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INTERNATIONAL TRADE FLOWS OF THE BALKAN STATES

Vladimir RISTANOVIĆ[1]

Abstract: International economic relations are immensely important for small economies, such as the countries of the Western Balkans (WBC). The importance of economic relations is a key link in the overall economic growth and development, especially in international trade in goods. This paper analyses international trade flows of the WBC and the EU using the gravity panel data model in the period from 2006 to 2020. The research aims to assess the international trade flows between the Balkan countries and the EU, bearing in mind that they conduct the largest volume of trade with the EU member states. Simultaneously, this approach will enable a clearer view of the economic relations of candidate countries during the EU negotiation process for potential membership. The results indicate that the highest volume of trade is achieved with wealthy economies, measured by the development of the economy and the size of the market measured by the number of inhabitants, while the lowest volume of trade is achieved with distant economies. The use of the gravity model in its basic form provides satisfactory model estimates, while the extended model provides additional information on mutual commodity flows with additional variables and dummy variables in the model.

Keywords: international trade, gravity panel data model, Western Balkans, EU

INTRODUCTION

Regional integrations, such as the European Union, as a rule, present a significant economic undertaking for small, underdeveloped economies. The concept of regional integration is based on Mundell's theoretical concept of the optimal currency area (1961), according to which economies become part of the integration in order to realise the benefits of the single market and currency (Ristanović, 2017). The

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theoretical concept of economic cooperation starts from the assumption that two economies find the absolute and relative advantages of each economy separately, which can provide the potential for mutual trade growth. The rule is that economies achieve the largest volume of trade in goods and services with neighbouring economies. At the same time, the effects on trade are greater when the neighbouring economy is more developed and has a larger market. However, the advantages of such economies sometimes become less relevant compared to developed regional integrations. Therefore, it is not surprising that economies tend to join various regional integrations, such as the European Union. The direction of the Balkan states towards such integration is a natural, economically rational, and geographically justified procedure because it helps to overcome the limitations in the flow of capital, goods, services, people, and ideas. In the process of achieving the socio-political values of European countries, economic relations present an important idea. Developing commodity trade is only a support to the overall process of joining the European Union, and it is not surprising that these countries in the largest trade capacity realise trade in the integrated market of goods, production factors, and services.

Trade between the Balkan states (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania) and the EU is very high. This has been going on for decades. All this unequivocally points to the fact that the EU member states are the most important foreign trade partners for these countries. The total share of the foreign trade of the Western Balkans with the EU exceeds 60%. Moreover, the share of total foreign trade is high (exceeding 100% of GDP in certain years), which clearly shows that foreign trade plays an important role in the economies of small Balkan economies.

The period in which the analysis was conducted, from 2006 to 2020, was a period of crisis and instability, especially for the EU member states. During the analysed period, the European market was struck by the financial crisis of 2008, followed by the crisis of the real sector in 2012, and by the pandemic in 2019. At the same time, it is a period of intense activity in the process of the Balkan states' joining the European Union. Therefore, according to the author, the period for the analysis is relevant, and the economic environment was the same for all economies on the continent. In such circumstances, it was justified to measure and evaluate the trade flows.

Due to these instabilities in trade, the idea is to analyse the estimates through the analysis of trade flows of the Balkan countries with their partners from the European Union in order to stabilise and, possibly, increase them. The research aims to determine the impact of the basic determinants of the economy on trade flows between the Balkan countries and the EU. The subject of research is the econometric assessment of these impacts and the modelling of bilateral trade through the econometric model. For that purpose, the gravity model has been chosen, whose application in international trade gives an assessment of the trade flows of two

countries. The obtained results can be compared with the achieved ones, and valid conclusions can be drawn about future activities in economic policy.

We found the justification for choosing the gravity model for the analysis of trade flows between the Balkan states and the EU in its simplicity and practical application. The model provides a possibility to present the directions of trade in goods with foreign trade partners, as well as the potential growth of trade, which is the goal of this research. At the same time, the gravity model fails to explain certain features of economies in foreign trade, such as fragmented exports, low trade volume, insufficient export range, high import dependence, etc. These features of foreign trade, typical for the Western Balkans, are not part of this analysis.

To evaluate the gravity model, it is necessary to provide relatively available comparable data by country. In order to analyse the gravity panel data model, it is necessary to take into account the effects of space and time. The evaluation of the panel in relation to the cross-sectional data (N) and the time-series data (T) offers greater variability and a greater degree of freedom, which reduces collinearity among the explanatory variables in the model. The advantage of this combination (NT board data) is that it enables and helps analyse the structure of trade and changes in trade over time.

The basic hypothesis of the research is that the economic determinants that can affect the trade flow between two countries arise from the size of their economies and the distance between them. In addition to the null hypothesis, there are two secondary hypotheses in the research. The first is that the more developed the economies are, the greater the impact on trade flows. The second one is that the more distant the economies that trade with each other, the smaller the impact on trade flows.

The paper consists of six parts. After the introduction, the flow of foreign trade of the Western Balkans is presented. The third part presents the literature review of the gravity model and its application in similar research. The gravity model is presented in the fourth part (methodology), after which the results of the obtained model estimates for all economies are presented separately. Finally, at the end of the paper is the conclusion.

TRADE IN THE WBC

Regional integration can expand markets and input sources, allocate resources across the region in a better way, and improve risk sharing, which leads to accelerating economic growth. Obviously, there are also negative risks, such as spreading the potential profit more easily, which can lead to growing income inequality and the polarisation of a single market (ADB 2013, 41). Small economies in the Balkans, although they may have different preferences when it comes to regional integration,

strive to expand international economic relations through the EU's integrated market. It is often difficult to assess the impact of regional integration on trade flows, as indicated by the following results of the assessed econometric model of the analysed Balkan states: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania. Moreover, the availability and benefits of regional integration also attract developed economies. According to the official data of the Australian Government (2022), Australia currently has 15 free trade agreements with 26 countries. Australia is currently negotiating new bilateral and regional free trade agreements.

In recent years, the Balkan countries' regional structure of foreign trade has significantly improved: the share of developed countries has increased, and there has been an increase in the share of trade with the EU members with whom there was no trading to such an extent, if at all. The question is whether, given the existing level of development and economic structure of the Western Balkan countries, trade with the EU member states can be expanded further.

The trade exchange at the CEFTA level has recorded a decline in recent years, partly due to the growing trend in trade with the EU members, but also due to the well-known fact of intolerance and the ongoing political situation. Before the trade flows are econometrically assessed in the following part of the paper, the subject of this part of the paper will be the trade opportunities of the Balkan economies and the role and structure of trade within their economies. The emphasis will certainly be on trade with the EU in order to assess the state and potential flows and the possibilities for future growth of trade with the EU based on the following analysis.

The volume of trade between the countries of the Western Balkans and the EU recorded a growing trend until 2008 when the financial crisis of global proportions occurred. The crisis in the EU member states, caused first by the financial turmoil in 2008 and then by the recession in the real sector in 2012, was accompanied by a lower level of trade with the Balkan economies. The recovery in the trade followed in the coming years (after 2016), but was soon slowed down again due to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to official data from the Trade statistics for international business development database, the countries of the Western Balkans have a continuous deficit in trade with the EU (Figure 1).

Figure 1: WBC's trade deficit with EU members, 2006-2020, in bil. EUR



Source: The author's calculation based on Trade statistics for international business development.

The volume of total trade (exports + imports) of the Balkan countries with the EU is continually growing (Figure 2). In the analysed period, individually observed by countries, the largest part of the total trade with EU members was realised by Serbia. Serbia's share of total trade with the WBC and the EU ranged from 64% in 2006 to 78% in 2017.

Figure 2: WBC's total trade with EU members, 2006-2020, in bil. EUR



Source: The author's calculation based on Trade statistics for international business development.

The positive trend in total trade is accompanied by a better structure of trade. Namely, in the structure of trade, according to Eurostat data for the period 2009–2019 (Table 1), products of the manufacturing industry dominate (over 70%) compared to primary products. In recent years, the ratio of products of the processing industry to primary products has increased, which has certainly been reflected in a lower trade deficit. In fact, the products of the processing industry have higher prices in the markets compared to the prices of primary products.

Table 1: EU-27 exports to the Western Balkans by main groups, 2009-2019, percentage

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Primary goods											
Food and drink	10.7	10.2	10.0	10.5	10.8	10.8	10.7	10.4	10.0	10.0	10.7
Raw materials	2.6	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.5
Energy	9.0	11.8	14.9	16.2	12.8	12.8	10.6	8.8	10.7	9.8	10.3
Manufactured goods											
Chemicals	14.9	15.1	14.4	14.8	14.9	14.4	14.7	14.7	14.3	15.5	14.3
Machinery and vehicles	28.4	25.6	25.8	24.9	27.2	27.6	28.9	30.2	29.4	29.6	29.9
Other manufactured goods	32.6	32.8	30.8	29.5	30.5	31.0	31.5	32.9	32.3	32.1	31.6
Other goods											
Other goods	1.7	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Primary	22.3	25.3	28.2	29.9	26.6	26.3	23.9	21.5	23.3	22.1	23.5
Manufactured	76.0	73.5	71.0	69.3	72.6	73.0	75.1	77.9	76.0	77.2	75.7
Manufact./primary	3.4	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.2

Source: EUROSTAT

According to EU trading partners, based on Eurostat data for 2019, the Western Balkan countries have the largest trade surplus with Lithuania, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia, and the largest trade deficit with Germany, which is also the largest individual partner from the EU.

Considering the trade flows in the last fifteen years, the change in the volume and structure of trade in goods, the gravity towards the EU market, and the choice of the Balkan countries to opt for accession to regional integration, such as the EU, is quite justified. The potential assortment of goods in mutual exchange is increasing. The free exchange of goods, services, capital, people, and ideas is becoming more intense, which will bring benefits for both parties.

Although there is a CEFTA agreement between the countries of the Western Balkans, with numerous trade facilitations and the advantages of regional integration cooperation, these economies are more open to the EU members. Although, according to the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the volume of foreign trade within the CEFTA countries exceeds 3.5 billion euros. The volume of Serbia's foreign trade within the CEFTA agreement is around 2.5 billion euros, of which Bosnia and Herzegovina alone accounts for 0.9 billion euros, which is more than one-third of the total trade. A similar structure has been recorded in other Western Balkan countries.

For a deeper analysis of international trade, the flows of trade between the WBC and the EU will be estimated using the gravity model.

LITERARY REVIEW

The gravity model has been applied in numerous research areas for decades. In its basic form, it has significant application in the process of explaining bilateral trade and international trade. A large number of scientific papers and research in the literature show the relations between different economic determinants. The application of the gravity model is widespread from the point of view of the application of various methods and techniques in the evaluation of model variables, as well as the possibility of including numerous determinants of the economy, either as explanatory variables or as dummy variables. In this literature review, the emphasis will be mainly on trade flows and the basic economic determinants.

The application of the gravity model in economics dates back to the 1960s. Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966) were the first to apply the gravity model in empirical analyses of international trade. After more than a decade, Anderson (1979) made a clearer connection by analysing the consumption in the trade of two economies. Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1995), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), as well as Evenett and Keller (1998), also contributed to the development of the gravity model in the field of trade. In particular, with the opening of the Eastern Bloc in the 1990s, the use of the gravity model in economic analysis became more common (Hamilton and Winters, 1992; Bussière et al., 2005; Dragutinović Mitrović 2005). In research, the gravity model has been used as a standard to assess the potential of bilateral trade between countries. However, it has been successfully

applied in other areas as well, for the identification of trade potential, the assessment of the impact of membership in organisations (GATT, WTO), currency indicators, migration flows, etc. What makes this model unique is that it places a strong emphasis on empirical confirmation (Feestra et al. 2001).

Bilas (2007) showed that trade between countries is positively affected by their size and negatively by the distance between them. Ranilović (2017) concluded the same for Croatia. He used the gravity model to estimate trade flows in Croatia and showed that Croatia had a higher volume of trade with wealthy and, at the same time, closer economies. Smarzynska (2001) examined the impacts of trade flows in art between the GCC countries and developed countries and showed that GDP per capita had a positive and significant impact, while distance had a negative impact on trade. This research undoubtedly showed that countries with the higher purchasing power of their population (GDP per capita) had a greater influence on the art trade. Bialinicka-Birula (2015) used the gravity model in the analysis of the trade flows in the countries of the European Community and found that there was a negative and significant impact of distance on the volume of trade. Magrini et al. (2017) analysed the EU trade preferences imposed on the southern Mediterranean countries in the fishery and agricultural products from 2004 to 2014 and showed that there was a significant and effective impact on trade in these product groups. The restrictions on trade flows, in the example of Asian economies in the period from 2007 to 2014, were assessed by Ramaswami et al. (2016) using the gravity model. Waheed and Abbas (2015) assessed the trade relations between the GCC countries and their trading partners using the conventional gravity model and showed that GDP had a positive effect on overall trade while bilateral distance between countries had a negative effect. Antonucci and Manzocchi (2005) assessed the trade relations between Turkey and European Union countries for the period 1965-2011 and showed that the gravity panel data model of international trade fit well into Turkey's trade flows. Marku (2014) showed that the size of the economy had a positive effect on foreign direct investment in the EU. On the other hand, he justified the indeterminate influence of distance (the statistical significance of distance was not meaningful) with the phenomenon of globalisation, which by its nature diminished the role of distance over time.

Pradhan (2009) confirmed the assumptions of the gravity model by assessing trade relations between the GCC countries and India, pointing to the potential growth of exports in total trade. In an analysis of South Korean trade flows, Chan-Hyun (2001) showed that the volume of trade in bilateral trade increased with the trading partners who had higher GDP and less distance from the other partners. In the analysis of the trade flows between the MERCOSUR and the EU blocs, Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2003) and Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2006) indicated that the size of a country had a direct impact on the trade flows and that larger and more populous economies had a greater capacity to absorb the goods

due to their market size. In analysing the exports of Malaysia and the OIC member states, Abidin and Sahlan (2013) used the gravity model to assess the impact of several variables on Malaysian exports. Actually, the estimated parameter of the country's GDP variable was significant with a positive sign, starting from the assumption that the GDP estimate was based on the size of the economy.

Several studies examined trade potential using the integration of the gravity model, i.e., the gravity panel data model (Cinar et al., 2016; Sultan and Munir 2015). For example, Irshad et al. (2018) applied the gravity panel data model to assess South Korea's trade with the OPEC members in the period 2001–2016 and showed that income (GDP per capita), GDP, and trade openness significantly affected bilateral trade, while the impact of distance was negative. Sultan and Munir (2015) used a gravity panel model to individually analyse, in the period from 2001 to 2013, export, import, and the bilateral trade flows in different regions and showed that trade is determined by determinants such as population, GDP, distance, and customs. Similarly, Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2006) used a dynamic panel model instead of the traditional static specification of the gravity model and showed that regionalism fostered international trade within and/or outside blocs, observing heterogeneity over time and between countries.

The above examples and aspects of using the gravity model to estimate international trade flows will be the basis for finding an answer to the question of whether there is a possibility of modifying the traditional gravity model of international trade between the Western Balkans and the EU to give the best estimates of model parameters. The methodology and specification of the model, which will be presented in the next chapter, have already been presented in similar papers (Ristanović et al. 2017; Ristanović et al. 2019, Ristanović et al. 2020).

The process of estimating using the gravitational model was started by the basic form of the regression equation, which consisted of GDP and distance. Estimates of the parameters of the model were efficient and statistically significant, so the inclusion of an additional variable in the model (as the independent variables) was justified. In the new regression equation, in addition to GDP and distance, the population was added, in order to check the real impact of the population on total trade. Numerous researchers are always in a dilemma about whether to include the population in the model or not because it is difficult to determine *a priori* the effects of the population on international trade (Ristanović et al., 2019). It is obvious that trade grows with population growth, indicating that large and rich countries tend to trade with each other based on GDP per capita (Fitzsimons et al. 1999). However, Oguledo and MacPhee (1994) and Eita and Jordaan (2007) show that the effects of the population on total trade are ambiguous. The importance of distance is seen through the fact that geographical distance may also include transaction costs (Guiso et al. 2005; Krugman 1979; Linnemann 1966; Portes and Rey 2005). In the model, the distance is taken as the physical distance between the capitals, measured in

kilometres. All other forms of distance, cited by Bialynicka-Birula (2015) in their research, like temporal distance (travel time), economic distance (transport cost, trade policy, customs tariffs), and political distance (membership in one of the groups, participation in agreements of an international character), are not taken into account. By introducing dummy variables into the gravity model, it is possible to consider various factors that affect trade flows, but they are not numerically determined, and the problem is quantifying them. In that case, dummy variables are useful because they control different effects on trade flows, such as trade agreements, common language or borders, common history, etc. (Sekur 2013; Baldwin and Taglioni 2006).

RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The gravity model provides a relatively intuitive description of trade between economies based on the concept of Newton's law of gravity. Basically, the model simply looks at trade between two economies and combines their basic economic elements — GDP, population, and distance. The assumption is that trade between two countries develops depending on the degree of development of their economies, the size of their markets, and the distance that exists between them. Actually, trade flows between two countries grow if the level of GDP is higher, but the market in which products are placed and the distance are smaller. Generally speaking, trade flows between different countries should be higher if they are relatively closer and have common borders, similar cultures and languages, and close economic and social relations.

The gravity model is often the subject of criticism (Dragutinović Mitrović 2005) because it is justified to claim that it simplifies the actual trade flows between two economies and that it can lead to wrong conclusions. Frequently, other factors associated with real and everyday trade flows, such as social, institutional, local, and other economic and non-economic factors, are not in the model. However, this can be remedied by making a more expended model. The latter implies that by expanding the model with new determinants, the application of panels in the gravity model (along with time series and comparative data), and the use of technological innovations and advanced statistics, these shortcomings can be eliminated. The gravity panel models structured in that way can also be used to predict commodity flows, forecast future agglomerations and locations, make projections of demand and supply of goods, etc. It is important to emphasise that there are a number of limitations to this complex model, which are reflected in the unavailability of updated information for all countries or for the desired period, insufficiently long time series, and, therefore, an insufficient number of observations for the analysis, different sources for the same data, inability to measure consumer preferences or the elasticity of foreign demand and domestic supply, etc.

Despite the existing shortcomings, the application of the gravity model is widespread in the analysis of international trade. This is primarily due to the fact that the basic determinants of the economy are easily accessible to any economy over a long period of time and allow a useful comparative analysis of bilateral trade (Paas 2000; Sekur 2003). Thus, Evenett and Keller (2002) point out that the equation of the gravity model in economics is one of the most important results in trade flows. Bilas (2007) rightly states that the gravity model is an ex-post econometric technique for examining the determinants of bilateral trade flows. As such, it is also considered a successful technique for analysing trade flows, the relationships that exist between trading partners, and changes in global trade. At the same time, realistic assumptions that trade between countries is directly proportional to the volume of GDP and inversely proportional to distance make this model attractive and well-known. This is also indicated by Salvatore (2014), "In its simplest form, the gravity model is based on the assumption (with other circumstances unchanged) that bilateral trade between two countries is proportional, or at least positively related to GDP produced in two countries, and it is lower when the distance between those two countries is greater (Newton's law of gravity in physics)".

Therefore, in this analysis, the gravity panel model was used to estimate trade flows based on basic determinants of the economy in order to simultaneously observe comparative data for five variable models (one independent variable: total trade; three explanatory variables: GDP, population, and distance; and two dummy variables: common border and common language) from five countries in the Western Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania) and a time series for a period of 15 years, 2006–2020. The model was tested through the STATA software package, which provides an analyst with the opportunity to obtain valid estimates of quantitative and qualitative determinants within the same model, in space and time, giving a more accurate picture of trade flows. The analysis of the basic determinants of the economy within the model, which evaluates trade flows, is the basis for further expansion of the model in future research, which will include collecting more data for more variables in the model and thus far more observations, which is a prerequisite for better estimates of the model and more detailed results and conclusions.

All the data for economic determinants used in the model as parameters come from official sources. The names of the variables, their definitions, data sources, and levels are presented in Table 2. The analysis of trade between the Western Balkans and 28 EU member states covers the period from 2006 to 2020.

Table 2: List of variables included in the Gravity model

Variables	Content	Data Source	Level
TT	Total trade	Eurostat and Trade statistics for international business development	Bilateral
GDP	Exporting countries' real gross domestic product in constant US dollars	Eurostat and Trade statistics for international business development	Unilateral
GDP*	Importing countries' real gross domestic product in constant US dollars	Eurostat and Trade statistics for international business development	Unilateral
POP	Exporting countries' population (millions)	World Bank Annual Statistics	Unilateral
POP*	Importing countries' population (millions)	World Bank Annual Statistics	Unilateral
Distance	The distance in kilometres (expressed in the distance between each country's capital)	CEPII – *le Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales*	Bilateral
Border	*1* if countries *i* and *j* share the border, *0* otherwise	A dummy	Bilateral
Language	*1* if countries *i* and *j* share the common official language, *0* otherwise	A dummy	Bilateral

Source: Author

As in the previous analyses of trade and export flows (Ristanović et al. 2017; Ristanović et al. 2019, Ristanović et al. 2020), the gravity panel model was used to assess the trade flows between the Western Balkans and EU member states, within which the influence of specific determinants of the economy on total trade was examined by the regression equations with the help of panel series. Panel series data are suitable for this type of estimation of the regression equations as they allow for the simultaneous analysis of comparative data (N) and time-series data (T). Thanks to the features of the panel series, the sample size (NT) increases and the amount of information from a limited number of observations (samples) increases as well. In this way, the efficiency of model evaluation increases and we get better results. The larger the sample, the greater the efficiency of the model estimates. At the same time, the greater the degree of variability, the greater the degree of freedom, and the lower the correlation of explanatory variables. Another advantage of using the

gravity panel model is that it allows us to simultaneously analyse both trade structure and changes in trade over time. The evaluated results of the model should show the relationship between the size of an economy, the purchasing power of the population, and distance, on the one hand, and the total trade, on the other hand.

Within the dynamic gravity panel model, the determinant of GDP reflects the size of the economy, the population in the model determines the size of the market, and the distance indicates the distance between countries and is a substitute for all trade barriers (transport costs in international trade, export/import tariffs, dumping prices, etc.). The model is designed so that the equations contain at least three regional variables, which allows an analyst to simultaneously test the effects of grouping within the union, outside the union, and total trade. Such models involve the use of panel data to verify potentially inconspicuous country-specific factors that will have an impact on trade between them (Trotignon 2010). Finally, in order to examine the individual characteristics of the countries participating in the analysis of trade flows through which we want to analyse mutual trade relations, dummy variables are included in the model. The influence of specific factors in the gravity model is examined by the regression equations with the help of panel series (Ristanović et al. 2017; Ristanović et al. 2019, Ristanović et al. 2020).

As a rule, in the regression equation, the dependent variable (Y) is explained by the independent variables of the model (X_i), which is expressed in terms of the level of the coefficient of determination (R^2). The higher the level of the coefficient of determination, the higher the percentage of the dependent variable explained by the selected independent variables. Thus, the results obtained in the previous step indicate the choice of a model with random effects. The next step in the evaluation process is to check for the existence of heteroskedasticity (using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange test). The obtained values clearly confirm the use of the random effect model. This means that we reject the hypothesis – there are no individual effects. This additionally confirms the previous statement on the acceptance of the random effects panel regression model. At the same time, as in every process of regression analysis, diagnostic tests were conducted that facilitated the assumptions of the random effects model.

In fact, the estimated model parameters are estimates of the partial elasticity coefficients. This means that the estimated parameters in the model (b_1, b_2 …b_n) represent the elasticity of the dependent variable related to the change of the independent variable. In other words, changing the independent variable by 1 percentage point causes the dependent variable to change by 1 percentage point.

These economic determinants are included in the model as explanatory variables. Apart from them, dummy variables (common border and common language) are included in the model as well. An expanded gravity panel model of this type has been tested and evaluated for its impact on total trade, both in terms of the common

border and common language. The evaluation process was conducted through two models: the random effect model (RE) and the fixed effect model (FE). The differences between the two models should be outlined. In the random effect model, the regression parameters with explanatory variables are invariant, while the random error in the model reflects variations in both observation units and over time. In the fixed effect model, the random error u_{ij} has a normal distribution with a zero mean value and constant variance, while the explanatory variables are non-stochastic and the error term is independent. Which model will be chosen depends on the value of the Hausman test, which will unequivocally show which of the two models will give the best results when testing and evaluating the coefficients with the model variables. Descriptive statistics show that the model used to estimate the variables contains 280 observations [N = 28; T = 10]. All the steps in estimating the model parameters are conducted through the statistical software STATA, S/E, version 13.0.

Gravity model specification

The original form of the gravity model was an analogy to Newton's law of gravity in physics. The model has been transformed to represent relationships between economies and is presented in logarithmic form. The following regression equation (equation 1) contains variables whose values vary by country and time, as well as variables whose values vary from country to country but are constant over time.

$$X_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{it} + \beta_2 Y_{jt} + \beta_3 POP_{it} + \beta_4 POP_{jt} + \beta_5 DIST_{ij} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

, where X_{ijt} represents the total trade of an economy *i* and an economy *j* in a year *t* (TT_{ijt}); Y_i (Y_j) reflects the GDP of the economy *i* and the economy *j* in a year *t*; $DIST_{ij}$ is a measure of the distance between the capitals of these countries; POP_i (POP_j) is the size of the market of the economy *i* and the economy *j* in a year *t*. ε shows the random component of the model.

In the next step (equation 2), two dummy variables are included in the model.

$$X_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BDP_{it} + \beta_2 BDP_{jt} + \beta_3 POP_{it} + \beta_4 POP_{jt} + \beta_5 DIST_{ij} + \beta_6 bord_{ij} + \beta_5 lang_{ij} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

, where the dummy $bord_{ij}$ presents the common border between country *i* and country *j*, and the dummy $lang_{ij}$ presents the common language between country *i* and country *j*.

Estimation of bilateral trade between 28 EU countries and 5 Western Balkan countries for the period 2006-2020 begins by estimating the gravitational model using the ordinary least squares method (OLS) to calculate the total trade equation.

The bias in the estimation obtained by the OLS model is eliminated in the following steps by using a panel model with random and fixed effects.

Before starting the evaluation of the model parameters, it is necessary to consider the theoretical expectations of the signs (+/-) of the estimated coefficients of the variables. Economic growth (the size of the economy, i.e., an increase in production levels and aggregate demand) affects the growth of trade between economies, which indicates that the coefficients in front of the variables GDP, β_1 and β_2, should have a positive sign, with a slightly greater impact of GDP from the EU countries. The influence of the population is ambiguous, so its coefficients (β_3 and β_4) have both positive and negative signs. It depends on the effect of absorption and economies of scale. A negative sign is expected for the distance coefficient (β_5) because the greater distance between the two economies increases the price of total trade and it decreases. Conversely, a smaller distance between the two economies makes overall trade cheaper and it increases. A positive sign is expected for both coefficients with dummy variables. As a rule, it is easier and more traded if the partner countries share a common border ($bord_{ij}$) and/or speak the same language ($lang_{ij}$). (Statistical data are available on request: descriptive statistics, model estimates, and tests of estimated parameters).

To evaluate the regression model, the existence of individual effects is first examined. If these effects are absent, it is recommended to use a regression estimation model. However, if there are individual effects within the model, then either a fixed effects model or a random effects model is recommended. It depends on the degree of correlation between individual effects and model variables. The Hausman test is used, which shows which of the two models gives the more effective estimates. According to Gujarati (2007) and Dragutinović-Mitrović (2005), unlike the fixed effects model, the random effects model is used when there is no correlation in the model between individual effects and explanatory variables; individual effects are random and new explanatory variables are obtained through residuals. In this way, the random effect model provides more efficient parameter estimates.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS), the Fixed Effect model and the Random Effect model, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg heteroscedasticity test, and the Hausman test were used to evaluate the model.

In accordance with the theory, it is expected that the estimated parameters will be statistically significant and that the signs of the gravity model parameters will be defined in advance. Thus, the value of the sign of parameter b_1 will be positive because the volume of trade is expected to increase in line with the increase in the GDP of the partner country. On the other hand, the value of the sign of parameter

b_2 is also positive because it is expected that the size of the market, measured by the number of inhabitants, will have a positive effect on trade from the aspect of higher demand. Finally, with the last explanatory variable, the theoretically expected value of the coefficient b_3 is negative, given that the volume of trade between the Balkan states and the EU decreases with the increasing geographical distance between them. However, this statement must be accepted with reservations due to the specific relationship between distance and trade; trade is certainly limited by distance. Transaction and other costs usually increase with increasing the distance, so in that case, the distance is a limiting variable. However, if the distance proves not to be statistically significant, it does not necessarily mean that it is insignificant, but that it has a different effect on trade (positive or negative). For the coefficients with dummy variables, it is expected to be a positive sign for both the evaluated parameters b_4 and b_5.

In this example, total trade should be positively correlated with the degree of development (GDP) of a foreign country, positively correlated with the size of a market (population), and negatively correlated with the distance of a foreign market from the domestic one (distance). This is confirmed by the obtained results, i.e., they show that the variables included in the gravity equation are statistically significant and emphasise already expected effects. The estimated coefficients represent, in most cases, expected signs and magnitudes.

Table 3: Estimated result of a gravity model for the WBC, random effect

Dependant variable: TT					
Variable	**SRB**	**MNE**	**MKD**	**B&H**	**ALB**
GDP	.5497298***	1.501445***	1.290911*	2.632017***	.2695439
GDP*	.7697678***	1.657788***	.6313784***	1.081607***	.8849231***
POP	-11.35147***	-1.772462	30.90436**	.4636441	-19.4305***
POP*	.2467783*	-.6217995**	.5039832**	-.1546122	-.2224467
DISTANCE	-1.795294***	-2.73689***	-1.847095***	-2.464953***	-1.352163***
BORDER	-.0087273	-1.369217	1.391817	-.7011573	2.029901*
LANGUAGE	1.21348***	1.303641**	-.2885174	2.100249**	.6152361
_cons	173.4569***	-7.041022	-472.5567***	-58.89204**	289.9064***

Variable	SRB	MNE	MKD	B&H	ALB
Obs	420	420	420	420	420
R^2	92.70	80.30	84.52	88.04	63.64

Source: ***; **; * are statistically significant at the level of 1%; 5%; 10%.

Note: SRB – Serbia, MNE – Montenegro, MKD – North Macedonia, B&H – Bosnia and Hercegovina, ALB - Albania

The results of estimated parameters from the random effects regression model for total trade, which includes three independent variables (GDP, distance, and population in the Western Balkans and the EU member states) and two dummy variables (dummy Border and dummy Languages) as dependent variables, are shown in Table 3. In this model, too, the coefficients of determination (R^2) for all five equations of the Western Balkans are high, which confirms that the explanatory variables unequivocally reflect the impact on the dependent variable. The estimates of the mentioned variables in the model more or less correspond to the expected signs and are of different levels of significance. This is explained by the nature of the ambiguous influence of the population variable. The estimated coefficients for GDP and distance reflect a high degree of significance. The estimated coefficients for the common border in all Western Balkan countries reflect a negative and weak impact on overall trade, and it is not statistically significant in all countries (except in Albania, with a significance level of 10%). The estimated common language coefficients in all Western Balkan countries reflect a positive and relatively weak impact on overall trade, although not statistically significant in North Macedonia and Albania. This insufficiently clear impact of dummy variables shows that the process of globalisation has greatly influenced the flow of trade beyond the common border (lower transport costs, advances in telecommunications, fast and short transport routes) and that language similarities in border areas are not key to trade (English has become a business language).

Based on the estimated equations using the panel gravity model, it has been unequivocally shown that economic determinants of economic size and distance are important determinants for the expansion of trade between the Western Balkans and the EU member states. In other words, the impact of the size of the economy, i.e., GDP, is an important determinant of the future trade of these economies, and further expansion of economic relations can be expected to have a reciprocal impact on GDP on trade. This would further enable the growth of the purchasing power of the population and increase mutual demand, so we could expect a more significant impact of the population on overall trade. Distance is not a constraint on trade,

which shows that it is possible to expect benefits from expanding trade with the most remote parts of the EU single market.

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of the paper was to examine trade flows between the countries of the Western Balkans and the European Union. As in previous research, the gravity model was used in the analysis, which proved to be a very effective tool for examining international trade. By creating the gravity panel model, consistent estimates were obtained that showed the extent to which trade flows were determined by economic determinants in certain Balkan countries. Most of the results had already been known intuitively, but the estimated model variables, i.e., the determinants of economies, quantitatively expressed, revealed the volume of trade flows and could be the basis for trade projections in the future.

In accordance with the gravity theory, regression analyses were performed, and the model parameters were estimated using a number of econometric tools. The results showed that trade is determined by GDP as an indicator of economic growth and population as an indicator of market size regarding demand and distance, i.e., the distance between trading countries. Quantitatively expressed, through the evaluation of parameters, cooperation with a more developed, more populous, and closer economy contributes to a larger volume of trade.

Based on the analysis of each of the Western Balkan countries individually observed, the results clearly show that in the analysed period 2006-2020, the growth of trade in goods was positively affected by economic cooperation with the size of the GDP of the partner country and negatively affected by the distance of the partner country. To put it differently, a greater volume of trade was realised with those economies that were richer and closer.

In the extended gravity panel data model, which included the population in the equation, the results showed ambiguous effects on trade — both positive and negative in relation to total trade. This is partly understandable because it does not mean that populous countries are rich and have developed economies at the same time. Hence, market size is partially acceptable as a determinant of the economy that affects trade flows.

Concrete results in some countries of the Western Balkans give a common conclusion: all Balkan economies (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Albania) are determined to trade with the EU and that there is a growing trend of trade. The results of individual equations, i.e., the evaluation of the model for each economy individually, show that the volume of trade with rich and populous economies within the EU has increased over time and that

commodity trade is the lowest with the farthest EU members, regardless of the level of development.

The results, discussion, and conclusions presented above unmistakably confirm the null and both secondary hypotheses. The basic economic determinants that affect trade flows arise from the factors of the size of the economy and the distance between them, but also the purchasing power of the population (GDP per capita) and market size (population). The size of the economy shows a positive impact, and distance has a negative impact on total global trade. Although from the author's point of view, this analysis provides constructive and acceptable results and conclusions, which can make it easier for economic policymakers to achieve a clearer vision of trade in the EU single market, the author recommends future research with more data and variables.

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ПРАВЦИ МЕЂУНАРОДНЕ ТРГОВИНЕ БАЛКАНСКИХ ДРЖАВА

Апстракт: Значај међународних економских односа посебно је важан за мале економије, попут држава Западног Балкана (WБЦ). Важност економских односа је кључна карика целокупног привредног раста и развоја, нарочито њихова међународна робна размена. У овом раду су анализирани токови међународне трговине држава Западног Балкана и Европске уније, употребом гравитационог панел модела у периоду 2006-2020. година. Циљ овог истраживања је да се оцене токови међународне робне размене балканских држава са ЕУ, с обзиром на чињеницу да оне највећи обим трговине управо реализују са државама чланицама ЕУ. Истовремено, овај приступ омогућиће да се јасније сагледају економске релације држава кандидата у току процеса преговора са ЕУ, и стицања потенцијалног чланства. Резултати су показали да је највећи степен трговине остварен са богатим економијама мерено развојем економије, величином тржишта мерено бројем становника, док је најмањи остварен са удаљеним економијама. Употреба гравитационог модела у свом основном облику пружила је задовољавајуће оцене модела, при чему је проширени модел додатним варијаблама и вештачким променљивим у моделу обезбедио додатне информације о међусобним робним токовима.

Кључне речи: међународна робна размена, гравитациони панел модел, Западни Балкан, ЕУ.

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THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN NORMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA IN THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION (SCO)

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Abstract: The primary aim of this paper is to investigate the objective of India's joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The significance of this research lies in finding the correlation between the norms adopted by the organisation and the real reason for a country's joining that organisation. Similarly, special attention has been paid to the concept of international organisations as norm disseminators. The paper first discusses the normative theory of international relations and tries to bridge it with international organisations (IOs). Additionally, the paper assesses the role played by norms in driving international organisations or *vice versa*. The main argument is that India has adopted a cooperation and competition approach to the SCO, considering its bitter relations with China and Pakistan. This is a qualitative study that considers primary and secondary sources to connect the theoretical understanding with the empirical study.

Keywords: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India, China, Pakistan, International Organisation, Norms.

INTRODUCTION

Within the arena of International Organisations (IOs), there are long-running debates about the correlation between "norms and IOs". But it is undeniably true that if an international organisation is established, it will be based on certain norms and values accepted by all the member states. On the other hand, there is

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a possibility that IOs can change their norms and values over time. Significantly, an IO can change its identity in order to disseminate specific norms. The bureaucratic culture of an organisation is described as its dominant profession's bureaucratic culture, which impacts how its mandate is carried out and how the organisation is regarded (Wendt 1999). The identification of the IO and the influence of norms that dictate appropriate behaviour of participants within the international system are the two primary criteria that IOs use to operationalize their mission (March and Olsen 1989). The definition of how IOs work requires an understanding of identity. While states play an important role in establishing IOs by defining their mandate, scope, and function, all of which contribute to determining their identity, an organisation's historical development and culture, as well as the professional orientation of the majority of its staff, influence how an IO will act in specific situations within the international system (Cox et al. 1973; Ascher 1983; Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Norm adoption generally works at two levels: *norm recognition* (the first reference to a norm) and *norm adoption* (the first reference to a policy devoted to a norm).

In the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), as the leading initiator, China first took the opportunity to set the norms and values according to its interests. Considering the security vulnerabilities China is facing throughout Central Asia, the SCO is of strategic importance to Beijing in its fight against three evils: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. For more than 15 years since its establishment, the same norms have worked for all the member states of the SCO. However, when the SCO welcomed two arch-rivals, India and Pakistan, into the organisation in 2017, the balance shifted slightly. As the use of international organisations as instruments of foreign policy by member nations has negative consequences for their development, India is keen to impose its version of the norms on the organisation.

Similarly, India's interest in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is abundant. The organisation includes Russia, India's strategic partner and friend, China, Pakistan, as well as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, four major Central Asian Republics (CARs). Due to Chinese domination through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a large chequebook, India's lack of proper connection with the CARs has been a key barrier. As a result, innovative methods must be devised to increase India's footprint in the region's marketplaces. India and Central Asia are linked by a unique combination of history, geopolitical, cultural, civilizational, and economic imperatives. Deepening connections with Russia, monitoring and countering the influence of China and Pakistan, and expanding collaboration with CARs are the three pillars of New Delhi's agenda (Bhatia 2020). Some also argue that the persuasion of SCO's membership was driven by a desire to create strategic regional relationships and that providing

permanent status to India was motivated by a desire to balance bilateral alliances (Ahmed and Bhatnagar 2019).

Since the notion of India joining the SCO was initially floated, academic studies have investigated the potential impact of this expansion on the SCO in terms of India's foreign policy objectives (Stobdan 2015; 2016), trade expansion (Bakshi 2008), peace in Afghanistan and regional peace stability in South Asia (Qadir and Rehman 2016), and India's increasing role in regional affairs (Ahmad 2018; Qureshi and Hashmi 2020). While we want to interpret the functionalities of any international organisation, the focus must first be given to the common norms and values shared by the member states. However, very few perspectives have been found in academia about the norms that established the SCO and whether India joined the SCO because of norms or something else. Therefore, this research aims to analyse India's interest and objective in the SCO. To do so, this research addresses the following questions: i) What are the primary norms that established the SCO? ii) What is the primary interest of India in joining the SCO?

The paper is structured as follows. It begins by explaining the norms and international organisations. The paper then discusses the genesis of the SCO, followed by the perceptions of the Indian state toward the SCO. Further, the paper presents India's perceptions of the SCO. The main conclusion is that although India has entered the SCO respecting all its adopted norms and values, it uses the SCO platform in accordance with its foreign policy interests.

NORMATIVE THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (IOS)

Brown (1992) defines normative theory as follows:

> "That body of work that addresses the moral dimension of international relations and the larger questions of meaning and interpretation by the discipline".

In the social sciences, it is well known that in the 1960s, neo-Marxists began to assert that the concept of objective and unbiased science was questionable. Theorists such as Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas argued that social theory implies social critique by definition, and they were able to influence the minds of many intellectuals (Strauss 2003). Normative theory, unlike empirical IR theory, deals with issues such as ethical norms, obligations, responsibilities, rights, and duties as they apply to persons, states, and the international state system. Studies with a normative orientation, in particular, concentrate on contentious issues such as the moral significance of states and borders, the ethics of war and peace, the nature of human rights, the case for (political and military) intervention, and

the demands of international distributive justice. For this purpose, normative theory is concerned with the norms, rules, values, and standards that govern international politics, and as such, it encompasses all areas of the field, including international law, international political economy, and diplomacy (Evans and Newnham 1998).

In simple terms, the normative theory of international relations refers to the moral or ethical dimension of international governance. On the other hand, the way normative analyses and reflections are deployed and practised is anything but straightforward. Certainly, a variety of practical challenges, such as intervention, nuclear issues, international legal issues, distributive justice, and others, are difficult to resolve (Lawson 2003). Furthermore, one of the primary questions is who is responsible for what, how far accountability extends, and to what extent the global and local, universal, and particular, are linked. Consider a situation where refugees are fleeing conflict and cannot feed, clothe, house, or educate their families.

From the end of WWII until the late 1980s, the normative theory was pushed aside by the popularity of theories based on positivist explanations of the profession (Nicholson 1996). Positivist approaches are inherently biased towards the normative theory because they "distinguish between facts and morality", claiming that knowledge of facts is the only acceptable knowledge based on the natural science model of enquiry (Frost 1986). In principle, the scientific (positivist) approach should produce "explanatory hypotheses based on facts." This means that theories based on "facts" observed in the "real" world are objective and do not need to be interpreted — a good theory should be based on things that everyone can see. In this light, morality and ethics, which are the normative theorists' field of study, are subjective and non-verifiable; a more damning description would be to ascribe the term "value judgements" to them; morals and ethics are not intersubjectively verifiable, thus they are not accessible to all, and thus they are not "informative" (Frost 1986).

Within the international domain, International Organisations are seen as norm diffusers or transmitters (Finnemore 1993; Checkel 1999; Grigorescu 2002). Norms, according to Finnemore, are disseminated across the international system and taught to governments through international organisations and non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Norms are characterised as "collectively held views about behaviour", with the caveat that "not like private ideas, norms are shared and social; they are not only subjective but inter-subjective". Norms are crucial because they educate states about appropriate behaviour in any given circumstance, explaining why actors behave in ways that are not explained by rationalist theories or contradict them. Furthermore, the existence of international norms explains how governments with disparate interests come up with identical policy goals when there is no clear demand or necessity on the part

of the state (True and Mintrom 2001). This explains how national interests develop in states and refutes solely materialist theories of state behaviour in the international system. However, international institutions are subject to criticism for various reasons.

John Mearsheimer's (1994) piece on international security, "The False Promise of International Institutions," is a fascinating read. It was written in response to a specific set of circumstances in the early 1990s, and it reflected Mearsheimer's hard-line scepticism of international organisations, but the argument is still relevant to the (non-) debate of the 1930s, as well as the future of international institutions in the 2010s and 2020s. Part of Mearsheimer's lengthy piece is devoted to what he refers to as "critical theorists", primarily Wendtian (1992) constructivists, but the argument's core is a critique of liberal institutionalists like Keohane (1989), who was at the time the most famous. Peace (when there is peace) is the result of a balance of power, according to Mearsheimer, and institutions are, at most, intervening variables rather than the independent variables that liberal institutionalists believe they are. In fact, relying on institutions may jeopardise peace by weakening the power balance.

Ikenberry (2011) has chronicled how America's post-war political leadership built this system, employing the enormous material advantage the war had given them not for short-term benefits but to build a structure that would operate in their long-term interests. This has proven to be a very effective technique. The other major international powers, both past friends and former adversaries, have regained and exceeded their previous strength under the canopy of American dominance, and the United States has retained its preeminent position in the world despite fostering the rise of its rivals. Brooks and Wohlforth (2015) eloquently summarised the facts to support this position. The US's GDP accounts for 22.5% of global GDP and 36% of the GDPs of the nine major countries, while US defence spending accounts for 34% of global defence. Russia, China, and India continue to lag far behind the United States in terms of defence spending.

For instance, if one asked what the US would do to mitigate the rise of China in the coming period, what would the answer be? The common response from IR experts to this topic is that the United States should continue to support the institutional frameworks it has established or reinforced over the past 100 years through its own initiatives. Thus, international organisations are trapped between the "idealism" and "realism" of contemporary politics. On the one hand, there is a set of rules and norms that members of the institutions should ideally follow, and on the other hand, certain members have an interest in establishing that institution for their own benefit.

UNDERSTANDING THE SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Group began as a counterterrorism and security organisation. It then evolved into a multifunctional regional organisation that includes economic cooperation and active diplomatic contact. The SCO was basically established as an Intergovernmental Network headed by annual summits and frequent meetings of the Heads of State, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and other high-ranking officials. Except for India, the majority of observer states send comparable personnel to comparable high-level meetings. The most frequented teams of working-level meetings in the security sector are currently national security secretaries and heads of supreme courts (Bailes et al. 2007). China's Central Asian diplomacy and the development of "non-alliance" forms of strategic cooperation have become anchored by the SCO. The SCO is also important to Russia. Despite the SCO's efforts to portray itself as a platform for information exchange and trust-building, as well as political and economic cooperation, hard power concerns continue to play a significant role in the organisation's policymaking (Majid 2016). Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan decided to form a regional multilateral forum to address these transnational concerns and difficulties, which became known as the Shanghai Five when the inaugural meeting of the member nations took place in the Chinese city of Shanghai on April 26, 1996 (Chung 2006). With the addition of Uzbekistan in June 2001, the Shanghai Five changed its name to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The historic summit of the SCO leaders of state and government, held in Astana, Kazakhstan, on June 8 and 9, 2017, marked the start of a new phase in the organisation's growth. One of the main consequences was the admission of India and Pakistan to the SCO as full members. The SCO's capability has been strengthened, and its range of prospects has been expanded because of the addition of these two powerful and prominent South Asian states, especially in countering existing and developing problems and dangers (Alimov 2020).

The SCO has the SCO Secretariat and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure as two permanent entities. Situated in Beijing, this Secretariat is made up of 30 personnel assigned to the budget of the SCO by the member states. The Secretariat works closely with the National Coordinating Council to prepare draft documents, make proposals, implement resolutions, and supervise the budget for the organisation. The RATS is based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and its staff are responsible for intelligence collection and sharing on suspected terrorist groups operating in member states of the SCO (Chung 2006).

The SCO has four main objectives. These are: (i) strengthening relations among the member states; (ii) promoting cooperation in political affairs, economics, and trade, scientific-technical, cultural, and educational spheres, as well as energy, transportation, tourism, and environmental protection; (iii)

safeguarding regional peace, security, and stability; and (iv) creating a democratic, equitable international political and economic order (SCO 2001a). China, as one of the SCO's founders, has had a considerable impact on the organisation's formation and subsequent evolution. For a variety of reasons, China initially regarded the SCO as a helpful instrument. First, China anticipated that it would aid in the consolidation of the Shanghai Five's achievements on border settlement and security confidence-building measures along China's borders with its neighbours in the SCO. Second, the SCO was expected to aid in the resolution of outstanding border issues with Russia, such as the disputed islands in the Amur and Argun rivers. Third, it was believed that the SCO would help ease the Bush administration's increasing security constraints on China, particularly in the aftermath of the Hainan aviation crash. Finally, China anticipated that the organisation's goal might be expanded to include collaborative operations against the "three evils", economic partnerships, and cultural exchanges (Qingguo 2007).

The objectives and tasks foreseen for the SCO are visibly described in Article 1 of the SCO Charter. In addition to regional cooperation in multiple spheres, Article 1 clearly emphasises the need to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to combat illicit drugs, arms trafficking, and other forms of transnational criminal activity and illegal migration in all its forms (SCO 2001b). Significantly, Article 2 of the SCO Charter specifies that in neighbouring territories, no nation shall pursue "unilateral military supremacy". This gives a very strong impulse to the organisation's efficiency, as it implies that any strategic distrust between Russia and China, or between Russia and other smaller nations, or between China and other smaller nations, will not hinder any front movement within the organisation, as that decreases the sensibility of the perceived military threat as a result of that provision.

There are common values with which most member states agree and comply. These include fighting terrorism, drug trafficking, extremism, and increasing diplomatic and economic interaction between member states. Many nations, including Russia and China, support the notion of "collective security" and agree fully with the role of the SCO. Sovereignty and international law are two notions that are intertwined in collective security (Li et al. 2020). On the sidelines, each member state has its own expectations regarding the SCO, but the organisation, however, is said to be dominated by Chinese standards and interests. The SCO's official pronouncements frequently allude to Chinese rhetoric on the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which is one evidence among many of Chinese domestic influence (Renard 2013).

China has developed its influence in both political and economic spheres through the SCO over the years and, therefore, has arguably emerged as a significant participant in regional affairs. In essence, China has used the procedures, equipment, and institutional processes of the SCO to carry out its

diplomatic ambitions in Central Asia. China's diplomacy in Central Asia has had such an influence that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is now regarded and acknowledged as a key regional platform for the larger Eurasian area, just two decades after its founding (Hashmi 2021).

Similarly, despite being a founding member of the SCO, Russia has formed a self-initiated regional cooperation organisation, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Both organisations overlap the economic and security agendas of the SCO in many ways. This indicates the expectation of Russia to be in the driving seat of any organisation. On the other hand, the SCO also plays a vital role in managing the increasing asymmetric relations between Russia and China. Some doubt Russia's true objectives for the SCO. Moscow failed to provide adequate support for the actual development of the SCO's competencies which would have allowed it to become a more effective organisation (Gabuev 2017). There are even broader critiques of the group, which is accused of "overpromising and underdelivering" and is said to be more concerned with symbols than content (Stronski and Sokolsky 2020).

Similarly, in 2017, Pakistan became a member of the SCO, which it described as an opportunity to improve relations with regional countries by facilitating trade through the Gwadar port, contributing to a regional solution to the Afghan problem, addressing its growing energy crisis, and learning from and contributing to the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). To improve bilateral relations with the SCO member states, Pakistan wants to increase interaction with Russia, contribute to the anti-terrorism campaign along with China, Iran, and Russia, and address the emerging energy needs (Zeb 2018). Likewise, the economic growth of Central Asian nations is currently below expectations, and they want the SCO to devote more attention to this problem. As a result, Central Asian member states of the SCO increasingly perceive the organisation as a forum to express their economic goals and promote their economic initiatives (Hashimova 2018).

INDIA IN THE SCO

In 2005, India was admitted as an observer to the SCO. Both the Council of Heads of States (CHS) and the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) meetings were attended by Indian Ministers of External Affairs or Ministers of Power during India's observer status (due to the high energy reserves of oil, gas, coal, and uranium in numerous SCO members). The SCO voted to welcome India and Pakistan as full members in July 2015 at Ufa, Russia. In June 2016, India and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, which started the official process of becoming full members of the SCO. India and Pakistan became full members of the SCO on June 9, 2017, during a historic

meeting in Astana (MEA 2020). India's full membership in the SCO has been formalised with the formation of the SCO Division at the Ministry of External Affairs and the appointment of a National Coordinator and Permanent Representative to the SCO. Various SCO meetings have been held regularly.

When India and Pakistan were accepted into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2017, political scientists and professionals split into two camps: optimists and pessimists. Pessimists claimed that the organisation's admittance of New Delhi and Islamabad would spell its demise: India and Pakistan would bring their host of disputes to the organisation, thus paralysing its operations (Denisov and Safranchuk 2017) and that could be seen in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an example. Optimists, on the other hand, claimed that without India, and even without Pakistan, a full-fledged system of stability in Eurasia could not be built. Therefore, there was no genuine choice but to embrace them (Kupriyanov 2020).

For both geopolitical and economic considerations, India's admission to the SCO as a full member state is an important milestone. China and Pakistan, both SCO members, have border issues with India. Since its independence, the country has been a victim of cross-border terrorism. India has not been able to tackle this problem on its own and therefore welcomes its participation in an organisation whose primary goal is to combat terrorism, extremism, and radicalism (Chakraborty 2017). Similarly, India, being a developing country, has huge energy demands. Resourceful Central Asian republics may be able to offer reliable electricity. Because of its participation, India will also be able to carry out its "Connect Central Asia Policy". India may now use SCO procedures to pressure Pakistan to open land routes to Central Asia, allowing the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) pipeline project to restart operations (Jaspal 2016).

In this broader environment, India seeks to pursue diplomacy concurrently along two parallel lines. The first way was to equate China in the Indo-Pacific Region with American assistance and aid, and the second way was to counter China with Russian support and help in the Eurasia Region. This is the method for India to emphasise its genuine long-term interests in the Indian Ocean and the Eurasian countryside as well. In other words, it represents the aspiration of India to emerge as both a continental and a maritime power, given its geostrategic location in the south and the physical proximity to the Eurasiatic landmass in the north (Mudiam 2018).

Similarly, there are two strategic approaches to India's position in the SCO. First, relations between India, Russia, and Central Asia (SCO members) are a key component in the group's functioning. Indeed, Russia and Central Asian nations applauded India's decision to become an SC Officer, despite China's early

inhibitions. The reason behind the Central Asian Republics' sympathising with India is that these countries clearly understand that India can challenge China's increasing domination in the Eurasian region. Secondly, the notion of India playing a major role in the post-Soviet Eurasia region through the SCO is increasing in certain places. But here it must be emphasised that India, even without the SCO, is a key participant in Eurasia's post-Soviet geopolitics. In Eurasia, there is also a need to extend the membership of the SCO due to evolving geopolitical realignment (Mohapatra 2020).

Currently, India is using the SCO platform for three primary reasons. Taking into account the Sino-Indo strategic rivalry in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, India is using the SCO to minimise Chinese influence on its borderline. While addressing the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, PM Modi stated, referring to China, that India thinks that for the region's development and security, we must develop a shared rules-based system via discussion. It also must apply to everyone individually, as well as globally. Such an order must value sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the equality of all states, regardless of size or power. These laws and standards should be based on universal consent rather than the authority of a few. This must be based on trust in discussion rather than relying on coercion (MEA 2018). Especially after the China-India border clash in the Galwan River Valley in the Ladakh region, India has constantly used "mutual respect and sovereignty" in its SCO addresses. Similarly, India constantly opposes China's penetration of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its connectivity projects in the SCO agreements. In his speech on November 10, 2020, PM Modi emphasised the importance of a diverse set of connectivity initiatives for long-term growth. He added that the "international North-South Transport Corridor, Chabahar Port, and Ashgabat Agreements demonstrate India's strong determination towards connectivity (Mohapatra 2020)."

Second, India is constantly using the SCO summit to confront Pakistan. Without mentioning Pakistan, India's vice president in 2020 stressed the need for all countries to work together to combat terrorism, particularly cross-border terrorism. The VP reprimanded nations that use terrorism as a tool of state strategy. He chastised members who brought up bilateral problems in SCO discussions, saying that this was against the organisation's norms and mission. PM Modi also raised this issue during the SCO CHS meeting hosted by Russia on November 10, 2020 (Sajjanhar 2020). At the same meeting, PM Modi also said he also chastised individuals who try to "unnecessarily" bring bilateral matters to the SCO in contravention of the grouping's founding principles, referring to Pakistan (Stobdan 2020). At the recent meeting of the National Security Advisor in Dushanbe, India's NSA Ajit Doval proposed an action plan against Pakistan's terrorist organisations Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). He condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, called for the

elimination of double standards in dealing with terrorists, and agreed to share terrorist intelligence. India's administration thinks that acting against terrorist groups is critical to tightening the screws on Pakistan (*Times of India* 2021).

And third, India has also managed to demonstrate its leadership capabilities through the SCO in the region. The SCO members held several major activities to improve economic, commercial, and cultural cooperation. India hosted the first-ever SCO Young Scientists Conclave (November 24–28) in a virtual format, with more than 200 young scientists attending. Additionally, the first Consortium of SCO Economic Think Tanks (August 20–21) and the first SCO Startup Forum were also held in India (October 27). The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry held the inaugural SCO Business Conclave on November 23 in a B2B format, with a focus on MSMEs' collaboration. Similarly, India also aimed to develop three new pillars of collaboration under its leadership: startups and innovation; science and technology; and traditional medicine.

Similarly, during the chairmanship of India in the SCO in 2020, India introduced three new pillars within the SCO framework, namely, Startups and Innovation, Science and Technology, and Traditional Medicine. The first Consortium of SCO Economic Think Tanks (August 20–21) and the first SCO Startup Forum were also held in India (October 27). The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry held the first SCO Business Conclave (November 23) in a B2B format, with a focus on MSMEs' cooperation (Sajjanhar 2020). India's activities, especially after 2020, signalled India's intention to expand economic cooperation within the SCO.

However, on the sidelines, the SCO has become hostile because of the bilateral relations between the member states. Bilateral antagonism was specifically prohibited, for example, in territorial conflicts, from the SCO agenda with the accession of India and Pakistan (*Times of India* 2017). However, India and Pakistan were bound to be included as full members, creating tensions within the SCO. Surprisingly, the tensions between India and Pakistan were less obvious than those between India and China. A little less than a week after India joined the SCO in 2017, a disagreement broke out over a Chinese-built road in Doklam, and border troops were amassed on both sides (*Xinhua* 2017). This was a precursor to the 2020 battle. Some months later, the issue was resolved with the removal of soldiers from both sides. In order to deescalate this issue, the SCO has played no part.

CONCLUSION

According to some studies, International Organisations' authority in world politics has been growing in recent years. Over the past few decades, international organisations have grown in authority, becoming less reliant on the control of

individual member nations. National governments are increasingly putting aside their vetoes by embracing majoritarian forms of decision-making (pooling) and empowering independent institutions to act on their behalf, reflecting the growing authority of international organisations (delegation). For instance, Peritz (2020) made an assessment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on how the domestic veto influences the decision-making process within the organisation. The findings of the study are premised on the fact that although the decision-making process of the WTO is superior to that of other organizations, participant countries wilfully delay or disobey complying with the standard for domestic economic and political reasons. The reasons for the development of international authority are threefold: i) the functional drive for successful cooperation, (ii) rising political demands for non-governmental engagement, and (iii) the spread of authoritative institutional templates among international organisations (Lenz 2017). In the future, these forces are likely to continue to push for greater international authority. And although the world is inherently competitive, governments do cooperate on a variety of norms, they believe collectively. Sometimes it is difficult to maintain the balance between competition and cooperation. Concerns about cheating and relative gains are two variables that prevent collaboration. Mearsheimer (1994) mentioned that states must be driven largely by concerns about relative gains when considering cooperation because they are concerned about the balance of power. While each state seeks to maximise its absolute benefits, it is more vital to ensure that it outperforms, or at the very least does not outperform, the other state in any agreement. Academically, if we look at the ontological foundation and the regulatory link between international society and its normative side, it is not clear that it can act, create standards, and apply its own criteria of membership. This underlines the basic issue that the functionality of an international organisation is theoretically sound but less pragmatic in reality.

Thus, academic superficiality, optimistic objectives, and the power struggle between the member states that derive the focus of the organisation can be clearly seen in the SCO. More specifically, India does not focus on normative values but is focused on minimising the gains of China and Pakistan through the organisation. In recent years, New Delhi has been cautious with regard to Beijing. India avoided direct confrontations (except for the Doklam moment), engaged in proxy wars against Chinese influence in the region (Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives), and strengthened cooperation with friendly Indo-Pacific nations.

While the establishment of the SCO has forwarded the Chinese idea of regionalism to fight the so-called *three evils*, India has approached the organisation in a different manner. Geopolitically, China and Pakistan are the main reasons why India joined the SCO. However, now India is taking various initiatives within the organisation that not only represent the leadership capabilities of the organisation but also the attitude based on interest in the organisation. India

identified the foundational characteristic of Eurasia as being "SECURE" during the 2018 SCO summit, which is expected to influence India's future involvement in the area. SECURE is made up of (Roy and Roy 2020):

a. S: Security of our citizens,

b. E: Economic Development for all,

c. C: Connecting the Region,

d. U: Unite our People,

e. R: Respect for Sovereignty and Integrity, and,

f. E: Environmental Protection.

Similarly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi summed up India's approach to economic development in the SCO in his presentation to the SCO Council of Heads of Government on November 10, 2020, emphasising the importance of a diverse set of connectivity projects for long-term development. At the summit, Prime Minister Modi remarked that "the International North-South Transport Corridor, Chabahar Port, and Ashgabat Agreements represent India's strong commitment to connectivity." To enhance connectivity, India feels it is vital to stick to the core values of respecting each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Not only that, India now frequently uses the SCO platform to oppose the "One Belt, One Road" initiative as well. India rejects the OBOR initiative and has simply abstained from signing the OBOR declaration at both the "SCO Council of Heads of Government" and the "meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation." The "Joint Communique following the meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation" detailed the "alternative connectivity system" in Central Asia under the UN plan in great detail (Mohapatra 2020). The inclusion of the UN to counter the idea of China also signals the basic foundation on which India's norms are inclined.

On the other hand, having great power with different interests within one organisation can linger or make the organisation dysfunctional. Scholars point out that these organisations suffer from unique pathologies that cause them to become bureaucratic and unresponsive to the requirements of their stakeholders. Having China, Russia, India, and Pakistan in the SCO has the same effect when their states' interests directly impact the organisation's decision-making. In this context, there are three ideal scenarios for India within the SCO.

First, one may expect that, through rigorous discussions, India and China would either resolve their border dispute, restore the *status quo*, or find another method to ensure that the border issue does not obstruct the growth of their relationship. The same may be said of India's and Pakistan's ties. Second, the SCO will not regard the current situation as a problem but will continue to cooperate in areas where

the differences between India, China, and Pakistan are not important, and talks on matters such as counterterrorism will be carried over to bilateral levels. And third, within the SCO, two organisations will emerge: the "broader SCO", in which all participants interact on issues that do not cause any contradictions; and the "restricted SCO", with alternative mechanisms of interaction, through which dialogue on topics blocked by Pakistan and India is conducted.

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БОРБА ИЗМЕЂУ НОРМИ И МЕЂУНАРОДНЕ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЈЕ: СТУДИЈА СЛУЧАЈА ИНДИЈЕ У ШАНГАЈСКОЈ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЈИ САРАДЊЕ (ШОС)

Апстракт: Примарни задатак овог рада је да истражи циљ придруживања Индије Шангајској организацији за сарадњу (ШОС). Проналажење корелације између норми које је организације успоставила и правог разлога зашто се једна држава придружује тој организацији кључни је значај студије. Такође, посебна пажња је посвећена концепту међународних организација као дисеминатора норми. У раду се прво говори о нормативној теорији у међународним односима и покушају да је премости са међународним организацијама (МО). Поред тога, у раду је дата процена улоге коју имају норме у покретању међународне организације и обрнуто. Главни аргумент је да је Индија уједно усвојила и сарадњу и конкурентски приступ према ШОС-у, посебно имајући у виду непријатељске односе са Кином и Пакистаном. Овај рад је квалитативна студија, која је разматрала примарне и секундарне изворе података, како би повезала теоријско изучавање са емпиријским истраживањима.

Кључне речи: Шангајска организација за сарадњу (ШОС), Индија, Кина, Пакистан, међународна организација, норме.

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Review article

RUSSIA'S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA – REACH AND LIMITS OF RUSSIA'S RE-EMERGENCE

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Abstract: This paper aims to show the growing Russian interest in the development perspectives of African countries. Russia decided to join the new scramble for Africa alongside other international actors, such as China, India, etc. However, due to its internal limitations, Russia's ability to project its influence in Africa is limited. Therefore, the proposed hypothesis in this paper is that Russia cannot play a leadership role in Africa, but can represent a kind of strategic alternative for African countries. The paper identifies four dimensions of the relationship between Russia and African countries: political, economic, military, and soft power. Furthermore, four goals of Russian policy towards Africa are determined: projecting power on the global stage; accessing raw materials and natural resources; arms exports and security; supporting energy capacities; and infrastructure development in Africa through Russian companies. The paper also addresses African interests in cooperation with Russia. Lastly, Russia's strategy in Africa has been represented through a SWOT analysis to determine its strengths and weaknesses.

Keywords: Russia, Africa, Central African Republic, soft power, scramble, SWOT analysis.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, the goal is to determine the reach, scope, and limitations of Russian influence in Africa. Four dimensions of Russia's relations with African

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countries are identified: political, economic, military, and soft power.[2] Then, we will try to determine the objectives of Russian engagement in Africa and identify potential investment models that can lead to the achievement of those goals. We will attempt to perceive the weaknesses of Russian strategy in Africa, either in absolute terms or in comparison with other actors operating in this area (France, the UK, the US, China, India, etc.). However, this is not a comparative study of the external actors in Africa, which is a complex topic that would go beyond the scope of this paper. Comparisons with other actors will be used only to highlight Russia's key comparative advantages or disadvantages over other external actors. Finally, African interests are not neglected. The paper considers what African countries and Africans gain from the Russian presence on the continent.

The main hypothesis claims that Russia cannot play a leadership role in Africa due to its economic-financial, demographic, and naval limitations. However, it can be an interesting alternative to other external actors and serve African countries as a means of diversification vis-à-vis China, India, and the Western bloc. In terms of methodology, we use analytical and synthetic methods as well as the method of concretization. Analytical methods identify individual Russian interests and elements of strategy. Synthetic methods and the method of concretization allow us to define a clear and comprehensive Russian strategy.

As for the literature review, Western academia was basically ignoring the role of Russia in Africa until recently. Things have changed since Russia's intervention in the Central African Republic, and Western authors have resumed their examination of Russia's African policy. The most prominent author is Kimberly Marten, who in her paper from 2019 assessed the role of Russia as destabilising and negative, primarily due to the use of private military company Wagner Group. Media headlines in western media related to this topic are predominantly negative (*BBC News* 2021; Lister and Shukla 2021). On the other hand, Russian authors such as Irina Abramova talk about the favourable aspects of Russia's engagement in Africa, citing opportunities for mutual benefit. The Russian authors are very assertive and provide specific guidelines for improving Russian policy in this area. Other authors have a neutral position, citing the shortcomings and limitations of Russian policy and its specifics in relation to other actors. Finally, it should be noted that the topic of Russia in Africa has not been analysed as much as the policies of China, India, and others.

[2] We define soft power, according to the description by Joseph Nye, as the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes you want (Nye 2004).

DIMENSIONS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES

As we have already pointed out, we identify four dimensions of relations between Russia and African countries: political, economic, military, and soft power. The history of Russian-African relations will be presented within the political dimension. Given that Russia is one of the largest exporters of weapons in the world, we believe that this segment of military cooperation must be singled out. In this section, we also consider the events in the Central African Republic, where Russia has taken an active part in the conflict for the first time in post-Cold War history. The education sector is perceived as the most important segment of Russia's soft power in the region.

Political dimension

The fact that Russia never tried to colonise the African continent[3] and that the Soviet Union supported the anti-colonial struggle in Africa gives present-day Russia credibility as a reliable partner. In 1869, for instance, Russia gave Ethiopia military support to threaten the position of the British in their quest to control the Suez Canal. Russia did this because Britain was one of its main European rivals (Beseny 2019). Russia also helped Ethiopia during the First Italo-Ethiopian War from 1895 to 1896. Russia's early interest in Ethiopia, in particular, is especially prescient vis-à-vis later Soviet and post-Soviet calculations. As Yakobson points out, to the Russians of pre-Soviet days, a peaceful penetration of Ethiopia meant not only a means of influencing and controlling the fate of the country, but an opportunity to enter the interior of Africa, to exert influence on Egypt and the whole Nile area, to get a foothold on the Red Sea, and, last but not least, to keep a check on the British. Thus, the Russians saw Ethiopia as the most suitable postern gate "into the African continent" (Yakobson 1963).

After the Revolution of 1917, the Communist International (Rus. *Коминтéрн, III Интернационáл*) became the primary vehicle for the Kremlin's contacts with Africa and its efforts to politically influence the continent's nascent anti-colonial movements. During the Cold War, Africa was a major theatre of the Soviet Union's competition with the United States. For example, Soviet financial

[3] Although there is a narrative according to which Russia should be portrayed as a colonial power in Africa, this was not *de facto* the case. The short-lived presence of the Russians in the town of Sagallo (present-day Djibouti) was the work of the renegade Cossack Ataman Nikolai Ashinov and his 165 Terek Cossacks (it was not an act of the Russian state). The colony existed for less than three weeks (from January 14, 1889, to February 5, of the same year), after which it was conquered by the French (Lunochkin 1999).

assistance was critical to the ANC's establishment of military training camps. Even more important was the flow of arms, including thousands of AK-47s and a few dozen Strela antiaircraft missile launchers. Scholarships for generations of ANC students enabled them to study in the Soviet Union, both of which were tremendous boosts to the then-embattled movement (Pahm 2010, 72). Similarly, the Soviet Union played an important role in supporting the MPLA in Angola, not only in the period leading up to the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975 but also in the latter struggle against Jonas Savimbi's rival nationalist group, the UNITA (Shubin and Tokarev 2001, 614).

Russia benefits from ties established decades ago through the assistance the Soviet Union provided to many African anti-colonial leaders. By the time the Soviet Union formally dissolved, more than 50,000 Africans had studied in Soviet universities and military and technical institutes, and at least another 200,000 Africans had received Soviet training on African soil (Pahm 2014). However, in the 1990s, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the African continent was neglected by the "new Russia", and relations with African countries were sacrificed for chimerical expectations of "aid" from the West and the absolute atrophy of Russian influence worldwide. In total, nine embassies, three consulates, and a variety of trade missions and student exchange programmes were closed in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution (Marten 2019, 155).

Ever since Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president, there has been a slow but steady renewal of Russian interest in Africa. The first visit of a modern Russian head of state to an African country occurred in 2005, when Vladimir Putin visited Egypt. Another visit happened in 2015. Although he was expected much earlier, Putin visited South Africa in September 2006 and signed with President Thabo Mbeki a treaty of friendship and partnership between Russia and South Africa. In June 2009, Dmitry Medvedev visited Egypt, Angola, Namibia, and Nigeria (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 55).

Likewise, a number of African leaders visited Moscow. In 2001 alone, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, Lansana Conté of Guinea, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia made official visits to Moscow (Pahm 2010, 75). In 2016, two African heads of state, King Mohammed VI of Morocco and Alfa Condé, President of Guinea, visited Russia. The latter took part in the annual Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2016, and there he suggested the idea of establishing a Russia-Africa forum, which would be a convenient platform for discussion of new joint projects and development programs. The idea was neither rejected nor obviously supported (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 55). Russia welcomed 43 heads of state or government, along with dozens of business and community leaders, in Sochi in 2019 (Paquette 2019).

Russia seeks to develop a comprehensive policy toward Africa. Two departments in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs deal directly with Africa: the Department of Africa (sub-Saharan) and the Department of the Middle East and North Africa. It should be noted that the top officials of the ministry are familiar with the Global South. Minister Sergey Lavrov's initial speciality was Sri Lanka. Former (until September 2019) State Secretary and Deputy Minister Grigory Karasin was the first Soviet student of Hausa at a Nigerian university, while the current Deputy Minister and President's Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, Mikhail Bogdanov, served as ambassador to Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 53).

We should mention two other executive bodies: the Ministry of Economic Development, which includes the Department of Asia and Africa and, in particular, supervises the work of Russian trade missions abroad (Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation); the other one is the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which has its own division covering the Middle East and North African countries, and a division covering African countries (Minpromtorg of the Russian Federation). At the same time, Russia has invested a large amount of money in gathering information about Africa. The best example is the Institute for African Studies within the Russian Academy of Sciences, which now embraces thirteen research units, a working group, and an information centre, employing a total of more than one hundred academic staff members (Pahm 2014).

In short, Russian policy towards Africa has two pillars: (i) economic access to international markets and (ii) the use of multilateralism to promote Russian geopolitical hegemony" (Pahm 2010, 75).

Russia supports Africans in their desire to address domestic challenges (related to security and economic development) on their own and actively engage in shaping global architecture. Clearly, social and economic progress on the continent correlates with long-lasting peace and stability. A good example here is the African Union (AU), which granted observer status to Russia in 2006. Both Russia and the AU are deeply interested in further cooperation in line with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in September 2014 between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commission of the African Union on the procedure of political consultations (Abramova 2017, 11). Moscow sees as a priority the diversification of ties with continental and regional bodies in Africa, the foremost being the AU. Putin's special representative for the Middle East and Africa regularly attends AU summits (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 56–57).

One of the main multilateral stepping-stones for Russia in Africa is the BRICS. Naturally, South Africa is regarded by Moscow as a key partner on the African continent. Bilateral relations are based on a joint declaration on the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership signed in March 2013.

(Daniel and Shubin 2018, 57). Recently, Russia has also been trying to expand its cooperation with African regional economic communities, especially the SADC.

Economic dimension

From the point of view of political economy, the fundamental similarity between African and Russian developmental paradigms lies in the fact that their natural resources are used as a primary source of revenue (Fituni and Abramova 2010, 60). Russia's economic interests are different from those of China and India, for whom access to Africa's natural resources, especially its hydrocarbons, is a strategic necessity if they are to continue to sustain the growth of their economies (Pahm 2014). That is not the case with Russia, which has these resources in abundance. It cannot be overlooked, however, that Russia tries to mine certain raw materials, such as aluminium, chrome, manganese, mercury, titanium, copper, nickel, zinc, bauxite, and diamonds, in Africa (Pahm 2014; *The Conversation* 2019). Although Russia is usually in the top ten countries in terms of strategic reserves of most of these minerals, it strives to save up its strategic reserves and perform mining elsewhere where the whole process is cheaper and more deregulated.

In total, twenty major Russian companies participate in mining in Africa. Russia is involved in a mega-project to develop Zimbabwe's biggest platinum mine at Darwendale, which would create about 15,000 jobs and produce about a million ounces of platinum a year (*Chronicle Zimbabwe* 2015). Russia, on the other hand, wants to expand its partnership with Africa beyond minerals, to include engineering and research, as well as the ability to market advanced technology. For example, Russian advanced technology and financial resources are being used to create the Angolan National System of Satellite Communications and Broadcasting (ANGOSAT). Work on the project began in 2013. ANGOSAT-1, which was launched in 2017, supports Angola's telecommunications infrastructure and improves the quality of radio signals, television broadcasts, and telephone and internet services in the country (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 57–59).

To utilise its part of the complementary relations, Russia is now seeking to exploit conventional gas and oil fields in Africa. Part of its long-term energy strategy is to use Russian companies to create new streams of energy supply. For example, Russian companies have made significant investments in Algeria's oil and gas industries. They have also invested in Libya, Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Egypt (Beseny 2019). In addition to Gazprom, other Russian firms are active in the Algerian oil and gas sector. Stroytransgaz has completed a 403-kilometre gas pipeline running from Haud el-Hamra to Arzrev and is working on another 273-kilometre-long pipeline from Hadjret En Nouss to Sougueur. In tandem

with Stroytransgaz, Rosneft pursues oil and gas exploration in largely untapped southern Algeria, while Soyuzneftegaz, another Russian oil and gas company, is pioneering the local use of advanced technologies to enhance yield and rehabilitate older fields (Titorenko 2006, 163–169).

Russian-African trade increased more than tenfold between 2000 and 2012. Trade between Russia and sub-Saharan Africa started at low levels but increased rapidly to $4.8 billion in 2018 from $1.8 billion in 2010. In the same year, Russia's exports to sub-Saharan Africa totalled $3 billion, while imports from sub-Saharan Africa came in at $1.7 billion. In 2015, Algeria, together with Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and South Africa, accounted for 80% of Africa's exports to Russia. Cote d'Ivoire saw a strong increase in mutual trade with Russia in 2018, particularly in agricultural products and energy (Signé 2019).

The positive incentive for Russia-Africa cooperation in the economic sphere was created by Moscow's decision to cancel the debt of African countries (around $20 billion; it is difficult to determine the exact amount because of the various currencies involved in the trade during the USSR) in 2012. Russia also introduced a preferential system for traditional African export commodities such as fruits. Several agreements have been signed with African countries on the use of remaining debts to fund development projects. There are a number of bilateral intergovernmental commissions with African countries, but unfortunately, not all of them are active (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 59).

According to the African Development Bank, Russian companies invested about $20 billion in Africa in 2014 in the projects ranging from energy production and mining to infrastructure and fisheries. Russian business interests across the continent are promoted by the Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with African Countries (AFROCOM), which brings together ministries and other government agencies as well as companies large and small. AFROCOM is headed by the chairman of state-owned Vnesheconombank (VEB), which created the Russian Agency on Insurance of Export Credits and Investments in 2011 to facilitate the activities of Russian companies in Africa by protecting export credits and investments from political risk (Pahm 2014). More recently, Russia has started organising numerous economic forums. The three-day June 2018 Saint Petersburg Economic Forum reunited Russia and Africa and gave African countries the chance to meet with Russia's foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov. The Russia-SADC business forum that was held in February in Moscow is another example of the strengthening of ties between Russia and Africa in a broad range of economic fields (Signé 2019). Cooperation with the regional integration group Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is in force, and with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is

ongoing. This cooperation with RECs may benefit Russia in many ways. The future will show if its full potential is achieved.

The first-ever Russia-Africa summit in full capacity was held on October 23-24, 2019, in Sochi, marking the culminating point of the return of Russia to Africa, with more than 50 African leaders and more than 6,000 delegates from 104 countries attending the summit. During the two days, Russia and Africa signed more than 50 agreements worth over $12 billion. Russia presented a map of Russian competencies for Africa, which included information and analytical software. More than 170 Russian companies and organisations participated (*The Standard* 2019).

For the development of economic ties between Russia and Africa, the segment of small and medium businesses is very important. Russian businesses in Africa face competition from other countries, but even worse, they face malicious reporting that could be potentially damaging to their reputation and, consequently, business performance. For example, South African press reports on the cooperation of Moscow and Tshwane in the field of atomic energy have been negative. Russian entrepreneurs that do business in Africa need the help of the Russian state. In 2011, the Russian Export Insurance Agency was established. Then, in 2015, the government established the Russian Export Centre as a "daughter" of the state-owned Vnesheconombank, to operate as "one window" for both financial and other steps to support exports. At the same time, Russian business people interested in Africa have taken some steps to organise themselves. In 2009, the Coordination Committee on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa (Afrocom) united more than 90 Russian entities, including ministries, agencies, organisations, and companies representing big, small, and medium-sized businesses. The committee now operates under the auspices of the Russian Export Centre. However, despite these initiatives, efforts to improve business relations between Africa and Russia have remained weak when compared to other players' mechanisms for multilateral cooperation, such as Chinese FOCAC and the India-Africa Forum (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 59–60). The reasons for this are numerous. Firstly, Russia lacks financial resources in comparison to other actors such as China, India, Japan, the US, etc. For this reason, Russia must use its financial resources more selectively. Russia has the financial know-how to implement individual projects, but it lacks the resources of, for example, China to cover the entire African continent with a variety of different projects, especially big residential (non-profit-generating) projects. Secondly, both China and India have a larger diaspora in Africa than Russia. Establishing business connections with the diaspora is very important.[4]

[4] China and Russia in Africa do not act in agreement, but they are not opposed either. See more about the possibilities of an alliance between Russia and China in: Lađevac 2015.

Military cooperation

Defence and military cooperation are very important for Russia, given that Russia is one of the leading manufacturers of military equipment. Russia has traditionally been one of Africa's main arms suppliers. During the Cold War, several armed liberation organisations and African countries, such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Guinea (Beseny 2019), were involved. In 2001, Russia signed a $120 million contract to equip Sudan with ten MiG-29SE fighters and two MiG-24UB dual-seat trainers. In 2011, Russia signed another deal to sell two dozen Mi-24 attack helicopters and fourteen Mi-8 transport helicopters to Sudan. In general, the Russian model can be defined as arms first, business concessions later. As demonstrated by the cases of Mozambique and Angola, in many African countries, military assistance is used to get access to strategic economic sectors, such as the energy and mining sectors of African countries (Signé 2019).

The number of arms supplied by Russia keeps increasing, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) found that Russia's sales of weaponry to African countries in 2017 had doubled compared to 2012. China and the US are crucial weapons suppliers in the world in general, but in Africa, they fall behind Russia, which supplied 39% of Africa's imported arms between 2017 and 2013. SIPRI's data on major weapons transfers show that the main arms transferred by Russia in 2016-2017 were principally second-hand equipment such as combat and transport helicopters, aircraft, and surface-to-air missile systems (Signé 2019). That implicitly means that Russian military technicians are still fulfilling maintenance contracts on this second-hand equipment (Marten 2019, 158).

Russia is also providing training for South African air force pilots to increase their flying hours (*DefenceWeb* 2016). Since 2015, Russia has signed more than 20 military cooperation agreements with African states, any one of which could theoretically evolve into a permanent basing presence (Hedenskog 2018). Moreover, in September 2018, Russia announced an agreement with Eritrea to build a naval logistics facility in Assab, just a few hundred miles from US AFRICOM's naval hub in Djibouti (Dahir 2018). The Russian Navy also escorts the Russian and foreign vessels in the Gulf of Aden as part of the fight against piracy. Eight attempts to board ships were stopped, and four pirate ships were detained. The Russian sailors' actions were highly commended around the world, and many partners called for developing cooperation against piracy (Fituni and Abramova 2010, 186).

Russia has contributed troops, expertise, and military observers to UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South

Sudan, Sudan, and Western Sahara. In 2012 alone, Russia contributed $2 million to the AU's Peace Fund (Pahm 2014).

Another significant military engagement by Russia is in the Central African Republic (CAR). In 2013, the ongoing power struggle in the CAR became religious. Seleka-Muslim rebels seized power in the primarily Christian country. Soon after, in 2014, anti-balaka-Christian militias rose up and pressured Seleka rebels to hand power to a transitional government. Soon after, the Seleka group split and started fighting among each other, as well as anti-balaka groups. This conflict was too complex for Western countries to handle, and it did not fit into the desirable binary narrative of good guys vs. bad guys because all sides committed atrocities during the conflict. Among the top 10 contributors to the MINUSCA peacekeeping mission, there are no European countries. A small French contingent was present there, but on a different task.

Russia has taken advantage of the security vacuum. For example, Russia donated its own weapons to the CAR in 2018 in order to surpass France's offer and achieve a monopoly on strategic access in the country (Signé 2019). Russia may be experimenting with a model of intervention in the CAR that it could use elsewhere. Western authors, particularly Kimberly Marten, are harsh critics of Russia's participation in the CAR. She says that firstly, Russian-trained security forces in the CAR are not being integrated into the UN-backed EU training mission with its legal and human rights standards. A parallel, Russia-controlled national security structure, is emerging that could be used to protect Russian interests while thwarting democratic oversight of the CAR military. Secondly, while Russia did play a positive role in fast-tracking a peace accord in the war-torn country in February 2019, rebel militia leaders are being integrated into the CAR government and military institutions with inadequate vetting and oversight. Since the state currently controls only 20 percent of the country's territory, this hasty integration throws into doubt the CAR's ability to achieve real sovereignty. The people of CAR will suffer the most, she says, if Russia cannot be persuaded to play by well-established international peacekeeping norms, since they are the ones who will be dealing with illiberal security forces and a lack of accountability in their supposedly democratic new government (Marten 2019, 162–163). However, it remains unclear what norms she had in mind given the well-known sexual scandals involving United Nations peacekeepers from various countries that took place in Cambodia and elsewhere. Interestingly, the lack of accountability is significant only when it comes to the Russians. Anyhow, we can compare the Russian strategy in the CAR to the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan. The goal is to secure the government in the capital and the big cities while the countryside is left to the rebels. In this way, Russia wants to ensure the stability of the local government

and thus maintain the legitimacy of its presence because it justifies its presence through bilateral calls for cooperation.[5]

Soft power

Russia's soft power on the African continent is represented through humanitarian aid, the construction of Russian humanitarian centres, the teaching of the Russian language, the education of Africans in Russia, the development of scientific cooperation, the provision of medical care, and assistance in natural disasters (Konstantinova 2020, 6).

The Russian centres of science and culture (*Руссийские центры науки и культуры – РЦНК*) are the focal points of Russian soft power in Africa. These centres are present in eight countries: Egypt, Zambia, Morocco, the Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and South Africa. In these centres, cultural workers organise their meetings, Russian films and TV shows are played, and Russian language courses are also organised. The interest of African youth in the Russian language is growing. In Egypt and the Republic of the Congo, departments of the Russian language were opened at the faculties of philology (Konstantinova 2020, 6–7). Moreover, an agreement was signed between Zambia's Copperbelt University and the People's Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University–*Российский университет дружбы народов,* formerly the Patrice Lumumba University), to set up a regional centre offering Russian language courses to students in Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola (Signé 2019).

Another element of soft power is the offices of the "Russian world" (*Русскиймир*). They are located at the leading universities in many African countries. These offices also provide Russian language courses. There are also Russian schools that mainly serve to educate the children of Russian diplomats, but are also open to African students (Konstantinova 2020, 7).

In 2020, 17,000 students from Africa studied at Russian universities. That is insufficient compared to China, which had about 50,000 students in the same year. Russian vaccines are also a significant source of soft power. These are vaccines against yellow fever, poliomyelitis, the experimental Ebola vaccine, as well as the COVID-19 vaccine (Konstantinova 2020, 8). Russia's contribution to eradicating the Ebola virus was over $60 million, received at the AU summit in January 2016 (Daniel and Shubin 2018, 57).

[5] Russia also has extensive experience in international negotiations, calming and stabilising conflicts. See more in Jović-Lazić i Lađevac 2013.

Another factor is the so-called "people's diplomacy", which is primarily embodied in the Russian Orthodox Church, but also in various sports activities. The Russian Orthodox Church is most active in Ethiopia, but also in the traditionally religious Congo (both the DRC and the RC). The 2018 FIFA World Cup also promoted Russia on the African continent (Konstantinova 2020, 9). The last source of power is the media. RT, Sputnik TASS, and TV news (*ТВ-Новости*) are present in Africa (Konstantinova 2020, 10).

For diplomacy and support, Russia offers a non-Western-centric option. In 2015, Russia created an alternative credit rating agency to counterbalance the influence that Western credit agencies had in deciding on the access to finance of the developing world (Signé 2019).

GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION MODELS OF RUSSIA'S STRATEGY TOWARDS AFRICA

This section presents four specific goals of Russia's strategy on the African continent.

Goal 1: Projecting power on the global stage

African countries constitute the largest voting bloc in the United Nations General Assembly. By supporting them, Russia is cultivating allies in its challenge to the current United States and Euro-Atlantic-dominated security order. This strategy already proved useful to China when it managed to push Taiwan out of the United Nations with the help of the votes of African countries. Russian diplomacy has seen the benefits of this strategy, and it is making an effort to win over the hearts and minds of African countries. By doing so, Russia will increase its chances of blocking resolutions within the United Nations General Assembly that are to Russia's detriment.

Goal 2: Accessing raw materials and natural resources

In terms of natural resources, Russia is trying to use its complementarity with Africa. Unlike other external actors, Russia is not looking for fossil fuels or gold. Russia actually needs other rare elements such as manganese (100%), chrome (80%), and cobalt, to name a few. Bauxites imported from Africa, for example, account for more than 60% of Russian aluminium production. Production costs in Africa are usually much lower than in Russia. From the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Central African Republic, Russian companies are scaling up their activities in the mining of resources such as coltan, cobalt, gold, and diamonds. In Zimbabwe, a joint venture between Russia's JSC Afromet and Zimbabwe's Pen East Ltd is developing one of the world's largest deposits of platinum group metal. In Angola, Russian mining company Alroser recently increased its stake in local producer Catoca to 41% in a deal that provides the

diamond giant with a production base outside Russia. Russia also wants to use its mostly state-owned oil and gas companies to create new streams of energy supply. In 2018, for instance, Nigerian oil and gas exploration company Oranto Petroleum announced that it would cooperate with Russia's largest oil producer, Rosneft, to develop 21 oil assets across 17 African countries. Several Russian companies have also made significant investments in Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Egypt's oil and gas industries (Adibe 2019). Therefore, unlike other external partners, Russia does not want African oil and gas, but rather to develop infrastructure (for transporting those commodities) and thus make money while leaving the possibility to connect that infrastructure with its own in the future.

Goal 3: Arms exports and security

In recent years, Russia has become the largest supplier of arms to Africa, accounting for 35% of arms exports to the region, followed by China (17%), the United States (9.6%), and France (6.9%). Since 2015, Russia has signed more than 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African states (Adibe 2019). For Russia, arms exports are a source of revenue but also a projection of influence. Russian weapons have a good cost-quality ratio compared to those of other manufacturers. Moreover, its reliability is very good, so it can often be used as "second-hand merchandise" with great efficiency. The last factor that gives Russian weapons a competitive advantage over rivals is the fact that Russian or Soviet weapons have been present in Africa since the "liberation period"[6] so that forces on the ground are familiar with and accustomed to their use.

The scenario from the Central African Republic is a model according to which Russia could act in Africa, and that is by filling the security gaps that arise due to fatigue or lack of interest by Western partners. Russia's goal in such engagements is to provide security for a government that is willing to support cooperation with Russia. Russia is not guided by ideological principles in such types of cooperation.

Goal 4: Supporting energy and power development in Africa through Russian companies

In a way, this fourth goal represents the development of the second goal, which is the energy infrastructure development. The lack of affordable, reliable electricity in Africa makes it a lucrative location for Russia's energy and power industry. Several state-owned Russian companies, such as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rostec, and Rosatom, are active in Africa. Activities are largely concentrated in

[6] The liberation period represents various types of armed rebellions that eventually led to the liberation of African countries from colonialism. There is no exact definition or periodization because it is different for each country.

Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and Uganda. Thus far, Rosatom has signed memorandums and agreements to develop nuclear energy with 18 African countries, including Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. In 2018 alone, Rosatom agreed to build four 1200 MW VVER-type nuclear reactors in Egypt. This includes construction and maintenance valued at $60 billion, with a Russian loan of up to $25 billion at an annual interest rate of 3% (Adibe 2019).

As we said, the Russian academic community is very proactive in Russian engagement in Africa. Irina Abramova came up with five basic principles on how to identify the regions most attractive for investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. These are common principles in both applied (strategic investment analysis, project investment, venture capital, private equity investment analysis, and valuation country/region risk assessment) and academic methods. These principles are as follows:

- Objective indicators of economic development, demographic and resource potential;
- Differentiation of the investment climate by different economic levels;
- The investment climate of the region is more than just the sum of investment climates in the countries of this region (the synergy effect);
- The investment climate has to be plugged into the regional economy (Abramova 2017, 19).

Based on these principles, Abramova formulated four possible Russian investment models in Africa:

1) The resource-oriented investment model implies that a Russian investor seeks to get stable access to a strategic resource (for instance, oil, gas, aluminium, manganese, or palladium). As we pointed out several times, the focus is on access, not extraction. It is a capital-intensive model with big investments and a relatively long return period. Often, this strategy caters to large Russian corporations with a hefty government stake. The model can ensure Russia's access to rare raw materials and deny these materials to rival countries. As for geographic distribution, the model defines four main areas: the Western Guinean Region (including Guinea, Sierra-Leone, Ghana, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria), the Eastern Guinean Region (Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo/Brazzaville, the Angolan seashore), the Southern Region (the province of Sheba in the DRC and Luanda in Angola, and the Copperbelt in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique).

2) The market-based investment model in Africa implies that Russian investors seek to set up a stable and profitable market for their products. It could either be a market for investment products or a place for retail trade. This model caters to large manufacturers, sales companies, wholesalers, and retail chains, as

well as SMEs. This model can be applied to the service market as well, including IT and mobile communications, the most rapidly growing market in Africa.

3) The efficiency-based investment model. This model favours investment in sub-regional economic drivers such as Nigeria (West Africa), Kenya (East Africa), Ethiopia (East and partly Central Africa), and South Africa (Southern Africa). These countries accommodate local investment headquarters, which run the expansion into neighbouring countries through local firms. They boast better business infrastructure within their geographic sub-regions. The strategy goes far beyond the issues of business management and harmonisation within Africa. In many cases, corporations are eager to build an African-based production chain rather than export goods to the African market from Russia or other countries. Some African branches may become logistic hubs for subsidiaries in Brazil, South Africa, and India.

4) The investment model of strategic expansion is an economic strategy typical of particular African states or big corporations working in the national interest. For some reason, private companies may also join the economic expansion into Africa. Such an approach requires a joint, harmonised economic policy implemented by all the actors on a mutually beneficial basis. Abramova states that in some ways, this is a mimicry of China's policy (2017, 19-20).[7]

However, the Russian model has many weaknesses. We can divide them into two groups: challenges at the micro and macro level. Micro challenges are mainly related to corporate culture and include:

- Difficulties in adapting to local sanitary and climate conditions, as well as Africans' mentality, mindset, traditions, customs, and rights;
- To uphold the universal code of corporate social responsibility and contractual obligations;
- To stay alert and cautious when dealing with local businessmen;
- To eliminate the superstition that bribes are omnipotent on the continent (Abramova 2017, 28-29);
- Young and inexperienced entrepreneurial class, especially inexperienced in doing business in international markets, particularly in Africa. As proof of this, the authors offer the fact that 90% of Russian entrepreneurs operating in the African market use international intermediaries (Deitch and Korendyasov 2010).

Macro challenges include limitations connected to the conjuncture between Africa and Russia. Limitations from the Russian side include:

[7] Abramova has also developed a whole range of criteria that must meet these principles and models. They can be found in the same article, but we will not cite them here for the sake of being concise.

- Underestimating the potential of the African market and the potential of Russian-African cooperation;
- Strong competition from Western multinational companies as well as economic entities from China, India, Japan, and Brazil. This limitation also includes Russia's modest economic and financial resources in relation to other external players;
- Restrictions on transport infrastructure between Russia and Africa;
- Lack of stronger state aid to Russian entrepreneurs as well as modest African development programmes (Deitch and Korendyasov 2010).

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON RUSSIAN INVESTMENT

Russia and African countries are facing a new challenge as they pursue an equitable world order in line with the new realities. Africans still consider Russia as one of their best allies in the international arena and as a natural counterweight to the hegemonic ambitions of a foreign power (or a group of powers). The main reason for that is the positive historical heritage. From the African perspective, Russia offers a strategic alternative to America's global hegemony, China's economic diplomacy, and the lingering influence of Africa's former colonial masters (Beseny 2019). Russia is highlighting collaboration over aid, and that message sounds appealing to some leaders who view the West's outreach as patronizing. Bakary Sambe, director of the Timbuktu Institute African Centre for Peace Studies in Dakar, said: "Africa no longer wants to have all our eggs in one basket". He also added, "We want equal exchanges, as opposed to colonial power relations" (Paquette 2019). Russian military support offers come without political conditions imposed by American and European governments (Pahm 2010, 80).

However, there are limiting factors from the African side as well. Those are:

- Lack of credible information on the potentials of both the Russian and African markets;
- Clientelism from former colonial blocs, as well as the activities of Western NGOs;
- Underdevelopment of institutional and entrepreneurial structures and professional services;
- Commercial risk reflected in the inert bureaucratic structure;
- Lack of market and business culture (Deitch and Korendyasov 2010, 15–16).

Investing in Africa has its risks, but as Mzwandile Collen Masina (at the time Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa) said at the 20th Saint-Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2016, "It is not risky to invest in Africa, it is risky not to invest in it." Investing in Africa has potential benefits that outweigh

those risks. Therefore, Russia has to consider Africa as a strategic partner (Abramova 2017, 14).

THE SWOT ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA

When giving a final assessment of Russia's actions in Africa, a SWOT analysis is used. The SWOT analysis is a strategic planning tool for identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in business strategy or project planning, company policy, and so on. It has its origins in marketing and strategic management, but it can also be applied in other fields such as oil and gas, mining and metallurgy, business, manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, etc. (Namugenyi et al. 2019). We strongly believe that it can be used in IR as well, especially when considering strategies or policies.

The strengths and weaknesses given in the SWOT matrix represent the Russian point of view. Russia can influence them by modifying its own policies and strategies. On the other hand, opportunities and threats cannot be fully influenced by Russia because these are circumstances that occur regardless of Russian actions. Opportunities and threats are largely the product of the actions of other international actors.

We define the SWOT matrix of Russian engagement with Africa as follows:

<table>
<tr><th>Strengths</th><th>Weaknesses</th></tr>
<tr><td>Good historical heritage</td><td>Absence of a clear strategic policy</td></tr>
<tr><td>Absence of conditioning</td><td>Lack of financial resources and naval capacities</td></tr>
<tr><td>Natural resource compatibility</td><td rowspan="2">Lack of a large diaspora in Africa</td></tr>
<tr><td>Good military cooperation</td></tr>
<tr><th>Opportunities</th><th>Threats</th></tr>
<tr><td>Security vacuum</td><td>Competition from other external players, above all India and China</td></tr>
<tr><td>Further potential for military cooperation</td><td rowspan="4">The possibility of deteriorating relations with other countries due to mutual confrontation in Africa</td></tr>
<tr><td>The eagerness of Africans to learn the Russian language and study in Russia</td></tr>
<tr><td>African countries are looking for a partner to invest in the mining and energetics sectors</td></tr>
<tr><td>The rising (bullish) trend in raw material prices</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Author

Russia's main strength in Africa is a positive historical heritage, which dates back to the time of Tsarist Russia, continued during communism, and has been maintained to this day. We emphasise once again that Russia has never been a coloniser in Africa. Furthermore, Russia never sets political conditions when negotiating and concluding agreements with African countries, whether it is the recognition of Crimea as part of Russia or any other condition related to human rights, democracy, or freedom of the media. Although it has certain mining operations in Africa, Russia should not be perceived as an exploiter of African resources. In fact, Russia's investment in oil and gas infrastructure on the African continent positions Russia as an investor and strategic partner, not an exploiter. By exporting military equipment, Russia generates income, projects influence, and also significantly contributes to the stability of African countries.

The main weakness of Russia is the absence of a full-fledged coherent policy towards African countries. Russia's presence is mostly limited to the growing ties of major Russian companies, which seldom have a vision of business development in Africa. In those cases when they do have a strategy, this strategy is not really a part of any concrete national action plan for the African continent. As Abramova puts it:

> "It is high time for us to develop new forms of economic cooperation, including marketing and finance. If Russia wants to penetrate into African markets and stay there, it needs to set up a consistent diplomatic, political, and financial infrastructure. The point is that the Russian business needs state support to stand a higher chance in African markets. The new models of Russian-African partnership should combine national and corporate interests to benefit from state and private assets alike" (Abramova 2017, 13–14).

Financial resources are Russia's biggest problem. Nominally speaking, Russia does not lack financial resources. It is a large, rich, and powerful country, but in relative terms, Russian investments cannot be compared with Chinese, Indian, American, or French ones. The Russian diaspora is small and scattered when compared to the Chinese and Indian ones. It also lacks the depth and clientelistic connections that business circles from the former colonial powers have.

Despite the weaknesses, many opportunities are opening up for Russia. The case of the Central African Republic is a model of security cooperation that needs to be copied. By filling the security vacuum, Russia can compensate for the lack of financial resources to some extent. Russia must make the most of the eagerness of young Africans to learn Russian and study in Russia, which means that it must make the most of the soft power mechanisms. Furthermore, Russia must use the opportunity that African countries are looking for a strategic partner in the energy sector. The projected growth of energy prices in the future will certainly have a positive impact on cooperation in this area.

Finally, competition from other external players such as China, India, former colonial powers, and now even Japan and Turkey, is Russia's biggest threat in Africa due to the fact that Russia does not have sufficient financial capacity compared to most of these countries and also has less developed soft power mechanisms compared to most of them. Russia's possible misunderstandings with some of these actors that may occur on African soil in the future could have the potential to disrupt overall bilateral relations with one of the opposing countries. As an example, we cite the short-term deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations due to the events in Syria, specifically the shooting down of a Russian bomber by Turkish fighter jets.

CONCLUSION

Due to the lack of a clear and comprehensive strategy for Africa, a lack of financial resources, naval capacity, and a small diaspora in Africa, Russia is in a subordinate position in comparison to other international actors. Therefore, it cannot play a leadership role in Africa. On the other hand, Russia has many positive factors on its side. Good historical heritage, lack of conditioning, the fact that Russia is not perceived as an exploiter of African resources, and good military cooperation contribute to the Russian image. For African countries, Russia represents a significant alternative to other more dominant actors. This pattern is mutually beneficial because it allows Russia to make profit and expand its influence, at least to some extent. On the other hand, it provides African countries with an instrument of diversification in relation to other actors. So far, the security model that Russia is implementing in the Central African Republic is satisfactory. At the time of writing, this model is proliferating further into the region, in countries like Mali and Burkina Faso. However, the final results of Russia's security engagement in West Africa will be revealed in the near future.

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НОВА УЛОГА РУСИЈЕ У АФРИЦИ – ДОСТИГНУЋА И ГРАНИЦЕ ПОНОВНОГ ПОЈАВЉИВАЊА РУСИЈЕ

Апстракт: Овај рад има за циљ да покаже растуће интересовање Русије за развојне перспективе афричких земаља. Русија је одлучила да се придружи новој јагми за Африку заједно са другим међународним актерима, као што су Кина, Индија, итд. Међутим, због својих унутрашњих ограничења, способност Русије да пројектује свој утицај у Африци је ограничен. Стога је у овом раду предложена хипотеза да Русија не може имати водећу улогу у Африци, али може представљати неку врсту стратешке алтернативе за афричке земље. У раду су идентификоване четири димензије односа Русије и афричких земаља: политичка, економска, војна и димензија меке моћи. Такође су одређена четири циља руске политике према Африци: пројектовање моћи на глобалној сцени, приступ сировинама и природним ресурсима, извоз оружја и безбедност, и подршка развоју енергетике у Африци преко руских компанија. Рад се такође бави афричким интересима у сарадњи са Русијом. На крају, руска стратегија у Африци је подвргнута СВОТ анализи како би се утврдиле њене снаге и слабости.

Кључне речи: Русија, Африка, Централноафричка Република, мека моћ, јагма за Африку, СВОТ анализа.

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Review article

DECONSTRUCTING LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING: LESSONS FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS

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Abstract: The paper contributes to the deconstruction of the liberal peacebuilding concept, particularly its main components of failed state and state-building, through the analysis of two internationally-backed statehood projects in the Western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The authors analyse critical peacebuilding literature on these two cases to provide arguments for abandoning the failed state and state-building ideas as overly biassed and ideologically based. Instead, they suggest reintroducing the conceptualisation of state-making as a more suitable framework for understanding the post-war context and dynamics in the Western Balkans. Based on that premise, the authors conclude that the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo should be approached from a broader historical and geographical perspective and call for the decentralisation of the "Westphalian state" and the reinstatement of the *longue durée* perspective in state-formation research, as well as the depathologisation of the subjects of that research.

Keywords: liberal peacebuilding, failed state, state-building, state-making, the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo.

INTRODUCTION

From a critical perspective, liberal peacebuilding could be defined "as a 'liberal' exercise aimed at resolving the underlying sources of conflict, [that] in

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reality... tends to be aimed at containing or repressing conflict in the interests of international peace and stability in general or of particular hegemonic strategic interests" (Newman 2009, 26-27). The interventionist practice of organisations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU has mostly reduced the whole concept of liberal peacebuilding to state-building (reconstruction of governance, control of territory, regular international participation, etc.), neglecting its other sectors, such as local rights and needs, reconciliation, inequality, justice, etc. Furthermore, state-building is often portrayed as a disguised attempt to "civilise" the "third world countries", resembling the period of colonialism and *mission civilisatrice* (Newman 2009; Franks and Richmond 2008).

The whole field of liberal peacebuilding, after a more affirmative approach during the 1990s, has been almost exclusively reduced to critical peacebuilding during the previous two decades (see Newman 2009; Richmond 2009; Paris 2009; Randazzo 2017; Mathieu and Bargues-Pedreny 2020; Mac Ginty 2021). Since the goal of these critical approaches to peacebuilding is "to expose the pathologies associated with the contemporary peace operations and explain the relationship between peacebuilding and broader debates about world order and legitimacy" (Newman 2009, 44), their literature has determined the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo[3] post-war transitions as anomalies of the international system. As Oliver Richmond (2014) argues, these two cases, among others, are relevant examples of the liberal peace (peace-as-governance) crisis, which has been lasting for over two decades now. From East Timor and Cambodia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and the Middle East, to the Balkans, these peacebuilding missions have had unintended consequences or failed to achieve their ambitious objectives, mainly because of the lack of grounded (local) legitimacy, contextual knowledge, and the ability to construct meaningful relations with the locals. Whether they blame local or international agencies or both of them, most critical peacebuilding scholars agree these two cases are "pathologies", negative exceptions, usually framed as failed states or examples of failed peacebuilding (Visoka and Doyle 2014, 677).

This way, liberal peacebuilding scholars commit a fallacy of essentialisation of international organisations' political discourse. As Musliu and Orbie (2014) explain, the UN, NATO, and the EU legitimise their missions as a moral duty to intervene, end a conflict, build a state, democracy, and peace, and protect the local population. In practice, this legitimisation is based on two primary strategies or discourses: *pathologising* and *objectifying* the Other. The former discourse insists

[3] Since our aim is not to discuss the legal status of Kosovo, we will refer to it in this article as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia under the interim administration of the United Nations (UNMIK) in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244. Nevertheless, some of the sources cited in the article do not share this perspective, but that does not reflect the attitudes of the authors.

on the inherent moral, cultural, or political dubiousness of the Other, while the latter frames the object of intervention as inferior, invaluable, and dysfunctional. These discourses argue that because Western countries are developed, prosperous, and endowed with superior values, they do not require local approval to intervene: the mere "fact" of Balkan "tribalism, anarchy, and chaos" and Western superiority construct legitimate reasons for intervention (see also Tepšić 2017; Tepšić and Džuverović 2018).

Thus, we would argue in this paper that Bosnia and Kosovo statehood projects are not anomalies but part of the post-Cold War international trend (Menkhaus 2010) and a transhistorical process of state-making. The problem with the peacebuilding scholarships is their ideological bias, particularly regarding the concepts of a (Westphalian) state, a failed state, and state-building. Therefore, we agree that it is necessary to dismantle the myth of the Westphalian state (Bartelson et al. 2018) and deconstruct the failed state and state-building (Woodward 2017), to open the space for thinking about Bosnian and Kosovan cases beyond these frameworks, with the intention of depathologising the Western Balkans but to avoid concurrent pathologisation of the West.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the (critical) peacebuilding literature on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo; the second section criticises the critical peacebuilding literature, including the concepts of "local", "hybridity", "Westphalian state", "failed state", and "state-building", and the third section discusses the reasons for political stalemate in BiH and Kosovo beyond the notions of failed state and state-building.

STATE-BUILDING IN THE WESTERN BALKANS THROUGH THE LENSES OF CRITICAL PEACEBUILDING SCHOLARS

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Divjak and Pugh (2008, 373) argued that the situation in BiH "has led critics to denounce the 'liberal peace' in BiH as a travesty of state-building". Critics of peacebuilding and state-building in Bosnia are usually directed towards the Dayton Accords/system because it failed to create "a functional liberal state" (Richmond and Franks 2009, 18), although critics acknowledge its success in ending the war (Chandler 2006a; Paris 2004). For the sake of analytical clarity, we roughly summarise the reasons scholars suggest for this failure into two arguments: the "local argument'", which emphasises domestic social/political/economic conditions as the main cause of the Bosnian stalemate, and the "international argument", which steers the criticism of scholars toward the role of the international community in the post-war Bosnian transition. As Bose

(2005) framed it, it is either a question of the appropriateness of consociation and a confederal paradigm for Bosnian society or a question of international engagement with state-building and democratisation in Bosnia.

When it comes to the "local argument", Paris (2004, 111) suggests the problem with BiH is that war parties "remained in place", perceiving each other as a threat, and democratisation only reinforced their positions (giving them new legitimacy through the post-war democratic elections), providing them with the opportunity to obstruct the measures of moderation and reconciliation introduced by the Dayton Accords (see also Aggestam and Björkdahl 2013). Newman (2009, 27) assesses the Bosnian peacebuilding project as far from success because of its ethnic polarisation, sectarian and nationalist politics, and social and economic gaps and stresses that its sustainability without external support is questionable. Bose (2005) gives a somewhat different explanation of the "local" argument. He argues that although there is a space for serious criticism, the international community has brought more good than harm to the Bosnian state and society. Even though he acknowledges all the pitfalls of the political framework, he is cautiously affirmative about it. Furthermore, he explains that the problem is not the Bosnian institutional structure itself, at least not primarily, but the "dire condition of the economy and mass unemployment; the emigration of highly educated and qualified citizens… the extremely poor quality of post-secondary education… and the extremely low calibre of the political class, which is ineffective more because of incompetence than inter-ethnic wrangling" (Bose 2005, 329-330). Bose (2005, 324-333) designates Bosnia as "a fragment of a failed state" (Yugoslavia), where the 'fears of state failure still loom'. Bojičić-Dželilović (2009, 2014) gives a similar economic perspective on the topic and ascribes the problem of the post-war Bosnian transition to the shortcomings of neo-liberal political and economic reforms that generated "a kind of 'perpetual transition' characterised by unstable, socially divisive developmental patterns and low-level democracy, which obstructs progress towards meaningful peace".

A recognisable representative of the second, "international argument", Chandler (2006a, 17), rejects the "idea that the post-war transition has been frustrated by a surfeit of Bosnian governing institutions, protected by their Dayton status", and names the international administration and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) as the main culprits for "reducing the Bosnian institutions established by Dayton to administrative shells". He describes post-war BiH as not a case of state-building but of informal trusteeship (or shared sovereignty) that has done almost nothing to build the Bosnian state's capacities or legitimise it in front of its population (Chandler 2006a; 2006b; see also Belloni 2009). Like Chandler, many authors direct their criticism at the role of the High Representative, "the most powerful state-building agency in postwar Bosnia" (Gilbert 2012). They mainly criticise the self-acquired (through the Peace

Implementation Council) "Bonn powers" (1997), which gave the OHR unlimited legislative, judicial, and executive authority in BiH. Carlos Westendorp, the second High Representative (1997-1999), explained this situation as an empowerment of the High Representative (HR) "to interpret his own powers" (Pehar 2019). Consequently, from 1997 until 2006, the mission progressively expanded and embraced "virtually all facets of political and economic life in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Peter 2011, 60).

Majstorović (2007, 648) explains that the OHR's politics in Bosnia ("a fragile country") is an example of forced democratisation, "an experiment that did not yield much self-sustainability and democracy in the country, but has resulted in the local perception of the OHR and the international community as colonialist and authoritarian". It is a phenomenon Gilbert (2012) calls the "democratisation paradox" — the promotion of democracy through undemocratic means. Peter (2011) supports this argument and adds that the state-building process in BiH is "without direction" and "unprecedented in the post-Second World War", which was, during the mandates of Wolfgang Petritsch (1999-2002) and Paddy Ashdown (2002-2006), largely expanded and transformed into a fierce struggle with the local elites. In the period between 1998 and 2005, the OHR removed 119 democratically elected officials from their offices, imposed 757 decisions, and 286 laws and amendments (Martinović 2012; Tepšić 2017; Tepšić and Džuverović 2018). That led Baros (2010, 6) to conclude that the OHR's administration has been "the most sustained attack on the Rule of Law in modern history, so to speak" (see also Pehar 2019).

Richmond and Franks (2009) also focus on the international aspect of the post-war Bosnian transition, but from a broader perspective, assessing the liberal state-building project in BiH as very conservative, "sowing the seeds of its own failure by being unable to actualise the benefits of the liberal state in social and economic terms, just as in the political sphere" (Richmond and Franks 2009, 34). They conclude that, although the Dayton Accords and subsequent institutionalisation of ethnic divisions appear to be the main structural obstacles to this project, a more fundamental problem is the Western state-building model applied to the culturally and ideologically different society, including "the overbearing paternal influence of the internationals" (Richmond and Franks 2009). In his other piece, Richmond (2014, viii-12), similarly to Majstorović (2007), explains that these international practices "resemble the colonial projects of previous eras when looked at from the perspective of their recipients in far-flung corners" and adds that liberal peacebuilding/state-building "appears to be failed by design".

Whether they support the first or the second argument, or both of them, peacebuilding scholars generally agree that peacebuilding/state-building in Bosnia has been unsuccessful since it created "ambivalent peace" and a "Potemkin state"

(Kostić 2007; De Guevara 2009). Mac Ginty (2011, 139–143) explains that critiques of the Bosnian case "are in keeping with criticisms made of virtually every liberal peace intervention in the post-Cold War era: top-down, technocratic, neo-liberal, and unsustainable", making Bosnia just another "anomalous case".

Kosovo

Although there are many differences between the cases of post-war transition in BiH and Kosovo, some of them fundamental (lack of Kosovo's external sovereignty and recognition, for instance), peacebuilding scholars use the category of "failed state" to label the status of Kosovo, as well. For instance, Richmond (2014, 7), in his seminal work on failed states, includes Kosovo in his list of cases. He argues that in both cases (of Kosovo and BiH), the international community adopted an ethnic framing of the conflict and political transition, which resulted in institutional frameworks based on a "primordial view of power and identity" (Richmond 2014, 56). Consequently, that led to ethnic democracies, deep political contests, and negative peace frameworks. For Richmond (2014, 70), Kosovo is an example of an "empty state and virtual peace" (along with BiH, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands, etc.). In his previous piece about Kosovo, with Jason Franks (2008, 99), he explained that: "The Kosovan entity is heading towards mono-ethnic, majoritarian sovereignty, a weak economy and marginalised minorities, hastened by the threat of violence (or actual violence, as in March 2004) if Kosovo Albanians do not get their way. These are not indicators of sustainable peace, liberal or otherwise." Later on, he concluded, these factors hastened the Kosovanisation (or Albanisation) of the international mission, which led to the independence of Kosovo in 2008 and, in general, fostered the marginalisation of other identity groups and their agendas (Richmond 2014).

Lemay-Hebert (2011) supports this "international argument" about Kosovo and locates the main cause of its state failure (fragility) in the state-building approach of the UN administration. The UN, he argues, adopted the "empty shell" approach, which considered local territory a *tabula rasa* or *terra nullius*, and insisted on building a state from scratch, "from virtually nothing to practically everything" (Lemay-Hebert 2011, 195). As the head of the UN mission in Kosovo, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) had "virtually unlimited powers". For example, the first SRSG for Kosovo, Sergio Vieira de Mello (who previously served as UNPROFOR director in Bosnia), described his job as "benevolent despotism" (Lemay-Hebert, 2011, 193; Franks & Richmond 2008). Just as the OHR in Bosnia, UNMIK/SRSG was non-transparent, unaccountable, and lacked meaningful political relations with the people of Kosovo. Thus, Marek Nowicki, former Kosovo Ombudsman accused of not "playing on the same team" by the UNMIK, stated in 2006: "...from a

legal point of view, Kosovo is the black hole of Europe or like a novel by Kafka. The UN arrives to defend human rights — and at the same time, deprives people of all legal means to claim these rights" (Lemay-Hebert 2009, 76).

Similarly to Lemay-Hebert, Musliu and Orbie (2015, 3) explain that Kosovo has more characteristics of a protectorate/semi-protectorate than of a state ("UNMIKistan" or "EULEXperiment"). In the Kosovo Institute of Peace report from 2013, Visoka (2011, 29) argued that Kosovo's independence only undermined the consolidation of its statehood and enabled Serbia to do the same. "The international presence, therefore, contributes both to Kosovo's domestic failure to establish the rule of law and good governance, and to Kosovo's international failure to consolidate its sovereignty." Visoka explained that Serbian parallel structures and international administration mutually reinforce each other since the former legitimises and justifies the latter's presence (Visoka 2013a, 31). He does not use the term" failed" directly. However, he acknowledges the failure of "attempts to establish a functioning state" in Kosovo and emphasises that "Kosovar authorities demanded independence and state-building" from the international community (Visoka 2011, 29-31).

Montanaro (2009), focusing more on the "local argument", disagrees with the notion of a "failed state", although she acknowledges the fragility of Kosovo, determining it as a "critically weak state". She locates the critical causes of its weakness in "a criminal-political nexus… extreme ethnic polarisation, dynamics of parallel authorities competing for legitimacy and… deep economic stagnation". However, she recognises the flaws of external intervention, as well (Montanaro 2009, v). Namely, the inability of the international community to address the critical causes of conflict and state weakness. Furthermore, she argues that the international community has even contributed to the state's fragility and consolidated it (Montanaro 2009, 19).

Beha and Visoka (2010) also emphasise local factors of governance fragility and protracted ethnic destabilisation in Kosovo: economic instability, underdevelopment, and high rates of poverty and unemployment, above all. In his other piece on hybridisation in Kosovo, Visoka (2013a, 33) concluded "that electoral choice and power-sharing as a result of hybridisation dynamics can lead to negative outcomes for the democratisation process, whereby moderate elites are excluded, political structures lose popular support, the local population lacks ownership over political processes, and ultimately fragile ethnic relations become entrenched". Governmental institutions lost popular support, he infers, because they failed "to fulfil people's needs for employment, justice, fair governance, and redistribution of goods (Visoka 2013b, 26).

Similar to Mac Ginty's conclusion about BiH, scholarships on Kosovo usually adhere to more or less universal critical peacebuilding patterns, including

"mainstream and top-down, externally driven debate focused on power and clashing interests at an elite level; a turn towards bringing in social and structural forces in a more liberal sense… and leading to the formation of institutions that balance elite and social power; and a sociological and anthropological turn, offering contextual, bottom-up, postcolonial and subaltern insights relating to questions of inequality and justice as well as agency" (Richmond 2014, 58-59). Most critical peacebuilding scholars agree that Kosovo constitutes a weak, fragile, or failed state, an "anomaly" similar to BiH.

CRITICISING CRITICAL PEACEBUILDING: WHAT LIES BEHIND STATE-BUILDING?

We accept Richmond's designation of liberal peacebuilding in general as "failed by design" since the UN's top-down orthodox approach proved to be unsuccessful in harmonising the confrontational local power structures with the determination of peacebuilders "to transfer" alien "methodologies, objectives, and norms into the new governance framework" (Franks and Richmond 2008). Furthermore, we support the thesis that the fallacy of the design lies in the Kantian perception of universality, which rests upon the belief that it is possible to mould a war-shattered society in accordance with an ideal-type liberal democratic state. Moreover, this perception insists that all of this is possible by implementing the institutional framework and concepts originating from a different culture, and in a much shorter time than it was needed for those institutions and concepts to develop and be established in their place of origin. This typical one-dimensional blank slate view considers that people's choices and actions are exclusively shaped by institutional arrangements rather than by contextual agency (Richmond and Franks 2009).

Nevertheless, critical peacebuilding literature recognises that expressing mere resentment towards the universalistic nature of orthodox peacebuilding principles and their ramifications should not, on the other hand, lead to "static" and "romanticised" perspectives of the "local". In practice, "local" has often turned out to be an excuse for either local autocratic or obsolete yet lucrative practices of "indigenous" ways towards peace, some of which have been "rediscovered" in the light of the newly established "grassroots" oriented INGO funds (Mac Ginty 2011, 62). Besides, the very local/international dichotomy is seen as an oversimplification of far more complex entities, which is blind to acknowledging how deeply intertwined they are and that no pure ontological, epistemological, or political reality has evolved in isolation (Paffenholz 2015). For example, one could argue, as George F. Kennan did, that aggressive nationalism and "non-European" sentiments of ethnic hatred, which are "inherent" in the Balkan nations, provided common ground for the Balkan Wars in both the second and

the last decade of the 20th century (Todorova 2009, 6). However, such a claim is not only problematic due to its essentialist nature but also because nationalism (both benign and aggressive) is a phenomenon of European origin *par excellence*, intended as a "means to freedom from barbarity" where "barbarity itself was defined as localism, provincialism, parochialism, feudalism and tyranny" (Stoianovich 1992, 267). In a collision with the "local" ethnoreligious circumstances, universalism brought a specific hybrid form of nationalism to the peoples of the Balkans, to which many of the violent historical episodes can be attributed (Todorova 2009; Stoianovich 1992).

The evolution of nationalism in the Balkans can be viewed from the position of "hybridity" and "hybrid political orders" (HPO), which "are better able to tap into local knowledge, to mobilise citizens and to generate legitimacy than 'top-down' arrangements of governance" (Kraushaar and Lambach 2009, 1). As explained before, not every hybridisation brings about peace. "Hybrid conflicts" or "hybrid wars" are also possible outcomes of such endeavours. However, peacebuilding scholars aim to provide the methods for achieving "hybrid peace", which should not be perceived as a mere static aim but as a process "of social negotiation, coalescence, cooperation, and conflict" (Mac Ginty 2011, 208). Although HPO is analytically useful to a certain point, and the notion of hybridisation recognises the dynamic nature of peace, we claim that it rushes to normative conclusions before being enriched with another analytical dimension. As observed by Paffenholz (2015, 865), "… the current hybridity debate within the local turn in peacebuilding needs much more grounding in empirical realities as a means to unpack power and dominance".

Even though these scholars recognise the "lack of cultural sensitivity and contextuality" of peacebuilding/state-building (Kappler 2013, 170), and sometimes even overestimate the singularity of "ontological, historical and ethical contexts" of particular positionalities (Richmond 2014, 8-9), they have not given up on the Westphalian state, its processes of failure and building, as conceptual tools. They do question and criticise the standard definition of the concept of a liberal state (Richmond 2014), which is a first step in the "de-centring of state-making". However, they miss revising their conventional explanations "in order to make sense of cases that otherwise appear idiosyncratic or anomalous", and to use "insights from such idiosyncratic and anomalous cases in order to identify alternative paths to statehood and more general explanations of state-making" (Bartelson et al. 2018, 2). Instead of trying to envision the notion of a state beyond the "Westphalian myth" (Bartelson et al. 2018), they search for local non-state alternatives to the liberal state, as the vast literature about the "local turn" and hybridity demonstrates (Mac Ginty 2011; Kappler and Richmond 2011; Kappler 2013; Richmond 2014).

Bartelson et al. (2018) argue that this is the case due to a strong current in the social sciences that explains the spread of a sovereign state "as an unintended outcome of European expansion on other continents", implying that more or less the same factors that once led to the state formation in Western Europe would produce similar results in other contexts. That includes territorial boundedness, exclusive political authority, a sense of nationality, and popular legitimacy, as the main preconditions of sovereign statehood. The problem with some of these assumptions is that they do not travel well in other historical and geographical contexts. Therefore, the concept of state should be envisioned "without implying that political authority and community are territorially congruent" (Bartelson et al. 2018, 3; see also Richmond 2014). As a result, that would suggest stretching the notion of the state beyond conventional connotations to encompass the cases of political struggles that would otherwise fall outside the analytical scope.

For example, political entities such as BiH and Kosovo can coexist with other forms of political authority, even if they rival and contest the central government. The Bosnian case shows that the central government is often overpowered by the subnational polities, either entities or cantons, for instance, when they reject to adopt the verdicts of the Constitutional Court of BiH (more than 90 rulings have never been implemented). Kosovo needed five years after the proclamation of independence to integrate its northern part, dominated by the Serbian majority (the Brussels Agreement, April 2013). However, it still has not finished this process. Serbian municipalities in Kosovo are still largely controlled by the Serbian government. It is important to stress that these are not only characteristics of the Bosnian or Kosovan cases or any other post-Cold War state-building endeavour. Rather, it is the transhistorical quality of a state. States have often been "characterised by divided sovereignty, plural and overlapping jurisdictions, and fuzzy boundaries" (Bartelson et al. 2018, 4). They are not embryos, and their agency cannot be taken for granted, as international relations (both in the political and academic sense) have been trying to persuade us. States consist of many distinct actors, who can act autonomously, and whose mutual relations, including the relations toward the state itself, could vary from amity to enmity (see Wight 2007). For this reason, the concept of a failed state does not make much sense.

This concept's rise in popularity started with the end of the Cold War when the failed state began to represent "the primary cause of threats to international peace and security" (Woodward 2017, 12). Since the beginning of the 1990s and the civil wars in Somalia and Bosnia, international organisations, governmental agencies, research institutes, and academic journals have been progressively categorising more and more countries as either fragile or failed (although the countries categorised disagree with these labels). All that created an unchallengeable consensus without empirical foundations, as Woodward explains.

She argues, as well, that the "failed state" concept "is not just a label but an ideology" that shaped the "common sense" of the wider public and enabled social action based on the axiomatic set of beliefs. This axiom assumes that determining a state as failed means that the problems belong to the inside. Consequently, that calls for outside intervention in the form of state-building (Woodward 2017; see also Gilbert 2012 on the issue of the "inside/outside" distinction).

Although the consensus on the failed state-state-building nexus is mainly undisputed, the practical results of these concepts are mainly unsuccessful, as we have argued in the previous paragraphs and sections. Woodward (2017) explains this ineffectiveness by suggesting that state-building is more about the developing resources and capacities of the intervening actors (for international interventions and possible state-building in their own countries) than about rebuilding failed states. That is why these actors respond to the frequent criticism with a call for more capacities and resources, explaining dissatisfactory results as a consequence of their insufficient capacities. "In sum, the argument… is that the concept of a failed state is actually about the international system and actors intervening in states… This is not just one aspect of the concept, but its essence…" (Woodward 2017, 10) Since these two concepts do not tell us much about the objects of intervention, we find them particularly misleading. Therefore, Woodward's conclusion that failed state and state-building as concepts "cannot serve either informed analysis and explanation or informed policy, and, thus, should be abandoned", seems very plausible (Woodward 2017, 25).

ABANDONING STATE-BUILDING, REINTRODUCING STATE-MAKING

When considering the case of Bosnia from an empirical perspective, this state did not even have an opportunity to become a failed state since it acquired its independence in April 1992, when the Bosnian war had already started. Yugoslavia was a state that collapsed, although some would argue it was intentionally deconstructed (see Campbell 1998), but not Bosnia. The Bosnian war reaffirmed Bosnian statehood, as the Serbian side was forced to give up on the independence of its political entity and to recognise Bosnia as a state in Dayton. A similar situation was with the Croatian side, which intermittently fought for and against the Bosnian state. Although the war caused significant destruction and casualties, it did not result in BiH becoming a *tabula rasa* in a political sense, since wars represent significant content of the political, and of course, the political in BiH was already filled with different contents that preceded the war (see Tepšić 2017; Tepšić and Džuverović 2018).

Unlike BiH, Kosovo is not a member of the UN. Its independence is disputed by half of the UN members, including Russia and China, permanent members of the UN Security Council. For that reason, Kosovo fits more into the category of an unrecognised state (a borderline case, according to Caspersen 2012, 10) or a contested state (Montanaro 2009) than a failed state. Prior to 2008, Kosovo had never been a state but had always been a part of a larger entity — the Ottoman Empire, Serbia, or Yugoslavia (for a short period during the Second World War, it was also a part of the Greater Albania). From a historical perspective, eleven years under the trusteeship of the UN and the EU are not long enough to declare Kosovo a failed state, or a state at all, since state-making is a *longue durée* process. An unrecognised state is not necessarily a failed one. However, Caspersen (2012, 104) explains that "unrecognised states are… more likely than recognised states to experience the kind of fractionalisation that is typical of failed states".

At this point, we suggest using the concept of state-making or state-formation as less biassed and more empirically grounded than state-building. For centuries, state-making "meant absorbing numerous political units which already exercised significant claims to sovereignty", and it included various political strategies, such as "combining, consolidating, neutralising, [and] manipulating" (Tilly 1975, 24-25). These strategies, almost without exception, caused strong resistance. In order to accomplish their goals, state-makers had to tear down that resistance and dissolve already constituted webs of political relations. Although Western countries achieved a high level of stateness in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, their state-making paths were full of turmoil. State-making in the West was never linear nor progressive. It was often slowed or even reversed, as Tilly (1975, 34) observed: "Although the drift after 1500 throughout Europe ran toward increasing stateness, different governments moved at very different rates. As a result, international disparities in stateness increase." The costs of these processes were also very high, "in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labour" (Tilly 1975, 71).

When we situate the cases of BiH and Kosovo in this historical state-making context, they do not seem "anomalous" at all. On the contrary, their "normality" is evident. Of course, we are not suggesting that BiH and Kosovo resemble Western Europe of previous centuries, which would be an atavistic notion. We suggest that the making of these two entities is determined mainly by the continuity of war enmities and divisions they confront, which is more or less regular in the history of state-making (Tilly 1985; Spruyt 2017; Sharma 2017). As Zahra (2011, 786) argues, escaping the pathology of Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, does not require argumentation that the East is as modern and developed as the West. However, it needs to highlight their relatedness and similarities: "Western and East European societies alike faced the challenges of

democracy, development, and "managing" diverse populations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And West European nation-states and empires did not necessarily deal with these challenges with any less conflict or violence."

Both Bosnian and Kosovan post-war political transitions could be described as "continuation of war by other means" (Pehar 2019), which is an inversion of the famous dictum by Clausewitz and belongs to one of Foucault's hypotheses on power (Foucault 2003, 15). According to Foucault (2003, 15), it means "that power relations… are essentially anchored in a certain relationship of force that was established in and through the war at a given historical moment that can be historically specified", and although power puts an end to war and establishes peace, it does not "neutralise the disequilibrium revealed by the last battle of the war" (Foucault 2003, 16). In other words, power and politics simultaneously sanction and reproduce this disequilibrium, and post-war political disputes, struggles over or with power, and alterations of relations of force in a political system should be understood as a continuation of the war.

CONCLUSION

Based on the lessons from the Western Balkans' post-war transition experience, we have tried to demonstrate in this paper that peacebuilding scholarships are ill-equipped to understand the cases of Bosnian and Kosovan statehood projects beyond the notions of a failed state and liberal state-building. As we have tried to argue, the main reason for that is the ideological bias these two concepts are endowed with, which makes them misleading and leads to either pathologisation of the local (the Balkans) or counter-pathologisation of the international (the West). We agree with Sarajlić (2011, 19), who stressed the necessity of a new way of thinking about the post-war Bosnian transition (but it relates to Kosovo as well) in order to include the dynamic and open-ended nature of social conflicts, their irreducibility and irresolvability, and an understanding that "the main question to be concerned with is not how to remove and prevent ruptures and tensions but how to provide them with democratic means of exhibition and occurrence". For that reason, we have tried to deconstruct the concepts of failed state and state-building and bring back the notion of state-making to show that BiH and Kosovo perfectly fit its transhistorical perspective, which stresses the interrelations between wars (or violence in general) and state-formation. This perspective, supported by contextual knowledge, shows that BiH and Kosovo are not "anomalies". They are states in the process of formation, which is often contradictory and characterised by "conflict, negotiation, and compromise between groups" (Légaré 2017, 18).

First of all, BiH and Kosovo are hybrid entities in multiple senses. Their particular local ethnoreligious diversity and political contingencies determine the

nature of how the nation-state is perceived. The rule that a religious community should govern itself, together with the Western idea of nationalism, created a specific environment subject to the instrumentalisation of people's ethnoreligious sentiments in times of crisis (wars). The very conflictual context, especially after the 1992-1995 and 1998-1999 wars, cemented the political content. It is not the liberal ideal-type struggle between "rational individuals" but between two or more antagonised collective bodies. The political is not decided by a decree. It evolved contextually and contingently. The mutual negation of legitimacy caused BiH (Serbian elites contest the legitimacy of BiH, while Bosniaks do the same with RS) and Kosovo (both Serbian sovereignty and Kosovo independence are disputed) to be labelled as polities to which the phrase "continuation of war by other means" is often related.

Secondly, despite the antagonistic relations that reside in Bosnia and Kosovo, they have not disintegrated as polities, primarily due to the international protectorate. That is not to claim it will never be the case, but to acknowledge that BiH and Kosovo have existed as states and contested states for twenty-seven and fourteen years, respectively. From the perspective we adopted in this paper, polities, either as states or contested states, can exist, evolve, and be part of the international system for quite a time, even if their internal working is antagonistic or if they lack international recognition and sovereignty.

To summarise, the aim of this article was not to discuss the legal status of Kosovo and BiH or the legal perspective of a state in general. On the contrary, the paper tried to deconstruct the concept of liberal peacebuilding (notions of the Westphalian state, failed state, and state-building, in particular) and suggested its rejection as an analytical framework, even in its critical form. Drawing from the Western Balkan experience, we tried to support the rejection of failed state and state-building concepts since they "cannot serve either informed analysis and explanation or informed policy", as Woodward (2017) argued. Instead, we suggested the transhistorical concept of state-making as less biassed and more empirically grounded.

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ДЕКОНСТРУИСАЊЕ ЛИБЕРАЛНЕ ИЗГРАДЊЕ МИРА: ЛЕКЦИЈЕ СА ЗАПАДНОГ БАЛКАНА

Апстракт: Текст представља допринос деконструкцији концепта либералне изградње мира, посебно његових главних чинилаца: неуспеле државе и изградње државе, кроз анализу два међународно подржана државна пројекта на Западном Балкану: Босне и Херцеговине и Косова. Аутори анализирају критичку литературу о изградњи мира посвећену овим двама случајевима како би понудили аргументе за напуштање концепата неуспеле државе и изградње државе, због њихове претеране пристрасности и идеолошке заснованости. Уместо тога, они предлажу враћање концепту стварања државе као примеренијем теоријском оквиру за разумевање послератног контекста и динамике на Западном Балкану. Полазећи од те претпоставке, аутори закључују да би случајевима Босне и Херцеговине и Косова требало приступати из шире историјске и географске перспективе и позивају на децентрализацију идеје "вестфалске државе", враћање лонгуе дурée перспективи у истраживању стварања држава, као и на депатологизацију предмета тог истраживања.

Кључне речи: либерална изградња мира, неуспела држава, изградња државе, стварање државе, Западни Балкан, Босна и Херцеговина, Косово.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE ART OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW

Francesco Francioni and Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, eds. 2020. *The Oxford Handbook of International Cultural Heritage Law.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1012.

At the dawn of the 21st century, a greater interest in International Cultural Heritage Law as a separate, specialised branch of Public International Law began to grow. Some of the main reasons behind this phenomenon were the following: the need for its better protection, the correction of historical injustices, raising awareness of indigenous rights and human rights in general, etc. It is no accident that the Cultural Heritage Law-making by UNESCO has gradually moved from treating issues of predominantly national importance (protection of cultural property during armed conflict and against illicit movement and trade) to dealing with those regarded as of more universal interest (the world's cultural and natural heritage) and those much more closely tied up with local and regional interests (intangible cultural heritage and diversity of cultural expressions) (Blake 2015, 9).

The Oxford Handbook of International Cultural Heritage Law, edited by Francesco Francioni (Professor Emeritus of International Law at the European University Institute, Florence and Professor of International Law at LUISS University, Rome) and Ana Filipa Vrdoljak (Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, and UNESCO Chair of International Law and Cultural Heritage at the University of Technology Sydney), represents an ambitious scholarly endeavour, underlining the most important developments in this dynamic and evolving area of law.

Despite the compartmentalization of culture conventions and the fragmentation of cultural heritage throughout international law, the editors shed light on growing evidence of cross-fertilization between these regimes, with special emphasis on their interpretation (Vrdoljak and Francioni 2020, 9). This has proved to be correct. One of the most outstanding characteristics of Cultural Heritage Law is its permeation with other areas of international law, such as Intellectual Property Law, Environmental Law, Human Rights Law, Trade and Investment Law, and many more. The afore-explained complexity is conveniently reflected through the Handbook's structure, which is divided into five different

thematic areas covering the majority, if not all, of topics related to cultural heritage and cultural property in general.

Following the introductory historical overview, the second section introduces the plethora of substantive cultural heritage aspects without bypassing contemporary debates on cultural diversity, women, indigenous peoples, intellectual property laws, and human rights. The third section touches upon the conjunction of General International Law with Cultural Heritage Law, which is depicted in the chapters relating to immunity, succession, and responsibility of the State. The Handbook's fourth section is dedicated to dispute adjudication mechanisms, a topic of growing importance, bearing in mind that the general dispute procedure is frequently not adequate to be applied to cultural property disputes. What stands out is the fifth section's profound devotion to regional approaches, which fully encircles the Handbook's theoretical contours. The regional approach is particularly significant in the field of legal anthropology, where several scholars have underlined the consequences of "Western concepts" on cultural heritage, for example, that the Western notion of "property" does not necessarily address the needs of all peoples (Lixinski 2013, 6).

In addition, although the topics of tangible, intangible, underwater, and indigenous cultural heritage are analysed in separate chapters, the Handbook can be considered to have an integral approach to cultural heritage, having in mind the interconnectivity between different chapters and the holistic approach, in addition to the profound legal analysis of the most relevant topics and legal provisions.

Having in mind the absence of a unified legal definition of cultural heritage as well as its multilayered nature, the aim of the Handbook in question is not to provide precise delineations with other areas of international law or to create a theoretical framework that is set in stone. The Handbook's main contribution is precisely depicted in its thorough insights into the various legal nuances of cultural heritage protection development. Therefore, having in mind its normative complexity, the Handbook would be of great use primarily to legal scholars, international law practitioners, and, of course, advanced or Ph.D. law students specialising in this area. However, it certainly represents an inevitable source for anthropologists, archaeologists, sociologists, (art) historians, and researchers in the field of international cultural relations, cultural policy, and diplomacy.

Forming the international legal framework for cultural heritage was conducted in phases, after the Second World War and mainly under the auspices of UNESCO. Stronger foundations have been laid in recent decades for the further development of Cultural Heritage Law and its interaction with other areas of International Law. Evidently, the formation process has not been finalized. Due to its prominent international dimension and often fraught with

enforcement obstacles, the legal protection of cultural heritage represents an ongoing affair. Especially given that law enforcement in this area necessitates the constant interaction and hybridization of different legal orders: private and public, domestic and international, national and regional, and soft and mandatory law (Francioni 2013, 9). Therefore, the intention of the editors is not to compress international cultural heritage law into one handbook, but rather to present the most important aspects and challenges of its legal protection while elucidating the way for further development in the area.

What particularly distinguishes this volume are the authors – world-renewed scholars, prominent experts and practitioners in the field of cultural heritage, with notable books and papers published and an overall experience relevant to the subject matter. This indeed represents an added value, paving the way for this Handbook to potentially become a general textbook and a mandatory reading when it comes to Cultural Heritage Law.

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The Review of International Affairs is a peer-reviewed journal that focuses on the theoretical, methodological and practical dimensions of international affairs. We strongly encourage papers on politics, economics, security and international law issues in the Balkan regional context. Aside from the Balkan-related issues, we are welcoming papers on other regional studies as well. However, this focus

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Use continuous line numbers starting on the first page, with page numbers on the right side of the bottom of the page.

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Below the title is given the author's full name, with a footnote that refers to her/his institutional affiliation (the name of the institution and its seat), and her e-mail address. Author's affiliation is the affiliation where the research was conducted. Besides this, authors should provide their ORCID iD's.

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(Jabri 2007; Herman 2004; Rohrbach 2020)

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Book

Reference list entry:

Jabri, Vivienne. 2007. *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html.

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2011. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy. Vol. 17 of *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–.

In-text citation:

(Jabri 2007, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995)

(Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

Journal article

Reference list entry:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

Adams, Tracy, and Zohar Kampf. 2020. "'Solemn and just demands': Seeking apologies in the international arena". *Review of International Studies*. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210520000261.

In-text citation:

(Nordin and Öberg 2015, 401)

(Tracy and Kampf 2020)

Article in edited volume

Reference list entry:

Herman, Michael. 2004. "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001". In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Reference list entry:

(Herman 2004)

Conference paper (if not published in conference proceedings)

Reference list entry:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. "Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?". Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

Reference list entry:

(Korać 2016)

Book review

Reference list entry:

Firchow, Pamina. 2020. "Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics", Review of *Measuring Peace*, by Richard Caplan. *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 337–338.

Reference list entry:

(Firchow 2020, 337)

Legal and official documents

International treaties

Reference list entry:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/ volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf.

[TFEU] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, October 26. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.

[UN Charter] Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/ introductory-note/index.html.

In-text citation:

(PTBT 1963, Article III, para. 3)

(TFEU 2012, Article 87)

(UN Charter, Chapter X)

UN documents

Reference list entry:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/67/18.

In-text citation:

(UNSC Res. 2222)

(UNGA Res. 67/18)

National legislation

Reference list entry:

[Constitution RS] Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 98/2006.

Homeland Security Act. 2002. United States of America, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (November 25). https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf.

In-text citation:

(Constitution RS 2006, Article 111)

(Homeland Security Act 2002)

Official reports

Reference list entry:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES.

[The 9-11 Commission] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Publication Office.

US Congress. 1993. Nomination of R. James Woolsey to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 104th Congress, 1st session, February 2–3, 1993. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/103296.pdf.

[USAFH] United States Air Force Headquarters. 2014. United States Air Force RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts: 2013–2038. www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts 2013-2038.pdf.

In-text citation:

(YILC 2014, 321)

(The 9-11 Commission 2004, 437)

(US Congress 1993, 125)

(USAFH 2014)

EU legislation

Reference list entry:

Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 295, 6 November 2013. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN.

[EC] European Commision. 2010. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the

Council, November 22. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0673& from=GA.

Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 141, 5 June 2015. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849 &from=EN.

In-text citation:

(Regulation [EU] No. 1052/2013, Article 11, para. 4)

(EC COM[2010] 673 final)

(Directive [EU] 2015/849)

Decisions of international courts and tribunals

Reference list entry:

[ICJ] International Court of Justice. Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.

[ICJ Order 1999] *Legality of Use of Force* (*Yugoslavia* v. *United Kingdom*). International Court of Justice, Order ICJ Rep. 1999 (June 2). https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/113/113-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf.

[ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A] *Prosecutor* v. *Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32-A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictment, 30 October 2000. https://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/ind/en/vasonly-ii000125e.pdf.

Costa v *Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica*, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61964CJ0006.

[CJEU Judgment T-289/15] *Hamas* v *Council*, Case T-289/15. Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, 6 March 2019, ECLI:EU:

T:2019:138. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?language =EN&critereEcli=ECLI:EU:T:2019:138

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