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CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE: WHY REALIST OPPONENTS OF LIBERAL HEGEMONY MISS THE TARGET?

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Abstract: There is an intense debate within the United States on whether it should continue with its current grand strategy of liberal hegemony or replace it with a more restrained foreign policy. Among the opponents of liberal hegemony, four prominent realist international scholars distinguished themselves: Christopher Layne, Barry Posen, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer. However, their critique is flawed on two accounts: (1) they do not define liberal hegemony properly, and (2) liberal hegemony is actually a far more realist strategy than they argue. In this paper, the author criticises the realist critique in three steps. First, he points out that the critics do not answer the question of what hegemony as a state's status in the international system is, and consequently, whether the U.S. is a hegemon or wants to become one. Second, he shows that the critics fail to deliver a convincing argument that the current U.S. grand strategy is liberal in its content as it is in its source. Third, he applies the critics' own theories to the U.S. foreign policy case to show that liberal hegemony is in fact a realist grand strategy. The author's ultimate goal is to make space for a better critique of liberal hegemony, which would still be realist but with the addition of some moderate liberal arguments.

Keywords: liberal hegemony; grand strategy; realism; liberalism; the United States.

INTRODUCTION

In his "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance", issued in March 2021 to serve as a temporary replacement for the National Security Strategy of the United

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States (on which work is still in progress), U.S. President Joseph Biden expressed the idea that "our world is at an inflection point in history", "in the midst of a fundamental debate" about its future direction, centred on the question of whether "democracy can still deliver for our people and for the people around the world", or "autocracy is the best way forward" in times of "accelerating global challenges" (The White House 2021, 3, 23). Invoking democracy as a central value to defend and an antipode to autocracy was not just Biden's reflection on the observed anti-democratic international and domestic trends. It was clear that U.S. foreign policy also found itself at an inflection point, with Biden obviously siding with those who would want to continue with its existing course, known as the grand strategy of liberal hegemony (Trapara 2021, 124). In short, liberal hegemony is U.S. policy which aims at creating a hegemonic world order led by the United States for the sake of inherently American liberal values. Yet since the inception of this strategy after the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a unipolar international system, there has been debate over whether the United States should stick to it or replace it with a more restrained foreign policy. This debate has been especially intense since the first huge U.S. foreign policy failures became apparent, sometime around the middle of the first decade of the 21st century.

In this paper, I deal with four prominent international relations scholars who adhere to the realist school of thought and are widely seen as the biggest critics of the liberal hegemony grand strategy. My focus is on four distinguished books they published on the topic, although I also use their other works: Christopher Layne's *Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (2006); Barry Posen's *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (2014); Stephen Walt's *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy* (2018); and John Mearsheimer's *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (2018). Common to all four authors is the argument that at least since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been pursuing a grand strategy of liberal hegemony, which has been unsuccessful, costly, and damaging to the U.S. national interest; therefore, it should be replaced with a realist grand strategy of restraint/offshore balancing. However, their critique has two main flaws: it lacks an appropriate definition of liberal hegemony and it ignores the actual realism of this grand strategy, rooted in the critics' own international relations theories.[2]

If one wants to criticise something, he should first clearly define what it is. The definition of liberal hegemony I presented in the previous paragraph is abstract enough so that all the critics could fit into it, yet the problem arises when it comes to the interpretation of its main elements. "Liberal hegemony" consists of two terms:

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[2] My critique of the critique is not the first of a kind. Michael Fitzsimmons (2019) published an article in which he criticised Posen, Walt, and Mearsheimer, as well as David Hendrickson, a liberal critic of liberal hegemony.

"liberal" and "hegemony", both of which should be properly defined if U.S. grand strategy was to deserve this label. What is hegemony? Liberal hegemony is liberal in what sense? Realist critics did an unsatisfying job when answering both questions. The third question is whether the current U.S. grand strategy is actually a realist one. The critics say it is not, deciding in favour of restraint/offshore balancing, which in their opinion is a realist alternative. Yet, to support such an argument, they should rely on the proper application of their own international relations theories to the case of U.S. foreign policy, and this is a task they also do not perform well. The rest of the paper is therefore divided into three main sections, dealing with: defining hegemony and whether the United States is a hegemon (or wants to become one); explaining in what sense U.S. grand strategy is liberal (and in what sense it is not); applying the critics' realist international relations theories to the U.S. case to show its grand strategy is far more realist than the critics argue. In the Conclusion, I present what the real realist critique of liberal hegemony should look like.

U.S. HEGEMONY IS…

For two reasons, hegemony should be defined separately from liberalism. First, it is important to establish whether U.S. foreign policy is actually hegemonic. If it was not, it would be sufficient to call it liberal foreign policy, and the critique could be reduced to the critique of liberalism. Second, a clear definition of hegemony is necessary to determine whether U.S. foreign policy is a *status quo* or a revisionist one. If it was revisionist, then the critique would be better justified, for revisionism is automatically more expensive and risky compared to a policy that defends the *status quo*. There are two ways in which a state's foreign policy can be hegemonic: if the state is already a hegemon in the international system and wants to retain this status; or if the state is not a hegemon but wants to become one. In the former case, we speak of a *status quo* foreign policy, while in the latter, of a revisionist one. And if a state is neither a hegemon nor aspires to become one, its foreign policy cannot be labelled hegemonic at all. Thus, to define hegemony as *policy*, hegemony as *status* should be defined first – what does it mean to be a hegemon in the international system? Is it just the position of the most powerful state in the system, or some other quality that is needed? Only then could we answer if the United States is a hegemon and whether its foreign policy is a *status quo* or revisionist one – or whether it is not hegemonic at all. The critics missed doing this appropriately.

In *The Great Delusion*, John Mearsheimer (2018, 8) emphasises the significance of precise definitions of the concepts used in scholarly studies. Yet hegemony is apparently not among these concepts[3] – he defines it only once: "The ideal situation

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[3] "Five basic concepts" which Mearsheimer (2018, 18) considers "essential" for his study to be precisely defined are: "culture, groups, identity, political institutions, and society".

for any state is to be a hegemon, which effectively means being the only great power in the system" (Mearsheimer 2018, 134). On other occasions, Mearsheimer (2018, 2, 122, 130, 139) underlines that liberal hegemony as foreign policy is possible only under circumstances of unipolarity in the international system, which in effect means that there are no great powers in the system other than the unipole. From this, we could conclude that Mearsheimer equates hegemony as status with unipolarity, or the absence of other great powers from the system, which would mean the U.S. has actually been a global hegemon during the entire post-Cold War period, and its foreign policy has been of a *status quo* nature. Yet this clearly contradicts his earlier book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* which added a new quality to the concept of hegemony – "domination of the system", whether global or regional (Mearsheimer 2001, 40). Mearsheimer (2001, 415) understands this domination as transforming the organising principle of the system: "if one state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic".[4] However, he argues that global hegemony is "virtually impossible" due to "the stopping power of water", which prevents states to "conquer and control" distant regions (Mearsheimer 2001, 41). Thus, according to Mearsheimer's *Tragedy*, to qualify as a hegemon, it is not sufficient for the state to possess preponderant (unipolar) power. A degree of domination, conquest, control and hierarchy over others is also needed, yet these concepts are almost completely absent from the understanding of hegemony in *The Great Delusion*. Instead, Mearsheimer (2018, 122–123, 137–138, 149–151) speaks of the hierarchy only in the context of the possible creation of a "world state", the feasibility of which he denies by similar arguments to those he uses against global hegemony in *The Tragedy*. It is obvious that there is confusion among Mearsheimer's works over what hegemony as a status exactly is, and consequently, whether the U.S. is an actual global hegemon (or is it even feasible to become one). The logical outcome of his definitions of hegemony and great powers from *The Tragedy* would be that the essence of U.S. global hegemonic strategy is in attempting to transform the international system from anarchy to hierarchy by imposing its domination over the two remaining great powers – Russia and China – which is a bad policy because the "stopping power of water" prevents its feasibility. But Mearsheimer falls short of arguing anything close to this either in

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[4] In this fashion is Mearsheimer's (2001, 381–382) argument in *The Tragedy* that the only great powers in the contemporary international system besides the United States are China and Russia. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan – regardless of their great power potential – do not qualify as great powers "because they depend in large part on the United States for their security; they are effectively semi-sovereign states". In *The Great Delusion*, however, he denies Russia and China's great power status, calling them "major powers". (Mearsheimer 2018, 162). And in one of his later articles, he nevertheless admits that since 2016 both China and Russia have been great powers, which was the fact that transformed the international system from unipolar to multipolar (Mearsheimer 2019, 8, 42).

The Tragedy or *The Great Delusion*. Instead of resolving the issue of hegemony, Mearsheimer focuses on liberal elements of U.S. foreign policy, which actually makes him a critic of liberalism, in effect excluding hegemony from the equation.

In *The Hell of Good Intentions,* Stephen Walt also fails to define hegemony apart from liberalism. He says this strategy is hegemonic "because it identifies America as the 'indispensable nation'" uniquely qualified to spread liberal values and institutions (Walt 2018, 14). The fact that a state thinks of itself as indispensable is hardly a satisfactory basis to consider it a hegemon or its foreign policy hegemonic. Although Walt (2018, xi, 15–16, 31–32) argues that in the wake of the Cold War, the U.S. "achieved a position of primacy unseen since the Roman Empire", he also states that in 2016 the world was no more unipolar, with Russia and China significantly stronger than they had been, which leaves the issue of whether the U.S. at this moment is a hegemon or wants to become one unresolved. Yet in one of his earlier works (before the alleged decline of unipolarity), Walt (2006, 22–23) stressed the difference between primacy and hegemony, arguing that the U.S. was indeed "more than the first among the equals", but still not a global hegemon which could "physically control the whole planet" or "make other states do what they want". As with Mearsheimer, the possible solution could be to build on this definition and consider the U.S. a revisionist power that aims to impose its hegemony on Russia and China, but Walt does not argue this. Instead, he also sees revisionism, not in hegemonic, but in liberal elements of U.S. foreign policy – the reason the U.S. is not a *status quo* power lies in its ambition "to create a liberal world order" through the active use of its power (Walt 2018, 23). If both Mearsheimer and Walt, in their most recent books critical of U.S. grand strategy of liberal hegemony, actually do not see hegemony itself as a source of trouble apart from its liberalism, then the question naturally arises – would they consider some kind of illiberal hegemony better?[5]

Barry Posen (2018, 26) is the only one among the critics who touches on this issue, denouncing Donald Trump for pursuing illiberal hegemony as "primacy without purpose". Yet in *Restraint,* he also leaves confusion over what primacy/hegemony is.[6] In his words, the strategy of liberal hegemony is hegemonic "because it builds on the great power advantage of the United States relative to all other major powers and intends to preserve as much of that advantage as possible through a range of actions, including a sustained investment in military power whose aim is to overwhelm potential challengers so that they will not even try to compete, much less fight" (Posen 2014, 5). This would imply that the U.S. pursues a *status quo*

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[5] Fitzsimmons (2019) also concludes that Walt and Mearsheimer put too great emphasis on the "liberal half" of liberal hegemony while underestimating hegemony, with which according to this author "most of the evidence they marshal about U.S. foreign policy failures has much more to do".

[6] Primacy is actually the term Posen used for a variant of U.S. grand strategy before he employed the concept of liberal hegemony (Posen and Ross 1996–1997, 32–43).

foreign policy aimed at preserving its hegemonic position. Yet, Posen (2014, 67–68) explicitly says, "it is not a *status quo* policy" because it is "inherently expansionist and seems destined to drift regularly into military action". Why, if the U.S. only wanted to maintain its already attained status? In addition to blaming liberalism for this, as his colleagues do, by criticising Trump, Posen admits that pursuing hegemony even without liberalism is a source of trouble, but still fails to decide whether the U.S. only wants to keep its relative preponderant power over others, deterring them from challenging it, or is an expansionist actor who wants to impose some new quality of relations on its competitors.

In *The Peace of Illusions*, Christopher Layne comes closest to a decent definition of hegemony, which consists of five elements. First, hegemony is about "raw, hard power" – militarily, no state can "put up a serious fight" against a hegemon; economically, a hegemon has "economic supremacy" and "preponderance of material resources". Second, it is about the hegemon's ambitions – "to create a stable international order that will safeguard its security and its economic and ideological interests". Third, it is about polarity – a hegemon is the only great power in the international system, which is therefore unipolar. Fourth, hegemony is about a hegemon's will to exercise its power "to impose order on the international system". Fifth, hegemony is about structural change – quoting Robert Gilpin, Layne concludes that when a great power achieves hegemony, "the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic" (Layne 2006a, 4). Layne then applies this definition to U.S. foreign policy and its position in the international system. According to him, since the early 40's of the 20th century, the U.S. has pursued an expansionist grand strategy of "extra-regional hegemony", aiming "to establish its hegemony in the world's three most important regions outside North America itself: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf" (Layne 2006a, 3). Layne (2006a, 5) argues that the U.S. "to a great extent" attained the status of an extra-regional hegemon. He points out that during the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was not simply counterhegemonic (aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from achieving hegemony), but that it imposed its own hegemony on Western Europe, Germany, and Japan, preventing the independent foreign and security policies of these local actors (Layne 2006a, 55-57). As the Soviet Union remained the only check against U.S. hegemonic ambitions, Washington sought to eliminate it as a peer competitor from the very beginning of the Cold War (Layne 2006a, 50–51, 58, 62–64). Layne (2006a, 106, 111–113) correctly observes that the U.S. did not withdraw from Europe after the Cold War because it still pursued extra-regional hegemony there and even expanded it on the former Soviet sphere of influence by "double enlargement" of NATO – "not only extending NATO's geographical scope but broadening its mission to encompass regions beyond the Alliance's boundaries". It is clear that Layne, starting from his own definition of hegemony, considers U.S. foreign policy both hegemonic and revisionist: after achieving regional hegemony, it went for an extra-regional one, and later even expanded its scope. Still, he differentiates between hegemony and universal empire; in

hegemony, there are still sovereign states with the potential to balance against a hegemon (Layne 2006a, 149–150). Yet even Layne does not dare cross the threshold that his colleagues have also avoided: arguing that the United States' ultimate ambition is to achieve global hegemony (or universal empire) by imposing hierarchic relations on Russia and China, the two remaining great powers with independent foreign and security policies. Stopping at arguing that the U.S. maintains its already achieved extra-regional hegemony, Layne contradicts his own remark about the expansionist aims of U.S. grand strategy.[7]

Two conclusions can be derived. First, save for Layne, realist critics of liberal hegemony failed to offer a clear definition of hegemony as a state's status in the international system, which makes their critique more pointed at liberalism than at hegemony. This is the topic of the next section. Second, although all four authors admit that U.S. foreign policy is not a *status quo* one, none of them argues this is because the United States wants to become a global hegemon by imposing a hierarchy on the remaining great powers in the international system (Russia and China).[8] Without such an argument, labelling U.S. foreign policy as revisionist, or even hegemonic, is unconvincing. With Mearsheimer, Walt, and Posen, this is a consequence of poorly defined hegemony (although Mearsheimer could have applied his definition from *The Tragedy*), and with Layne, of poor application of his otherwise decent definition to contemporary international relations. Failure to resolve the hegemony issue exposes the realist critique to counter-arguments from both realist and liberal proponents of the current U.S. grand strategy. For example, realists Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth (2016, 128–129, 156) deny this strategy is

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[7] As a matter of fact, only a year after publishing *The Peace of Illusions*, in his debate with Bradley Thayer, Layne argued that the U.S. was actually a global hegemon – the most powerful state and the only great power in the system – yet with an expansionist foreign policy aimed at creating an "empire" (Layne and Thayer 2007, 51, 55, 57–58, 61–62, 67). In one of his other works from the same period, there is an apparent confusion between his understanding of the *status quo* and expansionist policies: "Although some scholars argue that, as a hegemon**,** the United States is a *status quo* power, its grand strategy is actually a peculiar mix. The United States is a *status quo* power in that it aims to preserve the existing distribution of power. However, the United States is also an expansionist state that seeks to increase its power advantages and to extend its geopolitical and ideological reach. To preserve the *status quo* that favours them, hegemons must keep knocking down actual and potential rivals; that is, they must continue to expand" (Layne 2006b, 13). This confusion would be easy to remove if Layne just admitted that the U.S. sought to eliminate the remaining great powers (Russia and China) as independent actors from the international system – as he did regarding U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union.

[8] Possibly the only realist who comes close to such an argument (although he never authored a book against liberal hegemony) is Randall Schweller. He argues that after the Cold War, the United States pursued "revisionism in the guise of liberal hegemony", aiming to make "all states, including authoritarian major powers such as Russia and China… supplicants in an American-dominated world order" (Schweller 2018, 44).

hegemonic (they prefer calling it "deep engagement"), unless hegemony is defined in a minimalist way – as "relative, not absolute, and that it concerns the preservation of the *status quo*, not revisionism", which means that a hegemon is "a state that has the largest share of material capabilities in the system", without making "any judgement about the character of influence or the logic of political relationships that exists within the global system". A minimalist definition of hegemony is also present in the work of a liberal, John Ikenberry (2020, 63) (who prefers the term "liberal internationalism"), for whom "hegemonic order reflects the efforts of the predominant state to use its economic and military capabilities to promulgate and underwrite a set of rules and institutions that add regularity and predictability for actors large and small", differing it from empire by the fact that in hegemony "the lesser powers retain their sovereignty as well as considerable manoeuvring room and even influence on the leading state". If the critics wanted to beat these "benign" definitions of hegemony, they should develop their own, more "malign" definition.

…NOT THAT LIBERAL…

The second issue with the definition of liberal hegemony is to determine in what sense it is liberal. There are two possible senses. First, liberal hegemony could be liberal in its source – liberal ideology could motivate hegemonic foreign policy because a liberal state cannot feel safe in a system that also contains illiberal states unless it achieves hegemony. Second, it could be liberal in its content – such a foreign policy would have liberal ends (supporting the open economy, spreading liberal democracy, and building liberal international institutions) and prefer liberal means (diplomacy over the military, "carrots" over "sticks") for achieving them. If U.S. foreign policy was liberal on both accounts, then we might say liberalism would have priority over hegemony – the latter in service of the former – and the critique of such a policy could focus on liberal elements rather than hegemonic ones (as our critics actually do). If it was liberal only in its source but had illiberal ends and means in its content, we could still call it liberal hegemony, but it would be clear that hegemony is the priority – liberalism is just an excuse and a means of legitimising a hegemonic policy. To realist critics, U.S. grand strategy is liberal in both its source and content, yet their arguments regarding the latter are unconvincing. It is interesting that, in their earlier works, they did not even use the term "liberal", although they all had appropriate labels for U.S. hegemonic grand strategy. In his pioneer work about offshore balancing, Layne (1997) spoke of U.S. "preponderance" and, in a later debate with Bradley Thayer (2007, 51–102, 121–137) of "empire". Mearsheimer (2001, 234–266) in *The Tragedy* even denied the U.S. hegemonic ambitions, considering them an offshore balancer, but somewhat later (2011, 18–19), admitted Washington's "imperial" grand strategy of "global dominance". Posen (with Ross) (1996–1997, 32–43) and Walt (2006) opted for the

term "primacy". Yet, in time, they have settled on the term "liberal hegemony", giving liberalism a defining quality in the contemporary U.S. grand strategy.

Christopher Layne is, in fact, the only critic who does not explicitly label U.S. hegemony "liberal". Yet, from his description of its sources and contents, it is clear that liberalism plays a decisive role in both. According to Layne (2006a, 7–10), "U.S. overwhelming material capabilities" after World War II and especially during the Cold War gave it only "the opportunity and the means" to seek hegemony, but the motive for this he finds in the liberal (Wilsonian) "Open Door" school of thought. This school assumes that the United States cannot be secure unless it creates an "open door" international system, which means a world order open for U.S. economic (open international economy) and ideological penetration (spreading democracy and liberal institutions) (Layne 2006a, 29–36). Thus, the U.S. seeks hegemony in order to create an "open door" world; without this liberal motive, it could have made a different grand strategic choice: "the U.S. grand strategy is both ambitious and expansionary precisely because it is predicated on the belief that the health of America's core values at home is linked to the maintenance of an Open Door world abroad. Liberalism imposes a logic on the U.S. grand strategy that causes overexpansion" (Layne 2006a, 119–120). Layne (2006a, 121–122) sees liberalism as intolerant of competing ideologies and a source of the American "crusader mentality", which leads it towards seeking regime change in nondemocratic states and imposing its own values on the rest of the world. Yet he is a bit contradictory here – first, he says that U.S. policymakers "believe that a world of many democracies will be peaceful and stable" according to democratic peace theory, but then he denounces this theory's validity and calls it "a handy pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of regimes it considers troublemakers" (Layne 2006a, 121). The dilemma of whether U.S. policymakers genuinely believe in peace and stability brought by spreading democracy, or use democratic concerns only as a pretext for actions against disobedient regimes, remains unresolved by Layne.

Mearsheimer (2018, 1) defines liberal hegemony as "an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions". The source of this strategy is the "crusading mentality" of liberal states, based on their universalistic view of individual rights, which makes them feel responsible for intervening in other states' internal affairs, aiming to turn them into liberal democracies ("with the ultimate goal of creating a world populated solely by liberal democracies") and include them in the open world economy and international institutions (Mearsheimer 2018, 2, 8–9, 120–128).[9] According to

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[9] According to Mearsheimer (2018, 171–172; 2019, 23), NATO expansion to the east and Western involvement in the Ukraine crisis were also based on liberal principles and aimed at promoting "democracy and Western values".

Mearsheimer (2018, 157), when a state adopts liberal hegemony, it develops "a deep-seated antipathy toward illiberal states" and tends "to see the international system as consisting of good and evil states, with little room for compromise between the two sides", where "unconditional surrender becomes the order of the day". Yet he contradicts his own argument about U.S. universalistic view of individual rights when he admits that Washington rarely treats foreigners as equals, citing several examples of American insensitivity to foreign casualties or reluctance to use force for humanitarian purposes when U.S. citizens were not involved (Mearsheimer 2018, 140–141). Moreover, he argues that most of the time, liberal democracies act "according to realist dictates" and "have little difficulty conducting diplomacy with illiberal states", citing examples of the U.S. forming alliances with "murderous dictators" and even overthrowing hostile democratic regimes during World War II and the Cold War, going "to great lengths to disguise such behaviour with liberal rhetoric", yet he does not present convincing evidence that Washington changed this pattern of behaviour after adopting liberal hegemony (Mearsheimer 2018, 157). Mearsheimer (2011, 29) actually presented the opposite in one of his earlier works, citing the U.S. thwarting democracy in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Walt (2018, 14) argues that liberal hegemony is liberal "because it seeks to use American power to defend and spread the traditional liberal principles of individual freedom, democratic governance, and a market-based economy". It is "an ambitious effort to use American power to reshape the world according to U.S. preferences and political values", a grand strategy that "seeks to expand and deepen a liberal world order under the benevolent leadership of the United States" (Walt 2018, 53–54). Walt (2018, 55–56) finds intellectual foundations of liberal hegemony in liberal theories of international relations (democratic peace, economic liberalism, and liberal institutionalism), which together imply that the U.S. "could foster a more prosperous and peaceful world by spreading democracy, promoting economic globalisation, and creating, expanding, or strengthening international institutions". He delivers the ultimate argument about the liberal content of U.S. grand strategy: "U.S. primacy was, for the most part, not used to keep dangerous adversaries from attacking the United States or vital U.S. interests", but "to shape the international environment according to U.S. preferences, to topple authoritarian leaders at odds with Washington, or to advance broadly liberal objectives" (Walt 2018, 63–64). Yet he admits that "the commitment to spreading liberal principles did not prevent Washington from supporting authoritarian governments… or keep it from turning a blind eye to human rights abuses practiced by close allies… nor did Washington seem overly concerned about the human costs its policies inflicted on others" (Walt 2018, 68). And in one of his earlier books, Walt (2006, 37–38, 42) goes to great lengths to actually suspect the liberal character of U.S. foreign policy, as when he cites examples of selective support for free markets (in sectors where U.S. firms were competitive, while applying protectionist practices in others) or argues that

"no U.S. president has been willing to risk much blood or treasure solely to promote democracy or to advance human rights".

Posen is actually the only realist critic of liberal hegemony who does not admit any deviation of U.S. foreign policy from its alleged liberal content. He considers U.S. grand strategy liberal "because it aims to defend and promote a range of values associated with Western society in general and U.S. society in particular – including democratic governance within nation-states, individual rights, free markets, a free press, and the rule of law". Spreading these values is seen by the proponents of liberal hegemony as essential for U.S. security: "The view is that the United States could only be truly safe in a world full of states like us, and so long as the United States has the power to pursue this outcome, it should". According to Posen, this view originated even before Woodrow Wilson, with "the earliest ideas about the United States relative to the rest of the world", which "were given new energy by the victory over Soviet totalitarianism and the sudden realisation that the United States might actually have sufficient power to spread its ideas about domestic governance and international order" (Posen 2014, 6).

In conclusion, in explaining in what sense U.S. grand strategy of liberal hegemony is liberal, realist critics present decent arguments for how liberal ideology motivates hegemonic foreign policy. Yet three of them occasionally admit that the actual performance of this strategy puts hegemony before liberalism, and the fourth one turns a blind eye to numerous examples of using liberalism only as a disguise for conducting hegemonic policy.[10] Such examples are the focus of a liberal critic of liberal hegemony, David Hendrickson. In *Republic in Peril,* he argues that the U.S. supports the "Open Door" policy only in rhetoric, while actually undermining liberal order by subordinating trading interests to strategic calculations (for example, by using economic sanctions as a political tool), creating "public bads", making international economic institutions biased in favour of Western societies, abusing new technologies for creating a "universal panopticon", having double standards towards nuclear proliferation, etc (Hendrickson 2018, 39–42, 106–107, 122).[11] He openly challenges realist critics' labelling of U.S. foreign policy as liberal, arguing that it actually "departed from liberal tradition in critical respects", and that flaws in American-led world order "should not be attributed to liberalism but to a flock of 'neo-isms' parading in the guise thereof" (Hendrickson 2018, 211). Furthermore, a realist proponent of U.S. "imperial" grand strategy, Bradley Thayer, is clear that "if there is a tension between democracy and maintaining a pro-American

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[10] Not to mention the means of conducting this strategy, which all of the critics consider overly militarized and neglectful of diplomacy.

[11] Citing U.S. double standard regarding the right to national self-determination and the breach of its own democratic principles in Ukraine, Hendrickson (2018, 29–30) presents a clear counter-argument to Mearsheimer's claim that liberal and democratic motives led the U.S. into the Ukraine crisis.

government, then the latter is the right choice for the United States" (Layne and Thayer 2007, 116). Also, Brooks and Wohlforth (2016, 75) consider promoting liberal economic order and supporting global institutions as the means for maximising domestic prosperity and securing "interstate cooperation on terms favourable to U.S. interests". However, its chief liberal proponent, John Ikenberry, has made the ultimate argument that liberal hegemony as foreign policy is not quite what realist critics say it is. At the very beginning of *A World Safe for Democracy,* he argues that there is a misinterpretation of a famous Woodrow Wilson's call "to make a world safe for democracy". This phrase is typically understood – and the realist critics obviously adhere to this understanding – as "an idealist appeal to spread democracy worldwide" and "to remake the world in America's image", but it actually was "a call to reform the postwar international order so as to allow Western liberal democracy to survive" (Ikenberry 2020, xi). Thus, the essence of liberal hegemony is not in bringing democracy to every corner of the globe (as flawed realist critique claims), but in making such a world order (which would of course consist of authoritarian besides democratic states) in which the United States and other liberal democracies could be secure – and the proponents of this strategy obviously think that only a U.S.-led hegemonic order could provide this.

…BUT FAR MORE REALIST

So far, I have argued that the realist critics of liberal hegemony have missed defining hegemony properly and thus take the opportunity to criticise U.S. foreign policy as revisionism of an aspiring global hegemon, overestimating the liberal character of this grand strategy instead. Now I turn to discuss that the current U.S. grand strategy is not only less liberal in its content, but actually, far more realist than the critics would admit – according to the basic assumptions of their own theories.

The four scholars we deal with here are unambiguously realists, by both their own self-identification and others' classifications. Only Mearsheimer is an offensive realist, while the remaining three adhere to defensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001, 4–14, 17–22; Taliaferro 2000–2001, 130, 135).[12] Regarding the neorealism/neoclassical realism divide, Layne and Posen certainly belong to neoclassical realism, while Walt and Mearsheimer initially were neorealists, but later also included strong elements of neoclassical realism (Layne 2006a, 7–8; Taliaferro 2000–2001, 135).[13]

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[12] Layne is also labelled a defensive realist by his competitor in a debate, Bradley Thayer (2007, 104). Posen is included among the defensive realists because he adopts one of the cornerstone concepts of defensive realism – security dilemma (Posen, 1993).

[13] In *Restraint*, Posen's (2014, 21) elaboration of his understanding of international anarchy and the different strategies states employ to deal with it clearly points to neoclassical realist thinking. Both Walt and Mearsheimer, in their works, emphasise the impact of ideologies (nationalism, liberalism), which matter at the unit level of analysis.

It is important to have both defensive and offensive realists among the critics, to show that misinterpretations of liberal hegemony are featured on both sides of this divide. And the fact that all four of the critics are more or less neoclassical realists is significant because, namely, neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy (therefore also grand strategy), and due to its potential to be combined with the concepts from other schools of thought, it is the best realism we have for studying international relations in the 21st century (Rose 1998; Trapara 2017a).

The critics share the opinion that liberal hegemony is not a realist strategy but, as Posen (2014, xi) says, "unnecessary, counterproductive, costly, and wasteful". They use several main arguments to claim this is a bad grand strategy. First, liberal hegemony ignores power relations and is likely to face balancing responses from other powers. According to Walt (2018, 54, 71), this strategy rests on "mistaken views of how international politics actually works", ignoring that "imbalances of power make other states nervous". Layne (2006a, 5-6, 150) considers geopolitical resistance to hegemonic strategy inevitable, as in former cases of unipolarity. Posen (2014, 31, 65) thinks this resistance will in time rise to the level of real balancing, as in Russia's pushback against NATO enlargement, which is expected by balance of power theorists. And Mearsheimer (2018, 177) argues that Western liberal elites were surprised by the events in Ukraine because they believed realism and geopolitics were obsolete. Second, liberal hegemony drains American power and resources by involving them in endless wars, which leads to an "imperial overstretch" (Walt 2018, 259; Layne 2006a, 7, 155; Posen 2014, 60–68; Mearsheimer 2018, 2–3, 152). Third, supporting an open economy actually helps the rise of other powers (Layne 2006a, 152; Layne 1997, 109). Fourth, liberal hegemony clashes with nationalism, which is a stronger ideology than liberalism (Posen 2014, 22; Mearsheimer 2018, viii, 3). Fifth, it provokes terrorism and nuclear proliferation instead of preventing them (Walt 2018, 164–165; Layne 2006a, 7, 190). Lastly, it undermines liberal order at home. According to Mearsheimer (2018, 179), liberal hegemony does it by building a powerful national security bureaucracy to wage endless wars.

The alternative to liberal hegemony is a "realist" grand strategy, which Posen calls "restraint" and Layne, Walt, and Mearsheimer "offshore balancing". Layne was the first to use the latter concept back in 1997. He understood offshore balancing as a defensive strategy, aimed at protecting U.S. territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon (Layne 1997, 112). Given that the risk of Eurasian hegemony was small, Layne (1997, 113) assessed that the local states' efforts could be sufficient to contain a potential hegemon. Using other states to balance against regional hegemons in Europe and Asia while U.S. troops remain "offshore" – in its own hemisphere – is the essence of offshore balancing/restraint. Only if local states failed, the U.S. should come "onshore" with its troops, but this is valid only for three regions of vital American interest: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf (Walt 2018, 261–263; Mearsheimer 2018, 222–223). All four critics concur that there

is no potential hegemon at the moment in Europe, which means that NATO should be abandoned and European security left to the Europeans (Walt 2018, 269–270; Layne 2006a, 186–187; Posen 2014, 87–91; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 81–82). However, in Northeast Asia, there is a China threat, which should be contained by a carefully orchestrated coalition of its powerful neighbours (Walt 2018, 269; Layne 2006a, 186–187; Posen 2014, 91–98; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 81).

According to realist critics of liberal hegemony, the offshore balancing/restraint strategy is a more realist strategy, because it would allegedly succeed where liberal hegemony failed. It takes into account balance of power considerations, thus preventing the rise of a counter-hegemonic coalition against the United States and Washington's involvement in other powers' conflicts (Layne 2006a, 160–168; Mearsheimer 2018, 221–223). It is more sensitive to identity politics (the power of nationalism) (Mearsheimer 2018, 217). It saves American money so that it can be redirected to more urgent needs. (Posen 2014, 70, 163). It does not provoke terrorism and nuclear proliferation (Posen 2014, 71–87; Layne 2006a, 160). Finally, it protects liberal values at home (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 72; Mearsheimer 2018, 232–233).

The basic problem with the critics' arguments that liberal hegemony is more costly and damaging yet less realist strategy than restraint/offshore balancing would be is that they rest on a poor application of the critics' own realist theoretical assumptions to the U.S. case, and have already elaborated on an inappropriate definition of liberal hegemony. If the critics were to admit that the United States was a revisionist power that aimed to achieve global hegemony by eliminating the remaining great powers (Russia and China) from the system that would be consequently transformed from an anarchical to a hierarchical one, they could easily prove it was a bad strategy compared to a more defensive one, whose aim would be only to prevent other powers' regional hegemonies. Instead, they focus on criticising liberalism too heavily, while underestimating hegemony (although Layne does it less than the others). Liberal hegemony is indeed a costly and damaging strategy, but primarily because it is hegemonic, not because it is liberal – save for an indirect effect of liberalism as a motive for hegemonism, or the fact that some of the worst excesses of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period were legitimated by liberal rhetoric.

Yet it still does not mean liberal hegemony is not a realist foreign policy – it actually is, by both offensive and defensive realism, if they were applied appropriately. As a matter of fact, the fundamental assumption of Mearsheimer's offensive realism is that hegemony is the best way for the state to ensure its security (Mearsheimer 2001, 21–22, 34–35). With one already mentioned exception – global hegemony is infeasible due to the "stopping power of water", i.e., the inability to project sufficient power across oceans and seas to control distant regions. Given this, it is safe to say that the U.S., as an offshore power, cannot impose its control over Eurasia, making

a bid for global hegemony unrealistic – unless it does not. As Layne (2006a, 140–141; 2007, 68; 2006b, 22) argues and openly criticises Mearsheimer's claim in *The Tragedy* that the U.S. is an offshore balancer, U.S. power in Eurasia has been pretty much onshore ever since World War II – especially in Europe, where its extra-regional hegemony even expanded to the east after the Cold War. Actually, if we look at the map of Eastern Europe, the eastern border of the current U.S. sphere of influence (measured by NATO enlargement) is farther to the East compared to that of the German sphere of influence on the eve of its invasion against the Soviet Union back in 1941 – if the "stopping power of water" did not prevent Germany from its hegemonic ambitions against Russia, it should even less prevent the United States. Why then, U.S. geopolitical offensive against Russia, aimed at completing European hegemony and encircling China from both land and sea, would not be a realist strategy from the standpoint of offensive realism?[14] Yet it still does not mean it would be a successful policy, without enormous costs and a possible path to a catastrophe. But did not Mearsheimer himself have this in mind when he titled his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, acknowledging that the behaviour of great powers according to the dictates of offensive realism ultimately leads to – namely that – tragedy?

A U.S. bid for global hegemony can also be justified by defensive realism. Layne has always been aware that preponderance – what he initially called hegemony – is a realist strategy, in the sense of both offensive and defensive realism. According to him, defensive realists justify hegemony by three arguments: that a "balance of threats" prevents balancing against U.S. hegemony; that other states will bandwagon with the U.S. because it shows concern for their interests; and that the U.S. could look less threatening to others by relying on soft power (Layne 1997, 92–94).[15] The "balance-of-threat" theory is Stephen Walt's creation. Its basic assumption is that

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[14] When I presented this question to Mearsheimer in person, he defended his stance by pointing to the difference in contexts – while the Germans had a mighty army on Soviet borders, a U.S. military offensive against Russia would be infeasible, both due to the insufficient troops in NATO countries and the deterrence role of nuclear weapons. He did not think of the possibility that a hegemonic geopolitical offensive does not have to be directly military. As he also acknowledges, there are other means of interfering in major powers' internal affairs short of the use of military force (Mearsheimer 2018, 152–153, 162). If the Cold War resulted in the Soviet Union's collapse and regime change in Moscow without a single shot fired, then why wouldn't U.S. establishment realistically hope for a similar outcome in the current geopolitical confrontation with the Russian Federation?

[15] To be sure, he denied this later in *The Peace of Illusions*, arguing that defensive realism favours "more or less equal diffusion of powers", yet he admitted that defensive realists explain expansionist grand strategies by the existence of "bad" and "greedy" states with "domestic pathologies" which make them "want more than security" (Layne 2006a, 16–17). Although defensive realists think of "domestic pathologies" in terms of illiberalism, it would be natural for a true realist – as our critics claim they are – to consider U.S. liberal ideology such a pathology.

states do not balance against the strongest state in the system, but against the one they consider the greatest threat, which besides aggregate power, depends on three additional factors: geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and offensive intentions (Walt 1985, 8–13). Most of the states in Eurasia thus do not consider the United States a threat, but quite opposite – a valuable ally against more proximate powers with perceived offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions. The abundance of disposable local allies surely facilitates U.S. expansion at the expense of Russia, China, and some rogue states such as Iran, and makes it quite a realist strategy. Posen (2014, 9) also admits that primacy (a strategy that preceded liberal hegemony) was initially favoured by some realists who thought the U.S. should remain at the pinnacle of world power. Among realists who support the current U.S. grand strategy surely is Bradley Thayer, who believes that only U.S. dominance ensures peace and stability as one "can count with one hand" countries that do not want to align with the United States (Layne and Thayer 2007, 106). Realists like Brooks and Wohlforth (2016, 1–71) base their support for "deep engagement" (another name for Layne's extra-regional hegemony) on a denial that this strategy has been unsuccessful and that U.S. power is in decline. They also argue that both offensive and defensive realism predict security benefits for the U.S. from deep engagement (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, 94–101).

Bizarrely, realist critics of liberal hegemony are, in a way, liberal hegemonists themselves. Although their favourite offshore balancing is surely a *status quo* grand strategy, it still contains elements of both hegemony and liberalism. Neither of them puts into question U.S. regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere, or U.S. position as the most powerful actor in the international system. On the contrary, Mearsheimer and Walt (2016, 72) are quite explicit when they say that the "principal concern" of offshore balancing "would be to keep the United States as powerful as possible – ideally, the dominant state on the planet. Above all, that means maintaining hegemony in the Western hemisphere". The critics' are not isolationists – they see offshore balancing as a better strategy for keeping U.S. power in international relations than giving up on it. According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2016, 72), "by husbanding U.S. strength, offshore balancing would preserve U.S. primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home". Posen (2014, 69–70) emphasises "power position" as the most important component of national security, understanding it as "national capabilities relative to other key actors in the system", which are "a state's primary insurance in a world without policeman". To keep its power position, the U.S. should rely on retaining "command of the commons" – military control over sea, air, and space (Posen 2014, 135–163). Even Layne (1997, 87) in his pioneering work on offshore balancing, argued that one of the "two crucial objectives" of this strategy would be "enhancing America's relative power in the international system".

Also, neither of the critics puts into question its own adherence to liberal ideology. We have seen that they consider offshore balancing/restraint a better strategy than liberal hegemony for preserving the liberal values of U.S. society. Mearsheimer (2018, 11–12) is the most explicit when he argues that "within countries… liberalism is a genuine force of good" and that he considers himself "especially fortunate to have been born and lived all my (his) life in liberal America". Yet he does not present a convincing solution to keep liberalism only for domestic use while eliminating it from foreign policy. On the contrary, he says that "when a liberal country finds itself in a position to pursue this ambitious policy, it will almost always do so" (Mearsheimer 2018, 120–121). The ultimate argument that offshore balancing is motivated by liberal ideology as much as liberal hegemony is lies in the answer to the question: why is it so important to the United States to prevent other powers' regional hegemonies while retaining its own? Isn't the belief that the U.S. could not be secure unless it was in charge of maintaining the Eurasian balance of power a product of the same "exceptionalism" the critics blame on the proponents of liberal hegemony as the basis of their support for the current U.S. grand strategy?

We may conclude that liberal hegemony is far more realist and offshore balancing/restraint far more liberal grand strategy than our four critics would admit. These two strategies are like two sides of the same coin – different visions of how the liberal United States could survive in an illiberal world, derived from different perceptions of U.S. position in world geopolitics and the international balance of power. Yet both can be justified by realist theories of international relations, either defensive or offensive. This is why there are realists who support the current U.S. grand strategy with no less fervour than liberals do. To them, a shift to offshore balancing/restraint would be a move against realism – as Brooks and Wohlforth (2016, 80) argue, "realism 101 would stress that in an uncertain world, prudential leaders should maintain power, not throw it away". According to these two authors, proponents of "retrenchment" (their term for offshore balancing/restraint) overestimate the difference in the costs between deep engagement and their favourite strategy, for they still "invariably support the maintenance of a force projection capacity that is second to none" (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, 123). Moreover, Brooks and Wohlforth (2016, 137) point to the contradiction in the critics' application of the balance of power theory – they have not explained why other states' incentives to balance against the U.S. would decrease if it retrenched, for it would still retain its material capabilities, which motivated balancing efforts in the first place. Thayer's main realist argument against offshore balancing is that it would be a sign of weakness which could be exploited by its primary rival: "If the United States does not lead the world, another hegemon will rise to replace it. That hegemon will be China. China will then be in a position to dictate to the rest of the world, including the United States" (Layne and Thayer 2007, 117). The critics do not have appropriate answers to these issues.

CONCLUSION

Four realist critics of U.S. grand strategy of liberal hegemony who have published books on this matter – Layne, Posen, Walt, and Mearsheimer – present a critique which is flawed on two accounts. They do not properly define liberal hegemony, either by answering the question of what hegemony actually is, or in what sense it is liberal. They underestimate the actual realism of liberal hegemony, rooted in their own international relations theories. Consequently, they fail to deliver a clear-cut argument why the alternative grand strategy of offshore balancing/restraint would be more realist, less liberal, and better for the U.S. and the world. The flaws in the critique made it vulnerable to the arguments of both liberal and realist supporters of current U.S. foreign policy. In other words, by missing their own target, the critics made themselves an easy target for others.

My "critique of the critique" does not mean I support liberal hegemony, which I blame for most of the bad things the world went through during the post-Cold War period. On the contrary, by exposing flawed critique, I aim to make space for a better one. Nor do I think realism is bad, especially when it comes to neoclassical realism. I consider realist theories the best tool we have for understanding international phenomena, including U.S. foreign policy – of course, if they are correctly applied. Why do the four scholars fail to do this – the answer maybe lies in their position of the outsiders from the actual decision-making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. They all criticize U.S. foreign policy elite from the outside and find the solution for transforming the grand strategy by creating an alternative elite which would someday get into a position to implement its ideas (Walt 2018, 284–291; Layne 2006a, 204–205; Posen 2014, 174–175; Mearsheimer 2018, 229–234). However, if we imagined them and their followers getting into a position to decide on U.S. foreign policy, how could we be sure they would really shift towards offshore balancing? Starting from a flawed critique on the outside, they could only be struck by reality once on the inside, discovering that liberal hegemony is "the only game in town", or shifting to some form of "illiberal hegemony" such as Trump's.[16]

A shift in the distribution of power in the international system – a relative decline of U.S. power – could push the United States away from liberal hegemony, yet it is not sufficient. A real ideological transformation of American society is needed, and it would certainly not happen if one group of liberal exceptionalists replaced the other. Here, even some of the moderate liberal arguments could be useful, such as those presented by David Hendrickson.[17] He advocates an American return to the original liberal ideas of the Founding Fathers, which included a pluralist

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[16] Although I prefer the version in which Trump did not have a grand strategy at all (Trapara 2017b).

[17] The necessity of combining liberalism and realism is also expressed by Fitzsimmons (2019).

concept of international relations based on Westphalian norms of national independence and non-intervention, as well as balanced power and great powers' concert as the model of world governance (Hendrickson sees the UN Security Council as an institutional framework of such concert) (Hendrickson 2018, 5, 74, 168–169, 193). However, as long as radical liberals like John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye dominate U.S. academic community and continue to believe in the liberal order as an ideologically superior model of world order compared to all possible alternatives, and thus propose only tactical defence on the outside while battling "populist" alternatives on the inside, one should be cautious about expecting a change anytime soon (Ikenberry 2020, 6, 307–311; Ikenberry 2018, 23; Nye 2019, 80). Until then, other states – especially those having "issues" with the United States – should embrace true realism in order to maximise their own national interests in a world still defined by the hegemonic foreign policy of the most powerful state.

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KRITIKA KRITIKE: ZAŠTO REALISTIČKI PROTIVNICI LIBERALNE HEGEMONIJE PROMAŠUJU METU?

Apstrakt: Unutar SAD vodi se intenzivna debata o tome da li one treba da nastave sa trenutnom velikom strategijom liberalne hegemonije, ili je zamene uzdržanijom spoljnom politikom. Među protivnicima liberalne hegemonije, izdvajaju se četiri poznata realistička teoretičara međunarodnih odnosa: Kristofer Lejn, Beri Pozen, Stiven Volt i Džon Miršajmer. No, njihova kritika ima dva nedostatka: ne definišu liberalnu hegemoniju pravilno; liberalna hegemonija je zapravo daleko realističkija strategija nego što tvrde. U ovom radu, autor kritikuje realističku kritiku u tri koraka. Prvo, pokazuje da kritičari ne odgovaraju na pitanje šta predstavlja hegemonija kao status države u međunarodnom sistemu i, posledično, jesu li SAD hegemon, ili žele to da postanu. Drugo, ukazuje na to da kritičari ne pružaju ubedljiv argument da se trenutna američka velika strategija odlikuje liberalizmom u svom sadržaju u meri u kojoj izvire iz njega. Treće, primenjuje teorije samih kritičara na slučaj spoljne politike SAD, kako bi pokazao da je liberalna hegemonija zapravo realistička velika strategija. Konačni cilj autora je da napravi prostor za bolju kritiku liberalne hegemonije, koja bi i dalje bila realistička, ali uz dodatak umerenih liberalnih argumenata.

Ključne reči: liberalna hegemonija; velika strategija; realizam; liberalizam; Sjedinjene Države.

ENTANGLED IN THE CONTINUUM OF VIOLENCE: HOW DO WOMEN EXPERIENCE WAR?

Srđan T. KORAĆ[1]

Abstract: The paper illuminates several issues that arise from the lack of or extensive marginalisation of the female wartime experiences as a relevant debate topic in International Relations (IR) of the day. The analysis is positioned in feminist IR theories and gender studies of war and centres around the notion of continuum of violence as an optimal conceptual tool to embrace the complexities of interactions between women's agency in war and their pervasive victimisation. By employing the concept of continuum of violence, two intertwined planes of female war experiences are examined: the experiences of knowing war and the experiences of doing war. The author concludes that, despite the representational power of the corporate and social media in conveying images of reality to an ever-widening public, wartime experiences of women continue to be blurred and devalued in contrast to glorification of masculine ideal of male hero. Women's experiences of war are officially acknowledged only if they fit the patriarchal order and dominant narratives on the state in international relations, not if they challenge gendered discursive practices. The gender stereotyping of women as "natural" non-combatants reproduces marginalisation of female experiences in doing war as female soldiers are either silenced after conflict or labelled as deviants.

Key words: war; continuum of violence; femininity; masculinity; gender politics; feminist theories of international relations.

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CONCEPTUALISATION OF WAR AS GENDERED EXPERIENCE

War as a social practice has mirrored gender roles embedded in society since ancient times. In epic-toned poetry, literature, and visual arts, men have been celebrated as agents of heroic deeds, while women have been depicted as non-violent, passive victims caught unwillingly in the whirlwind of war tempest. With media reporting backed by instantaneous digital communication and the strength of social media, greater opportunities for manipulation and disinformation have started contributing double victimisation of women in today`s armed conflicts. The ongoing war in Ukraine brings a fresh but sinister example of recent trend. A photo of heavily pregnant woman, Marianna Vyshemirsky, taken by an Associated Press reporter at the moment when she was fleeing a bombed maternity hospital in the aftermath of a Russian airstrike in Mariupol, became the subject of controversy, and ended in an extensive online abuse (*BBC Trending* 2022). As a part of information battle, the Kremlin falsely accused Marianna of being involved in the Ukrainian propaganda effort to distort war reality by presenting staged scenes, grounding this claim on the fact that she is a beauty blogger, and, thus, capable of acting and making up fake injuries (*BBC Trending* 2022). The accusation against Marianna had been broadcasted repeatedly on dozens of television channels and Telegram, which provoked an avalanche of death threats she received on social media (*BBC Trending* 2022).

The reason this news story caught my eye was that it symbolises something I hold it is worth to highlight: the continuum of violence in which women are being entangled, and which sharply underlines reproduction of strong gender stereotyping of war experience. Lived war experience of men seems to be more analysed, valued, and talked about than women's; in other words, it becomes more trustworthy. Besides, I appreciate how this news story pinpoints the significance of the commoners' perspective in the analysis of international relations. This perspective is either missing or marginalised in debates within the IR discipline. The mainstream scientific description and explanation of international relations see war as a fundamental pattern of the state behaviour driven by the quest for power and domination aimed at providing superior access to resources (Thayer 2004). Sovereign states are the leading, if not the only actors relevant for analysis of the reality of international relations (see Aron 2017; Lebow 2010; Waltz 2001; Waltz 1979). War is therefore considered a social phenomenon that can be properly understood and scientifically explained on the level of system/structure. This is the epistemological cornerstone of the Realist school of thought in the discipline of IR, drawing on the positivist paradigm that social phenomena and processes can be explained by use of the same methods as those used for natural world, and that facts can be clearly differentiated from values (see Lišanin 2017; Johnson and Duffy Toft 2013–14; Elman 2007, 11–20; Spegele 1996, 22–50; Neufeld 1995, 32–38).

The (neo)realist worldview implies that conflict is a human universal, i.e. disorder is a "primordial" state of humankind. Whether this epistemological stance is being valid or not, warfare embraces much wider layers of social practices related to the condition of hostility (Bousquet 2016, 94), and it penetrates far deeper into social tissue than it is manifested by political and military actions. This is an outcome of the changed nature of warfare in the post-Cold War era with ever more elusive boundary between the combat zone and the rear, the situation in which violence – as the deliberate infliction of harm on people – has not been targeting only soldiers as the traditional agents of violence, but civilians as well (Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010, 2).

A century ago, the world wars overshadowed the fruits of civic culture and civilisation, bringing into everyday life and collective memory violence of hitherto unimaginable encroachment and depth of penetration into privacy. In words of Jan Patočka, the discomfort and pressure of the experience of facing death at the frontline made war an escape from the everyday to the orgiastic, but in the 20th century it has just become an everyday, normal state of existence in whose service the threat of death now lies to encourage life itself, as a guide for soul and body (1996, 119–137). By living in the shadow of the constant threat of death, war normalises what refuses to be normalised, which *per se* could never be affirmation of life. James Dodd problematises violence not only as a possibility but also reality; this reality is imperceptibly woven into social practice as a legacy passed down from generation to generation via socialisation process, and which, hidden behind the external normalcy of peacetime life, always threatens to disrupt the event horizon (Dodd 2009, 140–144). Although in contemporary Western societies warfare begin to be perceived as "something utterly repugnant and futile (…) incomprehensible to the point of absurdity" (Gat 2006, 662), the analysis of international politics in terms of hegemonic masculinity is still not obsolete.

In his influential theory of masculinity, the Australian sociologist Robert W. Connell maintains that masculinity is a cultural construction in the form of a set of social practices that does not exist except in contrast with "femininity" (Connell 2020, 67–71). As the next conceptual step, Connell defines hegemonic masculinity as "the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women" (Connell 2020, 77). Being members of the privileged gender, all men benefit as hegemony constitutes and maintains power relations as "natural" and "normal" (Jindy Pettman 1996, 67). The patriarchal order is "the core of the collective project of hegemonic masculinity" (Connell 2020, 212), so as to masculine violence is legitimised clearly in terms of defending society/family from female delinquency and of fighting for homeland on the global scale (Connell 2020, 213). In a socio-political order rooted in gender essentialism, women are belittled in political process

on the ground of being the natural "home-makers" and "peace-makers", so to speak, genuine non-combatants neither interested in nor capable of making decisions on war. This protector-protected relationship not only portrays women as dependent on men and state but also obscures victimisation of women in conflict zones – equally by enemy soldiers and their fathers/husbands/brothers (Jindy Pettman 1996, 71). Women are exposed to strict control of men and to "costs of protection" as well, which largely narrows women's civil rights. Following this line of argumentation, Heeg Maruska identifies the American cultural pattern of hegemonic masculinity, which was transformed in hypermasculinity in the post-9/11 era, as single major contributor to popular support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq (2010, 249).

The perpetual reproduction of the patriarchal order through the socialisation of young generations enables the militarisation of society by restoring the collective memory of past wars through narration, ceremonies, and rituals to shape masculinity and femininity, so that they fulfil the role in war as a collective endeavour (Cockburn 2010). Hegemonic masculinities command the state, including the military. Connell reminds that the Western cultural imagery of the masculine centres around the figure of the hero (2020, 213). The Western idea and standards of heroic masculinity have been affected by the Iliad and the Odyssey, two influential epic poems of the ancient Greece presumably composed and written by Homer. The old Greek aristocratic ideal of heroism was solely attributed to men, because women had no access to the world of warriors. The aristocracy of the day cherished two gender ideals represented in Homer's literary characters of King Odysseus and his wife Queen Penelope. Vandkilde argues that these two figures signify symmetric gender ideals:

> Whereas Odysseus is the cosmopolitan warrior who fights his own and others' battles, Penelope stays at home and guards the family and its properties (…) A violent, extroverted, masculine cosmopolitan is contrasted with a peaceful feminine counterpart in the domestic sphere. The ideals and roles of the aristocracy spread downwards in society, in that ordinary women typically work as servants in the palaces, while men's jobs are out in the countryside, even though not primarily in battle. There is, however, a clear division of labour according to gender, originating in and interacting with the contrasting male and female ideals (2006, 522–523).

The problem arises when lived experience of victimised or marginalised groups in war – above all the elderly, women, and children – has been refined subtly through the socially accepted narratives based on dominant notion of heroic masculinity. For instance, individual lived experience of women gets easily absorbed into collective memory not as factual presentation of their real involvement in war events, but primarily to fit the patriarchal order. The female experience of war is transformed so as to become dispersed into marginalised storytelling in the private realm, only to eventually disappear in the widespread culture of hegemonic masculinity.

Once experienced war violence persists within war-torn communities even after formal peace is declared. It seems that violence is or becomes endemic across social strata. Carolyn Nordstrom lucidly points out the ability of violence to "escalate and to insinuate itself into the fabric of everyday life" and debunks the idea that battlefield is a self-contained zone of violence (2004, 68). On the contrary, according to Nordstrom, violence can rather be categorised along a continuum – from necessary to extreme and from civilised to inhumane (2004, 57). She argues further that

> (…) the very place researchers choose for studying war is shaped by their notions of what constitutes, and does not constitute, political violence. The people who documented war from its sidelines, pen and paper in hand, went to the sites of military battles. They watched immediate and sometimes immense physical carnage. They were far less likely to trace all the circumstances that led each and every actor to converge on the battlefield; to follow these soldiers as they pursued their lives after the battle. They seldom passed the sites of physical fighting by to document less honorable activities – the profiteering among commanders, the lies and deceits among soldiers, the torture behind closed doors. They documented the heroic and tragic. Nor did they find the lives of the soldiers' wives, sisters, and daughters as interesting as the lives of the soldiers themselves (…) There remains a tendency to see a soldier shooting at another soldier as constituting war's violence, while the shooting of a civilian, or the rape of a woman as a soldier returns to the barracks, is seen as peripheral – an accident, an anomaly. The civilian casualty and the rape are understood as different orders of violence situated along a continuum that demarcates both severity and im/morality (Nordstrom 2004, 58).

Violence is reproduced nationally and internationally/globally through the practices of ordinary life – we oftentimes take for granted – that, in turn, shape embodied and informal experience through which disenfranchised populations live their lives stripped out of social power required to re-examine the role of world politics in the production of their own marginality, which all partly result from the gender-based hierarchical oppression (Dixon and Marston 2011; Williams and Massaro 2013). The continuum of violence is not acknowledged in IR mainstream debates nor the political and social meanings of the body, i.e. how those meanings materialise in the international arena. In IR analysis, men and women are routinely abstracted as "cogs" in the grand state mechanism – some sort of avatars with no bodies. Parashar critiques many mainstream IR scholars for being the innocent bystanders who focus their research solely on the causes and consequences of particular wars but intentionally do not spotlight the experiences of ordinary people during the war and in the period between wars (2013, 617–619). In providing a thorough insight, Christine Sylvester elaborates on leaving out the commoners as relevant IR actors:

Ordinary people are overwhelmingly absent in IR because they are not seen as key stakeholders in IR's versions of international relations. My challenge to the field is to pay more attention to war as experience, on two grounds: war cannot be fully apprehended unless it is studied up from people and not only studied down from places that sweep blood, tears and laughter away, or assign those things to some other field to look into; and people demonstrate time and again that they too comprise international relations, especially the relations of war, and cannot therefore be ignored or relegated to a collateral status (Sylvester 2012, 484).

In contrast to the mainstream IR epistemological stance and related knowledge production, a feminist approach shifts the focus from structure to lived and embodied experiences of women as members of marginalised populations in quest for possible connections between different levels of violence. In this paper, I seek to investigate how women's war experiences are developing in the context of deep-rooted social causes of warfare, such as the culture of hegemonic masculinity, the intersections of the public (state, global) and the private/intimate (body, home), and interrelatedness of embodied life practices and abstract/bureaucratic foreign policy projects. In doing so, I will employ the concept of continuum of violence as an optimal conceptual tool to embrace the complexity of interactions between violent wartime actions and victimisation process. In my analysis, I will focus on two intertwined planes of female war experiences: 1) the experiences of knowing war, and 2) the experiences of doing war.

The investigation might be hampered to some extent because storytelling about women's experiences related to warfare are sharply contested on the state/society level through the everlasting clash of competing narratives. The female wartime experience evolves into the acceptable one only if, and as long as, it serves to legitimise the war, strengthens the patriarchal order, and reproduces the identity of the state by negatively stereotyping "others" as enemies. On the contrary, the very same lived experience is effectively silenced by the state when demonstrates the opposing worldview on war, i.e., if disturbs the official narrative of the sacred duty to sacrifice one's life for the homeland. This may be clearly seen in the examples of mothers of soldiers protesting the aggressive foreign policies of the United States, during interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (*Los Angeles Times* 2005), or Russia, due to the ongoing war in Ukraine (*Newsweek* 2022).

EXPERIENCES OF KNOWING WAR: MARGINALISATION OF WOMEN

For feminist IR theorists, experiencing war by learning empirically about it begins when we acknowledge that "war as an institution depends on gendered images of combatants and civilians" (Sjoberg 2006, 895). The war narrative

reproduces gender hierarchy in such fashion that the man is idealised as just warrior who defend innocent women as "social, biological, and cultural reproducers of nation and nationality", while the image of woman mirrors a delicate being with beautiful soul worth of fighting war for (Sjoberg and Peet 2011, 176). When it comes to liberal/disciplining wars of the twenty-first century, Wegner (2021) argues that imperialistic objectives of NATO-led interventions have been partly legitimised by promotion of the helpful hero model, a masculine ideal of postmodern soldiering that sanitises illegal/illegitimate violence against local populations of the global periphery. This recently constructed cosmopolitan ideal of masculine but empathetic and gender-sensitive soldier, who risks his life to protect violated bodies and rights of women in the global periphery, seems to fairly contradict questionable on-the-ground achievements of many Western military interventions.

As violence haunts the everyday life in conflict-ridden areas, grasping the experiences of warfare has to include the personal realm of ordinary people, which is devalued with ease in the IR mainstream by the label of banal sentimentality. The emotional level of women's war experience is in traditional war narratives either marginalised or completely excluded, although it evolves from specific event(s) and/or processes emerging in the international arena. Tyner and Henkin (2015) analyse the gender component of wartime violence through a narrative of the personalised experience of a young Vietnamese physician described in her diary. Tyner and Henkin seek to understand how women articulate their traumatic life experiences (filled with destruction, loss of the loved ones, and enormous pain) and discern the intersectionality of the realm of everyday and the realm of international during long-lasting U.S. intervention. The selected case study reveals the importance of the female war experience in unveiling of the dark, horrible, immoral, and traumatic violent practices in armed conflicts and in depicting the crash of fragile corporeality with abstract military strategy. The descriptions of a lived wartime experience filled with the unbearable stench of dismembered rotting corpses are certainly not convenient for official representations of war one can find in history textbooks and rituals as media of collective memory.

Women experience war at different rhythms than men. They gain understanding of war as a social practice through subordination of their roles to the masculine ones. According to Cockburn, the continuum of violence stems from the imbalance of power in gender relations that the patriarchal order upholds by "syringing doses" of violence into fundamental institutions – such as the family, military, and state – and thus reproduces aggressive behaviour intimately coupled with cultural ideal of hegemonic masculinity (2004, 44). For women, war does not qualify as "emergency" or "aberration" nor disruption of the event horizon. It is just a radicalisation of the day-to-day, routinised violence women suffer at home and in the community. Yet the difference is that women in war become a specific target due to the symbolic meaning they carry as members of a nation or ethnic/religious community. The

social value of women is reflected in the biological, social, and cultural role of delivering and nurturing new soldiers who will protect the nation from decay or disappearance. This implies that the body is far more than a fixed and unique part of physical reality: it has historically, plurally and culturally mediated ontological significance as well (Alison 2007, 81). The female perception of war as a part of her lived experience is intricately connected to her body. The female body appears in war conditions as a kind of front line and becomes exposed primarily to sexual victimisation as a means of war strategy. The systematic rape of women – who are oftentimes killed or subsequently die of wounds shortly after being raped many times – aims to sabotage women's lifetime reproductive capacity and their sacred role as bearers of "genetical material" of their ethnic group (Alison 2007, 78–81).

In a rare attempt to provide a global empirical insight, the 2007 large-scale study conducted by Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces offers a grim glimpse into the obscure anatomy and atrocious proportions of sexual violence in armed conflicts in 51 countries, indicating that it is not a culturally restricted phenomenon but a planetary scourge (Bastick et al. 2007). Pankhurst (2010) systematises four major circumstances that contribute to sexual violence against women in conflict zones. Firstly, mass rape committed in public by a group of soldiers/civilians can be perpetuated as intended act, that is designed as a sinister tool of political and military strategy of enemy state (Pankhurst 2010, 152). The rape as a warring tool also signifies a symbolic attack on men's ability to protect their wives/sisters and an act of humiliating women as biological embodiment of national pride and identity. Secondly, mass rape is perpetuated to some extent with the perverted idea of military commanders to reward soldiers and inspire the ingroup bonds and favouritism (Pankhurst 2010, 152–153). Thirdly, sexual violence in wartime is eased by loosening of peacetime social constraints, or by their complete removal; men's sexually violent urges are seen as being biologically driven to such an extent that men have no control over them (Pankhurst 2010, 153–154). Ultimately, sexually violent behaviour is also ascribed to the psychological trauma experienced by men in the childhood or adolescence (Pankhurst 2010, 155). Other theorists of modern warfare see causes of sexual violence in conflict zones in various military, social, and institutional factors. For instance, Asal and Nagel (2021) empirically support corelation between sexual violence of insurgent groups and their methods of establishing and maintaining territorial control, particularly aimed at regulating human, sexual, and reproductive capital and exercising social power over local population.

Pervasiveness of sexual violence denotes the ways along which masculine power is dispersed in social tissue. Disruption of economic and social infrastructure in wartime induces uncertain working conditions and complete dependency on men as income provider and bring about prerequisites for gendered power hierarchies to be enforced more harshly. In such circumstances, a spectrum of violent acts

establishes to reveal the complex dynamics of different modes of violence at different levels (private, communal, society at large, interstate) – modes that not only shade into one another but also reinforce one another. Cynthia Cockburn argues that women associate the continuum of violence with the feeling of being continuously on the front, that is, as if the intimate dimension of their life became "battlefield" – with no clear boundary between war and peace, as well as between preparation for war and post-war hopelessness (2004, 43). The gender component is always present in violence that "flows" unhindered along the entire continuum in such a manner that the identification of time-space points of either initiation or suspension of violent practices is ultimately arbitrary. Krause (2015) emphasises that, judging by the linearity of the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence during conflict, flight, and displacement, the continuum of violence actually stretches beyond combat area. Hyndman (2004) contends that for a woman – already being victimised by sheer fact that she is uprooted from the familiar social surroundings – refugee camps located near the conflict zone are an integral part of the battlefield, because they reproduce gender-based dependence and subordination. Displaced women, usually unaccompanied by their partners or male relatives, now must cope with new power dynamics related to the struggle with hostile locals for distribution of livelihoods and scarce resources provided by humanitarian agencies (Hyndman 2004).

Following Krause's line of argumentation on the continuum of violence beyond the front, Korać (2017) argues that the UN peacekeeping operations, instead of being an effective tool of maintaining world peace and security, have become source of insecurity itself, because of persistent but largely unsanctioned sexual exploitation and abuse of local women by Blue Helmets. Sex industry quickly rises as an informal sector of local economy since almost all of peacekeepers are men who are single or unaccompanied by partners or families (Jennings 2014, 314). Besides, peacekeepers hire women for cleaning, laundry, ironing, cooking etc. Peacekeeper's power, manifested in high income and diplomatic immunity, and weak status of socially marginalised local women both tailor power hierarchy favourable for gender-based violence or exploitation. Local women are also sexually objectified by peacekeepers either in the role of regular sex workers or through involvement in long-term but also transactional relationship based on in-kind payments (e.g. sex in exchange for food). Blue Helmets may be the source of contagious diseases (such as HIV/AIDS) and unwanted pregnancies – phenomenon of so called "peacekeeper babies" (Nordås and Rustad 2013, 512). The unwanted pregnancies can deeply affect relations between local women and their partners and undermine victims' social status due to shaming (Simić and O'Brien 2014).

Preston and Wong (2004) give another example of how an armed conflict violently reshape life and cause long-standing fear, suffering and anxiety in their analysis of the experience of Ghanaian women trapped in the continuum of

violence through political, economic, and social processes. In addition to drastic impoverishment and patriarchal repression as common denominators of life in the conflict-ridden homeland, women experience subordination and marginalisation when fleeing combat zone. Leaving the extended family makes woman more vulnerable to gender-based violence by either her dissatisfied spouse, exploitative employers, and criminals pursuing profits from sex trafficking. Preston and Wong posit that the female wartime experiences evidence that conflict zones – although seemingly geographically fixed territories clearly delineated towards peace zones – have expansible boundaries, because violent practices are easily stretched far beyond the borders (2004, 167).

For women caught in entanglement of society at war, experience of knowing war brings many disappointments, particularly in those who are to be most trusted in the realm of intimacy. The matrix of military subordination employed on the front steps into home as violent subjugation of women. Idealised gender role of a masculine man as the protector of the nation often turns into a protection racket, where men extract maximum privileges from women based on the mere promise to fight enemies but instead turn them into victims of sexual violence (Sjoberg and Peet 2011). Assaults on women usually increase after the cessation of armed conflict, sometimes to an even higher level than during it, including violence from husbands/partners discharged from the military. Experience of rape in such an intimate social surrounding, which is expected to be the realm of safety, is immensely shameful and painful at the same time and deepens further the subordinate gender status of victimised women. That is reason why the process of documenting and investigating rape cases has inherent negative side-effect of the continuum of violence, as it displays pervasive gender discrimination of victims long after the war is ended (Davies and True 2017). In an attempt to conceive an effective support strategy for war rape victims, Jindy Pettman stresses that, in order to break silence around sexually assaulted women, it is essential to recognise the collective meaning of the rape, which is associated with national, communal, and male dishonour – not necessarily with women's right to physical autonomy (1996, 74). Survival strategy includes denial and silence as the only available ways to avoid social stigma and protect family honour (Jindy Pettman 1996, 75). This means that even various official reports on wartime violence against women, as True warns, present incomplete and unreliable quantitative and qualitative data due to the lack of systematic field research and effective victims protection programmes (2015, 561–562). According to some feminist theorists, silence (and anonymity) can be the only form of agency available to victimised women who intentionally choose to distance themselves from performances of victimhood (Krystalli 2021, 133–134).

Despite various obstructions by global powers and institutional weaknesses, international criminal justice is likely to lead in addressing impunity for crimes related to devastating consequences of contemporary wars on women's rights. The

International Criminal Court can exercise its jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of international crimes and has powers to address the complex needs of witness protection, victims participation in trials, and formulation of reparations. On the organisational level, great improvement has been made by appointing women as prosecutors because of benefits that their gender sensitive deliberation on criminal charges may bring to global gender justice. Women as prosecutors may be of great help in processing criminal cases of sexual violence committed against female soldiers. Criminal investigations and court proceedings in this sort of cases is complex due to dual role of women in armed conflict: they can be combatant and victims of sexual violence at the same time (Grey 2014, 612–614). The International Criminal Court judgement delivered in the *Ntaganda* case in 2019, related to conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2002–2003), recognised for the first time the dual status of female victims (Ntaganda case 2019). Girl soldiers were members of armed group Patriotic Force for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC), where convicted Bosco Ntaganda was Deputy Chief of Staff and key operation commander. The International Criminal Court ruled that, under the Rome Statute, rape and sexual slavery of girl soldiers that had been committed by other members of the same armed group constituted war crimes. Unfortunately, Gallagher et al. (2020) show that it has been complicated to establish beyond doubt positive corelation between the presence of women at the ICTY and improved gender justice outcomes.

EXPERIENCES OF DOING WAR: MASCULINISATION OF WOMEN

After having delved into victimhood as one-half of women's experience of warfare, I will employ the concept of a continuum of violence as an optimal analytical tool in examining the intricacies of women's agency in violent wartime actions. There are various ways in which women join and participate in conflicts, either as agents or supporters (Bethke Elshtain 2000, 307–312). On the support side, women play the role of a labour reserve ready to replace the male workforce dispatched to the front. Women's work and responsibilities in the rear are doubled. In addition to the household work, they are assigned to provide goods and services to keep the military operations going or to cater shelter and food and/or give information to guerrilla fighters in irregular wars. Yet the division between doing war and supporting war is complicated to preserve as the boundaries of the front and the rear keep fluctuating. Building on Manchanda's thesis (2005) that war and peace are not separate phases but overlapping ones, I will explore whether the usual marginalisation of the female wartime experiences in knowing war, largely through victimisation, replicates itself in women's agency in war.

Women have generally performed on equal footing with men either in the front and in the rear, albeit there have been very few historical cases of massive participation of female soldiers in killing roles (see Goldstein 2004, 59–127). The twenty-first century has seen a shift in the human resources management in the military defying the traditional organisation of one of the most conservative institutions in any society – greater participation of women in military operations. For instance, nearly 283,000 women were deployed in US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kamarck 2016). In the last two decades, NATO and its member countries have included gender component in their military normative and institutional frameworks, on either the national and international level, to implement the UN Security Council's the Women, Peace and Security Agenda through the adoption of a set of ten resolutions, starting with 1325 (DCAF & PfPC 2016; see UN Peacemaker n.d.). The resolutions have been embedded by Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 as the key guideline for routinising gender mainstreaming in NATO's operational effectiveness, based on the integration of skills and experiences of both male and female personnel, as well as for protecting women and girls during armed conflict (NATO 2009). In an attempt to utilise popular culture in projecting its policy against gender-based sexual violence, NATO hosted UN High Commissioner for Refugees Special Envoy Angelina Jolie at the Headquarters in January 2018 (NATO 2018). Wright and Bergman Rosamond (2021) interpret this a bit surprising action of cultural referencing of one of the most famous film celebrities as a NATO's cunning plan designed to upgrade its public credibility by exploiting the high visibility of celebrities as security actors. In this way, according to Wright and Bergman Rosamond, Angelina Jolie might glamorise NATO's global public image in decline by lending to this international organisation a part of "gender legitimacy" based on her professional and public engagements with the issue of wartime sexual violence.

Leave the glitz and glam of the world of celebrities aside and let us now look into how well women are doing in their recently won status in the profession of arms. Neither as glamorous as Angelina Jolie might wish you to believe nor as praised as was Lieutenant Jordan O'Neil (Demi Moore) at the end of the 1997 Ridley Scott□s film *G.I Jane*. No matter how good their combat performance is, women in the US military are often exposed to an organisational culture based on hegemonic masculinity facing the derogatory binary code "whore/bitch" (King 2016). This binary code not only denies female soldiers equality and professional recognition but mirrors the supremacy of heteronormative optics in treating female colleagues on the ground of their sexuality: in male military jargon, "whores" are sexually available colleagues, while "bitches" are the unapproachable ones (King 2016, 124–125). Few women who have been successfully accepted by male colleagues are categorised as "honorary men"; some even adopt a masculine look (short hair, lack of make-up, non-feminine civilian clothes) to conform to traditional

gender norms. A closer look at the meaning of the status of "honorary man" reveals that it is a social construct that covertly rejects women's identity as incompatible with the traditional gender role of soldiers. Woman in the military is still perceived as a sort of moral Frankenstein whose violent acts in war are interpreted rather as a biological "defect" of femininity than heroic deeds.

Various measures implemented in Western militaries have not achieved gender neutrality nor they have significantly contributed to alleviating masculine glorification of violence. Yuval-Davis (2004, 173) contends that women are allowed to work in the US military for purely pragmatic reasons motivated by the need to maintain the imperial power around the globe, that is, to overcome chronically low turnout in regular professional conscription, and the inability to replenish general conscription. The recent practice of increased recruitment of women in the military is not a result of the military's openness to gender-neutral human resource policy but an outcome of the gendered logic of the late capitalism that still treats women as a reserve army of labour. The possibility of greater employment of women stems from decreasing direct participation on the front due to killing from a distance enabled by advanced military technologies (e.g., drones) and from the growing number of jobs of a professional and bureaucratic nature. Yet Yuval-Davis draws attention to the fact that the functional deployment of women in the US military still reflects the traditional gender division of labour in terms of "keeping" female soldiers far away from combat missions as it is still seen as the exclusive male domain, ultimately preventing women from meeting the required eligibility criteria for promotion to higher ranks (2004, 176–181). Ashley Nicolas, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer and veteran of *Operation Enduring Freedom*, denounces a potentially crippling impact of recent changes in the organisational culture of the US Army, in the form of "bigotry of low expectations", on the individual combat capability (Ashley 2014). She argues that making excuses for female soldiers in achieving professional standards in firing or physical fit – already set by and for male soldiers – lowers the bar for performance and, in the long run, leads to a reduced level of an overall combat capability of troops (Ashley 2014). In disapproval of critiques of the lack of gender neutrality in the military, Resic argues that the process of so-called feminisation of the military, in the long run, may have serious implications for soldiering as the utmost approval of manhood, if women prove that they are able to cope with the mental and physical challenges of combat operations on the equal foot as men (2006, 430). This old, and still ongoing debate on who can do war and soldiering and who cannot has opened important questions about the ontology of warfare in the twenty-first century. Some of them were concisely formulated by Jindy Pettman more than two decades ago, who asked whether the combat is still the ultimate valid test of masculinity that we have to protect in order to conserve the manliness of war, as well as whether men will lose their manhood if women begin participating equally in the combat (1996, 104).

New women's experiences of doing war have come along with evolution of the practice of killing from a distance enabled by drone technology. The new feminine war experience of operating drones has affected the conceptual image of a female soldier who kills in combat by additionally undermining the traditional myth about the emotional incapability of women as natural life-givers to conduct lethal operations. Clark (2022) analysed how the gendering of drone warfare is co-constituted by concepts of motherhood and hysteria, so as to frame the trauma of a female drone operator reflecting the way women's violence is generally constructed as resulting from personal failures and irrational emotionality. Delving into the colleagues' reactions to the emotional state of a pregnant British Reaper operator, Clark's findings show that most male drone operators doubted her operational fitness and capability for teamwork due to various conditions associated with impending motherhood (2022, 83). Women's capability to act as an agent of war is being obviously denied once again under the gendered logic of the continuum of violence based upon naturalistic assumptions about alleged incompatibility between motherhood and doing war.

There are vivid examples of how extreme violence in wartime is not only the cause of women's suffering but can be the consequence of women's agency. The magnitude of the brutality of women's violence that occurred in some recent conflicts left proponents of gender stereotyping puzzled regarding the right answer to the question should we categorise female soldiers who were perpetrators of war crimes as deviants? The case of the systematic abuse of prisoners of war in the Abu Ghraib prison complex in Iraq, revealed by the media in 2004, probably would not have attracted so much public attention – and later become the subject of a feminist academic debate – if female members of the US military were not actively involved in the torture. Photographs of female soldiers humiliating Iraqi prisoners have shaken conventional assumptions about women's moral superiority and inherent inability to inflict pain. The active participation of women in war crimes and violence, particularly in torture, feminist theorists attributed to the patriarchal order reproduced in the US army, which moulded the mindset and actions of women to match expectations based on hegemonic masculinity centred about maintaining a high level of combat readiness (Titunik 2009). If they want to keep their job and get promoted in the military, women come under pressure to imitate masculine patterns of behaviour – even though they are hostile to them because they are opposed to the virtues of femininity. That is why Titunik insists that the case of the systematic abuse of prisoners of war at Abu Ghraib cannot be examined as an example of behaviour based on gender equality, even the perverted one, but, on the contrary, it is another practice of female subordination to the logic of militarised masculinity (2009, 262).

The participation of around 100,000 women in the Rwandan genocide, committed in 1994 against the Tutsi people, has been another major blow to

gendered conventions of the sanctity of motherhood, empathy, and victimhood. The massive and active role of Hutu women in inciting, planning, and organising other perpetrators of violence, and personally in inciting hidden Tutsi members, looting victims' property and, to a lesser extent, rape, torture, and execution are well evidenced (Brown 2014). Brown finds the reasons for such successful masculine militarisation and mobilisation of Hutu women in fear and obedience rooted in patriarchal order, but this time consolidated by effective mass propaganda, which managed to easily destroy women's solidarity by dehumanising Tutsi women as dangerous enemies and traitors working to the detriment of Hutus (2014, 453–457). In her analysis of the civil war in Sierra Leone, Dara Kay Cohen (2013) explains the higher average violence of women in combat by their desire to prove to their fellow male fighters that they are not the "weaker sex" and, in such way, to fight social recognition and affirmation of their social status but under values of traditional patriarchal order. These two cases of women's participation in hostilities and war crimes support the thesis that the masculinisation of women can be interpreted as a sort of gender-based "manoeuvre" of the ruling elites aimed at reproducing the patriarchal order, rather than a step towards the expected greater gender equality.

Understanding of feminine lived experiences of doing war seems to require acknowledgment of the identity of female soldiers as a dual one, which is marked both by the speech and silence. Parashar (2010) argues that, while soldiering is an opportunity for women to have a voice in the public realm, particularly in the postcolonial struggle, it is also another opportunity for men in power to bring back women further into the realm of the private. MacKenzie (2010) explored how women and girls who had volunteered to fight in the war in Sierra Leone, among which over 75 percent were involved in active combat duties, were later excluded from the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process, with their combat role diminished by labels such as "wives", "camp followers", or "sex slaves" (MacKenzie 2010, 156, 161–162). Jindy Pettman also points out that the contribution of female fighters is officially erased shortly after the combat ends, as well as their own memories and storytelling of their own wartime experiences (1996, 91–98). In other words, in the gender-based patriarchal order doing war as a genuine women's experience is expected to be only of temporary nature for gender roles can be suspended exclusively during the war, while the return to peacetime implies a quick restoration of the prewar societal order. All things considered, the continuum of violence continues to be a relevant component of women's experience in wartime, even when that experience clearly include female agency, not victimhood.

Another example of visibility of the continuum of violence in women's experiences of doing war comes in the form of either absence of or an inadequate public commemoration of the heroism of fallen female soldiers. Unlike the

practices of honouring the heroism of killed male soldiers, the commemoration of the war contribution of the fallen women combatants signifies a disturbance of the usual gender binary that, on the discursive level, seems to undermine patriarchal order. Millar (2015) examines the ways in which the public duty to commemorate the heroism of soldiers is connected to the possibility of receiving recognition as a worthy life within the existing social imaginary materialised in US popular culture. Millar holds that US female soldiers are imperfectly publicly commemorated and rarely mourned despite the personal articulations of remembrance by their loved ones, because they cannot be specifically categorised within the normative structures of patriarchal order. Such a gender insensitive practice reproduces the continuum of violence in women's experiences of doing war, yet this time after the war and far away from the front, by transforming the disavowal of the need of families of fallen female soldiers to mourn into continued traumatic experience related to the failure of society to honour all soldiers who lost their lives.

CONCLUSION

It is not novel to stress that a thorough exploration of the twenty-first warfare requires the inclusion of the epistemological perspective of individual experiences, particularly of the female wartime experiences – either of being soldiers or victims. What I have explored in this paper are the complexities of interactions between female agency in war and the victimisation process of women. I have analysed two intertwined planes of female war experiences: the experiences of knowing war and the experiences of doing war. In doing so, I have employed the concept of a continuum of violence because this notion helps in illuminating the connection between deep-rooted social causes of warfare and the society-level phenomena such as: the culture of hegemonic masculinity, the intersections of the public (state, global) and the private/intimate (body, home), and interrelatedness of embodied life practices and abstract/bureaucratic foreign policy projects.

Both planes of the analysis indicate troublesome misrepresentation of female wartime experiences in the official discourse, particularly in the narration and public commemoration of war. Gender stereotyping of lived war experiences led to the lack of or extensive marginalisation of women's role in the war as a highly gendered social practice, both in collective memories and in the mainstream of the discipline of International Relations. While men are celebrated as masculine just warriors, women mirror the image of feminine peacekeepers that ought to be defended as valuable "national asset" as they are social, biological, and cultural reproducers of ethnicity. Devaluation of women as non-combatants – that is, human beings not capable of agency in armed conflicts – is rooted in the strong prejudice shaped by gender hierarchy that downplays women's experiences of war as untrustworthy. If women are not constitutive of war as a part of the reality of international politics,

according to the mainstream IR theories, then female experiences of knowing and doing war are not "eligible" to become a "legitimate" part of empirical reality and, consequently, a part of the realm of foreign policy decision making.

More worrisome is the double victimisation of women in today's armed conflicts, which is an outcome of a spill over of the continuum of violence on different levels of agency – family, communal, national, and international. If a woman takes the role of a soldier and shows excellence in combat performance, she never obtains professional recognition. On the contrary, a woman soldier is more likely to be sexually objectified by her male colleagues than to be accepted as an honorary man – never as a woman. In the case of committing war crimes by imitating her male co-fighter, the woman eventually becomes labelled as deviant because it is not in the nature of women to kill. When it comes to learning from lived female wartime experience, its validity is once again renounced by the patriarchal order and the state. The fashion in which a victimised woman learns and tells stories about her intimate view of war heavily disturbs a romanticised and sugar-coated image of war in history textbooks. The female optic is perceived as highly subversive because it depicts vividly the traumas of ordinary combatants entangled in senseless violence wandering around through the "fog of war".

The most blatant example of gender-based denigration of the epistemic and moral validity of women's wartime experiences I found, unexpectedly, in the words of Yasushi Akashi, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Cambodia in the early 1990s. In response to overwhelming public concerns about the then sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers, Mr. Akashi tried to downplay the gravity of the allegations with a fairly shocking statement that "Boys will be boys" (Lynch 2005). The described case of Kremlin's media manipulation of the imagery of a pregnant woman, a beauty blogger from Mariupol who is now suffering double victimisation due to the information war, displays a fresh example of this "never-trust-women" narrative embedded in the gender structure of violent practices.

Despite the representational power of corporate and social media in conveying images of reality to an ever-widening public, wartime experiences of women continue to be blurred and devalued in contrast to the glorification of heroic masculinity. Women's experiences of war are officially acknowledged only if they fit the patriarchal order and dominant narratives on the state in international relations, not if they challenge gendered discursive practices. The gender stereotyping of women as "natural" non-combatants and homemakers seems to denounce two main ways in which women join and participate in war. The strict division between doing war and supporting war becomes vague as the boundaries of the front and the rear keep fluctuating. We have seen in this analysis that female soldiers may, at the same time, act as agents of violence against the enemy and yet become themselves targets of violent acts perpetrated by their own compatriots. Female soldiers may perform violent acts on the front, as it is in the case of drone

operators, and yet keep taking care of others at home as gentle mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters. This may create confusion in designing and conducting research on contemporary armed conflicts, but it also may add valuable insights as necessary steps on the path towards a more holistic understanding of warfare.

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ЗАПЕТЉАНЕ У „МРЕЖУ" КОНТИНУУМА НАСИЉА: КАКО ЖЕНЕ СТИЧУ ИСКУСТВО О РАТУ?

Апстракт: Рад настоји да освети више питања која су се појавила услед потпуног одсуства или снажне маргинализације женских искустава рата као једне од релевантних тема унутар текуће дебате у научној дисциплини о међународним односима. Анализа у овом раду смештена је у епистемолошки и концептуални оквир феминистичких теорија о међународним односима и студија рода и одвија се посредством идеје о континууму насиља као оптималног концептуалног оруђа за стицање увида у сложеност међудејства активне улоге жена у рату и њихове постојане виктимизације. У средишту анализе налазе се две испреплетене равни женских искустава о рату: искуства спознаје рата и искуства активног учешћа у рату. Аутор закључује да – упркос репрезентационој моћи корпоративних и друштвених медија да пренесу слике стварности све ширем делу јавности – ратна искуства жена настављају да буду замагљена и обезвређена спрам сталне глорификације маскулинистичког идеала јунака. Ратна искуства жена званично стичу признање само уколико се уклапају у патријархални поредак и владајуће наративе о држави у међународним односима, никако ако доводе у питање родно посредоване дискурзивне праксе. Родна стереотипизација жена као „природних" небораца репродукује маргинализацију женских искустава активног учешћа у рату, будући да се жене војници било уђуткују после окончања оружаног сукоба, било етикетирају као девијантне особе.

Кључне речи: рат; континуум насиља; женскост; мушкост; политика рода; феминистичке теорије међународних односа.

CONCEPTS OF INFORMATION WARFARE (OPERATIONS) OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CHINA AND RUSSIA

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Abstract: The paper emphasises the importance of information and communication technologies (ICT) in modern society. In the introductory part of the paper, the authors describe different terms, such as "information environment", "information superiority", "information warfare" (IW), and "information operations" (IO). The authors analyse the concepts of IW of the United States of America (US), China, and Russia. The mentioned research subject is directly related to the objective of the paper, aimed at emphasising and explaining strategic documents, manuals, handbooks, and other documents, given in the second part of the paper. The result of the research is the identification of similarities and differences in perceptions and views about information warfare. The authors conclude that at the present moment, all three countries are aware of the importance of information and ICT, especially in the case of armed conflict. The information space is increasingly an area of conflict between the mentioned countries, both in peace and in war. It is estimated that their importance will grow in the future. The advantage and dominance that the US used to have are decreasing in relation to the competitors.

Keywords: information; superiority; operations; warfare; US; China; Russia.

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INTRODUCTION

The dominant process in the third technological revolution, characterised by the rapid development of science and technology, is the informatization of society. This period of development is often called the "information revolution". Society today has reached new levels of development, and the achieved level has led to the fact that the pursuit of interests is not primarily done by the use of armed force but by other means. Due to the technological progress of society, the physiognomy of armed conflicts has changed in the last few decades. The role of non-military content and its impact on the outcome of the conflict is growing (Kreveld 2010, 11; Vračar 2019, 449–450; Milenković i Vračar 2022, 159). Certain strategists and theorists, such as Gray (2007, 15–19), hold traditional views, arguing that the nature of war has not changed, but only its characteristics. Another group of theorists, advocates of modern thinking, such as Kreveld (2010, 49–55) and Kaldor (2005, 13–29), believe that existing knowledge about the nature of war is outdated. Despite some disagreement about the change in the nature of war, they agree that there was a change in his physiognomy because modern conflicts reflected the growing presence of unarmed content of war, which clearly made them different from previous (traditional, classical) conflicts (Vuletić i Vračar 2018, 142–143).

All conflicts are based on information. In the modern information age, information has become even more important. The expansion of information warfare began in the 20th century with the development of information and communication technologies. That development enabled achievements in weapons and accompanying equipment, which affected the way warfare changed. Information warfare involves taking action to achieve information superiority by attacking adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems while defending one's own information, information-based processes, and information systems (Schleher 1999, 3). Information warfare includes, among other things, striving to find out as much as possible about your opponent and preventing your opponent from knowing a lot about your forces (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1995). This information enables the optimal functioning of the decision-making process by military commanders. The optimal decision implies the best choice from a set of several options to achieve the desired goal. In order to achieve that, a large amount of timely, relevant, current, and accurate information is necessary. Information can also be used in a negative context, to disorganise governance, organise protests by anti-government organisations, influence public opinion, and reduce an adversary's will to oppose.

The history of the conflict testifies to numerous examples that indicate the importance of information and the achievement of information superiority over an adversary (in relation to the opponent). Information superiority is the

operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same (FM 3-0 2017). Control of information communicated to adversaries, for example, through deception and concealment, can create a reality misperception for an adversary. Information warfare uses information to influence an adversary's perception in order to subdue its will to fight, in place of physical force. The goal of subject "A" is to influence and force subject "B" to act in a way that is favourable to subject "A". The ultimate goal of each warring party is to induce an adversary to act in the desired manner: to surrender, make a mistake or fail, withdraw its forces, stop hostilities, etc. An attacker can use force or other available resources to achieve this goal. A defender may make a decision known to be in favour of subject "A" (e.g., admit defeat and surrender) or may become a victim of seduction or deception and unknowingly make decisions in favour of subject "A" (Sheen 2020, 1). Information superiority is the basis of the functioning of armies and is one of the key success factors in a possible conflict (Metz 2018, 21; Hammond-Errey 2019, 3).

Information superiority means dominance in the information environment over opponents. An information environment is a set of individuals, organisations, and systems that collect, process, or otherwise act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions (physical, informational, and cognitive). The physical dimension involves military forces, units, means, facilities, etc. The informational dimension is characterised by the flow of information (collection, processing, distribution, display) and serves to communicate and exchange information between all participants in operations. The cognitive dimension includes motivation, vulnerabilities, perception, education, understanding, beliefs, values of participants, etc (JP 3-13 2014; Alberts et al. 2001, 10; ATP 3-13.1 2018). The information environment is an environment that consists of different complex elements where the human factor is the most important and unavoidable part of that system. The information environment is a key component of the broader operational environment of the commander and has a huge impact on the decision-making process of the commander (DoD Strategy 2016, 3). The operational environment is a phrase that is most often used in military terminology and refers to a set of conditions in which, based on the commander's decisions, forces are used in the operation and which affect its outcome. The operational environment is a combination of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the engagement of capabilities and influence the decisions of the commander. Understanding the operational environment helps the commander to better identify the problem, predict potential outcomes, and better understand the various activities of the enemy and how these actions affect the achievement of a military state of emergency.

Some actions can be performed within an information environment, and they can have military or commercial goals. The critical infrastructure of one country can also be a goal. The military has traditionally attacked military targets with military weapons, but IW implies that all national sources are potential weapons. Therefore, they may be considered targets. Information superiority is the ultimate goal of information warfare or operations (Sheen 2020, 1).

IO provide units with support and the increased understanding of the situation with the aim of dominating the battlefield. An information operation is the joint engagement of Information Related Capabilities (IRCs)[3] during military operations, consistent with other operations that affect, disrupt, compromise, or impede the decision-making process of adversaries and their allies (JP 3-13 2014; IO 2014). The preparation of IO is complex and integrates numerous activities. It is the integration and synchronisation of information-related capabilities that enables the desired effects in the information environment at specific times and in specific locations. By carrying out information operations activities, it is possible to influence the will, morale, and perception of opponents' decision-makers (commanders of all levels, important personalities) and other participants in operations, information flows of opponents who distribute information and serve as support in the decision-making process as well as means of collecting and processing information in the enemy's command system (means of monitoring, surveillance, reconnaissance, and processing).

IW and IO are not synonims. IW is an information operation conducted during crises or conflicts. IW is carried out in times of crisis and IO at any time (JP 3-13 2014; Poisel 2013, 34). Information operations can be defined as activities that affect the content, flow, and other operations for the purpose of information superiority (Poisel 2013, 50). The term "information operation" has only been used in official US strategic documents in recent years. The IO force consists of units, staff, and individuals; military professionals, active and reserve; as well as civilians in the Ministry of Defense who perform or support the integration of action against the enemy and potential enemy (IO 2017).

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[3] Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) are all available means of the state that are used to create adequate conditions for the operation of combat units and other formations. (DoD Dictionary 2021, 104).

CONCEPTS OF IW OF THE WORLD'S LEADING POWERS AND OPERATIONALISATION THROUGH STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

The concept of IW in the US

Accelerated, primarily technological development, requires new concepts, so the terminology has developed rapidly in recent years, from multidimensional battle through multidimensional operations to operations in all domains. A multi-domain operation basically explains how US forces will deter and defeat an adversary in a crisis situation or in the case of a conflict situation. This concept enables US forces to physically, virtually, and cognitively overcome their opponents, using combined weapons in all domains. US strategists estimate that, for the US military to maintain its superiority in capabilities over advanced technologies and enemy concepts, better integration of all forces must take place. According to expert estimates, the current system does not sufficiently integrate all domains, such as technological integration. Certain weaknesses were also noticed when it comes to the real-time command and control system (Vuletić et al. 2021, 4; TRADOC 2018).

The analysis of US strategic documents shows a change in the concept of how to act in the information space. In the earlier period, the emphasis was placed more on the defensive aspect, calculating that domination and demonstration of abilities in the information space would deter potential attackers. Such a concept did not prove to be effective in practice, and preventive, offensive action was taken against rivals in the information environment (Vuletić et al. 2021, 5).

The central idea is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare in order to deter the adversary and gain an advantage in armed conflict. The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept, developed by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 2018, proposes solutions to conflicts in various domains. The Air Force 2025 study was also the basis for new and creative thinking. The study covers topics such as information warfare, unmanned aerial combat platforms, organisations dealing with the situation between peace and war, and ways to most effectively degrade enemy unity and will (Metz 2018, 27).

According to their understanding, the new Concept will change the character of modern warfare. Every action of joint forces, every written or spoken word, displayed or transmitted image, has an informative character. The usual concept of working in an information environment assumes that the Joint Forces know how to handle information and various information activities in order to achieve information superiority. The Joint Forces use information power to achieve various goals, such as changing or maintaining perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that trigger desired adversary behaviours; protecting and securing the

perceptions, attitudes, decisions, and behaviours of their own forces; and also the collection, processing, distribution, and use of data to enhance combat power (JCOIE 2018).

The following are the key principles (according to the DoD Strategy 2016, 6):

1. IO is an important component at all stages of an operation or campaign, including the shaping of peacetime activities. Planning, integration activities, and coordination with other joint operations are crucial for success.

2. In some cases, joint operations in the information environment require close cooperation not only within the ministry but also within the US government (inter–agency process).

3. Although information activities can be carried out in peacetime and in conflict, some of them are limited by policies, doctrines, or operational plans that will require a high level of permission to carry them out. Procedures for managing information activities in an appropriate way through conflict levels have been established.

4. The Ministry of Defence seeks to deter attacks and defend the state from any adversary trying to harm them. To this end, the Ministry of Defence develops capabilities and capacities and seeks to integrate them into other aspects of the country's defence.

5. Ongoing intelligence support is needed to succeed. Due to dynamic and rapid changes, some old processes and tools may not be responsible enough, and new methods may be needed for reading, evaluating, managing, and controlling.

6. In order to provide EW at the current level, certain resources are allocated. In order to succeed, it is necessary to build capacity and increase efficiency, which can be achieved by informing about priorities or by resource compensation. In this context, the DoD provides unique approaches, capabilities, and capacities that are necessary for success.

7. The Ministry must coordinate and synchronise influence activities with information activities, primarily public affairs, which publish information that becomes immediately available to the general public, including opponents and potential opponents.

The US Army's publication "Information Operations" (JP 3-13 2014) provides a common doctrine for planning, preparing, executing, and evaluating specific types of operations, such as information operations. Handbook FM 3-13 is a basic document for the operationalization actions in the information space. The handbook contributes to better harmonisation of military doctrine with the joint doctrine while recognising uniform requirements for information operations to support ground forces. FM 3-13 clarifies the place and goal of information

operations in today's complex global security environment (technological capabilities, interpersonal skills, individual possibilities, etc.) (FM 3-13 2016). The purpose (goal) of the IO is to create desired effects that give commanders a decisive advantage over enemies and opponents. Commanders achieve this advantage by preserving and facilitating decision-making and the impact of decision-making while influencing, hindering, or degrading the decision-making of adversaries; obtaining more timely, relevant, accurate, and complete information from the enemies or opponents; or influencing the attitudes and behaviour of the relevant audience that have an impact on operations and decision-making (FM 3-13 2016).

Guidelines for the implementation of IO have been developed through ATP 3-13.1 "Conducting Information Operations". It is primarily intended for IO officers and planners or those who have been assigned responsibilities for fulfilling duties related to information operations. It also provides useful material for commanders, operational officers, intelligence officers, and other staff members who oversee, coordinate, or provide support in the IO's planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation. ATP Manual 3-13.1 states that the three levels of warfare (strategic, operational, and tactical) shape the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions. Command layout, unit size, equipment types and types, and the position of forces or components can often be related to a particular level: strategic, operational, or tactical. The purpose of their engagement depends on the nature of their task, mission, or goal (ATP 3-13. 1. 2018).

The concept of IW of the People's Republic of China

The Chinese concept of integrated strategic deterrence has an increasing emphasis on space and information and communication technologies. China's assessment is that military competition in the information space is intensifying and the struggle for dominance in the field of information is likely to prove decisive in future wars (DoD Strategy 2016, 2). China increasingly sees space and cyberspace as an important arena for both achieving domination and the spread of Chinese interests, but at the same time as a potential vulnerability (Chase and Chan 2016, 118). China's position, in line with its strategic goals, places more emphasis on control of its information space. Chinese authorities put priority on the issue of information security, and that concept emphasises the importance of controlling the narratives, information, and content distributed to their citizens. China stands for sovereignty in information (cyberspace), i.e., control of what is distributed to citizens through ICT (Raud 2016, 6–10).

China's real capabilities in IW and cyber warfare remain unknown. Gaining power and superiority in cyberspace has become an important issue in China. In

general, the level of military development is measured by the level of information warfare capabilities. China plans to build capacity, have trained personnel, and provide the forces and resources to win information wars before 2050 (Ventre 2010, 2). War is evolving in form towards information warfare, i.e., the form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization. In order to achieve information dominance, China's armed forces will speed up weaponry and equipment upgrades and work to develop a weaponry and equipment system that can effectively respond to informationized warfare and help fulfil missions and tasks. China's armed forces will continue with the strategic project for personnel training that can meet the demands of informationized warfare (China's National Defense 2010; China's Military Strategy 2015; Bebber 2016, 45).

The Chinese concept related to information capabilities is aimed at positioning China as one of the world's leading powers in the information space. In addition, huge attention is paid to the control and management of the information domain at the national level by providing the so-called "digital sovereignty". They are aware of the risks associated with social networks and try to advise but also control citizens to use social media responsibly. A large amount of personal information relevant to competitors is stored on these platforms. Social networks can be a threat to national security and political stability, especially given that the creators of these networks come from certain countries marked as competitors (Ventre 2010, 3).

China has developed its own concept of IW, different from the concept of leading Western countries, which may have served only as the basis for their development. Chinese experts believe that the essence of the information ability is to break the will of the opponents, their attitudes and beliefs, which would affect the will and morale of the opponents to continue to fight. According to the Chinese concept, information warfare has an offensive and defensive aspect. Both aspects are important for the normal functioning of the state and the protection of its own interests. It will be especially important to ensure the functioning of critical information infrastructures, which will be the main targets of enemy attacks (Anand 2006, 782–786).

China is taking a number of steps to develop information warfare capabilities, including the development of computer network capabilities. China's cyber capabilities can help the People's Liberation Army (PLA) gather information for intelligence purposes or carry out a cyber attack. The PLA achieves dominance in the information space by relying on its computer networks and information systems, denying the opponent the opportunity to do the same. The PLA understands information warfare as an important means of reducing the impact of high-tech adversaries in the conflict with China. Information and communication tools could be used in conjunction with conventional and cyber attacks on enemy radars and other types of electronic equipment, reducing the

enemy's ability to use information to its advantage and allowing China to take the initiative. China is also investigating and deploying its forces and resources for information warfare beyond national borders (Chase and Chan 2016, 126; MSDIPRC 2015, 37–37).

PLA strategists understand the increase in competition between the great powers, which is intensifying due to their increasing dependence on computer networks for a wide range of military and economic functions. Measures are being taken and preparations are being made to achieve information superiority over their opponents in the war. According to PLA strategists, there is already a struggle in the information space for information and peace. Chinese strategists see the US and other countries with powerful military forces as a threat to China's national interests (Chase and Chan 2016, 122). The goal of the PLA is to build adequate forces and obtain an information war. In Nanjing, the PLA has developed more than 250 Trojans and similar tools. The Chinese Academy of Sciences, which has an advisory role in national information security policy and law, has established a state laboratory for information security. The laboratory launched the "National Attack Project" as one of its research programs. Also, certain professionals have been recruited into military organisations to strengthen their combat capabilities in future wars. China pays great attention to the offensive component in the information space, although it concentrates primarily on the defence aspect (Medeiros et al. 2004, 242; Anand 2006, 782–786). In July 2010, the PLA announced the establishment of an Information Protection Base. China's decision to create such a base was made soon after the United States formed the Cyber Command (Ball 2011, 81).

The PLA has spent more than a decade examining US military publications on network-oriented warfare and US information warfare doctrines. Prior to building their own capacities, the achievements of developed countries, primarily the US, were studied over a long period of time, as were experiences from the application of various forms of IR in conflicts in the late 20th and early 21st century. Concepts and strategic and other documents have been adopted in line with the country's specifics, size, vulnerability, national interests, tradition and degree of technological development. Great funds have been allocated for modernization and capacity building for the application of various forms of information warfare in the event of a conflict. Increasing emphasis is being placed on intelligence-reconnaissance and cyber warfare (Wortzel 2014, 1).

For the PLA, special attention is paid to the detection of information exchange devices, information channels, information processing, and decision-making systems. The goals are information superiority, disruption of enemy control of information and information capabilities, and maintenance of one's own information systems and capabilities. For decades, China's military culture

has emphasised the importance of people, not equipment, in warfare (Wortzel 2014, 1).

The PLA views cyber warfare as part of information warfare. These operations are designed to access, exploit, and possibly damage, through electronic means, the enemy's information systems and networks, computers, communication systems, and supporting infrastructure. Like other developed countries, China is highly dependent and relies heavily on computer networks. These operations are being prepared for a number of reasons, such as (Wortzel 2014, 16–17; Sheldon 2011, 36–51):

1. Strengthening China's political and economic power;
2. Complementing other forms of intelligence gathering and collecting economic, military, or technological information;
3. Reconnaissance, mapping, and collection of targeted data in foreign military, governmental, civilian infrastructure, or corporate networks for subsequent exploitation or attack;
4. Conducting exploitation or attacks using the information collected and
5. Improving the capacity and ability to perform, primarily, defence operations.

The concept of IW in the Russian Federation

According to Russia's strategic documents, IW is the main tool for achieving various strategic goals. In that sense, an information attack is realised to degrade or disable the functioning of information and communication systems of the enemy, but not necessarily for their destruction. In Russia's strategic documents, technological and psychological means of IW have been constantly evolving and are characterised by a high degree of integration. Russia has also developed a high level of warning about threats coming from the information space (Devai 2020, 34).

According to the Russian view, information warfare is seen as a conflict between two or more states in the information space with the aim of damaging information systems, processes and resources, critical and other structures, undermining the political and economic situation in a country, mass psychological manipulation, destabilisation of the state and society, and thus affects the decision-making process of the enemy (Porche III 2020, 25). Russia sees information superiority in the mass and widespread use of various devices, systems, and platforms that are necessary for a positive outcome in a potential conflict. Modern conflicts involve the use of the military but also non-military and non-violent measures that include various activities in the information space in order to achieve information superiority. Contemporary conflicts will be accompanied by increased activity on various social networks, blogs, forums, discussion groups, etc., which will have a great influence

on public opinion and attitudes towards the conflicting parties (Akimenko and Giles 2020, 68; Giles 2016, 6–7).

The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Strategy RF 2015) explains that information security is a part of national security and that national security is provided by information means. The role and importance of the media as an unavoidable segment of modern conflict were emphasised. Critical information infrastructure is one of the objects of information threats. Certain updates and amendments to the Strategy were implemented in 2021, primarily in the field of threats in cyberspace and the development of forces and capabilities to act in that domain. In 2017, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu announced the establishment of information-operations forces within the Russian armed forces. The training of military information-security specialists is mainly undertaken by Krasnodar Higher Military School (IISS 2022, 509).

According to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Doctrine RF 2014), military threats are present in the information space and their seriousness, role, and importance for the outcome of the conflict were emphasised. The role and importance of the media and social networks in forming attitudes and reactions to the use of military force by various international organisations, associations, and individual states were also considered. The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, approved in December 2016, contains similar provisions as the National Security Strategy, which emphasises the growing threats to Russia. The information space is defined more broadly than in the previous version of the same doctrine from 2000. "Informatization" is a key term, which refers to the economic and technical processes for adoption and widespread use of ICT across the country and providing access to information resources. This change indicates an understanding of the growing importance of ICT and technological development and, most importantly, it considers this domain a tool for changing society. The greater need and importance of Internet governance, information security, and risk management in ICT systems are emphasised, as well as the necessity of relying on domestic ICT products and resources (Akimenko and Giles 2020, 69).

Maintaining continuous, uninterrupted, and well-prepared information operations is particularly emphasised. Special emphasis is placed on critical information infrastructure and imminent threats that may endanger their functioning during the war. The Doctrine also emphasises geopolitical interests, the importance and influence of intelligence, psychological, and other means by which to influence the situation in the country, as well as in different regions of the world (Doctrine RF 2016).

Through its strategic documents, Russia seeks to establish a comprehensive and coordinated approach to security and the successful pursuit of its interests.

This effort is conceived as a joint action of state institutions and non-governmental actors. In fact, the strategy, doctrine, and narratives promoted by the government suggest that Russia's national interests require the involvement of numerous and diverse social actors. While Russia is increasingly emphasising non-military means and activities, the process of military modernization is constantly being carried out. According to Russian General Valeri V. Gerasimov, the relationship between non-military and military measures in the modern security environment is 4:1 (Tachev et al. 2019, 133). He thinks that the key feature of warfare is the simultaneous effects on the entire depth of enemy territory, in all physical media and in the information domain (Giles 2016, 77).

IW, and thus cyber warfare, has become a legitimate means of peace and war. According to General Gerasimov, the line between war and peace is blurred in the 21st century, which is amplified by the fact that wars are no longer declared. In addition to that, IW and thus cyber warfare have become a legitimate means of peace and war. The experience of military conflicts, including the so-called "colour revolution" in North Africa and Ukraine, confirms that a perfectly successful state can enter the arena of fierce armed conflict, become a "victim" of foreign intervention, and fall into chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war in a matter of months or even days (Connell and Vogler 2017, 4). Russia's IW is uninterrupted and constant. While Western nations tend to differentiate between war and peace, in Russian thinking, states are constantly in the process of fighting for the protection of national interests, security, influence, and resources (Tachev et al. 2019, 141).

Russia's approach is characterised by the so-called non-linear approach to military strategy, which essentially implies that war and peace as they once were are disappearing, and that continuous warfare can become a regular form of relations between states. IW is at the core of this non-linear strategy. Methods and ways of acting are changing depending on the situation on the terrain. The conflict in Ukraine is proof of this, where information warfare techniques and tools have been actively tested on the ground (Molder and Sazonov 2018, 327). Chekinov and Bogdanov believe that the critical component of IW is the beginning of information activities in order to prepare the battlefield for action by other means. This perspective is in accordance with Gerasimov's observation that IW is largely the basis for victory (Chekinov and Bogdanov 2013, 12–23).

A characteristic of the Russian position on the issue of information flow is the intention to control information processes within state borders. Russia's defence includes protecting infrastructure and increasing digital sovereignty by improving preparedness and capabilities with various measures and solutions, such as isolating the Russian segment of the Internet (Kari 2019, 89–92). Russia stands for multilateral regulatory procedures for the use of ICT for various purposes, especially criminal and terrorist ones (Vuletić i Đorđević 2021, 240).

Russian officials are convinced that they are in a constant struggle with certain countries and organisations that want to endanger its security. Globalization, together with the free flow of information it creates, is both a threat and an opportunity. According to Russian strategic documents, there is no clear distinction between peacetime and wartime (Connell and Vogler 2017, 27–28). According to the Russian perspective, the number and seriousness of threats to Russia have increased, and those threats are being transferred to the internal sphere of Russia. Russia's national interests may be threatened on or through the Internet. Terrorists and extremists can carry out attacks on resources and infrastructure of strategic importance, disrupt the management and decision-making system, and paralyse Russia's strategic leadership. In addition, cybercriminals can threaten Russia's critical infrastructure in or through cyberspace by infiltrating state information systems (Doctrine RF 2016; Strategy RF 2015; Doctrine RF 2014).

SIMILARITIES AND DISTINCTIONS IN THE VIEWS OF THE US, CHINA AND RUSSIA REGARDING IW (IO)

There is still no consensus among the world's leading powers on many issues related to the use of ICT for military purposes, although there have been several initiatives within international organisations on this issue. Regarding the use of terms such as IW, Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Computer Network Operations (CNO), and others, there is a lot of confusion because there are many conflicting definitions, and these terms are used in different contexts to describe different goals and actions (Giles 2016, 6–7).

By analysing the strategic documents of the considered countries, it can be concluded that the importance of information and achieving information superiority is recognised in all three countries, especially in armed conflicts. Russia and China observe IW more broadly, in both peacetime and wartime, whereas the United States' perspective is narrower and only refers to wartime. Russia and China do not have official doctrines or other documents related to IW and IO known to the public. In contrast, the US has certain publications, manuals, handbooks, etc. (Heickero 2010, 23–24).

In the Chinese view, IO is a component of IW, as opposed to the American view. Russia's view is much closer to the understanding of the People's Republic of China, according to which IW is conducted in peace and war (less, more constantly) at several levels and dimensions (Heickero 2010, 23–24). According to the US view, IW are information operations conducted during crises or conflicts, while IO is conducted at any time. According to the US, IW involves the more limited use of forces and resources.

Russia's approach to understanding information operations differs in some elements from the US approach. Information has its value and must be protected in peace and war, as it is emphasised in Russian strategic documents. Information protection is of strategic importance and is a key factor for the functioning of the society, political stability, and opportunities for action and victory in potential conflict. Military doctrine indicates the role of the IW during the initial phase of the conflict, but also the conduct of an information campaign during the conflict and how important it is for the final outcome and victory (Heickero 2010, 23–24). From the standpoint of Russia, IW is focused predominantly on the cognitive layer of the opponent, while the US has given priority to the physical layer with similar or identical goals. Technological, psychological, and other means of information warfare are constantly evolving, and they are much more integrated into the activities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation (Devai 2020, 34).

The advantages in the capabilities that the US had in the past regarding IW are diminishing in relation to other leading world powers (DoD Strategy 2016, 2). According to the opinion of certain experts (Singer and Friedman 2014, 94; Cheung et al. 2015, 3; Yavuz 2019, 236) China lags behind the US and is not capable of carrying out a complex attack in cyberspace. Others believe that China has the capabilities and the will to surpass the West in military capability. However, no one is sure how far China's current strengths, long-term plans, technical solutions, and achievements in the field of ICT can reach. China is the country with the economic and military capacity to truly challenge the US and to disrupt the international system it presides over. The internet is an increasingly critical part of that system. Consequently, cyberspace will be an important battlefield that will primarily affect the final outcome of the conflict (SGI, 2018).

In recent years, China has shown great progress in improving its forces and resources, which has direct implications for the national security of the US. China's ability to wage an information war against the US in peace and war could pose a serious challenge to American strategists. China seeks to build capacity and reach such a level of development to become a leading player internationally in the field of IW, with a special focus on cyber warfare. China's intentions to endanger US infrastructure are obvious, as evidenced by many examples, as well as China's intention to become an active player in the arms race in the information space and its efforts to become the world's leading power in this field.

CONCLUSION

The mass use of ICT has enabled access to a huge amount of data and the connection of a large number of entities, both state and non-state. Modern society with the achieved technological progress compared to the previous one is characterised by various forms of communication, information exchange and

an increasing number of interoperable, interconnected, digital devices (DoD Strategy 2016, 4). In today's world, ICT is not just a privilege of developed countries. Certain countries, often with the involvement of non-state actors, try to endanger the resources of the opposite side (Proroković 2017, 402–403). In order to realise their activities, they use various techniques and tools.

Accelerated development and the increasing use of ICT on a large scale have hung the modern world. Changes in the information environment make information superiority a key factor in achieving success in a conflict. Contemporary conflicts are also strongly characterised as struggles in the information domain. Among the key factors in the international community, there is a commonality in understanding the importance of information, but there are some differences in terms of place and role, as well as the application of information operations.

Modern conflicts are accompanied by very intense information warfare. The greatest intensity is at the beginning of the armed conflict, but it is being waged continuously all the time. The various techniques, methods, and tools used in IW have a strong impact on the warring parties and enable the realisation of the information superiority of the dominant party in the conflict. The actions and goals of IW are planned long before the beginning of the armed conflict. Different forms of IW are escalating in scope, sophistication, and better coordination.

In the US, there is an obvious shift in the concept, with an increasing emphasis on offensive action in the information space. The current concept of action enables the better use of resources and the rational use of forces. The US approach differs from the views of other considered world powers on the issue of IW. It is considered primarily during the war.

The People's Republic of China's concept is very similar to the Russian one. It differs from the US, and it is probably based on a long-term study of the actions of other world and regional powers in the conflicts initiated and led by these countries. China has developed its own model, striving to improve capabilities and deter potential attackers. China, like Russia, is trying to achieve so-called digital sovereignty, i.e., control of its own information space. Both mentioned countries believe that the information war is being waged continuously, both in peace and war.

The analysis of strategic and other documents reveals all the complexity of IW (IO) as well as different approaches. IO are regarded today as an integral part of warfare. These terms, IW and IO, cover a number of aspects, including psychological, electronic, cyber, etc. What they have in common is that all three countries are investing more and more funds in information warfare, and that the latest technological achievements are being used for that purpose as well.

In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the role and relevance of IO in relation to other types of operations (land, air, naval, and other sorts of operations). The emphasis in all three countries considered is on the defensive aspect of action and the protection of one's own interests. The principles of efficiency, timeliness, speed, and integration of all capacities are especially emphasised. Concepts and views have more similarities than differences. They share the employment of various forms of information warfare for geopolitical reasons and the realisation of national interests, among other things. However, the analysis of certain events shows that they are conceptually different from the real things. Many activities are carried out "under the cloak" of protection of human rights and democratic values.

Over the last few years, there has been a growing confrontation in the information environment and more and more mutual accusations between the US, on the one hand, and Russia or China, on the other hand, for acting due to interference in internal affairs and destabilization, such as presidential elections, territorial integrity, theft of intellectual property, etc. Many things related to information security are among the most closely guarded secrets, so it is difficult to say with certainty which of the considered world powers is dominant in the information space. There is no doubt that this aspect of warfare and various soft power mechanisms has an increasingly important role in achieving foreign policy goals (Stojanović i Đorđević 2017, 479; Kostić 2018, 407; Vuletić 2018, 274). In this constant rivalry, the achievements of potential opponents are analysed, special forces are formed, increasing funds are allocated, and strategies, doctrines, and other regulations are adopted, all with the goal of achieving information superiority over adversaries.

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КОНЦЕПТИ ИНФОРМАЦИОНОГ РАТОВАЊА (ОПЕРАЦИЈА) СЈЕДИЊЕНИХ АМЕРИЧКИХ ДРЖАВА, КИНЕ И РУСИЈЕ

Апстракт: У раду се истиче значај информационо-комуникационих технологија (ИКТ) у савременом друштву. У уводном делу рада аутори описују различите појмове као што су “информационо окружење”, “информациона супериорност”, “информационо ратовање” (ИР) и “информационе операције” (ИО). Аутори анализирају концепте ИР Сједињених Америчких Држава (САД), Кине и Русије. Наведени предмет истраживања је у директној вези са циљем рада, који је усмерен на истицање и објашњење стратешких докумената, упутстава, приручника и других докумената, датих у другом делу рада. Резултат истраживања је идентификација сличности и разлика у перцепцијама и ставовима о информационом ратовању. Аутори закључују да су у овом тренутку све три земље свесне значаја информација и ИКТ, посебно у случају оружаног сукоба. Информациони простор је све више подручје сукоба наведених држава, како у миру тако и у рату. Процењује се да ће њихов значај у будућности расти. Предност и доминација коју су САД имале се смањују у односу на конкуренте.

Кључне речи: информације; супериорност; операције; ратовање; САД; Кина; Русија.

ARGENTINA'S STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ON THE MALVINAS ISLANDS

Rajko PETROVIĆ[1]

Abstract: The subject of this research is the analysis of Argentina's struggle to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Malvinas, both diplomatically and militarily. The starting hypothesis of the research is that Argentina justifiably lays claim to the geographically closest Malvinas, which are one of the last objects of decolonisation, but that the United Kingdom wants to keep them under its control, considering them part of its territory. The author first explains the history of the Malvinas and when and in what way they were occupied and managed by European colonial powers. An explanation of the arguments based on which the official Buenos Aires and London claim the right to the Malvinas and of their current status will follow. The research results show that the formal-legal and historical arguments in the dispute over the Malvinas are on the side of Argentina, but that their population wants to remain under the rule of the British Crown, which greatly complicates the situation on the ground. We used the historical method, the case study method, and the comparative analysis in our research.

Keywords: Argentina; United Kingdom; Malvinas; decolonization; sovereignty; territorial integrity; Falklands War.

INTRODUCTION

The Malvinas, as they are called by the Argentines, or the Falklands, as they are called by the British, are an archipelago of about 200 islands divided into two large groups: the East Malvinas (East Falklands) and the West Malvinas (West

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Falklands). Their area is 12,200 km², of which the eastern part accounts for the greater part (6,610 km² versus 4,530 km² of the western part of the archipelago). They are about 480 km from the southern coast of the Argentine province of Patagonia and about 1,210 km from Antarctica. The history of this seemingly ordinary Atlantic archipelago is anything but boring. It is believed that the English sailor John Davis was the first European explorer to arrive in the Malvinas in 1592 (Falkland Islands Government 2013, 3). Argentine historiography, however, claims that Fernando de Magallanes discovered the Malvinas in 1520 under the auspices of the Spanish crown (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto 2012, 1). The Dutch sailor Sebald de Weert visited the islands in 1600 and named them the Sebald Islands (Freedman 2005, 3). In 1690, the British sailor John Strong named the sea that separates the eastern and western islands of the Falkland Islands as the Falkland Sea in honour of the Falkland Viscount[2] Anthony Cary, who was the patron of his voyage, and later the name spread to the entire archipelago (Falkland Islands Government 2013, 3). The Malvinas, a term used by the Spaniards and later the Argentines, came from the French sailor Louis Antoine de Bougainville, who gave them the name *Îles Malouines* in 1764 in honour of its first settlers, colonists from a small French port named Saint-Meloir (Gustafson 1988, 8). It is interesting that the term "Falkland Islands" is most often used by the Serbian public today, which was created by a wrong transcription during the Falklands War, which was reported by the Yugoslav press. Today, the Argentine authorities consider the name Falkland Islands offensive, and the same is the case with the British authorities when it comes to the name Malvinas. The French occupied the eastern island in 1764, and the British occupied the western island of the Falkland Archipelago in the same year. The Spanish crown bought the islands from the French in 1770, which is why British colonists left the islands. After gaining independence, Argentina captured the Malvinas in 1816, and four years later declared sovereignty over them (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto 2012, 2). The problem arose in 1833 when the British occupied the islands and shared their presence with the Argentine side (Falkland Islands Government 2003, 3–4). After the failed negotiations of Buenos Aires and London under the auspices of the United Nations on the future status of the Malvinas, Argentina decided on a military initiative in 1982 and occupied the entire archipelago, thus starting the famous Falklands War in which the United Kingdom won a total victory (Roxana Bellot 2013, 25–26).

In the formal-legal sense, the Falkland Islands have been a British self-governing overseas territory since then. The 2009 Constitution defines that the Falklands enjoy full internal self-government, where only foreign affairs and good

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[2] A Scottish noble title, denoting ownership of a particular land.

governance are left to official London. The Falkland Islands are formally headed by a British monarch who controls events through his governor. It is the governor who appoints the head of the executive (Falkland Executive Council) on behalf of the monarch, but this must be the candidate proposed by the legislature. The governor himself is also considered the head of the executive branch in the islands. The Assembly is unicameral and has 11 deputies who do not belong to any organised political party, and who are elected in general and free elections for a term of four years (The Falkland Islands Constitution Order 2008, 21–35).

According to the 2016 census, the Malvinas have 3,398 inhabitants, which means that they are extremely sparsely populated with only 0.28 inhabitants per square kilometer. Only 43% of the population was born in the Malvinas, while the rest immigrated from the United Kingdom (48%), St. Helena[3] (17%), Chile (11%), and the remaining 24% immigrated from 56 different countries (Falkland Islands Government 2016, 1–7). Almost half of the population declares themselves to be Falklanders, and 24% as British. However, it should be noted that the dual identity is pronounced, with 80% of the population considering themselves as Falklanders, British, or both. In addition, 8% of the population declare themselves as Saint Helenians and 5% as Chileans (Falkland Islands Government 2016, 7). English is the mother tongue for 85% of the population, while less than 500 people speak other mother tongues – first Spanish, then Shona (Zimbabwean) and various Filipino languages and dialects. The latter, however, are well integrated, as 86% of them speak good or excellent English (Falkland Islands Government 2016, 7). It is important to emphasise that only 69% of the inhabitants of the Malvinas live there permanently, while the rest have temporary residence and are most often immigrant workers (Falkland Islands Government 2016, 8). The capital and largest city of the Malvinas is Stanley, where more than 2/3 of the total population lives.

ARGENTINE AND BRITISH PRESENCE
IN THE MALVINAS ISLANDS

With the May Revolution of 1810, Argentina initiated the process of liberation from Spanish rule, which resulted in the proclamation of independence of the then United Provinces of Rio de la Plata in 1816 at the Congress in Tucuman. In that sense, Argentina is considered the successor of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata from the time of Spanish colonialism, since it originated in most of its territory. It is for this reason that independent Argentina claimed the right to the Malvinas since they belonged to a given viceroyalty. Even before it

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[3] British Overseas Territory in the South Atlantic.

bought the Malvinas from France, Spain, referring to the papal bulls *Inter Caetera* and *Dudum si Quidem* from the end of the 15th century, installed in 1767 a stronghold in Puerto Soledad (Martínez Casado 2010, 43–112). Relations between Spain and Great Britain were quite hostile during the second half of the 18th century due to conflicts over supremacy in the world sea, and it was only thanks to the Nootka Sound Conventions (a series of three agreements between Great Britain and Spain signed in 1790 on territorial disputes over parts of the northwestern Pacific coast of North America) that an open war between the two countries was prevented. Argentine political and military elites, such as Manuel Belgrano and José de San Martín, considered it natural for the Malvinas to belong to them at the very beginning of the birth of the independent state. As early as 1811, Spanish troops withdrew from the Malvinas and focused on defending the East Coast[4] and Montevideo from the insurgents, so David Jewett commanded the Heroine fragment on behalf of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plate and occupied the Malvinas in 1820 (Tesler 1968, 105–152). The first measure that Jewett took on behalf of the Argentine authorities was a ban on hunting and fishing in the territory and waters of the Malvinas, informing the foreigners present (primarily the British) that these were now the territories of the new sovereign state (Destefani 1982, 54). Argentina then established the institutions of its government in that area. Jewett was appointed governor of the Malvinas, and they also received military command. Therefore, after Jewett's departure, when he was appointed by the authorities in Buenos Aires, the institution of the governor was established. In fact, Martin Rodríguez, who was head of government in Buenos Aires at the time, was the first to initiate the practice of directly appointing a governor for the Malvinas because he wanted to protect it as effectively as possible from potential British naval attacks. In the administrative sense, the islands were not an independent unit, but part of the province of Buenos Aires (Lorenz 2014, 54–55). It is important to point out that as early as 1825, the United Kingdom and the United Provinces of Rio de la Plate signed the Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation, which also meant that official London recognised the newly formed country within its then borders, without challenging its sovereignty over the Malvinas (Martínez Casado 2010, 113). On August 3, 1821, the British newspaper *The Times* published news of the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas, which did not provoke a revolt or condemnation from the British public (Beck 2014, 67). On June 10, 1829, the Government of the Province of Buenos Aires (Governor Martin Rodriguez), in charge of the foreign affairs of the United Provinces of the River Plate (later República Argentina), passed a law creating a new territorial jurisdiction: the Political and Military Command of the Malvinas. This governor also named Luis Vernet his

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[4] Today's Uruguay.

first political and military Commander, and this fact is recognised today in Argentina as the day of the "First Declaration of the Argentine Sovereign Rights over the Malvinas Islands" (Goebel 1982). On June 17, 1833, the Argentine diplomatic representative to the Court of Saint James, Manuel Moreno, issued the first protest to Lord Palmerston. The arguments remained similar to contemporary Argentine claims. The crucial question of the Malvinas settlers' origins as non-natives was included afterwards.

We have already mentioned that British sailors visited the Malvinas several times and that a certain number of British colonists were present there until the Spanish crown bought them from France. For the British Empire, occupying strategically important positions in the South Atlantic was extremely important due to naval competition with other European colonial powers, especially Spain. The collapse of the Spanish Empire in the area of America was seen by the British crown as an opportunity to dominate that part of the world and bring under control the most important trade route. Although Argentina occupied the Malvinas after the departure of Spanish troops and signed the mentioned agreement on friendship and mutual recognition with the United Kingdom, authorities in London were waiting for a favourable moment to appropriate the islands. The investigation of the American warship USS Lexington in 1831 on the occasion of the capture of three American whaling ships in the Malvinas proved to be an ideal opportunity, which resulted in great pressure from official Washington to change Argentina's policy of banning fishing in that area and forming authorities on the islands, carried out personally by the American naval officer Silas Duncan (Peterson 1964, 106). Argentina's attempt to regain control of the Malvinas by installing a garrison in 1832 failed. In the same year, official London sent two ships to occupy the archipelago and place it under the sovereignty of the British Crown. The first ship, the HMS Clio, under the command of Captain John James Onslow, disembarked on December 20, 1832. On January 2, 1833, it sailed into the Malvinas' port of Puerto Luis and replaced the Argentine flag with the British. Since then, the United Kingdom has been claiming sovereignty over the territory of the Malvinas (Brown et al. 1960, 43).

ARGENTINE-BRITISH TERRITORIAL DISPUTE
AND THE FALKLANDS WAR

In 1840, the Falklands were granted the status of a British royal colony governed by a governor appointed by the British monarch. Active colonisation of the islands began, where the first Scottish colonies sprang up. The Falklands became important as a holiday destination for British ships and as a trading hub, despite the bad reputation they enjoyed in the first half of the 19th century. Stanley, formerly Port Jackson, became the administrative and main port centre

of the Falklands in 1845. Sheep breeding and the sale of wool, meat, and dairy products from them soon became the main economic branch for the local population, and this tradition has continued to this day.[5] After the Panama Canal was dug in 1914, the Falklands lost their commercial significance, and only the Falkland Islands Company stood out, which not only had a monopoly on trade and housing, but also maintained the financial independence of the Falklands by trading with the United Kingdom (Reginald and Elliot 1983, 9). During the first half of the 20th century, the Falklands had a double significance for official London. First, they played an important role as a base during British expeditions to Antarctica and, second, they were a naval base for the British Navy during the First and Second World Wars. Moreover, on December 8, 1914, the Battle of the Falklands took place between the British Royal Navy and the German Imperial Navy, which resulted in the victory of the former (Borsani 2015, 273).

After the Second World War, the Malvinas became the subject of a diplomatic dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Since the British took the Malvinas in 1833, Argentina has protested against such a decision, believing that its sovereignty and territorial integrity have been violated. Official Buenos Aires protested in 1841, 1849, 1884, 1908, 1927 and 1933, and since 1946, it has protested to the United Nations over the status of the Malvinas on an annual basis (Gustafson 1988, 34). During the first period of the reign of Juan Perón (1946-1955), who tried to pursue isolationist policies, Buenos Aires vigorously demanded that London stop violating Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas. In addition to the Malvinas, Peron's populist idea of New Argentina also included Antarctica (Garcia 2009, 1033). During the 1960s, Argentina's demands for the Malvinas grew even more since the United Nations adopted the famous decolonisation declaration in 1960, which Buenos Aires considered must be applied to the Malvinas case as well. The United Nations has tried to calm the passions between the two countries through negotiations under its auspices and to find a peaceful solution. It should be noted that some steps have been taken, such as committing both sides to reaching a solution through dialogue and peace. One of them was UN Resolution 2065 of 1965 (Laver 2001, 125).

The peak of the Argentine-British dispute over the Malvinas happened somewhat suddenly and unexpectedly. In 1982, Argentina was in a deep political and social crisis, but also in a period of economic stagnation. After the fall of the military junta of Jorge Rafael Videla and Roberto Eduardo Viola in 1981, a new junta came to power, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri. On the one hand, the new government tried to divert the attention of the Argentine public from the severe economic crisis in the country. On the other hand, military circles were

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[5] Interestingly, the current ratio of the number of sheep and the number of inhabitants in the Falklands is around 200:1.

increasingly talking about a military solution as the only option to end the dispute over the Malvinas. Admiral Jorge Anaya, one of the members of the ruling military junta, stood out among them (Anaya 2012, 299). Anaya also became the main strategist for the capture of the Malvinas, which was preceded by the landing of Argentine workers on the island of South Georgia to which Argentina also claims the right. By order of the Supreme Command, the Argentine army captured the port of Stanley on April 2, 1982, and placed the entire archipelago under military control, thus officially starting the Falklands (Malvinas) War. On April 3, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ordered British troops to respond militarily, and the first warships set sail from the port of Portsmouth in the direction of the island on April 5. Thatcher's reputation in the British public was greatly shaken due to a series of unpopular measures in the socio-economic sphere (so-called Thatcherism), so the conflict in the Malvinas was a good opportunity to restore it. After the initial Argentine initiative on land, sea, and air, British troops managed to achieve strategic victories step by step in the days and months that followed, until the war ended on June 14 in favour of the United Kingdom's victory. The war lasted a total of 2 months and 12 days, in which 650 people lost their lives on the Argentine side and 1,687 were wounded, while 255 people were killed and 775 wounded on the British side. Argentina lost 6 ships and 34 aircraft, and the British side lost 5 ships and 98 aircraft. Unlike the British, for whom this victory brought back memories of the glorious days of the British Empire, the Falklands War left behind a humiliated Argentine nation and hundreds of soldiers who never recovered from war trauma, many of whom committed suicide. The general impression is that Argentina entered the war organizationally unprepared and hasty (Nievas y Bonavena 2012, 9–55). Public outrage resulted in the fall of the government in Buenos Aires as early as 1983, bringing Argentina into a phase of gradual democratisation and demilitarisation of the political sector. On the other hand, the Malvinas have been under the full control of official London since the end of the war.

TWO SIDES OF THE ARGUMENT

Today, Argentina considers the Malvinas to be its inalienable component, to which it claims full rights. Thus, the transitional provisions of the Argentine Constitution state that "The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands and the corresponding maritime and insular spaces, as they are an integral part of the national territory. The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respecting the way of life of its inhabitants, and in accordance with the principles of International Law, constitute a permanent and inalienable objective of the Argentine people" (Constitución de la Nación

Argentina 2013, 39). Argentina, therefore, in its highest legal act, emphasises not only that the Malvinas belong to it according to the logic of law, but also that the permanent goal and obligation of the Argentine nation is their return. The official position of the Government of Argentina is that the United Kingdom, violating the territorial integrity of Argentina, illegally occupied the Malvinas, expelled the Argentine authorities there, and constantly prevented the return to the islands of the Argentine authorities and the settlement of Argentines from the mainland. As we mentioned earlier, Argentina regularly protests in front of international institutions against the British occupation of the Malvinas. In that sense, Argentina lays hopes in the United Nations, which has classified the issue of the Malvinas as a special and unique case of decolonisation of the former colonial territory to which the principle of the people's right to self-determination cannot be applied. After the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) on December 16, 1965, which recognised the existence of a dispute over sovereignty in the Malvinas between Argentina and the United Kingdom, it called on both sides to reach a peaceful solution through negotiations. Since then, the UN General Assembly and the UN Decolonization Committee have adopted over 40 resolutions on this issue. For Argentina, the support it enjoys in the fight to preserve its sovereignty from China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but also from Latin American countries, is very important (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto 2021). For Argentina, the Malvinas issue today is not only a matter of territory, but also an important part of the overall national identity. The Falklands War is the most significant conflict that happened to it in the 20th century, and its participants have the status of national heroes. In their official publications, the Argentine authorities often place the story of the Malvinas in a broader, Latin American context, where they are a symbol of the resistance of Latin Americans to neo-colonial claims to their territories.

There are three groups of arguments that Argentina invokes in defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Malvinas: geographical, historical, and diplomatic-legal. According to geographical arguments, the Malvinas, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands, i.e., their land and sea area, belong to the Argentine continental platform. In geological terms, these islands are considered to be a single formation with parts of Patagonia. The Malvinas archipelago is only 550 km away from Patagonia and almost 14,000 km away from London, which means that it is 25 times more distant from Great Britain than from Argentina. When it comes to historical arguments, Argentina refers to the fact that in the period of colonialism, the Malvinas were under the rule of the Spanish crown, and that the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata inherited the Malvinas together with the mainland after the May Revolution of 1810, both confirmed in the Declaration of Independence of 1816 and a series of subsequent documents of the first Argentine authorities. When it comes to

Spanish rule over the islands, Argentina refers to the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), as well as the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), where the British Empire recognised the Spanish Empire within the borders that included the Malvinas. The right of Spain over the Malvinas at that time is argued by the Argentine side by using the words of Ferrer Vieyra: "In the cases of islands that are distant from another or are more or less inappropriate for human settlement, the effective occupation is reduced to the necessary symbolic acts that express the desire to claim them" (Vieyra 1984, 54). The diplomatic and legal arguments invoked by Argentina are the fact that the United Kingdom usurped the Malvinas in 1833, that Argentina never renounced its sovereignty over them, and that it has regularly protested on this issue before the relevant international institutions, above all the United Nations (Adamoli y Flachsland 2013, 5–15.). Unlike the United Kingdom, which has been actively calling for the application of the principle of self-determination in the case of the Malvinas since 1982, Argentina rejects such demands and believes that the principle of territorial integrity should be given priority. The reason lies in the fact that in 1833, the British not only expelled the Argentine government and population but also eventually settled the islands with their colonists. Therefore, according to the Argentine authorities, it is absurd to invoke the right to self-determination, considering that the original Argentine population is no longer on the islands, i.e., that it has been replaced by the British one. Former Argentine ambassador Vicente Berasategui believes that in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, Argentina unsuccessfully tried to regain control over the Malvinas through diplomacy, and that the 1960s were the most promising in favour of Argentina. The United Nations General Assembly at that time adopted the famous Resolution 2065 (XX), calling on both sides to negotiate. The British side, however, believes Berasategui, from then until the outbreak of the armed conflict in 1982, very skillfully "bought time" by prolonging negotiations and lobbying internationally (Berasategui 2011). Since 2004, Argentina has managed to put the issue of the status of the Malvinas on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, to which it submits detailed reports on its requests to them on an annual basis (Adamoli y Flachsland 2013, 22).

Argentina's contemporary argumentation regarding the protection of its own interests in the Malvinas is very developed and is based on the use of a combination of international legal, legal and historical arguments. The official Buenos Aires is considered to be in a dispute over their sovereignty in the case of the Malvinas, emphasising that it is not about negotiations or a fight over the borders correction with the United Kingdom because it is not a coastal state in natural contact with the islands. The Argentine side insists that the case of the Malvinas is the so-called "special case of decolonisation", where the existing sovereignty dispute must be resolved between the two parties to dispute — the United Kingdom and Argentina. According to Osvaldo Narciso Mársico,

Argentina's ambassador to Serbia and former head of the National Directorate for the Malvinas and South Atlantic Islands (2016-2020), the right to self-determination cannot be exercised in the Malvinas case for five reasons. First, the right to self-determination is only applicable to nations, and the United Nations does not recognise the Malvinas as a separate nation. Secondly, because in 1833, the United Kingdom expelled the Argentine population and government there. Third, because from the period of occupation of the islands in 1833 until today, the United Kingdom first inhabited the Malvinas with its own population, and then strictly controlled migrations in the same direction, just like buying and selling land and houses in the Malvinas. Fourth, because no United Nations resolution dedicated to the Malvinas refers to the self-determination of the people there. Fifth, because the United Nations has clearly defined only two sides of the dispute — the United Kingdom and Argentina (Петровић 2022).

The British reasoning and arguments related to the Falklands are, understandably, completely different. Official London claims that it realised the right to the Falklands in 1765 when the settlement of Port Egmont was built on the island of Saunders before the Spaniards showed any interest in it. Moreover, the British refer to their supposedly substantiated geographical discoveries from the end of the 16th century as a basis for their later claims to the Falklands (Hoffmann and Hoffmann 1984). When it comes to the expulsion of the Argentine population from the island in 1833, the British side claims that a garrison of 26 Argentine soldiers was expelled, with whom 11 women and 8 children left. Other residents remained to live freely, including, for example, businesswoman Antonina Roxa, who remained in the Falklands until her natural death in 1869. When it comes to the Argentine accusation that the United Kingdom deliberately populated the islands with British people after 1833, the British response is that in the 1840s, not only British families, but also families from Uruguay, Canada, and Scandinavia, immigrated to the same islands (Falkland Islands Government 2014, 3–7). Official London claims that the Peace Convention was signed in November 1849 between Felipe Arana on behalf of the Argentine Confederation and Henry Southern on behalf of the United Kingdom, which was ratified on May 15, 1850, and by which a "perfect friendship" was established between the two nations, including the Falklands issue. The British side also claims that from 1850 to 1941, Argentina never protested over the status of the Falklands (Falkland Islands Government 2014, 8–9). The British side rejects the argument of geographical proximity because it is a principle that is not recognised by International Law. In addition, the British side claims that in 1882, the director of the Argentine Office for National Statistics, Francisco Latzina, made a map of Argentina showing the Falklands as non-Argentine territory. Also, the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture in 1918, showing agricultural areas and the railway

network, marked the islands as a territory that does not belong to Argentina (Falkland Islands Government 2014, 11).

London categorically rejects Argentine accusations that the Falklands are a subjugated British colony that serves to pursue its geopolitical interests in the South Atlantic. The Falklands, according to the British authorities, enjoy political and economic self-government, have democratically elected government institutions, and are financially self-sufficient. The United Kingdom only has the functions of military defence of the archipelago and conducting foreign affairs on behalf of its citizens. The British consider the principle of self-determination to be key in this case, and in a referendum in March 2013 (with international observers present), 99.8% of those who voted said that the Falklands would remain British overseas territory (Falkland Islands Government 2014, 13). In his book, *The Territorial Status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Past and Present*, Rudolf Dolzer, a German author, gives a broad historical and legal argument in favour of the British side. He first claims that France "had occupied the islands" in 1764 (Dolzer 1993, 25), then that Great Britain had a "legally based position" on the islands in the period 1766-1770 (Dolzer 1993, 35), and concluded that in the period 1832-1833, Great Britain had the legitimacy to annex the Falklands by force (Dolzer 1993, 111–122). However, he also elaborated on the application of the right to self-determination of the people as an option to resolve the Falklands case after the end of the Falklands War (Dolzer 1993, 170).

MALVINAS OR FALKLANDS – WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

As it was stated before, both sides invoke arguments that exclude the interests of the other party. Obviously, there is no desire and will for a compromise solution that would mean shared sovereignty, joint management of the islands, division of the observed territory or maybe even the creation of an independent state that would commit to peaceful and strategic relations with Argentina and the United Kingdom. As a result, the United Kingdom considers the Falklands to be its overseas territory, but Argentina wishes to return to the situation prior to 1833. Peter Calvert, a professor of international relations at the University of Southampton, said in his 1983 article *Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands* that both sides' "claims were based on historical facts which, on the other hand, were vague, confusing and disputed, and if there is any solution to this issue, much of the homework will have to be done by both sides first" (Calvert 1983, 405). For Jorge Luis Borges, the greatest Argentine writer of the 20th century, "The Falklands thing was a fight over a comb between two bald men" (Barnes 2002). Former British Prime Minister David Cameron said that "Falkland's sovereignty cannot be negotiated, end of story" (*La Nación* 2011). On the other hand, Cristina

Kirchner, the former president of Argentina, stated on the 33rd anniversary of the outbreak of the war at the celebration of the Day of Veterans and Fallen in the Malvinas War that "we are going to see the Malvinas again as part of our territory" (*La Nación* 2015). Pope Francisco, the first Latin American pope ever expected to work to address the problems facing Latin American countries, said in 2015 that the time had come for dialogue between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas (*BBC* 2015). Speaking about the Malvinas, the current President of Argentina, Alberto Fernández, pointed out that "diplomacy is what should lead Argentina to regain those islands" (*La Nación* 2021), and that "there is no place for colonialism in the world" (*La Nación* 2021), apparently referring to the British presence on the Malvinas. Also, Fernández said that "the Malvinas have been unjustifiably usurped by the United Kingdom" (*La Nación* 2021) and that "the Malvinas are a huge pain for us, because we don't have them" (*La Nación* 2021). Contrary to the peaceful and diplomatically measured statements from Buenos Aires, there are far more belligerent statements from London. Thus, the current Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, said that, if necessary, he would "use force to defend the Falklands" (*MercoPress* 2021). The British royal family has always unequivocally advocated for the preservation of the Falklands under the control of London. In 1983, Queen Elizabeth II thanked the United States on the Los Angeles City Council for its assistance and support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War (Cumming 1983). Prince Andrew himself was a participant in the war, while Princess Anne paid an official visit to Stanley in 2009 and 2016 and expressed support for the British people there (*The Royal Family* 2016).

The future of the status of the Malvinas is not only a bilateral but also an international issue. This greatly complicates not only their status, but also the future that lies ahead. In the midst of the Western anti-Russian narrative over the Navalny case, Russian President Vladimir Putin called on the United Kingdom to return the Falklands to Argentina, while Russian Ambassador to Buenos Aires Dmitry Feoktistov (*Дмитрий Феоктистов*) said that Russia would always support official Buenos Aires in the Falklands dispute and give honour to those who fell in the Falklands War (Hammond 2021). In all previous years, China has strongly supported Argentina's efforts to bring the Malvinas under its sovereignty, believing that London and Buenos Aires must reach a solution through dialogue. Official Beijing, however, emphasises that the issue of the Malvinas Islands is essentially a matter of colonial heritage (*CGTN* 2021). Likewise, Chile, a neighbouring country with which Argentina has often had various types of disputes, stands firmly with the demands of official Buenos Aires regarding the status of the Malvinas. Thus, Milenko Skoknic, Chile's permanent representative to the United Nations, said at the session of the United Nations Decolonization Committee on June 25, 2021, that "the final solution to the Malvinas issue is of fundamental

importance and sensitivity to nations in Latin America and the Caribbean" (Bielsa 2021) and that "Chile and other joint patrons support the legitimate rights of Argentina's sovereignty in this matter" (Bielsa 2021). Mercosur, the most important international trade organisation in South America, is determined to support Argentina in resolving the Malvinas and protecting its natural resources. Thus, on December 16, 2020, the presidents of the member countries of Mercosur and those who are associate members of the organisation gave full support to Argentina in protecting its sovereignty and economic interests in the Malvinas. Among them were not only left-wing leaders ideologically close to the Argentine Peronists in power, but also right-wingers less sympathetic to Argentina, such as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto 2020).

CONCLUSION

The status of the Malvinas, i.e., the Falklands, is today one of the most famous and most complicated territorial disputes. The loss of the island in 1833 and the failed military attempt to regain it under its full control in 1982 left a strong impression on Argentina and the Argentines. Buenos Aires has never planned to give up its demands for the Malvinas Islands to be fully integrated into its legal order and to exercise sovereign power over them. On the other hand, the United Kingdom is not only unready for negotiations with Argentina on that issue, but, moreover, it often sends warning messages that, if necessary, it will defend the islands it considers to belong to it with full rights. We believe that Argentina's demands in the case of the Malvinas are legitimate. First, it is clear that the Malvinas came under the rule of the British Crown in 1833 as a result of London's colonial and expansionist policies, without any consent from the local population at the time. In that sense, the status of the Malvinas Islands today is one of the last relapses of colonialism against which the United Nations fought so fiercely and rightly in the second half of the 20th century. Secondly, Argentina is the successor of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, i.e., the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata, whose seat was in Buenos Aires and which was part of the Spanish Empire. Since the Malvinas belonged to the same, according to all then-valid international agreements and treaties, after the independence of Argentina, it can be considered the only legitimate successor of the same. Thirdly, Argentina can justifiably invoke the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, the principle according to which everyone retains what belongs to him by law, given that since 1810, i.e., the declaration of its independence from the Spanish crown, it has exercised effective power over the territory of the former Viceroyalty of Spain independent of Madrid, including the Malvinas since 1820. Fourth, in the natural-geographical sense, the Malvinas are undoubtedly part of the South American continental platform. In the geological sense, they are part

of the Patagonian platform, and the Argentine territory is today the closest neighbouring land territory. Fifth, the principle of the right to self-determination in the case of the Malvinas cannot be applied because it is extremely absurd to invoke the same in a situation where the British are the majority Malvinas population today simply because the British authorities settled them there. It is absurd, just as it would be the situation if Argentina occupied the Shetland Islands, expelled British people, planned settlements of Argentines, and finally demanded that the future of the island be decided through the right to self-determination of inhabited Argentines. Argentina's demands and diplomatic efforts for the peaceful reintegration of the Malvinas into its legal order are therefore legal and legitimate, and, accordingly, it is to be expected that official Buenos Aires will continue its policy called "Malvinas are Argentine" in the future.

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БОРБА АРГЕНТИНЕ ЗА ОЧУВАЊЕ СУВЕРЕНИТЕТА И ТЕРИТОРИЈАЛНОГ ИНТЕГРИТЕТА НА МАЛВИНСКИМ ОСТРВИМА

Апстракт: Предмет овог истраживања јесте анализа борбе Аргентине за очување њеног суверенитета и територијалног интегритета на Малвинским острвима, како дипломатским, тако и војним путем. Полазна хипотеза истраживања је да Аргентина оправдано полаже право на њој географски најближа Малвинска острва која су један од последњих предмета деколонизације, али и да Уједињено Краљевство жели да сачува иста под својом контролом сматрајући их својом територијом. Аутор прво објашњава историјат Малвинских острва и образлаже када и на који начин су их запоселе и њима управљале европске колонијалне силе. Након тога следи приказ аргумената на основу којих званични Буенос Ајрес и Лондон полажу право на Малвинска острва, те какав је тренутни статус истих. Резултати истраживања показују да су формално-правни и историјски аргументи у спору око Малвинских острва на страни Аргентине, али да становништво истих жели да остане под влашћу британске круне, што увелико компликује ситуацију на терену. У истраживању је коришћен историјски метод, метод студије случаја и компаративна анализа.

Кључне речи: Аргентина; Уједињено Краљевство; Малвинска острва; деколонизација; суверенитет; територијални интегритет; Фолкландски рат.

HEDGING STRATEGY AS A RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES-CHINA RIVALRY: THE CASE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Pavle NEDIĆ[1]

Abstract: The Southeast Asian countries use a hedging strategy to respond accordingly to the risk that the great power rivalry between the United States and China presents in the region. Hedging is focused on the creation of backup options to be used if the situation in the region escalates. These options are created through engagement with the potential threat and deterrence through a form of soft or indirect balancing. The article focuses on the behaviour of regional states, particularly Singapore, as an illustrative case study, to examine evolving hedging practices aimed at creating viable response options in the wake of the increased tensions in the region. The author argues that the second decade of the 21st century brought two developments that increased uncertainty in the region: growing tensions over the South China Sea and the American pivot to Asia initiated by the Obama administration. In response, the Southeast Asian countries were incited to hedge more directly by diversifying their economic partners and upgrading their defence capabilities. However, the US-China rivalry will continue to grow, and it will become more difficult to successfully use hedging strategy.

Keywords: hedging; Southeast Asia; Singapore; US-China rivalry; South China Sea.

INTRODUCTION

The growing United States-China rivalry presents a risk for the Southeast Asian countries, which rely on the balance of power in the region as the condition

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most suited to their interests. Transcending the balancing or bandwagoning dichotomy of the Cold War alignment, regional countries rely primarily on hedging. The concept has various meanings and is used in both broader and narrower understandings. The first includes security, political, and economic aspects, while the second focuses only on the military alignment (Kuik 2016a; Lim and Cooper 2015). However, the common trait of most definitions is that hedging is a risk response strategy aimed not against a particular threat but rather to prevent the threat from manifesting and diversify the available options if the threat ultimately arises.

After the Cold War, the risk presented by China, great power in the immediate geographical proximity, was successfully dealt with through hedging. Regional states engaged China through developing economic connections, diplomatic actions, and incorporation into the regional institutional structure centred around the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Acharya 2001; Goh 2005, Storey 2011). Beijing was willing to respond affirmatively, actively participate, and build positive relations with the ASEAN countries (Goh 2005, 10–11). Simultaneously, the continued presence of the United States presented an important counterweight to this process.

However, the second decade of the XXI century brought two developments that increased uncertainty in the region: growing tensions over the South China Sea and the American pivot to Asia conducted by President Barack Obama and his administration. The rising contestation between Beijing and Washington prompted Southeast Asian countries to hedge more directly in the 2010s. As their economic ties with China developed, they actively sought options to diversify their trading partners. The differing stances over the South China Sea incited them to strengthen military cooperation with the US (Kuik 2016a, 511). On the other hand, they were simultaneously upgrading relations with China in the same domain, not wanting to align with one side. Having found themselves between Beijing and Washington, the Southeast Asian countries now have to weigh their options and potential gains. Regarding China, benefits from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are contrasted with the country's growing assertiveness. Regarding the US, the security insurance is contrasted with a history of critiques about human rights, the rule of law, and corruption, as well as the uncertainty of Washington's commitment to the region. In these conditions, hedging remained the preferred and optimal strategy for the regional countries, but it was increasingly harder to implement. The case of Singapore, whose security concerns stemming from its geography, history, and political situation make it a textbook hedger, is illustrative of the ways regional states have evolved their hedging behaviour in this period.

The article poses the question of how the developments stemming from the great power rivalry in the region affect hedging conducted by the Southeast Asian

countries. It traces their hedging efforts, primarily in the security and economic domains, which are aimed at minimising the effects the US-China rivalry has on them. It argues that the US pivot to Asia and the South China Sea disputes incite more direct hedging by regional actors, which manifests in attempts to diversify economic partners and strengthen defence capabilities, mainly through military cooperation with the US. Using the case of Singapore as an example, the article shows how, under these conditions, hedging is made more difficult, as the city-state moves more towards Washington, while at the same time attempting to placate Beijing. The article is divided into three parts, followed by a conclusion. The first part explains the concept of hedging and its distinctions compared to balancing or bandwagoning. It explains the different ways analysts define and use the term, especially in the application of the concept to Southeast Asia. The second part analyses how the states in Southeast Asia hedge in order to respond to the risks they face, particularly in the context of the South China Sea disputes and the American pivot to Asia as the main drivers of rising precariousness in the region. The third part focuses on the behaviour of Singapore as an example of hedging, examining the city-state's strategy as a way of engaging with China while upgrading its relations with the US as a counterweight.

HEDGING AS A STRATEGY
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In an anarchical international system, the primary objective of a state is to secure its survival. The differences in the aggregate power capabilities of states are the main point of differentiation among them. However, Stephen Walt (1987, 21) points out that states do not react to the power capabilities of others but to "the foreign power that poses the greatest threat" (hereafter threatening power). The level of threat a state recognises in another is determined by several factors: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions (Walt 1985, 9). When responding to an existential threat, states choose to adhere to the logic of balancing or bandwagoning. Balancing supposes that the state decides to respond to the threat by opposing it. It can opt to build its own military capacity, increasing its ability to defend itself against the threatening state. Alternatively, or concurrently, it can build alliances in order to secure the power of other states, with whom it shares security interests, to call upon for assistance if the need arises.

The first option is referred to as internal balancing, while the second is designated as external balancing (Waltz 1979, 118). These are the traditional forms of the so-called hard balancing. However, a state can also choose to engage the threatening power in a less conflicting manner by utilising soft balancing. Soft balancing includes, but is not restricted to, strengthening economic ties with rival

powers, enhancing military cooperation with them but stopping short of a formal alliance, and frustrating threatening powers' aims through diplomatic and political actions (Pape 2005, 10; Paul 2005, 58). Whatever form it takes, balancing behaviour is based on the notion that in order to successfully tackle a threat, a proper response is to position itself against it. A state chooses to align with the weaker power in order for them to jointly dissuade the more powerful one. Opposing the threat through balancing gives two benefits. The first is that it builds up security and power to resist the threat directly. The second benefit is that it raises the costs for the threatening power in the event of a conflict, thereby increasing deterrence capacity.

Bandwagoning is based on the opposite logic. A state aligns itself with the threatening power and not the power opposing the threat. Thus, it joins the stronger side against the weaker in order to increase its own security. In this way, a state hopes to divert attention from itself and ensure its survival through cooperation with the threatening power and contribution to its goals. This motive makes bandwagoning a form of appeasement (Walt 1987, 21). However, as Randall Schweller (1994, 74) explains, a state may also decide to bandwagon for profit. According to him, "the presence of a significant external threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to bandwagon". States may decide willingly to align with the stronger side in order to share in the spoils of victory. The potential rewards for joining are reason enough for a state to select its allies. They may also choose to do so as a result of a domino effect because they believe it represents the wave of the future or to prevent punishment for failing to join and support the winning side (Schweller 1994, 93–98). Still, whether a state chooses to align with or against the stronger power, entering into an alliance brings its own set of dilemmas and risks, of which the main ones are abandonment and entrapment. The first is the possibility of being deserted by an ally that fails to live up to explicit promises or expectations of support, realigns with the opponent, or breaks the alliance. The second means "being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share, or shares only partially" (Snyder 1984, 466–467).

However, the alignment and foreign policy strategies in the post-Cold War world overcame this binary distinction. The end of bipolarity has opened the space for many different approaches that states can use to position themselves in the international arena according to their perceived national interests. While the options to balance or bandwagon were not the only ones during the Cold War, they were prevalent. The structure of the international system incited states to either align against the most powerful state they perceive as a threat in order to limit its influence and ambitions, or to side with it, whether to protect themselves or to profit from such a partnership. Even then, the geographical, historical, political, and security specifics of particular regions created the space

for some states to try alternative strategies. Still, the end of bipolarity and the end of the overwhelming impact the Cold War between the United States and the USSR had on alignment strategies allowed these regional factors to become much more influential in the process of their formation.

Hedging in Southeast Asia

The regional factors that shaped strategy choice in Southeast Asia were such that they encouraged the rise of the hedging strategy, though traces of its mild form could be found in the region as early as the 1970s (Kuik 2016a, 506). However, hedging is a concept that lacks a precise definition and is used by different authors in various ways. Jürgen Haacke (2019, 377–379) identifies four distinct conceptualizations of the term. The first approach sees hedging as a response to the perceived risk in the light of specific strategic and economic vulnerabilities. The second conceptualization uses hedging as an alignment choice that small and middle powers use in order to navigate relations with major powers, while the third presents hedging as a way to deal with risks stemming from alignment choices regarding major powers. Finally, the fourth conceptualization defines hedging as a mixed policy approach. Another question is how to measure and identify if hedging is taking place. Van Jackson (2014, 333) proposes a set of indicators that include "military strengthening (defence spending and qualitative improvements) without a declared adversary, increasing participation in voluntary (as opposed to rules-based) bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning, and the simultaneous/equidistant improvement in relations with the two greatest regional powers".

Some authors see hedging as a wider strategy transcending only the military options and argue that "alignment choice is not just about alliance choice" (Kuik 2016a, 501). Evelyn Goh (2005, 2) envisions hedging as "a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality". Their response is to try to maintain an equal distance from the major powers for as long as possible, avoiding having to choose a definite side. In Southeast Asia, this is manifested in attempts by the ASEAN countries to hedge between the US and China. As for specific triangular hedging between two major powers, the main goal of the hedging countries is to signal ambiguity (Goh 2016). This is accomplished through the soft balancing of China through cooperation with the US in the security sphere, while at the same time engaging China with economic and political means. Moreover, they attempt to enmesh a number of regional great powers to become invested in the stability of the region and balance one another, thus providing security for the smaller and middle states. Thus, some indirect and light versions of balancing are a part of the hedging

strategy. As Denny Roy (2005, 306) puts it, "hedging is a general strategy that may or may not include balancing".

For Cheng-Chwee Kuik, hedging covers a vast area between two full alignment poles, full-scale balancing, and full-scale bandwagoning, respectively. It can take place in the military, political, and economic arenas, and is primarily characterised by concurrently implementing opposing and counteracting measures. One set of measures is the "returns-maximising options" (economic pragmatism, binding engagement, and limited bandwagoning) aimed at gaining economic, political, and security benefits from cooperation with a major power. The other side of the coin is the "risk-contingency options" (economic diversification, dominance denial, and indirect balancing) developed at the same time vis-à-vis the same power as a form of a backup aimed to minimise economic, political, and security risks (Kuik 2016a, 504-505).

Others opt for a narrower definition of hedging. Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper eliminate the economic and political dimensions of hedging. They focus on military alignment and the ambiguity of signals towards great powers as the central aspects of hedging. They define it as a "class of behaviours which signal ambiguity regarding great power alignment, therefore requiring the state to make a trade-off between the fundamental (but conflicting) interests of autonomy and alignment" (Lim and Cooper 2015, 703). The consequence is the uncertainty about which side in a potential conflict between the great powers a hedging state would take. This refusal to clearly align with one side has advantages as the state avoids the potential abandonment, entrapment, or targeting by an opposing great power, but also rejects protection offered by the ally (Lim and Cooper 2015, 705–706). Haacke builds on this concept. He also focuses on the military sphere and uses three indicators to identify hedging behaviour. The first is the statements, national security strategies, and white papers that countries and leaders produce. The second is the "state's military capabilities enhancement (MCE) measures with respect to force development and force employment", while the third, drawing from the work of Lim and Cooper, is the ambiguous signals regarding security alignment (Haacke 2019, 394–395).

In this article, hedging is understood as a middle way between balancing and bandwagoning, a strategy that is focused on the creation of backup options for response to a risk, through engagement with the potential threat in military, economic, and political areas on the one hand, and deterrence through a form of soft or indirect balancing on the other. One of the defining features of hedging is that it presents a state's response not to an existing threat but to a potential one, a risk (Ciorciari and Haacke 2019, 369). This characteristic is a basic trait that distinguishes hedging from balancing and bandwagoning. So, hedging is used when a state perceives another state or a situation as a potential threat in the future and opts to respond in a way that will minimise the possibility of the

threat to emerge and materialise while simultaneously building its capabilities to respond accordingly if that scenario manifests. Hedging is not the same as insurance, since insurance activates only when the primary option fails, but it could be said that one part of hedging is insurance building. However, creating insurance through soft or indirect balancing is, at the same time, supposed to prevent the need for the insurance to be used at all. The other aspect on which the prevention of the transformation of a risk into a threat is based is the engagement through diplomacy, institutional binding, and the establishment of economic connections.

Although applied to other regions and not constrained only to Southeast Asia, hedging is often associated with and used to analyse the relations in this region. Van Jackson identifies three distinct interpretations which are used to explain why hedging is a strategy often used by Asian countries. The first relates to the power transition theory. As is usually the case when the rising and dominant great powers collide, the rise of China and the decline of American primacy brings unpredictability and instability. Asian countries are rather dependent on the US-China relationship. The uncertainty of its direction and the resulting power balance makes hedging attractive since the potential structural changes make balancing or bandwagoning too risky (Jackson 2014, 338). The second is based on the effects of rising multipolarity, which brings changing power relations and shifting alliances. The required information and assurances for a firm alignment with one power over another are lacking. This makes hedging a viable option for a state in order to increase its own security while avoiding potential abandonment or entrapment by its allies or capitulation in the face of a formidable threat (Jackson 2014, 339). The third explanation frames the issue of Asian security as a complex network in which its structures are understood as relations and links amongst nodes. It is characterised by high sensitivity, or how much one state is affected by another, constant fluidity of the structure, which is not static, and heterarchy in the form of multiple hierarchies governing security relations, economic relations, and cultural relations (Jackson 2014, 340–342). The complexity of these relations between the Asian states promotes hedging as foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, this interpretation, Jackson argues, allows us to understand why hedging is not only currently happening in the region but will endure over time (Jackson 2014, 351). The next part will describe how hedging is used as a strategy in Southeast Asia.

SOUTHEAST ASIA BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

The end of the Cold War brought a change in power distribution amongst the great powers and sent the world into the era of the unipolar dominance of

the United States. For the Southeast Asian states, this marked the start of increased regionalism and interdependence between them. The key channel for this process was the ASEAN, an organisation founded in 1967. But the end of the Cold War enabled states formerly on opposite sides of the great power rivalry to cooperate freely, despite the ideological differences at the foundation of their respective political systems. The founding members of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand were joined by Brunei in 1984, paving the way for further expansion in the 1990s. Thus, Vietnam became a member in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 (Association of Southeast Asian Nations n.d.). The members operate on the basis of the norms of "non-use of force and pacific settlement of disputes, regional autonomy and self-reliance, non-interference in internal affairs and rejection of an ASEAN military pact and the preference for bilateral defence cooperation" (Acharya 2001, 47–48). Their cooperation and approach to regional problem solving is based on the ambiguous concept of the ASEAN way, usually understood as "decision-making process that features a high degree of consultation and consensus" (Acharya 2001, 64).

During this period, the ASEAN countries had to navigate the unipolar international system.[2] While the great power competition was on the decline, the rising threat of terrorism significantly shaped their security concerns. In this region, the threat of radical Islam emerged predominantly in the 21st century, although the sporadic incidents, including terrorist attacks, did exist before (Proroković 2018, 127). This had a positive influence on the continued American presence. Additionally, the steady rise of China, whose geographical proximity means it affects the economic, political, and security landscape of the region in various ways, was also perceived as a potential risk. For its part, China was willing to try to dissuade these concerns through its initiatives and actions, starting with its pledge not to devalue its currency during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which was an important element of aid for the struggling countries.

China also responded positively to attempts by the ASEAN countries to bind it through incorporation into the regional multilateral platforms. For example, since 1997, China, together with Japan and South Korea, has been part of the regional forum ASEAN + 3. It signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) with the ASEAN states in 2002 and acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 (Kuik 2016a, 510). China was also willing to enter into a joint exploration deal in disputed areas in the South China Sea from 2005 to 2008 with the Philippines and Vietnam (Murphy 2017,

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[2] For the detailed analyses of Southeast Asian states during the unipolar dominance of the US see: Goh 2007/2008, He 2008 and Storey 2011. For their role in global fight against terrorism led by the US, see: Simon 2006.

180). China participates in a number of regional initiatives that include other powers too. Thus, in order to check Beijing's rising influence, the Southeast Asian countries successfully included India, Australia, and New Zealand (in addition to the ASEAN + 3 countries) into the East Asian Summit, an annual regional forum held since 2005. Furthermore, China is a part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), focused on security issues, whose members also include the European Union, the United States, and Japan, among others (Goh 2005, 31).

Economic cooperation was also thriving. The trade between the ASEAN countries and China increased from $8.36 billion in 1991 to $280 billion in 2011 (Invest in ASEAN n.d.; *China International Import Expo* 2021). The ASEAN-China free trade zone (ACFTA), based on the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation signed between the eleven countries in 2002, enabled the reduction of tariffs on 90% of imports between China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand by 2010, while Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia joined the regime in 2015 (Medina 2021). The regional countries attempted to engage China and not treat it as a threat. As Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad put it in his interview for Asiaweek in 1997: "Why should we fear China? If you identify a country as your future enemy, it becomes your present enemy" (cited in Kuik 2008, 175). These improving economic and political relations with China were counterbalanced by the continued US presence in the region, which was supported by most Southeast Asian states.

Summarily, the regional countries were subtly using the hedging strategy in this period, benefiting from increased economic cooperation with China and, at the same time, building their backup options through political engagement and reliance on the US presence. However, the second decade of the 21st century brought two interconnected developments that increased the overall level of uncertainty in the region and incited some countries to move towards more direct hedging.

The rising great power rivalry and the regional response

The changes at the systemic level caused by the rising challenges to American unipolar domination were manifested openly in the 2010s. The growing rivalry between two great powers, the United States and China, was visible in Southeast Asia in two ways. The first was growing tensions over the South China Sea territorial disputes. The South China Sea's geostrategic significance stems from its status as an important route for maritime trade, large reserves of natural oil and gas, and its immense biodiversity (Lađevac and Jović-Lazić 2014, 47). China, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Vietnam all claim some of the disputed, mainly uninhabited islands in this sea and the surrounding waters.

The period from 2007 to 2010 saw the growing assertiveness of all involved parties (Fravel 2014, 4). Due to Chinese power and its continued rise as the US' main challenger, Beijing's aspirations in the South China Sea elicited Washington to react. Thus, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed at the 2010 ARF meeting that the US has a "national interest in the freedom of navigation" and opposes "the use of force by any claimant" in the South China Sea (Feng and He 2018, 3). The American stance and involvement increased the relevance of the dispute and provoked China to act more boldly, which led to further incidents between China and other claimant countries, such as with the Philippines in 2012 over the Scarborough Shoal and with Vietnam in 2014 over the deployment of a Chinese oil rig within the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The arbitration case filed by the Philippines under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against China in 2013 and the corresponding ruling in favour of the Philippines in 2016 led to further division on the issue (Heydarian 2017, 227–228). On the other hand, continued work by the ASEAN and China started in 2002 to develop a Regional Code of Conduct on the South China Sea has not yet been successful (Strating 2019, 111).

The second development is the US "rebalance" or "pivot" to Asia, promoted by the Obama administration. As part of this great policy initiative, which was in part enabled by the gradual withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the US took several important steps and made several promises. It joined the East Asian Summit in 2011. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) pledged to strengthen the US's formal alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, which include treaties with Australia, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines. Accordingly, the new troop deployments to Australia, the new naval deployments to Singapore, and new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines were announced. Obama's National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon (2011), insisted that "reductions in defence spending will not come at the expense of Asia Pacific". Finally, Washington put in significant effort to promote and make progress in negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement, which at the time included Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States (Manyin et al. 2012, 22). Beijing viewed American policies within the pivot to Asia as a preventive measure against the possibility of Asian countries gathering around China (Korolev 2019, 432).

These two developments rose in part as a response to each other, and taken together, increased the uncertainty and tensions in Southeast Asia significantly, fusing even more during the Trump administration. President Trump kept the focus on Asia, but with a preference for bilateral relations with partners and a more direct confrontation with China, particularly on the South China Sea issue. Thus, between May 2017 and August 2020, the US Navy conducted 24 Freedom

of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands – six times more than during the Obama administration, which fueled the tensions further (Storey and Cook 2019, 5). The continuously rising competitiveness between Washington and Beijing induced the regional states to hedge more directly in the 2010s by diversifying their economic partners and upgrading defence capabilities, which enhanced their abilities to respond adequately to the risks stemming from the great power rivalry.

For the Southeast Asian states, profits from economic cooperation with China are considerable. All ASEAN countries are members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Trade between the ASEAN members and China reached $685.28 billion in 2020. In that year, the ASEAN became China's largest trading partner, while China maintained its status as the ASEAN's largest trading partner for the 12th consecutive year (*China International Import Expo* 2021). China's foreign direct investments (FDI) in the region are also on the rise, from an annual average of $6.9 billion in 2011–2015 to $11.5 billion in 2016–2020. In 2019, out of the top ten beneficiaries of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) within the BRI, seven are the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN accounted for more than 60% of the OFDI stock in the BRI route (The ASEAN Secretariat 2021). For China, investments within the BRI framework in Southeast Asia are additionally important in their attempts to improve energy security through diversification in order to reduce dependence on the Malacca Strait route (Strating 2019, 102–104).

Still, the regional countries do not neglect the fact that "China's geo-economics is at the service of its geopolitics" (Šekarić 2020, 369). However, their hopes to diversify economic relations through increased trade with the US within the framework of the TPP failed when President Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the agreement in January of 2017. Nevertheless, the economic ties some of the regional countries have with the US are developing. For example, America is Vietnam's largest export market and one of its leading sources of FDI (Thuy and Tuan 2018, 112).

In the security realm, the rising tensions in the region have impactful consequences. The Philippines, the only formal American ally in the region besides Thailand, stepped up their balancing efforts beyond what could be considered to be a part of the hedging strategy. The administration of President Benigno Aquino III signed the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Washington in 2014. The agreement focuses on cooperation "in capacity- and capability-building in external defence, particularly with respect to the maritime domain", a significant fact in the context of the South China Sea dispute (Batongbacal 2018, 92). It also allows the US forces access to Philippine bases from which they were evicted in 1992 after the Cold War ended. The next Philippine President, Rodrigo Duterte, initially tried to position the country closer

to China and has unofficially frozen the application of the agreement in practice and planned to cancel the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed with the US in 1998. However, by the end of his term, he made moves to implement the EDCA, renewed the VFA with the US, and agreed to resume their bilateral strategic dialogue (Grossman 2021).

Nevertheless, most countries did not go as far as the Philippines. They primarily perceive China not as an existing threat but as a source of a potential one, a risk which they try to address through the improvement of their defence capabilities, in part through reliance on Washington and the simultaneous development of security cooperation with Beijing. For example, Malaysia upgraded its status in the US-initiated Cobra Gold military exercise from observer to participant in 2010 and took part in the exercise in this capacity for the first time in 2011 (Kuik 2016b, 163). On the other hand, in 2015, Malaysia and China conducted their first joint field exercise, Aman-Youyi 2015 (Peace and Friendship 2015), which was the largest bilateral combined exercise between China and an ASEAN country at the time (Bing 2021, 7). The country elevated its relations with Beijing to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2013 and signed a Comprehensive Partnership agreement with Washington in 2014 (Parameswaran 2018, 62–63).

Vietnam's strategy is also very calibrated not to antagonise China directly. The visit of Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang to the US in July 2013, which led to the establishment of a comprehensive partnership between the two countries, was preceded by his visit to Beijing in June of the same year. Similarly, the historic visit of General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong to the US in 2015 was counterweighted by his visit to China three months prior and Xi Jinping's visit to Hanoi later that year (Kang 2017, 133–136; Petty 2015). Still, Vietnam-US military relations are improving, manifested in the lifting of the American arms sales embargo in 2016 and the 2018 visit of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to Da Nang, marking the largest presence of US troops in the country since the end of the Vietnam War (Capie 2020, 254). Vietnam's hedging is increasingly stepping up its balancing component, primarily because of the South China Sea dispute.

But the best example of a hedging strategy in Southeast Asia is the behaviour of Singapore. The city-state response to the risk China presents is a combination of political and economic engagement with the power, while simultaneously improving its relations with the US, primarily in the military sphere. This is textbook hedging behaviour. It will be further analysed below.

SINGAPORE – THE ULTIMATE HEDGER

After the end of colonial rule by the British and a brief period as a part of a federation with Malaysia, Singapore found itself independent in 1965. Its security concerns were and remain considerable, and the country has always had a distinct sense of vulnerability stemming from its size, geographical location, two large predominantly Muslim neighbouring countries of Malaysia and Indonesia, and lack of natural resources. Accordingly, Singapore invests considerably in its defence force and has an active military reserve force of around 950,000 (Marston and Liow 2018, 47). It consistently spends around 3% of its GDP on defence (SIPRI n.d.). The city-state's ruling People's Action Party (PAP) was always staunchly anti-communist and, fearing Chinese support for the communist revolutions across the region, supported American intervention in Vietnam. The reliance on the US presence in the region as a provider of security and an essential factor that contributes to the regional balance of power has not vanished ever since. When the Philippines decided to close American bases on their soil on the estimation that that kind of protection was no longer needed with the end of the Cold War, Singapore signed a Memorandum of understanding with the US in 1990 and invited Americans to use their facilities (Leifer 2000, 104–105). Furthermore, in 1998, they allowed the US access to the Changi Naval Base. The base, whose construction was financed in its entirety by Singapore, is able to accommodate an aircraft carrier despite the fact that Singapore does not have one. In 2005, the two countries signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security (SFA), which was the first of its kind Washington signed with a non-ally since the Cold War. The SFA included a Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) within it (Kuok 2016, 5–6).

On the other hand, Singapore's relations with China are complex. Although without formal diplomatic relations during the Cold War, they were significant trading partners even during that period. Singapore voted in favour of the one-China principle in the UN in 1971. The two leaders, Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping, exchanged visits in 1976 and 1978 (Marston and Liow 2018, 40). In October of 1990, Singapore established diplomatic relations with China. It was the last of the ASEAN countries to do so. This is a consequence of a decision by Singapore's leadership based on the strong intention to remain seen as independent and not influenced by China. Singapore is the only country in the world with a majority Chinese population, excluding Taiwan, whose sovereignty is not universally recognised (Leifer 2000, 120). However, Singapore has its own distinct cultural identity. Although Chinese constitute around 76% of Singapore's citizens, and the largest minority are Malayans with 15%, the *lingua franca* of the city-state is English. In interactions both with China and other ASEAN countries,

Singapore's leaders and diplomats have always gone to great lengths to instil this understanding of their independence and uniqueness in others.

During the last three decades, Singapore has repeatedly stressed its commitment not to choose sides between Washington and Beijing. Singapore's economic ties with China are strengthening continuously. China has been its largest trading partner since 2013, and Singapore is the largest source of foreign direct investments in China. The value of their trade rose rapidly, from S\$2.9 billion in 1990 to S\$75 billion in 2010 (Foong 2016, 212). Two countries signed a free trade agreement in 2009 and upgraded it in 2018. In 2020, the value of their trade reached 136.2 billion Singapore dollars (\$101.5 billion) (Idrus 2021). The city-state joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015, and in August of the same year began a three-year term as the ASEAN's "Country Coordinator for China-ASEAN relations" (Marston and Liow 2018, 42). Singapore welcomed the Belt and Road Initiative. As part of the China-Singapore Chongqing Connectivity Initiative, the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor is an important part of the BRI (*Xinhuanet* 2020). Simultaneously, Singapore tries to leverage its increasing links with China through cooperation with the US. The basis for their economic relationship is the Free Trade Agreement, signed in 2003. American companies are the main source of FDI in the city-state. Singapore was approving of the US pivot to Asia and was particularly deeply invested in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was its main economic pillar. As a strong proponent of free trade, Singapore did not have a problem with the proposed TPP rules (Foong 2016, 219). Consequently, the decision by President Donald Trump to withdraw from this agreement at the beginning of 2017 was a big disappointment for the city-state's leaders.

Consistent with the hedging strategy, the growing ties with China, primarily in the economic domain, were followed by moves aimed at sustaining the balance in relations with great powers. Thus, Singapore worked on its fallback options in case relations with China worsened, particularly in the wake of the growing tensions in the South China Sea and the American pivot to Asia. This was most evident in the developing ties with Washington in the security sphere. Singapore agreed to host up to four littoral ships on a rotational basis starting from 2012. On the basis of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed in 2015, the same year saw the deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft to Singapore. New joint military exercises were introduced in addition to the longstanding ones, such as the Pacific Griffin in the waters off Guam in 2017 (Haacke 2019, 408). In September 2019, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and US President Donald Trump signed an agreement extending the US access to Singaporean air and naval bases until 2035 (Capie 2020, 252). However, for Singapore, it is important to distinguish between *basing* and *bases*. So, while it allows the US access to its facilities for resupply and repair, the city-

state does not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil (Marston and Liow 2018, 49). Singapore was approved by the US government to purchase F-35B fighter jets in 2020, the first Southeast Asian country to do so (Yi and Zhang 2020).

Still, Singapore is careful not to let this cooperation with the US be perceived as a hard balancing against China. It has worked on developing military links with Beijing as well. The two countries reached a Four Point Consensus in 2014, which serves as a basis for the development of security cooperation. In 2019, they upgraded the Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation signed in 2008. The new aspects of cooperation include a commitment to regularise and scale-up bilateral exercises, the Visiting Forces Agreement for troops participating in bilateral exercises, mutual logistics support, and a bilateral hotline (*South China Morning Post* 2019). The two sides have conducted joint army exercises titled Exercise Cooperation since 2009, with the last being held in 2019, and in 2015 they conducted Navy Exercise Maritime Cooperation (Wei 2019).

This complex hedging strategy based on the risk of more adversarial relations with Beijing in the wake of its growing assertiveness and the rising level of US-China competitiveness in the region proved to be founded on realistic propositions. Although Singapore is not a claimant in the South China Sea disputes, it is deeply reliant on the freedom of navigation and respect for the international maritime law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for its trade and security. Following the arbitral tribunal ruling in favour of the Philippines against China in 2016, Singapore called on "all parties to fully respect legal and diplomatic processes, exercise self-restraint and avoid conducting any activities that may raise tensions in the region" (Capie 2020, 246). When Hong Kong authorities seized nine Singaporean Terrex armoured vehicles travelling from exercises in Taiwan, many in Singapore saw it as a Chinese punishment for their stance on the South China Sea issue. The incident was resolved successfully and the vehicles were returned (Marston and Liow 2018, 43–44). However, it showed the potential for a rapid decline in relations and the punitive measures China can implement if a country finds itself opposed to its interests. This is the predicament of all small powers *vis-a-vis* great ones, a fact Singapore's leaders are acutely aware of. They have always shaped Singapore's foreign policy in accordance with the words of Lee Kuan Yew: "In a world where the big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimps, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp" (cited in *AsiaGlobal Online* 2020).

China also proved able to divide the usually cohesive ASEAN members regarding the issue of the South China Sea. At the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Cambodia, a country with close ties to Beijing, blocked any reference to the South China Sea in the ministerial communique. This marked the first time in the group's history that it had failed to issue a consensus statement. In

2016, China reached a consensus with Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei that the South China Sea disputes are between China and claimant countries and not the ASEAN as a whole (Capie 2020, 249–250). This move was characterised by Singapore's Ambassador-at-large Ong Keng Yong as Chinese meddling in the internal affairs of the ASEAN (Chan 2016). Given Singapore's reliance on the ASEAN as a way to exercise influence disproportionately large compared to its size, these kinds of divisions within the organisation are concerning for the city-state.

Since the further rise of China is inevitable, Singapore will continue trying to navigate it in a way most useful for the interests of the city-state. It has much to gain by cooperation with Beijing within the BRI. On the other hand, the South China Sea dispute is a challenge to its main security and trade interests, which Singapore will try to address primarily through the ASEAN and further development of security ties with the US. The decline in the US-China relations will continue, and Singapore's main goal will be to keep the privilege of not having to pick sides, although it does move more towards Washington. The fears Prime Minister Lee expressed in 2017 when he said, "If America-China relations become very difficult, our position becomes tougher, because then we will be coerced to choose between being friends with America and friends with China", may very well become reality (*Reuters* 2017).

CONCLUSION

In Southeast Asia, hedging, a strategy focused on the creation of backup options for response to a risk, through both engagement with the potential threat and deterrence through a form of soft or indirect balancing, is used by regional countries to navigate the uncertainties of the great power rivalry and the rise of China, particularly in the second decade of the 21st century, the period when tensions in the region spiked due to the growing importance of the South China Sea disputes and the American pivot to Asia.

Some of the ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia, Vietnam, and especially Singapore, attempt to prevent these risks from growing into open threats by cooperating with China in the security domain, diplomatic engagement, and developing economic ties while simultaneously working on their relations with the US in an attempt to create fallback options. With the US-China rivalry expected to grow further and their interests to increasingly diverge, hedging will become harder to pull off for the regional countries.

Still, their interest is the balance of power in the region. They can benefit greatly from trade with China and the BRI, but also need Washington to check Beijing's ambitions as China asserts its position as a great power interested in

exercising global influence. But they cannot fully rely on Washington. The Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012, when China kept control of these islands even after negotiations with the Philippines mediated by the US, shows the limits of American influence. Furthermore, the countries cannot take the US commitment to the region as a permanent arrangement, since global developments could incite Washington to embark on a pivot to another part of the world. On the other hand, China, due to its geographical location, is there to stay.

These considerations shape the strategies of the Southeast Asian countries. They will continue to hedge in an attempt to avoid the need to align with one of the sides. The ASEAN and unity within the organisation will be a big part of the continuous hedging. Finally, although the economic ties with China will strengthen further, regional countries will move closer to Washington if security concerns in the South China Sea threaten to escalate.

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СТРАТЕГИЈА ХЕЏИНГА КАО ОДГОВОР НА РИВАЛИТЕТ СЈЕДИЊЕНИХ АМЕРИЧКИХ ДРЖАВА И КИНЕ: СЛУЧАЈ ЈУГОИСТОЧНЕ АЗИЈЕ

Апстракт: Државе Југоисточне Азије користе стратегију хеџинга, која ставља фокус на развој резервних опција кроз интеракцију са потенцијалном претњом и одвраћање кроз облике меког или индиректног уравнотежавања, како би адекватно одговориле на ризик који представља ривалство великих сила САД и Кине у региону. Рад се фокусира на понашање регионалних држава, посебно Сингапура као класичног примера, како би испитао развијајуће праксе хеџинга усмерене на стварање валидних одговора у контексту растућих тензија у региону. Аутор заступа став да је друга деценија XXI века донела два развоја који су повећали несигурност у региону: растуће тензије око Јужног Кинеског мора и амерички заокрет ка Азији који је иницирала Обамина администрација. Као одговор, државе Југоисточне Азије су биле подстакнуте да директније користе хеџинг кроз диверзификацију својих економских партнера и унапређење својих одбрамбених капацитета. Међутим, ривалство САД и Кине ће наставити да расте и биће теже успешно користити стратегију хеџинга.

Кључне речи: хеџинг; Југоисточна Азија; Сингапур; ривалство САД и Кине; Јужно Кинеско море.

BOOK REVIEW

CONVERGENCE AND CONFRONTATION: THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Janković, Slobodan, ed. 2021. *Convergence and Confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21ˢᵗ Century*. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.

A large number of studies have provided insights on diverse regions' dynamics with a focus on the great and regional powers' influence on a region and their impact on the local level. Scholarly interest grows with the growth of actors included and the implications they produce on the ground. The publication "Convergence and Confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21st Century" offers a snapshot of the two regions – the Balkans and the Middle East. As thematic proceedings, this publication focuses on both traditional and non-traditional stakeholders within these two regions by mapping the key issues and perspectives tackled by those actors. This publication, issued by the Institute of International Politics and Economics from Belgrade, is edited by Slobodan Janković. Comprising eleven articles, the thematic proceedings approach the key issues within these two regions from the political, economic, and security perspectives.

In questioning the so-called "Blue Homeland" doctrine in Turkey's external politics in the first article, Anthony Deriziotis gives an overview of this concept and its implications for Turkey's relations with neighbouring countries, mainly with Greece. By highlighting its opposing nature with the "zero problems with neighbours" policy (Deriziotis 2021, 9), the author pointed out the fickle consequences of this doctrine if employed in a volatile regional environment. The subject of the second article refers to China's presence in the Mediterranean, viewed through the concept of centripetal imperialism, which is further questioned on the example of China's presence in the Balkans. The authors consider "the EU's political mistakes" (Marconi and Barbaro 2021, 36) (but not considering some internal regional issues) as the main driver for increased China's penetration in the Mediterranean region and Beijing as an attractive alternative option in the context of the "Western failures".

In the third article, Slobodan Janković questions the position of Israel as a regional power in the post-Lebanon war period. The author provides valuable insight into regional security dynamics in this part of the Middle East but lacks

specific critiques of "Anglo-American theoretical production" (Janković 2021, 59), not considering the existence of theories equipped with tools for mapping some future trajectories of concrete regional security dynamics. The authors of the fourth article discuss Iran's vision of the Middle East and its engagement in the region. After identifying the international, regional, and local conditions that accelerated Iran's power growth in the Middle East, the authors highlighted Iran's vision of a (New) Middle East based on its political and military consolidation but loaded with some economic challenges.

The fifth article introduces the overall perspective of the multipolar world in the post-COVID-19 period. The author thus offers insight into the changing international system towards the appearance of the new poles, including a possible "Iranian-Islamic" civilization as an "Emerging Power" (Siraki 2021, 115) in the multipolar post-COVID-19 era. This dynamic is viewed through the "theory of resistance", which is further operationalized by the author. The Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone is the subject of the analysis of the sixth article. Via historical analysis, the authors of the article gave a view into the genesis of the idea of establishing this kind of non-proliferation policy in the Middle East. Though it is concluded that the establishment of the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone is highly improbable, the authors offer arguments for the continued existence of the idea, which is high on political agendas.

Nataša Stanojević focuses her analysis on the potential of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the Middle East region due to its constant lag in economic development. The seventh article in the publication, thus, offers a comprehensive insight into the literature review based on the existing body of knowledge on ICTs–economic development nexus and an adequate methodology for accessing the Middle East countries' criteria for joining developed countries in this domain. Another article about economics focuses on Iran's economic cooperation with Eastern European countries. In the eighth article, the foreign trade between Iran and Eastern European countries is seen as an "extraordinary space" and the potential for deepening mutual relations is highlighted.

The ninth article is dedicated to the Nagorno-Karabakh second armed conflict. The author of this article offered a significant analysis of its causes, the plethora of involved stakeholders, and its implications. Reviewing the whole genesis of the conflict and the factors that have shaped it, the author concluded with some future considerations regarding this conflict. The last two articles in the thematic proceedings touch upon the Balkan region. Thus, the tenth article is focused on the non-papers of the Republic of Slovenia and their implications for prospective solutions to the Western Balkans' problems. Despite the informality of those communications, the author underlined their importance in eliciting public reactions

in a specific Balkan context. The final, eleventh article in the publication sets the role of Turkey in the Balkans as the focus of the study. Viewed through the concept of neo-Ottomanism, the author of this article questions Turkish diplomacy and its motives regarding the Balkan region. The author discusses how growing Turkish economic and energy influence and its soft power imposed Turkey as a significant regional power in the Balkans, among many other big players.

The publication "Convergence and Confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21st Century" offers very insightful and *up-to-date* views on the political, security, and economic dynamics of the two regions – the Middle East and the Balkans. However, most of the articles focus on the Middle East region, thus lacking a more detailed analysis of the Balkan security, economic, and political issues. Nevertheless, the goal of the authors was not to cover all the characteristics of the regions but to sketch the most evident determinants and challenges of the Middle East and the Balkans. Therefore, the publication is certainly valuable literature for academic researchers as well as for those interested in the dynamics of the two regions. In addition, the thematic proceedings could serve as a call for further research into the dynamics of these two complex regions.

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Nevena ŠEKARIĆ STOJANOVIĆ

EDITORIAL POLICY

The Review of International Affairs is scientific journal dedicated to international legal, economic, political and security relations. Established in 1950 as the first Yugoslav scholarly journal in its field, *The Review of International Affairs* is one of the oldest and best-known periodicals in the Balkans that cover research in International Relations.

The journal *The Review of International Affairs* publishes original papers and review articles. The journal also publishes lectures given by foreign ambassadors at the IIPE's Ambassadorial Forum, as well as a substantial book review section that identifies the most salient work of both emerging and enduring scholars of International Studies.

We strongly encourage papers on politics, economics, security and international law issues in the Balkan regional context. Aside from the Balkan-related issues, we are welcoming papers on other regional studies as well. However, this focus thus not presuppose limitation for articles, studies and comments on other relevant international topics.

The journal is published three times a year in English with abstracts, both in English and Serbian. Authors that speak the BHS language should submit their abstracts in the Serbian language, and for the authors from other countries, Editorial Team will provide translation in the Serbian language. In Serbia, readers are the diplomatic representatives of foreign countries, foreign news agencies, universities, research institutions, and prominent political, academic, economic and cultural figures. Abroad, readers are the diplomatic representatives of Serbia, policy-makers at the national and international levels, chambers of commerce, companies, universities, research institutes etc. The journal is distributed in more than 150 countries.

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The Review of International Affairs is a peer-reviewed journal that focuses on the theoretical, methodological and practical dimensions of international affairs. We strongly encourage papers on politics, economics, security and international law issues in the Balkan regional context. Aside from the Balkan-related issues, we are welcoming papers on other regional studies as well. However, this focus

thus not presuppose limitation for articles, studies and comments on other relevant international topics.

Submission of a manuscript implies: that it is not under consideration for publication anywhere else; that the work described has not been published before; that its publication has been approved by all co-authors, if any, as well as by the responsible authorities – tacitly or explicitly – at the institution where the work has been carried out. The publisher will not be held legally responsible should there be any claims for compensation. Manuscripts should be submitted by email to the editorial office: RIA@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs and riadiplomacy@gmail.com

Together with the submission, the authors should send a signed Author's statement form that is available on the website of journal. Statement should be signed and scanned, as an attachment, in the .pdf format, and sent to the same e-mail addresses: RIA@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs and riadiplomacy@gmail.com

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Use continuous line numbers starting on the first page, with page numbers on the right side of the bottom of the page.

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(Jabri 2007; Herman 2004; Rohrbach 2020)

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Book

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Jabri, Vivienne. 2007. *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html.

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2011. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy. Vol. 17 of *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–.

In-text citation:

(Jabri 2007, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995)

(Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

Journal article

Reference list entry:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

Adams, Tracy, and Zohar Kampf. 2020. "'Solemn and just demands': Seeking apologies in the international arena". *Review of International Studies*. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210520000261.

In-text citation:

(Nordin and Öberg 2015, 401)

(Tracy and Kampf 2020)

Article in edited volume

Reference list entry:

Herman, Michael. 2004. "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001". In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Reference list entry:

(Herman 2004)

Conference paper (if not published in conference proceedings)

Reference list entry:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. "Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?". Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

Reference list entry:

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Book review

Reference list entry:

Firchow, Pamina. 2020. "Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics", Review of *Measuring Peace*, by Richard Caplan. *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 337–338.

Reference list entry:

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Legal and official documents

International treaties

Reference list entry:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/ volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf.

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In-text citation:

(PTBT 1963, Article III, para. 3)

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UN documents

Reference list entry:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/sc/ documents/resolutions/2015.shtml.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. https://undocs.org/pdf? symbol=en/A/RES/67/18.

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Reference list entry:

[Constitution RS] Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 98/2006.

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Reference list entry:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES.

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[USAFH] United States Air Force Headquarters. 2014. United States Air Force RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts: 2013–2038. www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts 2013-2038.pdf.

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Reference list entry:

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[EC] European Commision. 2010. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the

Council, November 22. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0673& from=GA.

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Decisions of international courts and tribunals

Reference list entry:

[ICJ] International Court of Justice. Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

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[Opinion of AG Bobek] *Région de Bruxelles-Capitale* v *Commission*, Case C-352/19 P. Court of Justice of the European Union. Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 16 July 2020(1), ECLI:EU:C:2020:588. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=485A5D9A C129179D3D2F2.EC571A384CD?text=&docid=228708&pageIndex=0&do clang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5064004.

In-text citation:

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010, 411)

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Reference list entry:

Gibbs, Samuel. 2017. "Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots", *The Guardian*, August 20.

Power, Matthew. 2013. "Confessions of a Drone Warrior", *GQ*, October 22. https://www.gq.com/story/drone-uav-pilot-assassination.

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Reference list entry:

Scott, Ridley. [1982] 2007. *Blade Runner: The Final Cut.* Directed by Ridley Scott. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Blue-Ray disc, 117 min.

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In-text citation:

(Scott [1982] 2007)

(Future Weapons 2019)

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Reference list entry:

National Library of Australia. 2020. "National Library of Australia's Facebook Page". Facebook*,* August 1, 2020. https://www.facebook.com/National.Library.of.Australia/.

Kruszelnicki, Karl *(@DoctorKarl).* 2017. "Dr Karl Twitter post." Twitter*,* February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl.

Trapara, Vladimir. 2018. "Victory or nil". *Unwrapping the Essence* (blog). May 29, 2018. https://unwrappingtheessence.weebly.com/blog/pobeda-ili-nista.

In-text citation:

(National Library of Australia 2020)

(Kruszelnicki 2017)

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Doctoral dissertation

Reference list entry:

Rohrbach, Livia. 2020. *Beyond intractability? Territorial solutions to self-determination conflicts*. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

In-text citation:

(Rohrbach 2020)

Internet source

If citing an undated online document, give an access date and use the year of access as year of publication.

Reference list entry:

Oxford Library. 2012. "Library Strategy". Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html.

Google Maps. 2015. "The British Library, London, UK". *Google*. Accessed February 5, 2015. https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/The+British+Library/@51.529972,-0.127676,17z/data=!3m1!4b1! 4m2!3m1!1s0x48761b3b 70171395:0x18905479de0fdb25.

IIPE [Institute of International Politics and Economics]. n.d. "Mission". Accessed August 1, 2020. https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/en/mission/.

In-text citation:

(Oxford Library 2012)

(Google Maps 2015)

(IIPE n.d.)

Personal communication (letter, emails, telephone conversation)

Personal communications include conversations, interviews, lecture material, telephone conversations, letters and e-mail messages. Place references to personal communications such as letters and conversations within the

running text and not as formal end references, because they do not contain recoverable data:

… as mentioned in an e-mail to me from Dr Slobodan Jankovic, December 10, 2019 …

When in published collections, letters are cited by date of the collection, with individual correspondence dates given in the text:

In a letter to Mary Louise Green from University of Belgrade, May 13, 2017 (Green 2012, 34), …

Secondary source

If you read an article or book which cites or quotes some information that you want to use, always refer to both the original source and the source where you found the information:

In-text citation:

In his 1975 book *Power* [Macht], Luhmann bases his understanding of power mainly on the social exchange and community power literature (cited in Guzzini 2013, 79).

Reference list entry:

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism.* Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

TABLES, FIGURES AND GEOGRAPHICAL MAPS

It is necessary to give their number and full title – e.g. *Table 1: Human Development Index among EU members* or *Figure 2: State-Building or Sovereignty Strategy* or *Map 1: Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region.*

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The list of references should only include works that are cited in the text, tables, figure legend, and footnotes, and that have been published or accepted for publication.

Personal communications and unpublished works should only be mentioned in the text. Do not use footnotes or endnotes as a substitute for a reference list.

Reference list entries should be alphabetised by the last name of author or editor. If no author/editor, order by title.

If the reference list contains two or more items by the same author in the same year, add a, b, etc. and list them alphabetically by title of the work:

Gregory, Derek. 2014a. "Drone Geographies". *Radical Philosophy* RP 183: 7–19.

Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

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Međunarodna politika
A scholarly journal of international relations
Published in Serbian

Međunarodni problemi/International problems
A scholarly journal in English and Serbian

Evropsko zakonodavstvo
A scholarly journal for European Union law
Published in Serbian

BOOKS:

Марина Костић Шулејић, *Стратешка стабилност у мултиполарном свету*, броширано, 2022, 260 стр.

Katarina Zakić, *Savremena menadžment praksa u Kini i Srbiji"*, broširano, 2022, 204 str.

Виолета Рашковић Таловић, Миша Стојадиновић, Драган Станар, *Србија и свет – друштвене и политичке парадигме*, тврд повез, 2022, 510 стр.

Ђорђе Н. Лопичић, Јелена Ђ. Лопичић Јанчић, *Преглед спољне политике Краљевине Југославије од 1918. до 1935. године*, броширано, 2022, 158 стр.

Слободан Комазец, Рајко Буквић, Бојан Димитријевић, Драган Петровић, *Србија у савременим геоекономским процесима*, тврд повез, 2022, 424 стр.

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Convergence and confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21st century, Слободан Јанковић (ур.), броширано, 2021, 272 стр.

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Dragan Petrović, Rajko Bukvić, *Evropa i migrantsko pitanje 2014-2020.*, broširano, 2020, 190 str.

Zarazne bolesti kao globalni bezbednosni izazov – Pandemija COVID-19: stvarnost i posledice, Zoran Jeftić i Mihajlo Kopanja (ur.), elektronska publikacija (CD), 2020, 295 str.