



# THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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BELGRADE, VOL. LXXII, No. 1182, MAY–AUGUST 2021

*Slobodan JANKOVIĆ*

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*Pavle NEDIĆ*

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THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT  
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TRANSLATIONS OF GEOGRAPHY:  
REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE AND CULTURE  
IN LITERARY TEXT ANALYSIS



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## **GEOPOLITICS OF THE BALKANS: 2019-2021**

Slobodan JANKOVIĆ<sup>1</sup>

*Abstract:* Geopolitical analysis of the policies of the great powers over and in the Balkans in the period of three years is the object of this paper. The author initiates by retelling an event in 2019, indicative of one of the two theses of the text, namely that the US has returned to the Balkans. The second is the assumption, originally launched by the Russian geopolitician Dugin, that the Balkans are one of two monitors of world politics. The text is divided into five chapters. In the introductory part, the author defines his hypothesis and opts for Italian neoclassical geopolitical thought as a theoretical framework. The second chapter overviews basic socio-historical and geographical features of the Peninsula relevant for geopolitical understanding, while the third part of the text puts local political action of both external and internal actors into a broader geopolitical context. The fourth part is the most extensive and represents an overview of the most significant political actions of the great powers - Russia, the United States and China, and Germany, Turkey, and local countries. The conclusive part answers positively to Dugin's assumption and confirms the thesis that great powers' politics in the Balkans has regained importance for the US.

*Keywords:* Geopolitics, Balkan politics, Russian Balkan policy, Belt and Road, U.S. initiatives in the Balkans, Serbia, Greece, German Balkan politics.

### **A THIRD-GRADE DIGNITARY AND AMERICAN RETURN TO THE BALKANS**

The American novelist and diplomat Matthew Palmer participated in a local security forum in the late summer of 2019 in a small European country called Slovenia. His assignment was to deliver the tasks and check the students covering

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The paper presents the findings of a study developed as part of the research project entitled 'Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2021', financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

local positions in the formally independent countries in South-East Europe. And he did it well. The message was that the Balkans was again important for U.S. policy, well at least for the then President and the latter presidential candidate, Donald Trump. He had an opportunity to receive expressions of obedience and promises that the tasks would be fulfilled by a delegation from a country that recently changed its name in order to be accepted as a formal part of the club that provides units for its lord and follows instructions on internal and foreign behaviour. He also met with representatives of Serbia and Kosovo Albanians, who, under the protection of the American lord, managed to present themselves in some circles as an independent country. This deputy assistant, a third-grade dignitary of the empire, met with presidents and ministers since then and urged them to continue with dictated reforms or to reach a normalisation (between, as he said, Serbia and Kosovo), in order to become a part of the European Union. Nobody asks publicly how come officials of the United States are offering a path toward the European Union if this Union is not in some kind of tributary relationship with official Washington? A detailed description of this visit was offered by an Italian university review under the title “USA: Return of Washington in Balkan Geopolitics”. (Ceremigna, 2019).

This episode partially depicts the quality of relations in the Balkans that may be analysed in the context of Balkan geopolitics. Geopolitics emphasizes analysis of the relations between some countries, regions, or territories in general with regard to their features or geographical characteristics relevant to international political significance, at local, macro-regional, and global levels. As there were enough studies on Balkan geopolitics in the previous period, the period studied in this study will start from the supposed return of the Americans in 2019.

Recently, a political risk consultant, originally from the Balkans, Gordon Bardos, launched a claim about the small importance, almost irrelevance, of the region for U.S. policy:

“From a realist perspective, the region should be of little interest to the United States. None of the countries in south eastern Europe have nuclear weapons; none are a military threat to the United States; none of these countries have oil, and waves of Balkan refugees are not going to come streaming over U.S. borders. The region is irrelevant to the U.S. economy; in 2020, U.S. trade with all of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Serbia) was less than one-tenth of 1 percent of total U.S. foreign trade.” (Bardos 2021).

Nonetheless, there is evidence of a certain comeback, as the US never really left the region, but it was out of focus for a while. During that period, the war on terrorism, economic crises, and similar overshadowed business in South-East Europe. Hence, why did Washington return to Balkan geopolitics and why did Brussels agree to common action in this small part of Europe and an even smaller

part of the world? The answer to this question may corroborate the assumption of the famous Russian geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin that the Balkans represent one of two monitors of world geopolitics (the other is the Middle East). (Glišić, 2020, 49). An analysis of the great powers' interests in the region is part of the answer to this claim.

Italian neoclassical geopolitical thought, in combination with Lake's concept of international hierarchy, will be used as a theoretical framework best suited to explain the motives and objectives of the behaviour of geopolitical actors because it incorporates the will (*volontà*) of those holding political power, cultural and historical context, and, lastly, geographic characteristics. This thought could be summarized in the phrase that "it is the spirit that rules over the material", as said by Gofreddo Jaja (see: Janković 2020, 107-8).

One could argue that in the region where political relations are impregnated with history, constructivism would be more suited. Yet, the constructivist approach lacks to define a reality that depends not only on perceptions but also on the will of the actors and different layers of analysis. For example, Serbia and Russia indeed have a common history of cooperation and friendship through centuries that cannot be explained by mere Machiavellian calculus. Bulgaria switched sides several times in the past hundred years. Greece, due to the nature of its maritime borders and for historical reasons, has conflicting relations with Turkey. Greece, with its long heritage, just like other Balkan nations, lays claim to territories outside its national borders. Also, the Turkish Neo-Ottomans view the Balkans as their core imperial land (Todorova 2009, 50). *Ergo*, more reliance on history induced by real events and not only perceptions of the geographic factors in the politics of the contact region favours Italian neoclassical geopolitical thought.

Marconi, a representative of the Italian neoclassical school, indicates that thought and historical experience shape space. (Marconi 2012, 53). Putting the will, thoughts and experience of those who plan and execute politics in relation to history and geography explains the behaviour of Turkey, Russia, and other countries. Germany and Italy are two main economic partners of the Balkan countries, and yet they are superseded by Washington. The European Union is part of the liberal international order where the US is the "core guarantor". (Lake, Martin and Risse 2021, 238). In the international hierarchy led by Washington, Germany is a weak but enduring American protectorate and Italy is one of the most subordinate states. (Lake 2009, 55, 86).

## **SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF THE BALKANS**

The historical and cultural context of the Balkans refers to it as a mainly orthodox Christian peninsula with a significant Muslim and a less significant



Roman Catholic minority. The historical geography of the region is important for the world and, in particular, for European history. It is old Europe, as the oldest European cultures were born in the Balkans. Lepenski vir, Starčevo, Vinča, and afterwards, Minoan and Greek cultures were born and flourished here. The importance of this region for the early history of the old continent and its antiquity is hard to overestimate. The current characteristics of the contact or crossing point of the Balkans regarding religions were formed during a long period of time, starting with the spread of Christian teachings.

Christianisation since the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, and the partitioning of the peninsula along the religious line since 1054, divided it between Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics. Ottoman invasions brought Islamisation of part of the population and complicated divisions. Slavic peoples dominate the area, although they are religiously and politically divided. The Serbs, Bulgarians, and Slavic Macedonians are Orthodox, the Croats are Catholics, and there are Slavic Muslim populations, part of which since the 1990s, have defined themselves as Bosnians irrespective of historical ties with the territory called Bosnia (a significant part of today's Bosnia and Herzegovina), in Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia. Albanians have a particular ethnic origin. They are mainly Muslims, with a strong minority of Catholics and Orthodox Christians in Albania and a large swath of atheists among Albanians in Albania. The overwhelming majority of them in the Serbian secessionist province of Kosovo and Metohija and in North Macedonia are Muslims. Romanians have mixed origins, mostly of Romanised Balkan tribes, and are predominantly Orthodox with a Catholic and Greco-Catholic minority. Finally, Greeks are Orthodox. Along this line is the conclusion of Samuel Huntington that "Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin." (Huntington 1996, 158).

Religion was, as the great Serbian historian Ekmečić would say, a watershed for nations and peoples in the Balkans. (Ekmečić, 2010, 201) The process of making and reimagining nations in the Balkans did not stop, and it still evolves in parallel with the realignment of borders. British Diplomat Timothy Less has argued for years that borders in the Balkans are problematic because they do not follow ethnic (and religious) divisions. (Less 2016).

"Balkans borders are the result of the fight for the national liberation that initiated in the region with the Serbian uprising in 1804. It was followed in 19 century with Greek, Romanian and Bulgarian fight for national freedom. Albanians won the independence in 1912 as a result of the defeat of Ottomans and the loss of its Balkan provinces. Still, Albania was established in it borders as a result of imperial policies of Austro-Hungarian monarchy, of British empire and of Italy directed against Serbia's presence on the Adriatic shores. Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (it was nominated Yugoslavia in 1929) solved the Serbian national question

(unification of Serbian territories). Croatians, Slovenes, Muslims in Bosnia and Macedonians achieved their national states out of the dissolution of Socialist Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992... New states and correspondingly, new borders emerged after administrative lines of federal units inside old Yugoslavia (as was the case of ex USSR).” (Janković 2010, 168).

Communist created administrative lines were cut across the ethnic presence of Serbian and other people in what was previously Socialist Yugoslavia. When they turned into international borders, it was one of the ignitions of war that served the great powers and, in particular, NATO to impose its newly found *raison d'être*.<sup>2</sup>

Historical and geographic features also refer to the name of the Peninsula. In the past quarter of a century, the EU and the US introduced a newly found syntagma - the Western Balkans. As Despotović and Glišin would say, to name something is to wield power, recalling the analysis of Kljakić who holds that naming a territory represents a decision to influence future political orientation (of political entities, S, J). (Despotović, Glišin 2021, 315-7). Jovan Cvijić, a renowned Serbian geographer, related that this space was denominated by medieval geographers as the Hellenic (Jelinsko) or Byzantine Peninsula, to become later known as European Turkey, after the conquests of the Anatolian Turks. Later, the Balkans — a name given by the German geographer Zeune in the year 1808 — was adopted in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Zeune has sought to give the geographic name (as was adopted for the Italian peninsula — Apennine, and the Iberian got the name Pyrenean). (Cvijić 1991, 4-5). With time, according to the infamous fame of Turks, as Goldsworthy mentions, in West European perception, “the adjective ‘Balkan’ can imply the opposite of European.” (Goldsworthy 2013, ix) The term Balkan was the source of the term ‘Balkanization’. Why? The rebellious spirit, the fight for the liberation and unification of the Balkans people, causing the disintegration of two empires (Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian) looked through imperial glances (in particular through the British) came to be associated with something barbaric and uncivilized. The division of empires and the creation of small nation states were negative in the eyes of Western European imperial planners. Thus, instead of being considered as the cradle of European and Mediterranean civilisation, it became an association with something barbaric. That is because of the perceptions that shape partially the will of the decision-makers, those holding institutional (statesmen, politicians) and non-institutional power (those who

<sup>2</sup> See more on that in: Janković, Slobodan. (2019). “Nato Road to Serbia: Why 1999?”, in: Nebojša Vuković (ed.), *DAVID vs. Goliath: NATO war against Yugoslavia and its implications*, Institute of International Politics and Economics: Faculty of Security Studies,- Belgrade, Novi Sad: Mala knjiga +. pp. 155-176.

control key shares in the largest corporations and hedge funds, heads of formally non-governmental influential think tanks such as the Council of Foreign Relations or Chatham House).

Regarding space and its features important for the hunger of the elites for territories and their resources, the first obvious fact is that the geographic Balkans is south of the rivers Sava and Danube. Still, because of the historic legacy of Greek-Byzantine and Ottoman influences, Romania is also counted among the Balkan nations. The surface is counted differently. It may be 505.578 km<sup>2</sup>, but also more or less.<sup>3</sup> For example, Glišin claims it has 520.000 km<sup>2</sup>. (Glišin 2019, 54). Both estimates refer to territory not counting in Romania, but variations depend on whether one counts a small part of Slovenia and a minuscule part of Italy. It has 50 to 70 million people.<sup>4</sup> This different information on the size derives from differently assessed borders of the Peninsula. They are quite murky on the north-western side, where they follow the river Kupa, or part of the Alps. The Black Sea in the east, the Adriatic Sea in the west and the Aegean Sea, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in the south are natural borders of the Peninsula. Thus, states which are entirely or partially in the Balkans are Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

The most important geographic features are communication lines: a) the old *via Egnatia* (now controlled mostly by Americans) from the Albanian port of Dyrrachium to Constantinople; b) the *via Militaris*, a natural road from Belgrade following river valleys, passing through Niš, Sofia, and arriving in Constantinople; and c) the river Danube, connecting central Europe and the central part of the Balkans with the Black Sea. The European Union has also projected other significant roads to connect Western Asia with central Europe through Budapest, passing through Belgrade, which opens up the road toward Vienna and the ports of Trieste and Koper (Italy and Slovenia).<sup>5</sup> These roads and the history of the region as a borderline for many centuries continue to be essential features. Still, the Peninsula has also added other characteristics, such as a contact region and a knot of interests.<sup>6</sup> Proroković adds the ‘magnetic’ character of the Balkans, in a

<sup>3</sup> It depends whether one counts the geographic Balkans, only countries that are entirely or mostly in the Peninsula, or the ‘cultural’ Balkans with Romania.

<sup>4</sup> Population total: Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, half of Croatia: 38 million + 20 millions of Romania and Turkey 11,961,338 (estimation 2019).

<sup>5</sup> On the subject of the EU roads see in: Glišin Vanja. 2019. *Balkanska geopolitička paradigma*, Kairos 2019, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup> On the mentioned characteristics of the Balkans, and the authors who wrote on it, from Šušnjić to Gajić, Despotović, Grčić, Stepić and Knežević, see a chapter in Vanja Glišin. 2019. *Balkan Geopolitical Paradigm* (Балканска геополитичка парадигма: Балкан у геополитичкој визири великих сила), Kairos: Sremski Karlovci, p. 56-60.

sense of attracting the intrusion of great powers. (Proroković 2017, 413). In the view of classical geopolitics, it is part of the Rimland - an area named by Dutch-American Spykman, who was looking to understand the world as it was in the 1940s and deemed it crucial for ruling Eurasia. (Spykman, 1969, 43). But his understanding had little to do with the Balkans as he was researching the ways for the US to dominate the world and offered world level analysis.<sup>7</sup> The Rimland refers to vast territories of which the Balkans are only a small, but arguably important part.

Such a position makes it interesting for the trafficking of narcotics and illegal migrants. The former socialist Yugoslavia, and since the 1990s, the states formed after the destruction and dissolution of Yugoslavia, have acquired rising importance in the illegal trade not only from Asia to Europe, but, in recent years, also partly of cocaine from South America to parts of the European black markets. (McDermot et al. 2021, 32-35, 62).

Besides these types of goods trafficked illegally, the Peninsula holds some rich and even strategic deposits of ores. Mining ores of gold, nickel, lithium, copper and others are important, in particular in Serbia and Romania. In the Serbian province of Kosovo, at the heart of the Balkans, the estimated value of different minerals and mining ores is around 1000 billion USD. (Janković 2018, 37). The Balkans are on the road from Asia Minor to Central Europe and, via the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea, has communication also with the Levant and North Africa. Deposits of ore rich in lithium in western Serbia are estimated at 10 percent of the world's deposits of the ore essential for creating batteries for electric transport vehicles. (Nuttall 2021).

From the local point of view, these historical and geographic features make the Balkans an important and increasingly interesting theatre for the actions of actors on a global, regional, and local scale because it represents the crossroads of political, economic, and criminal interests on a wider scale.

### **THE PLACE OF THE BALKANS IN THE BROADER GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT**

After presenting the crucial historical and geographic characteristics, one should proceed to review the interests and presence of the crucial geopolitical actors in the region. Relations of cooperation and confrontation may be studied as a battle of global elites against the peoples, or traditionally as relations between

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<sup>7</sup> For example, he mentions Yugoslavia and offers its map (Map 20) in order to demonstrate the dangers of encirclement. (Spykman 1969, 22-23).

nations and other international actors. For the purpose of the paper, the second approach is adopted.

All three great powers, the US, Russia, and China, are active in the Peninsula, and their geopolitical interests will be briefly presented. Besides them, corporations are indeed important, but whether we are more akin to realists, constructivists or the liberalist school of thought, it is safe to say, for the purpose of the paper, that countries implement policies in line with the interests of major corporations (or corporations follow them). The role of Germany or Turkey will be briefly mentioned. Finally, local players will be presented.

Just as Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans has recently witnessed:

“a twofold transition, social and geopolitical. Social is in the sense of change of the global social system and of models of social development... Geopolitical transition of the Balkans is reflected in the reorientation of the most of its countries westward and start of the euro-integrations. Geopolitical result of these changes is ... NATOisation of the Balkans, protectorisation of the said geospace, marginalisation of the Russian influence...” (Mitrović 2008, 11).

These processes put the Balkans in the broader context of the control of the European part of the Rimland in order to solidify the front toward Moscow, emphasized after Putin came to denounce American prepotency in his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Looking back at the beginning of the 1980s, David Fromkin, regarding the Afghan intervention by the Soviet Union, published a paper on the history of the Great Game, the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. (Fromkin 1980). But, if we could attribute this term as a general term for the rivalry or, better, for the confrontation between Russia and the West, then we may also apply it to the West-Russia confrontation in the Balkans. Years ago, in Europe, the main theatre of that confrontation was eastwards of the Balkans. Starting with the new Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Western confrontation with Russia erupted again in the former centre of Russian civilisation, in Kiev. That is when groups of protesters, including Nazi-style radical groups, staged mass protests and again overthrew the legal president in what was known as the Maidan protests. (Cohen 2018; BBC 2014). Crimea separated and joined Russia, and the war in the eastern parts of Ukraine erupted. The revived great game between Russia and Westerners continued. But despite the pressure inside what was once tsarist Russia and afterwards the USSR, Moscow continued its policy of playing behind immediate contact lines with NATO.

This demonstrates how politics in a certain space is often a result of the will of great powers (external to the Balkans) to implement them and their ability to use them. The history here is important because, without it, there would be no reason for the West to see Serbs as inherently small Russians (Stepić 2012, 205)

or at least as their allies, or for Bulgarians to further claim the identity of North Macedonian Slavs. Equally, Russia could not expect Serbian governments to be induced by popular opinion to cooperate with Moscow.

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the West continued to expand eastward by means of the EU and NATO. But at that moment, the collapse of the pluridecennial rival gave the American president an opportunity to proclaim the new world order. In parallel, what occurred in central Europe was the unification of Germany and the will of its leadership to assert the united country as a European power.

Russian politics in the Balkans fits into the general policy of relocation of conflict away from the borders. By doing so, Moscow is able to move part of the pressure away from itself and cherish good relations with its partners, showing it can guarantee its partners. This is part of the explanation why Russia became engaged in Syria (since 2015), and in Libya, if not before, then since 2018. (Lenta.ru, 2018). The Russians did not accomplish anything similar in the Balkans as in the Middle East. There was no occasion for such an endeavour. Yet, it insisted on developing gas corridors at the bottom of the Baltic and North Seas, across the Black Sea and the Balkans, crossing Turkey, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Diplomatic support and energy policy of Russia towards Serbia and their economic engagement with Bulgaria were enough for Western think tanks to advise policymakers in the White House in 2016 to “prioritize combating Russian influence” (Conley, 2016, 32). This approach of self-mirroring, where any action or simple diplomatic words serve to recreate an image of some growing alien presence, in this case, Russia, is witness to paranoia and ideologically driven analysis in the United States. However, actions are being taken after such types of studies.

The role of big powers in contemporary Balkan politics is also induced by their contact position, the role of the Bosphorus and Dardanelle straits through which the Russian Black Sea operates in the East Mediterranean and the western fleets pass and provoke Russia by organising military marine drills. If the Balkans is the playground for the Russian bypass of NATO and NATO-allied countries from Ukraine to Romania, then for the West, NATO and the EU, a part of the Balkans represents possibly Russian-allied and influenced territories. In this context, if we look at the map of NATO (and also of the EU) in the Balkans, it clearly shows circled Serbian positions as an island supported diplomatically by Russia. These different perspectives on the same region partially perpetuate the designated role of some of the local actors. The main Russian diplomatic partners in the region are Serbia and the Republic of Srpska (the Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH). Similarly, like Russia, China invests in the Balkans and has developed particular ties with Serbia, as the only country besides BiH which is outside of NATO.

This activity of the great powers, and of the EU as a key economic partner of the Balkan countries, has influenced infrastructural investments in the Balkans: a) expansion of the highways in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Greece and a project to build one from Tirane, the capital of Albania, through Priština to Niš (south-east Serbia); b) investment in military infrastructure in Greece; and c) Chinese interest in developing continental connection from Budapest to the port of Piraeus.

## THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BALKANS SINCE 2019

### Russia

In the mentioned period, Russia was in a diplomatic row with the West and Ukraine at the top of current affairs. The EU constantly renews sanctions on Moscow “adopted in response to the **illegal annexation of Crimea** and the deliberate **destabilisation of Ukraine**.” (bold words are original). (Council of the European Union, 2021). While Germany continues its policy of cooperating with Russia regarding gas, when Trump, the then U.S. president, called for the return of Russia to the G7 (ostracised after the separation of Crimea from Ukraine), it was Berlin, according to its uncharismatic minister of foreign affairs, Heiko Mass, who was against it. (Brzozowski 2020). Brussels, following the objectives of transatlantic elites, puts pressure on the Balkan countries not to cooperate with Russia and to impose sanctions. The only two countries resisting such pressure are BiH and the Republic of Serbia. (Pivovarenko, 2019). Russian support for Serbian interests and the position of Serbs on the status of the Republic of Srpska (in BiH) and Kosovo and Metohija is supported by investment projects, arms modernisation, diplomatic cooperation, and cooperation and support for the growth of bilateral trade. In January 2019, Russian president Putin assisted in the signing of more than 20 memoranda of cooperation. (Ivanov 2019). The Russian state railways project of building more than 400 km of railways is the most significant, together with the construction of the Balkan stream (BS is a part of the Turkish stream). As regards the latest project, it was silently connected in January 2021, with the connection of pipelines between Serbia and Bulgaria. With this, Moscow has achieved two things: 1) three Balkan states are more closely connected to Russia, at least in the field of energy cooperation, and will have a transit fee — Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. (MFA 2021); 2) Russia managed to bypass Ukraine and have more leverage in its relations both with Kiev and Brussels. The plan is to send Russian gas to Central Europe — and the infrastructure for that is ready as pipes between Serbia and Hungary will be connected in July 2021 — via Serbia and eventually to Italy if

TAP (Trans Adriatic Pipeline) does not start. (Денькович 2021). This secures longer Russian influence in the central Balkans (see Map 1).

Map 1. Russian gas pipeline in the Balkans



source: Русская Болгария, 22 ноября, 2018, <https://rus.bg/ekonomika/ekonomika/24967-gazprom-opredelilsya-s-marshrutom-postavki-gaza-po-turetskomu-potoku-kotoryj-projdet-cherez-bolgariyu> accessed: 10/7/2021.

Besides energy policy, traditionally, Russia has been interested in selling arms and preventing the expansion of NATO. As regards arms, besides the most known selling contract of the S-400 to Turkey, Russia has modernised, sold and donated different military equipment to Serbia. Only in 2021, it donated 30 tanks T-72MC and 30 armoured vehicles worth €75 mil. With the admission of North Macedonia (a country that accepted to change its name and the names of streets and public buildings, and granted particular rights to the Albanian minority and their language in order to be admitted) to NATO, only two countries remain outside the Alliance, both in the central part of the Peninsula - Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Along with Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, these countries are also outside the European Union. The constant policy of preventing the expansion of NATO has obviously failed, with non-NATO countries being surrounded.



Russia managed to partially use the Covid-19 crisis to launch its medical help and then its vaccine Sputnik V in some countries of the region, which was viewed through a magnifying glass as vaccine geopolitics.

### **The United States of America**

For US geostrategy, it is essential that NATO controls the shores of all four seas (Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean and Black Sea) on the Balkan littoral. The American grip on the Peninsula goes in four directions: 1) versus Russia, 2) versus Turkey and the Middle East, 3) versus the European Union, and 4) against Chinese penetration.

- 1) Direction on Russia is part of the old strategy of encircling the enemy and impeding Moscow from having influence and partners, in order not to be able to project power outside the USSR sphere and, ideally, outside its borders. Control of the Adriatic was already secured with the dominant influence of the West over Albania and Italy, the US and the UK allies in the Strait of Otranto.
- 2) After Turkey started an autonomous foreign policy, the US started to develop closer and more intense cooperation with Greece. This cooperation is the logistical centre for the two triangles, of which one is composed of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, and the other of Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. The US investment in the port of Alexandroupolis is aimed at threatening the Turkish/Balkan Stream, and potentially controlling the power projection of Turkey (in the Balkans) and of Russia through the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It is part of the bilateral defence arrangements that should prepare bases for the eventual repositioning of U.S. forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (of 2020)<sup>8</sup> between Washington and Athens provides the US with four military facilities in this Balkan country, and negotiations to expand them are underway. It already includes usage of two military bases in Thessaly, Larissa Air Base and Stefanovikio Army Aviation Base, along with usage of the port of Alexandroupolis and the expansion of Souda Bay naval and aviation facilities on the island of Crete. (GOA 2019). The eventual expansion would include more military facilities in Greece to be used potentially by American military forces. Economically, the US enforced the activities of its consulate in Thessaloniki. Elisabeth Lee, heading this consulate in October 2020, emphasized that:

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
<sup>8</sup> It is, in fact, an amendment to the Agreement of 1990.

“The United States considers Greece a pillar of stability in the region, a country that is vital to our strategic interests.” Lee also pointed out that the US Ambassador to Greece, Geoffrey Pyatt, has visited Alexandroupolis five times during his tenure, “more than any other US ambassador in history.” (GCT 2020).

- 3) Engagement versus the EU can be seen in enforcing the US influence in the Balkans, on the European continent. The US did that in Ukraine in order to show that the big boss is in Washington and the US is the one who makes decisions, not Brussels. Thus, Washington is crucial in negotiations between Belgrade and Priština. The US is the main security partner of Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Albania. It is Washington who approves the EU representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the United States and not the EU that used its leverage in order to induce Greece and Skoplje to firm up the Prespa Agreement and achieve membership of North Macedonia in NATO.
- 4) The US presence in Greece and, in particular, the building of its infrastructure in the northern part of the country is aimed at curbing Chinese power projection from the port of Piraeus towards North Macedonia, Serbia and Central Europe.

These policies and further American engagement were officially announced by the White House in the readout of the call between U.S. President Biden and the President of the EU Commission, Von der Leyen. (White House, 2021). In that short statement, it was said that “close US-EU ... leaders also agreed to coordinate on issues of shared interest, including China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans.” (same).

Map 2. Trimarium and two ‘triangles’:  
U.S. partnerships from Baltic Sea to Levant



As is visible on the map, Greece is a place where one U.S. supported initiative — Trimarium, connecting the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas — which is a revival of the Intermarium in the period between the two world wars (as it fulfils the same purpose of inserting a block between Russia and Germany) — is continued with two tripartite partnerships supported by the US.<sup>9</sup> Hence, Greece, a NATO country, connects this American project with the Levant through two new local coalitions.<sup>10</sup>

## China

The Chinese presence and politics in the Balkans in the mentioned period is a continuation of the New Silk Road economic expansion, relying both on the continental and maritime traits of the Belt and Road (the new name for the initiative launched in 2013). China is using its 17+1 – now turned 16+1 (with Lithuania pulling out) cooperation and direct contact with leading parties in the

<sup>9</sup> Though Germany has changed drastically, it is hard to say that it can ever again pursue any policy independent of the West.

<sup>10</sup> Although representatives of the EU Commission and Germany participate on a yearly basis.

region to firmly establish its influence and enforce it. But in the past two years, this fabric has been shaken. Not only did Lithuania leave, but six leaders decided not to participate in the yearly summit. The EU countries, the members of the club, supported the sanctions against China. For the moment, three countries are the most solid Chinese partners - Hungary, Serbia and Greece.<sup>11</sup> Although China tries to play on economic cooperation and not to get involved in political conflicts, growing tensions on a global scale induced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing to announce that “China would like to remind NATO that they still owe a debt of blood to the Chinese people... The dead have passed away, but the living need more vigilance and reflection.” (Global Times 2021).

Yet, the expansion of the Chinese economic presence in the Balkans in this period coincides with heavy debt connected to the Covid-19 crisis. The activities of the Bank of China through its Luxembourg subsidiary are tied to Chinese projects. In the Balkans, it has three branches, in Greece, Romania and Serbia, where it operates exclusively for corporate clients. (The Banks, 2021). In order to be able to send goods to central Europe, the Chinese imperative is to complete the railroad from Piraeus to Budapest. Western European markets are within a reach of the ports of Genoa and Trieste, where China is also investing. In this area, there is a problem with the highway in Montenegro (Bar-Boljare) and in North Macedonia (Kičevo-Ohrid).

*Table 1: Amount of trade (selected countries)  
with the great powers and Germany in 2019 and in 2020.*

Balkan Country trade (in millions USD)	With Germany		With Russia		With the US		With China	
	2019	2020	2019	2020	2019	2020	2019	2020
Albania	448 (5) <sup>12</sup>	579 (4)	123 (10)	148 (8)	140 (9)	N*	692 (3)	546 (6)
Greece	9114 (1)	9300 (1)	4309 (5)	3524 (6)	2780 (10)	2420 (11)	5545 (3)	5249 (3)
Romania	35700 (1)	35400 (1)	4610 (12)	2995 (14)	2768 (16)	2240 (15)	5930 (7)	6683 (6)
Serbia	6090 (1)	6080 (1)	3410 (3)	2481 (4)	791 (20)	811 (18)	1891 (5)	3667 (3)

Sources: Trading Economics and the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC)

\* Unknown data

<sup>11</sup> For the sanctions and the crisis inside the format 17+1 see: Kavalski Emilian. 2021. “Quo Vadis Cooperation Between China and Eastern Europe in the Era of COVID-19?”, *World Affairs*. 2021, Volume: 184 issue: 1, pp. 33-56. doi:10.1177/0043820021991116

<sup>12</sup> At the list of trading partners. For example (1) means the first trading partner.

### **Germany**

Germany is following transatlantic (another name for transnational) interests. When Trump was substituted by the new government and the US returned to globalist policies, the European Union and Germany, as its economic motor, rejoiced. In this period, Berlin is following its policy of economic domination of the markets, which may be used for political influence. Trade domination is thus a tool that ties Balkan countries to Germany and the EU. Table 2 shows the value of trade between selected Balkan countries and the great powers and Germany. Besides trade, other aspects, such as the transfer of German-owned production in Serbia and Romania, play a significant role in the local economies. Yet, this is not translated into political influence wielded by great powers, which indicates that the will to act, but also the means which may be of non-transparent nature (through intelligence, secret arrangements, semi-secret societies) are above mere economics in (international) politics. Germany is the first trade partner of all Balkan countries except Albania and Montenegro (Trading Economics, 2021).

### **Turkey**

Turkey has dispersed its armed forces, intelligence, and other resources in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus, with engagements in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Azerbaijan, besides already maintaining a significant military presence in other countries. It continues to support its partners among the Muslim populations in Bosnia, in Albania, in Serbia (in particular, among Kosovo Albanians) and elsewhere. Continued clashes with Greece and Cyprus over territorial waters and the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones with the deployment of warships and tensions on the continental border with Greece over the migrant crisis are impeding any stronger Balkan initiative from Ankara in the observed period. Having its multivector policy strengthened, among other directions in the Balkans, Turkey, for the time being, is maintaining its strategic depth by cultivating ties with the Muslim population and waiting for the opportunity to return as a more assertive player.

### **Balkan countries**

As already noticed above, the majority of the countries on the Peninsula are members of the transatlantic integration, mostly of NATO. Serbs and Albanians are on opposite sides, but neither of their homeland countries is in the EU. Serbia and the Republic of Srpska are historical allies of Russia. Western support for all secessionist movements in the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the expense of Serbian interests, and finally, NATO aggression on Serbia and Montenegro

in 1999, enforced good relations with Russia. Greece, in its altercations with Turkey, seeks support from Washington and not from Brussels, unable to cope with Turkey. Hence, Athens but also North Macedonia, where Washington's diplomacy was the key to the changing name and the agreement with the Albanians to push the country into NATO. In this period, the status of the Serbian secessionist province of Kosovo and Metohija, along with the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are at the centre of the clashing interests of the great powers. It was witnessed lately by the opposite standings of the Western camp and Russia and China regarding the imposition of a German politician as a new international envoy acting as a sort of a governor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Sputnik.rs, 2021). All of the peninsula is struck by deep demographic erosion, as many young people, and especially skilled people, have left the region. While Serbia and the Serbian people are generically still in their defensive policies, the Albanian factor is still playing across North Macedonia, the province of Kosovo and Metohija, and with a low profile in Montenegro. Potentialities for geopolitical restructuring still exist and are activated in this period through a series of non-papers following more or less the logic launched by Less in 2016 (see more in the first part of the text). A Slovenian non-paper (informal document, *aide-mémoire*) titled *The Western Balkans – a way forward* was published by a local media outlet and it is suspected of being created in the office of Slovenian Prime Minister Janša. It presupposes changes in borders in the so-called Western Balkans, among them the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the division of Macedonia and the annexation of the largest part of Kosovo and Metohija by Albania, all in order to join remnant countries and territories in NATO and the EU. (Cirman, Vuković 2021). This coincided with old plans elaborated informally at Chatham House in the 1990s, and leaves a sinister outlook for the near future.

## CONCLUSION

The geopolitical position of the Balkans is highlighted in the examined period by growing global rivalry. Moscow and Beijing are building their regional footprints and partnerships in parallel to the EU and Washington. The decision of the elites to create an American foreign policy that would curb Russian and Chinese positions in Europe has led to what can be called a “return” to the Balkans.

As a result of concerted efforts by the US and its EU allies, clients or subordinate partners are trying to limit and eventually block Chinese economic penetration in Europe. As part of these efforts, China is suffering from a crisis in its format 16+1, including Balkan countries. However, Beijing still manages to maintain a crucial direction for its trade in the south-north direction from central Greece to Budapest, with the eventual inclusion of Turkey, depending

on the result of the relations between the two countries (which is beyond the scope of this paper).

It was the decision of Russian elites to challenge American unilateral policies in 2007 that led them, among other reasons, to build the Balkan Stream, previously obstructed as the South Stream. Once the plans to implement policies promoting a stronger presence in the Balkans were made, Russia followed its traditional and geographically logical direction from Turkey through Bulgaria and Serbia to Central Europe. It is a gas pipeline built along more or less the old *Via militaris* and continuing north toward Slovakia. At the same time, this pipeline connects countries with a significant population with sympathies towards Russia or with political elites cooperating with Moscow. The US, on the other hand, is acting along the axis North-South, from the Baltic Sea to the shores of the Black Sea, the Adriatic and Egean Seas, trying to halt the penetration of two challenging powers. For that, it has developed or strengthened bilateral, trilateral and multilateral partnerships (with Greece, with two trilateral partnerships, with Trimarium). These partnerships are new tools, or adaptations of the old strategy, employed in the fifties with the Balkan and Baghdad pacts. Basically, these initiatives, and one of their expressions, is the new strategic road, named in line with the American Roman parallel *via Carpatia*. This road connects Klaipeda in Lithuania to Thessaloniki, in order to block Russia (and the Chinese Belt and Road initiative), with power projection in the direction of the North-South. Still, Russian influence comes from the East and Chinese influence is dispersive (aimed at many points) but with a geographically clear source. Despite being economically dominant in the region, the EU and Germany are politically underrepresented. When it comes to Turkey, it concentrated on activities in other regions (the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa) and, for the time being, is simply maintaining its clients.

The decision or willingness of different powers to act based on historical heritage (relationships between Russia and Serbia, or a common position of Serbia and China regarding NATO aggression in 1999), or some geographic feature of the Balkans (its location at the crossroads of continents, cultures, and political blocs) explains foreign actors' actions more deeply. It is a small space compared to other macro-regions, but its divisions leave space for many different actors to be active and contribute to confirming the thesis of Aleksandr Dugin that the Balkans are indeed one of the monitors of world politics.

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### GEOPOLITIKA BALKANA: 2019-2021.

*Apstrakt.* Predmet ovog rada je geopolitička analiza politike velikih sila na i oko Balkana u periodu od tri godine. Autor započinje tekst sa prepričavanjem događaja iz 2019. godine koji je indikativan za jednu od dve hipoteze. Prva je da se Amerika `vratila` na Balkan, a drugu je definisao ruski geopolitičar Aleksandar Dugin, a to je da je Balkansko poluostrvo jedno od dva monitora svetske politike. Tekst je podeljen u pet celina. U uvodnom delu autor definiše hipoteze i odabira italijansku neoklasičnu geopolitičku misao za teoretski okvir. U drugom poglavlju je pružen pregled osnovnih društveno-istorijskih i geografskih osobenosti poluostrva bitnih za geopolitičko poimanje. Treći deo teksta je posvećen stavljanju vođenja balkanske politike spoljnih i unutrašnjih aktera u širi geopolitički okvir. Četvrti deo je najduži i u njemu je ukazano na najznačajnije političke aktivnosti velikih sila, Rusije, SAD i Kine, kao i Nemačke, Turske i lokalnih zemalja. Zaključni deo potvrđuje Duginovu pretpostavku i potvrđuje tezu da je politika velikih sila na Balkanu ponovo dobila na značaju za SAD.

*Ključne reči:* Geopolitika, Balkanska politika, Ruska balkanska politika, Pojas i put, američke inicijative na Balkanu, Srbija, Grčka, nemačka balkanska politika.

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## **A VALUABLE PIECE OF THE LIBERAL HEGEMONY PUZZLE: THE UNITED STATES' INVOLVEMENT IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS**

Pavle NEDIĆ<sup>1</sup>

*Abstract:* The conflict in Northern Ireland was resolved with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and with the great involvement of the Clinton administration. The paper explores how the United States (US) efforts in the Northern Ireland peace process contributed to the US grand strategy of liberal hegemony, approaching the subject from a realist perspective and using the method of a case study. It concludes that the Clinton administration saw the potential for a peaceful resolution of this conflict as an important part of its broader efforts to establish a liberal world order in the wake of the ending of the Cold War. This factor was a major motivation for the increased interest of the Bill Clinton administration. The positive outcome of the peace process, which was sponsored and mediated by the US, has become an important foundation for the justification of further engagements supposed to contribute to the liberal hegemony that Clinton's foreign policy aimed to construct.

*Keywords:* Liberal hegemony, US foreign policy, Bill Clinton, Northern Ireland, Good Friday Agreement.

### **INTRODUCTION**

The Good Friday or the Belfast Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998 and ended decades of conflict and violence in Northern Ireland, known as “the Troubles”. The strife between Protestants and Catholics, the unionists and the republicans, traces its origins to the Irish War of Independence, and even further into the past. It was marked by both violent and peaceful protests, political and

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cultural repression, terrorism and police brutality. However, the end of direct and open violence came with the signing of this peace agreement. The talks between the representatives of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and major Northern Irish political parties were moderated and chaired by US Senator George J. Mitchell, who was appointed by President Bill Clinton. The US involvement came as a consequence of a wider context. President Clinton's commitment to conflict resolution was an important part of his foreign policy, based on the role of the US as a global promoter of peace in the aftermath of the Cold War.

In this paper, the US contribution to the peace process as a part of Clinton's grand strategy – the creation of global liberal hegemony will be analysed. Relying on the realist approach and the works of Mearsheimer and Walt on liberal hegemony, the paper will explore how the US efforts in the Northern Ireland peace process contributed to this goal. Although the role of the United States in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement is well established, this paper will examine it in the wider context of Washington's grand strategy during the Clinton administration. It will thus contribute to the existing literature both on the subjects of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process and of the US foreign policy and grand strategy. Temporally, the focus of the paper will be on the first and second presidential terms of Bill Clinton, from 1993 to 2001. Spatially, it will primarily focus on Northern Ireland and the United States, but it will touch upon other regions as well, since its subject is the superpower's grand strategy that, by definition, has a global reach and pretensions. By using Northern Ireland as a case study, the paper aims to show how the US efforts in a specific peace process must be seen from a wider perspective of its grand strategy and previous foreign policy results.

The paper consists of four parts and a conclusion. In the first part of the paper, a literature overview will be given, where the existing research on the concept of liberal hegemony, the conflict in Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement and Clinton's foreign policy will be presented. The second part will provide a brief overview of the Northern Ireland conflict, its history, and the parties involved, as well as a summary of the key provisions of the Good Friday Agreement and an explanation of its significance. In the third part, the role of the US in the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland will be explored. In the fourth part, the US involvement will be analysed as a part of a greater strategy developed by policymakers in Washington, based on the concept of liberal hegemony. Finally, the conclusion will be given.

## **LITERATURE OVERVIEW**

The concept of liberal hegemony was analysed and its results assessed in detail by the authors from the perspective of the realist school of international

relations. Mearsheimer (2018) explains what happens when the idea of liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, which in turn leads to the preference for democracy and an open market economy, embraces the same principles in its foreign policy. The underlying ideas behind this grand strategy are that individual rights are universal, and a great liberal power has to protect them, that democratic countries do not go to war with each other, and that by promoting liberalism abroad, they are protecting it at home, since non-liberal countries often support domestic anti-liberals (Mearsheimer 2018, 131–136). These ideas lead to the attempts of social engineering across the globe. However, in the absence of a hierarchy in the international system, the great powers are forced to behave in accordance with the realist logic and restrain themselves because other great powers would feel threatened by such a foreign policy. Mearsheimer argues that only in a specific unipolar balance of power can the remaining great power attempt to establish a liberal hegemony unchallenged. Such conditions were created in the aftermath of the Cold War (Mearsheimer 2018, 146). The United States pursued the establishment of liberal hegemony during the height of its unprecedented dominance during the Clinton administration of the 1990s and during the presidential terms of his successors, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, despite the obvious failings of this grand strategy. It leads to militarism, proneness to war as a primary solution, undercuts diplomacy and antagonizes other major powers (Mearsheimer 2018, 159). The author also explains that liberalism at the international level endangers liberalism at home through secrecy, lack of transparency and erosion of civil liberties (Mearsheimer 2018, 185–191).

The reasons behind the continued reliance on liberal hegemony and its less than admirable effects were analysed by Walt (2018). The fall of the USSR gave the United States an opportunity to pursue the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, but America's security, wealth and geostrategic position did not require it. As the author explains, "U.S. primacy made an ambitious grand strategy possible, but it also made it less necessary" (Walt 2018, 15). Liberal hegemony "seeks to expand and deepen a liberal world order under the benevolent leadership of the United States" (Walt 2018, 38). However, it underestimated the antagonism of other major powers to the expanding US influence, over-relied on the results US military power could achieve, misjudged the difficulties and costs of this policy and exaggerated its benefits. Despite the dismal record and numerous unsuccessful initiatives and operations it spawned, the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations clung to it vehemently (Walt 2018, 14). This is a result of the foreign policy establishment's commitment to this strategy, argues Walt. The ability of the foreign policy community to influence and steer the public debate on these issues has enabled them to present liberal hegemony as the only viable strategy. In this way, they misrepresented the options and influenced the

decision-making process in a way that they believed was desirable for the US, the world and themselves (Walt 2018, 16).

On the other hand, some authors question the very existence of the liberal international order (LIO) and the liberal hegemony of the United States. Glaser explains that the LIO concept is not useful since it focuses only on the interaction between its member states – liberal democracies, while ignoring the fact that powers such as Russia and China are not part of it (Glaser 2019, 52–53). Moreover, the author argues that “because of weaknesses in three of the mechanisms that constitute the LIO concept—binding, hierarchy, and political convergence—the LIO does not provide the United States with significant indirect security benefits” (Glaser 2019, 65). Offering the critique of the LIO from another angle, Porter argues that the US hegemony is not, in fact, fundamentally different from those that existed throughout history. It is, in its essence, imperial. When it is convenient, “the US, at critical moments, exempts itself from rules and norms, even while preaching them” (Porter 2020, 90). The superpower is ready to wage war in order to promote peace and insists on its own sphere of influence while insisting they are a thing of the past. Thus, in Porter’s view, the liberal aspect of the international order does not exist.

It goes without saying that US foreign policy during the Clinton administration was analysed extensively and from multiple perspectives (Warshaw 2004; Lynch 2020). Some authors stamped it with rather negative qualifications due to its reactiveness (Hyland 1999), less than impressive record (Mandelbaum 1996), wrong choice of priorities (Haass 1997) or the President’s lack of vision (Foreign policy editors 2000). However, others have made an effort to re-evaluate its effects and results, both on their own and in the context of the policies of the administrations that followed it. Dumbrell (2005; 2009) finds that Clinton’s foreign policy, framed “between the Bushes”, deserves more acknowledgement. Even Walt gave a somewhat apologetic take on Clinton’s foreign policy results, taking into account the specific international context the President found himself in (Walt 2000). In particular, his handling of the Northern Ireland conflict was praised (Martin 1999; Dumbrell 2010). The authors also debated at length whether Clinton had a grand strategy and a doctrine, and if he had, were they effective? (Dumbrell 2002, Brands 2008).

The authors also addressed the US involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict during its settlement phase in the 1990s, but also explored the positions of previous administrations on this particular issue although it was never in their foreign policy focus (Thompson 1991). As a superpower whose defining characteristic is its ability to project its influence and power across the globe, a conflict directly involving one of its main and crucial allies, the United Kingdom, had to be of interest to foreign policy makers in Washington, independently of other issues they had to deal with. The influence of the Irish-American

communities, especially Catholics, and organizations, such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAI) and the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH), in both the peace efforts and the protraction of the conflict has been explored, as well as the position of the Nixon and Carter administrations, which were mainly indifferent to it (Dumbrell 1995). The increased US interest during Ronald Reagan's presidency and his contribution to the securing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 were also acknowledged (Cooper 2017). Expectedly, due to his important role, Bill Clinton's involvement was written about in great detail as well (MacGinty 1997; Wilson 1997; Cox 1999; Hazleton 2000). Other authors focused on US economic support in this period (Wilson 2001; White 2018). The important function of the moderator and the personal touch Senator Mitchell brought to the negotiation is another important factor that was covered by scholars (Curran et al. 2004). Although often neglected to be mentioned, due to the significance the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq conducted in his term had on international relations, the contribution of Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, to the peace process in Northern Ireland and the enforcement of the Good Friday Agreement was also the subject of scientific interest (Marsden 2006; Clancy 2007).

The Good Friday Agreement, which brought an immediate resolution to the violence between the varying factions in Northern Ireland, the unionists and the Irish nationalists, was compared and analysed in juxtaposition with the failed Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 (Tonge 2000). The road to peace and the necessary conditions which led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 were also of interest to scholars (Wolff 2001), as well as the ways in which it changed the structure of the conflict by enabling the British to reposition themselves (Todd 2003). Furthermore, it was also researched how the signing parties were able to convince the population on both sides to accept the agreement by presenting it as the less risky option (Hancock et al. 2010). McGarry (2001; 2002) focused on the political institutions stemming from the agreement and gave a detailed analysis of Northern Ireland as a model of consociational democracy, first developed by Arend Lijphart. Additionally, peace studies researchers studied the Northern Ireland conflict and its peaceful solution as a learning process (Tannam 2001) and an example of path dependency (Ruane and Todd 2007). Of course, due to the perceived effectiveness of this particular conflict resolution, the lessons learned from it and their potential implementation in other conflict cases were examined as well (White 2013).

So, the Northern Ireland conflict is a hot topic in the scientific disciplines of international relations, peace studies and security studies. The foreign policy of the Clinton administration, in general, has also been vastly discussed, debated and analysed. However, the conflict, its resolution and decisive role the United States interest had in it have not garnered much scientific attention from the



scholars dealing with topics of the US foreign policy, the US grand strategy, international relations in the immediate period after the end of the Cold War and researchers interested in the US sponsored and supported efforts to establish liberal hegemony during the 1990s. Both the US military and peace involvement in conflicts and its interventionism during this period have been the subject of great, thorough and insightful analysis and scientific research. Many papers and books were written about the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992-1993 (Clark 1992; Clarke and Herbst 1996; Klarevas 2000) in which the US role was crucial, or the decisive influence of Washington on the developments and ultimate settlement of the wars in the Balkans (Varadarajan 1999), primarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sobel 1998) and Kosovo and Metohija (Henkin 1999). Yet, although the United States contributed greatly to the peace process in Northern Ireland and, all things considered, their involvement can be characterized as a successful one, which is not the attribute given without hesitation to some of the aforementioned operations, it did not warrant detailed analysis in the context of the US grand strategy of the 1990s, and that of the Clinton administration specifically. The paper will present the US role in the settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland in this context. It will explore how can the contribution of Bill Clinton be understood as a part of his approach to the US foreign policy and the wider international relations goals of his administration, namely the achievement of global liberal hegemony, led by the United States, which is unburdened by a rival ideology with whom it must compete for world domination. The paper will argue that the US support for the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the negotiations that led to it was an important piece of these efforts. But first, a brief history of the conflict in Northern Ireland will be presented in order to better understand the causes and roots of this decades-spanning cycle of violence and political struggle.

### **THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A BRIEF HISTORY**

The conflict in Northern Ireland has its roots in a history of conquest, oppression, rebellions and competing visions of the future of the northern part of the island. The basis for the English conquest of Ireland can be traced to the papal bull *Laudabiliter* issued in 1155 by the only English Pope, Adrian IV, which granted the right to the king Henry II to invade and rule the Irish island (Beggan and Indurthy 1999, 4). In the subsequent centuries, English forces took control of the whole of Ireland. James I started the settlement of Protestants in the northern part of the island – Ulster in the seventeenth century and forced out the Catholic Irish living there. The process was intensified during the reign of Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell. The incoming English settlers were large

landowners, so the social cleavage that was created divided the people across national, religious and class lines. The Irish struggle and desire for independence resulted in an unsuccessful rebellion at Easter 1916, which led to the Irish War of Independence of 1919–1921. The result of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign was an Irish Free State, which severed all ties with Britain and the Commonwealth after the referendum and the declaration of the Republic in 1937. However, this state did not encompass the whole island.

Northern Ireland was formed in the northern part of the island by the British from six of the nine counties of the Ulster province. Besides the four counties with a predominantly Protestant population (Antrim, Armagh, Down and Londonderry), it also includes the two with the most prominent Protestant minority (Fermanagh and Tyrone), which meant that at the time of its creation, two-thirds of the Northern Irish population were Protestants and one-third were Catholics (Beggan and Indurthy 1999, 6). This created a suitable situation for continuous strife and conflict, further incited by the discrimination of the Catholic minority in the aspects of political representation, employment and housing (Dorney 2015). The following decades created two opposing ideas that became deeply embedded in their respective communities. Protestants were mainly in favour of unionism and remaining firmly in the United Kingdom, while Catholics predominantly favoured republicanism and pushed for independence from the British Crown and unity with the Republic of Ireland.

In the late 1960s, inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was founded. Its goal was to fight for the end of discrimination against the Catholic part of the population. Their protests and marches often led to violence due to attacks of the unionists. The culmination was the riots of August 1969, which resulted in eight deaths and numerous people being injured and displaced, houses burned and neighbourhoods destroyed (Dorney 2015). This sparked the deployment of the British Army in order to restore order, which was initially welcomed by Catholics since it meant the end of the current violence.

The riots were a preview of the 1970s, which were the most violent and bloody decade in the Northern Irish conflict (Dorney 2015). The Provisional IRA detached from the original organization in order to fight for a united Ireland through a campaign of violence and terrorism. The unionists had their own paramilitary organizations, such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which organized attacks on both the IRA and civilian targets and used indiscriminate methods to wage war for the cause of unionism. “The Troubles” drove the British Government to abolish Northern Irish autonomy in 1972 and govern the province directly from London, primarily through the office of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The British policies during the 1970s and 1980s led to further divisions and enforced the

determination of the republicans. For example, the British Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974, which allowed the authorities to hold a suspect for up to seven days without any charge. The government of Margaret Thatcher removed the political status of the IRA prisoners and treated all the IRA actions as criminal and not as political acts. In protest, many imprisoned IRA members went on hunger strikes, often with fatal outcomes (Beggan and Indurthy 1999, 10–11).

Despite all the violence, the 1970s and 1980s also brought two important initiatives which were aimed at finding a permanent solution to the situation in Northern Ireland. The first one was the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. The crucial aspect was the creation of the Council of Ireland, which was to be formed of an equal number of representatives of legislative and executive from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Council was supposed to manage the policy areas of common interest for the whole island, but it was never constituted and the agreement collapsed. The unionists were fervently opposed to this concept and felt betrayed by the Labour government in London (Wolff 2001, 166). They organized massive strikes led by the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Reverend Ian Paisley. The second initiative was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. It was signed by the British and Irish Prime Ministers. The Agreement established a joint intergovernmental conference which was supposed to give the Republic of Ireland a consultative role in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland and address some of the Catholic grievances, primarily in the security sector (Coakley 2001, 13). The unionists were again opposed and led a successful “Ulster Says No” campaign against it. Although the results of the aforementioned initiatives were questionable or downright non-existent, both agreements were important in paving the road for the one that would succeed in the future. This could be said of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in particular, because it allowed London and Dublin to collaborate to find a solution to the Northern Ireland situation.

The conditions for the negotiations started to form in the 1990s. A favourable international context in the wake of the end of the Cold War, on the one hand, and the prolonged nature of the fighting that left both sides in a stalemate, on the other, made a resolution by compromise an achievable and not an unwelcomed result. In 1994, first the IRA and then the unionist paramilitary organizations proclaimed a ceasefire and a series of negotiations and peace talks started with a diverse group of actors and in a series of various configurations and phases (Coakley 2001, 15). In the negotiations were represented, among others, the British and Irish governments, more moderate parties such as the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the republican Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), as well as Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA. The DUP, which was present at the start, left the negotiations after the inclusion of Sinn

Féin. The talks were moderated by US Senator George J. Mitchell, appointed by the US President, Bill Clinton. The final text of the Good Friday or the Belfast Agreement, signed on 10 April 1998, was deliberately vague and ambiguous in order to be acceptable to all sides. According to the agreement, Northern Ireland's constitutional status would be decided solely by the democratic vote of its inhabitants, recognizing that the majority of its people want to remain in the United Kingdom. The provisions included dual citizenship, a proportionally elected legislative body, an executive led by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who come from different communities, an Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conference and a North-South ministerial council (Coakley 2001, 17–19). The paramilitary groups were to disarm and prisoners would be granted an early release. The Agreement was confirmed in a referendum in Northern Ireland, followed by a successful referendum in the Republic of Ireland to remove the claim to Northern Ireland from its constitution, which was also stipulated in the document. The referendums gave the people a sense of ownership of the process (Wolff 2001, 169). Although the following years showed the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement was a slow and hard process, it did effectively put an end to “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland. What was the role of the US in this peace process? In the next part, this aspect, especially in the context of the American grand strategy, will be analysed.

### **THE US INVOLVEMENT IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS**

Although the conflict and the violence in Northern Ireland were a continuous and ever-present issue, the US administrations in the 1970s and 1980s were not very interested in taking any steps to influence the situation there. President Jimmy Carter, whose whole foreign policy was framed around the issue of human rights, made an unexpected exception in 1977 when he gave a statement about potential increased US investment in Northern Ireland if a peaceful solution was achieved (Dumbrell 2018, 116). Still, he limited his response to this remark. President Ronald Reagan's contribution, on the other hand, was most felt during the talks which resulted in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. He discussed the issue with Prime Minister Thatcher in order to nudge her to be more willing to consider a possible deal (Dumbrell 2018, 119). Despite the fact that his intervention was successful, the US showed little interest in getting more actively engaged. The main channel through which the Northern Ireland conflict was put on the table of US politics was the campaigns and lobbying of the so-called Four Horsemen – Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O'Neil, Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Governor of New York Hugh Carey (White 2018, 6). The considerable influence of these

politicians and their sympathy for the idea of a united Ireland, along with the efforts of American-Irish interest groups, such as the AOH and the NORAI, managed to make a case for the republican cause relatively successfully. The Four Horsemen put pressure on both Carter and Reagan to engage in some capacity, which resulted in the mentioned actions. However, the executive branch remained largely uninterested in the developments in what it considered an internal issue of the United Kingdom. American disinterest is best illustrated by the fact that the State Department traditionally assigned a junior Foreign Service Officer (FSO) to the Ireland-Northern Ireland-Iceland Desk, who always deferred to a Senior FSO at the British Desk since Northern Ireland is a part of the UK (Thompson 1991, 104). This general inactivity regarding the Northern Ireland conflict was to change rather drastically under President Bill Clinton.

Bill Clinton first became associated with the Northern Ireland issue during his presidential election campaign and fundraising activities. During the forum for Irish issues held in the Sheraton Hotel in Manhattan in April 1992, the future President gave several replies about his actions regarding Northern Ireland. In order to win the support of the influential American Irish Catholic community, Clinton promised to grant a US visa to the IRA leader, Gerry Adams, who was denied this document on several previous occasions. He also pledged to send a special envoy to Northern Ireland (Beggan and Indurthy 1999, 13–14). After winning the election and becoming President, Clinton came into a situation where he could make good on his promises. While his special envoy idea never gathered much support from either the community in Northern Ireland or the British and Irish governments, the potential visa for Gerry Adams was seen as an important signal. The President declined to grant it to the IRA leader in 1993. However, the following year, he changed his decision (Cox 1997, 687). This change caused great controversy and dissatisfaction in Britain, but it turned out to be one of the better judgment calls by President Clinton and influenced the prospective negotiations greatly. Disregarding the opinions on the matter of the CIA, the FBI and the State Department, he followed the advice of his National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Nancy Soderberg. They framed the situation as a win-win scenario for the president, and he decided to take a gamble (Cox 1999, 63–64). The visa was given with expectations of the IRA ceasefire in return. They reasoned that if Adams delivered this result, it would be a diplomatic victory. If he did not, the IRA would be exposed as untrustworthy and lose its credibility. The gamble paid off. The position in the organization of the moderate Gerry Adams was strengthened with this move and contributed to his successful push against the more radical IRA members. As a result, the unilaterally declared ceasefire in 1994 was the start of a negotiation process that led to the Good Friday Agreement four years later.

The incentives for the IRA by the Clinton administration to remain committed to negotiations and the quest for a peaceful solution continued in the following years. Adams was granted a visa again in 1995 and met with President Clinton at the celebration of Saint Patrick's Day in the White House. Moreover, the IRA was given permission to fundraise in the United States, despite strong opposition from the British (Wilson 1997, 33). UK Prime Minister John Major was reportedly so aggravated that he declined calls from Clinton for a week (MacGinty 1997, 6). Still, the more active role the US has taken enabled the unprecedented meeting of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, and Gerry Adams at the Investment Conference in Washington in May 1995 (Wilson 1997, 33). This remarkable encounter was an important factor in the normalization of regular contacts between all sides in order to find a solution.

Clinton's visit to London, Belfast, Derry and Dublin in late 1995 with his wife Hilary was a culmination and a high-point of the President's commitment to the Northern Ireland conflict resolution. The significance of the visit stems from the renewed sense of progress and concrete events it inspired in the population. On the other hand, it was a significant step in the process of convincing the unionist that the US is not one-sided in its approach to this conflict and has no favourites. As unionist Roy Bradford commented on the importance of Clinton's visit, it "significantly changed the feeling among unionists that the American agenda is exclusively nationalist" (as quoted in MacGinty 1997, 8). The exception was the reaction and stance of Ian Paisley and the DUP. The ceasefire broke down in 1996 and Clinton was focused on the elections back home, but his dedication to the peace process remained, evident in the appointment of former Senate majority leader George J. Mitchell as chair of the multi-party peace talks in June of the same year (MacGinty 1997, 9), which followed his earlier appointment as a Special Envoy for Northern Ireland in December 1994 (Dumbrell 2018, 124).

The Senator's role was crucial, as his fair and balanced approach enabled all sides to have confidence in his handling of the talks. He successfully navigated difficult and sensitive topics and focused on achieving results in the areas that all parties could agree upon at the time. Still, behind him, there was always Clinton and his genuine will to contribute to the solution. The gravity President's interest brought to negotiations cannot be overstated. When the outline of the document was drafted and an end was visible on the horizon, he made himself available constantly to the participants via phone. These phone consultations were instrumental in convincing Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern when he was having second thoughts about the proposed agreement. Clinton was also able to persuade the UUP and SDLP leaders, David Trimble and John Hume, to accept the agreement, although they had serious reservations. Trimble especially faced grave opposition within his party about the concessions he made, so the

President's encouragement and persuasiveness were essential (White 2018, 8). The result of these combined undertakings of all parties involved was the peace in Northern Ireland, which has lasted for more than 20 years. It is doubtful if the peace talks would have resulted in an agreement there and then without the Clinton administration's dedication to it.

### **NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE US GRAND STRATEGY**

The US involvement in Northern Ireland can be characterized as an “encouragement from the sidelines” (Hazleton 2000) and that it was “regularized, though not institutionalized” (MacGinty 1997, 7). Different factors contributed to Clinton's interest in this issue and the active role he took. He initially looked at securing the important American Irish vote in the elections of 1992. His closeness to the Kennedy family also played a role. Clinton relied heavily on Senator Edward Kennedy for advice and appointed his sister, Jean Kennedy Smith, as the US ambassador to Ireland in 1993 (Cox 1999, 63). Furthermore, his decision to disregard the British complaints regarding the Gerry Adams visa was also influenced by his contempt for the Conservatives and John Major because they actively worked to help the Bush campaign in 1992 (Beggan and Indurthy 1999, 14). However, a very important factor of his involvement is the larger international context and the US foreign policy of the time, primarily shaped by the grand strategy of liberal hegemony.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the position of the US as the sole remaining superpower enabled it to embark on a reordering at the international level to its preferences. The balance of power that existed in the bipolar world during the previous 45 years has ceased to exist. Even during the period of the Cold War, the Northern Ireland issue was decidedly in the US sphere of influence, although its interest in the conflict was rather limited, as previously explained. The IRA was in part inspired by the wider revolutionary struggles around the world, with the battle between capitalism and communism in the background (Cox 1997, 677). The change in the global framework affected the organization and prompted the increase of US interest. So, the involvement of the US was intensified in the period when the country was more than ever able to act and intervene without the significant opposition of other powers since Russia was adapting to its new role in the aftermath of the USSR collapse and China was focused inward on its economic development. On the regional level, the involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process confirmed the dominant position of the US in the “special relationship” with the UK. Additionally, it emphasised the role of the US as the security provider for Europe and asserted its commitment to European affairs even without the threat of communism and

the forces of the USSR. This stance was also evident in the US grand strategy of the period.

The grand strategy of the Clinton administration was outlined by the National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, in his speech given at John Hopkins University on 21 September 1993 and further elaborated by the President in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 27 September 1993 (Brinkley 1997, 115). In 1994, the crucial principles and ideas were laid out in the new National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Brinkley 1997, 120). The document primarily stems from the new role and position of the United States in the post-Cold War world. Through its basis in the liberal values of free trade and democracy as foundations for a more prosperous and secure world, it was the groundwork for the pursuit of liberal hegemony, the central concept that drove the foreign policy of both Clinton and his successors. Observing the Northern Ireland case through the prism of grand strategy is useful in three aspects. Firstly, taking into account that economic development is one of the founding principles of liberal hegemony, the considerable emphasis that the US has placed on this component of its support can be understood. Secondly, putting the success in Northern Ireland into a wider perspective shows its use as a positive example and argument for involvement in other conflicts, namely in the Balkans and the Middle East, during the Clinton administration and those of his successors. Thirdly, it shows that the positive result can in part be attributed to the minimalist approach taken and the commitment to be as neutral as possible.

Regarding Northern Ireland, the domestic focus on the economy in the US was followed by the application of a similar approach to foreign policy. It was in line with the idea of economic interdependence, which is one of the main pillars of the concept of liberal hegemony (Mearsheimer 2018, 195). It is based on the belief that the economic development, in significant part stimulated by foreign investment, will lead to trade and economic links which will make the war harder and the cost of conflict too high. With this logic in mind, the economic dimension of US involvement in Northern Ireland has become considerable. Before being appointed Special Envoy, Mitchell was a special presidential adviser on economic initiatives for Northern Ireland, while Nancy Soderberg chaired a committee which was examining potential economic initiatives (MacGinty 1997, 7). Several delegations visited Northern Ireland to investigate opportunities for investment, including two led by US Commerce Secretary Ron Brown in 1994 and 1995 (Wilson 2003, 160). Additionally, Clinton increased the annual US contribution to the International Fund for Ireland from 20 million dollars to 30 million (MacGinty 1997, 7).

However, Clinton's foreign policy approach in the first period of his presidential term was not marked by a clear adherence to any strategy or plan. It was reactive and constantly modified on a case-by-case basis. He committed the



US troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. They were the linchpin of the operation, since the UN relied on the American presence as the backbone of the humanitarian intervention. Shortly after the killings of 18 US Army Rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993, Clinton withdrew the American forces from the country (Lynch 2020, 61). The humanitarian crisis in Haiti, caused by brutal reprisals after a forceful regime change in a country not far from US soil, prompted the President to send in the USS *Harlan County* in October 1993, barely a week after the Mogadishu firefight. But after the protest by the local population on the docks, the ship turned away and returned to its homeport (Lynch 2020, 63). These failings caused the administration's reluctance to engage in Rwanda and potentially stop the genocide or lessen the number of perpetrated mass killings. The feeble initial foreign policy results led to the recognition of the Northern Ireland conflict as a chance to finally achieve some tangible and worthy results.

After a series of unsuccessful endeavours, the President needed a breakthrough on some foreign policy fronts. The conflict in Northern Ireland was recognized as an opportunity for a relatively easy score. The potential costs were comparatively small and acceptable. The unavoidable disturbance of the “special relationship” with London did not carry as much weight as it did during the Cold War. As Clinton said, “I think sometimes that we are too reluctant to engage ourselves in a positive way because of our long-standing special relationship with Great Britain” (as quoted in Cox 1997, 686). The changing international context meant that the good terms with their traditional ally across the Atlantic could suffer a moderate setback without serious or long-lasting consequences. The administration's involvement and the peaceful resolution of the decades-long violence it would stimulate were expected to justify the further engagement in other conflicts and parts of the world, such as the Balkans and the Middle East. It must not be overlooked that they were much more important to the US interests than the situation on the Irish island, but the support for this kind of entanglement was rather reluctant. The Balkans was an opportunity to assert the American commitment to Eastern Europe and confirm that the only remaining global superpower is fully committed to its newly acquired allies, in the wake of the emerging process of NATO enlargement. The approach to this issue was a test of NATO's credibility and Clinton's statesmanship (Lynch 2020, 73). The Middle East was a traditionally important region due to its oil and geostrategic position and has become increasingly unstable due to the struggles for regional supremacy among its main actors. Also, it was the main source of the developing threat of terrorism, although that significance was not fully comprehended at the time. The positive result in Northern Ireland gave considerably more weight to a more active and continual US role in these regions.

Finally, the success of the Northern Ireland case was in part due to the restraint that the US showed in this particular instance. The more comprehensive

involvement and attempts to achieve a deep reform of the whole country and society proved very difficult and result questionable, especially during the international undertakings of Clinton's successors. On the other hand, the minimalistic approach which was taken in Northern Ireland and the genuine commitment to be as neutral and impartial as possible gave credibility to American inclusion as an important factor in the process. The confirmation came when George J. Mitchell was called again to Northern Ireland to help mediate an impasse in the decommissioning process and the formation of a power-sharing executive (Beggan and Indurthy 1999, 17). Part of the success in Northern Ireland can be contributed to the US reluctance to "try to impose solutions on others solely by issuing ultimatums and ratcheting up more and more pressure" (Walt 2018, 56). So, because the US did not apply all the regular methods it relied upon in the creation of liberal hegemony, the accomplishment in Northern Ireland was easier to achieve. Paradoxically, that accomplishment gave justification and a precedent for the later ventures which ended up more or less unsuccessfully, in part because the positive example of Northern Ireland was not relied upon more closely as a blueprint.

## CONCLUSION

The establishment of liberal hegemony was a leading idea and rationale behind the decisions of foreign policy makers in the United States during the last decade of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. For the US, the undisputed victor of the Cold War, the space for the reshaping of the international order at its will has been opened. The conflict in Northern Ireland, whose roots and causes trace back to history, in this new international context, was a great opportunity for larger American involvement. The previous administrations treated it as a British internal issue, but President Bill Clinton showed great personal interest and dedication to a peaceful solution to the conflict between the unionists and the republicans. Taking a calculated risk with the visa for the IRA leader Gerry Adams in 1994, he stimulated the creation of necessary conditions for the ceasefire and negotiations. Furthermore, his commitment, demonstrated during the peace talks and the appointment of Senator Mitchell as a Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, who greatly influenced the peace process, contributed to the solution in the form of the Good Friday Agreement. The American role was also evident in the economic stimulus supposed to induce the people of Northern Ireland, while the President's attentiveness can be further comprehended in the wake of his previous international undertakings. He needed a relatively easy win on the foreign policy front to mitigate the damage of these failings, at the same time providing a justification for future engagements in other regional conflicts more important

for the US strategic interests. Hence, the US involvement in Northern Ireland presented an important and overlooked part of the wider pursuit of liberal hegemony creation, which started during the two presidential terms of President Bill Clinton.

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**VAŽAN DEO U SLAGALICI LIBERALNE HEGEMONIJE:  
UKLJUČENOST SJEDINJENIH AMERIČKIH DRŽAVA  
U MIROVNI PROCES U SEVERNOJ IRSKOJ**

*Apstrakt:* Sukob u Severnoj Irskoj je okončan potpisivanjem Sporazuma na Veliki Petak 1998. godine uz značajno uključivanje Klintonove administracije. Rad istražuje na koji je način uticaj Sjedinjenih Država na mirovni proces u Severnoj Irskoj doprineo američkoj velikoj strategiji liberalne hegemonije, prilazeći temi iz ugla teorije realizma i koristeći metodu studije slučaja. Zaključuje se da je Klintonova administracija videla potencijal za mirovno rešenje ovog sukoba kao važan deo širih napora da uspostavi liberalni svetski poredak nakon završetka Hladnog rata. Ovaj faktor je doprineo motivaciji za povećano interesovanje administracije Bila Clintona. Pozitivan rezultat mirovnog procesa, koji su podržale i u kojem su posredovale SAD, postao je važna osnova za opravdavanje budućih interencija u cilju doprinesa stvaranju liberalne hegemonije kojoj je težila Klintonova spoljna politika.

*Ključne reči:* liberalna hegemonija, spoljna politika SAD, Bil Clinton, Severna Irska, Sporazum na Veliki petak.

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## **NGOs AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: BETWEEN INFORMAL REALITY AND POSSIBILITIES OF FORMAL INTERACTION**

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*Abstract.* Following the end of the Cold War, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) took the initiative in their interactions with the UN Security Council. Since then, mechanisms for informal consultations between NGOs and the Security Council have been established. Through informal consultations, NGOs have successfully influenced the decisions of the Security Council in the area of soft policy. It is critical to take appropriate measures in a timely manner when it comes to international peace and security. Mechanisms of informal access are not able to provide this request because they depend on the goodwill of the permanent members of the Security Council. The author examines possibilities for the establishment of formal interaction between the Security Council and NGOs. The author considers the UN Charter revision or granting international legal personality to NGOs as solutions for the establishment of formal interaction. Until one of these options happens, the paper considers that the Security Council and its permanent members must be more open towards NGOs and use NGOs' resources to improve their own reputation and increase transparency.

*Keywords:* NGOs, the Security Council, UN Charter revision, international legal personality, informal consultations, transparency, formal interaction, permanent members of the Security Council.

### **INTRODUCTION**

The Security Council is a body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security within the UN system. Over the years, the UN

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member states have noticed a few negative tendencies related to the functioning of the Security Council.

The Security Council has been criticized on multiple levels for being in a democratic deficit. The fact that the UN Charter gives permanent Security Council membership (the P-5) and the veto power of the permanent members, makes the P-5 more equal than the others. The Security Council has been criticized for being insufficiently representative of the broader membership of the UN. The remaining ten seats on the Council are elected for two-year terms, with five incomings and five outgoings each year. Legal theorists consider that it is unlikely that the Security Council, as an undemocratic body, “would operate democratically and reach democratic outcomes in its decision-making” and that it is “equally unlikely that such an undemocratic entity would make decisions that serve the interests of democracy” (Farrall 2009, 917–918).

The veto power of the permanent members, the frequent abuse of the veto, the lack of transparency, scandals and manipulations relating to peacekeeping operations have cast a shadow over its reputation. In the legal literature, the Security Council has been characterized as “a superpower organ with contrasting aspirations of the majority of the members of the UN” (Rath 2006, 61), “an oligarchic” and “an exclusive club” (Dimitrijević 2009, 11). It has been compared to “an international police officer who has centralized the application of international law” (Jovanović 2015, 61).

What could be a possible “cure” for the damaged reputation and the lack of transparency of the Security Council? Could it be an interaction with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)? NGOs are very active participants in the international arena - in the area of international politics as well as international law. They have made significant contributions to the development of international law, human rights, environmental law, humanitarian law, etc. NGOs are often invited to take part in international affairs because they are seen as “representing civil society” and, as such, their participation is interpreted as legitimizing or democratizing the whole process (Martens 2003, 24). Nowadays, NGOs have the capacity to influence international organization policy and to intervene directly in choices traditionally reserved for individual sovereign states under international law. They exercise real power in the international community (Tarlock 1992, 65). Theorists consider that the inclusion of non-state actors might be a way to mitigate the democratic deficit in global governance, but the Security Council has been considered as a “hard case” for opening up to NGOs (Binder 2008, 2).

The paper investigates how interaction with NGOs can help increase transparency and repair the Security Council’s tarnished reputation. What obstacles are NGOs faced with when it comes to interaction with the Security Council? Could these obstacles be overcome? To what extent is the Security Council open

to interaction with NGOs? Are there some possibilities for formal interaction between NGOs and the Security Council in the future? These are some of the questions that require answers.

### **NGOS INITIATIVES FOR INTERACTION WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

As a response to a great increase in the Security Council activity in the post-Cold War era, the General Assembly has started negotiations on the reform of the Security Council. NGOs based in New York and Geneva decided to get involved. NGOs established the NGO Working Group on the Security Council in early 1995, with the aim of influencing the debate about the reform of the Security Council. The working group has organized two public meetings on reform topics as well as several private meetings with delegates and with the office of the General Assembly President to propose initiatives and gain support (Paul 2010).

Just two years later, it was clear that Security Council reform was a slow and never-ending process. The NGO Working Group had to change course. It began to organize a public dialogue between the Council members and the NGO community in 1996. The aim of these dialogues was the establishment of formal interaction between NGOs and the Security Council. The NGO Working Group approached Ambassador Juan Somavia of Chile, the then President of the Security Council. Ambassador Somavia, a former NGO leader himself, at that moment, was an important supporter of establishing links between NGOs and the Security Council. As the President of the Security Council, he participated in an NGO public meeting in April 1996. In his opinion, the Security Council needs “closer contact between humanitarian organizations and the Council, and much more information for Council members. Because, finally, the only thing we have on the table from these organizations is what we receive through reports of the Secretary-General. It would be extremely useful to receive reports directly and more often from the organizations themselves. I would advocate closer contact, particularly to learn more of their opinions about these conflicts because they have such a valuable perspective” (*Global Policy Forum* 1996).

Encouraged by the support of Ambassador Somavia, the NGO Working Group wrote a letter to Paolo Fulci, the incoming president of the Security Council, with a very ambitious proposal. They suggested that the Council President hold a monthly briefing for the NGOs. The permanent members of the Security Council refused the proposal, but the Council affirmed the right of its members, when not serving or speaking as the Council President, to brief NGOs (Paul 2010). Even the fact that the initial proposal of the NGO Working Group was not accepted by the permanent members of the Security Council, the Working Group was the winner in this situation.

Similarly to Ambassador Somavia of Chile, the next President of the Council, Ambassador Antonio Monteiro of Portugal, expressed enthusiasm for NGOs and persuaded other ambassadors to meet with the Working Group. Representatives of the Working group met with the ambassadors of South Korea, Sweden, Slovenia, etc. Informal NGO contacts with delegations became more common, and Working Group NGO members gained a much higher level of expertise in the Council's operations. The Working Group has established its closest relations with the elected members of the Security Council (Paul 2010).

The late 90s were the new era for the activities of the Working Group. NGO advocacy of security issues has steadily increased. Since the Working Group itself did not take common positions on the most important security issues, members formed separate *ad hoc* groups to work jointly on advocacy topics. Some of these groups were the NGO Working Group on Iraq, the Children's Watch List, the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, etc. (Paul 2010). According to theorists, "as criticism of the Council grew, a number of delegations came to see increased Council interaction with NGOs as an essential step toward a more legitimate and effective international political and legal order" (Paul 2004a, 375).

The representatives of the NGO Working Group on the Security Council have met with numerous delegations, ambassadors, presidents of the Security Council, senior UN officers and even the Foreign Ministers of Ireland, Canada, Spain, Austria, Argentina, etc. When it was established in 1995, no one imagined that an NGO body could have a regular informal interaction with the Council members at the highest level. On the one hand, the NGO Working Group is proof that, even in the world of international policy, the unexpected can happen (Paul 2010).

### **INFORMAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND NGOS**

The relationship between the Security Council and NGOs is rated as positive and growing by the legal theorists. The Security Council is "relatively more open, active and effective than we give it credit for" (Trent and Schnurr 2018, 59). Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council members "have increasingly turned to NGOs as partners and service contractors in emergency and post-emergency situations under the Council's authority" (Hill 2002, 27). All these are important steps forward in improving the reputation of the Security Council and increasing its transparency. But, how much is the Security Council actually open to interaction with NGOs?

The SC-NGO interactions are limited entirely on informal consultation. There are threetypes of informal consultation:

- The "Arria Formula",

- Regular Meeting Process,
- Bilateral consultations.

Besides these three types of meetings, there are also more indirect forms of interactions between the SC and NGOs, including:

- Naming and shaming,
- The takeover of implementation tasks,
- Lobbying.

For the Security Council, receiving timely information is very important. The most valuable sources of information about developments on the ground in different conflicts were often actors who were not a part of the UN system. The Security Council lacked a working method that would allow it to take advantage of the expertise and information provided by these actors.

In March 1992, while Venezuela held the Security Council presidency, Ambassador Diego Arria was contacted by a Croatian priest who was willing to give his testimony about the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the members of the Council. Since it was impossible to witness the testimony of the priest in an official session of the Security Council, Ambassador Arria invited other members of the Council to meet outside the Council chambers. In the early phase of its establishment, the Arria Formula primarily enabled a member of the Security Council to invite other Security Council members to a meeting held outside the official chambers to be informed by an expert on some important developments on the ground.

In 1996, the use of the Arria Formula was broadened by some elected members of the Security Council to include NGOs and other non-state actors. The permanent members of the Security Council strongly opposed the idea of the broadening of the Arria Formula. After much discussion, in 1999, the Security Council adopted a more flexible meeting arrangement allowing its members to meet with NGOs (Martens 2005, 48). The Arria Formula has been used more regularly since 1999 to provide expertise and testimony on thematic issues taken up by the Council, in particular on humanitarian issues, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Children and Armed Conflict and, more recently, on Women, Peace and Security. The Arria Formula meetings are announced by the president of the Security Council at the beginning of each month as part of the regular Council schedule. No Council meetings or consultations are ever scheduled at a time when the Arria Formula meetings take place. The Arria Formula meetings are a significant positive development against the rigid and non-transparent traditions of the Security Council. It allows the Security Council to “open itself in a very limited way to the outside world” (Paul 2003).

The regular meeting process implies informal briefings between individual members of the Security Council and NGOs, outside the chambers of the Council. During the 90s, the permanent members of the Security Council opposed this form of interaction with NGOs. Despite the opposition of the permanent members, NGOs have met with the Council's ambassadors on a regular basis to exchange information. This kind of interaction has been promoted primarily by the elected members of the Security Council, who have had the most to gain by working with NGOs. Most of the elected members, because of their limited resources, are not able to deal with the workload of the Security Council. They often turn to NGOs in order to obtain information and expertise (Binder 2008, 12).

Bilateral meetings are held between individual NGOs and individual representatives from the Security Council member states. These meetings are also informal and take place outside the chambers of the Security Council. This kind of interaction has been promoted by the elected members of the Security Council as well. Some NGOs have provided expertise to some of the smaller delegations in the Security Council. For the smaller delegations, NGOs expertise is a source of information and ideas necessary to assume their role. With time, even some of the bigger delegations, as well as some of the permanent members of the Security Council, held bilateral meetings with NGOs (Mégret 2020, 45). Bilateral meetings between NGOs and one member of the Security Council have become quite common since the early 2000s. Besides the importance and significant progress of bilateral meetings, theorists are paying attention to the negative side of these meetings. Quite often, bilateral meetings are tightly structured, with some delegations sending junior staff who are not inclined to engage (Hill 2002, 29).

Aside from the regular meeting process, the Arria Formula, and bilateral meetings, NGOs are interacting with the Security Council in less informal ways. These methods are naming and shaming, lobbying and implementing agencies.

Mohamed (2013, 1207) defines naming and shaming in international law as “a strategy adopted by an intergovernmental organization, NGO, or government, whereby moral condemnation is directed at a state for its failure to adhere to some shared norm of conduct. This criticism seeks to change that state's behavior by revealing or calling attention to its failure to adhere to a shared norm and perhaps threatening some sanctions to be imposed either by peer governments or by domestic or foreign constituencies”. Throughout naming and shaming, NGOs exert pressure on the Security Council to adopt different policies. A good example of naming and shaming is the Global Whiteness campaign against bloody diamonds in Angola, which successfully influenced the Security Council's policymaking. Moral condemnation of the Security Council might be effective in the areas of human rights, humanitarian crises, terrorism, etc. Naming and shaming is a method for putting pressure on the Security Council for its activities or the lack of activities.

Acting as implementing agencies, NGOs provide the implementation of the Security Council's policy. Their role is important in the field of humanitarian assistance. Acting as implementing agencies, NGOs offer information, provide resources and assist in collective enforcement efforts. Charnovitz (2006, 355) considers resolutions on Yugoslavia (1992) and Sierra Leone (2003) good examples of NGOs' assistance in providing information and resources for the Security Council. In Security Council Resolution 771 regarding the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council states "...and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information" relating to violations of humanitarian law (UNSC Res. 771). In Security Council Resolution 1470 regarding Sierra Leone, the Security Council calls on "States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to continue to support the National Recovery Strategy of the Government of Sierra Leone" (UNSC Res. 1470). Having in mind the expanded role of the Security Council in peacekeeping and peace-building, interaction with NGOs may be of particular importance and contribute to its policy.

Finally, lobbying is one of the mechanisms NGOs use to interact with the Security Council. Theorists consider that the most effective lobbying strategy is to combine diplomacy in New York with worldwide public advocacy campaigns. (Paul 2004a, 379) Human rights NGOs often use lobbying. They seek contact with the Security Council representatives in order to convince them to address the issues of concern to them. When lobbying them, they provide data on human rights violations in a particular country for use in official forums (Martens 2005, 49).

## **NGOS' INFLUENCE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISIONS**

Having in mind that the interaction between NGOs and the Security Council is informal, it is expected that their influence on the decisions of the Security Council will be limited. On the other hand, despite informal interaction, individual NGOs, as well as specialized NGOs formed from the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, have made some important accomplishments in the decisions and politics of the Security Council. It is important to emphasize that specialized working groups did not detract from the main Working Group on the Security Council, but instead strengthened it. They brought their well-developed advocacy concerns into the Working Group's meetings and took advantage of the contacts they made with ambassadors (Paul 2010).

Particularly successful was the new Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. On October 23, 2000, women from Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Guatemala, Somalia and international NGOs addressed the Council in an Arria Formula meeting, revealing the gender-specific conditions and acts that women experience in war. Under the presidency of Namibia, the Security Council held an open session during which more than forty speakers addressed issues of women, peace and

security (Hill et al. 2003, 1255). The Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security on October 31, 2000, as a result of the debate. The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-building and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention (UNSC Res. 1325). It urges all parties to an armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict. The resolution provides a number of important operational mandates, with implications for member states and the entities of the United Nations system.

The issue of women's rights and women in war is certainly not a new one, but the Security Council has remained silent on it for a few decades. For the first time, in 2000, the doors "were opened just wide enough for women to squeeze into a Security Council debate for the first time" (Hill et al. 2003, 1265). It sounds unbelievable that Resolution 1325 was the first formal document from the Security Council that required parties in a conflict to prevent violations of women's rights, to support women's participation in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction, and to protect women and girls from wartime sexual violence. The resolution has generated many activities: meetings have occurred between women's organizations and the Security Council; NGOs have produced documents monitoring the progress of its implementation and have held regional consultations in Africa, South Asia, and Europe, developing new information-sharing networks; and the Inter-Agency Taskforce on Women, Peace and Security at the United Nations has coordinated a system-wide implementation strategy. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) appointed two independent experts to prepare a report on the issue, and the UN Secretary-General has also prepared a study and report (Hill et al. 2003, 1256). Resolution 1325 was "the pivotal link between gender equality and international peace and security" (UN MCPR 2015).

Fifteen years after Resolution 1325, the Security Council adopted unanimously Resolution 2242 with the goal of integrating women's, peace and security concerns across all country-specific situations on its agenda. Resolution 2242 calls upon the Member States to further integrate the women's, peace and security agenda into their strategic plans, such as national action plans and other planning frameworks, including implementation of relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, through broad consultation, including with civil society, in particular women's organizations (UNSC Res. 2242). It encourages the participation of civil society organizations at international and regional peace and security meetings, including donor conferences, to help ensure that gender

considerations are integrated into the development, prioritization, coordination, and implementation of policies and programs.

NGOs have been influential in children's rights, especially on issues of children in conflict - such as child soldiers, sexual abuse of children by combatants, etc. Bode (2017) describes NGOs' activities regarding children in the armed process as "tactical practices, designed to create space by turning well-timed manipulations of events into opportunities for influence". NGOs' lobbying on this issue resulted in the creation of the United Nations' Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children. The Special Representative has made regular field visits to conflict-affected countries and has convinced the Security Council to place the issue of children in armed conflicts on its agenda (Becker 2013, 103). The lobbying of NGOs has had an impact on both the General Assembly and the Security Council's deliberations. The UN General Assembly formally adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) in 2000. It became legally binding in February 2002. At the same time, the Security Council started adopting a series of resolutions regarding children in armed conflicts. Some of the most important Resolutions of the Security Council on children in armed conflicts are 1261 (1999), 1308 (2000), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), etc.

Paul (2004a, 358) states that the influence of NGOs was the strongest in soft policy areas, like Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and Resolution 1612 on the protection of children affected by armed conflict and child soldiers, etc. NGOs have worked on issues such as Rwanda, Iraq, Sudan, the Balkans, the Great Lakes, disarmament, the Israel/Palestine conflict, etc. In all these cases, the support of the elected members was not enough. They faced the brick wall of the permanent members of the Security Council. The national interests of the permanent members prevailed over the interests of humanity. NGOs were aware of "how Council resolutions were disregarded and undermined by leading members, how powerful members sometimes issued economic threats to win important Council votes (...) and how ambassadors could be chastised or even recalled if they angered mighty opponents" (Paul 2004b). The influence of NGOs on the hard policy areas has been limited.

The Global Witness has succeeded in drawing the international community's attention to the problem of "blood diamonds" by releasing their report "A Rough Trade" in 1998. The report demonstrates how diamonds have helped fund the civil war in Angola. The Security Council consequently adopted Resolution 1295 in April 2000, which consisted mainly of reaffirmations of condemnations and sanctions against UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The Security Council authorized a tightening of sanctions against UNITA and established a panel of experts to investigate violations of Security Council



resolutions imposing measures against UNITA. If there had been formal mechanisms of cooperation and interaction between NGOs and the Security Council, Global Witness or another NGO could have discovered the facts sooner and put pressure on the Security Council to act on time and on the spot. UNITA has been using conflict diamonds since 1992 to pay for the war. Resolution 1295 was adopted in 2000. During that period, a lot of human lives were lost. If formal mechanisms for cooperation with the Security Council existed, perhaps the Global Witness or some other NGO might prevent further violations of human rights (Bektaş 2017, 21–22).

In all these cases above, the influence of NGOs on decisions of the Security Council was initiated by NGOs. It comes as a result of the Arria Formula, lobbying or some other form of informal interaction.

NGOs have a long tradition of interaction with states and international organizations. When it comes to the Security Council, theorists have mostly positive opinions on the importance of NGOs and their capability to improve the capacity of the Security Council and influence its decisions. Paul (2004b) considers that after more than two decades of NGO action, “the public knows much more about the Council than before, and citizens are in a stronger position to demand accountability for Council action.” It also seems that the Security Council is aware of the importance of NGOs for its transparency.

Resolution 2122 on Women, Peace and Security, adopted by the Security Council on 18 October 2003, “recognizes the importance of interactions of civil society” (UNSC Res. 2122). This kind of NGOs’ acknowledgment by the Security Council was unimaginable a few decades ago. This resolution was not the last resolution on the acknowledgment of NGOs by the Security Council.

Only a year after passing Resolution 2122, the Security Council expressed even more appreciation for NGOs. In Resolution 2171 on the Maintenance of international peace and security, adopted on 21 August 2014, the Security Council “reaffirms its willingness to strengthen its relationship with civil society, including, as appropriate, though, inter alia, meetings in an informal and flexible manner with civil society, to exchange analyses and perspectives on the issue of the prevention of armed conflict” (UNSC Res. 2171). According to NGO activists, “language on the importance of the role of civil society has become more evident in Security Council thematic and country resolutions (...) The Security Council’s increased engagement with civil society comes as a result of civil society efforts (...) to demand entry to Council spaces” (ISHR 2014).

## **POSSIBILITIES OF FORMAL INTERACTION BETWEEN NGOS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

Compared with the situation before the Cold War, the relationship between NGOs and the Security Council is progressing. NGOs have used several methods to reach the Security Council. All those methods have been informal and have depended on the agreement of the Security Council members, especially its permanent members. NGOs have shown knowledge, information, will and initiative to access the Security Council. The permanent members of the Security Council have shown resistance and opposition to interaction with NGOs. It looks as if the Security Council is the last bastion to resist formal relationships with NGOs (Bektaş 2017, 28). The elected members of the Security Council have shown much more understanding of the importance of interaction with NGOs. If there was no support and understanding from the elected members, perhaps NGOs would never develop interaction with NGOs. If the President of the Security Council was from the P-5 countries instead of Diego Arria, perhaps the Arria Formula meetings would not have been established.

On the one hand, having in mind the structure, working methods and the lack of transparency of the Security Council, even its informal interaction with NGOs might be marked as progressive. On the other hand, there is no interaction between the Security Council and NGOs on issues that are important to the permanent members. Paul (2004a, 358) emphasizes: “When the P-5 have strong positions, as they often do, NGOs encounter immovable opposition. On sanctions reform, Chechnya, the Middle East, Iraq, and many other important issues, even the most vigorous NGO advocacy runs into a brick wall of P-5 opposition (especially from the United States), as national interest block key NGO concerns.”

The Security Council does not have a clear strategy for interaction and cooperation with NGOs. NGOs are non-state actors. At the international level, NGOs are facing some serious challenges. Their nature can be characterized as dual. On the one hand, they are not subjects of international law. From the perspective of international law, there are no legal norms that regulate their legal personality and their rights and obligations under international law. NGOs are using their unregulated and unclear international legal status as an opportunity to undertake various activities in the international arena. In the absence of clear rules and criteria, NGOs are using opportunities to participate in many international activities from which they are not explicitly excluded (Gordanić 2020, 212).

On the other hand, NGOs are very relevant subjects of international relations. Their actions affect and influence states and international organizations. While traditionally, only states have been granted legal personality, it would not be unprecedented for legal personality to extend beyond nations in the international legal sphere. For example, in human rights litigation, multiple international tribunals

have granted individuals the right to sue on their own behalf (Jedele 2020, 138). Today's world is a changing one. Theorists consider that "by 2025, nation-states will no longer be the only, and often not the most important, actors on the world stage and the "international system" will have morphed to accommodate the new reality" (Nijman 2010, 93). The influence of NGOs on the decisions of the Security Council is undeniable, especially having in mind its exclusiveness, closeness and lack of transparency.

The Security Council is not well-prepared for the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It looks like it had lost direction. The UN member states have noticed the encroachment of the Security Council on the competence and jurisdiction of the General Assembly and the other UN organs. The encroachment indicates the tendency of the Security Council to broaden, arbitrarily, the definition of a threat to international peace and security, particularly with respect to thematic debates on social, humanitarian, economic and development issues. On the other hand, the Security Council is unable to deal with issues of international peace and security through a state-based system. The presence of NGOs in this state-based club might be considered as the "tectonic shifts in the international order" (Paul 2004a, 386). In the last few decades, the Security Council has failed a lot of times in its main role – the maintenance of international peace and security. The necessity of formal cooperation between the Security Council and NGOs is a reality of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Informal interactions provide limited access to NGOs and do not allow them to operate with efficiency. The Security Council deals with international peace and security. In these kinds of issues, it is a necessity to take appropriate measures in a timely manner. Informal access is not able to provide this request because it depends on the goodwill of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Within the United Nations, NGOs have a long tradition of cooperation with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Article 71 of the UN Charter regulates the status of NGOs within the UN system. It states: "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned." In the absence of international NGO law as such, Article 71 of the UN Charter "has served *de facto* as a charter for NGOs" (Charnovitz 2006, 358). So far, more than a thousand NGOs worldwide have acquired consultative status under the provisions of Article 71 of the UN Charter. Consultative agreements are concluded between NGOs and some of the UN specialized agencies.

Consultative status entitles an NGO to attend meetings of the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary organs, circulate written statements at these

meetings and make oral statements with the permission of the chair. NGOs with the highest category of consultative status may submit proposals for the agenda of the Economic and Social Council. In addition, consultative status entitles NGOs to gather information, advise member states, obtain support from governments and citizens of member states for UN policy, deliver information regarding UN-relevant operations and provide knowledge and information relevant to the UN.

Could the ECOSOC - NGOs interaction be used as a role model for the formal interaction between NGOs and the Security Council? How can a formal interaction between NGOs and the Security Council be established?

One possible solution is the revision of the UN Charter. The UN Charter was created “as a product of a time that does not exist anymore” (Gordanić 2020, 796). The Charter has shown extraordinary flexibility and applicability in situations that the founders of the United Nations could not predict. Convening a general conference to revise the UN Charter is the only effective way to adapt the structure of the United Nations to the 21st century. One of the most important issues in the UN Charter revision must be the Security Council. Aside from the traditional issues concerning Security Council reform (its membership, the issue of veto power, relations with the General Assembly and other UN bodies), the issue of the Security Council’s interaction with NGOs or other non-state actors must be addressed. The UN Charter contains no provision regarding formal cooperation between the Security Council and NGOs. Having in mind the influence of NGOs on the decisions of the Security Council, some form of formal interaction with NGOs is a reality and a necessity of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The potential revision of the Charter should consider adding a new article related to the interaction between NGOs and the Security Council. Article 71 of the UN Charter might be used as a role model for the formal relationship between NGOs and the Security Council.

Currently, NGOs are influencing the Security Council and the maintenance of international peace and security indirectly - through their informal consultations on human rights, disarmament, improvement of the position of vulnerable groups in armed conflicts such as women and children, etc. With the establishment of formal interaction, NGOs will be able to have a more direct influence on the maintenance of international peace and security. Also, through formal interaction, NGOs could act as the conscience of the international community. They can turn the attention of the Security Council to conflicts where the actions of the Council are necessary. Having in mind the presence of NGOs on the ground and the insider information they have on certain conflicts, through formal cooperation, the Security Council might be able to improve its knowledge and the quantity of information on conflicts. In that manner, the Security Council will take some actions on time and a lot of human lives in armed conflicts will be saved.

The other possible solution to the formal relationship between NGOs and the Security Council is granting at least a partial legal personality that would allow NGOs to perform more efficiently. In the case of NGOs, as a category of non-state actors, there is a discrepancy between the *de facto* significance and the *de jure* insignificance (Nijman 2010, 94). NGOs have a long tradition of cooperation with international organizations. International organizations show an open tendency towards cooperation with NGOs and might have multiple benefits: resources in terms of expertise, personnel or funding. If the complexity of problems is high and the resources of international institutions are limited, then the assistance of NGOs in providing additional knowledge and expertise, implementing international organization policies, and monitoring compliance with international agreements are expected to be beneficial to international organizations. NGOs that provide these services might receive access in exchange - they “trade” resources for participation. It might be concluded that the opportunities for an NGO to access an international organization increase with the complexity of the issue and the international organization’s demand for resources controlled by the NGO (Binder 2008, 18).

Many authors have instead adopted an open attitude towards recognizing NGOs as international legal subjects. They argue that following a more liberal delimitation of subjects of international law could lead to the conclusion that an entity can be considered a subject of the international legal system if it has rights and/or obligations under that system. NGOs have already gained some degree of *de facto* international legal personality, at least in terms of law-making (Bakker and Vierruci 2009, 3–4). On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasize that the granting of the international legal personality of NGOs is going to be a very long and perhaps never-ending process. Some authors consider that the “golden age” of NGOs has passed. Also, dilemmas about the legitimacy of NGOs and possible abuses of NGOs for the purposes of powerful states are not favorable to granting legal personality (Vučić 2020, 17). States are important sources of income for many international NGOs. The preferences of states’ aid agencies can shape NGOs’ programs and strategies (Stroup 2020).

## CONCLUSION

NGOs have proven to be important actors in international law and international relations. Their influence on the development of international law is undeniable. Their cooperation with the ECOSOC has existed since the establishment of the UN. Their interaction with the Security Council, on the other hand, has lasted since the Cold War’s end. During that period, NGOs have successfully influenced changes in the Security Council’s procedures. They have

established their own regular process of consultation with the Council members and have broadened the Arria Formula.

NGOs have influenced the decisions of the Security Council, but their influence is limited in three aspects. Firstly, their influence was the strongest in soft policy areas. Secondly, NGOs cannot access issues important to the permanent members of the Security Council. Thirdly, the interaction between NGOs and the Security Council is strictly informal. For the issues of international peace and security, it is a necessity to take appropriate measures in a timely manner. Only formal access can meet this request.

Having in mind the structure and the reputation of the Security Council, its informal relations with NGOs have been satisfactory. Transferring relations into a formal mode would increase the transparency of the Security Council and enhance its capabilities. NGOs would be able to provide more resources more efficiently, and the Security Council would be able to address the realities of the international legal order more efficiently. Formal interaction with NGOs might significantly contribute to the quality of the work and decisions of the Security Council. Informally, NGOs have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security indirectly. Their naming and shaming tactics, the Arria formula meetings and other forms of informal interaction have contributed to saving lives and improving the position of vulnerable groups in international conflicts. NGOs dealing with wars, international conflicts and the positions of vulnerable groups (such as women and children in armed conflicts), have the same goals as the Security Council. That goal is the maintenance of international peace and security. The establishment of formal cooperation with NGOs might benefit the Security Council and improve its working methods and actions in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Of course, the establishment of a formal relationship between NGOs and the Security Council is not going to be an easy-going process. So far, NGOs are not very close to being granted a legal personality. Despite the optimistic attitudes of theorists towards recognizing NGOs as international legal subjects, that is not realistic to happen in the following decade. The revision of the UN Charter might be a possible solution to the establishment of a formal relationship between NGOs and the Security Council. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Charter will be revised anytime soon. It has been an issue since the establishment of the UN, but it lacks the political will of the member states.

In the context of their relationship with the Security Council, NGOs have been trapped between informal reality and dreams of formal interaction. In the future, NGOs should develop current forms of informal interactions with the Security Council. On the other hand, the Security Council (especially its permanent

members) should be more open towards NGOs and use NGOs' resources to improve its own working mechanisms and transparency.

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## **NEVLADINE ORGANIZACIJE I SAVET BEZBEDNOSTI UJEDINJENIH NACIJA: IZMEĐU NEFORMALNE REALNOSTI I MOGUĆNOSTI FORMALNE INTERAKCIJE**

*Apstrakt.* Nakon okončanja Hladnog rata, nevladine organizacije (NVO) pokazale su inicijativu za interakcijom sa Savetom bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija. Od tada je došlo do uspostavljanja nekoliko vrsta neformalnih konsultacija između njih i Saveta bezbednosti. Putem neformalnih konsultacija, NVO su uticale na odluke Saveta bezbednosti iz domena soft politike. U oblastima međunarodnog mira i bezbednosti neophodno je na vreme sprovoditi aktivnosti. Mehanizmi neformalnih pristupa ne ispunjavaju ovaj zahtev zato što prvenstveno zavise od dobre volje stalnih članica Saveta bezbednosti. Autor ispituje mogućnosti za uspostavljanje formalne interakcije između Saveta bezbednosti i NVO. Kao potencijalna rešenja formalne interakcije autor smatra reviziju Povelje UN ili mogućnost da NVO steknu međunarodnopravni subjektivitet. Dok se bar jedna od ovih mogućnosti ne ostvari, autor smatra da je neophodno da Savet bezbednosti, a posebno njegovi stalni članovi, budu otvoreniji prema NVO i da koriste resurse nevladinih organizacija kako bi poboljšali sopstvenu reputaciju i transparentnost.

*Ključne reči:* nevladine organizacije (NVO), Savet bezbednosti, revizija Povelje UN, međunarodnopravni subjektivitet, neformalne konsultacije, transparentnost, formalna interakcija, stalne članice Saveta bezbednosti.

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## **TRANSLATIONS OF GEOGRAPHY: REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE AND CULTURE IN LITERARY TEXT ANALYSIS**

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*Abstract:* In recent years, the analysis of geographic, cultural, and semiotic spaces has gradually piqued the interest of researchers, particularly those involved in interdisciplinary projects in the fields of translation and cultural studies. But, what exactly do we mean when we argue about the translation of geography in terms of the perception and interpretation of space, real or imaginary? And how could literary text analysis offer qualitative and quantitative data in order to represent spaces and cultures and, finally, translate the geocultural coordinates of an area? The purpose of this article is to first identify the characteristics of modern translations of geography, and then to present a geocultural approach to literary text analysis that can reconstruct either geographic or semiotic and cultural space.

*Keywords:* translation, geography, space, imaginary, real, text analysis, literature, geocultural approach, semiotic and cultural diversity

### **GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION OF GEOGRAPHY**

Indisputably, the last two decades have witnessed the beginning of a prolific dialogue between translation and geography. Such a dialogue is continuously expanding and developing within an interdisciplinary framework. Recently, Federico Italiano (2016: ix) has stated that there is an “increasing attention paid by translation scholars towards a spatial understanding of translation”. Federico Italiano considers this increasing interest in geography shown by some translation scholars as a “spatial turn” in translation studies. Regarding this tendency, Italiano underlines that:

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The “spatial turn” within the recent flourishing of the “translational turn” is not merely another academic trend but probably the most consistent attempt to overcome the almost positivistic view of translation based on the illusion of linguistic equivalence in the transfer of meaning (2016: ix).

There is also no doubt that the Geography of Translation does not constitute an alternative lexical form or a linguistic sign or a simple synonym for the Translation of Geography. In order to avoid misunderstandings regarding the dialogue between Translation and Geography, we must highlight the fact that Translation and Geography constitute an interdisciplinary subfield of Translation Studies with the contribution of Geography, Semiotics and Cultural Studies. Translation and Geography principally consist of two different areas of study: the Geography of Translation and the Translation of Geography. On the one hand, the Geography of Translation concerns the study of translation as a cultural product on a geographical scale: the translators, the editorial centers, the cities and the schools where translation is produced, the distribution networks, the consumption systems and societies, the imports and exports of translations in the literary systems, when, where and under what circumstances translations are born or consumed, etc. As far as the Hellenic geographic space and the Greek literature system in relation to the Italian literary system are concerned, the monograph of Zosi Zografidou (1999) is representative, especially, of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Italian-Greek translation production. Another monograph (Spyridonidis 2017), based on PhD research under the supervision of the professor of Translation Studies, Eleni Kassapi, presents a case study of a delimited geographic space of a city, in which we studied the Italian cultural influence of the translations in Kozani’s library from the 15<sup>th</sup> century to 1912 (during the Ottoman occupation) (Spyridonidis 2012). This case study was carried out from a diachronic perspective. Recently, post-doctoral research gave us the opportunity to study the geography of translations at a regional level, analyzing the corpora of the public libraries in Western Macedonia. (Spiridonidis 2021). The importance of geography and cartography in literature was also clearly expressed by Franco Moretti in his introduction “towards a geography of literature” in *Atlas of the European novel 1800-1900*:

“... geography is not an inert container, it is not a box in which history ‘happens’, but an active force that pervades the literary field and shapes it in depth. Making the connection between geography and literature explicit, then – mapping it: because a map is precisely that, a connection made visible – will allow us to see some significant relationships that have so far escaped us” (Moretti 1998, 3).

“Such a literary geography, however, can refer to two very different things. It may indicate the study of space in literature; or else, of literature in space. In the first case, the dominant is a fictional one: Balzac’s version of Paris, the Africa of colonial romances, Austen’s redrawing of Britain. In the second case,

it is a real historical space: the provincial libraries of Victorian Britain, or the European diffusion of *Don Quixote* and *Buddenbrooks*” (Moretti 1998, 3).

On the other hand, the Translation of Geography principally concerns the study of the representation of space and culture within literary texts. In other words, how geography and space are translated and interpreted from one semiotic code to another. Besides, Federico Italiano offers another important aspect of the Translation of Geography:

“Rather, I am interested in the translation of geographies; that is, a negotiation of cultural differences between constructions of worlds and spatial imaginations. Consequently, the questions raised in my book primarily concern how and to what extent Western spatial imaginations, in particular those constructed by literary works, have been translated across languages, media and epochs” (Italiano 2016, 4).

Without a doubt, the concept of space and the spatial imaginary are fundamental and central to the translation of geography. That is also confirmed by the above-mentioned Italian scholar when he writes:

“I invariably came to the conclusion that the spatial imagination contained in a work of literature was the most truthful mirror in which humanity could reflect and examine itself. Inevitably, spurred on by my own experience of orientation in space as a form of translation across cultural differences, I started to ask myself how spatial imaginations negotiate geographies not only across epochs, languages and literary texts, but also across the media...” (Italiano 2016, ix).

Taking into consideration all the above, we realize that a geocultural space, real or imaginary, can take the form of a prototype literary text through the work of a writer. Consequently, that space included in a prototype can also be translated into other languages or other semiotic systems. The diffusion and the reception of this particular perception of space (that derives from the writer’s personal point of view, more or less impartial) can also be measured in terms of the knowledge effect on the readers or as a mere information-data shared on a local, regional or global scale. In addition, the Translation of Geography and the geocultural approach to literary texts’ analysis can practically provide significant data, information and documentation about the perception, the interpretation and the representation of a specific area from a diachronic or a synchronic perspective within the study of different texts. In other terms, how has a specific area been seen or translated by various authors and in various literary texts, prototypes and translations? Furthermore, what differences and what similarities can we discover through a critical analysis of these different texts?

In this article, we present the way in which we can extract geographic and cultural information from literary texts after the implementation of a geocultural

approach to literary text analysis. This method allows us to collect data that could contribute to the increase and broadening of our knowledge in many fields related - directly or indirectly - to geographic space. Such fields are antiquities, architecture, nature, history, health, population, economic life, production-techniques, cultural life, religion, political structures, travel conditions, etc.

Moreover, the Translation of Geography, in its modern concept, is also considered an inherent part of the Geopolitics of Translation. According to Ioannis Mazis (2002, 514), translations form “the geopolitics of translation in the service of wider civilizations’ geopolitics” and constitute important geopolitical factors such as the possession of knowledge and information. Mazis also writes that “As it turns out, we are now referring to ‘geopolitics of culture’ or, more precisely, to ‘geopolitics of civilizations’” (2002, 515). Michael Cronin also highlighted some aspects of translation in relation to the geopolitics of the globalized world in his monographs *Across the Lines* (2000), *Translation and Globalization* (2003) and *Translation and Identity* (2006).

## **GEOCULTURAL APPROACH AND LITERARY TEXT ANALYSIS**

It is interesting how varying interpretations of a specific space are inspired by diverging points of view, different cultures and perspectives. So, how is the geography of an area in a text or at least some significant geocultural elements of a specific space perceived and represented? In order to study and analyze texts, we must first compile a text corpus and determine the variables for our research. For example, within the framework of the Apollonis research project (Apollonis n.d.), which is part of the Clarin:el project – the National Infrastructure for Language Resources & Technologies in Greece (Clarin:el n.d.), and is run at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki under the scientific supervision of Professor Titika Dimitroulia (Department of French Language and Literature), we studied the travelogues’ translations from Italian into Greek from a diachronic perspective. As a result, we created a corpus of texts containing all the translations of Italian travelogues into Greek. We continued with the implementation of text analysis using a geocultural approach in order to extract data and information about specific spatial categories of language signs, such as toponyms or realia. In parallel with our geocultural text analysis, we annotated the texts in order to create an annotated language resource. In fact, the annotation of the translated texts enabled us to collect significant geocultural spatial data. It is a matter of fact that toponyms, as language and semiotic signs, constitute fundamental elements of the representation of an area. On the other hand, toponyms also constitute a part of the spatial coordinates of literary texts. After a comparative analysis of the annotated texts, it is interesting, indeed, to discover the differences that emerge between some specific travelogue translations when describing a particular space, area or region.

In some cases, the translations of the geographical aspects of the same space were very common among the various travelogues, which were written, more or less, in the same chronological period. So, what is characteristic is the similarity between interpretations and translations of space. This similarity emerges from different travelogues which, in the same period, describe a specific space. An indicative example constitutes the description of Thessaloniki in three different texts written by Ciriaco di Ancona in 1431, Pero Tafur in 1436 and Giovanni Maria Angiolello in 1470. Of course, we could never sustain that the translations of space that emerge from the above texts were identical. Nevertheless, it is a matter of fact that all these texts contain useful information about the translation of Thessaloniki's space. Furthermore, it was not only the representations of Thessaloniki's space in these particular literary texts that were quite similar, but also the interpretations of reality by their single writers. In 1431, a few months after the fall of Thessaloniki to the Ottomans, Ciriaco di Ancona or Ciriaco Anconitanus dei Pizzecolli described the city center, underlying the presence of important monuments and, in particular, of the great church of Saint Demetrius, the protector of the city (Grigoriou and Hekimoglou 2008, 28). Pero Tafur, in his *Andanças é viajes de Pero Tafur por diversas partes del mundo avidos (1435-1439)*, referred also to Thessaloniki, conquered by the Ottomans, as an important city for the Christian world. Some years later, in 1470, Giovanni Maria Angiolello also described Thessaloniki as an important economic center, giving in his text particular attention to the metropolitan church of Saint Demetrius (Grigoriou and Hekimoglou 2008, 31–33). Finally, these three travelogues depict the specific urban geography of Thessaloniki from 1431 to 1470, having as a common denominator the principal position of Saint Demetrius and the commercial and Christian character of the city. Of course, the geocultural methodology for the study of translations, their textual analysis, the annotation techniques and the semiotic categorization of the translated terms, is of greater interest to language and translation scientists and will be presented in reviews specialized in translation studies.

In substance, the study and the analysis of literary texts could provide us with representations and translations of space and culture useful as primary data or, in other cases, as complementary information for the reconstruction of reality in determined geographic areas. The information contained, for example, in travelogues or generally in travel literature texts is, without a doubt, semantically very rich. We can categorize systematically the annotated language signs in semiotic systems in order to facilitate our qualitative analysis. The semiotic categories that we will create depend directly on the content of the text. We can have categories such as toponyms (villages, cities, mountains, rivers, etc.), religion (churches, monasteries, synagogues, mosques, etc.), communication (streets, trains, stations, bridges, etc.), ancient sites, population, etc.



At this point, it is interesting to report the results of an indicative case study that offers us useful qualitative and quantitative information and data in order to reconstruct the geography of southern Serbian territories in the late 16th century. We studied Paolo's Contarini text written in Italian in 1580, entitled "Diario del viaggio da Venezia a Constantinopoli di M. Paolo Contarini che andava bailo a per la repubblica veneta alla porta ottomana". The monograph was first published by Teresa Gattei in Venice in 1856. Paolo Contarini was born in Venice on 23th January 1529. He was the son of Dionisio Contarini and Fiordalisse di Piero Zen.<sup>2</sup> Paolo Contarini studied close to Paolo Manuzio and after his studies he began his political career as a "savio agli Ordini" and a major in Levante, respectively in 1555 and in 1557. In 1570, he was "provveditore", alias the governor of Zante. His role was also very important in the victory of the Christian powers in the battle of Lepanto. He was elected *bailo of Constantinopoli* in 1580, a position he held for three years, until 1583. According to Gaetano Cozzi in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* (1983, 8) from Paolo Contarini's literal activity remained his diary, a rapid description of spaces, people, foods, caravanserais, mosques, cultivations, etc.:

"Quanto rimane di attività letteraria dei .C. non è, malgrado l'insegnamento manuziano, una prosa latina, ma un testo volgare, il Diario del viaggio da Venezia a Costantinopoli nel 1580 (edito da V. Lazari a Venezia nel 1856). È una descrizione rapida fatta da un viaggiatore curioso ed attento, che ha saputo osservare quanto si proponeva al suo sguardo - il paesaggio, la gente, i cibi, i caravanserragli, le moschee, le coltivazioni, e così via - e sa ora raccontare, in modo serrato ed avvincente".<sup>3</sup>

In order to extract valuable geographic information and data from the diary text of Contarini, we first studied its content and, afterwards, we transcribed and annotated an indicative part. The transcribed and annotated part comes from the only known existing publication from 1856. The publication of the opera was dedicated to Marco Antonio Grimani by Girolamo Oliviero (1856, 5–6). There is also an introduction entitled "Avvertimento" that was written by V. Lazari. Paolo Contarini departed from Venice on 12th April 1580 and, after some days, arrived in Ragusa. Contarini started his journey to Constantinople from Ragusa's port. In the text that we transcribed, we annotated the semiotic category of the toponyms, firstly underlying the terms in the text and secondly, identifying and documenting

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<sup>2</sup> More information on Paolo Contarini can be found at: Treccani n.d.

<sup>3</sup> The translation into English: [What remains of the literary activity of Contarini, despite the Manutian teaching, it is not a Latin prose, but a vulgar text, the Diary of the voyage from Venice to Constantinople in 1580 (published by V. Lazari in Venice in 1856). It is a quick description made by a curious and attentive traveler, who was able to observe what was proposed to his eyes - the landscape, the people, the foods, the caravanserai, the mosques, the crops, and so on - and now knows how to tell all these things, in a tight and compelling way].

them. The semiotic category of toponyms includes not only names of cities or villages, but also names of rivers (hydronyms), mountains, planes, hills, etc. Practically, we analyse and annotate every space-specific term.

As we have already mentioned, Contarini started his voyage from Dubrovnik (Ragusa) (Contarini 1856, 13–20): “ed entrati in Ragusi per una porta, ne uscimmo per l’altra”. After that, Contarini said (1856, 13–14): “1’ alpe del Moncenisio di Francia e 1’ Apennino” and then “vicini ad una bella fiumaja detta Tribina, presso ad una villa di Gomiliani”. The next day, the diplomatic mission passed from “per una pianura lungo il detto fiume fino al ponte di Trebina, di Mehemet Bassà” “provincia di Chertzegò” arriving at “ascendendo e poi di scendendo un monte Innutoglam, ed alloggiammo la sera (che fu alli 13) in campagna ad una villa detta Mausco”. The journey continued the following day (Contarini 1856, 13–14): “venimmo a trovar 1’ origine del fiume sopraddetto chiamato Tribina, e venimmo alla valle di Bellichia, villa ov’ è il caravanserà di Assan Bei”, and then “fino ad una villa detta Trinova ove sono due caravanserà di poca importanza” they departed from Trinova and arrive in Cernizza. “Partimmo da Trinova e, cavalcando per luoghi assai aspri, venimmo a Cernizza”, where they stopped to eat “Desinammo a Cernizza”. In this part of the text, Contarini also referred to toponyms which did not constitute the stations of the diplomatic mission itinerary (1856, 14–15): “Narenta, Chertzegò, Persia, Zighet, Ungheria”. The journey continued from Cernizza area to Termovaluca (Contarini 1856, 15–16): “Cernizza è più bassa, ed accanto le è un fiume detto Dobu”, “venimmo alla costiera del monte ad alloggiare in campagna a Lazaricchia ovvero Casco”, “un fiume detto Innoi”, “Montammo di poi la montagna Camerdaglaion”, “fin alla villa detta Ternoaluca”, “vicino ad una fiumaja detta di Ternoaluca”. The next day, the diplomatic mission arrived at (Contarini 1856, 15–16): “caravanserà di Temista, grande e molto onorevole. Continuummo dopo desinare il viaggio sempre per colline fino a Prisnoaluca accanto il fiume Drino”, “mandammo a Fochia a pigliar del vino”, “La fiumaja è molto bella e rapida, a similitudine della Piave, ed il suo principio è a Ternoaluca”. Contarini mentioned many toponyms of the area and often described their basic characteristics. He took notes of everything that could be interesting to his diplomatic mission from Venice to Constantinople. Because of that, his text constitutes an extraordinary font of translation geography. Some other indicative toponyms that Contarini notes in his text are (1856, 17–20): “Caiut, caravanserà di Bracha, Plevia, fiume Brenopesnizza, Prepaglia dalli Calogeri di santo Saba, Novopazar, fiume Lino, un torrente detto Miles per paese poco coltivato, al monastero de’ Calogeri di santo Saba, al castello Milesenas, il fiume Miles, luogo detto Milesenadruga, campagna detta Sinisfa, villa detta Dumaizza, torrente detto Rasca”, etc.

In our analysis, we create concordance table (Table 1) in order to better understand the context of the toponyms. As an indicative example, we studied the concordances of two toponyms and of a hydronym: “Plevia”, “Prepaglia” and “Lino”.

*Table 1:* Concordance table of some indicative toponyms in Paolo Contarini’s itinerary from Venice to Constantinople in 1580.

<b>Toponyms in the prototype</b>	<b>Concordances in the prototype</b>	<b>Identification</b>	<b>Documentation</b>
Plevia	procedemmo lasciando le some a buon’ora a Plevia; passata la campagnuola vicina alla terra di Plevia, ascendemmo una montagna fredda e inculta	Pljevlja	<a href="https://www.discover-montenegro.com/pljevlja/">https://www.discover-montenegro.com/pljevlja/</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pljevlja">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pljevlja</a>
Prepaglia	fin a Prepaglia dalli Calogeri di santo Saba; però ci fermammo a Prepaglia per far che le robe passassero comodamente; Prepaglia è assai buona villa	Prijepolje	SO RS 2014
Lino	un torrente di poca importanza che va nel Lino fiume assai grande e molto corrente; venimmo al sopradetto fiume Lino	Lim	Itinari 2018

The context is not only useful for the identification of the toponyms, but also for the translation of the space and the reconstruction of reality.

In this part of the journey, from Ragusa to Novi Pazar, we identified a number of toponyms that could constitute useful data for the reconstruction of the travel itinerary and for the representation of the area’s geography. But a certain number of toponyms extracted could be confusing, such as Ungheria, Montesanto, Damasco or Danubio. These name identities as toponyms do not constitute part of the itinerary and, of course, are not useful for the realistic representation of those south western Serbian territories. At this stage, it is highly important to implement geocultural text analysis in order to classify the toponyms into two

groups: on one hand, the toponyms that are only mentioned in the text but do not constitute part of the real itinerary (for example: Montesanto) and, on the other hand, the toponyms that document real places on the itinerary (for example: Prepaglia, which is identified with Prijepolje). After the implementation of the geocultural text analysis, all the toponyms that constitute part of the traveler's itinerary emerged. An analogue methodology was implemented for travelogues by Agathoklis Azelis and Ilia Chatzipanagioti in *Verzeichnis von Ortsnamen und unterkunftsangaben in reiseberichten des 16 und 17 jahrhunderts Über die südliche Balkanhalbinsel und das östliche mittellmeer* in 1993. Therefore, Azelis and Chatzipanagioti (1993) did not study Paolo Contarini's travelogue and this is the reason that we present it as an indicative case study in this article.

In our case, Paolo Contarini's text contains a significant number of toponyms. As a result of our analysis, we reconstructed the itinerary of his journey from Ragusa to Novi Pazar. The more significant toponyms that he passed through during his journey were: Ragusa, the river Tribina, Gomiliani, Trebina's bridge, mount Innutoglam, Mausco, valle di Bellichia, Cernizza, Narenta, Dobu, Lazaricchia, Casco, Innoi, mount Camerdaglaion, Ternoaluca, the river Ternoaluca, Temista, Prinsnoaluca, the river Drin, Fochia, Caiut, Bracha, Plevia, the river Brenospennizza, Prepaglia, Mileseva monastery, the Mileseva river, the river Lino, Milesndraga, Sinisfa, Dumaizza, the river Rasca, Novopazar, Glucanizza, Ibar, Zigoli, Copaono, Gerastiani, Toplizza, Sundinno, Innerno, Gherguri, Dragonani, Cliani, Suarsco, Gostisinei, Crelintzi, Morava, Nissa, Nissava, Cunonizza, Clissma, Pinor, Siridurica. The basic stations of Contarini's travel to Constantinople in the Serbian territories in 1580 were: Trebinje, Foča, Pljevlja, Prijepolje, Novi Pazar and Nis.

It is also important to identify the toponyms as works of the history of geography. For example, Prepaglia is, without doubt, Prijepolje. The river Lino is, of course, Lim, Cernizza is Crmnica, and Casco is identified with Gacko. In addition, the descriptions of Contarini allow us to reconstruct the geography of the areas that he visited via the geocultural text analysis. In this article, we present a small part of the textual analysis of Contarini's diary. On a larger scale, we can also precisely reconstruct the itinerary of his entire travel from Venice to Constantinople. Moreover, the above-presented geocultural text analysis can be implemented as a functional approach to every literary text which contains geographical information. The variable of the population is also important in the representation of a geographical area. Contarini offered interesting information about the population when he described that Serbians and Turks lived in separate areas (Contarini 1856, 17): "È partita la terra in due parti, in una abitano li turchi, vicino alla fiumaja, e nell' altra di sopra abitano li cristiani serviani di rito greco". According to Contarini, the population in Prijepolje was also divided into two communities (1856, 18): "Prepaglia è assai buona villa, abitata per la metà da

cristiani serviani di rito greco, e parte da turchi”. Naturally, the Christians were all Serbs and in the churches the liturgy was celebrated in Serbian as the text documents (1856: 19): “vi sono tre cappelle che introducono d’una in altra; ufiziano nel rito greco in lingua serviana”. Without a doubt, another variable that emerges from the travel diary is the food. Contarini described almost every day, not only the food that they found, but also the prices of the goods at every station. For example, outside Foča (Contarini 1856, 16): “Ci fornimmo di vino buono, pane negro ma assai sufficiente, castrati, ed ova, e desinammo fuor di Fochia a una fonte in campagna”. In terms of prices, they discovered in Prijepojie (Contarini 1856, 17): “Trovammo focacce bianche, non lievite e mal cotte, ova a 14 all’aspro, latte e vino non buono, e portato da Ragusi e Narenta, avemmo pesce fresco della fiumaja, e salato grande del Danubio”. Regarding the semiotic system of travel accommodation, there is a variety of terms that allow us to better understand how people travelled during the 16th century in the Ottoman-ruled territories. Contarini noted every day the places where they spent the night. In most cases, the places that they stopped at were caravanserais or other forms of guest houses. Contarini writes (1856, 20): “entrando poi in una campagna o valle lungo il fiume Rasca fino a Novobazar, ove alloggiammo tutto il giorno in un caravansera coperto di coppi, grande, fatto dal sopradetto Muthe Vilia”.

What is also worth mentioning is a case study that is a part of the research at the Aristotle University in Thessaloniki. As a fairly impartial observer, Vico Mantegazza, an Italian traveler from Milan, described various parts of South East Europe in the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In his journey through Macedonia in 1903, he described, among others, “Monastir (Bitola)”, providing an extraordinary translation of the area at that time, dedicating to this city an entire chapter (VIII). In particular, Mantegazza described the street of the consuls in the city center (Mantegazza 1903, 244) and the canalization of the river Dragor (Ἰδραγόρας). Another traveler, Mary Adelaide Walker, described the same location in 1864, some years before the canalization (1864, 156). In this direction, the collection of a corpus of translations from a specific place or area could possibly constitute a realistic representation of that space from a diachronic or synchronic perspective. Furthermore, another aspect that emerges from the text analysis and the translation of space is the qualitative and quantitative representation of the population. What seems to be interesting is the ethnic fragmentation of the population, in many cases, in South East Europe. In particular, in Monastir (Bitola), Vico Mantegazza described in his travel diary, not only the separate communities that constituted the population of the city (1903, 223–252), but also the differences in their activities (1903, 245–246) and life that were practically almost totally distinct. As an indicative example, Mantegazza depicted the fundamental characteristics of all the ethnic communities in Monastir that were surprisingly maintained as separate after approximately five centuries of

Ottoman oppression.<sup>4</sup> We can note that the literary texts with historical or geographical content can also constitute useful documentation for the analysis of communities' tensions.

The division and the fragmentation of the postmodern societies under the influence of globalization forces constitute a large scale phenomenon that is also represented not only in literary texts but also in informative ones. Recently, in some informative articles that appeared in Greek newspapers such as *Eleftheros Typos*, *Athens Voice*, and *Ethnos*,<sup>5</sup> we read texts that translate the new geography of the city center of Athens, which has been transformed, in many cases, into Pakistani and Afghani controlled areas and how these fragmented realities create an environment of insecurity and regression at an economic,<sup>6</sup> social and national level.<sup>7</sup> In the same direction, some other indicative informative articles show how a hill called Strefi in Athens was transformed into an area of illegal activities controlled by an Algerian band (Propotas 2021). Over the last years, there has been a prolific publication, especially of informative texts, in almost every European language and literary system that tries to describe the fragmentation of space (particularly in cities) and the division of the communities. This attempt was attained by means of the translations of the new multicultural geography. There are surprising analogies between some translations of space in Madrid, Athens, Milan, Berlin, Paris and other European cities, presenting an image of homogenization when, at the same time, they are losing their cultural diversity. It is also worth analyzing this phenomenon by comparing textual translations of space.

Geographic space may be divided between two different communities, as it is a very well-known phenomenon, mostly evident in Israel. It is a matter of fact that the cohabitation of Israelis with Palestinian Arabs is a long and hard path, full of periods of tension and conflicts. However, the translation of space and geography in European cities has become more complicated, as has the problematic and conflictual cohabitation in many French, German, English, Spanish or Italian cities regarding a large number of ethnic, religious and cultural communities, creating

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<sup>4</sup> “Pei mestieri vi sono ancora a Monastir le corporazioni perfettamente chiuse –e ogni nazionalita ha la sua specialita. I Bulgari, per esempio, sono quelli che lavorano il rame; i Valacchi lavorano i metalli e sono esclusivamente opera loro tutte le impugnature damascate di fucili, di pugnali e gli oggetti di filigrana dei quali s’adornano specialmente le donne albanesi; e i Mussulmani hanno la specialita dei lavori di selleria. I Greci, non numerosi, hanno in mano il commercio,” (Mantegazza 1903, 245).

<sup>5</sup> For some indicative informative text publications, see: *Eleftheros Typos* 2018; Triantafyllou 2019; *Weekly News* 2020; Asimakopoulos 2020; *Ethnos* 2020.

<sup>6</sup> An indicative study for the economic impact of the new geography of the city center of Athens could be seen at: HCH 2011.

<sup>7</sup> See at: SETE 2012.

an iper-fragmented cultural geography and reality. It is a phenomenon of space separatism and fragmentation, especially in the degraded European suburbs. In this regard, also in modern Greek literature, there are texts that describe this new European human geography, such as the novel *Ο Χριστός σταμάτησε στον Γκώζη*, in which Lefteris Panousis (2020) depicts the transformation of an area in the city center of Athens into a multicultural, fragmented space. Panousis uses a title that is semantically interesting and, at the same time, his novel constitutes an intertext with the Italian classic novel *Cristo si è fermato a Eboli* (Christ stopped at Eboli) by Carlo Levi (1945). The principal analogy that we found after studying and analyzing the two novels, the Italian and the Greek, is that the culture of Christian civilization did not arrive in Eboli because of the social and economic regression of the Lucania region until the 40s. At the same time, the Christian culture in Gyzi, Athens' city center, has been disappearing over the last two decades (2000-2020) due to a population synthesis change. Indeed, Panousis expressively talks about (2020, frontpage) "the death of a Greek neighborhood in the era of globalisation and Islamisation" in his novel's subtitle.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the interdisciplinary approach to the translation of geography is continuously developing over the last years. Within the framework of the Apollonis project at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, we studied, annotated and analyzed texts which were translated from Italian into Greek and which belonged to various periods and contained data for the representation of space, including the studied territory and period. Furthermore, it has been proven that the extraction of space information via geocultural literary text analysis is possible. Finally, this methodology could contribute to the further understanding of translation and of the perception of geographic space.

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### **PREVODI GEOGRAFIJE: PREDSTAVLJANJA PROSTORA I KULTURE U ANALIZI KNJIŽEVNOG TEKSTA**

*Apstrakt:* Poslednjih godina analiza geografskih, kulturnih i semiotičkih prostora postepeno je pobudila interesovanje istraživača, posebno onih koji su uključeni u interdisciplinarne projekte na polju prevodilaštva i kulturoloških studija. Ali, na šta tačno mislimo kada se bavimo prevodom geografije u smislu percepcije i tumačenja prostora, stvarnog ili imaginarnog? Osim toga, kako bi analiza književnog teksta mogla ponuditi kvalitativne i kvantitativne podatke kako bi se predstavili prostori i kulture i, konačno, preveli geokulturne koordinate nekog područja? Svrha ovog članka je da prvo identifikuje karakteristike savremenih prevoda geografije, a zatim da predstavi geokulturni pristup analizi književnog teksta koji može rekonstruisati kako geografski, tako i semiotički i kulturni prostor.

*Кljučne reči:* prevod, geografija, prostor, imaginarno, stvarno, analiza teksta, književnost, geokulturni pristup, semiotička i kulturna raznolikost.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### INSTITUTIONALISED DREAMS: THE ART OF MANAGING FOREIGN AID

Drazkiewicz, Elzbieta. 2020. *Institutionalised dreams: The Art of Managing Foreign Aid*. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Ela Drazkiewicz is a social anthropologist specialising in organisational and political anthropology. Her research concerns development, globalisation and bureaucracy, with a focus on Poland and South Sudan. Currently, Ela is affiliated with the Institute for Sociology at the Slovak Academy of Sciences.

In this monograph, the author focuses on Poland's attempt to create its own foreign aid agency and apparatus. Nevertheless, the author hopes that readers will see beyond, as she calls it, "Polishness" and "Eastern Europeanness", and that this book will also represent the first step towards a wider debate about foreign aid, rather than just another case of non-Western donors. This book is not yet another debate seeking to understand the difference between Western and non-Western donors, nor is it a book about the effectiveness of aid projects. Instead, the author seeks to examine the processes behind the emergence of the aid industry to expose the "hidden curriculum" of aid practice and its side effects. In this book, the author demonstrates that, in order to understand international aid and development, we need to understand the social, political and cultural mechanisms that govern the work of the aid industry. As a result, the central questions guiding this book are: How does the need for aid arise? How do aid institutions emerge? What steps do states take to become donors?

The author emphasises that Western observers still define Poland as "a country getting to grips with being normal, which still feels apart from 'the West' and is struggling with poverty". Ultra-capitalist societies that endorse economic growth and whose primary focus is based on neoliberal values need "Others" as a measure of their own success. Because, if they are not the most successful, wealthy, productive, and innovative ones, who are they? (Drazkiewicz 2020, 4, 8). Poland, as an "Easterner", a post-socialist, underdeveloped country, represents "the other" on many levels. Realising this, the author proposes a shift in the study of foreign aid, which implies moving the discussions beyond specific projects towards the needs of local communities and conversations about how specific aid initiatives fit or do not fit into the local reality. If we want to move the

discussion forward, we have to start asking questions about the places from which aid originates, such as: What is the purpose of international engagement for donor societies? Furthermore, the author points out that we need to move away from research models that criticise the implementation techniques in the aid industry but leave the overall paradigm of aid intact.

By chronicling the creation of the Polish aid apparatus, this book demonstrates how the process of emerging as a donor requires constant manoeuvring between international pressures and domestic legal, socio-economic and political constraints. The creation of ‘new donors’ (non-DAC, emerging, non-Western), in fact, facilitated the Cold War-like competition among donors. Usually, “new donors” are presented as suspicious or even dangerous, while Western aid providers, by contrast, are more moral and more efficient.

The main novelty of this book is its unique approach, which maps out the interconnections between the realities in the country of project implementation and the region from which the aid originates. The book depicts how, in the process of emerging as a donor, the technocratic approach has gradually started to dominate the original endeavour. An aid activist suddenly turns into an aid expert; the volunteer-based grassroots society becomes a professional organisation. The creation of an effective Polish aid system has become an obsession among NGO activists. The book points out that the obsession with the creation of the perfect aid system is not typical only of so-called emerging donors, but it is characteristic of the aid industry in general. As a result, the process of emerging as a donor is never complete and never satisfactory; it can be perpetuated indefinitely until it reaches an abstract perfection (Ibid. 13-14).

There are two main actors in the book. These are the Department of Development Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Assistance for the International Needy (PAIN). The Ministry is responsible for managing the Polish Official Development Agency.

This book is organised into two parts and seven chapters. The first is concerned with the ideology of development aid. The second part is concerned with the stabilisation of those ideas and their institutionalisation.

As for the content, Chapter 1 serves as a historical and cultural background to this monograph. This chapter assesses the shifting position of Poland within the aid chain and demonstrates how this manoeuvring reflects major political changes in the world. The chapter outlines three historical stages. Firstly, it evokes past Polish involvement in various exchanges with African states when Poland, as a member of the Soviet Bloc, was actively involved in the decolonisation processes and modernisation schemes. Secondly, it discusses Polish experiences as a recipient of international aid. Finally, the chapter introduces the most recent,

post-EU membership era when, in order to finalise its return to Europe and the Western world, the country has relaunched its donor activities.

Chapter 2 explains the key historical, cultural and political mechanisms shaping Polish aid to Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This chapter also investigates the main discourse behind this international engagement and demonstrates that strong support for Polish involvement in the East is rooted in national ideologies and ideas.

Chapter 3 asks how support for other regions, specifically Africa, is mobilised. This chapter shows that in order to gain public support for Polish involvement in foreign aid, a connection with Africa and its citizens must be crafted.

In Chapter 4, the author demonstrates how supposedly secular and modernist values, visible in development education, are shaped by religious ideas of charity with specifically Catholic connotations. The chapter also discusses these issues by showcasing the stories of the PAIN and other NGOs, and their efforts to emerge as donors in South Sudan. It describes the process behind the allocation of funds in Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and demonstrates how religious institutions coexist in harmony with (supposedly) secular aid agents. This chapter shows how Catholic charitable thinking penetrates the moral economy of foreign aid. It argues that the role of the Catholic Church in Poland's emergence as a donor has a direct impact on the operational modes of foreign aid.

Chapter 5 shows that participation in foreign aid is equally motivated by the charitable and political need to assist those less fortunate, but also by a fascination with distant places and a passion for travel. The chapter re-examines the "narrative of virtues" that surrounds the aid industry. Furthermore, the chapter also shows the need for the constant expansion of aid activities. In the aid industry, it is difficult to achieve and measure success, yet the existence of aid agencies depends on their ability to demonstrate their positive impact.

Chapter 6 explains how aid activists, when defining their work and organisations, manoeuvre between satisfying their humanitarian vocation and fulfilling contemporary standards calling for the institutionalisation of social activism. The chapter debates whether aid work is a mission or a profession. Is it a personal matter or a strictly professional and structured task?

Chapter 7 continues the debate over the institutionalisation of the foreign aid machinery. It starts with the story of a failed aid project implemented in South Sudan. This chapter considers the obsession with reforming – though not abolishing – the system of governance. It discusses the phenomenon which the author defines as 'bureaucratic activism' – a form of social action in which the bureaucracy is not just an object of change, but a tool for it. This chapter also gives a detailed description of the ODA management system.

Both the biggest strengths and weaknesses of this book are embedded in its design. The unique approach that examines the dynamics of the donor is the greatest quality of the book. The biggest flaw is the lack of analysis of the effects of aid on the recipient countries. However, it is fair to say that it was the author's intention to choose this angle of research. To overcome this shortcoming and obtain a complete picture of the aid industry, the reader should read this book in conjunction with some of the books that analyse the effects of development aid on the recipient end, such as Jonathan Glennie's *The Trouble with Aid* (Glennie 2008) or Dambisa Moyo's classic *Dead Aid* (Moyo 2009).

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Danilo BABIĆ

## **MY NAME IS BALKAN, HER NAME IS EUROPE: POLITICAL KALEIDOSCOPE OF THE BALKANS AND THE ROLE(S) OF SERBIA**

Jović-Lazić, Ana and Alexis Troude (eds.). 2020. *Security challenges and the place of the Balkans and Serbia in a changing world*, 1–345. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Faculty of Security Studies at the University of Belgrade.

Today, the contemporary world is rapidly changing in front of our eyes, radically challenging its roots, depicted in its political, economic and security systems. Hence, drawing any conclusion or predicting future scenarios based on the current political and security kaleidoscope, not to mention the notorious pandemic crisis, may seem like a dubious task. However, despite the uncertainty that the realm of international relations carries, there are numerous academic attempts to provide more or less reliable guidelines. The above-mentioned facts may lead us to think that the uncertainty in the age of the crisis could be a positive catalyst for innovative solutions. This collection of papers, edited by Ana Jović-Lazić (the Institute of International Economics and Politics, Serbia) and Alexis Troude (University of Versailles, France), represents a brave scientific endeavor that offered prolific results. Divided into three different thematic areas, renowned experts from France, the United Kingdom, Serbia, Turkey, etc., contribute to this collection by dealing with the ongoing challenges of the multipolar world order. The fact that some papers are focused on Serbia and the Balkans, together with the intertwined interests of global and regional powers therein, represents an added value to this collection.

In the first unit, “Remodeling and Transformation of the World Order”, Richard Sakwa emphasizes the importance of distinguishing specific models of the world order, or the so-called “software” from the broader international system, which he refers to as “the hardware” in order to find a balanced *modus vivendi* in the plethora of international relations. While analyzing four different models of globalism that have appeared throughout contemporary history, Sakwa finally invites the reader to contemplate how the European Union can combine societal and human solidarity in a newly composed post-Atlantic West. Following Sakwa’s political-historical approach, the following author, Andrey Fursov, is looking for the missing pieces of the ‘mosaic of disorderly chaos’ depicted in contemporary world politics (Fursov 2020, 31). Exploring the flexible concept of the commonwealth as a possible “ante-chamber for an alliance”, Ramachandra Byrappa suggests a reassessment of this institutional framework of cooperation (Byrappa 2020, 43). Emphasizing its advantages in times of turmoil, Byrappa offers several quite interesting solutions for rebuilding Serbia’s foreign policy, especially in the light of its proclaimed military neutrality. In that regard, the creation of the Lower Danube Commonwealth, which would bring Austria,



Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria together towards a greater regional economic network, seems to be food for thought. The first unit concludes with contributions by Kopanja and Stekić, which shed light on the different patterns of the geopolitical system's restructuring process, precisely distinguishing compression zones, such as Central Asia and Central Africa, from the only "true" shatterbelt, depicted in the Middle East.

Furthermore, Vladimir Trapara introduces the second unit titled "Balkan regional security: challenges and perspectives". Basing its research on a theoretical framework Miller-Kagan's patterns of great powers' and Halford Mackinder's concept of Eastern Europe (Mackinder 1919), while using a sharp historical comparison, Trapara looks for possible causes of the "balkanization" of the political space (Trapara 2020, 83). The following author, Ruth Ferrero-Turrión, contributes to the open discussion regarding the Balkan area, particularly about the relationship between the Western Balkans and the externalization process of the EU borders. Within the framework of the Western Balkans, Ćeranić and Lalić mainly focus on the regional security dynamics, while at the same time warning of a possible conflict in this important but complex geopolitical position. Šekarić and Lazić analyze the Western Balkans' energy security in an interesting triangle of powers, such as the EU, Russia, and Turkey, emphasizing the rising role of Turkey through particular case studies of the Southern Gas Corridor and the Turk Stream. In the search for possible reconciliation scenarios that could successfully apply to the Western Balkans, Olga Barbasievicz analyzes the patterns of European (primarily Polish-German) and Asian experiences of reconciliation. Finally, closing the second unit, Birgül Demirtaş compares the different attitudes of the five biggest Turkish political parties towards Syrian refugees after the Syrian civil war while touching upon the questions of Turkish identity, as well as the (re)formulated identity of the refugees.

The third unit, titled "The position of Serbia in Contemporary International Relations", completes the previous two units in a coherent manner, providing a detailed insight into the Serbian position on the international stage. The unit begins with Elena Ponomareva's research on multivectoriness as a possible way out of the strategic vulnerability impasse, which could be extremely useful for Serbia, which is "the middle and most important country in the Western Balkans" (Ponomareva 2020, 170). In addition, Ponomareva analyzes the competition between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the race for the position of the dominant non-European actor. Alexis Troude explores the specific geopolitical position of Serbia, which finds itself between the East and the West. Troude pays special attention to the emerging Eurasian and Middle Eastern geopolitics, predicting their significant rise 'on the Balkan chessboard' in the years to come (Troude 2020, 194). Dušan Proroković points out the gap between Serbia's proclaimed path of European integrations and its actual foreign

policy, which is characterized by increasingly intensive cooperation with Russia. In that light, Proroković examines the “character of the Russian vector” in Serbian politics (Proroković 2020, 196). Analyzing the geopolitical demands of the EU, to some extent hidden beneath the Copenhagen criteria, Miša Đurković concludes that the relations between the Serbian people and the European Union represent a sad story with an unknown end, pointing out the geopolitical and identity price that Serbia, according to the author, has to pay for its EU membership.

Siniša Atlagić made an interesting mark with his research on communication procedures and psychological mechanisms, often used as an instrument of controlled chaos strategy in hybrid wars and colour revolutions. When it comes to China and its relations with Serbia, Duško Dimitrijević gives a comprehensive historical review, emphasizing the importance of economic factors that may deepen this cooperation, in line with the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In continuation of these units’ focus on China, Ivona Lađevac examines the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the role of Serbia within the said initiative. Lađevac urges Serbian stakeholders to take a more active role in relations with Chinese partners in order to create “an open, inclusive, balanced and benefits-sharing framework of regional economic cooperation” (Lađevac 2020, 281). When it comes to the important question of defense, Glišić, Đorđević, and Stojković treat the EU Global Strategy as a possible framework for deepening cooperation with the Republic of Serbia, emphasizing its long-term positive impact regarding the EU membership capacities. Speaking of EU membership, Ana Jović-Lazić examines the state of affairs, as well as the existing challenges in the process of alignment of Serbia with the common foreign, security and defense policy of the EU. The third unit is finalized with a comparative economic analysis, written by Marjanović and Zubović, dealing with the dominant macroeconomic indicators of Serbia and the selected SEE countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia).

Could a never-ending story between the Western Balkans (with a focus on Serbia as Europe’s strategically most important country) and Europe be seen through the lens of Serbian writer Milorad Pavić and his famous story „The Wedgewood Tea Set“? The story is depicted as a complex relationship between a woman and a man, and is told by a first-person narrator and finishes in the following way: “Could it be that I actually hated her? If the reader has not figured it out himself, here is the answer to the riddle. My name is Balkan. Her name – Europe” (Ponomareva 2020, 171).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pavić as cited in Ponomareva 2020, 171.

Be it as it may, in these curious and tumultuous times, it seems impossible to provide a precise and reliable prediction concerning the future of world politics. The international academic community can only do its best in an attempt to ask the right questions in order to provide the reader with credible information in his or her search for the truth. That being said, this collection of papers has accomplished its task of helping the reader to better understand the curious case of Serbia and the Balkans in today's world.

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- Trapara, Vladimir. 2020. “The Balkans as geopolitical periphery of Eastern Europe – Past implications for an uncertain future”. In: *Security challenges and the place of the Balkans and Serbia in a changing world*, edited by Ana Jović-Lazić and Alexis Troude, 75–86. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Faculty of Security Studies at the University of Belgrade.
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*Vanja PAVIĆEVIĆ*



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Use continuous line numbers starting on the first page, with page numbers on the right side of the bottom of the page.

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Use bold for the article title (size 14).

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Below the title is given the author's full name, with a footnote that refers to her/his institutional affiliation (the name of the institution and its seat), and her e-mail address. Author's affiliation is the affiliation where the research was conducted.

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Johnson and Axinn (2013, 136) argue that killing with emotions is morally superior to killing without emotions, because military honour demands a clear will to assume a risk of sacrifice of health and life.

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(Jabri 2007, 2011; Gregory 2014a, 2014b)



## Book

Reference list entry:

Jabri, Vivienne. 2007. *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. [www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html](http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html).

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2011. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy. Vol. 17 of *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–.

In-text citation:

(Jabri 2007, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995)

(Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

## Journal article

Reference list entry:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard”. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

Adams, Tracy, and Zohar Kampf. 2020. “‘Solemn and just demands’: Seeking apologies in the international arena”. *Review of International Studies*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210520000261>.

In-text citation:

(Nordin and Öberg 2015, 401)

(Tracy and Kampf 2020)

### **Article in edited volume**

Reference list entry:

Herman, Michael. 2004. “Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001”. In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Reference list entry:

(Herman 2004)

### **Conference paper (if not published in conference proceedings)**

Reference list entry:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. “Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?”. Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

Reference list entry:

(Korać 2016)

### **Book review**

Reference list entry:

**Firchow, Pamina. 2020. “Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics”, Review of *Measuring Peace*, by Richard Caplan. *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 337–338.**

Reference list entry:

(Firchow 2020, 337)

### **Legal and official documents**

#### ***International treaties***

Reference list entry:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf>.

[TFEU] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, October 26. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>.

[UN Charter] Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945.  
<https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html>.

In-text citation:

(PTBT 1963, Article III, para. 3)

(TFEU 2012, Article 87)

(UN Charter, Chapter X)

### ***UN documents***

Reference list entry:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml>.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/67/18>.

In-text citation:

(UNSC Res. 2222)

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### ***National legislation***

Reference list entry:

[Constitution RS] Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 98/2006.

Homeland Security Act. 2002. United States of America, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (November 25). [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr\\_5005\\_enr.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf).

In-text citation:

(Constitution RS 2006, Article 111)

(Homeland Security Act 2002)

### ***Official reports***

Reference list entry:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. [https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc\\_2014\\_v2\\_p2.pdf&lang=ES](https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES).

[The 9-11 Commission] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Publication Office.

US Congress. 1993. Nomination of R. James Woolsey to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 104th Congress, 1st session, February 2–3, 1993. <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/103296.pdf>.

[USAFH] United States Air Force Headquarters. 2014. United States Air Force RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts: 2013–2038. [www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf](http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPAVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf).

In-text citation:

(YILC 2014, 321)

(The 9-11 Commission 2004, 437)

(US Congress 1993, 125)

(USAFH 2014)

### ***EU legislation***

Reference list entry:

Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 295, 6 November 2013. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN>.

[EC] European Commission. 2010. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, November 22. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0673&from=GA>.

Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 141, 5 June 2015. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=EN>.

In-text citation:

(Regulation [EU] No. 1052/2013, Article 11, para. 4)

(EC COM[2010] 673 final)

(Directive [EU] 2015/849)

### ***Decisions of international courts and tribunals***

Reference list entry:

[ICJ] International Court of Justice. Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports. <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>.

[ICJ Order 1999] *Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom)*. International Court of Justice, Order ICJ Rep. 1999 (June 2). <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/113/113-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

[ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A] *Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32-A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictment, 30 October 2000. <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/ind/en/vasonly-ii000125e.pdf>.

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[CJEU Judgment T-289/15] *Hamas v Council*, Case T-289/15. Court of Justice of the European Union, Judgment, 6 March 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:138. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?language=EN&critereEcli=ECLI:EU:T:2019:138>

[Opinion of AG Bobek] *Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission*, Case C-352/19 P. Court of Justice of the European Union. Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 16 July 2020(1), ECLI:EU:C:2020:588. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=485A5D9AC129179D3D2F2.EC571A384CD?text=&docid=228708&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5064004>.

In-text citation:

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010, 411)

(ICJ Order 1999, para. 3)

(ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A)

(*Costa v ENEL*)

(CJEU Judgment T-289/15, para. 23)

(Opinion of AG Bobek C-352/19 P)

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Reference list entry:

Gibbs, Samuel. 2017. “Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots”, *The Guardian*, August 20.

Power, Matthew. 2013. “Confessions of a Drone Warrior”, *GQ*, October 22. <https://www.gq.com/story/drone-uav-pilot-assassination>.

*Economist*. 2015. “Who will fight the next war?” October 24. <https://www.economist.com/united-states/2015/10/24/who-will-fight-the-next-war>.

In-text citation:

(Gibbs 2017, A10)

(Power 2013)

(*Economist* 2015)

## Audio and visual media

Reference list entry:

Scott, Ridley. [1982] 2007. *Blade Runner: The Final Cut*. Directed by Ridley Scott. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Blue-Ray disc, 117 min.

*Future Weapons*. 2019. Waddell Media. Aired on August 7–16 on Discovery Science HD, 3 seasons, 30 episodes (43 min. each). <https://go.discovery.com/tv-shows/future-weapons/>.

Tech Legend. 2020. “Best Drones 2020 – Top 8 Best Drone with Cameras to Buy in 2020”. Uploaded on February 7, 2020. YouTube video, 27:20 min. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6\\_4JU5Mspw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6_4JU5Mspw).

In-text citation:

(Scott [1982] 2007)

(Future Weapons 2019)

(Tech Legend 2020)

## Social media

Reference list entry:

National Library of Australia. 2020. “National Library of Australia’s Facebook Page”. Facebook, August 1, 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/National.Library.of.Australia/>.

Kruszelnicki, Karl (@*DoctorKarl*). 2017. “Dr Karl Twitter post.” Twitter, February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. <https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl>.

Trapara, Vladimir. 2018. “Victory or nil”. *Unwrapping the Essence* (blog). May 29, 2018. <https://unwrappingtheessence.weebly.com/blog/pobeda-ili-nista>.

In-text citation:

(National Library of Australia 2020)

(Kruszelnicki 2017)

(Trapara 2018)

### **Doctoral dissertation**

Reference list entry:

Rohrbach, Livia. 2020. *Beyond intractability? Territorial solutions to self-determination conflicts*. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

In-text citation:

(Rohrbach 2020)

### **Internet source**

If citing an undated online document, give an access date and use the year of access as year of publication.

Reference list entry:

Oxford Library. 2012. “Library Strategy”. Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. <http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html>.

Google Maps. 2015. “The British Library, London, UK”. *Google*. Accessed February 5, 2015. <https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/The+British+Library/@51.529972,-0.127676,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m2!3m1!1s0x48761b3b70171395:0x18905479de0fdb25>.

IIPE [Institute of International Politics and Economics]. n.d. “Mission”. Accessed August 1, 2020. <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/en/mission/>.

In-text citation:

(Oxford Library 2012)

(Google Maps 2015)

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If you read an article or book which cites or quotes some information that you want to use, always refer to both the original source and the source where you found the information:

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In his 1975 book *Power* [Macht], Luhmann bases his understanding of power mainly on the social exchange and community power literature (cited in Guzzini 2013, 79).

Reference list entry:

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

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Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3):

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A scholarly journal for European Union law  
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*Europe in Changes: The Old Continent at a New Crossroads*, Katarina Zakić and Birgül Demirtaş (eds.), tvrd povez, 2021, 480 str.

*Izazovi savremenog sveta: strateško delovanje država ili rezultanta globalnih i lokalnih procesa i povoda?*, Zoran Jeftić i Nenad Stekić (ur.), elektronska publikacija (CD), 2020, 260 str.

Dragan Petrović, Rajko Bukvić, *Evropa i migrantsko pitanje 2014-2020.*, broširano, 2020, 190 str.

*Zarazne bolesti kao globalni bezbednosni izazov – Pandemija COVID-19: stvarnost i posledice*, Zoran Jeftić i Mihajlo Kopanja (ur.), elektronska publikacija (CD), 2020, 295 str.

*Čovek, prostor, tehnologija, ideje: međunarodna bezbednost u trećoj dekadi 21. veka*, Vladimir Ajzenhamer, Nebojša Vuković (ur.), tvrd povez, 2020, 322 str.

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Bogdan Stojanović, Elena Ponomareva (eds.), tvrd povez, 2020, 260 str.

Dragan Đukanović, *Balkan na posthladnoratovskom raskršću (1989–2020)*, drugo dopunje- no izdanje, broširano, 2020, 210 str.

*Security Challenges and the Place of the Balkans and Serbia in a Changing World*, Ana Jović-Lazić and Alexis Troude (eds.), tvrd povez, 2020, 346 str.

Vladimir Trapara, *Ratovi Rusije 1999-2019.*, broširano, 2019, 290 str.

*Integracioni procesi u Evroaziji*, Dušan Proroković, Ana Jović-Lazić (ur.), tvrd povez, 2019, 352 str.

Mihajlo Vučić, *Korektivna pravda pred Međunarodnim sudom*, broširano, 2019, 198 str.

Dragan Petrović, Rajko Bukvić, *Ukrajinska kriza 2013–2019*, broširano, 2019, 232 str.

*Strane investicije u Srbiji – novi pogledi*, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić (ur.), broširano, 2019, 218 str.

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*Balkan u doba globalnog preuređivanja*, Slobodan Janković, Marina Kostić (ur.), broširano, 2019, 204 str.

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