that the (Non-Aligned) Movement can survive and advocate on their behalf” because “most of the nations are not capable of doing it for themselves”. Nobody pays attention to them anymore (Shanon, 1992). The Non-Aligned Movement was not created for ideological reasons. It was not so much a response to a bipolar world, but a response to a non-free world, that is, a colonial system in which millions of people were in a subservient position, working and creating wealth for other countries. This prevented one’s free presentation and expression of free will in international relations. The NAM imparted to its members a feeling of psychological security and removed the constant threat of isolation and psychological insecurity. The most economically powerful countries now use sanctions as a means to achieve their goals. In the past, it was Third World countries that imposed sanctions against other countries through the UN system, as in the case of aggression against sovereign countries or the apartheid system. The Non-Aligned Movement emerged from an intellectual quest for liberation from foreign domination and the liberation of cultural potentials in countries. Pankaj Mishra called it “intellectual decolonisation” (Mishra, 2017). The Movement is no longer a global actor as it used to be, but its policy that is not directed against the United States, the European Union, Russia or China makes the bloc popular among the members. Although the 120-member organisation represents the great majority of the UN members, the exclusion of the global powers, such as the United States, Russia, Western Europe and Japan, can limit the ability of these countries to have an influence on global trends or impose their decisions. During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement was an instrument that enabled the developing countries to preserve their independence in the competition of the superpowers and their satellites. Although it was believed that the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of an era without wars and violence in international relations, the reality turned out to be different. Wars and increasingly strained relations among the world’s leading countries, the United States, the European Union, Russia and China, as well as the new regional confrontations in North Africa, the

Middle East, South East Asia and the Horn of Africa have revived the Cold War hotspots. The Balkans and the “post-Soviet space”, including Central Asia, have not been bypassed. We must ask ourselves why life is getting harder and harder, why problems are accumulating and conflicts are multiplying, although the total wealth of the world is growing and so is the total human potential. The question also arises whether we should live in the era of “modern barbarism”, where our human and state relations resemble barbaric ones, despite the most advanced achievements in the field of communications, industry and transport. Many studies and books have already been written describing the current and future periods as “global anarchy” (Kaplan, 1994) or “growing jungle” (Kagan, 2018). A long time ago, when the British Prime Minister, Lord Callaghan, asked Henry Kissinger what the 21st century would be like, the latter answered that it would be brutal and that he was very glad not to be living in it (Kissinger, 1999). One half of his prediction has already come true, and the other half has not. Henry Kissinger is still alive and can witness the reality of his prediction about the “brutal world”. The Non-Aligned Movement is one form of a globalised world where all its problems also concern the non-aligned countries. Since its creation, especially in the Cold War era, the non-aligned countries were criticised for “embracing rigorous moral pretensions as a substitute for a rigorous analysis of the problem”. Today, many countries, even the non-aligned ones, have rejected the ideas of morality and politics, value and politics and human rights and politics. They believe that they are able to pursue some particular national interests in the same way as the colonial powers did in the 19th century and that other countries cannot understand that as the basis of inequality and dominance and hegemonic intentions, and avoid that in a simple and easy way. Human rights and ethical political conduct, even in international relations, have just been included in interstate relations to protect the weak from the strong and guarantee equality to countries, small and big, rich and less rich. “Justice”, “righteousness” and law are the most frequent values invoked historically by the Movement. It is faced with the option of multi-alignment instead of non-alignment as a temporary step that keeps all options open, just the way the great powers do it (Babu, 2012). And even if they belong to different groups, they still serve the same goal: to articulate their own views while at the same time preserving their strategic autonomy in global affairs. If we have to compare the political philosophy of today’s world, we can go back and look for it in the “age of alliances”, which followed the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Some believe that the alliance of conservative monarchies or powers secured peace and stability in Europe, so similar analogies are

also made today. It is believed that an alliance of conservative countries and leaders could be an exit from uncertainty or that alliance and ally ships are the potential guarantee of stability. Some large countries have accused the Non-Aligned Movement of belonging to an “opportunistic bloc”. However, the fact that the non-aligned countries have survived the end of the Cold War points to a significant political fact or a dilemma as to whether it is a question of inertia in international relations. Therefore, the question that imposes itself here is whether the Movement has remained efficient and relevant in the current international context. The current sharp confrontations and conflicts on the world stage have reopened the question of the betrayal of high human expectations after the end of the bloc division and the Cold War, and the necessity of explaining why this is so and why international relations have escalated into conflicts and tensions, which sometimes seem stronger than in the Cold War era. Today’s criticism of the moral position starts from its weakness as an expression of the “liberal approach” to foreign policy. Criticising Nehru, Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor of International Politics at the Jawaharlal Nehru University Centre for International Politics, holds that, “from a Realist perspective, the key problem with a Nehruvian/liberal approach to foreign policy is that it misunderstands power and ignores the centrality of the balance of power politics in interstate relations” (Rajagopalan, 2012). Criticising India’s document titled “Non-Alignment 2.0”, Rajagopalan reproaches it for suggesting that India’s influence is ideational and moral rather than material. “The problem is that while ideas matter, it is less important than material power and usually its servant. Morality, ‘the power of example’, is even more problematic because it is inconsequential in international politics. The seesawing Indian position in global affairs should be a good example: India’s influence went from a high in the 1950s to the lows of the 1960s and resurgence over the past decade. This correlates nicely with power – India was courted and listened to in the 1950s, not because of India’s moral power, but because it was seen as a potential great power,” said Professor Rajagopalan. Responding to India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar that “non-alignment was a term of a particulate era and a particular ... geopolitical landscape”, which could be understood as the notion about non-alignment being a relict of the Cold War-era world order and the recognition that the world has since moved towards a polycentric system with a handful of great powers competing to enhance their spheres of influence and establish their hegemony, A. Vinod Kumar concludes: “Non-alignment was not merely defined by the previous principles like neutrality and equidistance, but also by the autonomy of decision-making

and flexibility of choices to act in the best interests of the country. As is evident from the many instances of realistic decision-making and unrelenting pursuit of national interests, non-alignment was a decisive practice of realist statecraft or pragmatic conduct of international relations. When seen from that perspective, the era of non-alignment could provide immense insights on how visionary leadership seeking to play an influential role in international politics could develop ideational frameworks that would propel the grand strategy of their choosing” (Kumar, 2020).

The EU and “History Rhyming”

The European Union (EU) was an observer at the Belgrade Summit in 1989. Amandeep Gill notes that “history rhymes” and that the European Union now seeks a NAM-like role, positioning it itself between the United States and China; “Today, as a new Cold War brews between China and the United States, Europe seeks a NAM-like role anchored in values, its own independent appreciation of where European interests lie, and is refusing to be drawn into either camp on issues such as trade, technology or freedom of navigation in the South Sea” (Gill, 2021). However, he does not believe that the EU’s effort will end well. He goes on to say: “Europe’s leading economic power, Germany, is a prime example, but so are EU members from Europe’s periphery in the East and in the South. They want to profit from Chinese investments into European industry and infrastructure. They refuse to toe the US line on banning the Chinese telecom company Huawei from building 5G networks and see no harm in negotiating access to the Chinese market in exchange for investment concessions and a soft peddling of human rights concerts” (Gill, 2021). The pandemic drew attention to the importance of international cooperation and multilateral relations. Thus, on 4 May 2020, Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, participated in the Online Summit-level Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in response to COVID-19, titled “United against COVID-19” (Statement, 2020). The European official welcomed the NAM initiative and called on it to support a “coordinated multilateral approach” because the “coronavirus pandemic requires united global action in response”. He emphasised that the international response should put people in the centre, fight against inequalities, and uphold human rights for all. He also pointed to the importance of fast and equitable access to safe, quality, effective and affordable diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines against the

coronavirus, where the EU participates in its “global response” with 20 billion Euros (Statement, 2020).

The Changing World Order

There are several reasons why the meetings of the non-aligned countries are still held: (a) there are still unresolved and new issues facing the Third World which require collective action; (b) the member countries can promote their national interests through the organisation that pulls together the countries of the “Global South”, and (c) the international system is dynamic and constantly changing. The dynamics of the world order is constantly changing so that the old issues have taken a new form and the new issues that affect all members of the NAM have emerged. This “justifies” the need for the Movement to continue to exist because it may happen that the system with more “power centres” is shaped so that reshaping the Non-Aligned Movement will be an adequate response. It is expected that reshaping the Non-Aligned Movement will take three specific forms: (1) symbolic changes, (2) structural changes and (3) policy changes (S. I. Keethaponcalan, 2016). “Politically, the notion of non-alignment should be retained, not as the fundamental objective of the movement, but as one of the guiding principles. The movement should be able to work with major international actors, including power centres on selected issues, rather than becoming permanent allies or enemies of one or the other actor. This approach would have the potential to facilitate better outcomes from the movement’s perspective” (Ketthapncalan, 2016). Changing the name of the organisation into the Solidarity Movement, for example, would be a symbolic change. Setting up some bodies of the NAM would be a structural change. The Movement has no permanent secretariat because its founders sought to ensure that it is not monopolised by a small group of countries, thus becoming only another bureaucratic form. “The importance of the NAM is becoming widely recognised, as more and more countries seek to become its members, while many developing countries are rapidly losing confidence in any type of alignment with big powers, especially military ones, which has often proved rather harmful. Therefore, non-alignment is still considered, albeit tacitly, to be an alternative to such a dominant system” (Čavoški, 2020). The general commitments that have determined the profile of the Movement since its formation remained unchanged in terms of the programme and goals: the struggle for peace, security, a guarantee of sovereignty, inviolability of the territory and integrity of states, and observance of international law. Today, we are witnessing exactly the

opposite processes: international law is not observed, the territorial integrity of states is violated, and the argument of force is increasingly used in international relations, while diplomacy is suppressed and unable to show its effectiveness (Jevremović, 2020).

The Goals of Sustainable Development and Multilateralism

Customs wars, the withdrawal of large countries from international trade, and security and climate agreements pose a great challenge to all developing countries. The European Union is a market with 300 million people. The North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) has 500 million people, and all this poses a huge task and problem for other countries to face them or compete with them. Therefore, collective economic development is of great importance for every country where the Movement can play an important role. Just like in the policy of pursuing the UN Sustainable Development Goals set in the 2030 Agenda. The Declaration adopted at the 18th Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting of the NAM, which was held in Baku on 5–6 April 2018, reaffirms the importance of multilateralism and emphasises the contribution of the non-aligned countries to the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Meeting was focused on the topic “Promoting International Peace and Security for Sustainable Development”. The member states called for further coordination in order to build a fair, inclusive, transparent and effective system of joint global governance and address the challenges and risks “stemming from global security threats, armed conflicts, environmental hazards, climate change, migration, contagious diseases, extreme poverty, among others”. The Declaration singles out the following areas as being important for the NAM: South-South cooperation, multilateralism, the strengthening, modernisation and revitalisation of the United Nations “as the most democratic, accountable, universal and representative body”, including the area of international peace and security, reform of the UN Security Council, fulfilment of all 17 Sustainable Development Goals, ending of poverty and hunger, as well as urging the developed countries to fulfil their commitments of providing finance, transfer of appropriate technology and capacity building to the developing countries, thus ensuring the fulfilment of the sustainable development goals. The Declaration emphasises climate change as a significant challenge and expresses concern about the impact of climate change, particularly on the developing countries, which is undermining their efforts to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development. Over the past 20 years, the

Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries has sought to reconsider the veto power. The Movement has dealt with the need to reconsider the veto power in the Declarations of the Non-Aligned Summits held in Colombo (1976), Havana (1979), New Delhi (1983), Harare (1986), Belgrade (1989), Jakarta (1992) and Cartagena, Colombia (1995). The Cartagena Summit, held in October 1995, specified that the veto power was contrary to the goal of UN democratisation and, therefore, should be curtailed and subsequently eliminated. Several largest non-aligned countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, Argentina and Brazil are also G20 members, and they should be reckoned with in the ideas for the future UN reform. That is why the concept of non-alignment was so comprehensive and attempted to offer a new dimension of international relations, seeking different kinds of “new world order” – from a new economic to a new information order in the world. It was the Non-Aligned Movement that affirmed the concept of “world order” that will emerge as a viable option of the universalisation of capitalism after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of global communism, but with a completely different meaning and the ideas being different and far from those of non-alignment. The logic of the present but also of the future, that is, the logic of development contributes to the fact that among the members of the NAM, those from East Africa and South-East Asia, as well as India are especially successful in their development efforts. During the previous decades, until recently, the members of the Non-Aligned Movement were marginalised as the Third World countries, but many of them are now viewed as the countries that are growing economically and thus are imparted a new significance. The role of many member countries is increasing, either due to regional conflicts, such as the Middle East, or global integrative projects such as the Chinese “Belt and Road” Initiative. Russia, China and the West can understand that many positions of the members of the NAM must be taken into account, especially because global leaders seek regional partners in order to accomplish their goals, instead of taking unilateral actions. The non-aligned countries have a new opportunity to present themselves as a significant and constructive force in resolving international conflict issues as well as the issues of international and their own development. Bearing in mind that they constitute a significant majority of countries in the world, the non-aligned countries should take their share of responsibility for overcoming international confrontations, instability and the pandemic that poses a threat to all aspects of international relations – from security to tourism, but is also a mirror of the prevailing relations in the world divided into the rich and poor countries, into the developed and developing countries.

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ADJUSTING THE NAM TO NEW GLOBAL REALITIES: EMPLOYING INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY AND EXPLORING BEST PRACTICES

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Abstract: There can be no better reason to write than to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Therefore, this celebration prompted the author to prepare a paper that presents his personal experience and impressions stemming from almost 30 years of professional diplomatic career and academic practice. The views expressed in this paper on the NAM and multilateralism do not reflect the author's current professional position, but stem from his previous work experience as a consul and plenipotentiary minister in the Egyptian Mission in New York. The paper presents the author's personal observations on the historical development of the NAM and the perspectives for its transformation. The author goes back with nostalgia to the time when he had the opportunity to personally participate in the activities of non-aligned countries in the United Nations, and passes on

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his rich experience to readers through the prediction of possible directions of development and adaptation of the NAM in global international relations.

Key words: of the Non-Aligned Movement, multilateralism, working groups, international relations.

Between Belgrade and Cairo: The NAM's Leadership Visibility

The image of the NAM that resonates in our minds is a picture of world leaders from the 1960s who work closely together to achieve a fairer world order. Ever since I landed in Cairo for Belgrade, arriving in Serbia as Egypt's ambassador, Nasser's and Tito's photographs in government buildings and museums have constantly reminded me of the leading role both countries played in establishing and nurturing that diplomatic fervour that forever influenced international affairs. There is hardly a diplomatic function in which I did not represent my country with full honours. Hence, I am very careful when the interlocutors would tell their personal participation or childhood memories of the leaders of both countries in their meetings through the NAM. A visit to the Serbian mission to the United Nations, which is almost halfway between the East and the Hudson River on Manhattan Island, or the Serbian Embassy in Cairo, almost on the banks of the Nile River on Zamalek Island, testifies to the place where the two great leaders met, sat, chatted and together imagined a world order that was fairer and more participatory; whose initial fruits we enjoy today and for which we are always ready to nurture further by adapting the Non-Aligned Movement to the vision of today's geopolitical reality.

New York: The NAM is working

While I have always been fascinated with this image of world leaders being as close together as possible, assuming by their own hands the highest level of diplomatic engagement of the Non-Aligned Movement, I have never witnessed it myself, nor have I had the opportunity to participate in it first-hand. I have had, however, the chance to discover another dimension of the NAM in a much different context, more of the working level, and by consequence much less known. Global norms, standards, rules and even laws are negotiated and agreed in multilateral frameworks, namely the United Nations. While developing countries

share generically many concerns and interests, they may lack the capacity to best defend their interest and promote their views individually, especially with the growing complexity of international relations and the increasing intensity of multilateral meetings. Groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 appear as a viable platform to aggregate interests, divide tasks and multiply impact. They do, hence, remain as relevant players in negotiating multilateral outcomes, thus contributing to the discourse on the issues and themes that are high on the agenda of international relations.

The usual format for such coordination of the NAM in New York is “working groups”, whose highlighting feature is that they benefit from the designation of a specific diplomatic mission of a Member of the Movement as Chair of the Group, permanently coordinating its activities and almost solely hosting its meetings, except for those that are held on the UN premises. This endows such NAM coordination with the quality that may be most difficult for any individual mission to enjoy by it alone, which is institutional memory. Many, if not most, diplomatic services, especially those of developing countries, do not dedicate or even promote specialised career paths even for the technical issues that have almost become the defining feature of multilateral relations. Diplomats who arrive in New York are usually overwhelmed with the tasks they are required to perform, and the knowledge they are expected to accumulate. The more their portfolio is technical, the more challenging this initiation phase of their work becomes. Participating in these NAM working groups becomes almost a refuge for these “multilaterally freshmen” diplomats. Reading the background documentation that residue at the archives of the coordinator is surely a rich resource, but not the only one. An equally important avenue of sharing knowledge and transmitting accumulated expertise is through the discussions that are usually interactive given the smaller number of delegates attending and the working level representation compared to the larger NAM plenary meetings that are usually at the ambassadorial level with a wider representation of the NAM’s membership. These close discussions immediately reveal the shared views and progressively the fine lines of divergent ones. They usually take place within a collegiate, if not even friendly, atmosphere. A spirit of solidarity emanates therefrom, one that becomes one of the most important tools in defending the “group’s” view when negotiating with other parties. Given that many of these meetings take place at the seat of the coordinator’s mission rather than at the UN headquarters, the hospitality of the convener adds an important conducive atmosphere for

developing common positions; which cannot be overestimated for developing a transnational, even transregional, bond among delegates of the NAM. Several of the tasks of these working groups are repetitive, making it more conformable for new delegates to integrate, yet, admittedly, sometimes turning a little monotonous for more experienced representatives. These recurrent drafting tasks also facilitate the elaboration of common documents and positions, as they rely on previously agreed language inherited through generations of representatives, and easily “borrowed” from one forum to the other, particularly from those documents adopted at the Summit, to other more technical and expert level platforms. This is not all without cost, as the price to pay is curtailing, to an extent, the creativity of new “language” and ideas, and adjusting long-standing positions to changing negotiating environments, especially those now emerging within the current challenging phase of multilateralism. The relative ease with which these working groups are able to develop fluid common positions is that each such group is usually dedicated to a technical issue, expectedly less tainted by political divisions. Here, I would recall my personal engagement in New York in both the Working Group on Disarmament coordinated by Indonesia and the Working Group on Peacekeeping coordinated by Morocco. These are technical issues which command much “allegiance” from the concerned diplomats. Even those delegates that are first introduced to the subject when joining their missions to the UN, they quickly develop or even construct a brand of expertise once they become familiar with the seemingly technical terminology, let alone decipher the shared coded language of acronyms and abbreviations.

NAM’s New York Spirit and the Visitors

This is surely a “plus” for the working groups as they gather the experts from the missions, almost leading to an “epistemic” community, accruing knowledge, promoting expertise and consolidating harmony among the participants. Yet it is also one of the shortcomings of such a format as this dimension of commonality may not necessarily extend beyond the frontiers of this closely-knit society. Well, it could, and should, at least extrapolate to the realm of permanent representatives, even if not to the same degree. Even when it does so, and to varying degrees, it still remains within the circle of diplomatic representatives to the NAM. It does not often extend to the other circles of representatives of sectorial or line ministries. After all, there are hardly the NAM forums that gather,

regularly and institutionally, such “real” technical experts. Most of the efforts that fall in this realm are either one-time events or at best sporadic. They do not elevate to the bond those results from the more institutional working groups, which not only benefit from the intensity and regularity of contact, but thrive on the established professional culture of diplomacy. This shortcoming becomes more acute as the negotiating issues become more technical, necessitating participation from these line ministries, or as initiatives are launched to intentionally bypass this community of technical diplomatic expertise including through involving representatives from other professional cultures. “Specialised diplomats” dedicated to the negotiation of technical issues at the UN headquarters may thus lose part of their influence in the negotiations, or at least may not have the same access to the now more restricted meetings formats, geared mainly for incoming officials who have joined from capital line ministries. The established networks of diplomatic negotiators represented by the working groups thus become less central to the negotiating processes, less able to engage or get the attention of the “new” delegates. There have been a number of initiatives by the NAM to quickly adapt to this. I recall one which I witnessed myself when the Working Group on Peacekeeping devoted one of its meetings to Chiefs of Staff of ministries of defence members of the NAM as they arrived in New York to participate in their first meeting ever on peacekeeping called for by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. An added level of complexity is when the outcomes of such meetings do not follow the standard format of subjecting a draft to intensive negotiations from experts to senior officials. Rather, the outcome may be a document prepared by the convener, and open, almost on a take it or leave basis, to accession for those countries who may want to sign. That leaves little room for amending the draft outcome genuinely if it proves substantially different from the national or group position. The only hope then is that the convener has either undertaken informal consultations to ensure that the draft is shared with main players, or that the convener has kept it at a level sufficiently general for it to be non-objectionable. In either case, the “traditional” dynamics of the NAM contribution and negotiation of the outcome no longer apply as they would normally in other more structured processes.

The NAM Working Groups from Start to Conclusion of Negotiations

These NAM working groups are therefore quite instrumental in galvanising the Movement’s positions on technical issues that are on the

agenda of the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly and its subsidiary organs. Their most effective contribution is in formulating initial positions, which are then pronounced as opening discourses or thematic statements. They also usually translate into working papers that are then included as part of the official documentation of the negotiating body or conference. As the negotiations move forward and middle positions are required, the group dynamics change, including the role of the coordinator or Chairman of the Group. That is usual in negotiations, yet more challenging for group positions. That is the reason for which the working groups assign facilitators for sub-themes, who report then to the group for developing the positions further to accommodate for the progress of the negotiations. At some advanced stages though, individual delegations may become more active in defending issues of high priority to their national interest. That does not mean acting in contradiction to the group, as usually such positions would have been included in the first place in the collective papers. It is just that the fervour in defending them, or the degree of flexibility in modifying them, rests, naturally, with those delegations that proposed them in the first place, in coordination with the rest of the group, of course. That is why online coordination and impromptu meetings become more and more important in the advanced phases of negotiations.

The NAM in the Digital Age of Diplomacy

The NAM working groups have already developed a longstanding tradition of coordination among the group experts by email, which enhances agility that is much needed for ongoing negotiations. Still, there is more room to develop online platforms for such group coordination. An example would be a mobile phone application facilitating access to the NAM's document in general, and that of its working groups focused on specialised multilateral issues. Such an online archive of the Movement's public documents would be a great addition to the ability of the NAM to further develop its common positions and enhance its working methods. This may reflect a specific need of the Movement, given its tradition of having the Presidency undertake the main tasks of the secretariat. In such circumstances and with such variable "nests", it becomes even more important for the NAM to have a single cumulative archive, especially if it is electronic. I recall that a think tank attempted to do so for the NAM documents related to disarmament (NAM Disarmament Database, 2020). One can easily imagine a similar platform

for all the NAM “literature”, in addition to a more interactive platform facilitating “search and rescue” for negotiators who may be badly in need of such assistance in time tight negotiations. By doing so, the rich residual knowledge of diplomats developing the NAM positions over generations would be available not only to the specialised circles, but to the wider public. It would be truly contributing to shaping the global discourse through friendly interactive media. Naturally, it would further anchor a somewhat invisible, and indeed non-invasive, institutionalisation to the NAM that may still conform to its concept of the role of its presidency, members and working methods.

The NAM’s Chairs and Coordinators: Continuity and Contiguity

The NAM’s reliance on its presidency without a secretariat provides it with agility and saves it from the administrative costs and functional hurdles of a large bureaucracy. Yet it poses a challenge for its ability to provide ongoing conference services and substantive support to its membership and its leadership alike. It also risks the “evaporation” of knowledge of its principal negotiators with their “repatriation” to their original tasks and diplomatic functions. With a continuing rotation of presidency across constitutive regional groupings and their continents, this test of continuity becomes even more serious. Mechanisms such as troika are an attempt to counterbalance this limitation. However, one cannot avoid asking if there are not even more developed frameworks that can further enhance avenues of cooperation between those countries that undertook the Movement’s chairmanship on one hand, and those that assume the coordinator role of its working group on the other hand, with a view to enhancing the Movement’s and collective memory, vision, and action without a permanent secretariat nor the traditionally accompanying institutional intergovernmental mechanisms. For this to become an epistemic community among experts in addition to being a forum for official interaction among officials of different levels, an innovative form of gathering former negotiators with current representatives may be needed. One could think of a variable geometry of track I and track II diplomacy not for searching concessions, as is usually the case in negotiation processes, but rather for exploring common positions and sharing expertise as ought to be the case in presumably more harmonious groups such as the NAM. This is not a well-established practice that is easy to emulate. Rather, it is an innovative proposal that merits to be explored further. It will not be without difficulties. In any diplomatic system, this

model is not without challenges, given that departments may work in silos and the weakness of established channels for transfer of knowledge between generations of negotiators. This may necessitate a multitude of platforms for sharing the experience and passing the expertise. Virtual platforms can prove to be a suitable environment for such interaction. Also, the platforms could become more sustainable with the adaptation of diplomacy to modern conditions after Covid-19. One simple practical idea may even be by inviting the chairs and coordinators to contribute with chapters offering a personal interpretive account of their experience as leading negotiations of the NAM, which would amount from more than simple narration to a more elaborate oral history of the movement and its substantive policy contributions. The example of valedictory dispatches in the British Foreign Ministry may be informative in this respect (Paris, 2015). Thematic volumes may be issued separately, thus readily available for the freshmen negotiators. Such ideas are worth exploring at forums that celebrate the anniversary of the NAM, which may be one rare occasion that will gather by definition all the presidencies and coordinators of the NAM, and by design or coincidence, several generations of negotiators thus helping accumulate expertise within any one delegation and among several of them. An opportunity that should not be missed, and that this book may help create in more than one way to reach for the continuity of the NAM's intellectual contributions and the contiguity of the NAM's negotiators virtually and in presence.

**Reaching Out Wider:
The NAM's Chairs and Coordinators
in the Age of Multistakeholder Diplomacy**

By further anchoring the intellectual contribution to global issues and strengthening the role of its chairs and coordinators, the NAM would be better equipped to reach out to wider circles of actors in international relations. It would also allow for more engagement with the academic, research and civil society. It would reinforce the NAM's multistakeholder diplomacy dimension, a continuously expanding feature of today's multilateral relations. A determining factor of how effective coalitions are in multilateral processes is how good they manage the network of relations with the various actors, governmental and beyond. The NAM has traditionally been focused on intergovernmental processes, focusing on its principal actors through state representatives. That is not to say that there has not been interaction with non-governmental organisations and other

non-state actors playing a wider role in such multilateral processes. In fact, the working groups may be the most interactive layer of the NAM with such new actors. I was witness to several such encounters at the level of the working group on disarmament where many of the views of the two sides converge. In fact, some would argue that several initiatives that are now attributed to leading NGOs and their coalitions are a continuation of ideas that originated in the NAM, which may have been too slow or too shy to pursue them further in recognition of the obstacles of the negotiating dynamics. The issues of nuclear disarmament are a clear example in this case. The issue of nuclear disarmament represents increasing space available to new actors in multilateralism. It offers new opportunities, but also new challenges. The relationship between developing countries and non-governmental organisations in the multilateral forum is quite complex. Questions regarding representativity, funding and positional orientation often arise, especially when the views are divergent and the seats or staff of some of these NGOs may be more from the Global North than from the South membership composing the NAM. For this reason, it becomes imperative to consolidate a network of “indigenous” think tanks, research centres, non-governmental organisations and other non-state actors relevant to the NAM positions and its membership. The experiment of the South Centre³ is instructive in that regard. Could a similar model be developed for the political issues that the NAM deals with within the realm of international peace and security, such as disarmament and peacekeeping? Does it have to be one single permanent institution or could a lighter structure, including through a network of thinkers among its membership, could be developed that would lead by the changing chairmanship? These are legitimate questions to ask and may not be too difficult to answer if there is recognition of this need. It becomes thus imperative to develop a strategy to guide the NAM in promoting its own views and consolidating its negotiating positions making full use of the potential in reaching out and coordinating with the participating non-state actors. Reaching out wider within the changing landscape of multilateral diplomacy is necessary for the NAM to achieve its objectives through a global communications strategy. One cannot exclude social media which

³ On its own website, the South Centre affirms that “within the limits of its capacity and mandate”, it “also responds to requests for policy advice and for technical and other support from collective entities of the South such as the Group of 77 (G-77) and China and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).”

has become an indispensable platform for actively interacting with other actors and shaping the environment encircling the multilateral negotiations. If the NAM principled positions were better known to the broader public, it would be added value to its negotiating power, especially if it reached them without necessarily going the filtering gatekeepers of institutionalised media. Again, this is a realm where the NAM's Chairs and Coordinators may be best equipped to deal with if they develop the internal working methods of coordination in a way which mandates them to do so in an effective way even with the faster pace of processes and the deeper complications of contemporary global relations.

**Adjusting Further on the 'Immediate',
the 'Intermediate' and the 'Ultimate' Levels:
The NAM Adapting to the Changing Global Geoeconomic
and Geopolitical Landscape of Multilateralism**

In today's world, the NAM continues to interact at three levels: the immediate one is internal with its own characteristics as a "movement" rather than an "organisation", the intermediate one with the dynamic changes of multilateralism as demonstrated by "multistakeholder diplomacy", and the ultimate one being that of the global geopolitical landscape. The latter was the *raison d'être* of the NAM born in the age of bipolarity. While the situation has changed with the end of the Cold War, polarity has not disappeared. It may have changed the form and may now be a result of different factors, whether strategic, political, economic or other. Its continuing existence necessitates the NAM. Its changing form necessitates adaptation by the NAM. The growing competition between world powers and blocs in the economic realm, including but not limited to issues of technology and energy may be a form of polarity towards which members of the Movement need to continue to be "non-aligned", focusing instead on the balanced relations and orientation geared for the best service of the needs of their peoples. Developing a vision of non-alignment towards new forms of polarity is not simply a matter of intellectual exercise of reinvigorating the NAM. It also touches on dimensions related to coordination and coalition-building between developing countries. Here comes a call for a deeper analysis of the division of labour and continuing coordination with the "sister" grouping of the G77 (Delcour, 2018, G-77, 2021). With largely overlapping membership, similar overall objectives, and sometimes intersecting agendas, this question becomes more acute in times of transitions and change such as the one we arguably live in. One that

merits reflection as the NAM membership gathers in Belgrade to celebrate its sixtieth anniversary, almost simultaneously with the yearly more routine high-level convening of the two groupings in New York on the margin of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Any such adjustment in the role of the NAM is also linked to the place of international organisations in general, and the United Nations in particular, within the notion and practise of multilateralism. After all, though born independently, the NAM has become at times synonymous to UN dynamics, as a form or group coalitions within multilateral negotiations and multilateralism. The fate of the latter hence immediately impacts the fate of the former that is the NAM. That is not to say that they cannot live without each other, rather that their lives are impacted by each other. Multilateralism faces multiple challenges, if not crises, all of which reflect on the NAM. The symbiotic relation that has existed between them necessitates mutual recovery from shocks and overcoming obstacles.

After Thoughts: Sixty – No Age for Retirement

Multilateral forums are often criticised for what they do not, or sometimes one could argue cannot, do. Yet they are little appraised for what they succeed to do, often belittling the functioning mechanisms. This contribution attempts to take as its point of the departure the working level NAM that is undertaking its tasks as best as it could. The aim is not to magnify and say that these are the NAM's most important achievements, nor that they are sufficient for achieving the Movement's objectives and goals. It is simply to recognise the areas where improvements can be made, yet it also identifies those working methods that are producing results. The objective of this brief paper is to highlight lessons learned, promote best practices, and pass takeaways that are useful for other levels of the NAM, or even other forums. The key to effectiveness for group work, including on the multilateral level, remains clear working dynamics, efficient management, and cohesive "professional" culture fortified by intensive interaction geared towards the common goals set through a participatory and intellectually rigorous process of harmonisation divergences and ensuring genuine collective ownership. I would argue that these concepts, which may appear complex in this wording, are in fact simple to apply. They are arguably best demonstrated at the collegiate level of delegates attending as experts on the subject matter. However, they can also be emulated at a higher level if the same approach is followed. In such an instant, the "working level" NAM may make the whole forum "working"

best to achieve its ideals, which are most needed in today's world and the current state of multilateralism. Additionally, practical proposals offered for the NAM would be further reinforcing its ability to positively impact multilateralism by adapting to its ongoing challenges. These included developing platforms for residual knowledge sharing among generations of chairs and coordinators, widening the network of interaction to impact the world of multistakeholder diplomacy, as well as juxtaposing the notion of non-alignment to the current causes of global polarity while maximising impact through the cooperative relationship with its sister groupings. The resources the NAM could employ are its accumulated negotiating literature and its original guiding principles, which are equally relevant today as they were at the time of its foundations, yet made applicable to today's world through developing its working methods and adjusting the focus of its conceptual lens to today's realities. There could not be a better time to do so than the celebration in Belgrade and no better forum to enlighten the discussion than this pioneering book encompassing a vigorous open exchange between the perspective of academics and the perception of practitioners.

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THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND REFORM TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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Abstract: From the historical experience so far, it can be seen that the United Nations has stimulated the emergence and development of the Non-Aligned Movement. The United Nations was a universal political forum in which non-aligned states could develop their activities and pursue their interests together with the interests of the international community as a whole. The world organisation provided opportunities in which the policy of non-alignment could be affirmed and in which the bloc pressures of the East and the West could be resisted. Expressing solidarity with the interests of Third World countries that had similar historical experiences with colonialism and economic and social backwardness, led to the merging of political identities into the identities of non-aligned countries. In that sense, the United Nations played a decisive role because it enabled the rapprochement of states that gained independence and freedom from the yoke of former colonial powers in the process of decolonisation. Acting under the auspices of the United Nations, the non-aligned countries have been actively involved in solving key political, economic and social problems in the world. In this way, the United Nations became their significant stronghold, an irreplaceable system for achieving their goals and principles, and an important instrument for justifying their real strength in international relations. This should come as no surprise, as the basic aims and principles of non-alignment were in line with the aims and principles

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contained in the United Nations Charter. As a fundamental legal basis for international relations from the end of the Second World War until today, the Charter has enabled the gradual implementation of the specific goals and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. The ability of the non-aligned countries to acquaint the world with their specific goals and principles through the United Nations system indicated the democratic basis of the world organisation, which in many segments was more receptive to non-aligned and underdeveloped countries than to those “aligned” or developed. Membership in the United Nations has therefore had a positive effect on the cohesion of the non-aligned countries, by developing awareness of the possibilities of a unified solution to common problems and open international issues. The active participation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the activities of the United Nations and its agencies has grown over time with the increasing number of the non-aligned countries in the membership of the world organisation. With an impressive and numerically superior voting power, the Non-Aligned Movement has practically influenced the course of international relations inside and outside the United Nations system. Its significant contribution to the reform processes of the world organisation has to some extent influenced the reshaping and strengthening of the role of the United Nations in contemporary international relations.

Key words: Non-Aligned Movement, United Nations, reform tendencies, Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council.

Introduction

A wide range of issues that the Non-Aligned Movement has faced over the past decades, and which have been discussed additionally more at eighteen conferences of Heads of State or Government: in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) – 1961; in Cairo (Egypt) – 1964; in Lusaka (Zambia) – 1970; in Algiers (Algeria) – 1973; in Colombo (Sri Lanka) – 1976; in Havana (Cuba) – 1979; in New Delhi (India) – 1983; in Harare (Zimbabwe) – 1986; in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) – 1989; in Jakarta (Indonesia) – 1992; in Cartagena (Colombia) – 1995; in Durban (South Africa) – 1998; in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) – 2003; in Havana (Cuba) – 2006; in Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt) – 2009; in Tehran (Iran) – 2012; in Port of Spain (Venezuela) – 2016, and in Baku (Azerbaijan) – 2019, can be sublimated to one general question: How to transform the world on a just and democratic basis? (Final Documents, 1961, 1964, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2016, 2019).

Since the beginning of its existence, the Non-Aligned Movement has given a significant place to the United Nations. Namely, the Movement believed that the world organisation had a real role in creating and building a new and fairer international order. In this sense, the impact of the ideas of the United Nations, its goals and principles regarding the preservation of peace and security and the creation of such a system of international relations within which all members of the international community should be equal in their rights and duties in order to build a more democratic, just and prosperous order, was crucial to the historical evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement. By accepting the ideas, goals and principles of the United Nations and incorporating them into its political doctrine and practice, the Non-Aligned Movement affirmed universal values such as the struggle for international peace, the development of friendly relations between the states and the peoples, and the development of international cooperation in addressing international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian issues.

The aspirations of the Non-Aligned Movement for the transformation of the international order have their roots in the so-called *Ten principles of Bandung*, which were proclaimed in the final Communiqué at the Conference of Asian-African Countries in 1955 (Bogetić, 2019, p. 31; Tadić, 1976, p. 142; Mates, 1970, pp. 249-250). These principles, which have become the main parameters for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, include the principles of respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, recognition of equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small, abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations (which assumes abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers and abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries), refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country, settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, promotion of mutual interests and cooperation and respect for justice and international obligations. By accepting and later elaborating these principles in its political practice, the Non-Aligned Movement has shown that it will not remain a

passive factor in international politics, but will have an independent role based on affirming the principles that represent its “quintessence” and within the United Nations system. In an attempt to quell bloc conflicts and complete the decolonisation process, the Non-Aligned Movement advocated within the United Nations for the recognition of national liberation and anti-colonial movements. The main goals of the non-aligned were focused on supporting the realisation of the people’s self-determination, achieving their national independence, and then building states through the protection of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Bringing new energy into the work of the world organisation and in the progressive construction and codification of legal rules of the new post-war international order, the Non-Aligned Movement became the main guardian of independence from all forms of colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, hegemony, and against all manifestations of aggression, domination, racism and torture in international relations.

Guided by the principles and goals of the UN Charter, the Non-Aligned Movement built its own ideological and institutional platform, which it needed to achieve its own goals and principles.² In this sense, the United Nations was for the Non-Aligned Movement the mainstay and instrument through which it could fulfil its role in the creation and transformation of

² Six years after the Bandung Conference, the First Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from September 1 to 6, 1961. At this Summit, closer cooperation of the non-aligned countries was initiated, which from the seventies of the last century until today, gradually took on the appropriate institutional outlines of international organisations. However, it should be acknowledged that the Non-Aligned Movement does not operate like other international organisations and does not formally have a structure typical of intergovernmental organisations. The movement has no formal constitutional act and no permanent secretariat. In recent years, the Movement has established a Coordination Bureau at the ministerial level and at the level of permanent representatives who regulate internal activities and activities in United Nations bodies. The Bureau is led by the Permanent Representative of the Chairman-in-Office to the United Nations. The decisions of the Movement are reached by consensus at the Summits of Heads of State or Government, which are usually convened every three years. The administration of the organisation of these Summits is the responsibility of the presiding state. The foreign ministers of the member states meet periodically at conferences. Otherwise, they meet regularly at the opening of each regular session of the UN General Assembly. There are also appropriate workings, experts, technical and other groups within the Movement.

the international order. Acting through the United Nations system, the Non-Aligned Movement in the given circumstances of the Cold War (but also in the post-Cold War period), learned a lot on the realisation of unique goals concerning preserving world peace and security and promoting friendly relations and international cooperation. Membership in the United Nations prevented the isolation of the non-aligned countries and developed their cohesion on the basis of their own political orientation, which arose from the idea of coexistence of formally equal all nations and sovereign states. The realisation of the principles and respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations has led to the profiling of a special non-aligned policy, which includes the idea of active peaceful coexistence (Bartoš, 1955, pp. 17-19; Mates, 1974; Petković, 1974).³ Active peaceful coexistence carried a visionary picture of a future international order that the non-aligned countries want to create together with other countries, regardless of differences in socio-political and economic systems and belonging to a particular civilization or cultural group.⁴ Hence, the participation of different states in regulating international relations points to the fact that active peaceful coexistence has served the Non-Aligned Movement as a political alternative in regulating the global issues of the international community (Blagović, 1973, pp. 34-42). In that sense, regardless of the crises into which the Non-Aligned Movement fell from time to time (so-called *crises of continuity and authority*), as well as regardless of the fact that it remained somewhat limited by narrow regional or continental political frameworks (via the so-called *tricontinental platform*), its role in the progressive development of the principle of active peaceful coexistence, as

³ The principle of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence derives from the *Panchsheel* principles, first formulated in the 1954 Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, and which affirms the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Starting from this political platform, Presidents Tito and Nehru in their joint statement from the same year formulated non-alignment as active realization of political and economic intentions, peaceful ideological coexistence and military detachment, which could have a significant impact on the course of world affairs.

⁴ In this sense, in accordance with its views on the future international order, the Non-Aligned Movement calls for the protection of cultural differences and tolerance of religious, socio-cultural and historical peculiarities that define human rights in a particular region. The Non-Aligned Movement thus draws strength from the diversity of the entire global society.

well as in the democratisation of international relations and in the building of a new and fairer international order, it has remained its main determinant since the First Belgrade Summit in 1961, until today (Bogetić, 2019, Dimić, 2011, p. 5).⁵

As a “protean movement”, the Non-Aligned Movement developed within and outside the United Nations system in response to the constant flow of the modern international order (Stojanović, 1981, pp. 443-450). However, only in the United Nations did the Non-Aligned Movement exercise its true power through important political and legal decisions and through direct communication with the Great Powers and developed countries. The number of its members in the world organisation enabled the more active participation of the non-aligned countries in the bodies and agencies of the United Nations, and thus the increased influence of the Non-Aligned Movement in world politics. Of course, the interpenetration of the Non-Aligned Movement and the world organisation was expressed in the harmonization and complementarity of the principles and goals of the UN Charter with the policy of the Non-Aligned Movement and in the contribution of this policy to strengthening the role and place of the United Nations in international relations (Komatina, 1981, p. 11). In this sense, the United Nations was also the most effective political forum for cooperation through which the Non-Aligned Movement could actively act to accelerate the process of democratisation of the international community.

⁵ According to the Yugoslav position, the policy of active peaceful coexistence, despite the strong ideological influence, included universal premises which can be reduced to the following: 1) The position that small countries, especially “non-engaged” are not competent to participate in world politics and contribute to solving international problems; 2) The view that the destiny of the world is indivisible and that hence there are deep common interests, obligations and responsibilities of “big” and “small” countries; 3) The belief that conservative regimes have no future, that their time is up and that in the background of the arms race and the Cold War is an attempt to prevent the defeat of capitalism by force and “stiffen” the development and spread of socialism (as Tito said, “that victory march progress and transformation of the world”); 4) The knowledge that we need to look realistically at the regulation of international relations in the age of nuclear weapons, space exploration, accelerated technological development, scientific achievements and unprecedented life opportunities.; 5) The need to concentrate all peaceful efforts in order for “lasting peace” to prevail over the catastrophe brought about by the war conflict of the Great Powers.

Due to inherited relations in the world embodied in the irreconcilable aspirations of developed and underdeveloped countries, uncoordinated interests of the countries of the Global North and Global South, strategic goals of large and small countries, or in general, due to insufficient maturity of political and social conditions, the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement in the United Nations has waned over time. In that sense, the position of the United Nations itself was somewhat ruined since the world organization found itself at a crossroads where it had to decide whether to follow the path of democracy and the rule of law, or to be satisfied with the “relativisation” of the international legal order? This is all the more so because the development of democracy and the rule of law is a precondition for achieving human progress related to solving crucial international issues in the economic and social sphere such as sustainable development and eradication of poverty and hunger, prevention of pandemics, natural disasters, environmental pollution, climate change and migration, prohibition of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear disarmament, combating terrorism and international crime, and protecting all human rights and fundamental freedoms (Damian-Lakićević, 2009, p. 497). As this key issue for humanity refers to the consistent, dedicated and balanced fulfilment of the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter and general international law, it is believed that this issue can be resolved only by the collective action of all relevant world actors. In this sense, the Non-Aligned Movement recognised the need for further deepening and by expanding increasingly dynamic relations with other world actors such as the G8, the Group of 77, the European Union, and so on, in order to intensify mutual cooperation and alleviate the gap that exists between the Global North and the Global South. The results of the last Non-Aligned Movement Summit held in Baku in 2019 illustrate these efforts as the non-Aligned Movement member states have clearly reaffirmed their commitment to implementing United Nations goals and principles in their international cooperation activities and in strengthening international peace and security. Recognising that the United Nations has a central role to play in the multilateral solution to the burning global problems and challenges facing humanity, the Non-Aligned Movement stressed that responsibility must be shared in a balanced way through the fulfilment of the international obligations contained in the UN Millennium Declaration of September 2000, then at the World Summit for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 2002, in the World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, in the outcome of the 2010 High Level Plenary Meeting on Millennium Development Goals, in the

outcome document of the Rio + 20 Conference on Sustainable Development entitled "Future We Want" of 2012, in the outcome of the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Sendai 2015, in General Assembly's resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015, entitled "Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development held in Ethiopia 2015, in the Paris Agreement adopted under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 2015, in the New Urban Agenda, adopted at the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development - Habitat III, held in Ecuador 2016, and at the High-Level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation held in Buenos Aires 2019 (Final document, 2019, pp. 36, etc).

Bearing in mind that the correction of political mistakes from the past is no longer possible, the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement, along with other interested states, have put themselves in the function of generally improving the capacity of major United Nations bodies. Given the continuity of the Non-Aligned Movement, it can be assumed that the Movement will continue to support and reaffirm the goals and principles of the world organisation while participating in the reform of its institutional system, whose binding factor and fundamental international legal basis remains the United Nations Charter (Dupuy, 1997, Šahović, 1998, pp. 239).⁶ For the non-aligned states, it is not disputed that the United Nations has no alternative. The earlier inefficiency of the main bodies of the United Nations has led to the belief that its structure no longer corresponds to political reality. However, in the previous period, the demands for changing its power structure did not go in favour of achieving optimal solutions. Neither the functional powers of the main bodies of the United Nations, nor their organisational structure, were to blame for that, but the responsibility lay on the wider disunity of the states and their unwillingness to implement appropriate political and legal reforms. The traditionally great ideological, political, economic and cultural differences, as well as the strong desire of the permanent members of the Security Council to preserve their privileged position stemming from the ruins of World War II, are a good example.

⁶ The interdependence between the application of the objectives and principles of the United Nations and the reform of the Security Council would most likely entail the amendment of the Charter within the meaning of the provision of Article 108.

Reform tendencies in the Security Council

Starting with the Eleventh Summit of Heads of State or Government held in Cartagena - 1995, through the Summit in Durban - 1998, Kuala Lumpur - 2003, Havana - 2006, Sharm el-Sheikh - 2009, Tehran - 2012, Porlamar - 2016 and finally in Baku - 2019, the Non-Aligned Movement concluded that the most important issue in the reform of the United Nations is the structural and functional reorganisation of the Security Council (Final Documents, 1995, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2016, 2019).

Earlier efforts by the non-aligned countries to recompose this major United Nations political body date back to the decolonisation process that began after World War II when new emancipated states on the African, Asian and American continents began to put more serious pressure on the United Nations, demanding Security Council reform (Mikhailtchenko, 2004, p. 2).⁷ The request was not supported for opportunistic reasons and due to the fact that its influence on the special rights of the Great Powers was not explained. The new proposal arrived from 44 countries in Asia and Africa in 1963. Based on the mentioned proposal, the General Assembly adopted Resolution no. 1991 (XVIII), 17 December 1963, which changed the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council from six to ten (Jovanović, 1989, p. 217). The enlargement of the Security Council has led to changes in its way of working. By increasing the number of members from eleven to fifteen, the importance of this solution also increased, because it was much harder for the permanent members of the Security Council to impose their "individual or collective will" in the "more or less visible" way (Avramov, 1965, Dimitrijević, 2009).⁸ Since the 1970s, the Non-Aligned Movement has increasingly insisted on Security Council reform. Namely,

⁷ The first formal proposal came from 18 Latin American countries in 1956.

⁸ These structural changes did not lead to a change in the competences of the Security Council, nor did they have any influence on the decision-making process, which remained dependent on the special rights of the great powers. The amendments confirmed the nomination system, so that 10 non-permanent members are elected according to the regional formula. 5 non-permanent members are elected from Asia and Africa, 2 from Latin America, while 1 member is elected from Eastern Europe and 2 from Western Europe and other countries (including the countries of the British Commonwealth, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, which are not belonged to the above groups). Every year, 5 new members are elected according to the rotation system, thus enabling greater fluctuation in the composition of this body.

by the resolution of the General Assembly 34/431 of 14 December 1979, it was decided to put the issue of Security Council reform on the agenda. No progress was possible, due to the well-known fact that the Cold War between the Great Powers was in full swing and that the possibility of any changes was immediately suspended. After the fall of the "Iron Curtain", the situation seemed to change drastically. The Security Council ceased to be a stage on which the conflict of the Great Powers took place and became a much more efficient body whose actions were to lead to further democratisation of the world organisation. Yet, due to the fact that since the early 1990s it has relied heavily on leading Western states that have provided it with unnecessary material support in maintaining collective security, the role of the Security Council has often been called into question by both developed and the non-aligned countries, precisely because of the inexplicable motives that determined its actions in practice. From there came numerous proposals from the non-aligned states and regional bodies to reconsider the function of the Security Council, and to organisationally encourage certain structural and functional reforms that would lead to greater efficiency, effectiveness and fairness of its work.

Due to the complex and far-reaching consequences of the reform of the Security Council, on 3 December 1993, the General Assembly formed the Open-ended Working Group on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council. The program of activities of the Working Group was divided into two sets of reform issues, namely, in relation to issues related to the enlargement of the Security Council, decision-making, periodic reviews, and then in relation to issues related to improving publicity, participation of non-permanent members in its work and relations between the Security Council, the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies, including issues of support, restriction and abolition of veto rights, as well as the possibility of amending the Charter (Dimitrijević, 2009; Müller, 1997, p. 88; Kumar Jha, 1994). The debates conducted within the Working Group and the presented proposals, together with the final reports from the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, today represent important sources for a clearer view of the political and legal positions of individual states, regional groups and international organisations. What can be noticed on the basis of time distance is that the Working Group systemised the presented proposals into three possible variants of the Security Council reform. The first group of proposals refers to immutability in relation to the existing permanent membership (the so-called *status quo model*), which would be applied only for a limited period of

time in the absence of a specific agreement on the comparative expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership of the Security Council. The second group of proposals includes the possibility of expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership which cannot go to the detriment of the already existing permanent members (the so-called *model of parallelism*), while the third group is a special variant of the previous solution (the so-called *model of the region*) which provides for the expansion of non-permanent membership solely on the basis of establishing the principles of sovereign equality and equitable geographical representation (Winkelmann, 1997, pp. 39-50; Dimitrijević, 2007, pp. 935-958; Report of the Open-ended Working Group, 2001, pp. 62-65).

The Non-Aligned Movement advocated a second model in which each region of the southern hemisphere (Africa, Asia and Latin America) would have one permanent seat on the Security Council. Adhering to a fundamentally fair regional approach that ensures the stability and indivisibility of the organisation, the Non-Aligned Movement supported the proposal to expand the Security Council from five permanent and six non-permanent seats. Welcoming the candidacy of Japan and Germany for permanent membership in the Security Council, the Non-Aligned Movement advocated that representatives from other, less developed regions of the world be represented in the permanent membership. In the event that the presented idea could not be realised, the Non-Aligned Movement proposed that the expansion of the total number of new non-permanent members of the Security Council be expanded from five to eleven (UN Doc. A/49/965, 18/9/1995, pp. 94, 96).⁹ Considering that states are elected to the Security Council primarily on the basis of their contribution to the maintenance of world peace and security (which is not always practical and measurable) and then on the basis of their equitable geographical representation (which includes representing the interests of countries in the region), the voluntaristic dimension of increasing its membership remained a constant of all proposals and debates to its structural reform. This is, after all, quite visible in the reports submitted by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the early 1990s.

Reports entitled: "An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping", and "An Agenda for Development"

⁹ Cuba suggested a slightly smaller number than the Non-Aligned Movement, without clearly explaining how the eight new members would share seats in the Security Council.

show that changes in the physiognomy of Security Council membership continue to be one of the central themes of all proposals for reform of the world organisation (UN Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111, 1992; UN Doc. A/48/935, 6 May 1994). Also, in the report of Secretary-General Kofi Annan of 21 March 2005, entitled: “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, which set out the High Level Panel’s joint proposals on the fair representation and increase of membership in the Security Council remained conditioned by the political compromise of its permanent members (UN Doc. A/59/2005, pp. 42-43). Looking from the current perspective of the proposed reform proposal, two separate models can be discerned.

The first model (*model A*) envisages the increase of the Security Council with six new permanent seats, two seats each for the countries of Africa and the countries of Asia and the Pacific, and one seat each for the countries of Europe and both Americas. In relation to the number and schedule of non-permanent members, the model plans to expand the Security Council by three additional seats in accordance with the regional key and rotation system every two years. Hence, based on the mentioned schedule, the region of “Africa” would get four, the region of “Asia and the Pacific” three, the region of “Europe” two and the region of “America” four non-permanent members. The number of permanent members would be increased from the current five to eleven, with the current permanent members, unlike the new permanent members, retaining the right of veto. The reason for accepting the proposed model is that none of the existing permanent members would want to give up the acquired right of veto. If the new members get the right of veto, it will be impossible to achieve one of the basic goals of the reform, which refers to increasing the efficiency of the Security Council, because the work of the Security Council could be slowed down, if not paralyzed. Finally, with the “model A”, the number of non-permanent members would rise from ten to thirteen out of a total of twenty-four seats (fifteen current and nine new). Each of the large regional groups would have six seats, but with a different status.

The second model (*model B*) does not envisage new seats for the permanent members of the Security Council. On the contrary, the model proposes the introduction of eight new seats for the category of non-permanent members with a four-year renewable term. One additional seat for non-permanent members with a two-year term that cannot be renewed is also envisaged. In the distribution of seats according to the system of rotation of non-permanent members with a four-year mandate, each regional

group should have two representatives. The distribution of seats of the non-permanent members with a two-year mandate assumes that Africa is represented by four, Asia and the Pacific by three, Europe by one and America by three representatives of the countries in the region. According to "model B", out of the total number of twenty-four seats in the Security Council, each region would be represented by six seats of different status.

Regarding the presented models of the Secretary General, the permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto, who are able to individually block the reform, were at least restrained in assessing their possible application in practice. On the other hand, the countries aspiring to become permanent members of the Security Council, which were originally gathered within the G4 group consisting of Germany, Japan, Brazil and India, and with the accession of South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria within the group 7+, clearly and openly stated the demands for the implementation of the Security Council reform. This was also understandable, because for them, resolving the reform issues is prejudicial in relation to the issue of strengthening personal status in international relations. In this regard, the discussion on the reorganisation of the Security Council outlined strategic goals that should be confirmed in the future, in line with other agreed goals (Šahović, 2005). However, mutual doubts and animosities, most certainly among the permanent members of the Security Council, have contributed to slowing down the process of adopting the United Nations reform package - a unique and useful instrument, which in the future should pave the way for a complex system of multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, despite the stated fact, the achievement of common goals regarding the reform of the Security Council was not interrupted, but continued.¹⁰ In its annual reports, the Non-Aligned Movement supported the continuation of the debate on this important

¹⁰ In this regard, it should be noted that the Non-Aligned Movement in principle supported some of the reform proposals of the current UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, who since 2017, presented a series of interrelated proposals involving economic and social development of the world in accordance with the guidelines contained in Agenda 2030 and within the strategic UN Development Assistance Framework, then in the field of redesign and restructuring of collective security, which should contribute to a more coherent, pragmatic, agile and efficient system of world peace, as well as in the management of the administrative apparatus of the world organisation which provides for the decentralisation of decision-making powers and the direction of policies and processes that should lead to increased accountability and transparency.

global issue, believing that the issue of Security Council reform should be considered as part of a package and in line with the *Millennium goals* promoted by heads of state and government on 8 September 2000. Advocating for the intensification of all aspects of Security Council reforms based on the principles of sovereign equality and equal geographical representation, as well as the needs and democratisation of its working methods, including the decision-making process, the Non-Aligned Movement stressed the need for a comprehensive approach. In that sense, the participation in the work of the Working Group examined the possibility of reforming the functional powers of the Security Council, i.e. their “adaptation” to the requirements of the time.

As is well known, the provisions of the Charter give the Security Council special powers and competencies with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter VI), taking action in case of threat to peace, violation of peace and acts of aggression (Chapter VII), use of regional agreements and organisations (Chapter VIII), administration and supervision of Trust Territories (Chapter XII). The motives for the transfer of basic functions to a narrower body, such as the Security Council, are contained in the view that through the Council as an operational-political body it is possible to achieve a greater degree of efficiency of the world organisation. Starting from the assumption that the Great Powers have greater political responsibility in making decisions related to peace and security than other members of the United Nations, a situation has been created that enables the concentration of power and centralization of monopolies of force in the hands of a narrow circle of elected states. This antinomy between the political and legal aspects of collective security in the Charter is supported by the “free consent” of other members of the Security Council. In international practice, this situation cannot relieve the Great Powers of their responsibility to act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, i.e. in synchrony with the goals and principles of the United Nations (Bowet, 1994, p. 92). It follows from the above that the functional organisation of the Security Council as the executive-political body of the United Nations does not reflect the equality of its institutional and normative aspects. The division of competencies, in which the powers in the field of peace and security are primarily concentrated within its framework, has not fully withstood the test of time. The reasons are, *inter alia*, that the Charter does not provide for the possibility of replacing the permanent members of the Security Council and does not contain any provisions on expanding their number. Likewise, the Charter does not prescribe criteria for determining which countries in the world are eligible to become members of an “exclusive club”

(Dimitrijević, 2009). In eliminating contradictions, it is necessary to provide certain mechanisms by which this situation will be resolved. The flow of opportunities with responsibilities previously required solving the problem of reforming the collective security system (Šahović, 2005; Dimitrijević, 2005-2006). Given the real geopolitical changes that took place in the world after the post-Cold War era, the Non-Aligned Movement advocates that the process of collective security reform be redirected towards the real empowerment of the United Nations to meet the challenges of the new age.¹¹ In this sense, it is first necessary to note that the use of force in new circumstances requires new and more precise rules. In recent years, states have often violated the general rule prohibiting the use of force and threats. The expansion of the scope of activities of the Security Council was therefore inevitable. The ideas of a New World Order and Global Governance in the field of peace and security had significant political implications, especially in the international community where conflicts were mitigated during the Cold War. At the same time, looking from the perspective of the Charter, three situations arose in practice. The first concerned the use of force for prevention, based on the right to self-defence when the threat was not imminent (pre-emptive use of force). The second situation referred to the preventive use of force in conditions when the threat potentially or actually existed, but outside the state borders (preventive use of force). The third situation also involved the use of force in the event of a threat, within the borders of the national territory. All three situations were “covered” by

¹¹ The development tendencies of the United Nations collective security system led to the formation of the Peacebuilding Commission. The establishment of the Commission was encouraged by the High Panel of Experts. Due to the divided competence in the matter of preserving peace and security, the initiative was first supported by the Security Council on the basis of Resolution 1645 of 20 December 2005, and then that proposal was supported by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/180 of 30 December 2005. The main task of the Peacebuilding Commission is to take action in post-conflict countries whose governments are seeking the help of the international community to resolve the difficult post-conflict situation. With the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, for the first time in its history, the United Nations has established a body whose mission in the field of collective security relies on the professional capacities of the world organisation. As an advisory body, the Commission proposes action plans to be followed in the countries involved in peacekeeping operations. The Commission does not have the possibility to take actions within the framework of peacekeeping operations on its own.

Security Council resolutions. In a wide range of objectives, resolutions have become the main instruments through which the Security Council has acted in cases where it has been determined that this would be politically expedient (Blokker, 200, 541-563). The Non-Aligned Movement considers that such conduct was largely contrary to its mission as set out in the United Nations Charter (Fassbender, 2005, pp. 14, etc; UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 152-154).¹²

In its final report from the recent conference, the Non-Aligned Movement has established that the Security Council must act in an emergency, non-selectively, impartially and responsibly, and strictly adhere to the powers and functions conferred on it by the Charter. In particular, this means that the Security Council must avoid applying Chapter VII of the Charter as an umbrella to address issues that do not necessarily pose a threat to international peace and security (Final document, 2019). In other words, the Security Council, in its resolutions, should more clearly define the principles on which the use of force in international relations would be based. This, under completely changed conditions could reaffirm the central role of the Security Council in the universal system of collective security and reaffirm the right to authorize military intervention as a last resort in the event of serious threats such as genocide and other mass crimes, ethnic cleansing or serious human rights violations. Also, the Non-Aligned Movement would have to oppose attempts by the Security Council to impose or extend sanctions against any state under the pretext or with the aim of achieving the political goals of one or more states. The Non-Aligned Movement also supported the proposal for the Security Council to envisage a mechanism that would consider all aspects and real effects of sanctions against a country, including in the framework of the application of Article 50 of the Charter. This is all the more so because the application of sanctions has profound consequences not only for the country to which the sanctions are applied, but also for neighbouring countries and trading partners. In addition, the Non-Aligned Movement stressed the need to minimise the harmful effects

¹² The direction of further developments in the reform of the Security Council was determined at the summit of heads of state and government held in September 2005. The final document, entitled "World Summit Outcome Document", reaffirmed the Security Council's existing role in preserving world peace and security and highlighted the need to reform it in order to achieve broad representativeness, efficiency and transparency, which could contribute to effectiveness and the legitimacy of his decisions.

of the imposed sanctions, as well as to clearly define the goals, deadlines and humanitarian aspects related to the normal life of the civilian population (Milinković, 1996, p. 151). The Non-Aligned Movement especially emphasised the need not to allow misinterpretation of the provisions of the Charter of Self-Defence in situations where instead of collective intervention of the Security Council, the individual preventive intervention of states outside their borders is applied without a real threat to their security.

In order to achieve democratisation, transparency and efficiency of the Security Council, it is necessary to achieve a balance in the work of the main bodies of the United Nations. This is especially true in cases where the Security Council expands its functions and powers at the expense of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (Strydom, 2007, pp. 1-46). All non-aligned states (including those involved in the activities of the Caucus of the Non Aligned Movement), should promote and defend the above-mentioned positions and goals during their mandate in the Security Council. Finally, Security Council reform should be comprehensive and address all substantive issues, including membership, regional representation, the Council's agenda, its working methods and decision-making process, including the use of vetoes, which should gain the widest possible political acceptance by the members in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and the relevant decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly (Final document, 2017, 2018, 2019).¹³

Reform tendencies in the General Assembly

In the previous historical period, the General Assembly remained the most democratic political, advisory and representative body of the world organisation. Due to the fact that it brings together delegations from all member states of the United Nations, which have equal voting rights in the decision-making process, the General Assembly has taken the form of a

¹³ Restricting the veto right according to the Non-Aligned Movement is a key component of Security Council reform. The veto should be limited to vital issues of the international community and Chapter VII of the Charter. Only in the next step should one think about its permanent abolition. In that sense, its rational use includes responsibility and accountability of the expanded composition of the Security Council, i.e. decision-making in the General Assembly in accordance with the Resolution "Uniting for Peace" or on the basis of extensive interpretation of Article 11 and Article 24, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter.

permanent diplomatic conference. Adapting its structure to the requirements of the time, the General Assembly took on a broader responsibility for performing the prescribed functions. This was especially noticeable after the fall of the "Iron Curtain". The new situation directly affected the work and functioning of the General Assembly. In addition to the increased number of delegations of the non aligned member states, which is important in itself, the issues of revitalisation of the work and competencies of the General Assembly were at the centre of attention of the United Nations.

The position of the Non-Aligned Movement towards the process of revitalisation of the General Assembly is reduced to the respected principles of democracy, transparency and accountability. The revitalisation of this main representative body of the world organisation presupposed open and inclusive consultations of non-aligned countries and other member states within the broader process of reforming the United Nations. Given that cohesion between the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement on this issue was quite difficult to achieve, the starting point was to regulate the issue of improving the procedural and working methods of the General Assembly. This issue *per se*, included issues related to the interpretation of its powers, which are not strictly prescribed by the Charter and which fall within the scope of competence of other bodies of the world organisation. In that sense, the Charter of the United Nations speaks about the general competence of the General Assembly, making a difference in relation to the so-called *the subsidiary competence*, which has arisen from the practice of the United Nations. Thus, with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly could not make recommendations on a dispute or situation decided by the Security Council until it had requested it to do so. However, the General Assembly did so in practice, but only in situations when the Security Council, due to the lack of consent of the permanent members, was not able to meet, discuss and make meritorious decisions, i.e. when it was unable to meet its primary obligations under the Charter. These are cases where, due to a Security Council blockade (usually due to the use of vetoes), the General Assembly has been empowered to make recommendations on collective action for serious threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression, at the request of two-thirds of member states or on the basis of a procedural decision of the Security Council (Jackson, 1983, p. 135).¹⁴ Expressing great concern at cases in practice where

¹⁴ The mentioned procedural rule was adopted on the occasion of the Korean crisis in 1950, when the General Assembly passed the well-known resolution "Uniting

the Security Council has been paralyzed in making decisions concerning its primary responsibilities (for example, in preventing acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or in establishing a ceasefire between warring parties), the Non-Aligned Movement supported the expansion of the competences of the General Assembly. In that sense, the Non-Aligned Movement was primarily guided by the calculation that this more representative body of the world organisation would achieve greater success in overcoming political divisions and inactions that led to the harsh reality of contemporary international relations.

Given the numerous and complex issues that have come under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly over time (areas of international peace, security, political, economic, social, cultural and educational cooperation, codification of international law, human rights and freedoms, etc.), this body had to form a wide network of organs and bodies that assisted him in decision-making. The ability to debate a wide range of issues with a dispersion of powers at multiple organisational levels has, over time, given the impression that the General Assembly has grown into a cumbersome and dysfunctional body unable to focus on the most serious problems in today's world. The adoption of a huge number of legally non-binding resolutions and declarations also contributed to the mentioned impression, which largely led to the decline of the authority of the General Assembly. In the previous period, the reputation of the General Assembly was seriously damaged by an overburdened agenda, lengthy and meaningful debates, slow procedures that often led to the adoption of "already seen" and "recycled" resolutions, without adequate mechanisms for their implementation (Račić, 2010, p. 95).¹⁵

The reform tendencies in the General Assembly were therefore connected with the question of the legitimacy of the world organisation. The

for Peace", 377 (V). Based on this resolution, a rule has been established that the General Assembly may convene an "emergency special session" within 24 hours of receiving a request addressed to the Secretary-General. The resolution did not affect the powers of the Security Council, which remained primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

¹⁵ Hence, it seems that the time has long passed when the General Assembly, with a large majority of member states (including the votes of the non-aligned countries), adopted resolutions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, on the Definition of Aggression, etc.

issue itself is not new and dates back to 1949. Namely, even then, the world organisation tried unsuccessfully to rationalise the procedure and organisation of the General Assembly. In 1952, a Special Committee of Measures was formed, which had the task of assessing the possibility of limiting the time of regular sessions of the General Assembly. In November 1970, the General Assembly formed a number of committees *inter alia*, including the Special Committee for the Rationalisation of Procedure and the Organisation of its Work. In order to provide a coherent vision that could contribute to the reform of the United Nations in the post-Cold War period, the General Assembly established five working groups in 1992. In August of the following year, it also founded the informal Open-ended Working Group on the Revitalisation of the Work of the General Assembly. At its 1995 session, the General Assembly established a High-Level Working Group to reach a consensus on strengthening the capacity of the world body (GA Res. 49/252, 1995). The Non-Aligned Movement supported the work of this Group, emphasising that its activities should not weaken the development activities of the United Nations system and that its competencies should not overlap with the competencies of existing working groups. In that regard, the Non-Aligned Movement pointed out that it would actively participate in the negotiations with a unified position, acting through the Coordination Bureau, which will consider reports and proposals submitted by various bodies, including non-governmental organisations related to United Nations reform.

In 1997, under the auspices of the General Assembly, an initiative was launched to engage civil society in the debate on the reform of the world organisation. When, during the jubilee 55th Summit in 2000, the issue of world organisation reform was highlighted as one of the *Millennium goals*, the Secretary General, in order to restore the prestige and vitality of the General Assembly, recommended the establishment of the *National Millennium Assembly* as a non-governmental forum for cooperation which should act in cooperation with the General Assembly to overcome all future international challenges (UN Doc. A/52/850, 1998). At later sessions, the need to strengthen the role and authority of the General Assembly in order to improve the efficiency and methods of its work was continuously repeated. The Non-Aligned Movement also continuously underlined the importance of revitalizing the General Assembly, and in that sense it formed a special Working Group that would coordinate common issues of interest to the entire Movement (Final Documents, 1998, 2003).

In a report, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, on 21 March 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed steps towards the adoption of a reform package that would lead to the strengthening and revitalisation of the General Assembly (UN Doc. A/59/2005, 2005).¹⁶ He underlined the importance of harmonizing the work of the General Assembly in order to increase its authority. Annan recommended structural and functional changes to the General Assembly Committee, strengthening the authority of the president, strengthening the role of civil society and changing the agenda. Although the report on the Secretary-General's reform was far from comprehensive, the report was an important step towards reaffirming the role and place of the General Assembly in the United Nations system. After that, at the annual Sessions of the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement encouraged interactive discussions on current issues of importance to the international community. During 2008, an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalisation of the General Assembly was established, with a mandate to "identify additional ways to improve the role, authority, effectiveness and efficiency of the General Assembly" (GA Res. 62/276, 2008). The *ad hoc* Working Group recommended that the President of the General Assembly engage in an interactive debate on the revitalisation of this body. In September 2010, the General Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming all its previous decisions relating to the revitalisation of its work. It also decided to form a new *ad hoc* Working Group that would be open to all Member States. From 2012 onwards, the Working Group was renewed with the task of working on issues of General Assembly reform, especially issues related to the General Assembly's relationship with other major United Nations bodies and groups outside the world organisation, working methods,

¹⁶ In that report, the Secretary-General suggested the adoption of an integrated proposal of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which, shortly before, in the report: *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, dated 2 December 2004, as part of the implementation of institutional reforms of the world organisation, proposed, among other things, the Human Rights Council which would replace the oft-criticized Human Rights Commission. That proposal was later adopted by General Assembly Resolution no. 60/251 of 15 March 2006. Today, the Non-Aligned Movement supports the work of the Human Rights Council not only through its membership, but also by insisting on its further institutionalisation and constructive approach in promoting and protecting all universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms based on the principles of non-selectivity, non-politicization, objectivity and impartiality.

implementation of resolutions and agendas, the selection and election of the Secretary General, the improvement of the capacity of the Office of the President of the General Assembly, including the strengthening of its institutional memory and its relationship with the Secretariat.

Regarding the above facts, it follows that the process of revitalisation of the General Assembly is not over. The reason for this stems from the lack of political will of all member states to complete the reforms. Changes in international relations have led to a new geopolitical division between states, and instead of the former division into West and East, today there is a division into different interest groups within the Global North and Global South, consisting of coalitions of developed countries on the one side, both underdeveloped and developing countries, on the other side (Group G77, which also includes the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, then a number of countries in transition to which the countries of the European Union from Eastern Europe belong, but also other countries from the profiled sub regional groups). The lack of consensus on the reforms of the General Assembly makes it impossible to effectively solve international problems, and thus significantly complicates the efficient and rational maintenance of peace and security in the world (Dimitrijević, 2014, pp. 23-44).

Reform tendencies in the Economic and Social Council

From the very beginning of its activities, in addition to preserving international peace and security, which are among its primary obligations and goals, the Non-Aligned Movement also emphasised the obligation to strengthen international cooperation in order to achieve economic and social development and progress (Strydom, 2007, p. 36). The realisation of these obligations is a precondition for the realisation of peaceful and friendly relations between nations, and then for the realisation of all other goals arising from the United Nations Charter. Due to the complexity of development issues, the Movement believes that they do not have to be separated but can be considered in an integral way within the main dimension of development in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (Tadić, 1982; Milinković 1996). In this regard, the Non-Aligned Movement insists on the restructuring and revitalisation of the United Nations in the economic and social fields so that they can respond to them in an effective manner. The main problem in that context is the dilemma of developing countries, because despite the extreme efforts of millions of people, their position has not significantly improved, but has

stagnated and is threatening to collapse in some fields. Hence, it is considered necessary to accelerate the reform process so that the UN mechanism, primarily the Economic and Social Council, can respond to the growing needs of the Third World countries. In this regard, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 61/16 on the strengthening of the Economic and Social Council of 20 November 2006, reaffirming the need to meet the commitments made in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the Monterey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Plan of Implementation), as well as the agreement reached at the World Summit in 2005, in the economic, social and related fields (Final document, 2019).

As is well known, the United Nations is acting in accordance with the objectives set out in Chapter IX of the Charter, which relate, *inter alia*, to the promotion of international economic and social cooperation by increasing living standards, full employment and conditions for economic and social progress, social, health and related issues, promotion of international cultural and educational cooperation and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In order to create the conditions of stability and prosperity necessary for peaceful and friendly relations between States, the United Nations has entrusted the implementation of these objectives, primarily to the General Assembly and under its auspices - the Economic and Social Council, which has the powers set out in Chapter X of the Charter. As one of the main bodies of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council has the opportunity to study and prepare reports on international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related issues. The Council also has the possibility of making certain recommendations to the General Assembly, Member States and interested specialized agencies. It may convene international conferences and prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly. Also, the Economic and Social Council may conclude agreements with specialized agencies which regulate in more detail the issues of connecting agencies with the world organisation. It may also provide services to Member States and specialized agencies and conclude consultancy agreements with interested organisations. The Economic and Social Council is assisted in its work by nine functional commissions for various fields (statistics, forestry, prevention and criminal justice, the fight against narcotics, social development, science and technology, sustainable development, women's rights, population, etc.). At the regional level, the Council is assisted by five commissions: the Economic Commission for Africa (based in Addis Ababa), the Economic and Social

Commission for Asia and the Pacific (based in Bangkok), the Economic Commission for Europe (based in Geneva), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (based in Santiago de Chile) and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (based in Beirut). In cases where the need arises, the Economic and Social Council is assisted by other bodies (Basic Facts about the UN, 2011, p. 14).

Since the beginning of the work of this United Nations body, there have been several proposals for its structural reform. Thus, with the entry into force of the Charter on October 24, 1945, there were 18 members in the Economic and Social Council elected by the General Assembly. With the increase in the number of members of the world organisation, a proposal was made to reform the composition of this body. By Resolution of the General Assembly 1991B (18) of 17 December 1963, this proposal was adopted by amending Article 61 of the Charter and increasing the number of members of the Economic and Social Council to 27. The next reform amendment to Article 61 of the Charter was based on a resolution of the General Assembly 2847 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, when the number of members was increased to 54. Given that each member of the Economic and Social Council had one representative in the Council, and that each of them had one vote, with the new reform solution that came into force on 24 September 1973, the representation of states was to be somewhat fairer because 14 members represented Africa, 10 members - America and the Caribbean, 13 members - Western Europe and other countries and 6 members - Eastern Europe (Kreća, 2007, p. 507). However, although the members of the Council were elected on the basis of geographical representation, and decisions in the Council were made by a majority vote of the members present and voting, the adopted reform proposals due to the present political opportunity did not prove fair enough. Therefore, the General Assembly soon adopted Resolution 32/197 of 20 December 1975, in order to make the functioning of the Economic and Social Council somewhat more effective and efficient. Namely, referring to the previously voted resolutions on the establishment of the *New Economic Order* and the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, the General Assembly, at the suggestion of the *ad hoc* Committee on Restructuring the Economic and Social Sector of the United Nations, proposed strategic priorities for the Council and the social sphere in the coming period (Bulajić, 1980, pp. 68-82; GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), 1974; GA Res. 3202 (S-VI), 1974; GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), 1974). Priorities included coordinating the work of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as improving the efficiency of the entire United Nations system in the field of international economic

cooperation (Luck, 2003). At the end of the 1980s, there was a new rift between the group of developed and developing countries. Thus, Group 77 submitted several draft resolutions to the General Assembly proposing the introduction of universal membership in the Economic and Social Council. Due to the opposition of a group of developed countries (especially the permanent members of the Security Council), the draft resolutions did not pass the voting procedure. Consequently, during the 50th session of the 1996 General Assembly, Resolution 50/227 was passed, setting out new demands for the strengthening of the Economic and Social Council. In order to further restructure and revitalize the United Nations system, the General Assembly recommended that the Economic and Social Council continue to strengthen its role as a central mechanism for coordinating the activities of the world organisation and its specialized agencies and as a body responsible for overseeing subsidiary bodies and functional bodies. It also recommended that the Council continue to coordinate activities related to the realisation of the results achieved at the most important international conferences in the economic and social field. In the later period, these recommendations were joined by another one related to taking over the role in the field of Global Economic Governance (A Background Document, 2003).

The second round of important reforms of the Economic and Social Council was launched during the 57th session of the General Assembly in 2003, when the *ad hoc* Working Group submitted a motion for a resolution on the coordinated and integrated implementation and monitoring of United Nations conferences. The General Assembly adopted the proposal and passed Resolution 57/270B entrusting the role of implementing and monitoring the achieved results in the management of the world development process to the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies (above all, functional-technical and regional commissions), and then to the bodies, funds and programs established by its organisations. Despite the progress made in the 1990s, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Economic and Social Council were unsatisfactory, and the conclusions of the 2005 jubilee summit of the General Assembly, paragraphs 155 and 156, mention the need to further strengthen the Economic and Social Council as well as the adaptation of its functional competencies in order to meet the set development goals. In the continuation of the summit, the General Assembly adopted several resolutions, among which, perhaps, the most important is Resolution. 61/16 of 20 November 2006. The resolution reaffirms the need to strengthen the Economic and Social Council through an annual ministerial substantive review of the report on the implementation of the Development Agenda, including the United Nations

Millennium Development Goals. The resolution also instructs the Council to hold a development cooperation forum every other year and to monitor trends and progress in the development of international cooperation, i.e. to monitor the regulation of aid quality and quantity, and to provide guidelines on practical measures and policy options on how to improve coherence and effectiveness of his work. Immediately after the adoption of the said resolution, the Council adopted Decision E / 2006/274 of 15 December 2006, which provided additional modalities for its involvement in the preparation of the said meetings. On that occasion, the Council specifically referred to: "The role of the United Nations system in promoting full and productive employment and decent work for all" After that period, the Economic and Social Council was the subject of consultations on a comprehensive reform of the United Nations system. In particular, these consultations considered the possibility of adopting a new resolution that would elaborate on the earlier progress made by General Assembly Resolution 61/16 of 20 November 2006 and Decision E/2006/206 of 10 February 2006, which concerned the harmonization of its working methods (A/RES/61/16, 2007; E/2006/206, 2006).

With the outbreak of the global economic crisis, the focus of economic problems shifted to the G20. The attitudes of some developing countries that global economic problems should be solved outside the United Nations system, which further raised questions about Global Governance, also contributed to the situation. The role of the Economic and Social Council was elaborated at the conference of the United Nations General Assembly held in July 2009, which was dedicated to financial and economic crises. The Member States, including the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, agreed on the need to support a coordinated responsibility for the development of the United Nations system through the adoption of adopted documents to help consensus on policies related to the global economic and financial crisis and their impact on development. At the conference, the Economic and Social Council was asked to send recommendations to the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Doha Declaration adopted on 2 December 2008, on the occasion of strengthening the process of financing development. Also, the Council was required to examine the possibility of strengthening institutional arrangements to promote international cooperation in the field of fiscal policy, as well as in the field of cooperation with international financial institutions. After that, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 63/303 of 13 July 2009, which recommended the establishment of an *ad hoc* Panel of Experts to analyse and provide technical expertise on overcoming the global economic and financial

crisis (A/RES/63/303, 2009). The impact of the global crisis has obviously led to the marginalization of the Economic and Social Council. It has become more of a forum for discussion on the Development Agenda and the *Millennium Development Goals* between the countries of the South, which have not joined the developed countries of the Global North that advocate resolving the world's most important economic issues outside the United Nations institutional framework. Certain constraints arising from the structure of the world economy, changing interests of developing countries, and still-present ideological conflicts among the world organisation's member states all contributed to this situation. In order to regain its authority as the principal body of the United Nations for the promotion of international economic cooperation, coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and formulation of recommendations on issues of economic and social development, the Economic and Social Council will have to hold open discussions with other bodies of the world organisation and to develop cooperation with international financial institutions and the World Trade Organisation (Chimni, 2011, pp. 48-54). The reaffirmation of its place and role in the international order will depend, among other things, on its ability to review and assess the balanced integration of the pillars of sustainable development and their impact on the full implementation of international development goals.

Conclusions

The study on the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the reform of the United Nations provides general information on the genesis of proposals for the reorganisation of the main bodies of the world organisation - the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. These proposals were generated within the final reports of the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, and then in the reports of the working groups established by the General Assembly. Some constructive and concrete proposals on reform processes have also come from the Secretaries General. The range of proposed reform models for the main bodies of the world organisation indicates the fact that the reform process is developing in parallel with a more subtle process of change in contemporary international relations. The discussion on the reform of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council is therefore more serious and sophisticated than it initially seems with the mandate of drafting concrete reform proposals. The analysis shows that the United Nations remains an indispensable multilateral mechanism of the member states of the Non-

Aligned Movement for solidarity in solving all their most important problems. Although the main bodies of the world organisation are rapidly changing their characteristics that go beyond their traditionally established legal frameworks, overcoming this difference is connected with the dynamics of the development of international relations. All the more so, efforts to reform the United Nations for the non-aligned countries represent a major investment that requires both a conceptual transformation of the Non-Aligned Movement and a methodological adaptation to possible structural and functional changes in the major organs of the world organisation. For the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, with its principal organs, remains the most appropriate international forum for preserving peace and security and for achieving fairer and more equitable economic and social relations. For the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, with its principal organs, remains the most appropriate international forum for preserving peace and security and for achieving fairer and more equitable economic and social relations. Only through the United Nations system can the Non-Aligned Movement influence the formation of a new international order based on law and justice, as well as on other leading goals and principles of active peaceful coexistence among nations and states. The determination of the Non-Aligned Movement to play a vital role in the revival, reconstruction and democratisation of the world organisation speaks in favour of the acceptance of the universal values contained in the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. Finally, despite the fact that there are some disagreements about the reform of the United Nations among the non-aligned states, the United Nations for all of them remains a significant factor in international relations and a place where their needs and attitudes are articulated as the needs and attitudes of the majority of the international community, which just personifies the Non-Aligned Movement itself.

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INDONESIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: BEING CUSTODIAN OF A PRINCIPLED WORLD AND NAVIGATING THROUGH THE CHALLENGES OF FUTURE RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE

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Abstract: The article explores Indonesia's role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and its leadership during its NAM chairmanship in 1992–1995. It further discusses the country's stewardship in transitioning the Movement into the new era of the post-Cold War, and in assuring its continued relevance within a new context of international relations. It also presents a brief survey of the NAM since its first Summit in Belgrade in 1961. This article presents a further discussion on the future significance of the Movement, looking at the present challenges that include Covid-19. It argues that the Movement will continue to be relevant for the 21st-century international relations. It will remain pertinent if the NAM is able to diversify leadership, show greater visibility in solving global problems, generate deliverables, enhance commitment depth, uphold the unity of voice and increase the level of multi-stakeholders internal support and participation.

Key words: Dasasila Bandung; New International Economic Order; leadership diversification, commitment depth, unity of voice.

Introduction

At 60 years old, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) becomes one of the oldest post-war international forums founded at the height of the Cold War. It not only survived the Cold War but also shaped its dynamics and

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geopolitics. It offered an alternative avenue for countries to navigate their foreign policy in the midst of the bipolar world. The Movement played a critical role as a negotiating pole within the UN system, especially in the consideration of matters that posed threats to international peace and security.

As the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the Movement had to respond to the question of whether it was still relevant. The urgency of the Movement to define its future direction as the global context was changing was coinciding with Indonesia's chairmanship of the NAM. In a summit in Jakarta in 1992, the NAM leaders affirmed the continued pertinence of the Movement in the changing milieu of international relations. They believed that the world was still far from being peaceful and just, and therefore it remained critical for the NAM to play a role and make a contribution.

While there had been unanimity among its members about the persistent relevance of the Movement, some quarters outside the Movement, however, had expressed doubts about the Movement's significance. Some said that the NAM was nothing but a Cold War relic. Others said the NAM represented the interests of only some of its member countries. All NAM members had often been dragged along by the interests of a few member countries that were more outspoken and assertive. For this reason, in his farewell address in January 2001, the outgoing US Representative to the UN in New York, Richard Holbrooke, urged African countries to break away from the Movement. He said: "I respectfully ask the African countries here today to reconsider their association with the Non-Aligned Movement. The Non-Aligned Movement is not Africa's friend at this point. Your goals and NAM's are not synonymous." (Deen, 2001). As the NAM is entering the 21st century, it is facing new realities both inside and outside. While the NAM comprises the least developed and developing nations, many of its member countries are now emerging economies, such as India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Their influence on the global stage is increasing, both economically and politically. But will the Movement survive and be able to shape the future in yet another 60 years?

This article argues that the Movement will continue to be relevant for the near and far future of its member countries. It will continue to be meaningful to its member countries and the rest of the world if the NAM manages to set leadership diversification and achieve more visibility in providing solutions to global problems. It will remain significant if the Movement is able to enhance the commitment depth of its member countries, secure unity of voice and increase the level of multi-stakeholders internal support and participation.

The NAM: It all began in Belgrade

The idea of non-aligned was translated into an institutionalised collaborative arrangement when leaders from twenty-five countries met at the first NAM Summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 1 – 6 September 1961. The Summit was convened amidst the Cold War that was intensely growing. The participating countries of the Summit mostly came from Asia and Africa, one from Latin America which was Cuba, and three observers which were Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador, and one from Europe which was the host of the Summit. Criteria for the NAM membership were successfully established in the Summit Preparatory Meeting in Cairo in June 1961 (Jansen, 1966, pp. 285-286; Gde Agung, 1973, p. 323).² The founders of NAM viewed that the geopolitics of the time, the division of the Western Bloc led by the United States, and the Eastern Bloc controlled by the Soviet Union, has plunged the world into potential nuclear warfare. Therefore, the founders agreed that there had to be a forum for countries outside of those two blocs to unify efforts and resources to create a global order based on peace, equality, and justice. That forum was called the NAM. Issues of colonialism and neocolonialism became the NAM's agenda at the beginning of the Movement until the 6th NAM Summit in Havana, held in September 1979. This was understandable because at the time there continued to be colonial practices in several Asian and African countries, for example, Oman that was still colonised by the British, and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. The apartheid policy of the South African government also became one of the NAM's important agendas. The NAM gave attention to international economics as well as the development gap between developed and non-developing countries mainly caused by colonialism and imperialism. In order to create a more just global economy, the NAM has come up with several initiatives. At the 1961 Belgrade Summit, for example, the NAM suggested the United Nations to create the UN Capital Development Fund. Social issues such as education and culture garnered

² The criteria are: (i) a country should follow an independent policy based on peaceful co-existence and non-alignment, or should be showing a trend in favour of such a policy; (ii) it should consistently have supported movements for national independence; (iii) it should not be a member of multilateral military alliances concluded in the context of great power conflicts; (iv) if it had conceded military bases, these concessions should not have been made in the context of great power conflicts; (v) if it is a member of a bilateral or regional defence arrangement, this should not be in the context of great power conflicts.

the NAM's attention at the Second Summit in Cairo, 5 – 10 October 1964. Leaders of the NAM realised the importance of culture, education, and science to increase development and strengthen freedom, justice, and peace. In this regard, the NAM underlined the importance of cooperation and exchanges of experience in those areas. The NAM also paid close attention to the issues of peace and international security. In addition to the *Dasasila Bandung*, the birth of the NAM was also influenced by the global tension created by the rivalry between the Western Bloc and the Eastern bloc. Facing this challenge, the NAM leaders tried to find a way out to deescalate tension and rivalry between these two blocs. Efforts to establish global peace continued to take place in the UN forum through what was named as "The Initiative of the Fives" which was spearheaded by the five NAM leaders which were the President of Ghana, Prime Minister of India, President of the Republic of Indonesia, President of Egypt, and President of Yugoslavia. The initiative was drafted into a resolution introduced by these five leaders to the President of the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1960 which demanded, among others, the UN members, specifically the United States and the Soviet Union, to decrease the tension between them to make way for peace and international security.

At the first Summit in Belgrade, the NAM leaders agreed to write a letter to President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev urging the two leaders to take steps to deescalate tension. Also, at the Summit, the members of NAM committed to preventing thermonuclear war. In relations to weapons disarmament, the NAM established the following three principles: (i) the NAM must be involved in any upcoming weapons disarmament conferences; (ii) all discussions related to weapons disarmament must be done within the UN framework; (iii) general and complete weapons disarmament must be guaranteed by an inspection and control involving the members of the NAM. Problems in the Middle East, including Palestine and Israel's aggression in Lebanon, became the attention of the NAM in the early 1970s. Since the 3rd Summit in Lusaka held from 8 – 10 September 1970, the issue of Palestine and the struggles of the Palestinian people became an important agenda for the NAM. Other issues of importance were racial discrimination, including the apartheid policy of South Africa. In this regard, the NAM has stated that by carrying out apartheid policy, the South African government is standing in opposition to UN resolutions on human rights and basic freedoms. During the Cold War in the 1970s, there was a surge of interdependence between countries. In this context, the NAM began to abandon the economic inequality argument that was based on colonialism. Instead, it began to place great

importance on the finding of a new alternative global order that could be mutually beneficial for all countries. An alternative suggestion made by the NAM at the time was the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The NIEO concept received full support from the NAM leaders during the 4th Summit in Algeria on 5 – 9 September 1973. The Algerian Summit reiterated the NAM's commitment to this concept and urged for acceptance by the international community and to be implemented in stages. This effort successfully pushed for the adoption of the Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order at the 6th UN General Assembly. The Declaration and Action of Programme showed a strong intention by the international community, specifically by the developing countries, to reject the old system based on exploitation and to create a new system based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, collective interest, and inter-nation cooperation. The adoption placed the NAM in the position of the initiator of new ideas, especially within the UN system. (Desai, 2008, p.193; Murthy, 2013, p. 134). Throughout the Cold War, the NAM became an entity that was reckoned with by the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc. The NAM became an alternative policy that was viable for several countries. The NAM's leverage in many issues during that time was quite big. The NAM's position towards problems in the Middle East and Palestine, apartheid and racial discrimination, weapons disarmament, and the NIEO became points of consideration by countries of the Western and Eastern blocs. In order to have effective activism in multilateral forums such as the UN, the NAM formed a Bureau of NAM Coordination and Caucus in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The Coordinating Bureau was given the mandate to coordinate activities with the NAM and to carry out duties assigned in the UN. Meanwhile, the NAM Caucus in the UNSC was formed to achieve an equal position with the UN members who sat in the Council. With the UNSC voting system that required affirmative votes from nine members (including votes from five permanent members), then the NAM through its Caucus has become an important factor in pushing forward or delaying issues relevant to the NAM priorities. In the post-Cold War era and the aftermath, the NAM was able to navigate through new challenges by commitments and recommitments to the Movement's principles and a variety of programmatic measures. Through a series of summity diplomacy in Jakarta (1992), Cartagena de Indias (1995), Durban (1998), Kuala Lumpur (2003), Havana (2006), Sharm el-Sheikh (2009), Tehran (2012), Island of Margarita (2016) and Baku (2019), the Movement accentuated its determination to remain meaningfully existent and be part of the solution to global concerns.

Indonesia and the NAM

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a premier forum for developing countries to collectively determine and fight for their various interests. For Indonesia, the NAM is one of the main pillars of its foreign policy which adopts the independent and active principle. Historically, the NAM has become an important mechanism for Indonesia in its efforts to achieve national interests and to establish a global order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice as mandated in the 1945 Constitution preamble. The independent and active foreign policy is also in line with the Bandung spirit and principles that provide the foundation of the NAM's presence and fight. The birth of the NAM was rooted in *Dasasila Bandung* (also known as the Ten Principles of Bandung)³ established by the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference. *Dasasila Bandung* encompasses the principles of international relations as envisioned by the Asian-African countries. *Dasasila Bandung* has not only inspired the acceleration of the decolonisation process and the emergence of new countries, but also the establishment of solidarity between developing countries, including the newly independent countries, within the context of international relations which was organised into competing blocs. The substance of “non-aligned” and the independent and active policy are quite closely related, even though they are different conceptually. As stated in the Explanation of Chapter 3 of Law No 37/1999, the definition of an independent and active foreign policy is “a foreign policy that is by nature not neutral, but a foreign policy that independently determines position and

³ *Dasasila Bandung* (Ten Principles of Bandung): (i) respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (ii) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (iii) recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small; (iv) abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; (v) respect for the right of each nation to defend singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (vi) (a) abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers, (b) abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; (vii) refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; (viii) settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; (ix) promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; and (x) respect for justice and international obligations.

policy towards international issues and does not commit *a priori* to one global power, and contributes actively through thoughts and active participation to resolve global conflicts, disagreements and other problems, in order to establish global order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice." The NAM is also an instrument for multilateral cooperation based on the principles of equality, solidarity and togetherness, mutual respect, and mutual assistance. The NAM rejects unilateral steps taken either by one country or a group of its member or non-member countries. This is in line with Indonesia's foreign policy that emphasises multilateral diplomacy, together with bilateral diplomacy, to achieve common objectives and to contribute collectively to peace and international security efforts, as well as the welfare of countries in the world. Indonesia assumed its responsibility as the Chair of the NAM from 1992 to 1995. It was the period when a post-Cold World was steadily forming. It carried with it opportunities for less confrontational relations among countries and global euphoria for common peace and progress. Yet the Movement was cautiously optimistic, viewing the new world as remaining far from being peaceful, just and secure. As reflected in the document of the 1992 Jakarta Message, the NAM leaders believed that the world today is still far from being a peaceful, just and secure place. Simmering disputes, violent conflicts, aggression and foreign occupation, interference in the internal affairs of states, policies of hegemony and domination, ethnic strife, religious intolerance, new forms of racism, and narrowly conceived nationalism are major and dangerous obstacles to harmonious co-existence among states and peoples and have even led to the disintegration of states and societies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1992, para. 3). Indonesia's NAM chairmanship that coincided with the end of the Cold War era was called upon to respond to the new development, and to the urgency to define the NAM's role and position within the new international order. For Indonesia, the NAM's ability to respond and adapt to the new challenges was essential for the NAM to remain relevant for its members and beyond. To begin, Indonesia in its capacity as the NAM's chair placed great significance on securing the collective commitment of the NAM member states to making the Movement pertinent. In the 1992 Summit, as reflected in its document, leaders of the Movement agreed (...), the Movement is committed to the shaping of a new international order, free from war, poverty, intolerance and injustice, a world based on the principles of peaceful co-existence and genuine interdependence, a world which takes into account the diversity of social systems and cultures ((Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1992, para. 27). The commitment was to be substantiated. And

Indonesia was well aware of this. The chair's first test was a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina that posed serious threats to international peace and security. The conflict preoccupied the NAM's agenda, and the Summit tasked Indonesia to "closely monitor the situation and to take appropriate action to give support to peace initiatives of the United Nations." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1992, para. 40). In accordance with the mandate, Indonesia took a range of initiatives, including appointing a Special Envoy tasked to liaise with leaders of key countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, the Russian Federation and Turkey. This step was compounded by a mission led by President Soeharto to Zagreb and Sarajevo on 12 - 14 March 1995. At the same time, Indonesia extended to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Slovenia an offer of good offices, on behalf of the Movement, to facilitate the peace process in the Balkan region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 1995, pp. 4-5). The conflict in the Balkans was not the only threat to international peace and security that created pressure on the international community. The NAM also had to respond to the unfolding inter-ethnic conflict in Rwanda. In a meeting in October 1994, the NAM's Foreign Ministers urged the cessation of violence that could spiral up to genocide. The Foreign Ministers also welcomed the intention of the United Nations to establish an international tribunal to bring perpetrators to justice. One year later, in a Coordinating Bureau Meeting of the NAM in Bandung in April 1995, the NAM's Foreign Ministers called for the urgency of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The end of the Cold War also carried with it a strong hope of the NAM member countries for an increase in North-South dialogue and South-South cooperation. In July 1993 Japan in its capacity as the Chair of G7 invited Indonesia for a discussion on measures to be taken to strengthen the North-South dialogue. To create a global cushion for such a dialogue, the NAM spearheaded multilateral discussions on the North-South dialogue and ways to strengthen it. The discussions led to the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution 48/165 "Renewal of the Dialogue on Strengthening International Economic Cooperation for Development through Partnership." One issue that was high on the agenda of the NAM that was critical to the dialogue was foreign debt. Indonesia regarded this issue as one of its NAM priorities and viewed that foreign debt resolution should be effective, comprehensive, fair, development-oriented, and durable. In August 1994 Indonesia hosted a Ministerial Meeting that focused on foreign debt and development. The Ministers outlined and gave emphasis to the "once and for all" principle in debt resolution and called for a substantial

reduction of up to 70 per cent for all categories of foreign debt. In the framework of South-South cooperation, Indonesia proposed a tripartite financing mechanism. In December 1994, at the United Nations, the NAM in collaboration with Group 77 pioneered the adoption of the UN resolution on “*The United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation*”.

The NAM’s Relevance

The question of the NAM’s relevance was particularly arising when the Cold War era ended. In the first ten years of transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, the NAM was facing a number of challenges that posed a test to the Movement’s relevance. One of the challenges was an increase in intra-state conflicts as found among others in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the Balkan region. With the event of 9/11 unfolding, the NAM member countries had to adjust to the new global reality that gave birth to a new bipolar world established under the dictum “you are either with us, or with the terrorists.” In the same period, the NAM had to respond to the globally growing demand for democracy and the promotion and protection of human rights, the desire for social progress, poverty alleviation and economic progress, the reduction or exemption of foreign debts, and the need for a fair international trading system and financing for sustainable development. There was a sentiment that cast doubt on the efficacy of the NAM in helping its member countries achieving these goals. In 2005, for example, the US Congress as stated in the report *American Interests and UN Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations* takes the view that “the so-called Non-Aligned Movement, a product of Cold War divisions, remains as a major impediment to economic development, protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy.” (USIP, 2005, p.6). The US Congress viewed that the NAM was just an obstacle to making progress in critical areas of human development. Today, the global politics landscape is immensely transforming. China is steadily emerging as a major power and its rise and relations with the US and the rest of the globe is shaping international relations of our time. The world is also facing disruptive waves, including industrial revolution 4.0 and Covid-19. The NAM has to find its place as a forum for collectively effective measures in responding to the disruptions, to show its meaningful existence for its member countries and the rest of the global community of nations. In other words, the NAM has to prove that it remains relevant to its member states and the milieu and other states outside the Movement. This article argues that the NAM’s relevance would

continue and significantly be felt by its member countries, especially within the present context of multi-dimensional developments and disruptions, if the Movement meets or continues to meet the following strategies:

First, is leadership diversification. The NAM diversifies its leadership. Since 1961, the NAM's chair has been decided on a geographically rotating basis. So far, five countries in Asia have assumed the chairmanship position: Sri Lanka (1976), India (1983), Indonesia (1992), Malaysia (2003), Iran (2012) and Azerbaijan (2019); five countries from Africa: Egypt (1964 & 2009), Zambia (1970), Algeria (1973), Zimbabwe (1986) and South Africa (1998); one from Europe: Yugoslavia (1961 & 1989); and three from Latin America: Cuba (1979 & 2006), Colombia (1995) and Venezuela (2016). With 120 member countries, the NAM's chairmanship and leadership need to go beyond this pattern. The NAM may wish to anticipate the fact that in the future, Chile, Nigeria, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines or Vietnam or else should chair and lead the Movement if they wish to do so. Diversity in leadership will enrich the NAM with traditions in governance. *Second*, greater visibility in solving global problems is another important element of the NAM's constant relevance. Critical to this visibility is leaders' innovation in finding solutions. The chair of the Movement may wish to use good offices or advisory offices, leader's missions, leader's special envoys, leader's Sherpa, ad-hoc task forces, confidence-building missions, or contact groups in helping resolve global and regional conflicts and disputes. The present situations in Syria, Yemen, and, of course, the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict seem to call for such initiatives. The decision of the NAM under the chairmanship of Azerbaijan, during the Online Summit Level Meeting of the NAM Contact Group in Response to Covid-19 on 4 May 2020, to establish a NAM Task Force in the fight against Covid-19 was very timely. *Third*, it is important for the NAM to make more deliverables in the future, both in dispute settlements among its members and meeting the socio-economic and development needs of its members. Conflicts and disputes still take place within and between some NAM member countries. Covid-19, climate change and poverty alleviation remain high on the agenda of the Movement. *Fourth*, the NAM needs to go beyond conference room deliberations in catering to the fundamental needs of the peoples of its members. It needs to go beyond the lengthy and thick final documents that are traditionally adopted at the end of a NAM Summit or ministerial meeting. The NAM member countries need to have commitment depth, which is the level of their commitment to the implementation of the principles and programmatic goals outlined in the outcome documents of collaborative arrangements. Commitment depth reflects the level of priority and significance that the NAM member countries

place on the Movement. *Fifth*, the NAM will need greater unity of voice in responding to future challenges. The unity of voice also reflects strong leadership and strong cohesion of the movement. When the NAM member states speak with one voice, it will have a better chance to achieve a symmetrical result in its diplomacy. *Sixth*, in the present and future world where the government is no longer the only actor that decides the fate of the NAM, the cause of the Movement will be strengthened when it enjoys unflagging support, let alone active participation, from its peoples. Therefore, the NAM might also wish to explore the greater contribution of the business sector and civil society groups from each of its member countries for the enhancement of the NAM cooperation.

Conclusions

Since its inception in Belgrade in 1961, the NAM has become a critical entity that shapes relations among nations in the Cold War as well as post-Cold War era and beyond. The NAM grouping has been an essential negotiation bloc, especially within the United Nations forums, which provided alternative perspectives and positions amidst contention between the Western and the Eastern bloc. In the present time, while its member countries continue to place great importance on the NAM, the question of its relevance and significance ceaselessly overshadows the Movement. The NAM has always been a critical part of Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy. When it chaired the Movement in 1992 – 1995, Indonesia succeeded at ensuring seamless NAM's transition, leaving the Cold War to enter the new context of post-Cold War international relations. It managed to give meaning to the continued relevance of the Movement, including through programmatic activities that responded to the pressing concerns of the Movement's member countries.

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THE NON-ALIGNED POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - A VIEW FROM SLOVENIA

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Abstract: It is known that during the Cold War, the world was divided into two poles, western and eastern, and that many Asian, African and Latin American countries decided to choose the “third way” in order to maintain their independence. With the progressive efforts of Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, Cuba and other countries, the Non-Aligned Movement was founded in the early 1960s. This Movement played a significant role in the fight against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including all other forms of foreign aggression and domination. Seeking its own path of development, the Non-Aligned Movement fought against bloc politics, which played a role in stabilizing international relations and ensuring international peace and security. After the end of the Cold War, a big question mark was placed on the relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement. Bearing in mind that the Non-Aligned Movement today consists of 120 countries, which is two-thirds of the total number of United Nations members, it cannot be disputed that the Non-Aligned Movement continues to play an important role in the development of modern international relations.

Key words: the Non-Aligned Movement, Cold War, Blocks, geopolitical prediction, international relations.

Introduction

When talking about the Non-Aligned policy, we should mention the Non-Aligned Movement, which was the result of the initiative in the 1950s

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and officially established in the 1960s. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was a forum of 120 developing world states that were not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. The Non-Aligned Movement was established in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia through the initiative of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, Indonesian President Sukarno, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito. This led to the first Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries. The purpose of the organisation was to ensure "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" in their "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics." The countries of the Non-Aligned Movement represented nearly two-thirds of the United Nations' members and contained 55% of the world population. Membership was particularly concentrated in countries considered to be developing or part of the Third World, though the Non-Aligned Movement also had a number of developed nations (Wikipedia, org). "In the 1950s, the so-called Non-aligned group represented a novel approach to international relations. Neutral nations had, of course, always existed, but their distinguishing feature had been a passive foreign policy. By contrast, the Non-aligned of the Cold War period did not perceive their neutrality to require non-involvement. They were active, occasionally shrill players promoting agendas established in forums designed to pool their strengths and enhance their influence, in effect forming an alliance of the Non-aligned. Though they were highly vocal in their complaints about international tensions, they knew how to profit from them. They learned how to play superpowers off against each other. And since they feared the Soviet Union more than they did the United States, they generally sided with the communists without feeling any reciprocal need to apply the same moral stringency to the Soviet Union as they did towards the United States." (Kissinger, 1996). In fact, the existence of two world-leading superpowers, which together with the countries, loyal or subordinated to them, was the basis of forming two blocs, economically, military, scientifically and politically strong. The reasons for entering the NAM were different from state to state, from region to region. All of them did not want to be the full member of the pro-US part or the pro-SU part of the globe. Somehow, they wanted to be independent as much as possible from the duties imposed or preferred by the SU or by the US. They definitely were not strong enough to

preserve this position, but, at the same time, they did not choose the policy of neutrality or non-activity. To preserve this position, they entered the alliance of the Non-aligned. This was the era of the so-called Cold War with two superpowers leading the biggest part of the world. In fact, this was the condition for the establishment of the NAM. Without the Cold War, such a movement would have no sense. Hence, it is reasonable for us to ask the question: Does the current world situation find the creation of a new non-aligned group of countries and to what extent would this be politically justified? The basic condition for establishing such a movement is whether there is a real possibility of some kind of a new Cold War. In the second half of the 2010s, the US policy was led by President Donald Trump, whose major idea of his policy was "America first". The policy was kind of isolationist, weakening strong political and economic relations with the EU, weakening the NATO alliance. The result was a strong positive impact on the American economy, with substantial economic growth, minimizing the unemployment rate. But without strong allies, America would not and could not be a world superpower. Russia had economic problems as a result of the imposed economic sanctions, which were imposed because of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its policy against the eastern part of Ukraine. China's economy was growing and becoming more powerful and more influential. But, at that time, China was an important big country and still not a superpower spreading its political intention worldwide. In many of the analysis emerging in this period, we could find the predictions that there is no possibility of some new Cold War and that a multipolar world would be the future global situation.

New geopolitical predictions about international relations

Those predictions changed in the 2020s. The possibility of some kind of a new cold war is becoming a real possibility. There are some signs that each big and powerful state, especially the US, Russia and China, are expected to diminish the cooperation with another superpower, but at the same time enforcing the political, economic and security cooperation with their allies. No more America first, but the aim to defend and unite democracy. "We're going to rebuild our alliances. We're going to reengage the world and take on the enormous challenges we face dealing with the pandemic, dealing with global warming and again, standing up for democracy and human rights around the world. Though many of these values have come under intense pressure in recent years, even

pushed to the brink in the last weeks, the American people are going to emerge from this moment more determined and better equipped to unite the world to defend democracy because we have fought for it ourselves", President Biden said (Biden 1, 2021).

China is a key geopolitical rival to the US, and tensions between Beijing and Washington increased in the later stages of the Trump presidency, with clashes on issues relating to trade, technology, regional security and human rights. Recently, the State Department issued a statement that the administration of President Biden wants to keep up with allies and partners before it gets in touch with China (Biden 2, 2021). President Biden is engineering a sharp shift in policy towards China, focused on gathering allies to counter Beijing's coercive diplomacy around the world and ensuring that China does not gain a permanent advantage in critical technologies. At first glance, it seems to adopt much of the Trump administration's conviction that the world's two biggest powers are veering dangerously toward confrontation, a clear change in tone from the Obama years (Sanger, Crowley, 2021). At the meeting of Chinese and U.S. high officials in Alaska, Chinese officials accused the US of inciting countries "to attack China", while the US said China had "arrived intent on grandstanding". Relations between the two superpowers are at their most strained for years. The US has pledged to raise contentious issues such as Beijing's treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. The ill-tempered talks in Anchorage involved Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on the US side, facing off with China's most senior foreign policy official, Yang Jiechi, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Are the US and China in a new 'Cold War'? (BBC, 2 2021). The Covid-19 pandemic showed the split among important world powers. The EU ordered the vaccine only from the western pharmaceutical companies, while the media several times informed the EU citizens that the Russian and Chinese vaccines are not reliable. "Pandemic is abused by politicians in order to achieve internal political goals, so is the battle against the new virus the part of the new cold war." (Cibej 2, 2021). In January 2021, the EU High Representative Mr Borell paid a visit to the Russian Foreign Minister Mr Lavrov, and they gave the impression that "Neither the European Union nor Russia have a vital need to cooperate." (Cibej 1, 2021). On February 11, 2021, China banned BBC World News from broadcasting, reportedly because of the wrong reports on the vaccine abuse in some parts of the country (BBC. 1, 2021). It is more or less evident that the world is going towards a kind of the cold war. It is difficult to find out when or if it would happen, and how it would look.

What will be the frontiers of a certain block, and how many blocks will emerge from the actual situation? But it is evident that the US, China and Russia are active in getting as many friendly countries as possible with the aim to embrace them into their block.

Foreign policy positioning of the Western Balkans - aligned or non-aligned policy?

It is more or less clear that the US is interested in the Western Balkans. After the election of the new U.S. president, it seems that the international policy towards the WB has changed. Analysts believe that the arrival of the new U.S. administration headed by President Joseph Biden is the key element for political changes in the Western Balkans, and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new U.S. administration in collaboration with the EU has to seek ways that will lead the country to necessary political changes, which will ultimately result in prosperity of the Western Balkan countries. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have the political will or strong institutions, which is why Bosnia and Herzegovina will need assistance from U.S. security-intelligence agencies, similar to the one provided to Italy after World War II. The current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is similar to the one in Italy after WWII. The encouraging fact is that in his conversation with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the newly elected U.S. President Joseph Biden touched upon the Western Balkans as well (Ifimes, 2020). Yet, it has not been clear which state would belong to which side. The majority of states still let the door open and leave it to the future to decide where to align. The EU is still open to all possibilities, although it is more probable that the majority of its members would align to the western side. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mr Borrell said: "Accepting the invitation of the Robert Schuman Foundation, I presented on last Monday some of our principles on which we will operate this year: diminish the tensions in our neighbourhood, organise a new start with the US, re-equalize our relations with China, actualize our strategic autonomy and restore the multilateralism." (Borell, 2021). It is now time to take the strategic decision for the future position of every state. We can expect more options, such as adhering to the pro-American bloc or the Chinese or Russian bloc. The third option is to remain neutral with a passive foreign policy. However, an old proverb says: "There are only dead dogs in the middle of the road", which means that it will not be easy to remain passive and completely neutral! Those who will not want to join any

major group will be forced to align among themselves. Right now it is still too early to make any decision on this matter, but sooner or later such a decision will have to be taken.

Conclusions

We can expect that some kind of new Non-Aligned Movement will emerge. It is impossible to predict how it will be organised and how it will function. But, probably, the leading countries of such a movement will thoroughly study how the NAM functioned, and what can be seen from the historical point of view as successful with many important positive results, especially in the process of decolonisation and race discrimination and the way towards the independent political orientation of newly created independent states. It is not easy for small states to stay neutral or non-aligned. They are simply too vulnerable in economic terms. They are far from being self-sufficient and need to cooperate strongly with other economies. It is difficult to cooperate if there are not good political relations. Strong economies can afford to remain neutral or non-aligned. Weak and small economies cannot. Slovenia is definitely a small economy, extremely dependent on economic relations with the EU countries. Slovenia is a cultural, economic and traditional partner of the Western European countries. The dependence on the Western economy is prevailing. Although there is some sentiment for the Non-Aligned Movement in Slovenia, the current foreign policy orientation indicates a lack of self-confidence to remain politically neutral or non-aligned.

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**THE NAM S&T CENTRE
- A SUCCESSFUL MECHANISM
FOR CAPACITY BUILDING IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION AND ACHIEVING
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH**

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Abstract: In pursuance of the decisions taken in various Conferences of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries, the Centre for Science and Technology of the Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries (NAM S&T Centre) was established in New Delhi, India in 1989 as an Intergovernmental Organisation for the promotion of intensive cooperation in the fields of Science and Technology for collective self-reliance among non-aligned and other developing countries. So far, 47 NAM countries from various regions represented by their Government departments, ministries or agencies dealing with Science & Technology have joined the Centre as its members. In order to meet its objectives, the NAM S&T Centre has been implementing a wide range of activities on Science, Technology & Innovation (STI), including organisation of international workshops, and training programmes/courses on various topics; award of fellowships to scientists and researchers for their affiliation with Centres of Excellence in different countries; implementation of multilateral collaborative projects; publication of books, monographs, handbooks and state-of-the-art reports; etc. The NAM S&T Centre has been working as a facilitator in STI-driven economic development in developing countries by encouraging their governments to nurture the S&T institutions

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and formulating policy guidelines for the integration of science and technology into national development plans. With the successful execution of a large number of programmes in diverse areas of STI, the Centre has been able to make significant contributions in helping the developing countries in STI Policy formulation and STI Diplomacy; and capacity building of the countries of the Global South in the realisation of the Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals.

Key words: India, the Non-Aligned Movement, the NAM S&T Centre, international cooperation, Global South, *Millennium* and Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was formed during the collapse of the colonial system and the independence struggles of the peoples of the African, Asian, Latin American and other regions of the world when the Cold War between the two Super Powers was at its peak. India's first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru coined the term "Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)" during the Conference of the newly liberalized Asian and African nations held at Bandung, Indonesia during April 18-24, 1955. Twenty-nine Heads of States attended the Conference to identify and deliberate on world issues and pursue joint policies on international relations. The ten-point Bandung Principles enunciated in the Conference Declaration led to the concept of *Panchsheel* or the five principles that comprise: i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; ii) mutual non-aggression; iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; iv) equality and mutual benefit; and v) peaceful co-existence. In pursuance of the Declaration of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement was formally established in September 1961 at the first Summit of the Heads of State and the Government hosted by erstwhile Yugoslavia in Belgrade, through an initiative of the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, Indonesian President Sukarno, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito. This multilateral grouping of the South, along with the Group of 77 (G77) founded in 1964, provides a common platform for the developing countries to actively voice and articulate their views and perspectives on political and economic issues in the United Nations and other international forums, and to help them pursue their mutual interest and cooperation (South Centre, 2015). The NAM presently has 120 members representing nearly two-thirds of the United Nations'

members and comprising 55 per cent of the world population, particularly the third world or developing countries and the emerging economies. The main purpose to form the NAM was to ensure that the newly independent countries could safeguard their independence and sovereignty, decide their own path of development and keep away from the conflicts between the two superpowers. The disintegration of the USSR in the early 1990s led to the end of the Cold War, which has brought the world to the threshold of a new era in international politics. Observers started suggesting that the NAM, which was formed as a response of the newly independent countries of the post-World War II period to domestic requirements, on the one hand, and the polarized international relations on the other, is passing through a critical period, and it is being argued that in the changed situation, non-alignment and most of the policies associated with it have become irrelevant. The 13th NAM Summit held in Kuala Lumpur in 2003 adopted a declaration on *“Continuing the Revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement”*. This document along with the *“Declaration on the Purposes and the Principles and the Role of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Present International Juncture”* adopted at the 14th Summit Meeting at Havana in 2006 convincingly answers the apprehensions about the Movement in the changed world scenario. These declarations highlighted the role played by the NAM on issues like decolonisation, apartheid, disarmament, poverty eradication and socio-economic development of its members and at the same time to commit them to “the ideals, principles and purposes” of the Movement, as laid out at the Bandung Conference of 1955 and to the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter. The aims and objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the current international scenario include: promotion and reinforcement of multilateral cooperation; serving as a forum of political coordination of the developing countries; promoting unity, solidarity and cooperation among the member countries to maintain international peace. The NAM also commits its members to encourage sustainable development through cooperation and respect for enjoyment and fundamental freedoms for all. The movement is committed to the principles of sustainable development and achieving the *Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)*, but it believes that the international community has not created conditions conducive to development and has infringed upon the right to sovereign development by each Member State. Issues such as globalisation, the debt burden, unfair trade practices, the decline in foreign aid, donor conditionality, and the lack of democracy in international financial decision-making are cited as factors inhibiting development (Ministry of External Affairs of India, 2012). An important element of the 17th NAM Summit

(September 2016, Venezuela) Declaration (now widely called the Margarita Declaration) is – “South-South Cooperation”: *They reiterated that South-South Cooperation is an important element of international cooperation for the sustainable development of their peoples, as a complement and not as a substitute to the North-South Cooperation, which allows for the transfer of appropriate technologies, in favourable conditions and preferential terms. In this regard, they reaffirmed that South-South Cooperation is an expression of solidarity and cooperation among the peoples and countries of the South, which contributes to their national wellbeing, guided by the principles of respect for sovereignty, national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in the internal affairs, and mutual benefit* (South Centre, 2016).

The NAM S&T Centre

Establishment of NAM S&T Centre

In accordance with the decisions taken in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Conferences of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-aligned Countries, respectively held in Colombo in 1976, Havana in 1979 and New Delhi in 1983, and in pursuance of the declaration and the “*Action Programmes on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*”, as well as the Charter adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the relevant provisions of the International Development Strategy and the Caracas Programme of Action, a decision was taken at the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the Non-aligned countries in New York in February 1985 to set up the *Centre for Science and Technology of the Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries (NAM S&T Centre)* as an Intergovernmental Organisation for the promotion of intensive cooperation in the fields of science and technology for collective self-reliance among non-aligned and other developing countries. In response to an offer made by the Government of India to host the Centre, the NAM S&T Centre was established in August 1989 with its Headquarters in New Delhi. In pursuance of a decision in the Eighth NAM Summit Meeting at Harare during 1-6 September 1986, the first Intergovernmental Consultative Conference of Experts (IGCCE) on “New and High Technologies” of the non-aligned and other developing countries was held in New Delhi during 4-5 October 1988 which was attended by representatives from 25 countries. The underlying perspective emphasised the need for developing countries to collectively ensure that “High” technologies emerge through joint efforts on technology generation, adaptation, modification/alteration, and to prevent technological

obsolescence in these countries. Most importantly, the countries of the South, together, are to take initiative and mould the high technologies as relevant to their needs and resources, and to their modernisation imperatives. Furthermore, the funding of multilateral programmes within the South must be based on the principle of collective self-reliance, with essentially no “outside” inputs. The Statute of the NAM S&T Centre was adopted by consensus during the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the Non-aligned Countries in New York in February 1985 and was placed for signature by the prospective member countries. Twenty-six countries signed the Statute at that time. The Statute was again opened for signature in Pyongyang, the DPR Korea in 1987 during the NAM Foreign Ministers’ meeting when five more countries signed the same. With the minimum requirement for the establishment of the Centre having been fulfilled, the Centre came into being in August 1989. In September 1989, a resolution was adopted in Belgrade at the 9th NAM Summit urging the developing countries to join the activities of the Centre and contribute to its effectiveness as an instrument in scientific and technological cooperation of the non-aligned and other developing countries (Final Document, 1989). So far, 47 NAM countries from various regions - represented by their Government departments, ministries or agencies dealing with science and technology have joined the Centre as its members. A list of current member countries of the Centre is given in Table - 1.

Table – 1: Member Countries of NAM S&T Centre

S. No	AFRICAN REGION	S. No	ASIAN REGION	S. No	MIDDLE EAST
1.	Algeria	18.	Afghanistan	32.	Cyprus
2.	Burkina Faso	19.	Bangladesh	33.	Iran
3.	Congo	20.	Bhutan	34.	Iraq
4.	Egypt	21.	Cambodia	35.	Jordan
5.	Ethiopia	22.	DPR Korea	36.	Lebanon
6.	Gabon	23.	India	37.	Palestine
7.	Gambia	24.	Indonesia	38.	Malta
8.	Kenya	25.	Malaysia	39.	Syria
9.	Malawi	26.	Myanmar	S. No	LaC Region
10.	Mauritius	27.	Nepal	40.	Argentina
11.	Nigeria	28.	Pakistan	41.	Bolivia
12.	South Africa	29.	Sri Lanka	42.	Colombia
13.	Tanzania	30.	Vietnam	43.	Cuba
14.	Togo			44.	Guyana
15.	Uganda	S. No	EUROPE	45.	Nicaragua
16.	Zambia			46.	St. Lucia
17.	Zimbabwe	31.	Serbia	47.	Venezuela

Aims, Objectives and Functions of the Centre

Right after the setting up of the Centre in the year 1989, its functioning for the first few years was restricted mainly to the activities as required in the formative stage of any organisation - such as arranging appropriate accommodation for the Centre, providing basic infrastructure, organising manpower, raising the initial subscription from members, etc., and establishing the network of Focal Points in member countries and their institutions. The Centre drew up a programme of scientific activities, which

was approved at the 4th Meeting of the Governing Council in April 1993 and was taken up for implementation thereafter. Even though there were financial constraints, in order to fulfil its commitment to members, the Centre endeavoured to implement an expanded range of scientific activities over the years by generating external funding from various other sources, particularly inviting other international scientific organisations to co-sponsor such programmes in areas of common interest and organising programmes on a partnership basis with national-level scientific institutions in various countries.

The main aim of the Centre is to promote various actions called for by the *Action Programme for Economic Cooperation* and by the *Common Strategy for Cooperation* in the fields of Science and Technology in order to strengthen cooperation among non-aligned and other developing countries. The objectives and functions of the Centre as stipulated in the Statute of the Centre include: to help in the establishment of links between National and Regional Centres for development and transfer of technology; promotion of fullest possible and mutually beneficial collaboration among scientists, technologists and scientific organisations from non-aligned and other developing countries; promoting the establishment of a system of meetings and consultations of scientists and technologists from non-aligned and other developing countries; to act as a clearing house of information regarding technological capabilities of the individual non-aligned and other developing countries with a view to promoting scientific and technological co-operation and transfer of technology among them, and provide early information about impending technological changes and seek to develop a data bank; maintaining a registry of S&T experts of high calibre whose services could be utilised by the Members of the Centre; stimulating and promoting joint R&D projects and training programmes on the bilateral or multilateral basis among the members of the Centre in selected fields of special relevance; to appoint special panels of outstanding experts for the preparation of State-of-the-art Reports in respects of selected fields and problems, with a view to rendering expert advice to the members in the choice of technology, and S&T growth, including human resources development; providing suggestions including models for balanced S&T development based on optimum utilisation of resources; and monitoring the implementation of the programmes pertaining to S&T development recommended at inter-governmental meetings of non-aligned and other developing countries.⁵ Furthermore, the Centre may perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by either a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries or by a Summit Meeting of Heads of

State or Government of Non-aligned Countries. Also, according to an important provision in the Statute, the Centre may, within the limits of its objectives and upon approval of the Governing Council, undertake appropriate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialised agencies as well as with other governmental and non-governmental organisations.

Role of NAM S&T Centre in the Promotion of South-South Cooperation in Science, Technology & Innovation (STI)

Planning and Implementation of Activities

South-South Cooperation practices are based on mutual and common interests of the developing countries and address jointly each partner's development challenges and major priorities. The partners provide and receive assistance based on their strengths and weaknesses under conditions of reciprocity and with respect to each other's sovereignty. Apart from that, South-South Cooperation seeks efficiency in the use of resources and promotes integrations between countries of the same region, as well as relations with partner countries in other regions. In this context, the NAM S&T Centre has emerged as a unique intergovernmental entity for promoting South-South Cooperation through the application of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for collective self-reliance of the developing countries. Furthermore, the Centre has been attempting to include a few activities on North-South Cooperation as well for the benefit of the developing countries. The NAM S&T Centre, soon after its establishment in August 1989, had the major task to prepare a profile of S&T activities and programmes of mutual interest and identify policy issues that need attention to foster cooperation among the NAM and other developing countries. For this purpose, the Centre initiated interactions with member countries, and also informal get-together of the representatives of member countries were organised on South-South Cooperation in a few areas. The first informal meeting of the member countries was held on "South-South Cooperation in Science and Technology" on 13th February 1990 in New Delhi. The second such meeting was on "South-South Cooperation in Low Cost Housing" held on 23rd August 1991 in New Delhi. The third meeting was on "South-South Cooperation in Biotechnological Applications for Food Security in Developing Countries" organised during 6-7 December 1991. During the last thirty-two years, the NAM S&T Centre has evolved as a multifunctional international scientific institution catering to the needs of

the developing countries for their capacity building and collective self-reliance through science and technology interventions. From its past experiences and lessons learnt thereof, the Centre has made several changes from time to time in its approach towards planning and implementation of its scientific programmes. The salient features of the present modus operandi are:

- Cooperative partnership with other organisations for sharing of organisational inputs, management and finances in holding international S&T programmes;
- Across the board networking of scientists, experts, science managers and policymakers;
- Widespread use of electronic media in carrying out day-to-day official communications and dissemination of information to the developing countries;
- Inculcating a scientific culture within the Centre's Secretariat; and
- Encouraging young scientists, and more specifically women scientists.

Further, in order to encourage participation in the activities of the Centre and also to promote public-private partnership in Science & Technology, a "NAM S&T - Industry Network" has been set up by the Centre, which may be joined by the academic and research institutions, S&T agencies and industry in the NAM and other developing countries as its members by paying a small annual membership fee. Currently, 16 scientific/academic institutions and industrial organisations of Bolivia, Brazil, India (10) and Nigeria (3) are the members of this Network. The above approach has led to a more visible impact of the programmes organised by the Centre. Consequently, the Center has expanded its activities in scope and content, which is reflected in the various successes it has achieved (Bandyopadhyay and Kavita, 2020).

Concept of Partnership

The Centre aims at bringing the non-aligned and other developing countries to the frontiers of science and technology through networking, sharing of knowledge, collective self-reliance, pooling of resources and mutual support. In this regard, the assistance of eminent experts is sought in preparing detailed proposals and planning of events and in the case of collaborative programmes, in the formulation of project documents. During the initial period of operation of the NAM S&T Centre, there were not many

institutions and scientific agencies from the member countries other than the host country India that had come forward to organise the scientific activities in partnership with the Centre. In fact, in the 1990s, most of the activities of the Centre were organised only in various Indian institutions and that too with full finances paid by the Centre. However, due to the proactive approach of the Centre and increasing popularity of the scientific contents and efficient management of its programmes, more and more institutions and agencies from other countries started coming forward to host and organise programmes in partnership with the Centre. The Centre now receives proposals from many such organisations to co-organise and host scientific events jointly with the Centre on a cost-sharing basis. In order to adopt a transparent system of partnership, the Centre has been following certain guidelines for sharing managerial responsibilities and expenditure with its prospective co-organisers/host institutions for the organisation of joint scientific events.

Priority Areas for Programmes on STI

The Intergovernmental Consultative Conference of Experts (IGCCE) on New and High Technologies of the Non-aligned and Other Developing Countries at its meeting held in October 1988 in New Delhi emphasised the need for developing countries to collectively ensure that “high” technologies emerged through joint efforts on technology generation, adaptation, modification/alteration, and to prevent technological obsolescence in these countries, and recommended that the countries of the South should take together initiative and mould the high technologies relevant to their needs and resources, and to their modernisation imperatives. The IGCCE recommended that the NAM S&T Centre would serve as the focal point for following up of these proposals and recommendations. Keeping in view these recommendations as the guiding principles, and the immediate needs and benefit of developing countries, the Governing Council (GC) directed the Secretariat from time to time to focus on areas that should be taken up on priority while planning the activities of the Centre. The GC, in its 10th Meeting held in Indonesia in November 2005, identified a few priority areas for the activities of the Centre, which were further modified as and when felt necessary with approvals of the GC and the Bureau of the Centre. The Centre is currently undertaking its programmes and activities in the following broad subject areas (Table - 2) which were approved by the 15th Governing Council Meeting held on 24th February 2021 in Virtual Mode and hosted by Sri Lanka (NAM S&T Centre, 2021).

Table 2: Priority Areas of NAM S&T Centre

Sl. No.	Priority Areas
1.	Sustainable Agriculture; Food and Food Processing; Nutrition
2.	Biotechnology including Agricultural, Medical and Industrial Biotechnology; Vaccine Development Technologies
3.	Drugs & Pharmaceuticals; Traditional Systems of Medicine; Herbal & Medicinal Plants
4.	Materials Science & Technology
5.	Minerals Processing & Beneficiation
6.	Nano Science and Technology; Nano Materials
7.	Environment and Climate Change; Water and Air Pollution
8.	Sustainable Habitat and Communities
9.	Clean Water and Sanitation
10.	Sustainable Energy including Renewable and Clean Energy; Energy Conservation
11.	Microelectronics; Information & Communication Technology (ICT)
12.	Fourth (4th) Industrial Revolution
13.	Natural Disaster Mitigation & Management; Extreme Climate Events; Lightning Protection
14.	STI Policy Issues including SDGs, IPR, STI Diplomacy, Women Empowerment, Rural Technology, S&T Communication and Popularization
15.	Innovation and Entrepreneurship; Technology Transfer and Commercialization
16.	STEM Education and Human Resource Development
17.	Hydrogen Technology
18.	Advanced Material Technologies in Manufacturing Sectors
19.	Global Pandemic such as the prevailing Covid-19
20.	Open Science
21.	Any other areas that may be of interest for the socio-economic progress of developing countries

Activities and Programmes on STI

In order to meet its objectives as specified in the Statute, the Centre has been implementing a wide range of scientific activities during the last thirty-two years of its existence as listed below:

- Organisation of international workshops, roundtables, symposiums and conferences, and international training programmes/courses on various topics that are of interest to developing countries;
- Award of fellowships to scientists and researchers for their affiliation with "Centres of Excellence" in various countries;
- Implementation of multilateral collaborative projects;
- Publication of books, monographs, conference proceedings, handbooks and state-of-the-art reports;
- International partnerships and STI Diplomacy;
- Technical support for international programmes organised by other S&T institutions and agencies;
- Dissemination of S&T information.

Cumulative achievements in various programmes and activities of the Centre since its inception are shown in Table - 3.

Table 3: Cumulative Achievements of the Centre (up to February 2021)

Sl. No.	Programmes and Activities	Achievements (Nos.)
1.	International Workshops, Symposiums and Roundtables	82
2.	International Training Programme/Course	43
3.	No. of Countries Represented	122
4.	Total No. of Participants	6839
5	Fellowship Programmes Executed/in Operation	12
6.	Total No. of Fellowship Awardees	386
7	Multilateral Collaborative Projects executed	4
8	No. of Publications	87

*The Organisation of International Workshops, Roundtable Meetings
and Training Courses/Training Programmes*

According to the Statute, the NAM S&T Centre's objectives include, *inter alia*, promotion of mutually beneficial collaboration among scientists, technologists and scientific organisations from the non-aligned and other developing countries; establishment of links between national and regional centres for development and transfer of technology; and providing suggestions including models for balanced S&T development based on optimum utilisation of resources. In order to achieve these objectives, the Centre regularly organises international workshops, conferences, roundtable meetings and training courses/training programmes in partnership with scientific agencies in various countries with appropriate sharing of organisational and fiscal responsibilities for facilitating scientist-to-scientist and institution-to-institution contacts, familiarisation with and capacity building in the latest developments and techniques, and identification of collaborative projects and areas of training on research, technology and policies in different fields of science and technology. The topics of such programmes are finalised in consultation with the partner institutions and after taking approval of the Bureau/Governing Council of the Centre. Since its inception, the Centre has so far (up to February 2021) organised 125 scientific programmes including 82 international workshops, conferences and roundtable meetings; and 43 training programmes/courses on various topics, in partnership with scientific agencies in 22 host countries. A large number of scientists and professionals (almost 7,000) had participated in the international programmes organised by the Centre. Besides the member countries, scientists from a large number of non-member developing countries, and also in some cases from the developed countries, have attended these activities either as participants or resource persons. A total of 122 countries has been represented in the workshops, conferences, roundtable meetings and training programmes organised by the Centre.

Award of Fellowships for Capacity Building of Scientists and Researchers

As another mechanism for promoting South-South and also North-South Cooperation in Science and Technology, the NAM S&T Centre has been implementing several Fellowship Schemes in different subjects in partnership with research institutions and Centres of Excellence in various countries with the aim of capacity building and upgrading the academic

and research skills of young scientists and researchers of the developing countries. The terms and conditions including topics, duration, eligibility, sharing of expenses, etc. for each fellowship scheme are finalised in consultation with the host institution for which a *Memorandum of Understanding* or an *Agreement of Cooperation* is concluded between the two sides. Following Fellowship Programmes have been/are being implemented by the Centre:

1. Young Scientist Lectureship Award (*since discontinued*)
2. NAM S&T Centre Research Fellowship (*since discontinued*)
3. Joint NAM S&T Centre - ICCBS Fellowship - in partnership with International Centre for Chemical and Biological Sciences (ICCBS) of the H.E.J. Research Institute of Chemistry and Dr Panjwani Centre for Molecular Medicine and Drug Research, University of Karachi, Pakistan on Natural Products Chemistry, Herbal Medicines, Drugs, Pharmaceuticals and Neutraceuticals, Molecular Medicine, Drug Research, Clinical Research, etc.
4. Joint NAM S&T Centre - ZMT Bremen (Germany) Fellowship - in partnership with the Centre for Tropical Marine Research (ZMT), Bremen, Germany in the fields related to Tropical Marine Systems.
5. Joint CSIR / CFTRI (Diamond Jubilee) - NAM S&T Centre Fellowship (*since discontinued*) - in partnership with CSIR - Central Food Technological Research Institute (CFTRI), Mysore, India, in various fields of Food Science & Technology for a period of six months.
6. Research Training Fellowship for Developing Country Scientists (RTF-DCS) (*since completed*) - sponsored by the Department of Science & Technology (DST), Govt. of India for capacity building of young researchers of the developing countries in any field of Science, Technology and Engineering by giving them opportunities to affiliate with premier academic and research institutions in India with full financial support including their international travel, and local hospitality, etc.
7. NAM S&T Centre - DST (South Africa) Training Fellowship - for affiliation of researchers, scientists and technologists from the member countries of the NAM S&T Centre with MINTEK, South Africa on Minerals Processing and Beneficiation.
8. NAM S&T Centre - U2ACN2 Research Associateship (*since discontinued*) - in partnership with the UNESCO UNISA Africa Chair in Nanosciences & Nanotechnology (U2ACN2), University of South Africa, Pretoria,

9. Joint NAM S&T Centre – ACENTDFB Fellowship – in partnership with the Africa Centre of Excellence for Neglected Tropical Diseases and Forensic Biotechnology (ACENTDFB), Nigeria, on Molecular Diagnostic and Vaccine Development for Neglected Tropical Diseases and Forensic Biotechnology.
10. NAM S&T Centre - ASRT, Egypt Fellowship - in partnership with the Academy of Scientific Research & Technology (ASRT), Egypt in the fields of Medical, Microbial and Plant Biotechnology.
11. Joint NAM S&T Centre – NABDA Visiting Expert Fellowship - in partnership with the National Biotechnology Development Agency (NABDA), Nigeria on Molecular Diagnostic Research, Forensic DNA and Vaccine Development.
12. NAMS&T Centre Senior Visiting Fellowship - to provide opportunities to senior scientists, researchers and academicians of any member country of the Centre and member of its NAM S&T – Industry Network to affiliate themselves with the S&T institutions located in another member country of the Centre for upgrading their research skills, undertaking short-term joint projects, delivering lectures, developing linkages and establishing closer cooperation with the scientists/ institutions in their fields of interest with full finances paid by the Centre.

So far (up to February 2021), altogether, 386 scientists and researchers have been awarded various fellowships offered by the Centre, a break-up of which is given in Table - 4.

Table 4: Total No. of Scientists and Researchers who were Awarded Fellowships

Sl. No.	Title of Fellowship Programme	Total No. of Awardees
1.	Young Scientist Lectureship Award / NAM S&T Centre Research Fellowship	9
2.	Joint NAM S&T Centre - ZMT Bremen (Germany) Fellowship in "Tropical Coastal Marine Research"	38
3.	Joint CSIR / CFTRI (Diamond Jubilee) - NAM S&T Centre Fellowship' on Food Science & Technology	9
4.	Joint NAM S&T Centre - ICCBS Fellowship in Natural Products Chemistry, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals	32
5.	Research Training Fellowship for Developing Country Scientists (RTF-DCS)	186
6.	Joint NAM S&T Centre - DST (South Africa) Training Fellowship on Minerals Processing & Beneficiation	97
7.	NAM S&T Centre - U2ACN2 (South Africa) Research Associate ship in Nanosciences & Nanotechnology	1
8.	NAM S&T Centre Senior Visiting Fellowship	5
9.	NAM S&T Centre - ACENTDFB Fellowship in Neglected Tropical Diseases and Forensic Biotechnology	2
10.	NAM S&T Centre - ASRT, Egypt Fellowship Programme	5
11.	Joint NAM S&T Centre - NABDA Visiting Expert Fellowship Programme	2
	GRAND TOTAL	386

Collaborative Projects

The Centre has the mandate to implement multilateral collaborative projects having implications on the transfer of technologies within the developing countries in various subjects that are of greater economic relevance to these countries. The Centre has successfully completed three collaborative projects partially supported by Perez-Guerrera Trust Fund

(PGTF) of the Group of 77 (G-77) on Low-cost Housing Technology (1998–2003), Bio-Control of Pests and Weeds for Successful Agricultural Development (2001–2003) and Rain Water Harvesting and Groundwater Recharge - HRD and Technology Transfer (2008–2011) with the participation of a number of Member Countries. A Project on Good Asian Practices in Innovation and Development under the Regional Technical Assistance (RETA) was also implemented in 2009 with partial support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with the participation of eight Asian countries.

Publications on Science, Technology & Innovation

According to the Statute, the Centre has the mandate to act as a clearing house of information regarding technological capabilities of non-aligned and other developing countries with a view to promoting technological cooperation and transfer of technology among them, and provide early information about impending technological changes and seek to develop a data bank. In order to fulfil this objective, the Centre has been publishing a number of technical books, monographs, state-of-the-art reports and proceedings in various S&T subjects. These publications are always highly rated by the scientific communities due to their excellent contents, quality and editing done by internationally renowned experts. They are also unique because while one can find a lot of information about the developed countries, the important data and status reports from the developing countries in the concerned fields of science and technology can be available only in the publications from the NAM S&T Centre. So far (up to February 2021), the Centre has brought out 87 publications, including 74 technical books, nine workshop proceedings and four state-of-the-art reports in different areas of priority.

STI Policy and Diplomacy, and International Partnerships

Science, Technology & Innovation (STI) is universally recognised as the key driver for economic development and poverty eradication, and an essential component for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, to make STI work for society, appropriate STI policy frameworks should be developed through consultations among the scientific community, S&T institutions, governments and other stakeholders. In this regard, through its scientific programmes, the NAM S&T Centre

supports the efforts of developing countries to reorient and revise national STI systems and governance and provides technical advice, methodologies and guidance to institutions and Governments on design, monitoring and implementation of STI policies as integral parts of national development policies and plans. Further, considering that “*STI Diplomacy*” aids in fostering international collaborations among nations by providing an opportunity for person-to-person dialogue and exploring ways to find partnerships on bilateral, regional and global cooperation in STI, the Centre has been organising programmes to popularise the concept of STI Diplomacy and for sharing of expertise and capacity building of developing countries in this area. The above-stated activities on STI Policy and Diplomacy have been highly productive which were attended by 907 experts, professionals and policymakers from 30 countries. Further, 11 books on relevant topics were also published by the Centre comprising country status papers and scientific/research articles presented by the participants and also contributed by other experts. Most importantly, “Resolutions” were unanimously adopted during some of these events with recommendations for all stakeholders, including governments, on policy reorientation and other guidelines on STI. The Centre closely cooperates with various international organisations in connection with the implementation of its objectives and functions. In the past, the Centre established partnerships for initiating new programmes, establishing new centres of excellence and extensively disseminating the information from various agencies in the member countries - with several leading international and national level S&T organisations across the world such as the ASEAN Committee on Science & Technology (COST); the International Science, Technology and Innovation Centre for South-South Cooperation (ISTIC) under the aegis of UNESCO; Kenya National Commission for UNESCO (KNATCOM); the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT); the Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology (APCTT); the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP); G-77; UN agencies like the Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO and UNIDO; and Academy of Sciences for the Developing World (TWAS); Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP); the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), etc. The Centre has been instrumental in planning and establishment of a few Centres of Excellence such as: the NAM African Centre for Lightning and Electromagnetics (ACLE) in Kampala, Uganda and its Zambian Centre, ACLE-Zambia; the NAM S&T Centre of Excellence in Minerals Processing and Beneficiation (CEMPB) in Harare, Zimbabwe and the NAM Centre of

Excellence for Dryland Agriculture in Zimbabwe. Further, the Centre has been collaborating with various other organisations to facilitate Science, Technology & Innovation Diplomacy such as the initiatives on the Science Forum South Africa (SFSa) jointly with the Department of Science & Innovation, South Africa; and cooperation with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to encourage engagements in the fields of academia, science and technology for capacity building and joint activities to achieve SDGs through the application of STI in the IORA and the NAM S&T Centre's member States for mutual benefit.

Capacity Building for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Global South - Role of the NAM S&T Centre

Harnessing Science, Technology and Innovation to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals

As part of a new sustainable development roadmap, the United Nations approved the 2030 Agenda, which contains the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These common goals require the active involvement of individuals, businesses, administrations and countries around the world. The Sustainable Development Goals, also known as the Global Goals, are a call from the United Nations to all countries around the world to address the great challenges that humanity faces and to ensure that all people have the same opportunities to live a better life without compromising our planet. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, together with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 specific targets, encompass the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental. The agenda recognises that social and economic development depends on the sustainable management of our planet's natural resources and therefore, it is necessary to conserve and sustainably use oceans and seas, freshwater resources, as well as forests, mountains and drylands and to protect biodiversity, ecosystems and wildlife. Achieving energy and food security; improving nutrition, health and education; promoting sustainable agriculture; making cities more sustainable; and combating climate change through sustainable development find an important place among the targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Science, Technology & Innovation (STI) is an important driver for increased productivity and value addition that stimulates the growth and competitiveness of a nation. Application of STI is necessary for enabling and accelerating the global transformation towards prosperous, inclusive

and environmentally sustainable economies in developing and developed countries alike. However, since individual non-aligned and other developing countries are at different stages of development, the targets of achieving sustainable development in each country, and thereby the mechanisms, dimensions and STI interventions need to be specific and unique for them taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and keeping the national policies and priorities in focus (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2021).

Role of the NAM S&T Centre in Capacity Building of the NAM and Other Developing Countries for Achieving SDGs

Science, Technology & Innovation (STI) has a direct role in the implementation of almost all the 17 SDGs. In this context, it may be mentioned that with its current 47 member countries and a worldwide network of STI professionals, the NAMS&T Centre has been vastly proactive in S&T human capacity building; science, technology and thematic policy formulations; securing technological excellence; imparting knowledge on intellectual property rights to appropriately exploit their traditional knowledge; and creating awareness amongst developing countries about the huge impact of the STI diplomacy in getting better deals in bilateral and multilateral negotiations leading to higher trade and economic prosperity; and improving the quality of life for masses. The NAM S&T Centre has been playing the role of a facilitator for the implementation of the Millennium Developed Goals (MDGs) that was earlier adopted for the period 2000-15, and the SDGs adopted in 2015 for the period up to 2030 - by bringing together policymakers, S&T communities and other development professionals & stakeholders of the developing countries. The Centre, over the years, has contributed significantly in most of the areas covered under SDGs through its various activities - international conferences, workshops, training programmes, training courses, collaborative projects, etc. Table - 5 provides the quantum of scientific programmes organised by the Centre for the exchange of expertise and capacity building of the countries in the Global South for achieving various SDGs.

Table 5: Activities of the NAM S&T Centre on SDGs

SDG No.	Description of Goal	No. of Programmes Organised
1.	Zero Hunger - End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture	10
2.	Good Health and Well-being - Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	16
3.	Quality Education - Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all	9
4.	Gender Equality - Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls	3
5.	Clean Water and Sanitation - Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	3
6.	Affordable and Clean Energy - Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all	11
7.	Decent Work and Economic Growth - Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	5
8.	Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure - Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and foster innovation.	26
9.	Sustainable Cities and Communities - Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable.	9
10.	Responsible Consumption and Production - Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.	1
11.	Climate Action - Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts by regulating emissions and promoting developments in renewable energy	9
12.	Life below Water - Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development	3
13.	Life on Land - Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss	4
14.	Partnerships to Achieve the Goal - Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	13

Summary of Achievements and Discussion

Since its establishment in 1989, the curve of accomplishments of the Centre has always been in the upward trend, and the Centre has succeeded in sustaining to work for achieving its mandated goal of stimulating and promoting mutually beneficial collaboration among the scientists, technologists and scientific organisations of the non-aligned and other developing countries. During this period, the Centre has proven itself to be a highly successful mechanism for the promotion of South-South Cooperation through the interventions of science, technology and innovation. With the successful execution of a large number of programmes in diverse areas of science and technology, the Centre has been striving to bring the developing countries to the frontiers of science & technology through networking, sharing of knowledge and pooling of resources. The most significant impact of the activities of the Centre has been in the organisation of training programmes and workshops, awarding fellowships in various subjects, and publication of books and state-of-the-art reports on topics of scientific and socio-economic relevance to developing countries. The Centre has also been making efforts at establishing new connectivity for interlinking the database on S&T experts and expertise with their national programmes and dovetailing the promotion of technological cooperation and transfer of technology initiatives with the S&T cooperation networks in these countries. During the last three decades, the Centre has organised 125 international workshops, conferences, roundtable meetings and training courses/programmes in 20 countries with the participation of about 6,000 scientists, experts and professionals from 120 countries from all over the world. In the last decade, the Centre has laid more emphasis on the publication of books for dissemination of S&T knowledge, and capacity building by instituting a large number of fellowship programmes. The concept of Science Diplomacy was introduced by the Centre for the first time in the developing countries by organising two workshops and publishing two books on the subject. In the recent past, the Centre has started giving special attention to a few priority subject areas for organising its programmes – such as biotechnology including industrial biotechnology; STI policy and STI Diplomacy; clean, renewable and sustainable energy; health and medicine, including herbal and traditional medicines, and natural products; innovation, entrepreneurship, technology transfer and commercialisation; information and communication technology; women's empowerment; popularisation of science – science centres and science museums; extreme climate events, and disaster mitigation and management

and other areas. The activities of the Centre have been extremely productive in bringing together the scientific communities of the developing countries and providing a platform for the exchange of ideas, expertise and experiences and paving the way for the transfer of technologies amongst these countries. The working of the Centre has been immensely cost-effective and despite its limited financial resources, an impressive range and number of programmes could be undertaken – only because of the approach of partnership with the scientific agencies in various countries. Due to the Centre's efficient management of its programmes, transparency in financial terms with its partners, and rich technical contents in the activities, several government departments, scientific agencies and academic institutions from the member countries have come forward on their own with proposals to cooperate with the Centre in hosting and jointly organising the scientific programmes of their interest.

The Way Forward

The Centre plans and evolves activities based on the requirements of the developing countries ranging from promoting high-end basic research and development of cutting edge technologies on the one hand, and to serve the technological requirements of the common man through the dissemination of appropriate skills and technologies on the other. The Centre is focused on capacity building and developing expertise in the developing countries in various important and emerging areas. However, the real achievements of the Centre are manifested in providing an opportunity for scientist-to-scientist contact and interaction, familiarizing participants with the latest developments and techniques in the subject areas, identifying collaborating projects which could be taken up within the member countries, providing training and expert assistance, and identifying technologies which could be transferred among the member countries. In the wake of the recent developments and the new demands that are being placed on the STI system, it is necessary for the Centre to embark on projects of relevance to global needs and programmes on newly emerging technology areas. The efforts, therefore, would be to hold more training courses and related activities in these areas to boost South-South Cooperation in science and technology.

With the encouraging response that the Centre has received from the scientific fraternity from all over the world, the Centre has planned to expand its footprint with the following initiatives in the near future:

While planning for the future scientific programmes and negotiating with the potential partner and host organisations, the Centre will give special attention to the emerging technologies largely facilitated by advances in digital technologies and the 4th Industrial Revolution (Industry 4.0) – such as the Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, remote sensing, big data analytics, cybersecurity, blockchain, 3-D printing, etc. – for creation of awareness and capacity building of the NAM and other developing countries in these areas.

Also, the Centre will give a further push to its activities related to the implementation of the Global Sustainable Development Agenda 2030.

Increasing attention in the publication of books, monographs and status reports for wider dissemination of S&T knowledge among developing countries. In this connection, the Centre will take forward its plan to publish a number of scholarly as well as technology-oriented monographs in various subjects such as Lightning Protection, Ocean Science & Technology, Dry-land Agriculture, STI Diplomacy, Water and Sanitation, Biotechnology, and other subjects of importance for developing economies.

In addition to the immensely popular NAM S&T Newsletter being published by the Centre quarterly, the Centre will also bring out a quarterly STI Bulletin which will be eventually upgraded to a peer-reviewed scientific Journal within a period of 2-3 years. An international Editorial Board will be constituted for this purpose.

New Fellowship schemes will be initiated in partnership with research institutions of various countries, including developed countries, on subjects that are not being covered at present under the currently operating fellowship schemes.

Expanding the activity on Collaborative Projects on different subjects that are of socio-economic relevance to the NAM and other developing countries with support from international financing institutions.

In pursuance of the MoU signed between the NAM S&T Centre and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) on 7th November 2019, the Centre will execute activities and collaborative projects in partnership with the IORA; Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India and concerned S&T institutions in various fields such as “Cost-effective technologies for desalination of seawater/brackish water for producing potable water in coastal villages”; “Role of science, technology and innovation (STI) in achieving Sustainable Development Goals – 2030”, “Technology for the cultivation of seaweeds and manufacture of value-added products”, etc.

The Centre will continue to be proactively involved in the process of establishing and working of Centres of Excellence in various areas such as Dryland Agriculture, Minerals Processing and Beneficiation, STI Diplomacy, etc.

The concept of the “NAM S&T-Industry Network” of the Centre will be further popularized, and S&T and academic institutions and industrial organisations in various countries will be encouraged to join the network.

A database of scientists of the developing world will be created and enlarged in priority sectors of S&T.

Conclusions

Developing countries have several commonalities in their strengths as well as weaknesses with respect to their development and economic progress. These so-called “Countries in the South” are endowed with vast precious natural resources, flora, fauna, biodiversity, traditional knowledge and abundant cheap manpower. But at the same time, they face the problem of technological backwardness in the productive sector resulting in low production efficiency, poor quality of products and market uncompetitiveness. The natural resources possessed by them remain largely unutilised or under-utilised and are under constant threat of exploitation by the industrially developed nations. Due to a shortage of financial resources, developing countries are not in a position to make an adequate investment in science and technology. The Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) by most of these countries is often much less than 1% of GDP in stark contrast with the advanced countries, which have been consistently making a huge investment in R&D. Their GERD usually being more than 2% of GDP, resulting in a sound infrastructure and rapid advancement in S&T. This has led to a huge gap in scientific output and technological innovations between the North and the South. In order to bridge this knowledge divide, it has become imperative for the developing nations to work together and cooperate amongst themselves rather than perpetually depend upon the assistance from the advanced countries for harnessing the benefits of science and technology for their own development. The NAM S&T Centre is one of the most significant intergovernmental organisations that specifically helps in promoting South-South cooperation and collective self-reliance among developing countries and facilitate their capacity building and economic growth. Since its inception, the NAM S&T Centre has been working as a facilitator in science-driven economic development

in the countries of the South by encouraging their governments to nurture the S&T institutions and formulating action plans and policy guidelines for the integration of science and technology into national economic development plans. Over the years, the Centre has successfully evolved and implemented scientific activities in a wide range of subjects in order to provide an opportunity for scientist-to-scientist and institution-to-institution contacts, familiarisation with the latest developments and techniques, implementation of collaborative projects and training courses and facilitating the transfer of technology within the developing countries. The scientific activities of the Centre have helped the participating countries in capacity building and sharing of experiences and best practices in harnessing S&T for development. The efforts of the Centre have considerably strengthened partnership between the academic and R&D institutions within the South. The objectives of the NAM S&T Centre, however, go well beyond the NAM, and as its name "Centre for Science and Technology of the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries" implies, they aim at benefiting all the developing countries through scientific and technological interventions. The essence of mutual self-reliance is that the emerging economies in the developing world provide assistance to the less endowed ones for upgrading their S&T skills and capabilities, education and training of S&T manpower, development and transfer of technologies for industrial applications and undertaking collaborative projects of mutual interest. Such cooperation eventually helps in minimising regional imbalance in the South and reduces the dependence on developed nations. Through South-South cooperation, efforts are made to utilise the best of science and technology from within the South itself for solving the problems facing the developing world, and the S&T divide between the North and the South is minimised with the developing countries being able to make full use of the modern technological developments in various fields and working together to develop skills and guidelines on the protection of Intellectual Property Rights and traditional knowledge and evolve appropriate patent laws for negotiations in the WTO and other international agreements without any discrimination.

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