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AND CONTROVERSIES OF NON-LETHALITY

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For information on annual subscription please contact

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THE LATE MODERN WARFARE AND CONTROVERSIES OF NON-LETHALITY

Srđan T. KORAC¹

Abstract: The article seeks to investigate how the practice of non-lethality, built on recent advances in armament technology, may affect the ontology of warfare in the 21st century by turning enemy soldiers and civilian population of other countries into deviant outlaws devoid of moral value “naturally” attributed to “civilised” nations gathered under the (neo)liberal global order. The author analyses the practice of non-lethality in the context of military operations within the framework of US/West policing over the global periphery. The paper hypothesises that the anticipated development of non-lethal weapons raises several controversies related to the projected moral insensitivity of interventionist troops in the treatment of enemy fighters/combatants and the civilian population. The hypothesis is addressed by the critical approach to international security and ontology of warfare, as well as by philosophy of mind and normative approach to moral agency. The author concludes that the Western vision of war as a foreign policy instrument, entirely “sanitised” of the risk of moral wrongdoings, seems to turn a blind eye on the plausible negative effects of non-lethal weapons in combat situations. Contrary to expectations and military-strategic visions, the practice of non-lethality, combined with the manhunt, is likely to eventually oust enemy soldiers and civilians from the realm of moral concerns integral to military ethics.

Key words: non-lethality, non-lethal weapons, the ontology of warfare, military intervention, military technology, armament, military ethics, moral agency.

¹ Senior Research Fellow, the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

E-mail: srdjan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

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NON-LETHALITY AS A TECHNOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO CASUALTY-AVERSION WESTERN INTERVENTIONISM

Warfare has been an ancient social practice centred around political collectives deliberately using the armed struggle to impose their will on each other. In the early 21st century, the leading powers of the global centre gradually transformed and, side-by-side, reframed military interventions to control the policy of the “uncivilised” global periphery. Maja Zehfuss argues that this interventionist disposition has been justified in the political as much as the idealistic claim that the global centre has the ability and responsibility to help make the world a better place because it brings benefits to those on the receiving end (2018, 3–9). She draws attention to an excessive enthusiasm for global ethics that led to misinterpretation of the Western-style of the late modern warfare as “constrained by ethics and therefore somehow less violent, more benign” (2018, 9). The apprehension over war as an instrument of ethics culminated in the contemporary warfare taking on features of an anti-crime policy based on the methodology of policing, criminal justice, and the penitentiary system. In my recent work, I suggested that the main goal of late modern war as a global anti-crime policy is to preserve world peace grounded in moral values of the (neo)liberal order by restraining “deviant” behaviour of various warring-criminal-terrorist entities across the global periphery (Korać 2018). The imperial policy of disciplining the non-western periphery follows the corporate logic of classifying individuals and societies into the cooperative and non-cooperative sections in line with their utility for the global division of labour. Besides, the enemy is no longer a respected soldier of a rival army, but is now reduced to a criminal whose behaviour justifies devaluing his personality; he is an individual unworthy of living in the (neo)liberal order.

As a plausible avenue of democratic legitimisation of never-ending disciplining warfare, Western military and political leaderships whole-heartedly embrace the notion of sanitisation/purification of war. This idea reveals the political strategy of discourse manipulation as a means to keep out of the public eye morbid and sordid consequences of warfare by broadcasting highly aestheticized video images of bloodless and costless combat operations in the media (Eken 2017). As Derek Gregory put it, “Death is no longer seen as part of life, as in other cultural and social formations, but is sequestered in screened and medicalized spaces” (2008, 20). On the other side, the desire to minimise losses of human life and protect human rights, and treating of enemy fighters/combatants as ordinary criminals seem that do not require traditional military capabilities and weaponry in disciplining non-cooperative entities from the global periphery.² To provide a more adequate

² I use the terms “fighter” and “combatant” side by side, although international humanitarian law makes a distinction between two categories on the ground whether the hostilities are international

response to a plethora of asymmetrical threats in urban warfare – a typical combat operating environment for the Western military expeditions in failed/rogue states – policing methodologies employed at the national level to maintain public order and security seem to be a more reasonable tool for achieving foreign policy goals in this context (see Steverson 2008, 34–41; McLaughlin 2007, 115–142). Vivienne Jabri argues that the late modern warfare is now transformed into a regulative tool articulated in global terms and intertwined with practices of torture, deportation, state-building, and the like (2007, 59–62).

But then again, the business of war is still about killing and being killed. The affliction of injury upon enemy bodies as well as the destruction and seizure of enemy property are still constitutive elements of the ontology of warfare, and hence normal parts of the human experience. By building on Baudrillard's notion of war as a "reiterative and automated process which constructs a seamless economy of violence", Nordin and Öberg (2015) stress that the ontology of war-as-fighting implicates a highly violent practice although reflecting disrupted symbolic relations between a soldier and a hostile Other (now epitomised in an insurgent, terrorist, civilian). Despite the new ways in which an enemy Other from the global periphery becomes subjected to military violence thanks to the use of advanced targeting tactics, soldiering involves the making of right or wrong decisions about the perpetration of violence and sacrifice of self. For Jabri (2007, 11), aspiration for war in the absence of injury to the self is one that dominates strategic thinking in the West in the age of the late modern warfare. I find the idea of bloodless warfare perfectly condensed in a wish of Colonel George Fenton, Director of the US Marine Corps' Joint Non-Lethal Weapon Directorate, to get dust that can put both enemy combatants and civilians to sleep, so to execute a combat task successfully and avoid casualties at the same time (NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2001).

Not surprisingly, the Colonel's genuine wish has never been a problem in fiction stories and particularly in the science fiction genre. In *The Wizard of Oz*, people happen to fall asleep in the field of poppies with no harm or risk of dying, while in a number of other fictional stories there is always a magic way to safely disable an opponent and get away from a dangerous situation. In *A Deepness in the Sky* – a science fiction novel by American writer Vernor Vinge (1999) – the wire guns shoot out a very thin wire at high velocity. It is enough to point at the general direction of the threat; the wire wraps around and catches into the target, but it does not penetrate deep enough to be lethal. In Vinge's imagination, targeted persons are left unable to move because of both the pain and their limbs being somewhat restrained. After the removal of the wire, wounds heal in several days.

or non-international in character. For the purpose of my analysis, I find this distinction irrelevant due to the foggy line between irregular warfare and US/West-led military interventions pursued in the global periphery. The focus here is on the same function they perform.

Another typical piece of imaginary technology of tomorrow is an ion cannon as a sort of particle cannon, which projects ionised particles to damage various electronic devices and systems. Similar to the ion cannon is the phased polaron cannon that appears in the legendary sci-fi tv series *Star Trek*; it is an energy weapon that emits a beam of polaron particle. Carbon-freezing as the process by which liquid carbonite is flash-frozen into a solid-state took place in one of the most successful and influential franchises in film history – the nine-sequel *Star Wars* saga, notably in episodes *Star Wars: The Empire Strikes Back*, *Star Wars: Return of the Jedi*, and *Star Wars: The Clone Wars*. This hypothetical weapon has multiple uses, largely to temporarily disable individuals or entire groups of enemies (who can survive but with hibernation sickness).

Common to all described imagined weapons are non-lethal characteristics that bring the heightened theatricality of the combat scenes on the cinema screen but almost entirely purified from the gloomy reality of the battlefield. Will warfare centred around the idea and practice of non-lethality become nothing more than an organised drama with toys in soldiers' hands against the background of a standard operating behaviour in fighting? I suppose not. The seductive sci-fi fantasies about magical devices belong rather to the realm of wild futuristic fantasy than they correspond to the world of plausible science, as they are not within reach of the current scientific and technological advances in biology, chemistry, and physics. For the purpose of this article, I refer to a definition of non-lethal weapons (also described as soft-kill, less-than-lethal, sub-lethal weapons) synthesised from essential elements provided in several other definitions:

Non-lethal weapons are weapons whose physical and operational features cause temporary small-scale incapacitation that can be cancelled later, i.e. weapons designed and employed neither to cause fatalities and irreversible injuries to personnel nor undesired damage to property, infrastructure and the environment (see NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2001; US Department of Defense 2018; Kaurin 2010, 102; Gross 2017, 122–124).

The class of weapons collectively referred to as “non-lethal” permits the ability to better match the weapon to the objectives of military interventions across the global periphery, thousands of miles away from a wide network of overseas military bases. Unlike conventional weapons defined by their potential to inflict death or severe injuries, the operational effectiveness of non-lethal weapons seem to more adequately meet the political requirements for a responsible, economically less expensive, and life-conserving foreign policy aimed at containing and defeating insurgencies. Non-lethal weapons have been expected to provide greater flexibility to the use of force in combat missions and faster response to enemy actions so that to neutralise threats on the battlefield without resorting to deadly force. Non-lethal weapon systems can be constructed as a stand-alone weapon or as an adjunct to conventional weapons, providing enough room for soldier's choice on which level

of force at the scale of the-use-of-force continuum is adequate to meet the needs of the specific combat situation in the most effective way (Small Arms Survey 2020).

The application of the Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies in the design and construction of non-lethal weapons gives them the unique structural competencies that enable their specific role in military strategies and operational plans. Siniscalchi (1998) identifies the following unique features: 1) precision, 2) radius, 3) repeatability, and 4) selectivity. Firstly, unlike conventional weapons, precision gives non-lethal weapons the capability to control the destructive effects by attacking only selected components of the enemy's military infrastructure, combat equipment, and/or manpower. Secondly, non-lethal weapons, in general, can have a far larger combat radius (a countrywide radius in the case of biological weapons) and can destroy enemy's equipment, even when it is scattered over a large area or when it is difficult to detect exactly which are the critical infrastructure objects. Thirdly, bearing in mind the continuous development of adverse countermeasures, the credibility of non-lethal weapons in terms of achieving planned/desired combat performance is assumed primarily from the certainty that it will be able to repeat the same effects in different combat situations, even within the reach of hostile actions. Fourthly, the purpose of non-lethal weapons to avoid human suffering and material damage opens doors for designing and implementing far more flexible foreign policy and military strategies and action plans, which would be unsustainable if only conventional weapons were used. Moreover, diverse non-lethal weapons are designed to disable a human target by affecting her/his psychological, physical or both systems with projectiles, chemicals, electricity, light and sound to either obstruct or block human sensory systems (i.e. touch, sight, hearing and smell) or induce pain.

There must always be intentionality behind the technical details as the prime cause of the use of any type of weaponry. Intentionality is the directedness of the mind upon something, i.e., the mind's capacity to direct itself on things (see Searle 1999, 1–4). Arnauld holds that every perception is the perception of something because it has a representational content and thus is representative of some object ([1683] 1990, 381). This representative character is an intrinsic feature of the perceptual act and is what gives the act its directedness-towards-an-object. Since the action is the condition of satisfaction of the intention to perform it, I find Heidegger's thesis that intentionality is primarily a matter of action rather than consciousness helpful in the consideration of the practice of non-lethality. For Heidegger, the most basic form of intentionality is agency, which means that the world is a place of many possibilities for action ready to be interpreted by enacting some of the possibilities disclosed by understanding the world as a setting for action (Heidegger, 1982). Unlike human beings, structural features of weapons do not have intentionality in themselves. They do not have "original intentionality" but intentionality derived from the interpretation of their design

characteristics by the constructor and the end-user (military planners and commanders). Therefore, there is only the original intentionality that stems from the agency of constructors and military leaders. Military leaders and planners imagine and interpret the desired technical features of a weapon and define their specific needs in the form of a set of requirements for designers and constructors. Since intentionality implies a present activity directed towards a future by working out possibilities, the primary way in which military leaders intend a non-lethal weapon as a military tool has to be in an overt act of employing it on the battlefield. Still, is it all about design and technology?

The utilitarian reasoning about whether and in what way our free will makes an object a weapon in our hands seems to obscure the more important question of whether the moral reasons for its use are sound, with a view to the damage inflicted upon other people and the moral obligations to treat all human beings as of equal value. The way in which a weapon kills is essential as well, because over time – through practice – it develops gradually into the logic of killing consolidated in dominant normative order within which war operations take place. That is why Nisha Shah (2017) sets out to analyse how lethality is being legitimatised through the advancement in technology and design of weapons aspired for an increase in the ability to damage, and combined with a particular method of killing adequately to the weapon design, especially those characteristics that support ethical conduct in war. Shah emphasises that the ways in which the technical properties of a weapon are standardised are not only aimed at increasing its efficiency; they also constitute the legitimacy of war as social practice because weapons inflict injuries and death and at the same time specify acceptable ways in which death occurs (2017, 563–564). Shah explains that the acceptability of a type of weapon as an agent of destruction leans on the ways in which it is constituted by its technical properties, instructions for its use, military strategy, human ingenuity, and propensity to war; yet, it is also affected by moral worldviews and social conventions on what military objectives and ways of the use of armed force are (in)appropriate (2017, 557).

Moral behaviour is impossible without a free will as the latter is the ability to make choices between different possible courses of action autonomously. The praise or blame for morally good or bad actions is being ascribed not to the action itself, but to an agent who did that action. Swinburne claims that belief in the reality of moral responsibility is epistemically basic and since that moral responsibility entails free will, we feel it is not right to praise or blame someone for their unintentional actions (2013, 210–229). It is pertinent to see how the strategic employment of non-lethality in military operations raises the question of the moral acceptability of this type of weapon in terms of the (in)appropriateness of its combat use against the enemy. The point of departure for my analysis is the claim that an anticipated development of non-lethal weapons may raise several controversies related to the projected moral insensitivity of interventionist troops

of the global centre in the treatment of enemy fighters/combatants and the civilian population of the global periphery. I will critically interrogate whether the practice of non-lethality within the framework of US/West policing may affect the ontology of warfare by turning the enemy fighters and the civilian population into deviant outlaws devoid of moral value “naturally” attributed to “civilised” nations gathered under the (neo)liberal global order. My analysis will embrace manufactured, conceived and non-lethal weapons currently under development, primarily based on technologies of directed energy and sound. I will also reflect on the ethical quandaries that may raise from operationally relevant structural characteristics of non-lethal weapons, such as precision, radius, repeatability, and selectivity.

NON-LETHALITY AND INSENSITIVE MORAL AGENCY

Martin Van Creveld stresses that the will to die on the battlefield is a far more constitutive element of warfare than it is the will to kill because war begins only when a group of people intentionally accept the risk of being killed (Van Creveld 1991, 159–160). The will to fight, legitimised by people’s support to the long-term political objectives of a warring entity, is acknowledged as vital in the context of irregular warfare and has never had anything to do with the amount of resources insurgents have at hand (Porch 2013; Scheipers 2014). Some military historians and scientists brought to light unflattering truth about the natural reluctance, and even refusal, of the majority of ordinary men to kill their enemy counterparts in the close combat situations (Watson 1980; Jones 2006). Being one of the most prominent in that group of scholars, Dave Grossman (1996) refers to the massive empirical evidence in arguing that soldiers experience the greatest resistance when they see the enemy clearly or stare them in the eyes, i.e., when it becomes obvious that they are killing someone just like themselves.

The practice of non-lethality might soften the resistance of soldiers to engage in close combat against insurgents who always easily fit with the civilian population. The supporting argument for the future development of this type of weapon is largely based on the fact of benign intervention on the body as the result of its operational employment, where benignity plays a role of a desirable property because it safeguards the sanctity of the body and human life. Unlike conventional weapons, which have a binary option “try to kill or do nothing”, the use of non-lethal weapons opens up numerous possibilities for limiting the damage and suffering of innocent people, while at the same time providing military planners and commanders with a more precise manner in which the force can be used during combat – combined with a wider scope of combat actions and better distinction between combatants and civilians.

As the generally accepted moral concern of the late modern warfare is to reduce suffering, the way of waging wars ought to be such as to avoid cruelty to others.

Non-lethal weapons offer operational options more adequate to the modern rules of warfare aimed at reducing unnecessary or unintentional casualties and collateral damage. For scholars like Pauline Kaurin (2010, 109–112) and John B. Alexander (1999, 24), the practice of non-lethality is supposed to slow down the trajectory of violence so that participants in combat operations have enough room for sound ethical decision-making and get rid of the psychological burden of thinking about killing. Non-lethal weapons enable military planners to project more subtly the lowest effective level of the use of force meeting the level of adversary threat and to more easily decide on the use of the “shoot first, ask questions later” tactic. The problem with the tactic is it presupposes taking actions with serious consequences without delay while preserving the benefits of the surprise effect that occurs due to concealment of intentions. This can lead to the deliberate targeting of clearly innocent persons as calculated collateral damage being a function of accomplishing the combat mission.

Conventional weapons are designed to kill or incapacitate the enemy so that their very purpose contradicts the moral norms and laws of armed conflict. In contrast, since not being intended to kill, non-lethal weapons would expand the legitimisation ground for the use of force and thus turn civilians into legitimate targets because their direct use against civilians is not prohibited nor collateral damage can be considered contrary to international rules of war (Fidler 2001, 201–204). Never-ending wars led by US/West coalitions against rogue/failed states to suppress anti-(neo)liberal insurgencies across the global periphery might seem to have broken down the ontological distinction between law enforcement operations bounded by strict rules aimed at human rights protection and fighting wars by the rules of armed conflict. Counter-insurgency operations now include law enforcement tactics and tools regularly, which additionally make more confusing when policing stops and soldiering begins, and vice versa. The concept of non-lethality bears upon the intention to temporarily disrupt the operation of the human body without causing permanent injury or death, which makes this idea so at odds with the war’s constitutive objective to produce irreversible injury and death. In his study of moral quandaries that have emerged from the use of non-lethal weapons (in particular, incapacitating chemical agents and dazzling laser devices) by US forces in Iraq, Christian Enemark (2008) points out that the practice of non-lethality – as an ethically superior alternative to inflicting death and suffering – is being undermined by the failure of its accurate operationalisation in the midst of the uncertainty, friction, chaos, and ambiguity in situational awareness in combat (illustrated by the metaphor “fog of war”). Enemark shows that the non-lethality has been legitimised contingently so far, from case to case, as the current interpretation of the principles of discrimination and proportionality does not provide clear guidance and, thus, an ethically preferable instrument of interventionist forces.

The attribute “non-lethal” can be somewhat misleading. Any weapon has the potential to generate effects that do not match the intent of its user (and more indirectly, its planner and designer). The non-lethal weapons can certainly be fatal if used improperly, or contrary to the instructions of the designer or manufacturer. Even non-lethal weapons are not without shortcomings in terms of risks to the safety of the civilian population; those risks primarily may stem from improper use caused by deficient or unsound military training. For instance, some non-lethal weapons contain chemical agents designed to act on the enemy’s central nervous system. All of that raised reasonable concerns about how non-lethal weapons could be misused, which can be summed up in the argument that this type of weapon could be used to torture prisoners and illegal, even covert, population control. In fact, the constructors and military planners themselves have considered thoroughly moral and legal controversies from the very beginning (Alexander 2001, 186–188).

A professor of military ethics, Pauline Kaurin (2010, 103), criticises the efforts of some theorists to mislead the idea that non-lethality makes coping with moral dilemmas redundant, especially when it comes to distinguishing combatants from non-combatants because the non-lethal force can supposedly first disable the suspected enemy combatants, and then, later, identify who really is a (enemy) soldier and who is not. Moreover, there has been an illusion created that advances in the technology of non-lethality and subsequent improvements in operational characteristics of this type of weapons will by default be able to make a distinction between fighters and civilians – to say, almost automatically. Undoubtedly, no technology, no matter how advanced it may become in the future, is likely to be capable of replacing a human being in the chain of command because this type of action requires ethical decision-making and a moral agent with formal training in ethics. Kaurin remarks that only man is what makes any weapon, even a non-lethal one, “capable” of distinction between combatants and civilians; only man can use the weapon in a manner that will ensure the distinction is made according to the laws of armed conflict (2010, 103).

The assumption that non-lethal weapons may lower fatalities and collateral damage has nothing to do with the question of how commanders and soldiers would combine the practice of non-lethality with the principles of discrimination and proportionality on the battlefield. Non-lethality does not erase the moral dilemma (typical of conventional weapons) about whether it is permissible to deliberately target non-combatants if they find themselves in the middle of a combat operation, on the way to fire, given their immunity that provides them different treatment comparing to fighters. Stephen Coleman stresses that the use of non-lethal weapons in a fashion that applies the principle of discrimination “after” the use of force is contrary to how this principle is applied to the use of lethal force, which is “before” the use of that force – military personnel is simply not permitted to deliberately target non-combatants (2014, 37–39). Michael Gross

(2008) warns that the practice of non-lethality is gradually leading to a broadened targeting criterion that then embraces more and more civilians. Targeting civilians in this way ceases to be incidental and becomes intentional. It follows that, albeit it saves lives in the long run, non-lethality against non-combatants makes their immunity meaningless. It turns out that restrictions on the violation of the immunity of non-combatants can be morally more easily justified on the ground that the collateral damage is far less, so it seems that the supposed ethical pros of non-lethal weapons over conventional ones eventually become blurred (Kaurin 2010, 104).

Mitigating the effects of combat operations in the form of reducing collateral damage to people and property does not address a moral violation of the principle of discrimination. Kaurin also warns (2010, 105) that the empirical material gathered by studying the cases of low-intensity conflicts clearly evidences how the use of non-lethal weapons as precursors to conventional ones actually leads to a higher number of deaths. For instance, if caught in the beam projected by the Active Denial Technology – a sort of weaponised microwave that instantly heats nerve cells in the skin to induce pain without lasting harm – a person feels an immediate heating sensation, which she wants to get away from instinctively. As soon as she moves out of the beam's reach, the sensation disappears virtually immediately. But the Active Denial Technology can be used in a manner in which it may cause harm to disabled enemy fighters who are not able to defend themselves as combat operation develops farther so they cannot escape the beam, perhaps even to the point of being hors de combat. This non-lethal weapon might be used to deliberately inflict pain on civilians, while not causing any lasting (or even detectable) damage to their bodies.

Building her analysis of non-lethal weapons as a means of politics of micro-interventions on the body and macro-interventions on population and space on Foucault's teaching on governmentality – which is an offspring of his concept of biopolitics – Seantel Anaïs (2011) argues that this type of weapon reconfigures subjectivity in a way that remains beyond traditional concepts of power. Anaïs shows how the US Department of Defence's official discourse strives to strike a subtle balance between advocating the benefits of non-lethal weapons as a safe, convenient, and morally sensitive military tool and the research output aimed at determining the degree of force that the human body can withstand with no fatal outcome (2011, 546). For instance, the Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is designed to incapacitate people by projecting sound waves at a high volume to hit the target at up to 152 dbs. – enough to cause permanent hearing damage (Atherton 2020). An American journalist who experienced an LRAD attack in the Pittsburgh protests described the effect: “Your brain feels like it's vibrating in a bowl of jelly on the table” (MacDonald-Evoy 2018). Similarly, flash bang grenades (or stun grenades) produce a sudden bright light that causes ocular pain, confusion, and temporary blindness, in combination with the “bang” that is more

than 165 dbs. The desired balance about the degree of weapon's effect that the human body can withstand with no fatal outcome seems not yet to be reached. There have been multiple reports on injuries and deaths, including burns and fatal heart attacks, caused by using flash bangs grenades in police crowd control tactics across the United States (Atherton 2020). An Amnesty International report on human rights impact of less lethal weapons (AI & ORF 2015, 27) highlights that far-reaching safety risks may stem from scarce information about the medical risks (particularly for vulnerable groups highly sensitive to the weapon's effects), issues of accuracy, and issues of reliability related to possible design flaws and low manufacturing quality.

Non-lethal weapons genuinely are being tailored by scientists, designers, and engineers to push the threshold of undetectable harm up to the highest possible point. NATO report on the human effects of non-lethal technologies adopted in 2006 urged for acquiring data on human effects of the military technologies with the highest potential for effectiveness on the battlefield, but difficult to test due to ethical concerns and strict medical standards on the limit of human exposure (NATO 2006). Coleman suggests that the main goal of the corporate sector is to engineer non-lethal weapons “whose effects are temporary and reversible without any medical intervention but are also unpleasant enough to ensure compliance with the directions of the user” (2015, 199). I argue that performing experiments to collect detailed medical information on the highest possible point of undetectable harm to living individuals – and to use gathered data to create conclusions about how to design, develop, and deploy subsequently this type of weaponry – would be inherently immoral because it would treat humans as non-living objects devoid of intrinsic moral value. Identifying when the threshold of severe pain or suffering is crossed and calibrating the levels to keep them within health integrity limits might have an appearance of legitimate bureaucratic procedure euphemistically defined as e.g. standardisation of acceptable levels of harm. The intentionality behind controversial experiments related to non-lethality can be conceptualised by Martin Buber's (1937) notion of the *I-It* relationship. Buber explains how the encounter between humans as equally worth moral agents (the *I-Thou* relationship) is oftentimes degraded into a relationship that involves a self-conscious subject and a world of lifeless objects that the subject can measure and manipulate. Along with affecting the human sensory nervous system and brain functions, a non-lethal weapon is a psychological military tool as well, since it may cause a primordial fear of the unknown, common to all people, regardless of the ability to understand causal relations (weapon-injury), and upset members of a warring entity. When we instil fear in the enemy, we have power over him, and we can make him give up the fight, and achieve measurable effects that advance the unit's objectives. In the case of non-lethality, the asymmetry caused by advanced military technology seems to be inherently immoral because of its propensity to transform the war into a

manhunt of targeted insurgents with no reciprocal risk of death for interventionist troops (Caron 2020). The never-ending search for advancement in the routinised counter-insurgency industrial process of “search and destroy” obviously turns humans into objects stripped of moral value.

The recognition of the wrongness of killing another human being in the fog of war assumes the agency of a morally aware individual. Moral awareness is a critical component of sound moral reasoning and ethical decision-making and moral action. It refers to spontaneous recognition of the ethical aspect of an issue at hand, and the interpretation of a situation in moral terms (Clarkeburn 2002, 443). Moral awareness can be achieved by moral sensitivity, which is coined and defined by James Rest as the ability to recognise that in a situation in which we need to act, an ethical question arises, which we need to answer by choosing the course of action and to act accordingly (Rest 1994). Making good ethical decisions requires moral sensitivity developed in personality, so for a person who is not able to detect an ethical dimension of a situation, we usually say that he is morally insensitive, and thus not likely to choose the morally right course of action. In a combat environment where the morally insensitive professional mindset and behaviour occur due to the complex context of quick moral reasoning under intensive and protracted stress, combatants are likely to indicate moral blindness or the lack of moral response (i.e., moral disengagement). Another negative effect of moral insensitivity on the good moral judgment is insufficient attention rooted in the false perception of the moral intensity level of a certain situation (Jones 1991). On the battleground, a commander or soldier neglects the ethical aspect of a situation if he perceives that it has small importance (i.e., low moral intensity), ignores the risk of misinterpreting the moral aspects of the situation, and eventually makes mistakes inflicting harm on others. Moreover, moral agents tend to miscalculate the negative consequences of their acts and the risk involved, create inaccurate judgments about causal perceptions, and give disproportionately more weight to existing consequences than anticipated consequences.

For most people, war is a social anomaly, and it is normally wrong to deliberately take human life (Young 1979). Albeit the principle of respect for life is now universal, Richard Norman reminds us that the killing of thousands of people in war stops to be utterly wrong; it still is widely accepted as a necessary and inevitable part of our way of life (1995, 36–72). Bearing that in mind, Noam Zohar (2014) argues that it would be misleading to speak of the soldiers’ relevant obligation in terms of “preventing” harm to innocent non-combatants. He sees as vital to clear up the issue of whether soldiers may or may not intentionally kill innocent non-combatants in pursuing their military objectives because it is substantial to reaffirm the moral requirement of balancing the lives of soldiers and the lives of non-combatants whom they are at risk of killing (Zohar 2014, 161–170). Since no belligerents are enemies by nature, Anthony Coates posits sustained recognition of

the moral equality and the worth of the enemy as a logical outcome of “awareness of a moral community that transcends divisions and (...) secures the just limits of enmity” (2006, 218). In the quest for reaching the balance between the lives of soldiers and the lives of non-combatants, commanders and soldiers may act in a utilitarian fashion by turning to a non-lethal weapon on the grounds that it is more legitimate as being less evil tool comparing to the fatal effects of classical weaponry. From the perspective of this utilitarian reasoning, the practice of non-lethality – despite all possible negative side-effects on the human body – could make less misery for outlawed fighters and civilians in the global periphery, while at the same time “rescue” them from illiberal chaos.

Nevertheless, the non-lethality as the military practice aimed at merely incapacitating human bodies could encourage slack or negligent resort to force among soldiers. In this regard, the practice of non-lethality may pose many threats to human security while lacking compatibility with the test for proportionality. For instance, if the dose or level of force a non-lethal weapon delivers cannot be varied or is found to be unreliable, then it cannot deliver a discriminate or proportional level of force. Pursued from the angle of their operational characteristics of precision, radius, repeatability, and selectivity, directed sound weapons or laser blinding weapons could be easily, but not necessarily intentionally, misused due to soldier’s blind-spot-created incorrect assumption built on their designed non-lethality. The soldier may inflict irreversible injuries on others during combat operation simply by projecting a higher level of directed sound or laser beams, or in a longer period than it is originally instructed by the designer. In that case, the incorrect use of non-lethal weapons may originate from mistakes in judgment made in a haste, triggered by the stressful environment and chaotic conditions of combat. A soldier was not able to assess the adequate level of non-lethal force to project on enemies.

Far more serious controversies may arise around the various forms of likely malpractice of non-lethality. As an illustration, non-lethal weapons can be used in ways and for purposes that either were not originally intended by military planners or even contrary to issued orders. In this case, soldiers can intentionally use directed sound weapons or laser blinding weapons in the manner to “extract” extended effects on enemy fighters and civilians. Imprudent decision making may be rationalised on the morally wrong grounds that infliction of any sort of injury by a non-lethal force must, by disposition, be less wrongful action than the practice of killing. Embracing non-lethality as the silver bullet for effective policing of the global periphery may lead to a dramatic increase in soldiers become quicker on the trigger. The promise of benign characteristics of the non-lethality might dislocate soldiers from the reality of the battlefield full of manpower into a self-centred world of PC games, where a player (soldier) relates to fictional enemy fighters essentially as in Buber’s *I–It* relationship. When using directed sound weapons or laser-blinding

weapons on the battlefield against low-tech fighters of the global periphery, the soldier might feel himself as a fictional character from a sci-fi film, armed with a gun-mounted laser, neutralising a number of attacking opponents by simply clicking the buttons on a game console (or on a PC mouse). A portrayal of the morally disengaged and unemphatic logic of video games as an anticipated behavioural pattern of warfare in the 21st century underlines a likely profound downgrade in ethical decision making. In the depicted hypothetical cases, paying little heed to consequences reveals the hypothetical lack of moral sensitivity on the side of agents of non-lethal practice.

BLOODLESS/RISKLESS WARFARE BUT FOR WHOM?

The late modern warfare is being profoundly marked with military asymmetry, meaning that the military capability of one of the belligerents far exceeds that of the other, and this asymmetry is due in large part to the more powerful belligerent having weapons based on advanced technologies the other lacks. The huge technological gap between the United States and outlaw/failed states of the global periphery served as the starting point for Paul W. Kahn to conceptualise his paradigm of riskless warfare in an attempt to explain how combat situations in which the relationship of the mutual imposition of risk and mutual exposure to risk is constituted between belligerents meet standards of ethical conduct in war, but “the issue becomes more problematic when an army can destroy its enemies without any risk to its members’ lives” (2002, 3). Kahn further argues that the permission to kill is “subject to a condition of reciprocity: Soldiers cannot defend themselves by threatening to injure unjust non-combatants” (2002, 3). Tracing Kahn’s argument, Steven P. Lee (2012) contributes with the claim that the idea of reciprocal self-defence at the heart of combatant liability loses its hold in the reality of riskless warfare. Lee holds that “if combatants of the weak belligerent pose no risk to combatants of the strong belligerent, then the former to that extent lack threat liability, and attacks on them may not be justified” (2012, 225). While traditional warfare with soldiers facing reciprocal risks to their lives can be compared to a duel, riskless warfare can be summarised in the practice of manhunting.

In a speech delivered in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush explained that the United States, as “the leader of the free world”, was required to “hunt down” terrorists and “bring [them] to justice” (White House 2003). The deliberate choice of those words discursively reflects one of the central ideas behind the US/West interventionism in the early 21st century: treating the enemy as an ordinary outlaw/criminal who defies the law and should be imprisoned as soon as possible. This imperial politics of the manhunt ignores the absence of a formally declared state of war and thus inevitably erases the difference between the frontline and the rear, and consequently the distinction between the status of fighters and

civilians. The asymmetry embedded in the disciplining wars that are being waged against the rebellious global periphery introduces the practice of the manhunt as a feasible military operational scenario. In this scenario, strategic outfoxing turns into a game of hide-and-seek with the fugitive, always trying to avoid capture, and the hunter trying to catch him alive.

Non-lethal weapons are an ideal means of disciplining the global periphery as they provide the option of selective control and management of outlawed social groups or entire local communities that (allegedly) produce insecurity for post-industrial societies of the global centre and privileged ones of the global periphery societies. This easily constitutes and sustains the border between “cooperative” and “rogue” geographical areas and political communities, so that the latter is excluded from the realm of universal protection of human rights and freedoms on the basis of claiming to be a threat to the (neo)liberal global order. According to Aihwa Ong (2006), neoliberal logic reconfigures territoriality by diversifying the space of the government and consequently degrading citizenship in terms of rights and benefits, as it creates separate zones of sovereignty in which different scopes of guaranteed human rights and freedoms are practiced. In this way, the population of rogue states or outlaw entities becomes the target of non-lethal weapons as the optimal means of controlling and suppressing civil unrest and thus is objected to invasive actions that directly undermine human rights by endangering the physical and psychological integrity of the individual. The logic of security risk management easily creates a legitimising basis for the acceptable, supposedly benign, and short-lived actions that non-lethal weapons provide against those who threaten the stability of the liberal order.

David A. Koplow (2015, 236) emphasises that, as a less hostile alternative to traditional firepower, non-lethality “may encourage the military to act precipitously, when the wiser course of action might actually be self-restraint”. The risk that foreign policymakers would develop the practice of easily resorting to military interventions before the exhaustion of diplomatic means thanks to properties of non-lethal weapons that can provide small civilian casualties and material damage that would not resonate badly in the media. As with non-lethality, reduced war costs could encourage unnecessary and inappropriate resort to disciplining wars by the US and its Western allies, and later, by other global-power wannabes. Non-lethality would spur US and Western politicians to make more common use of armed conflict as a means of resolving international disputes and achieving foreign policy objectives since they could more easily justify military interventions to the public becoming more and more supportive of the “no body bags” policy. Some critical theorists focus on the dynamics of the complex of governmental practices related to the practice of non-lethality and its extra-local sites of governance in a rapidly expanding sphere of 21st-century interventionism. For instance, Seantel Anaïs lucidly observes that the use of non-lethal weapons – instead of alleviating anxiety

stemmed from difficulties in managing unmanageable groups in the global periphery – in itself constitutes “threatening” parts of the population by shaping their collective identity by discursively fixing sources of insecurity to it (2011, 548–549). Anaïs holds that it is not clear anymore whether an insecure subject becomes a target or is just a result of the use of non-lethal weapons, which as a military tool should be a response to the challenges faced by policing hybrid political-criminal-warring entities that do not clearly fit into the categories of oppressed or threatening, i.e., those that transgress the line between two categories.

Bloodless or riskless warfare refers to the possibility of achieving military objectives by delivering undetectable harm to humans, that is through benign intervention on the body. As the notion of benignity is being coupled with the class of advanced weaponry, the late modern warfare opens a room for a substantive question: Would warfare remains ontologically the same if we succeed to permanently remove death and suffering from it with the help of non-lethal weapons? Warfare assumes the infliction of suffering and damage to impose the will of one’s own political community on the will of another community, and it always presupposes a reciprocal relationship between the two conflicting parties. I suggest that the practices of non-lethality and the manhunt might collude to turn disciplining wars into a brand-new subgenre of reality television police shows. Global manhunt television shows would feed morally anaesthetised spectators of the global centre with real-time video imagery of combat operations in the planetary periphery. The monitoring of future military interventions in exotic scenery of “wild” Third World landscapes – in a safe and cosy home thousands of kilometres away from the battlefield – might eventually transform warfare into a new sport thanks to a thorough sanitising of combat operations through the benign practice of non-lethality. That would be a sort of the 21st century Benthamian Panopticon designed to send a powerful message to the public in the West and worldwide in the form of factual, fictional, and factional representations of how the global centre controls and shapes the global periphery. As a prospective example of the *I–It* relationship, the new Benthamian Panopticon would erode the recognition of the enemy as a moral equal and a bearer of rights and legitimate interests, that is, the moral restraints of war would be loosened.

CONCLUSION

From time immemorial, the ontology of warfare has been intertwined with the major impacts of the ever-changing technological landscape on people caught up in armed conflicts – both soldiers and civilians. The development of weapons based on new technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution may have widespread collateral consequences in the matter of deaths, harm, and disruption preventing the civilian population from living peaceful lives. That was the main reason why I

decided to investigate how the practice of non-lethality, built on recent advances in armament technology, may affect the ontology of warfare in the 21st century, particularly its substantive component – the ethical aspect of interpersonal dynamics. The main thesis that I have been endorsing is the idea that an anticipated development of non-lethal weapons may raise several controversies related to the assumed moral insensitivity of interventionist troops within the framework of US/West policing in the treatment of enemy fighters/combatants and the civilian population of the global periphery. In addition, I examined how the practice of non-lethality might turn enemy fighters and the civilian population into deviant outlaws devoid of moral value, which is “naturally” attributed to “civilised” nations gathered under the (neo)liberal global order.

I tested my hypothesis by scrutinising manufactured, conceived and non-lethal weapons currently under development and primarily based on technologies of directed energy and sound, with a focus on their operationally relevant structural characteristics of precision, radius, repeatability, and selectivity. The analysis of operational characteristics locates several nodes in which allegedly benign practice of non-lethality intersects with ethically unsound behavioural patterns. Universal moral worldview and social conventions on the appropriateness and inappropriateness of certain means of violence in armed conflicts praise the reversibility of non-lethality because this new military practice is likely to provide a “sanitised” manner in which violence could be enacted in the US/West-led interventionism legitimised on the liberal peace tenets. Military and academic discourse on bloodless/riskless warfare deceives political decision-makers and the public that there is a possibility of achieving military objectives by not harming human beings in a substantial way.

The proponents of the Western vision of war as a foreign policy instrument – utterly “purged” of the risk of moral wrongdoings – seem to turn a blind eye on the plausible negative effects of non-lethal weapons in combat situations. Albeit vehemently and persistently being marketed as benign for the human body, even delving into assumed negative effects of pursuing the non-lethal military practices – either caused by an unintentional incorrect use of non-lethal weapons or intentional misuse of technical features of these weapons – clearly demonstrates that the principles of distinction and proportionality could easily be weakened and obstructed in future combat operations in a not-so-obvious manner. The huge and ever-widening gap in military technology between the US/Western interventionist troops and warring entities and outlawed populations of the global periphery tends to disrupt the reciprocal relationship between the belligerents. Armed conflict between the high-tech and the low-tech parties is likely to turn into a police manhunt action pursued by the (neo)liberal intervening forces against the illiberal local outlaws.

New sophisticated weaponry would in the long run devalue populations of the global periphery through their objectification by indifference and collateral victimisation as parts of routinised non-lethal procedures. Being benign at first glance, the practice of non-lethality coupled with the manhunt breaks the reciprocal dynamics between adversaries as a constitutive element of traditional warfare. Facing high-tech weaponry whose effects are beyond the comprehension of low-tech soldiers could be a traumatic event for them. Although the hidden psychological effects of encountering weapons based on technologies of directed energy and sound are yet to be carefully and systematically examined, the practice of non-lethality could without any doubt instil irrational fear and strong anxiety in persons who have experienced lasers or sound guns. The ruptured reciprocity would cut the ground for moral sensitivity and, consequently, for sound moral reasoning on the battlefield. Moral awareness also would become redundant in the fighting environment where combat actions are intentionally aimed only at incapacitating enemy combatants. If nobody gets killed by my combat action or avoids the imposition of irreversible harm, why then I ought to judge that action on moral grounds? Tracing that argument, the non-lethality eventually could oust enemy soldiers and civilians from the realm of moral concerns integral to military ethics.

In closing, I would like to leave the reader with one tension that is not resolved, that is the following ethical quandary: whether it would be moral to have a weapon that would act as a sort of Colonel Fenton's imaginary magic dust that puts people to sleep? By drawing attention to the way in which non-lethality might be inscribed upon the body in deceptively less violent manners, this ethical quandary remains to be dealt with in future debates on the hidden dehumanising effects of high-tech weaponry practices.

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RATOVANJE U DOBA POZNE MODERNOSTI I KONTROVERZE NESMRTONOSNOSTI

Apstrakt: Rad nastoji da istraži kako praksa nesmrtonosnosti, zasnovana na nedavnim tehnološkim dostignućima u razvoju naoružanja, može da deluje na ontologiju ratovanja u 21. veku pretvaranjem neprijateljskih vojnika i civilnog stanovništva u devijantne odmetnike bez moralne vrednosti „normalne” za civilizovane nacije okupljene pod okriljem (neo)liberalnog globalnog poretka. Autor analizira praksu nesmrtonosnosti u kontekstu vojnih operacija preduzetih u okvirima američkog/zapadnog policijskog delovanja usmerenog na očuvanje reda na globalnoj periferiji. Autor polazi od pretpostavke da predvidljiv razvoj nesmrtonosnog oružja već sada otvara više kontroverznih pitanja proisteklih iz odsustva moralne osećajnosti intervencionističkih trupa u postupanju prema neprijateljskim borbama i civilnom stanovništvu. Hipoteza se propituje sa teorijskih pozicija kritičkog pristupa izučavanju međunarodne bezbednosti i ontologije ratovanja, kao i iz perspektive filozofije uma i normativnog pristupa moralnog delatništva. Autor zaključuje da se čini da zapadna vizija rata kao spoljnopolitičkog sredstva potpuno pročišćenog od rizika moralno pogrešnog postupanja, namerno previđa moguće negativne učinke nesmrtonosnog oružja u borbenim situacijama. Suprotno očekivanjima i vojnim strateškim vizijama, postoji verovatnoća da će praksa nesmrtonosnosti u spoju sa praksom lova na glave izmestiti neprijateljske vojnike i civile van područja moralnih obzira kao nerazdvojivog dela vojne etike.

Cljučne reči: nesmrtonosnost, nesmrtonosno oružje, ontologija ratovanja, vojna intervencija, vojna tehnologija, naoružanje, vojna etika, moralno delatništvo.

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THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP

Yury V. KULINTSEV¹

Abstract. The article analyses the new directions of development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, examines the geopolitical reasons for their emergence, and also identifies the role and place of the SCO in the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. With India and Pakistan joining the SCO, its capabilities began to expand, and new priorities appeared though not at the expense of traditional areas of responsibility – regional security and the fight against terrorism. The three-year period from 2015 to 2017 was a window of opportunity for the SCO in terms of choosing priorities for further development. The economic development begins to gain strength in the Organization. The SCO becomes the main platform for implementing economic integration in Eurasia, on the basis of which conjunction of the EEU and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will be implemented. On the margins of the SCO summit held in 2015 in Ufa the Development Strategy of the SCO until 2025 was adopted. This strategy focused on the economic and trade-related measures along with the issues of political interaction and cooperation in the field of security. Acting as one of the drivers of regional development, the SCO countries are making a concerted effort to create the necessary conditions for ensuring sustainable social and economic development. The new development directions of the SCO demonstrate that the Organization is able to quickly adapt to the new conditions of the changing world, while its participation in new formats of interaction is welcomed among countries of the Eurasian continent.

Keywords: SCO, Great Eurasian Partnership, Russia, China, Silk Road Economic Belt.

¹ Yury V. Kulintsev, Associate Researcher, North-East Asian Strategic Issues and SCO Center, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.
E-mail: kulintsev@ifes-ras.ru.

INTRODUCTION

The territory of Eurasia combines different countries with unique resources; their economic bases are able to successfully enlarge each other. All together, it creates a huge potential for cooperation and mutual development. The prerequisites for starting the contemporary processes of Eurasian integration began to evolve in the 2010s. During that period the countries of the region faced serious foreign policy challenges related to the tendency of strengthening the rivalry for economic and political leadership in Eurasia.

Almost each of the “big countries”, including extra-regional players, introduced its own strategy of action in the region. Thus, in 2011 the State Secretary H. Clinton announced US ideas about the development of the region – The Strategy of the New Silk Road (Hormats, 2011, p. 12), in 2013 Chinese leader Xi Jinping introduced the initiative of the Silk Road Economic Belt. Russia also was one of the first countries which understood the necessity to speed up the integration efforts. In 2010 Russia became one of the founders of the Customs Union, which in 2015 transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). And after that Russia launched the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) (Poslaniye Prezidenta, 2015).

Within the prescribed period the situation in the security field became complicated because of the growth of the terrorist threat in the region, which was considered to be the area of responsibility of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the upcoming GEP. The countries of the region had to consider additional security factors while discussing possible directions of regional development, the future of already existing integration projects, such as the SCO, as well as their plans to participate or not to in the sub-regional infrastructure projects of the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt initiative.

In these conditions, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation continued its activity in the international arena, remaining a classic example of the open regional organization. In 2020, the Organisation will mark the 19th anniversary of its establishment by the leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Initially, the organization focused on building an institutional framework, on joining their ranks with observers and dialogue partners. However, in the last few years, the SCO pays more attention to trade and economic cooperation and the processes of Eurasian integration.

The advancement of new conceptual paradigms for the development of Eurasia by the leading regional players has required an analysis of the geopolitical reasons for their nomination. In addition, it is necessary to analyse the conditions and possibilities of integration of the new development concepts with existing international organizations, in particular, with the SCO.

This article aims to specify the role and place of the SCO within the Russian GEP initiative. To achieve this goal, the author has decided to concentrate on four research tasks: 1) to give an overview of Moscow's motives, on which it has relied when proposing the GEP idea; 2) to show possible points of intersection of mutual interests of the SCO and the new integration structure – the GEP; 3) to study the reaction of China as Russia's largest international partner to the GEP initiative; 4) to designate new possible vectors for the SCO development, in the context of Moscow's priorities in the Organization.

Every time while analysing the SCO development, we have to keep in mind the increased role of China in Eurasia and the world. Beijing has started to pursue a more active foreign policy in Central Asia and has become one of the main trade partners for the countries of the region. In Russia, the Eurasian territory has been always perceived as an important region where Moscow's strategic interests are dominated.

THE ORIGINS OF THE RUSSIAN INTEGRATION PROJECT – GEP

One of the reasons to introduce the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, as well as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, was determined by the form of the current international order, where the countries of the West are dominated. Nevertheless, the changes of the US foreign policy shown during D. Trump's presidency and despite the claims of some experts that the positions of the West countries are weakening (Rolland, 2019, p. 9), i.e., the current narrative of the White House, is still directed against Moscow and Beijing and US policy is oriented to restrain economic development of Russia and China. The expansion of economic relations between Moscow and Beijing is the required prerequisite of social and political stability in Eurasia.

In 2015 there already were some announcements on the level of the top public officials that Russia successively supports the creation of the common economic space from Lisbon up to Vladivostok. At the same time, the growth of the interest from other countries and integration associations to develop cooperation with Moscow, was noted (Povolotskiy, 2015).

Nowadays, the regional integration in the Eurasian region is implemented by the two main players – Russia and China via mechanisms of the Eurasian Economic Union, via the Chinese Belt and Road initiative and via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The fact that there are several large-scale integration projects in Eurasia which have intercrossing member states and similar declared aims, it requires to find out a new approach to set up a trend of integration processes development in Eurasia.

The combination of these factors has stipulated the initiation of the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The GEP is aimed to protect the international positions of Moscow and strengthen its regional influence. From the very beginning, the GEP was oriented to support political stability and security, to create conditions for trade-economic, finance, and investment development. At the same time, the GEP reflects the perception of Russian political leadership about the future regional order.

The experts of the international discussion club “Valdai” were the first to discuss the idea of the GEP on a conceptual level. In the series of reports “Towards Great Ocean”, there was justified the position why the members of the above mention integration projects were faced with the same internal and external challenges and why they were motivated to coordinate social and economic development. It was the basis of the GEP’s idea, and it helped to increase the level of coherence of the countries that were interested in the Eurasian regional development (K Velikomuokeanu, 2019, p. 23–25).

The foreign political experts believe that the materials of the “Valdai” club reports underlie the idea of the Greater Eurasian Partnership that has been introduced by Russian President V. Putin in 2016 during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (Li, 2017, p. 30). V. Putin proposed to create the Greater Eurasian Partnership, which was involving the member-states of the SCO, the EAEU, the CIS countries, Iran, and a number of other states. The work of the GEP had to be oriented to create a new format of international cooperation in Eurasia with the support of the conjunction of Eurasian integration projects with the Chinese BRI (Stenogramma vystupleniya, 2016).

THE SPHERES OF COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN THE SCO AND THE GEP

The expansion of the geographical scope of the GEP over the whole Eurasian region, i.e., over the borders of the former Soviet republics, this expansion reflects the understanding of the Russian political elites that the EAEU itself is not enough to build a full-scale system of regional integration in Eurasia. In order to reach game-changing indicators of economic development, it is required to attract powerful Asian economies.

Some Chinese political experts say that Russia is providing the regional integration within the GEP as a new geo-economic strategy with the ultimate goal to reconstruct the common economic, political and military space within the borders of the former USSR, but in a new form (Zhao and Xiao, 2017, p. 22). It is important to note, that they believe that the Ukrainian crises of 2014 is interpreted as a key

milestone after which Moscow's foreign focus was reoriented from Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia.

Meanwhile, the Russian "pivot to East" is not a result of the US and Western countries' geopolitical efforts only (Kulintsev, 2016). The pivot was a strategic choice of Russia. The basis for the pivot was set up in early 2001 when the Treaty of friendship, neighbourliness, and co-operation between Russia and China was signed. Later, Russian-Chinese contingency was the consequence of the shift of global focus of political and economic development into the Asia-Pacific Region. It opened for Moscow new options for cooperation and development, including the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

A number of Chinese experts believe that Russian can refer to the Chinese BRI as potentially threatening to Chinese interests in the neighbouring countries (Jiao, 2018). The growing asymmetry of economic capacity between Russia and China too obvious in the region of Central Asia can make Moscow's displeased with the status of "younger brother" in the region.

The implementation of the GEP project allows Russia to minimize the risks of weakening its international positions and to guarantee that the Central Asia region continues to be a traditional sphere of Moscow's influence. The Russian fundamental interests coincide with the Chinese understanding of regional development, it explains why the GEP and the BRI have more common similarities than differences (Yang, 2016).

Maintaining security and stability in the Central Asian region, which belongs to the SCO's area of responsibility, is the common interest for Russia and China. Experts agreed that currently, Moscow's combined impact in Central Asia is greater than Beijing's one (Zhao and Xiao, 2017, p. 23). Thus, the GEP project becomes more interesting for these international players, including the SCO and other international structures, which want to use Russian experience and develop cooperation with Central Asian countries.

One of the key factors of GEP's successful development is mutually beneficial cooperation between the SCO countries. The SCO is one of the main structural components of the GEP (Luzianin and Klimenko, 2019, p. 105). The GEP is not a rival for the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt. It tries to play the role of a "link" for already existed integration formats in Eurasia, including cooperation within the SCO and the EAEU.

At the same time, the development of the SCO, the entry of India and Pakistan into the SCO as full members led to the expansion of its capabilities and the identification of new priorities, but not at the expense of traditional areas of responsibility – regional security and counterterrorism.

THE SCO IN THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The three-year period from 2015 to 2017 became a window of opportunity for the SCO in terms of prioritizing further development and correlation between this choice and changes of the Eurasian space. In approaching the 15-year milestone, the SCO occupies the position of an important actor in the international arena. The organization is an observer in the UN General Assembly and has two permanent executive bodies – the SCO Secretariat and the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). As part of the RATS, a mechanism of cooperation with observers and dialogue partners operates effectively. Also, a mechanism for accepting new members has been launched, which indicates its international demand and geopolitical potential. Moreover, from then on, the economic direction of the SCO development began to gain more strength.

In May 2015, leaders of Russia and China underlined in a joint statement that the SCO would become the main platform for the implementation of economic integration in Eurasia. The conjunction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) initiative will be implemented on this platform. Moreover, this work will be carried out in bilateral and multilateral formats of interaction (Sovmestnoe zayavlenie RF i KNR, 2015). Two months later, on the margins of the SCO summit held in 2015 in Ufa, the heads of member states adopted the Development Strategy of the SCO until 2025, which focuses on trade and economic cooperation measures along with issues of political interaction and security cooperation. In the medium term, they comply with the objectives of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. These include the formation of a favourable investment and business climate, support for business initiatives, implementation of projects in priority areas of cooperation and development of infrastructure, cooperation in the development of production capacities, promoting integration into the global economy, minimizing the negative effects of globalization and crises in the international economic processes on national economies. Within the framework of the SCO, practical measures are planned for the implementation of specific economic and investment projects (Strategiya razvitiya, 2015).

Speaking at the SCO Summit in Ufa in July 2015, President Putin expressed the position of the Russian side on the prospects for trade and economic cooperation and joining the Chinese SREB initiative. He claimed: “We place particular emphasis on continuing to develop trade and economic cooperation within the SCO. It is clear that if we join our efforts together, we can handle crises in the global economic and financial systems more effectively and easier overcome various restrictions and barriers. We think it is important to develop our cooperation in ensuring food, transport, energy and financial security. We are ready to work closely together to coordinate and build links between the two integration projects –

the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt” (Stenogramma zasedaniya RF i KNR, 2015).

In 2016, the potential of the SCO was again in demand as part of a new integration project – the Greater Eurasian Partnership, which was announced to the international community on the margins of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (Stenogramma vystupleniy, 2016). President Putin offered to create the Greater Eurasian Partnership involving the SCO member states, the EAEU, including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, the CIS countries, and a number of other states. The activity of the above-mentioned partnership should be aimed at the establishing a new format of international cooperation in Eurasia by supporting the idea of the conjunction of the Eurasian integration with the Chinese SREB initiative.

This means that the new development direction of the SCO began to establish, implying that eight countries should be one of the main pillars of the new world order in Eurasia.

THE COOPERATION OF RUSSIA AND CHINA ON EURASIAN INTEGRATION

From an economic point of view, the GEP and the Chinese BRI are aimed to develop Eurasian transport corridors, which support infrastructure integration and stimulate regional trade. From a geopolitical point of view, the potential conflict between China and Russia is so small that it cannot provide any serious negative impact on the development of both projects in the foreseeable future.

Compared to the Russian GEP and the EAEU, the Chinese BRI is more attractive in terms of investment possibilities. Beijing is ready to spend large financial resources on a variety of projects. The BRI is an inclusive project. That is why so many countries, including Russia, joined it or announced that supported it.

In 2015, during the meeting of Russian President V. Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping was signed the Joint statement for cooperation on the conjunction of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt (Sovmestnoe zayavlenie RF i KNR, 2015). It was the first step that showed the intention of both countries to work together and strengthen regional economic integration. This intention became the guarantee of the Eurasian integration, of peace and stability in the region (Xinhuanet, 2015). The joined investments, infrastructure development and plans to create a Free Trade Area between the EAEU and China – all these factors stimulate regional economic development. As a result, it generates new dialogue platforms that allow discussing practical measures and initiatives. The term “conjunction” (duijie) characterizes the consolidation process of the integration efforts of both countries.

In 2016 during V. Putin's official visit to China, two leaders of Russia and China highlighted in the joint statement that Moscow and Beijing were ready to coordinate its strategies of Eurasia development and ready to promote the idea of the Eurasian comprehensive partnership which is based on the principals of openness, transparency and respecting the mutual interests (Sovmestnoe zayavlenie RF i KNR, 2016). It was also announced the priority to involve the SCO, the EAEU and the ASEAN in the Eurasian integration process. The governments of both countries were assigned to develop measures for the implementation of these initiatives.

One year later, in July 2017, during Xi Jinping's official visit to Russia, both sides announced the further strengthening of interaction within the framework of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Moscow and China (Sovmestnoe zayavlenie RF i KNR, 2017). The Russian Ministry of economic development and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce signed a joint statement on the technical and economic feasibility of the Agreement on Eurasian economic partnership (Dokumenty, podpisannye, 2017). After bilateral consultations between Russian and Chinese experts, both sides reached a consensus in interpreting the principles of "sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs", as well as mutual respect of the "chosen development ways" (Li, 2018, p. 97).

In 2019 during the official meeting, the heads of Russia and China signed a joint statement that confirms that the Chinese BRI and the Russian GEP are able to develop in parallel, be coordinated, and are to promote the development of the SCO and other regional unions, bilateral and multilateral integration projects in Eurasia (Sovmestnoe zayavlenie RF i KNR, 2019). It did not mean that Russia joined the Chinese initiative. It meant the joint and parallel implementation of the BRI and the GEP, oriented to build a new model of international cooperation in Eurasia.

The legal footwork of the GEP is promoted by Russia under the support of the Chinese side. During the exchange of high-level visits, the corresponded phrases are included in the joint declarations. Moreover, both sides have created an effective mechanism of regular visit exchanges – from the meeting of the heads of the states to the consultations of the heads of departments in Ministries.

The future of Eurasia was on the agenda at the global forum "One Belt, One Road" held in 2017 and in 2019 in Beijing, which gathered a dozen heads of foreign states and governments and representatives of more than 100 international organizations, including the SCO. The leaders noted that the international community was on the threshold of forming rules of new world development. In this process, the leading SCO countries consider themselves as global responsible powers, which could take part in all international affairs and make a significant contribution to the world development and the global economy (Xi Jinping's speech, 2017).

China pays high attention to the SCO development and since its establishment wants to boost the Organization's economic potential and to include it into the integration formats. The Chinese experience shows that Beijing is ready to adopt all aspects of the SCO's enrolment in regional economic integrations. China has been precisely, methodically and gradually entering into economic integrations by building a network of international relations, contributing to its development strategy and correcting irregularities in its economy, while at the same time solving political problems (Zakić, 2019, p. 44).

One of the focal points of any state foreign policy is the question of territorial disputes irrespective of its geographical size, economic opportunities, or geopolitical ambitions. At the same time, in the modern world, the scenario of boundary change in Central Asia involving the use of force as a possible option for China to resolve territorial disputes is hardly probable. None of the parties, including neighbouring countries, are interested in intensifying territorial claims and initiating a real conflict. Despite the apparent advantages, a guaranteed response from the international community jeopardizes all benefits for the potential aggressor (for example, Beijing) from possible territorial acquisitions.

It should be added that there is a reliable international system to control and monitor the security situation in the region. The system has been established with the direct participation of Russia, and there are at least two international organizations – the SCO and the CSTO – who provide guarantees and responsibility for the security situation. Thus, the international community has enough military options and the political power to restrain any regional player from aggressive actions.

At the same time, we can observe a lot of civilized solutions to how territorial issues have been settled in Eurasia. They include – diplomatic negotiations, long-term lease land, the establishment of joint administration management, and so on. For example, in 1898, China leased its Hong Kong territory to Great Britain for a period of 99-years. In 1987 was signed a Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau between Portugal and China. The document provided guarantees that the Macau Special Administrative Region had a high degree of autonomy with local administration and independent legislative power (Edmonds, 1999). Thus, Macau started its way back to China. After the PRC has become a successful economic power, Beijing has preferred Chinese diplomats to speak about territorial disputes, rather than Chinese guns.

It should be pointed out that implementing its BRI, China has never presented it as a charity project. Moreover, the initial goal was to provide new drivers for its economy to develop the Central and Western regions of China. All foreign countries participating in the initiative have expressed their desire to join it on the terms of mutually beneficial development. By accepting China's offers and agreeing to its

loans and investment projects, any of the countries had the opportunity to assess the risks and not participate in them, or to make a choice and develop their own economy on the terms of other financial institutions, such as Western ones. In this case, China acts in the Central Asian region like most major powers interested in strengthening their positions and promoting their political, economic, and humanitarian agenda.

Possible allegations of Beijing of concluding economic contracts on bonded terms should also be addressed to officials of the “affected” countries who agreed to these proposals from the Chinese side. At the same time, if it appears that one of the parties has not acted in its national interests, this is more a problem of the internal state structure of a particular country and its attitude to the work of its own officials, and to a much lesser extent – a claim to the development of bilateral relations with China.

There is an example of using the foreign policy agenda in the internal political struggle. There was a statement of the leader of the opposition party of Tajikistan, R. Zoirov, who accused China of moving the border line 20 kilometres deeper into the territory of Tajikistan.

On the eve of the presidential elections in 2013, Tajikistan’s opposition once again tried to “accuse authorities of the surrendering land to China” in the framework of the 2002 border demarcation agreement. China claimed 28 thousand square kilometres of Tajikistan’s territory, but as a result of the negotiations, it received just over 1 thousand square kilometres of high-altitude land unsuitable for life, without the proven volumes of large deposits. The results of negotiations can be evaluated in different ways, but each country has the right to seek convenient forms of dispute resolution and debt repayment. In addition, this agreement was ratified by the government of Tajikistan only in 2011. The official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan described the statement of the oppositionist as a provocation due to the fact that the author acts in his own interest. Later, it was revealed that Zoirov’s statement refers to 2011 and was “made two years ago and published just now”. According to R. Zoirov, he determined the distance to the border based on the statements of local residents. The official authorities of Tajikistan, China, Russia and other regional powers ignored information about China’s occupation of Tajikistan’s territory as unreliable (Kulintsev, 2020).

Recognizing the high public sensitivity to the transfer of land of one state to repay credit obligations to another state, it is necessary to proceed from the analysis of the content of specific international agreements, the motives for signing them by the current authorities, and the national interests of the parties involved. Otherwise, it is likely to get a distorted interpretation of key events in line with the

populist rhetoric of an unknown blogger or to be the recipient of information propaganda carried out by major powers competing for regional influence.

Summarizing the above mentioned, it can be noted that Moscow and China are committed to coordinating efforts on the integration of the GEP in the system of international relations. Both sides understand that full format strategic cooperation is required for the successful implementation of the GEP.

THE INTEGRATION OF THE SCO IN THE GREATER EURASIAN PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE

The Russian side called for combining the potential of all the integration formats like the EAEU, the OBOR, the SCO and the ASEAN to build the foundation for a larger Eurasian partnership (Vystuplenie V. Putina, 2017).

The new SCO's function is highlighted in the proposed scenario for the creation of a new integrated structure in Eurasia -the SCO should link the SREB and the EAEU. In this case, Russia pursues its geopolitical goals, trying to align the asymmetry of economic opportunities between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia and keep this region as a sphere of traditional influence of Russia without damaging the processes of Eurasian integration.

Fundamental international organizations recognize the importance of the SCO in the regional and global agenda. The resolution on cooperation between the UN and the SCO, adopted at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, gave an additional impetus to the development of the Organization. The UN Secretary-General A. Guterres expressed confidence that the UN and the SCO would join their efforts and make a positive contribution to improving the lives of people in Eurasia, strengthening regional cooperation at all levels (Generalnyj sekretar SHOS, 2020).

It also means that the GEP is not a rival for the BRI, and does not challenge a tension or a conflict between Moscow and Beijing. The analysis of the actions of political leaders of both countries shows that, in fact, the contrary situation takes place. While understanding the risks of rivalry in Eurasia, Russia and China demonstrate self-confidence and coherence of actions trying to avoid unnecessary rivalry and focusing on the cooperation, which successfully allows conjunct their flagship initiatives.

The geography of the central part of Eurasia provides the SCO participants with a strategic advantage in implementing integration projects. Almost no one of the SCO members, observers or dialogue partners opposed the idea of participating in the Greater Eurasian Partnership. Most SCO countries also supported China's Belt and Road initiative. On the one hand, the heads of the SCO members see the economic and geopolitical prospects of new integration projects. On the other

hand, the initiators of the Eurasian integration understand the importance of the incorporation of their own projects into the SCO agenda. For almost two decades the SCO has successfully acted as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region. In other words, it provides vital conditions for the sustainable economic development of the member states.

The uniqueness of the geopolitical and geoeconomic situation of the SCO countries in the system of international relations in Eurasia led to the signing of the agreement between the governments of the SCO member states on the creation of favourable conditions for international road freight, which came into effect in January 2017 (Shanhajskaya organizaciya sotrudnichestva, 2017).

In November 2019, the SCO Council of Heads of State adopted the Concept of interaction between the railway administrations (Sovmestnoe kommyunike, 2019). This document became the basis for the creation of general legal provisions in the field of railway transport, which fits the common direction of development of the GEP integration potential and provides the floor for unleashing the SCO transit potential through transcontinental freight in Eurasia. According to experts, annually more than 23 million containers are sent from China to Southeast Asia and Europe, and the volume of container cargo traffic from China to Europe over the previous 9 years has shown a 40-fold increase (Generalnyj sekretar SHOS, 2020).

The improvement of transport infrastructure and the creation of optimal cargo transportation routes are the priorities for the development of the SCO and the formation of the GEP. The SCO has the Special Working Group on Customs Cooperation, which in November 2019 promoted the signing of the Memorandum between the customs services on mutual integration of national transit systems by the Council of Heads of Government (Sovmestnoe kommyunike, 2019). In this context, the efforts of the SCO member states to contribute to improving transport connectivity in Eurasia, allowing to implement innovative technological solutions and develop multimodal transport and logistics centres within the GEP.

The SCO is constantly searching for new ways of cooperation. As one of the drivers of global economic development, the participating countries are making concerted efforts to create the necessary conditions for ensuring sustainable social and economic development in Eurasia.

In November 2019, in order to enhance economic cooperation and improve the investment climate, the Council of Heads of Government approved the updated Program of multilateral trade and economic cooperation of state members of the SCO (Sovmestnoe kommyunike, 2019). The program is aimed at the consistent strengthening of an open, transparent and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system in the Eurasian space. According to the SCO Secretariat, in 2018 the SCO's economic importance was also determined by the fact that the SCO member states produced GDP worth over 18 trillion dollars (or more than

22% of world GDP). It is projected that by 2025 this figure will reach 38-40% (Ran, 2019, p. 21).

The promotion of trade and economic cooperation allows to balance the previous direction of development of the organization focused primarily on ensuring political interaction and regional security. The development of the SCO is becoming more stable, which contributes to the growing importance of the SCO in the international arena and also increases the interest of participants in mutual development.

CONCLUSIONS

Currently, one of the main challenges is to maintain new development directions of the SCO in the difficult external environment. After the enlargement of the SCO, the total power and influence of the Organization have increased significantly, allowing it to set more ambitious goals objectives. The priorities announced by the Russian presidency in 2019-2020 completely correspond with the SCO needs.

The current direction of the SCO development suits all member countries, thus one of the key points for Moscow will be to ensure continuity in the work of the Organization. Firstly, the efforts of the party holding the presidency will be focused on strengthening the SCO's position in the sphere of maintaining security and stability. Fighting against "three evils" and drug trafficking is a traditional area of cooperation for the SCO within the framework of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the SCO. In addition, the work will continue on resolving crisis situations and ensuring the peaceful settlement of conflicts near the external borders of the SCO countries in the context of the problems in Syria and Afghanistan as well as the situation around the Iranian nuclear program.

Secondly, Moscow sees great opportunities in expanding economic cooperation, primarily in transport and logistics, infrastructure, science and technology, and innovation. It is expected that special emphasis will be placed on strengthening inter-regional cooperation within the SCO. Among the planned events, Russia announced the First Forum of Heads of Regions of the SCO member states.

The development of cultural and humanitarian ties, the promotion of common moral and ethical values, intensification of cooperation in the fields of education, health, ecology, culture, tourism and youth contacts will be continued. It is planned to hold a series of large-scale events dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the victory in World War II.

Thirdly, the Russian side plans to consolidate the SCO member states and deepen foreign policy coordination in order to harmonize positions on topical international and regional issues and develop joint initiatives. It is expected that the SCO countries will strengthen coordination of positions within the UN as well as

increase practical cooperation with ASEAN, the CSTO, the CIS, the ECO and the EEU, including the exchange of experience and promoting of joint projects and initiatives (Tarasenko, 2019, p. 2).

At the same time, the Russian presidency priorities include new directions for the Organization's development. Firstly, this implies promoting synergy between the potentials of national development strategies and multilateral integration projects. In this context, the goal is to establish the SCO as one of the pillars of the space of broad, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation in Eurasia in the interests of ensuring reliable security and sustainable development within the framework of the idea of a Greater Eurasian partnership. Secondly, Moscow plans to launch inter-parliamentary cooperation in the SCO by creating a mechanism for interaction between the legislative bodies of the SCO member states, which also allows advancing the practical implementation of the Eurasian integration initiatives (Priorityty predsedatelstva, 2020).

In relation to the outbreak of a novel coronavirus in the world, in the first quarter of 2020, the Shanghai cooperation organization began to study proposals for a rapid response to infectious disease outbreaks. In particular, the SCO Secretariat sent a number of proposals to the relevant departments of the member states for consideration. They include the development of a multilateral mechanism for prompt notification in case of the emergence of epidemic hotbeds which have the potential for wide dissemination.

At the same time, already in 2018, the organization noted with deep concern the persistent threat of epidemics, including the flu, severe acute respiratory syndrome, and other particularly dangerous infections. At the summit in Qingdao (China), the Heads of State of the SCO made the Statement on joint efforts against the threat of epidemics in the SCO space and pointed out the resulting need to enhance the sanitary and epidemiological safety and the protection of public health, which is vital for the sustainable development and prosperity of the regional countries (Statement by the Heads, 2018).

This direction is also becoming one of the new development vectors of the organization. Within the SCO, the countries develop close ties with each other at the level of heads of ministries and departments responsible for health and the epidemiological situation. A number of documents have already been adopted, and working mechanisms have been created to ensure cooperation between the relevant organizations of the SCO countries in the field of health. The meetings of Ministers of Health and Heads of Services of the SCO member states responsible for the maintenance of the population's sanitary and epidemiological wellbeing are held.

Despite the fact that a number of SCO events were postponed due the spread of the epidemic, the existing mechanisms of cooperation allowed to continue holding meetings in the format of video-conference. The new development

directions of the SCO demonstrate that the Organization is able to quickly adapt to the new conditions of the changing world, and its participation in new formats of interaction is in demand among the countries of the Eurasian continent.

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ŠANGAJSKA ORGANIZACIJA ZA SARADNJU U STRUKTURI VELIKOG EVROAZIJSKOG PARTNERSTVA

Apstrakt: Članak analizira nove pravce razvoja Šangajske organizacije za saradnju, ispituje geopolitičke razloge njihovog nastanka, te takođe identifikuje ulogu i mesto ŠOS-a u okviru Velikog evroazijskog partnerstva. Sa pridruživanjem Indije i Pakistana ŠOS-u, njegove sposobnosti su uvećane, a novi prioriteti su se pojavili, nešteteći tradicionalnim područjima odgovornosti – regionalnoj bezbednosti i borbi protiv terorizma. Trogodišnji period od 2015. do 2017. godine bio je prilika za ŠOS u pogledu izbora prioriteta za dalji razvoj, dok se fokus organizacije premešta na ekonomski razvoj. ŠOS postaje glavna platforma za sprovođenje ekonomske integracije u Evroaziji, na osnovu koje će se sprovoditi povezivanje EEU i kineske Inicijative Pojas i put. Na marginama samita ŠOS, održanog 2015. godine u Ufi, usvojena je Strategija razvoja ŠOS do 2025. godine, koja se fokusirala na ekonomske i trgovinske mere, zajedno sa pitanjima političke interakcije i saradnje u oblasti bezbednosti. Delujući kao jedan od pokretača regionalnog razvoja, države ŠOS-a ulažu zajedničke napore da stvore neophodne uslove za osiguranje održivog socijalnog i ekonomskog razvoja. Novi pravci razvoja ŠOS pokazuju da je ova organizacija u stanju da se brzo prilagodi novim uslovima sveta koji se menja, dok je njeno učešće u novim formatima saradnje priželjkivano među zemljama evroazijskog prostora.

Ključne reči: ŠOS, Veliko evroazijsko partnerstvo, Rusija, Kina, Ekonomski Pojas puta svile.

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Review paper

THE RESULTS AND RISKS OF CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN SERBIA

Katarina ZAKIĆ¹

Abstract: China has been steadily increasing the level of its investment projects in Serbia since 2010. With Serbia joining its two very important initiatives, the 17+1 and the Belt and Road, those investments have grown exponentially. The projects vary in size and are placed in different sectors, with infrastructure projects as leading ones.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the achieved results of Chinese investment projects in Serbia connected to the Belt and Road Initiative from the economic point of view. At the same time, the author will present the list of potential risks for Serbia arising from those projects. The analysed data span from 2014 to May 2020, and they were collected from various sources and evaluated with content analysis. The risks were analysed by applying a scenario method. From an empirical standpoint, this paper will give a new perspective on the risks that Serbia is facing concerning the BRI projects, in the light of changes in the domestic and international environment, especially due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The author concludes that the BRI projects in Serbia contribute to the Serbian economic development, but at the same time, Serbia is facing two major risks – loan repayment and failure to comply with ecological standards.

Keywords: Serbia, China, Belt and Road Initiative, investment projects, economic results, risk.

¹ Katarina Zakić, Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.
E-mail: katarina@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

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INTRODUCTION

China and Serbia (previously as a part of former Yugoslavia) have had good diplomatic relations for decades, but they have not always been followed by developed economic relations. The turning point in economic cooperation happened in 2009 when China signed with Serbia the Agreement on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.² At the meeting of the presidents, several political and economic projects were negotiated.

One of the first projects agreed upon was the construction of the first Chinese bridge in Europe across the river Danube. The *China Road and Bridge Company Corporation* started to build this bridge in 2010 in Belgrade, and the construction was finished in 2014. The Mihajlo Pupin Bridge was officially opened during the Third Prime Ministers' meeting of 16+1 Cooperation Mechanism in Belgrade.

A strategic partnership was an introduction to the further development of cooperation between the two countries. In 2012, Serbia was among the first countries that agreed to join a new Cooperation Mechanism called 16+1. With this platform, China was pursuing a new way of cooperation with 16 countries situated in Central and Eastern Europe.³ Before the 16+1 was established, the then Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said that the main reason for founding this mechanism was to “strengthen coordination and cooperation and deliver tangible results through cooperation to the benefit of people in China and Central and Eastern Europe.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2012) In 2019, Greece joined this initiative, and from that point, the official name of this initiative is 17+1.

In addition, Serbia is also a member of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in late 2013. The initiative aspires to connect China with countries that are part of the Economic Belt (the continental part – Asia and Europe) and the Maritime Road (the maritime part – Asia, Africa, and Europe). The main aim is to mobilize resources that could improve connectivity between the BRI countries by building roads, railroads, ports, and different infrastructural projects. China provides financing for those projects through the Silk Road Fund and the Asia Infrastructural Investment Bank as the main financial institutions.

² For detailed information about the development of relations between China and Serbia see: Ladevac, I. (April 2020). The Republic of Serbia and the Belt and Road Initiative. In A. Jović – Lazić, A. Troude (Eds.), *Security challenges and the place of the Balkans and Serbia in a changing world* (pp. 273- 283), Belgrade, Serbia: Institute of International Politics and Economics.

³ Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

The cooperation platform 17+1 is nowadays integrated into the BRI, with a note that most of the Chinese projects in Serbia started through the 16+1 since Serbia joined this initiative first. Serbia and China have negotiated different projects through two initiatives, and many of them are now at some stage of realization. The first projects in which Serbia and China collaborated were in the field of infrastructure, then followed two acquisitions (production and mine), and in the end, the first greenfield investment in production.

Beside Greece, Serbia is one of the countries in the Balkans that have signed the biggest number of projects and it is the second in the volume of Chinese investments (Zakić, Radišić, 2019b, p. 64). A lot of questions about this cooperation have been raised. Among them, two are important for this paper: 1. is this cooperation beneficial for Serbia, and 2. what are the risks that Serbia is facing by implementing the BRI investment projects. For this purpose, the conducted analysis consists of the presentation of the completed and ongoing Chinese investment projects in Serbia.

All the projects will be analysed and evaluated individually in terms of their history, the project phase, invested funds, and effects on the Serbian economy. In addition, for each project, existing and potential risks will be explored using scenario methods.

LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE BRI INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN SERBIA

Chinese economic presence in Europe has attracted a lot of attention, especially in regards to the 17+1 and the BRI, which consequently entailed numerous research articles and books assessing the Chinese impact on European development. The findings of the authors who wrote about Serbian cooperation with China will be in focus.

Lađevac, in the article dedicated to the development of Serbian cooperation with China, states that Serbia and China linkage is based on mutual understanding and respect but, at the same time, it has never been conditioned. (Lađevac, 2020, p. 273). Jojić mostly shares those views and further states that Serbia and China's cooperation is focused on political and economic interests, and that allows Serbia to solve some burning issues in the economy, which have been slowing down Serbian development for many years. (Jojić, 2017, p. 11) Šekarić, while analyzing geo-economic and geopolitical relations of the Western Balkan countries with China, states that Serbia, among other countries, uses economic cooperation with China to catch up with the EU. (Šekarić, 2020, p. 363) She clarifies that countries in the Western Balkans that are not EU members and that want to become one must improve their economic performances to join the EU. By increasing their

trade and infrastructural projects with China, they are finding a quick solution to that problem.

Summing the economic results of the BRI in Balkan countries, Zakić and Radišić have explored the impact of the BRI on China's cooperation with those countries (2019a), as well as the prevailing type and sector of the BRI investments. (2019b). The authors conclude that the BRI had a significant impact on the rise of Chinese investment projects in Europe and the Balkans and that China invests resources in traditional sectors and in the form of loans. (Zakić, Radišić, 2019b, p. 65)

Several authors have discussed threats and opportunities arising from Serbia's cooperation with China, and they have different attitudes depending on their viewpoints. For example, Liu and Hurley et al. analyse risk from the Chinese point of view. While Hurley et al. (2018, p. 139) suggest how China can improve its credit policy and save both sides from risk, Liu identifies concrete risk factors China faces in Europe. Among the risks, he points out that logistic chains, differences in infrastructure, institutional rules and regulations, and political turbulences are things that China needs to take into account when deciding on the BRI projects in Europe. (Liu, 2019, p. 61- 64).

Pavličević identified an opportunity/threat paradigm that can be applied to Sino-Serbian relations. The main threats in this paradigm are following: loans are debt traps; poor governance and outcomes of the project; Chinese projects feed corruption; Chinese projects affect trade imbalance; win-lose relationship; China is seeking influence in the form of economic engagement; forced alignment with China's policies and preferences; jeopardizing Serbia's integration with the EU; erosion of European values; return to the neoliberal political and economic model. (Pavličević, 2019, p. 697) Obradović (2018), in his analyses of opportunities and challenges of Sino-Serbian cooperation, agrees that some main challenges in Serbian cooperation with China are the EU procedures and standards.

Loans for infrastructure in the CEEC, which are realized by Chinese companies and workforce, with violation of the EU standards, and high public debt are some of the problems identified by Tončev in his analysis of China-CEEC cooperation. (Tončev, 2017)

The specific risk analysis of the BRI infrastructural projects in Serbia conducted by Andrić et al. applies content analysis to identify risks in that field. The authors classify the risks into three groups, such as the OBOR policy, construction market, and project. The results show that the key risks in the OBOR highway projects in Serbia are cultural differences, language barrier, safety measures on the site, inflation and currency exchange, soil and water pollution, majeure force, poor quality of materials, unforeseeable ground conditions, noise pollution, and different religious backgrounds. (Andrić et al., p.8)

Finally, in the research conducted by Hurley et al. (2019), the authors conclude that the risks of repaying Chinese loans exist, and that is inversely proportional to the size of an economy. The authors conclude that after analysing 68 countries that received China's BRI loans, only eight out of 68 are at such risk (Hurley et al., p. 4), and those are small economies that undertook large infrastructural projects. (Stanojević, 2017, p.71).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Belt and Road Initiative, as it was stated earlier, integrated the platform 16+1 into its framework after it was established in late 2013. This is the reason the research period in this paper includes projects that were negotiated through the 16+1 and started in 2014. The final period for this analysis is May 2020, and one of the main reasons why it stopped there is the pandemic of COVID 19 and a temporary halt in negotiations and realization of international projects. The last news about a new agreement with China the Serbian Government released in January 2020.

The projects will be analysed in terms of the type of investments (acquisition, greenfield, joint-venture, loan), the sector in which they are placed (transport, energy, metallurgy, auto industry), and the value of investments. For some projects, it was possible to present background history, which was used in the analysis to assess objectively the achieved results and potential risks of those projects.

The analysis of many articles, briefings, official data, and news reports was used to present the results of China's investment projects in Serbia, as well as to assess the risks that Serbia is facing in that regard.⁴ The results will show if those projects are beneficial for Serbia's economy and its development, while the risk analysis will show existing and potential problems.

Project success will be assessed based on the conditions or business results in the given areas, sectors or companies before and after Chinese investments. If it is not possible to make such a comparison due to the nature of a project, or its current phase, some likely benefits of the project will be presented. Benefit, in those cases, means that their effect on Serbia's economic development in a broader sense is considered through the growth of GDP, employment rate, export, development of transportation or energy sector, etc.

⁴ Note: In those cases in which state, province, or city Government officials did not issue contracts publicly, news reports were used. If that was the case, the author did try to find reports or speeches that Government officials gave to reporters.

In addition, many reports made by non-governmental organizations were used, which they realised online.

Economic risk as a term has a variety of definitions. One of them states that economic risk presents different macroeconomic conditions (conditions in the whole economy) that may affect an investment or a company's prospects at home or abroad (MBN). There are different methods to analyse economic risks, such as risk matrix, sensitivity analysis, break-even analysis, scenario analysis, etc. Since this paper incorporates diversified projects, the scenario analysis was used as the main method as it was the most appropriate one. Huss states that: "A scenario is a narrative description of a consistent set of factors which define in a probabilistic sense alternative sets of future business conditions." (Huss, 1988) In regards to this analysis, it means that through all publicly available data, all factors relevant to each project are presented and discussed, and all existing or possible risks identified.

RESEARCH RESULTS

In the following Table 1, Chinese investment projects in Serbia negotiated under the 17+1 and the BRI are presented. The table consists of eight projects in total, out of which transportation, energy, metallurgy, and auto industry sectors each have two projects.⁵ Two companies, Mei Ta (China-French capital) and Shandong Linglong are private companies, while all the rest of them are Chinese state companies.

Further on, each project will be analysed individually and, in the end, the summary analysis will be presented.

⁵ Due to limited space in this paper, some Chinese projects were omitted in this analysis such as bypass road around Belgrade and Huawei 5G network.

Table 1 – Chinese investment projects in Serbia
(January 2014 - May 2020)

Project	Chinese partner/ investor	Type of the project	Sector	Status (finished, in progress)	Value
High speed railway Belgrade-Stara Pazova and Novi Sad – Subotica	China Communication Construction Company and China Railway International	loan	transport	in progress	\$1.412 billion
Kostolac thermal power plant	China Machinery Engineering Corporation	loan	energy	in progress	\$715.6 million
Highway Miloš Veliki (Corridor 11)	Shandong Hi-Speed Group and China Communication Construction Company	loan	transport	in progress	\$1.054,3 million
Hesteel Smederevo	HBIS Group Iron and Steel	acquisition	metallurgy	finished	€300 million
Mei Ta	Mei Ta	joint venture with Serbian Government	auto industry	finished	\$97 million
Zijin Mining Bor	Zijin Mining	acquisition	metallurgy	finished	\$1.26 billion and \$200 million for previous loans
Shandong Linglong tire company	Shandong Linglong	greenfield	auto industry	in progress	€800 million
Heating pipeline between Obrenovac and Novi Beograd	Power Construction Corporation of China	loan	hydro and coal	in progress	\$193 million

Source: Author's data collection

A) High speed railway Belgrade – Stara Pazova and Novi Sad – Subotica

A high-speed railway between Belgrade and Budapest was the first infrastructural project that was signed under the 16+1 platform for Serbia. For many decades, the Serbian railways deteriorated slowly, entailing different economic problems. Unfortunately, Serbia did not have the funds to change that situation in previous years. Therefore, when China formed the 16+1, Serbia used this opportunity to nominate this project and start the modernization and construction of one part of its railroads.

Serbia and Hungary negotiated the project conditions with China on several occasions. The plan was to use loans from the Chinese state bank and hire Chinese companies and workforce for the entire railway from Belgrade to Budapest. That plan was changed because the procedures upon which the three sides agreed were not in line with the EU regulations for building infrastructural projects. The EU members must obey procedures that guarantee a public tender, in which different companies can publicly apply for a job. China wanted to avoid this procedure and make a bilateral arrangement with both countries, which in the case of Hungary was not possible, and the EU strongly objected. Serbia, on the other hand, as a non-EU member, but a country that is in the process of joining the EU could use different procedures. The EU was not comfortable with this decision, but Serbia, nevertheless, continued with this project.

One of the things that affected the beginning of this project in Hungary was the official bidding offer from China for the Hungarian part of the railway. The Hungarian Government, after two public tenders, did not accept the Chinese offers because they were, according to their calculations, more expensive than it was projected (Rencz, 2019, p.8). Finally, after many negotiations, in April 2020, the Hungarian Government signed a deal with China to build its part of the railway, and the value of this part of the project is \$1.855 billion. (Than, Komuves, 2020)⁶ While 15% is provided by the Hungarian Government, the remaining part will be financed by the China Exim Bank.

Serbia changed its plans several times, and in the end, in 2019, it finally formulated the plan for this project. The novelty of the final decision was that Russia was also included in this project. The Chinese companies will build two parts of the railway: from Belgrade to Stara Pazova and from Novi Sad to Subotica. The first section is 30 km long, and China Communications Construction Company is in charge of this part of the railway, which is worth \$ 350 million. China Railway International and China Communications

⁶ Note: The Value of the project is stated according to Reuters, but in different sources, we can find different values. The problem with this value is that the Hungarian Government decided that information about this deal is classified, so we cannot be sure if this is the final value.

Construction Company will build the section Novi Sad – Subotica, which is 109km long and costs \$1.162 million. The third part of the railway, which is between these two, is given to the Russian RŽD International Company. The value of that section is \$585 million, and it is financed by a Russian loan. (Ministarstvo građevinarstva, saobraćaja i infrastruktura, 2019)

Serbia's main interest is to integrate its railroad network into the system of the European railroad networks. On the one hand, Serbia needs to make a railway connection between Belgrade and Niš, and after that with North Macedonia and Greece, especially in regards to the Piraeus port. On the other hand, the Hungarian railway needs to be more integrated with the CEEC network so that the railway that Serbia is currently constructing has a purpose. (Rogers, 2019, p.12) If the Serbian part of the railway is used only to meet domestic needs, then the project will neither achieve full productivity nor will it generate enough profit to repay the loans that Serbia used for the construction. The costs of this railway are already high, and if the costs of a future railway from Belgrade to Niš are added, we will see that Serbia needs to use the railway at full capacity in order to justify this project.

B) Kostolac Thermal Power Plant – China Machinery Engineering Corporation

The Thermal power plant Kostolac is the second biggest one in Serbia after TPP Nikola Tesla and is currently producing 17 percent of EPS [Electric Power Industry of Serbia] electricity generation. The capacity of its Blocks A and B is 750MW, and the last constructed block was commissioned in 1991. (Elektroprivreda Srbije)

The construction of the new Kostolac B3 unit (350 MW) is the first large thermal capacity that the Electric Power Industry of Serbia (EPS) is building after almost three decades. According to official statements, EPS will thus get a modern, efficient unit that will meet all domestic and European environmental criteria, and it will contribute to a long-term safety increase of the Serbian power system. (Energy Strategy of Republic of Serbia)

China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) is in charge of works in Kostolac TPP. EPS provides 15 percent of funds for the project, while the remaining part is financed by the China Exim Bank loan. EPS will invest 613 million US\$ for the construction of the new unit, and together with the increase of the mine Drmno's capacity, the investment will amount to 715.6 million dollars. The Export-Import Bank of China will provide 80% of the funding for the entire project of \$715 million through a 20-year loan (7 years of a grace period and an interest rate of 2.5%). (Energy Strategy of Republic of Serbia)

The expected annual production amounts to about 2.5 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity.

It should be noted that the signing of a contract with CMEC on 20 November 2013 was done without a public tender, and the Serbian Government declared that it was legitimately conducted according to the national law since Serbia is still a non-EU country. (CEE Bankwatch Network)

Domestic companies are engaged in construction works as well, and that is beneficial to Serbia. All necessary permits for the construction of the new unit have been obtained, including the Environmental Impact Assessment Study for which Romania gave its consent, but after numerous problems. (RS Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2017)

This is an important strategic project for EPS and the Serbian economy because the last thermal power plant was built almost 27 years ago. The construction of the Kostolac B3 unit is expected to be completed in 2020, and it will increase the total EPS production capacities by about five percent. The new unit will stabilize the production and provide a new modernized system of electricity production. Since the Serbian Government is responsible for repaying the loan, the main risk is the financial one. So far, the Governments have paid new loans and interest rates on time, but the economic situation was stable, and the world was not exposed to a pandemic. It is understandable to question now if Serbia will have enough funds to return loans under new circumstances.

Serbia is following the EU construction standards while building Kostolac B3, and at the same time, it is cooperating with the Chinese company that has not performed the same job under the EU rules. This is the reason why Serbia has hired supervisors to provide that the job is done according to the EU regulations. So, the risk of construction that is not in line with the domestic and EU standards has been avoided, thanks to supervisors.

Serbia heavily relies on lignite for electricity production. Almost 70% of domestic electricity is produced in that way, and that is a challenge for multiple reasons. The problem lies in the fact that Serbia wants to become an EU member, and the EU has a strict energy policy oriented towards a low-carbon economy. Being in the process of joining the EU, Serbia is obliged to lower the level of electricity produced in this way, and not to increase TPP capacities.

The second challenge relates to environmental issues that occurred during the floods in May and July 2014, which showed to which extent TPP and the Drmno mine are endangered, since Drmno was completely flooded for several months. The mine, which produces ore for Kostolac, currently supplies TPP with around 9 million tons of lignite per year, and it needs to expand its capacities to 12 million in order to feed the new plant. That significant increase will have long-term ecological consequences, and the mine will be more subject to weather conditions.

The biggest risk that this project is facing is related to ecological standards, especially air pollution. The Centre for Ecology and Sustainable Development (CEKOR) and CEE Bankwatch Network submitted a formal complaint to the Energy Community Treaty Secretariat in September 2018, stating that Serbia did not make an environmental impact assessment for the enlargement of the Drmno mine. (CEE Bankwatch Network, 2018) The pollution of air is significant, and it affects a lot the life of people who live nearby. Serbia needs to pay more attention to ecological standards, developing in a more beneficial way for its citizens.

C) Highway Miloš Veliki E-763 (Corridor XI)

The Belgrade-South Adriatic E-763 is a branch of the Trans-European Highway, which connects its main route from Gdansk to Athens and Istanbul with the Adriatic Sea and Port of Bar. The E-763 highway will connect Serbia and Montenegro, namely Belgrade and the southern Adriatic, and in a wider context, it will connect Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Italy. This road route on Serbian territory is important because it positions Serbia on the international corridor network. Infrastructural projects strongly impact economic development through increased production and distribution of products and services, as well as the living conditions of countries' citizens. (Šaranović et al., 2019, pp. 127)

The section of the highway that goes through Serbia will connect the cities of Belgrade, Obrenovac, Lajkovac, Ljig, Gornji Milanovac, Preljina, Čačak, and Požega. A general contractor for one part of Corridor 11 is Shandong High-Speed Group, with a contract value for two sections of \$333.3 million (road Obrenovac – Ub and Lajkovac – Ljig). (Ministry of CTI, Republic of Serbia, 2018) China Communications Construction Company Ltd. is in charge of several parts of Corridor 11 (Novi Beograd – Surčin, Surčin – Obrenovac, and Preljina – Požega), and the total contract value is \$721 million. (Ministry of CTI, Republic of Serbia, 2019) 85% will be funded by a loan from the Chinese Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank), and 15% will be secured from the budget of the Republic of Serbia.

The last section of Corridor 11 is the section from Požega to Boljare (107 km), and that is the most difficult one in terms of geological composition and topography. Based on the General Project prepared by CIP, the section is supposed to feature 51 tunnels, 100 bridges, and around 20 overpasses and underpasses. The value of the investment is approximately €1.8 billion. This section of Corridor 11 will connect Belgrade with Montenegro, and China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) will build this part of the highway.

For the Serbian Government, the biggest risk is repaying the loans. This highway is very expensive due to the difficult terrain and expected duration of its construction. The main obstacle is to achieve an optimal amount of infrastructural investment and be able to repay them. (Šaranović et al., 2019, pp. 127) So the main thing will be to see if Serbia, similar to the railroads, can finish these roads and repay the loans in pandemic conditions.

It should be noted that once again, there were no public tenders for those infrastructural projects, and that is not a good thing since Serbia wants to join the EU where public procurement is obligatory. Since CRBC publicly won the tender in Croatia for building the Pelješac Bridge and won it against two strong EU companies (Rogelja, Tsimonis, 2020, p. 115), it would be very wise to have public tenders in the future. That will probably overcome the stereotype of Chinese investments in Serbia.

D) HBIS GROUP Serbia Iron & Steel – Železara Smederevo

Company SARTID (later named Železara Smederevo) was founded in 1913, and its main purpose is steel production. From 1945 until 1992, the steel plant was governed by the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It worked constantly, even though the results were not great. During the 1990s, the company's value declined significantly, mainly due to the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The loss of the market and suppliers led to its bankruptcy later.

In April 2003, American steel company U.S. Steel (USS) acquired the bankrupted company for \$23 million. (BETA, 2003) U.S. Steel promised to put an additional \$150 million in the plant modernization. This company was the biggest Serbian exporter during the period from 2003 to 2012, and for many years, contributed to the increase of Serbian GDP. On January 31, 2012, U.S. Steel sold the company to the Government of Serbia for \$1, leaving it with 5,400 employees and amounted liabilities due to reduced global steel prices.

With the departure of US Steel, the company faced many problems. By the end of June 2012, it shut down both of its two large furnaces, while the remaining 5,000 workers were sent on a paid leave. In April 2013, it started operating again with reduced capacity. Ever since then, the Government of Serbia has tried to find a strategic partner. However, several public tenders failed due to a lack of valid bids.

In April 2016, Hesteel Group acquired the business for €46 million. The Government officials stated that HBIS was going to invest \$300 million over 2 years in the plant, including the installation of galvanization equipment, and raise production from 0.875 million to 2.1 million tons. (Ministarstvo privrede, 2016)

The opportunity for HBIS was, of course, the export of steel in Europe, and that was their ultimate goal. Serbia is located conveniently for exporting steel products not just in Europe, but also in Africa or the Middle East, especially in those countries in which Turkey is not so popular and does not export its steel.

The situation in Železara was difficult when HBIS bought it. Despite this, the results from the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019 indicated that Hesteel became the number one exporter in Serbia (SEEBiz /Tanjung, 2019) due to the many changes that were made in the production process and management of the company.

The biggest problem for both HBIS and Serbia is nowadays caused by the European Commission, which has imposed a cap on steel imports from HBIS. The EC placed Serbia in the group of countries such as Turkey, Moldavia, and Ukraine, whose steel export to the EU market is restricted. This means that all the countries outside the EU were allowed to export 3.3 million tons of hot-rolled steel to the EU (starting from the beginning of February until the end of June 2019), and with each additional ton were required to pay the additional 25% of customs duty.⁷ On the other two steel products from Smederevo an additional customs duty was imposed, and consequently, HBIS had to downsize its production significantly.

Besides this, HBIS is facing, as well as some other Chinese steel companies, accusations of dumping prices of steel. There were several reports, especially by the European Steel Association (Eurofer), against Chinese exporters of steel. (Baláž, Bayer, 2018, p. 120) According to them, HBIS, among others, sells on the EU market certain types of steel imported from China, and they suspect that steel is produced supported by a subsidy. This is the case of dumping prices, and the EU is addressing this issue now.

Negotiations between Belgrade and Brussels are still ongoing about the imposed quotas. The main argument for revising the current quotas is that Brussels used the average production in Smederevo in three years (years 2015, 2016, and 2017) for calculating the limit. The year 2015 is problematic because that was the year in which production was very low. The negotiation process is focused on changing the calculation – so the idea is to use the year 2018 instead of 2015 to calculate three-year average production and adjust the imposed limit for export to the EU. (Obradović, 2019) Although in July 2019, the EU granted

⁷ Note: For HBIS group: 56.480 tons of hot rolled steel starting from the beginning of February until the end of June 2019; from 1st July 2019 until 30th June 2020 HBIS can export 145.275 tons; from 1st of July 2020 until 30 June 2021 152.539 tons. After the 1st of July 2021, the EU will make a final decision about the import of steel from each country in the world individually. (<http://rs.n1info.com/Biznis/a454004/EU-ustanova-kvote-za-uvoz-celika.html>)

a 5% increase for export to all non-EU countries, and in June 2020, they allowed 5% more, Serbia is still negotiating with the EU to be completely excluded from these quotas.

The second potential risk is associated with the steel price fluctuation on the world market. Unfortunately, that is a serious threat that nobody can anticipate with certainty. The former US partner withdrew from *Železara Smederevo* (among other things) because the price of steel sharply fell on the world market.

Along with this risk, nowadays, companies are facing an additional risk caused by the pandemic of COVID 19. It was announced in July 2020 that production in *Smederevo* would be partially closed due to decreased demand for steel on the EU market. Since we stated that HBIS is the biggest exporter from Serbia, this risk is the most serious one.

First, the downsizing of production and export means that the Serbian Government will collect less tax money for its budget. In addition, it means that HBIS will not improve and modernize production capacities. Secondly, the number of workers in the factory could be laid off because of that, and that means more unemployed people. And in the end, the biggest risk, of course, is possible termination of the business contract with HBIS group, because that happened with the previous partner US Steel, which left Serbia with a huge debt and almost 5,000 (un)employed people that were receiving an aid from the Government for 3 years.

The fourth risk, worth mentioning, is related to ecology and sustainable development. HBIS *Smederevo* is located on the shore of the river Danube and situated very close to the local village. After the acquisition of the steel factory, officials from HBIS Group said that they would pay attention to air and river pollution and that they would invest in more environmental-friendly operations.

However, air pollution is increasing and the number of complaints, not only about usual red dust but pure black dust found in houses and yards, is rising. It should be noted that people who live in the close neighbourhood of the company bought the land and houses under favourable conditions because of its position. Nevertheless, something needs to be done to reduce the level of air pollution.

Hesteel *Smederevo* is an important factory for this city, and probably around 15,000 citizens of *Smederevo* live on income coming from the steel factory. It is important, therefore, that the citizens and the factory management, along with local officials and the Serbian Government, find a common solution for everyone.

In the end, it is also worth mentioning the risk concerning cultural differences between Chinese management and Serbian workers. A potential risk of cultural miscommunication can be avoided with good leadership. There were complaints about the management style of Chinese managers in *Smederevo*. The Chinese managers do need to make an effort to get to know local workers more and to

adapt to the local culture to yield better effects. And vice versa, they need to educate the workers about their culture and management style so that workers can adapt more successfully to the Chinese way of running the business.

E) Mei Ta

Mei Ta factory in Obrenovac was opened in 2016, two years after the initial agreement. According to its official website, this factory produces the automotive and engine parts. Even though Serbian officials stated that the factory in Serbia was established with Chinese and French capital, there was no information about that on the company's website. What was possible to find online, was that Mei Ta Ltd. is a company officially registered in Taiwan and that it has several manufacturing facilities in China, India, France, Germany, and Slovakia. (LEI.Info; Janković, Popović, Mitić)

Serbia has a national economic strategy to attract FDI, and due to this decision, many foreign companies have received a different type of state help. Mei Ta in Obrenovac was among them. Serbia agreed to give 14ha of land, as well as to forgive three years of taxes, in exchange for opening a factory and employing around 770 people. (Ministarstvo privrede, Ugovor o dodeli sredstava Mei Ta)

The total value of Chinese investment is \$97 million, and the Serbian part is around \$20 million. So far, Mei Ta has opened two factories and employed more than 3,000 people.

The main issue identified in previous years is the location of the factory and a possible risk regarding ecological standards. The factory is situated near the river Sava and the large city water utility (Barič). One of the main things that this factory uses in its production is mechanical oil, which is toxic, and its inappropriate use can damage the environment. (Prodanović, Milivojević, 2017) So far, no complaints in that respect have been officially made, but the potential risk should be identified.

F) Zijin Mining Bor – RTB Bor (Copper Miner and Smelter)

RTB Bor was originally founded in 1904 by a French bank. The original name of the company was the “French Society of the Bor Mines, the Concession St. George” and its headquarters were in Paris. The French capital remained in Bor until the end of World War II, and in 1951, the company's assets were nationalized by the Government of Yugoslavia. Since then, the company Bor has been in state ownership and performed good results.

Since the mid-1990s and during the time of sanctions on Yugoslavia, the production in the RTB Bor dropped significantly in comparison to the level of production in the 1970s and 1980s. There were two main reasons for that: the reserves of copper were diminishing and the use of outdated equipment that was not suitable for the production of high-quality ore.

From 2007 until 2017, RTB Bor had three failed privatization tenders: 1. Romanian Cuprom, \$400 million (BETA, 2007); 2. Austrian A-TEC, \$466 million, plus an obligation to invest \$180.4 million in facilities (BETA, 2008), and 3. Russian SMR, \$370 million, plus \$462 million for modernization. (B92, Tanjug, 2008)

During those difficult years, RTB Bor made huge debts, which accumulated to 1 billion euros. The Serbian Government attempted to solve some of the issues by financing the cost of new production facilities and writing off the company's debts towards Serbian public companies, worth 1 billion euros.

Even though copper prices started to rise globally and many things within this company were improved, financial losses continued. In 2015 and 2016, the losses were €110 million and €42 million, respectively. In 2017, before the acquisition by ZMG, the mine had a positive result after many years, with \$303 million (€255 million) of revenues and \$73 million (€61 million) of EBITDA.⁸ (Agencija za privredne registre, 2018)

In 2017, the Government of Serbia signed a memorandum with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in which it stated that they would find a strategic partner or a buyer until March 2018. Due to some difficulties, the sale was postponed until June 2018. Three companies – *Zijin Mining* from China, *Diamond Fields International* from Canada, and *U Gold* from Russia – applied to become a strategic partner of RTB Bor. The Serbian Government accepted the bid by the Chinese Zijin Mining Group.

The Chinese company Zijin Mining took over 63% of company shares in August 2018. The total value of this investment is \$1.26 billion. (IIPE, 2018) ZMG obliged to invest an additional 200 US\$ million to settle a part of RTB Bor's debt and promised to keep all 5,000 workers. Out of the \$1.26 billion, 135 million were allocated to tackle the environmental issues and 320 million for opening a new copper mine.

Soon after the news of the acquisition was official, ZMG announced that it bought Nevsun Resources Ltd, a Canadian company, for 1.41 billion US\$. (Zijin Mining, 2019) That news is important, not only to Canada but to Serbia as well. Nevsun is a company that acquired a permit from the Serbian Government in 2010 to explore the site Bor – Metovnica, during which they discovered that

⁸ EBITDA – Cash flow from operations before tax and financing costs

Čukaru Peki is the site that has a large reserve of copper worth around 100 billion US\$.

By buying RTB Bor and Nevsun, ZMG acquired large amounts of world copper reserves, and it gained a competitive advantage. Therefore, although the Bor mine had many problems, ZMG made a great decision. In the current world order, it is very difficult to achieve a competitive advantage, but in this case, that was gained through the acquisition of resources. In addition, the position of Bor is very good, so the transport costs will be reasonable. Copper will be exported mainly to the EU (Croatia, Germany, and Bulgaria), Turkey, and China. Besides copper, the Bor mine exports silver, palladium, and platinum to Great Britain, sulphuric acid to the Balkan countries, and selenium and pumice stone to Poland. We can see that the export is diversified, and that is always a good thing for reducing risk.

Current results show that the Chinese management along with the Serbian workforce are achieving great results. The results during the last year were 50% higher compared to the time when the Serbian management was running the company. Furthermore, Zijin employed new 474 workers, and in 2019, the number of work injuries fell by 55%. (SEEBiz /Tanjug, 2020)

A potential risk for the Serbian Government could be an unsuccessful acquisition of RTB Bor, like the one we had with US Steel. Of course, that could affect budget results and lead to different economic problems.

The second risk may come from the reduction in the number of people who work in the mine. This mine is located in the eastern part of Serbia in which the unemployment rate is around 16%, while in the rest of the country is around 11%. The Serbian economy needs to downscale the unemployment rate so it could prompt up its development.

As the mine is very significant for this region, if this company grows, it will help the development of some other businesses and industries. If not, it will threaten regional economic growth.

In the end, potential problems regarding the emission of sulphur dioxide (SO₂) are solved to a certain extent, but that can be improved in the future by using modernized eco-friendly technology. ZMG agreed to invest in environmental issues, and there are a couple of them in Bor, which should be solved as soon as possible.

A possible risk for Serbia is the restrictions regarding the export of copper to the EU. The risk is marginally plausible because the level of production of the selected metals that ZMG produces is not high in the EU, but the risk exists due to the EU governing policy to stop Chinese investments in the EU.

G) Heating pipeline between Obrenovac and Novi Beograd

The idea of building a heating pipeline between two parts of Belgrade (Novi Beograd and Obrenovac) is not new. Actually, the city of Belgrade started the implementation of this project during the 1990s. The Thermal power plant Nikola Tesla (TENT) situated in Obrenovac produces heated water as a by-product. Because of that, the city of Belgrade planned to build a heat pipeline that would transport this water to the heating utility in New Belgrade, so that it can be used for heating some parts of Belgrade. The project started, and a significant amount of resource was spent on making and installing the pipelines. During the 1990s, the construction was stopped due to the shortage of finance. In 2001, the city council decided to abandon this project, and for 15 years, the idea was put on hold.

In 2017, at one of the 17+1 meetings, the Serbian Government started to negotiate the completion of this project with China and, in January 2020, the city of Belgrade made a deal with Power China to build the heating pipeline. The project value is \$193million, and it will be financed by public utility company Beogradske Elektrane⁹ (15%) and by the Serbian Government (85%). (Službeni list grada Beograda 68/2020)

The main benefits of this project are: the level of pollution in New Belgrade will be less, hot water from Obrenovac will be used productively and will not be thrown away, and the costs of producing heat in Beogradske Elektrane (BE) will be lower.

Certainly, there is always a question regarding the cost-benefit analysis of this project. There are different opinions about the real benefit of building the heat pipeline. According to some sources, the reduction of electricity production in Obrenovac will be significant, and they will have huge losses, even though BE will cover their losses arising from the reduction in electricity production. (Vlaović, 2019) However, official statements tell a different story. According to them, the total savings that will be achieved by downsizing the import of natural gas for BE, are worth €16 million, and a part of those savings will be transferred to TENT. (eKapija, 2019)

In addition, it should be taken into account that TENT needs to modify significantly its plant (reconstruction of blocs A3, A4, A5, and A6) to transfer the heated water through that pipeline, and those costs are worth around €20 million. (Vlaović, 2019)

⁹ Heating public company

H) Shandong Linglong tire company

Shandong Linglong Tire Company is one of the leading Chinese companies in this industry, and it is ranked among the top 20 tire manufactures in the world. (Linglong tire) The company has four finished facilities and one under construction in China, as well as one in Thailand. The new production factory in Serbia will be their first one in Europe. Officials from Shandong Linglong stated that they were looking for some time for a country in Europe where they could build a tire factory. Serbia was not on their list whilst Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were. In the end, the conditions that Serbia offered to this company prevailed to build the factory in Zrenjanin city, situated 70 km north of Belgrade.

In March 2019, the foundation stone was laid in the industrial zone of Zrenjanin. It was announced that the total value of this project was worth around €800 mil and that it would be one of the biggest greenfield investments in Serbia. (RAS, 2019) The company would employ around 1,200 workers.

The Chinese company was granted with 96ha of land by Zrenjanin city authorities, which is worth around € 8 million. (021, 2019)¹⁰ According to the plans, the factory was expected to start working in 2021. Before the corona pandemic started in Serbia in March 2020, there were no visible activities on the Linglong construction site. On the other hand, in the local newspaper, we saw that the company started recruiting people in the administration. Those activities are indicative that Linglong is in the beginning stage of starting up its business.

Since Linglong planned to use Chinese construction companies and the workforce for the factory in Zrenjanin, it is obvious that due to the pandemic and travelling restrictions, those plans have to be postponed.

It is also apparent that if this company builds the factory and starts working in Serbia, it will be a huge benefit for the domestic economy. Serbia will increase its export and GDP, downsize the number of unemployed people, receive income from taxes, and raise the standard of people in Vojvodina province.

Several possible risks should be discussed. The first one refers to ecology, or more precisely, air pollution. There are different types of technologies used in tire production. Depending on the type of used technology, the level of air pollution differs. At the moment, there is no official information on the type of production technology that Linglong will use, so we cannot be sure if the local citizens will be exposed to air pollution or not. (Balkan Green Energy News, 2020) Since the future factory will be surrounded by land used for growing crops,

¹⁰ Unlike some others, the contract was not published publicly.

it is also important from that standpoint to have a clear perspective about the technology that will be used here.

One of the problems that should be considered regarding the work of this factory is the construction of regional roads. (VOICE, 2019) The Serbian Government promised to build roads before this factory starts to work because the existing infrastructure is not suitable for the level of transport that this factory needs. To fulfil this promise the Government needs to purchase private land so it can start with the construction of roads. This is still in the early stage. Only after this phase is over the construction of roads can start.

Even though the factory does not exist, there is a risk connected to the global pandemic, and that can affect the plans of the Chinese investor. Due to recent events, the demand for cars dropped down severely¹¹, and consequently, the demand for tires fell, so it is reasonable to ask: will this company start working in Serbia during the unprecedented crisis? Moreover, if Linglong decides to invest, will it invest the promised value or less?

DISCUSSION

Having analysed all the projects, it is important to discuss the research questions. The first one was dedicated to Serbia and China's cooperation and its results. Having in mind all the projects presented here, the author believes that those projects are beneficial for Serbia and that the two countries have fruitful cooperation. Some of the projects are more profitable than others. Some of them were a necessity, and for some of them, Serbia had waited for more than 20 years. In the case of *Železara Smederevo* alone, it is obvious that the benefits are there. About 5,000 employed people and their families have income thanks to Hesteel. This company is Serbia's number one exporter, with a significant contribution to Serbian GDP. The situation is similar with *ZMG Bor*, which, like *Železara*, had many problems for several decades, and now the company is run in a better way.

For many decades, Serbian infrastructure was one of its main problems, and nowadays the situation is much better. The main problem is that Serbia will repay the loans that have been negotiated through bilateral arrangements, and not by public tenders. We cannot compare the Chinese offer to some others that may have otherwise occurred. Serbian officials state the country is dedicated to the

¹¹ Note: According to the report from Deutsche Welle in June (<https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-pandemic-fuels-comeback-of-cars/a-53759607>), demand for used cars is increasing from May 2020, as well as demand for luxury new cars. However, the losses from January until May are huge, and it will take time for the auto industry to recover.

process of joining the EU, and one of its public business practices is the public procurement. We should be, of course, aware that tenders are not an ideal way of conducting business proposals. Even with them, we can experience many problems. Nevertheless, if we are dedicated to our EU path, we need to have those things in mind, and then the number of EU objections regarding Serbia's cooperation with China will be reduced.

From an economic point of view, it should also be noted that all infrastructural projects are done by the Chinese working force. In some cases, like in TPP Kostolac, we have Serbian companies that are working with Chinese ones, and that is a much better situation. The construction industry involved in public work is one of those which has a direct and fast impact on the development of the country. That was the reason, among others, why the USA, after the Great recession, spent so much money on public works and the construction industry.

Nevertheless, risks that Serbia is facing are also real, and among all the above-mentioned two stand out. The first one is repaying the loans. Serbia has been developing thanks to FDI and reforms in monetary and fiscal policy, which resulted in a constant decrease of public debt and strengthening of the basic macroeconomic indicators. In this situation, repaying loans is not a big burden to the country. However, 2020 came, and with it, the global pandemic crisis. The economic results from all over the world are upsetting, and the same applies to Serbia. Is Serbia capable to return the loans with so many infrastructural projects, loans, and increased public debt? The answer depends on many things, and it cannot be given at this moment. But the risk is there, and it should be acknowledged.

The second risk mentioned a couple of times in this paper is air pollution. Železara Smederevo, TPP Kostolac, and Bor face the same problem. The problem did not occur due to Chinese investors, but it existed for many decades. What is worrying is that Serbia does not use all the potential of new technologies that could decrease the level of pollution, and that can help its citizens who live nearby those facilities to have a better life. Even in times like this, ecology should be one of the imperatives of our Government. If we need to have all these factories, and that is the case here, we should comply with ecological standards.

CONCLUSION

Diplomatic and economic relations between Serbia and China are constantly developing and improving. Two countries cooperate under the 16+1 and the BRI Initiatives successfully, and Serbia is among the 17+1 countries one of those that realized numerous projects. Chinese state companies are leading the way, while

private companies are still few and emerging. Traditional sectors are still preferential in China's allocation of investments in Serbia. It is encouraging that Serbia will have one of the biggest greenfield investments in its history from China, and this will stimulate other Chinese investors to come to the Serbian market.

The projects' dynamics are good, and except for the railway in which we had a significant delay, other projects are done according to the schedule. The BRI projects have added to Serbia's development, and both sides are further negotiating different projects in which they want to cooperate.

Financial and ecological risks are the most serious ones, while the risks of unsuccessful acquisition, unemployment, reduced export, EU regulations, COVID-19, and cross-cultural communication are those that will have an impact on the final results of the Chinese BRI investment projects in Serbia.

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REZULTATI I RIZICI KINESKIH POJAS I PUT INVESTICIONIH PROJEKATA U SRBIJI

Apstrakt: Kina neprekidno od 2010. godine, povećava nivo investicionih projekata u Srbiji. Nakon pridruživanja Srbije inicijativama 17+1 i Pojas i put, te investicije su eksponencijalno rasle. Projekti se razlikuju po veličini i sektorima u kojima se realizuju, a vodeći su infrastrukturni projekti.

Glavna svrha ovog rada je analiza postignutih rezultata kineskih investicionih projekata u Srbiji, a koji su povezani sa inicijativom Pojas i put, sa ekonomske tačke gledišta. Istovremeno, autor će predstaviti potencijalne rizike za Srbiju koji proizilaze iz tih projekata. Analizirani podaci obuhvataju period od 2014. do maja 2020. godine i prikupljeni su iz različitih izvora i vrednovani analizom sadržaja. Rizici su analizirani primenom metode scenarija. Sa empirijskog stanovišta, ovaj rad će dati novi ugao gledanja na rizike sa kojima se Srbija suočava u BRI projektima, a u svetlu promena u domaćem i međunarodnom okruženju, posebno zbog uticaja pandemije COVID-19.

Autor zaključuje da BRI projekti u Srbiji doprinose ekonomskom razvoju Srbije, ali da se Srbija istovremeno suočava sa dva glavna rizika – otplatom kredita i neusklađivanjem sa ekološkim standardima.

Ključne reči: Srbija, Kina, Inicijativa Pojas i put, investicioni projekti, ekonomski rezultati, rizik.

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Review paper

TOWARDS AGONISM: THE SERBIAN AND BOSNIAK (BOSNIAN MUSLIM) STRUGGLE FOR CHURCH AND EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY 1897-1902

Sladjan RANKIĆ¹

Abstract: The author explores complex discursive relations between the Serbian and Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) community during their struggle for religious and educational autonomy *vis-à-vis* the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1897-1902. The starting hypothesis is that during their struggle against a common enemy over similar issues, an agonistic discursive relationship was formed between the two political elites. The Austro-Hungarian Empire sought to cut off Bosnian religious ties to Constantinople, both with the Ecumenical Patriarch and with the Caliph; and to force a state run school system on the population. This infringed on the traditional rights of ethnoreligious groups to communal autonomy regarding religious and educational matters, which resulted in the formation of the Movement for religious and educational autonomy and the Movement for Waqf-mearif autonomy, among Serbs and Muslims respectively. These movements aimed at restoring their respective autonomies and coordinated their efforts, which would result in the signing of the Draft of a contract of joint struggle for religious and educational autonomy in 1902. The author concludes that Austria-Hungary placed itself in an antagonistic position towards Serbs and Bosniaks through its policies. Consequently, it played a figure of a common enemy, around which an agonistic relationship between Serbs and Bosniaks could be formed.

Keyword: Bosnia and Herzegovina, agonism, antagonism, identity, political, politics, discourse.

INTRODUCTION

History is a difficult subject of study. This work does not seek to uncover historical truth about a particular period. It merely seeks to analyse discursive encounters and identify agonistic discursive relations in a specific period. First of

¹ Sladjan Rankić, Researcher, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade.
E-mail: sladjank@hotmail.com

all, in a study of discursive encounters, “the study contrasts the discourse of the Self with the Other’s ‘counter-construction’ of Self and Other”. (Hansen, 2006, p. 68) In the case of this work, since it is dealing with the Bosnian Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Orthodox community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first half of the 1900s, the study will focus on their discursive encounters. Discourse analysis necessitates a selection of relevant works to be analysed since it is difficult to cover the entirety of a particular national discourse. Hansen advises that these works should follow three criteria: “they are characterized by a clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended, and they have the formal authority to define a political position.” (Ibid, p. 76). The subject of this paper is the two movements for religious and educational autonomy, which were in effect protest movements against formal authorities of the time, the local and imperial Austro-Hungarian authorities. However, they articulate identities and policies, they were widely read, and they did enjoy widespread public support. Because of said support, they had the authority to define political positions. The Serbian movement had procurations from 60 Serbian-Orthodox municipalities in B&H (B&H zbornik II, p. 39), while the Bosniak movement had 136 000 individual Bosnian Muslims procurations, according to the leaders of the movements. (B&H zbornik V, p. 4). Thus, the two movements had democratic authority within their communities and, over time, forced the Austro-Hungarian authorities to negotiate with them. Thus, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian almanacs are the primary sources, and their discourse is the object of this study. The secondary literature is selected based on the same three criteria. However, it serves as an aid to the primary sources which were written by the leaders of the two movements.

In order to better understand the complex web of socio-political and economic relations in Austro-Hungarian Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is paramount that we present a brief overview of the historical conditions which led to the emergence of the two movements for religious and educational autonomy². I will try to steer away from presenting biased claims from secondary literature when presenting the historical context. It is particularly difficult when using works of national histories, whose communities today are in a discursive battle over history. For example, Imamović dismisses Serbian historiography on Islamization in Bosnia as “chauvinistic” (Imamović, 2006, p. 146), while Ekmečić claims that mythologisation of the past is a “disease” of Bosnian Muslim intellectuals (Ekmečić, 2017, p. 546). Hence, the reader should take the historical information that will be presented as a

² The movements are called the Movements for educational-religious autonomy (Pokret za versko-prosvetnu autonomiju) or the Movements for church-school autonomy (Pokret za crkveno-školsku autonomiju). The two terms are synonymous. From this point onward for the sake of brevity the Movement for religious and educational autonomy and the Movement for waqf-mearif autonomy will be called simply the Movements or Serbian and Bosniak Movements, respectively.

product of the secondary literature that is used in this work. In other words, it is a product of discourse, a discourse with its own biases layered over historical facts. To the best of my abilities, I will try to present facts behind these layers, when speaking about the historical context during which this move towards agonism takes place. If I present some controversial statements by authors (such as those above), I will note that it is what said authors claim.

I will need to present a few disclaimers regarding the very sensitive nature of the topic. First of all, the source material used in this paper was overwhelmingly written in Serbian³ and the material is over a century old, with a scarce official translation. Thus, all citations will be translated by the author of this paper, unless stated otherwise. This paper deals with discursive relations between Serbs and Bosniaks within Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period 1897-1902, or more specifically, relations between their local elites. I use the term Bosniak for the Bosnian Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the sake of simplicity.

The question of Bosniak nationhood is a complex one and it needs to be addressed here, albeit briefly. The Bosniak national name had been promoted from the “Bosniak” newspaper in the early 20th century, to “Bosanski pregljed”, a political emigre newspaper in Switzerland owned and edited by Adil Zulfikarpašić and it has finally become the dominant name of the Bosnian Muslim community during the First Bosniak Convention (Sabor) in 1993. (Imamović, 2006). Bosniak, as a name for Bosnian Muslims, had been used by the Ottoman Turks to distinguish them both from the Turks and local Christian Serbs and Croats (Čelebi, 1996, Dževdetpaša, 2017). The name Bosniak will be used for the sake of simplicity and clarity, but I would like to stress that the “nationhood” of Bosniaks or lack thereof was by far a settled matter in the early 20th century. Members of the Bosniak elite would evade declaring themselves as either Croats or Serbs, others like Osman Nuri Hadžić and Osman Đikić would consistently advocate for the Croatian and Serbian national cause respectively. Others still would oscillate between the two. Musa Ćazim Ćatić, a famous Bosnian Muslim poet, would write Serbian patriotic poems for “Bosanska vila” early on in his career, while after 1908, he would declare himself as a Croat and write Croatian patriotic poems. This extended to Bosnian Muslim newspapers and organizations, where “Gajret” and “Behar” would initially be nationally agnostic. However, “Gajret” would move towards an articulation of Serbian national identity (Vervae, 2013, pp. 312-313, Dacić, 2015, p. 23) under of Osman Đikić during 1907-08, while “Behar” would move toward the Croatian national identity under Čaušević and Ćatić as editors (Vervae, 2013, p. 309). By 1911 “Gajret” reached 2,000 copies

³ The name of the language was a matter of contention at the time when the source material was written as well as today. I use the name Serbian for the language written and spoken in: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia.

in circulation, while “Behar” would reach 800 (Ibid, p. 312). If circulation is any indication, it can be deduced that Serbian national identification was gaining ground within the Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia. It can be argued that Bosnian Muslim national identification was a question of political affiliations with the Serbian or Croat national movements. (Ibid, p. 310)

This national fluidity would continue in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes where the Yugoslav Muslim Party (YMO) would win 110 895 votes, while other Muslim parties would win a combined total of 1,877 votes. Of the 24 YMO members of parliament, 13 were Croats, 5 were Serbs, 4 were undeclared, 1 was a Yugoslav, and 1 was a Bosniak (Purivatra 1969, p. 181). What these individuals and organizations had in common was that they imagined a Bosnian Muslim community as a solid community moving down history (Anderson, 2016, p. 26) and as something distinct from Serbs and Croats, if not necessarily in its national name and nationality, but culturally and religiously. This paper will treat them as a distinct community and use the Bosniak name as a shorthand for said community.

With these controversies out of the way, we move on to a brief overview of the historical context. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878, under a mandate from the Berlin Congress. It was supposed to bring order to the two perpetually rebellious provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Although Austria-Hungary was supposed to be a custodian of Ottoman B&H⁴ and Sandžak, to secure order and eventually cede control back to the Ottoman Empire, it had other plans for the provinces. Austria-Hungary would quickly start eroding Ottoman sovereignty in B&H. This erosion of sovereign control from Constantinople and accumulation by Vienna was gradual. The process ended in 1908 after B&H was officially annexed. The process that can be best described as the creeping de-Ottomanization of B&H took many forms. Especially relevant for this paper is the eroding of the religious authority of Constantinople in B&H.

The Ottoman Empire was a theocratic state, with the head of state being the religious leader of all Sunni Muslims. Additionally, minority ethnoreligious groups enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy under *the millet system* (Markovich, 2013, pp. 227-232). In practice, the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were members of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and the so-called “Phanariotes”⁵, or Greek clergymen held the bishopric seats in B&H. Aside from these upper-level clergymen who were seen as foreign, lower level clergy came from the local communities and through

⁴ Bosnia and Herzegovina-B&H, for brevity the abbreviation will be used from this point onward

⁵ Named after the district of “Phanar” in Constantinople. Phanariotes were rich Greek merchants and clergymen who sought to spread Greek influence across the Balkans, thereby provoking ire from local Slavic Christians.

Serbian church-school municipalities (Srpsko-pravoslavne crkveno školske opštine), the local clergy and laymen could exercise a great degree of control over communal matters. Likewise, the local Catholic community had a degree of autonomy centred around its Franciscan monasteries. The Bosniak community had a degree of economic autonomy through their *waqfs* or religious endowments, which were a sort of surrogate private property meant to circumvent the restrictive timar system (Lampe, 1989, Ch 6, pp. 182-183). Particularly through *odžakluk* timars, Council of *ayans* and capitaines Bosniaks had economic and political autonomy from Constantinople, which they sought to preserve and expand. Still, they wanted to expand their autonomy, to reach the level of Serbia at that time, resisted progressive Ottoman reforms which affected their feudal privileges, and the Ottoman Empire ceding 6 municipalities to Serbia (Imamović, 2006, pp. 333-35).

Ekmečić, on the other hand, states that Gradašćević's first priority was that Serbia should not become independent and that Muslim immigration from Serbia should cease (Ekmečić, 2017, p. 231). According to Ekmečić, Albanian rebels under Mehmed pasha Skopljak supported these demands. Whatever the case may be, the most famous rebellion of Bosnian Muslims against the Ottomans was laid by the said Husein Captain Gradašćević, the Dragon of Bosnia. He is held in high regard by Bosniaks today as their national forefather (Imamović, 2006, pp. 35-37, Filipović 2007, pp. 190-91), as he was in the 1900s (B&H zbornik V⁶, 205-206). The character of the rebellion is a matter of scholarly dispute today on whether it was: a proto-national Bosniak rebellion, a rebellion of the aristocracy who wanted to preserve their feudal privileges, or an Islamic rebellion against a sultan who has given in too much to Christian pressures, both within and without the empire. It should be noted that Bosniak religious autonomy had been a nonissue in Ottoman times. They were members of a unified and privileged religious group in a theocratic state (Ibid, pp. 91-92). In fact, the Bosniak struggle for religious autonomy was a direct consequence of the severing of relations with the Ottoman theocratic state.

Austria-Hungary would put pressure on local religious autonomy within just a few years of taking power. It would sign a Convention with the Pope in 1881 and with the Ecumenical Patriarch in 1880, which would give the Emperor right to

⁶ Босанско-херцеговачки зборници“ or ”Bosnian-Herzegovinian almanacs” are a series of books chronicling the struggle for religious and educational autonomy in B&H. They were published by “Милетићева штампарија“ in Novi Sad in Cyrillic script. Its authors are not mentioned, although it can be deduced that they are the leaders of the Movements: Gligorije Jeftanović, Vojislav Šola, Emil Gavril, Šerif Arnautović, Ali-beg Firdus, and others. The books consisted of reprints of various memoranda, deputations, transcribed letters of negotiations between the parties, etc. For the sake of simplicity from this point onward, when citing and paraphrasing these Almanacs I will write “БиХ зборник I-VII”, depending on which book of the series I am citing.

appoint bishops, both Catholic and Orthodox, and gave the Austro-Hungarian state the obligation to pay for priestly salaries. After a decree from the sheik ul Islam⁷ in 1882, total control over religious matters in B&H had been vested onto the mufti of Sarajevo and through him, the Austro-Hungarian authorities would introduce sweeping reforms in the Islamic religious system in B&H (Краљачић, 2017). Like with the Catholic and Orthodox clergy, the Muslim clergy would become dependent on Vienna. While the local Catholic-Croatian community and/or its leaders stood silent on the matter (except for some Franciscan monks), these reforms caused a blowback among the Serbian and Bosniak communities. This religious pressure, coupled with the introduction of compulsory military service, sparked a rebellion in Herzegovina in 1882, where both Bosnian Muslims and Serbs took part (Ekmečić, 2017, p. 311). The Serbian Movement was active from 1881, firstly as a passive boycott of church life and then it would turn into an active movement led by Gligorije Jeftanović, Vojislav Šola, and others. The Muslim Movement started in 1899 and the spark that produced it was the allegedly forced conversion of underage Fata Omanović to Catholicism (Краљачић, 2017, p. 419). The two movements would then begin a campaign of concerted pressure on the Austro-Hungarian authorities to restore communal autonomy or at least to alter Austro-Hungarian reforms to make them more palatable to the Serbian and Bosniak communities.

THE POLITICAL AND POLITICS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

This paper approaches the issue of Serbo-Bosniak discursive relations from a constructivist perspective, drawing from the works of Chantal Mouffe and Carl Schmitt. It should be noted that Schmitt has never identified himself as a constructivist. However, he is used by constructivists, postmodernists, post-Marxists, poststructuralists, and the New Right, as their precursor. In regards to identity construction, I adhere to the dialogical perspective. Iver B. Neumann classifies Bakhtin, Kristeva, and Schmitt among others into this dialogical school of identity studies. Dialogism places itself in juxtaposition to dialectics. The Other, both for Neumann and for the dialogists, is an epistemological and ontological necessity and identities are constructed through discourse (Nojman, 2011, pp. 33-34). Unlike dialectics where a relation of thesis-antithesis is succeeded by synthesis, with dialogism there is no synthesis. To put it simply, “there is no inclusion without exclusion” (Ibid, p. 35) and for any kind of identity fusion or moulding to happen,

⁷ A sort of a steward of the religious function of the sultan. Sultan was still nominally the Caliph, however he would “outsource” the governing of the country’s religious affairs to the Sheikh ul Islam, while the Sultan was preoccupied with the matters of state.

there needs to be a greater, more alien, and more threatening Other. I base my ontological and epistemological approach largely on Mouffe and Laclau, and they in turn build off of Schmitt. For Schmitt, the enemy is “in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that the extreme conflict with him is possible” (Ibid, 1154-60). Mouffe builds upon Schmitt’s ideas and tries to find a middle ground between an ever-present threat of war and total eradication of societal conflict, which is the liberal ideal. She makes two crucial interventions into Schmitt’s conceptual framework. Firstly, she distinguishes between the *political* and *politics*. The former is a dimension of antagonism that cannot be done away with, while the latter is a system of practices, discourses, and institutions whose goal is to establish order and human coexistence; a system of checks and balances of the political (Mouffe, 2013, 191-206)⁸. Secondly, for Mouffe, there are three types of relations within the political: that of competitors who struggle for power without questioning the wider political system, that of enemies who seek to destroy each other or at least expel them from the political and finally that of adversaries who seek to implement their hegemonic projects while respecting the democratic procedures and institutions (Mouffe, 2013, 274-290). Enemies have an antagonistic relationship, while adversaries have an agonistic one. This means, in Mouffe’s words that “We will fight against his ideas but we will not question his right to defend them” (Mouffe, 1993, p. 4). Mouffe, while criticizing liberal and more specifically deliberative democracy, presents her model of *agonistic pluralism*. This model posits that the task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions, but to “mobilize those passions towards the production of democratic designs” (Mouffe, 1999, p. 756).

For Mouffe, the *raison d’être* of democratic politics is precisely to democratically frame social antagonism and turn them into agonistic relations. In her own words “Modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order” (Ibid.). She claims that liberal democracies tend to fail at this when “agonistic dynamic is hindered by an apparent excess of consensus, which usually masks a disquieting apathy” (Mouffe, 1993, p. 6). This paper expands upon this idea by posing a question: what happens when an authoritarian order does seek to suppress conflict? I argue that ameliorating internal antagonism within the political is not merely the purview of democratic politics. Specifically, Austria-Hungary sought to create consensus in B&H, ameliorate antagonisms towards it and between the three communities, and to tie them all to Austria-Hungary. This was all supposed to be achieved by creating a specific Bosnian identity, a form of local patriotism tied, as Kallay put it, “to a great and powerful state idea” of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Краљачић, 2017, pp. 82-83). Even before Kallay, the Ottoman tanzimat reformer in B&H Ahmed

⁸ For in-text references where there is no “p” or “pp” this means that the numbers are locations within an e-book file. This is a substitute for page numbers, when the pages of the e-book are not numbered.

Dževdet-paša sought to “revive the drive for preserving and protecting one’s own kin (rod) and then to stimulate attachment and love to their own country” (Dževdet-paša, 2017, p. 98). I argue that like the liberal-democratic system which Mouffe is criticizing, Austria-Hungary (which was not a liberal democracy) overreached, forced its ideas on the populace, implemented socially intrusive policies, thereby positioning itself as the enemy to local Serbs and Bosniaks. Their elites reacted by forming an agonistic relationship between one another and displacing Austria-Hungary to the role of the antagonistic enemy in the sense of “existentially something different and alien” (Schmitt 2007, 1154-60) that is “putting into question our identity and our existence” (Mouffe, 2013, 228-237). Common interests are necessary to form agonistic relations. However, a common enemy is a key to forming them. In their paper which analyses the contemporary discursive relations between the three national groups in B&H, Tepšić and Vukelić (2019) conclude that the Serbo-Croatian antagonistic relationship turned from antagonism to agonism “from the moment when two sides started perceiving the third as a risk to their constitutive socio-political identity” (p. 23). I argue that when Austria-Hungary started to infringe on Serbian and Bosniak religious and educational autonomy, the two communities started perceiving Austria-Hungary as the enemy, and by the extension the local Catholic population, both local Croats, as well as Germans and other colonists. Neumann claims that the Turks were the Other of Europe for centuries because they were: physically close, had a strong military, and had a strong (and alien) religious tradition (Neumann, 2011, p. 61). Austria-Hungary as the *de facto* and later *de jure* sovereign of B&H, was physically close, had a strong military, and was religiously alien to Muslim and Serbian Orthodox communities in B&H. This fact made it easier for the two communities to perceive Austria-Hungary as the Other. Moreover, Austro-Hungarian imposition of its political framework and oversight onto B&H, made it a prime target for othering and antagonization. In brief Austro-Hungarian *politics* failed to establish order, to “domesticate” the Bosnian *political* and “keep at bay the forces of destruction” (Mouffe, 1993, p. 141). Rather, these forces turned against it, turning it into the enemy while building an agonistic relationship between them. Crucially, I argue that since the two movements formed an agonistic alliance and they faced Austro-Hungarian authoritarian politics, they sought to, as Mouffe would put it, mobilize their passions to create democratic designs. In other words, the two Movements aimed to create *alternative democratic politics*.

THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS AND EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina were war-ravaged provinces after the Berlin Congress. They endured years of uprisings against the Ottomans by the local Christians and subsequently a brief struggle against the Austro-Hungarian occupying forces.

Ekmečić (2017) estimates based on the archives that the Great Eastern Crisis produced 250 000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina (p. 289), who poured into Austria-Hungary. In fact, count Andrasi raised the refugee issue as one of the key reasons why Austria-Hungary had been compelled to occupy B&H. During his address to the Berlin Congress, on 28 June 1878, he stated that the 200 000 refugees did not want to return to B&H unless the situation there was stabilized. According to Andrasi, B&H people are “fanatical in their antagonism” and they live “intermingled in the same counties, towns, and villages”; and these religious and social divisions, along with the problem of the Agrarian issue “can only be solved by a strong and neutral government” (B&H zbornik I, 1902, pp. 143-145). For Andrasi, naturally, this government was Austria-Hungary. We can see a clear intent of Austria-Hungary to pacify Bosnian antagonisms. It should be noted that this was his address to the Berlin Congress, and it should be seen as a discourse legitimizing Austro-Hungarian positions regarding B&H, rather than statements of fact.

The Agrarian issue had been a problem in B&H for some time before 1878 and had been one of the major driving factors behind Christian revolts in B&H. In brief, the local Muslim aristocracy owned the vast majority of arable land, while local Christians were employed as serfs and tenants, tilling the land and paying rent. This was a feudal relationship, but it was atypical for the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman aristocracy was essentially tenants of state land known as *timars*, which could be taken away by the Sultan at any moment. The local Christian peasants did work these timars, but they had some land of their own, had some legal protection, and could file complaints to the Ottoman legal system, which could (theoretically at least) result in the abusive lord losing their timar. During the 18th century, the local Bosnian Muslim aristocracy began a process of ciflukisation (*čitlučenje*) or transforming timar land into cifluks, *de facto* inheritable private land. This process incorporated also the appropriation of Christian (*raja*) peasant land and state land... New Christian peasants, usually migrating from upland villages into fertile valleys where cifluks were dominant, would have no other option than to work as serfs for the local Muslim lords. (Lampe, 1989, pp. 187-191) The Ottoman Empire would gradually legalize the cifluk system through various legal acts: the Hatisherif of Gulhana in 1839, the Ramazan Law of 1858, and the crucial Saferic Order of 1859. The Muslim lord officially became a property owner, while the Christian serf became a tenant, who works the lord's private property and pays the rent. The local serf did have pre-emption right, i.e., the lord had an obligation to offer to sell the land to the tenant first, and if he refuses, then he can sell the land to other customers. Austria-Hungary legalized cifluks as private property in 1878, and they remained so until 1918 (Imamović, 2006, 338-340). Considering that there were 85 000 households of serfs in 1879, out of whom 60 000 were Orthodox and 25 000 Catholic, while there were some 6-7000 aristocratic households and 77 000 free

peasant households, which were over 90% Muslim (Kraljačić, 2017, pp. 23-24) this naturally aggravated tensions between the communities. The situation did not improve much by 1910. Muslims made up 91.15% of aristocratic landlords and 56.65% of free peasants, while Orthodox Serbs made up 73.92% of the serf population, the rest being Catholic (Purivatra, 1969, p. 142).

Granted, Austria-Hungary did introduce loans for serfs seeking to buy land from their landlords, but their effects were underwhelming. The Agrarian issue was one of the major points of antagonism between Serbs and Bosniaks and, in some sense, it is today. The two Agrarian reforms of 1919 and 1946 transferred the land ownership to erstwhile serfs, who were overwhelmingly Serbs. This led some Bosniak intellectuals to claim that they were nothing more than a Serbian landgrab and plunder of Bosniak private property (Filipović, 2007, p. 79). In contrast to its activities on the Agrarian issue, where it preserved the status quo, Austria-Hungary was much more active in trying to reform local identities. Vienna's plans for transforming local identities were systematic and ambitious. They ranged from promoting state-run schools while putting pressure on church-run ones, censoring newspapers, banning books and newspapers, setting up pro-government newspapers, setting up the Land Museum (Zemaljski muzej) and exploring and writing Bosnian history, designing the Bosnian flag and coat of arms, promoting a unified Bosnian identity, constructing historical links between Bosnia (Rama in Medieval times) and Hungary, forbidding the usage of Serbian and Croatian national adjectives for societal organizations, colonizing the border region along the Drina River with Germans, trying to create autonomous religious centers in B&H like the Žitomisljić monastery to limit cross-border pilgrimages to Ostrog, etc. (Kraljačić, 2017). However, Vienna's infringement on religious autonomy was the straw that broke the camel's back and led to antagonistic mobilization *vis-à-vis* Austria-Hungary among the Serbian and Muslim communities.

I have presented a short overview of what caused the movements to arise. Through Concordats with the Vatican and the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the orders of Sheikh-ul-Islam, Austria-Hungary obtained the rights of appointment of the higher clergy and obligations of paying clergymen in B&H. Thus, as both movements claimed, higher religious organizations became alienated from its flock and lower clergy, while becoming totally dependent on a religiously alien (inoverna) government (B&H zbornik V, p. 120; B&H zbornik III, p. 187). The scale of Austro-Hungarian intrusion into local religious affairs was immense. For example, Article II of the Concordat of 1880 gave the emperor the right to appoint a new bishop if the seat is vacant and he merely had to notify the Synod⁹, while article III states that

⁹ The Saint Sinod is an executive and legislative body of a particular Orthodox Church. In some cases, there also exists a Saint Assembly or in Serbian "Sabor", which acts as a legislative body. In that case the Sinod and the Sabor are executive and legislative branch, respectively.

removing a bishop “is done in the same manner as his appointment” (B&H zbornik I, pp. 153-54). This article is deliberately vague, and it practically meant that Austria-Hungary had free reigns over appointing and dismissing bishops. It began by sacking the Greek bishop of Sarajevo Antim and appointing a Serb Savo Kosanović, who would later resign in protest against the government’s support of the Catholic archbishop of Sarajevo Štadler and his conversion and propaganda efforts (Краљачић, 2017, p. 345). Article VI obliges Austria-Hungary to take on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s tax duties to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, while Article VII obliges Austria-Hungary to pay salaries to Orthodox bishops and cancel the Bishop’s tax. The VI and VII articles were particularly problematic since they made the clergy independent of their flock and dependent on the government. This meant, according to the leaders of the Movement, that the Orthodox population of B&H had no sway on church matters in B&H and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The extent of this dependence can be seen in a “Program” on how to resolve intra-Orthodox tension in Mostar, delivered from the government to the bishop of Mostar, which states that it should be the bishop’s top priority to separate Vojislav Šola, Vladimir Radović and other leaders of Serbian-Orthodox Municipality of Mostar from the Orthodox flock and to place said flock in the hands of someone more loyal, a certain Lazar Miličević. (B&H Zbornik I, pp. 157-158). The aforementioned Radović would be buried without a priest conducting funeral rites, as a form of protest against Austro-Hungarian religious policies and pro-Austrian clergy (B&H zbornik II, p. V). As we can see, the Emperor had the *de facto* possibility to appoint all religious authorities. When this is coupled with the fact that civilian and military authorities were all appointed from Vienna, this in effect meant that all avenues of democratic articulation of interests and identities for the local communities were closed. Just as with Mouffe’s criticism of liberal democracies, Austro-Hungarian politics in an effort to eliminate antagonism drastically reduced the space for the democratic articulation of identities and interests, which caused a blowback.

The struggle for religious autonomy was conducted on two fronts, by both movements. Firstly, they would approach Benjamin Kallay for negotiations and if need be, approach the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest or petition the emperor. The Imperial memoranda were the chief tool of their communication with Austria-Hungary (B&H zbornik I). On the other hand, both movements would regularly travel to Constantinople to negotiate with their respective religious authorities. The Serbian movement addressed their concerns to the Ecumenical Patriarchate via Constantinopolitan Memorials (Carigradske spomenice). Through these documents, they suggested reforms, criticized the Austro-Hungarian policy as well as Constantinople’s policy, but they also pleaded for support with Constantinople. One of the greatest issues was the question of representation. As stated before, both movements were being suppressed by authoritarian politics and they responded by trying to create democratic politics. In the words of the leaders of the Serbian

movement, they hoped that people “would participate in the whole government of their fatherland, so that they could be the *masters of their own destinies*” (B&H zbornik I, p. 85). As the leaders of the movement claimed, before the Austro-Hungarian intrusion into local religious matters, B&H Orthodox Christians were not only autonomous on a local, municipal level; they had a say in choosing the Patriarch, which had been stated in the Constitution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In fact, Gavro Vučković, a Serbian layman, was a representative of the B&H Orthodox community when the Constitution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was drafted in the 1860s (B&H zbornik II, p. 10, p. 125). According to Petar Kočić, the Serbian population in B&H paid a special tax called “gavrija” to pay for Vučković’s expenses in Constantinople (Васин&Микавица, 2018, p. 45). The leaders of the Serbian Movement claimed that since the people had no say in crafting canonical documents since Vučković, particularly in the case of the Concordat of 1880, these new reforms “cannot have legal power” (B&H zbornik II, pp. 127-28). Since the leaders of the Serbian movement had written procurations that they represent the majority of Orthodox believers in B&H (at least according to them), then any reforms must be created with their participation. As the new Vučkovićs, i.e., new representatives of the people, they presented a series of propositions for religious reform in order to construct a semblance of democratic politics.

Practically identical arguments are presented both in the Constantinopolitan memorials and in the Imperial memoranda. “B&H zbornik III” presents in great detail the reforms which the Serbian movement sought to achieve. Since Austro-Hungarian authorities directed them to find common ground with the bishops and present a joint proposal for church reform, the members of the Serbian movement negotiated for years with the three and later for bishops of B&H, chief among them being bishop Nikola Mandić of Sarajevo. The key proposals of the Serbian movement were: annulling the Concordat of 1880, church bodies (Consistory, Higher Spiritual Court, Parochial Municipalities) were to be chosen and paid by parishes, forming a legislative body at the level of B&H consisted of 1/3 priests and 2/3 laymen (BiH Zbornik III, pp. 57-8). Mandić presented a compromise that the clergy members of these bodies should be appointed by the bishops, while the laymen should be approved by the bishops after elections, which meant that imperially appointed bishops would have veto power in all institutions (Ibid, pp. 102-03). This was, of course, unacceptable for Jeftanović, Šola, and other leaders of the movement, so an agreement could not be reached. The Bosniak movement had similar, yet distinct proposals for Islamic church reform. They proposed the formation of Waqf-Mearif Assembly, made up of hajis¹⁰ who would elect 5 candidates, out of whom the Land government of B&H¹¹ would choose one to

¹⁰ People who completed the Haj to Mecca

¹¹ Zemaljska vlada or in German Landesregierung

become the Reis¹² of B&H. A religious Council of 6 muftis and 24 hojas would elect members to the Waqf-Mearif Assembly (B&H zbornik V, pp. 55-56). The government wanted to have vetting powers over candidates for the Assembly, which was unacceptable to Ali-Fehmi Džabić, Ali-beg Firdus, Skender Kulenović, and other leaders of the movement because it meant that foreign religionists had the right to judge Islamic clerics on their theological competences (Ibid, pp. 62-63). According to Muslim leaders, such oversight by a foreign religion was canonically illegal and unprecedented. These proposals for religious reform were so similar to the Serbian ones for Kallay that he claimed that “they come from a Serbian source” (Ibid, p. 170). As with the Serbian movement, the Bosniak movement reforms and petitions fell on deaf ears both in Constantinople and Vienna. They did, however, garner some sympathies with the opposition in the Hungarian Delegation, particularly with Stevan Rakovski who compared Kallay’s policies in B&H with the repressive policies of Bach in Hungary. (Ibid, p. 150). To summarize, the reforms suggested were meant to democratize B&H politics and give local people representation. However, rather than asking for a parliament to be granted to them by Vienna, the movements saw their traditional institutions as something that can be reestablished and *democratically (re)designed*.

AGONISTIC ALLIANCE, COMMON ENEMY AND THE QUESTION OF IDENTITY

Both movements has had considerable democratic legitimacy if their claims are to be believed. They claimed that 45 out of 58 urban Orthodox-Serbian municipalities and 15 out of 42 rural ones gave procurations (punomoćja) to the Serbian movement, authorizing them to speak on their behalf (B&H zbornik II, p. 39). Concurrently, the Bosniak movement obtained 136 000 procurations from individual Bosnian Muslims (B&H zbornik V, p. 4). The Serbian movement’s leaders do not state how many individuals are behind these municipal procurations. For these reasons, the Kallay government found them to be a threat and would persecute the leaders of both movements. Džabić, Kulenović, and Bičakčić would be declared illegal emigres, while Arnautović would be put under house arrest in 1901 (Ibid, p. 3). Nikola Kašiković would be arrested, as well as Pero Drljača (BiH zbornik I, p.76, p. 25), while Jeftanović would face fines of up to 6,000 florins (Краљачић, 2017, p. 390). These were just some of the steps Austria-Hungary took to place itself on an antagonistic footing with Serbs and Bosniaks. More importantly, it would place local Croats in an antagonistic position since they were seen as Vienna’s proteges in B&H. In other words, for Serbs and Bosniaks, Austria-Hungary and Croats were seen as threats to “their constitutive socio-political identity”

¹² Supreme Islamic religious authority in the land, roughly equivalent to the catholic archbishop.

(Tepšić&Vukelić, 2019, p.23). This can be seen in the many grievances that both movements present.

For example, the Bosniak movement claims that both the government-led secular schools and archbishop Štadler are mere proponents of greater Croatian ideology and propaganda, which is assaulting Muslims in B&H (B&H Zbornik V, p.7, p. 95, p. 98). Likewise, the Serbian movement claims that the government has been forcing Latin script and “hrvatštinu”¹³ (B&H Zbornik I, p. 9) on them, that textbooks are full of “Croatian chauvinism” (Ibid p. 69), that Rome-Papal propaganda has been a constant aggressor on B&H for centuries (B&H Zbornik II, p. 33, p. 63.), and that catholic propaganda is not only the enemy of Orthodoxy and education but “an enemy of *national consciousness*” (B&H Zbornik VII, p. 24, highlighted in original). For both movements, the enemy was especially pernicious since it sought to disturb the reproduction of their identities. In other words, both movements wanted to control their own narratives and be autonomous in socializing their young and controlling their past. Both movements stress that Croat and Catholic propaganda in state-run schools is corrupting their youth and women (B&H zbornik II, p. 88; B&H zbornik I, p. 13, B&H Zbornik V, pp. 92-95). Both movements are colloquially called “Movements for church-school autonomy”. The educational part is critical since it was seen, especially in the era of Enlightenment, as a method of raising and maintaining national consciousness. The following citation is the best example of the value of educational autonomy for B&H communities.

The leaders of the Serbian movement, when arguing for an autonomous Serbian school for teachers, stressed that such schools “must nurture first and foremost *our holy faith* and its church *blagoljepije*¹⁴, *Serbian nationhood* and *its past*.” (B&H zbronic I, p. 65). The Muslim movement had the exact same goals, to retain and reproduce its particular identity. This is precisely why both movements criticize state-run schools, since they had alienated the youth from their “natural” identities. Muslim leaders, when speaking about Bosnian Muslim youth claim that they “have found it bereft of Islamic religious consciousness and pride, mere prey of catholic propaganda” (B&H Zbornik, V, p. 93). This is why Muslims need religious and educational autonomy, as weapons for “a battle against the fiercest onslaught of religious propaganda in all the centuries, nations (in the ethnic sense) and countries (*zemalja*)” (Ibid, p. 95). For Serbs, Austro-Hungarian influence in B&H is equally life-threatening. Inside these secular schools “into the souls of future mothers of our fatherland is instilled the teaching of Rome-papism” (B&H Zbornik II, p. 88),

¹³ Derisive expression for something Croatian

¹⁴ A neologism of Serbian words mild (*blago*) and beautiful (*lijepo*). The word is archaic and difficult to translate, so it was left in original.

while these schools simultaneously exclude “everything that is tied to the Serbian language, name and consciousness and children are denationalized (stripped of their ethnic origin) there” (B&H Zbornik I, p. 13). In other words, Austria-Hungary was the existentially alien and threatening other, which endangered the reproduction of Muslim and Serbian identities. Austro-Hungarian institutions, Austria-Hungary and Croats were being othered and perceived as an existential danger. Thus, an agonistic alliance against them was possible. This can clearly be seen in a Muslim submission (podneska) to Benjamin Kallay, in which they state that the Islamic and Orthodox elements “unanimously (jednodušno) declare that their religious existence is in danger under the occupation government” (B&H zbornik V, p. 126). The two movements as we can see are allies in the fight for the preservation of their identities, but they still maintain a boundary between one another. This boundary is agonistic, in the sense that the movements may disagree with one another, but they are fighting together against a more threatening antagonistic Austro-Hungarian other to preserve their own separate identities.

The desire to preserve their identities under assault from Austro-Hungarian national policies, fermented an agonistic relationship between the two movements. This does not mean that there were no points of contention between the two groups. On the contrary, the Agrarian issue remained the great watershed between Bosniaks and Serbs. Serbs resisted the imposition of the Bosnian language in the country (B&H Zbornik I, p. 9), while Bosniaks were nostalgic for the theocratic Ottoman past and their won socio-political dominance (B&H Zbornik V, p. 91-92). If we would move on to newspapers, there we would find many more instances of conflict, but that is a problem for some other paper.¹⁵ Discursive relations in B&H were and still are changing. “Yesterday’s non-issue can become today’s political and the other way around, as much as today’s enemies were yesterday’s adversaries.” (Tepšić&Vukelić, 2019, p. 13). The issue of religious and educational autonomy became the issue that defined the political in the last years of the 19th century and the first half of the 1900s. The Agrarian issue would come back again in the late 1900s, particularly with Petar Kočić (Васин&Микавица, 2018).

As for the period that this paper covers, relations were still agonistic. In 1902, a Draft of a Contract of political cooperation was drawn up, consisting of 25 articles. It called for autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, with a governor appointed by the Porte, a rotating position, where Serb governors would succeed Muslim ones and vice versa. According to Imamović (2006), the Draft was not signed because of the conflicts over the Agrarian issue and articles 11-13, which defined the official language in B&H as Serbian and mandated the exclusive usage of Cyrillic script in schools, official correspondence, and state institutions (p. 395).

¹⁵ “Bošnjak”, “Behar”, “Bosanska vila”, “Osvit”, “Sarajevski list” and “Bosanslki istočnik” are especially insightful for this topic.

He does add that this alliance stood until 1910 when B&H got its first parliament. Antić and Kecmanović (2017), on the other hand, claim that the Draft was signed by both parties (p. 127). Whatever the case may be, the alliance lasted during and after 1902. This is attested by B&H zbornik V, which had been published in 1903 and specifically, by the writings of Šerif Arnautović.

Arnautović was one of the key advocates of the Serbian-Bosniak alliance, even though he had been close to the Croatian national movement, giving a speech in honour of Ante Starčević in Mostar 1899 (Kraľavić, 2017, p. 313). However, B&H zbornik V largely covers the events of 1901 and 1902 when this Serbo-Bosniak alliance was strong, and Arnautović was vocal in his support of it. He states unequivocally that time of being fearful of Serbs is gone; that “a common misfortune has forced us to be inseparable friends”; that regarding prior conflicts “we have brought them more misery” and, that “they should forget old wounds and forgive us” (B&H Zbornik V, pp. 205-06). Arnautović goes even a step further equating the Serbian struggle against Ottomans with the Bosnian uprising against the Ottomans led by Husein Gradašćević. This agonistic alliance was not merely presented in open statements to the public, such as this one by Arnautović. Rather, it extended to official communication, like the Petition to Kallay from 19 December 1900. Here it is stated that “the Islamic and orthodox elements...unanimously¹⁶ declare that their existence is under threat under occupational government” and that its tutelage has led “to a total subjugation of the vast majority of Islamic and orthodox elements to a small¹⁷ minority of Catholic elements.” (Ibid. p. 127). This is a clear-cut expression of the agonistic alliance formation vis-à-vis the threatening antagonistic other.

CONCLUSION

In its attempt to domesticate the political, Austria-Hungary had pushed Serbs and Bosniak into an agonistic alliance. More importantly, the two respective movements would produce new generations of intellectuals set on preserving their identities and struggling against Vienna. The last years of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th show a trend towards agonism between Serbs and Bosniaks. Without a common enemy and one that could be legitimately presented as threatening one’s own identity, such an agonistic alliance would never have been possible. However, agonistic relations are not permanent. Just as both communities had reasons to cooperate in regards to their religious autonomy and in preserving their identities, points of conflict remained. During the first half of the 1900s, as

¹⁶ Jednodušno- a somewhat archaic and poetic expression, roughly equal to “of one heart and mind”.

¹⁷ Neznatna-which can also be translated as slight or insignificant.

the two movements moved towards agonism, other members of Bosniak and Serbian elites engaged in antagonistic intertextual communication on the pages of “Behar”, “Biser”, “Bosanska vila”, “Srpski vjesnik” and others. The Agrarian issue remained unresolved and waited to be articulated as a key political issue. We can draw a couple of conclusions from the Serbian and Bosniak struggle for political autonomy. Antagonism as a dimension of the political cannot be done away with. Identities once formed seek to preserve themselves and that means that they seek control over their own narratives. Trying to superimpose narratives on them creates a push-back, one that can produce a great sense of enmity lasting for decades. This was especially true for the Serbian community in B&H *vis-à-vis* Austria-Hungary. Agonistic relations in the political will seek to construct democratic politics if such politics are nonexistent or are lacking in certain areas. Trying to suppress these democratic designs can lead to antagonism and ultimately to open conflict. This paper can also be instructive for exploring other ethnoreligious complex societies, particularly those under international tutelage. As we can see, when a foreign power intrudes on a discursive dynamic it, inadvertently or not, turns one side into a protégé, thereby dislocating agonistic pluralism. In the case of B&H, the relatively agonistic Orthodox-Catholic relationship during Ottoman times, shifted into antagonism when Austria-Hungary took over and had been perceived as protecting Croats. In current-day B&H, it can be argued that an agonistic relationship has been formed between Serbs and Croats, due to both perceiving Bosniaks as proteges of the International Community in B&H. Of course, discursive encounters are never homogenous. Ultimately, foreign powers should be extremely wary of infringing upon national narratives since that can lead to blowback. Identities once formed seek to reproduce and see those who seek to prevent this reproduction as existential threats.

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**KA AGONIZMU: SRPSKA I BOŠNJAČKA
(BOSANSKO MUSLIMANSKA) BORBA ZA CRKVENO ŠKOLSKU
AUTONOMIJU 1897-1902**

Apstrakt: Autor istražuje kompleksne sociopolitičke odnose između srpske i bosansko muslimanske (bošnjačke) zajednice tokom njihove borbe za crkveno i školsku autonomiju protiv austrougarske vlasti u Bosni i Hercegovini između 1897-1902. Početna hipoteza je ta da je tokom njihove borbe protiv zajedničkog neprijatelja oko sličnih pitanja, stvoren jedan agonistički odnos između dve političke elite. Austrougarsko carstvo nastojalo je da ukine bosanske verske veze sa Carigradom, kako a Vaseljenskim patrijarhom, tako i sa halifom; i da nametne državni sistem škola stanovništvu. Ovo je nanosilo štetu tradicionalnim pravima etno-religijskih grupa na komunitarnu autonomiju u pogledu verskih i prosvetnih pitanja, što je dovelo do formiranja Pokreta za versku i prosvetnu autonomiju i Pokreta za vakufsko-mearifsku autonomiju, među Srbima, odnosno među Bošnjacima. Ovi pokreti nastojali su da obnove autonomije svojih zajednica, koordinisali su svoje napore koji će dovesti do potpisivanja Nacrta ugovora o zajedničkoj borbi za versku i prosvetnu autonomiju 1902. Autor zaključuje da je Austrougarska sama sebe postavila na antagonističku poziciju prema Srbima i Bošnjacima, svojim politikama. Posledično, igrala je ulogu neprijatelja, oko kojeg je bilo moguće formirati agonistički odnos između Srba i Bošnjaka.

Cljučne reči: Bosna i Hercegovina, agonizam, antagonizam, identitet, političko, politika, diskurs.

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MEASURED REVISIONISM: ALTERING POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATUS QUO STATES AND RISING CHALLENGERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Igor PEJIĆ¹

Abstract: This paper offers a conceptual framework on how rising and revisionist powers perceive their position in the contemporary international order. The argument of the paper is focused on the structure of the unipolar order and how such order produces a hierarchy that is differently accepted by other actors in world politics. Namely, the rising powers as potential challengers to the status quo have different approaches when assessing their future position in the already established international order. However, due to the complexity of the international order and embedded interdependence of the contemporary states, revisionism as a method of altering the *status quo* works differently than in the previous eras of world politics. That is to say, the scope of modern revisionism is heavily limited, which is induced by the structure of the unipolar order as well as the fact that revisionists today lack ideological foundations to alter the core principles of the order. Therefore, modern revisionism is measured or soft, not directed towards changing the core principles of the order, but rather directed towards altering the established hierarchy on which the current leading power operates the international system. The paper addresses the subject from a qualitative perspective, analysing the structural constraints of the contemporary order and how it all reflects on the possible revisionist efforts. The goal of this research attempt is to present the differences between rising and revisionist powers and what strategical approaches are available for the modern revisionists in order to accomplish their geopolitical ambitions.

Keywords: Measured Revisionism, International Order, Rising Powers, Unipolarity, Status Quo.

¹ PhD student at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Department for European and International Studies.

E-mail: amon.sum@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

The international order in the 21st century is wider and deeper than those of previous times. Rising powers and potential revisionists have a myriad of complex relationships with the ruling hegemon; in other words, they are both constrained by and tied to the contemporary order. John Ikenberry rightfully states that the complexity of the contemporary international order does not allow a straightforward cyclical method of change (Ikenberry 2014, p. 16). Rather, it requires a different approach corresponding with the already established pillars of democracy and capitalism, while forcing alterations in particular spheres of the hegemon's rule. Measured revisionism, which will be further discussed in this article, is a new method in great power politics that allows particular alterations of the international order without creating deeper distortions to the international system as a whole.

The main hypothesis driving the research effort in this article is that current revisionist attempts made by some rising challengers are not aimed at altering the basic principles of the current international order based on a free-market economy and capitalism. Rather, they are directed towards the structural hierarchy of the international order, forefront by the US primacy and the dominating power's authority that is not equally accepted by the rising actors. Therefore, current revisionism is "soft" or "measured" because temporary revisionists have no actual ideological alternative or "ideational package" to replace the structural framework that has benefited their rise in the first place (Kupchan 2014). The idea of measured revisionism comes from the works of Michael Mazarr, and it is somewhat present in Randall Schweller's concept of rising powers in terms of "supporters, shrikers and spoilers" (Mazarr 2015; Schweller 2014). Their prominent works have served as a primary basis to further examine this phenomenon, which will be an interesting matter in the forthcoming alteration of the unipolar order. Since we are debating the issues of international order, the author does not strictly confine his approach to a single school of international relations, for example, realism. Due to the complexity of the subject of international order, the author refers not only to the works of prominent realist thinkers, whose concepts are fundamental for understanding global politics, but also refers to the authors who are exploring status-orientated issues in international relations. At the same time, the author also includes the works of some institutionalists whose ideas are essential in understanding order in its full spectrum and not only as a struggle for power among actors.

In the first part of the paper, we will discuss the notions of the rising power and the revisionist power, the differences between them and why these concepts are often regarded as synonyms in the sphere of international relations. The argument here is based on structural premises, meaning that the structure of

international order is the definitive factor that initiates revisionist behaviour among the actors of international politics. The second part of the paper will examine the hierarchical structure of the unipolar order and how it reflects on the rising powers' ambitions. In the third part, we have tried to conceptualize the idea of measured revisionism as an attempt made by the rising challengers to delegitimize the leading power's authority and rearrange the hierarchy apparently unsuitable for the rising powers' needs and ambitions.

At the outset, a few general remarks should be made for the readers. In this paper, the term hegemony is used instead of imperialism, which is present in some non-western literature regarding the US global primacy. Although the US global authority is based on coercion, prevailing institutions and norms indicate that the authority is legitimate to a certain extent. Thus, the term hegemony corresponds with the idea presented by Robert O. Keohane, which implicates that such a method of international governance requires the established rules and institutions as well as a certain level of consent from other sovereign states (Keohane 1984, p. 46). The research approach used here represents a starting point in the attempt to tackle this serious scientific question. Though the approach may be criticized as insufficiently coherent, exploring the issues of international order requires a diversified methodology that is not rooted in a single school of academic literature. In that regard, the author believes that this is not the only (true) way and that the same conundrum can be explored by other scientific approaches that could yield even better results. It should also be noted that the states, as primary actors of world politics, are depicted as rational subjects. Lastly, this is a humble research attempt to examine a subject that is possibly out of reach of a journal scientific paper and requires a larger format in order to be understood in its entirety.

DIVERGING NATURE AND POLITICAL MISCONCEPTIONS BETWEEN THE RISING AND REVISIONIST POWERS

As Hedley Bull writes, great powers instigate policies that contribute to the world order but, at the same time, exploit their position of preponderance by imposing a central degree of direction to the international society as a whole (Bull 2012: p. 200). For Bull, great powers as bearers of the world order are both "givers and takers", states that seek order in the international system because it benefits their status. However, this kind of political set up is also accompanied by the rising powers whose goal is to reach or get close as much as possible to the power apex of world politics. As Randall Schweller suggests, efforts to preserve the *status quo* by temporary dominating states eventually slows down, thus allowing other rising powers to gauge and explore the possibilities of potential change in the current system (Schweller 2014, p. 45).

Change to the international order is a somewhat inevitable phenomenon that will occur sooner or later, whether the bearer of the old order starts to decline or other actors accumulate enough power and gain capabilities to reorganize the temporary state of affairs. Although power is essential for an order changing ventures, those who accumulate enough power and ascend further in international politics do not necessarily have to be the actors who will participate in order changing ventures or so-called revisionism. The definition of a “rising power” has no clear outlines; therefore, debating over a riser and a revisionist to the international order can sometimes be a confusing matter leading to inconclusive answers. A lack of clear definition of such terms derives mostly from the academic literature that has often identified a rising power and a revisionist as similar constructs that follow the same strategic choices in world politics (Gilpin 1981; Organski and Kugler 1981; Kennedy 1988; Modelski 1987; Goldstein 1989).

The concepts of power transition and hegemonic war theory, which argue that change in the temporary international order is inevitable since rising states will challenge the hegemon and its order as soon as they accumulate enough power or when the power of the hegemon declines to a sufficient extent, suffer from some illogicalities regarding the temporary material status of a rising power. A rising power, by definition, is doing better than everyone else in the current order; therefore, it is illogical to assume that (of all states) a rising power that prospers will adopt revisionist behaviour and initiate an order-changing war. Countries that prosper in the current international order have no reasonable incentives to engage in a costly global war with uncertain outcomes in order to overthrow the order that has worked for them thus far. Furthermore, changing the ruling coalition with new dominating power is an untested endeavour that can lead to uncertain outcomes in the future (Schweller 2015, p. 4). As we have noted at the beginning of this paper, countries should be perceived as rational actors. Such actors, by nature, should not be prone to risky endeavours that can backfire and endanger their future position in the international order, especially if their current position in the *status quo* promises future growth. As David Edelstein notes, rising powers recognize that their brightest days lie ahead, so they will seek to avoid anything that can prevent them from realizing that potential (Edelstein 2017, p. 23).

Before going further with the debate regarding the differences between a rising power and a revisionist, we should bear in mind that the nature of the riser’s expansion or ascendance can impact the perception whether that country will be deemed as a benevolent rising power or a revisionist state from the standpoint of a current dominating power. Emerging powers often see their interest expand along with their capabilities; in effect, revisionist attempts usually correspond with their relative power (Montgomery 2016, p. 25). A.F.K Organski debates, however, that one of the primary reasons why the US had a peaceful

rise and did not provoke the British was due to America's internal rapid growth that did not threaten the interests of the ruling hegemon. Although the Americans won their independence at the expense of the British colonial power, their future aspirations were not directed against the British Empire. The fact that the US did not want to upset the current set of rules, change the already established political and economic institutions or proclaim its own ideology represented a major factor for America's peaceful rise (Organski 1968, pp. 362-363). Michelle Murray further emphasizes that the strategic interests of the US and the UK were not zero-sum, while the collective Anglo-Saxon identity heavily influenced the British perception of the US rapid expansion as an endeavour that would ultimately serve the Crown's overall interest. Murray notes that powers able to identify each other in the same way are also able to build mutual trust and recognition. When their identities align, the hegemon is able to interpret the rising power's true intentions, which are not hostile and, therefore, will not undermine the hegemon's status. Ultimately, the rapprochement between the rising power of the US and the British hegemony was accomplished due to the political intent of the United States, which aspired to be a similar major power as was the UK. (Murray 2019, pp. 176-177, 195-196). Although some could argue that the US after achieving power dominance in the western hemisphere pressured the UK and some other European powers to dismantle their colonial empires, which also hasten their industrial and economic fall from the top tier of great powers, this essentially did not provoke any deeper hostilities between them. Moreover, the whole period of the 20th century led to further cooperation between the western countries that ultimately ended with the United States' legitimate leadership of the regional order.

Thus, we could observe the United States as a rising power that inherited the Anglo-French international order without any trace of revisionist intent. In other situations, the rising power intentions have been usually aggressive or revolutionary as Stacie Goddard notes, which openly threatened the current *status quo* and the power status of the ruling hegemon (Goddard 2018: p. 8). Enthroning itself as a sole global power after the Cold War, the US managed to recalibrate the structure of international politics. With the beginning of the unipolar era, the international order became rigid and hierarchical, seemingly deprived of any kind of competitor that could potentially defy the unipole's political will.

The traditional approach argues that anarchy, as a prevailing condition in international relations, leads to balancing behaviour, which does not allow any state to reign supreme and impose its will on others. As Waltz argues, balancing occurs because states seek to maximize their security in the anarchical structure, therefore, forging alliances against the dominating power (Waltz 1979, pp. 130-133). However, in our contemporary unipolar system, the concept of anarchy

does not neatly correspond with the traditional idea of international order. After the Cold War, many have chosen to bandwagon instead of to balance against the American-led order. William Wohlforth indicates that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States' overwhelming power in all aspects (including military, economy, technology and geopolitics) made balancing strategies of the second-tier states increasingly expensive and, thus, out of reach (Wohlforth 1999, pp. 7-8). Moreover, as David Lake underlines, in the post-Cold War era, many have chosen a more benign way of bandwagoning with the US rather than balancing against it. For Lake, this represents a clear sign of acceptance of the US authority and the unipolar structure that is more hierarchical than anarchical (Lake 2009, p. 176). If truth be told, the post-Cold War structure became increasingly hierarchical and organized around superordinate and subordinate states crisscrossed with institutions and norms governed by relatively liberal relationships among actors (Ikenberry 2011, p. 37). In such an international structure, a rising state that does not bandwagon with the current coalition, even if it does not engage in balancing, can be marked as a revisionist because it does not fit with the established hierarchical structure. As a matter of fact, in such a structure, balancing behaviour becomes the very definition of revisionism because in order to restore the balance to the system, it entails overthrowing the unipolar structure and its ruling hegemon. Unipolarity represents the only system where balancing is revisionist and not *status quo* politics (Schweller and Pu 2011, pp. 45-48).

Interestingly enough and in contrast to the previous argument, the stability of the unipolar structure does not solely hinge on the balancing behaviour of other actors and potential competitors to the ruling power. As Robert Jarvis points out, although deemed satisfactory by the ruling hegemon, the unipole structure can also instigate aggressive behaviour towards other potential competitors because of uncertainty that the future may hold. The realist logic behind the argument is relatively simple. However secure states are, only rarely can they be secure enough; and if they are currently very powerful, they will have strong impulses to act and prevent future deterioration (Jarvis 2009, p. 200). The paradox of the unipolar structure is that, although it provides power preponderance to the ruling state (coalition), it can also induce a degree of "paranoia" towards other rising powers, which can be perceived as revisionists because they could potentially threaten the future status of the contemporary hegemon as the gap of relative strength between them narrows. In light of the unipolar structure, the hegemon's own perception of the rising powers and their politics may actually determine whether the actor will be marked as a benevolent rising power or simply a revisionist.

In his predation theory, Joshua R. Shiffrin brings an interesting twist to the idea of the *status quo* powers and their perception towards new rising states. In his work, Shiffrin argues that the rising power's perception of a declining hegemon

actually determines whether the country will behave like a benevolent-supportive “riser” or whether it will partake in a revisionist endeavour. According to him, rising powers usually prey upon the declining hegemon in order to secure their ascendance in world politics. Rising powers can either support the declining hegemon in order to secure the balance and their position in the upcoming order, or they can intervene aggressively against the hegemon if his posture proves to be hostile and there are no sufficient reasons to further delay his decline. In Shiffrin’s theory, the political posture of the rising state is actually formed by the state’s own perception of the role which a declining hegemon might play in the coming international order (Shiffrin 2018, pp. 13-22). The problem with the theory is that predation does not leave much space for other factors, such as the character of the international structure, participation in the international government organizations, equal institutional development or any kind of cooperation that could influence the perception and relations between the established power and the rising one. Shiffrin’s theory perceives rising powers as the de-facto revisionist states with more or less subtle revisionist intent. The theory essentially views the international structure in ultra-Hobbesian fashion, in which all actors are prone to aggression in order to accomplish more power and security.

On the other hand, Steve Chan writes that although some of the states can be described as “dissatisfied”, which may propel some of them to expand or change, their revisionist or “anti-status quo” behaviour should essentially be determined on the basis of their attitudes towards the prevailing institutions and rules of conduct in the international relations. For Chan, a revisionist power is one that exhibits clear opposition when seeking to change and replace current institutions and rules of the contemporary order, thus mitigating the adverse effects the structure can impose on its future development. He notes that such regimes express ideologies that challenge the established values, expectations and ordering principles espoused by the existing international system. Unlike Itkowitz, Chan bolsters the idea that not all rising powers should be treated as default revisionists. In his view, treating a state that gains power and status under the existing order as a revisionist state (simply because it closes the power-gap between the state and the ruling hegemon) actually creates an analytical constant that focuses exclusively on power shifts, disregarding the actual political intent of the belligerents (Chan 2008, pp. 28-30). Jin Kai also confirms this reasoning to a certain extent. For Kai, a rising power can turn revisionists if the system fails to accommodate sufficient changes to the newly established power structure. Namely, the revisionist intent does not originate from the internal structure of the rising state, but rather from the external structure of the system that cannot satisfy the rising power’s needs in terms of established rules, norms and mechanisms that prevent its further accomplishment of national interests (Kai 2017, p. 36). As long as the ruling powers, as bearers of the system, are willing to accommodate rising

powers legitimate interests, the latter should have no reasonable motive to oppose the hegemon and initiate an order changing politics. Moreover, rising powers fear the disturbances in the contemporary order since it can provoke unforeseen consequences, such as balancing coalitions, which can ultimately disrupt their further ascendance (MacDonald and Parent 2018, pp. 65-66).

Although the mentioned authors and their respective works, which represent new research endeavors in the sphere of revisionism, make excellent arguments regarding the dilemma between revisionist states and rising powers, we should not forget about an older scientific theory which finely depicts the structural problem that is present in our contemporary politics. Johan Galtung's theory of aggression can help us summarize the dilemma between a rising state and a revisionist one. In his theory, Galtung argues that, although the individual or in our case one's internal characteristics can be important, the social environment or structure is the primary propellant for change or for aggression which propels change. Aggression actually represents a way out of the dissatisfactory or frustrating situation, which essentially harbors change to the temporary position of the perceived entity. The international structure, however balanced, is largely in a state of disequilibrium which exists between the structure's elements, in our case countries. Disequilibrium, which by default imposes ranks among nations, also suggests that some of them will be ranked as top dogs and some of them as underdogs of the system. For Galtung, the rank-disequilibrium system propels aggression among actors. In time, some of the lower-ranking nations will compete and eventually catch up with the top dogs of the system; however, their efforts or newly gained status do not automatically mean that they will be recognized as powers and integrated into the established order. The aggression and the revisionist intent of these actors will further excel if the system's integrational character is low or mobility channels blocked. Thus, a rising power that manages to transcend its limitations and its underdog status also expects to be integrated, or at least recognized, as a top-dog rank nation. If that nation is voted out of existence and denied membership in the great power club, it can be expected that the revisionist character and aggression will develop within a reasonable time span (Galtung 1964, pp. 95-99, 110-114).

The revisionist attitude, although partly based on the countries' intent to accept or oppose the temporary international order, is mainly determined by the rigidity of the order itself, regarding the willingness of the ruling hegemon (coalition) to accommodate the rising powers' needs. In contemporary world politics, there are no counterweights for the ruling hegemon; therefore, internal impulses may prevail, resulting in politics governed by unchecked power. Waltz notes that a state stronger than any other can decide whether to conform its policies to structural pressures and whether to avail itself of the opportunities the structural change may offer (Waltz 2000, p. 24). As with all monopolistic

structures, paying rents does not necessarily improve the relations inside the monopoly; on the contrary, it usually provides further incentive for the holder to widen its monopolistic reach. As such, the whole structure becomes extractive in essence. The structural inability to redistribute effectively the proceeds of the global status is a major incentive for rivals to seek change (Modelski 1978, p. 232). In the end, the hegemon's own hold over the unipolar order and the desire to preserve the *status quo* drives rising powers towards revisionism.

In a nutshell, rising powers could be designated as relatively content states that do not seek revision at first; however, due to the structure of the international order and the perception of the ruling coalition, their attitudes may change over time. Most (if not all) rising powers have managed to excel and expand their gradient of strength in the framework of the already established system of international norms and institutions; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the initial drive for revisionism does not necessarily come from their internal structure, nor do the rising powers accept revisionism as a default “work system” on which they operate. Relations between the rising power and the established countries, which constitute the ruling “clique” of international order more often than not, decide whether the rising power will be accepted and recognized, or whether it will be sidelined as a tier-two power that is by nature inferior. As we have noted previously, the frustration which propels aggression and the need for change comes from the social structure that confines the subject while rejecting its newly established status in the international system.

Revisionist powers, on the other hand, are states that have already passed the threshold of “aggressive intent”. In other words, they have already singled their intentions to other actors, especially *status quo* states, that their dissatisfaction with the current order demands certain alterations to it. In that manner, revisionists cannot be content with their status, even if that status suggests a rising power position that can potentially prosper further in the future. Therefore, revisionists, unlike regular rising powers, tend to disregard their current position in hope that change will be even more beneficial for their future status in the new-altered international order. Revisionists, though dependant on power, should not be defined solely by that category because power is common for other rising states as well. Rather, revisionists should be judged upon their politics towards the *status quo* and the majority that accepts such order, as well as their power capacities to make changes whether on a regional or global scale.

RISING POWERS' POSITION IN THE HIERARCHY OF THE UNIPOLAR ORDER

In the first part of this article, we have argued that the rising powers do not behave in a revisionist manner by default; rather, it is the structure of the

international order that may induce their revisionist intent. In the second part, we will try to explain how the structure produces a hierarchy that is in contrast with the rising powers' ambitions usually focused on asserting their newly established status. The basic argument here is that the rising powers' position has often been hindered by the already established power structure manifested in the hierarchy of the contemporary unipolar international order.

Power transition theorists believe that a successful dominant power tends to create alliances which include most of the great powers, middle powers and small states, which are satisfied and in principle accept the current structure of the intentional order. (Kai 2017, p. 34) This can be perceived as an attempt by the hegemon to create a hierarchical environment that ultimately serves his interest and status. The effects of security and stability that the hegemon provides within the order, as public goods, represent the means by which other members accept the established hierarchical structure. David Lake, as one of the well-known authors exploring hierarchy in international politics, further argues that the success of the Western-led international order lies within the liberal framework of the US hegemony whose hierarchy is deemed legitimate by the subordinate states. The authority of the liberal hegemon rests on the acceptance of the subordinate states as well as on their perception of the hegemon's credibility in terms of self-restraint and willingness not to exploit or endanger smaller states' interests. Authority as a social construct is based on mutual trust between the dominating and subordinating units, which can, over time, produce incentives for vesting future interests in the international order governed by the legitimate authority (Lake 2014: pp. 64-65). Although Lake argues that possible challengers can be converted into supporters if they become vested into the structure of the contemporary order (i.e., if their interests become intertwined with the hegemon's interests), in truth, many of the rising powers that have benefited from the US-led order are still struggling with the acceptance of the American global authority.

In light of structural theory, the unipolar order seems at least stable of all possible variations regarding the visage of international politics. Waltz, among many, often argued that unipolarity bears great expenses to the leading power, which ultimately ends in failure to properly govern. Moreover, since there are no checks and balances in the unipolar structure, the dominant power is prone to misuse its capabilities, thus worsening the situation with other weaker states that will start to worry about the hegemon's behaviour (Waltz 2000, pp. 1-2). The reach of the US legitimate authority, which Lake writes about, is relatively confined to and embedded within the unipolar structure that prevailed after the Cold War. As noted by Birthe Hansen, a unipolar power is in a unique position to spread its own political model and international agenda, thanks to the prevailing unipolar structure (Hansen 2000, pp. 112-123). Such state of affairs indicates the causal relationship with the Lake's concept of authority and

hierarchy that a dominant power may produce, albeit hierarchy in the unipolar structure is not necessarily produced by the legitimate authority but rather by the structure of the international order and the overwhelming asymmetry of power between the hegemon and other states.

Hence, we can debate that the unipolar moment is a permissive variable that allows the US global authority. Although the dominant power may provide “public goods”, much of its authority lies within the security-military capabilities and power projection capacities. In truth, by establishing its global military reach, the US has managed to impose its authority on other smaller countries. However, we should keep in mind that this same authority is not equally accepted by other major players. In fact, the unipole has relatively limited authority over other great powers that are not willing to accommodate such a state of affairs. Moreover, we can say that between the unipole and some major powers, relations are still relatively anarchic (Monteiro, p. 41). As Ikenberry underlines, the American-led order is governed by a distinctive mix of liberal and imperial characteristics that reinforce the overall international hierarchy (Ikenberry 2011, p. 15). For that reason, the idea of the United States as a legitimate bearer of the international hierarchy whose authority is mostly based on democracy and liberal foundations is somewhat questionable. Referring to the uniform approach to emerging issues, Lake does underline the importance of coercion for the dominant power’s overall success in establishing effective hierarchy. By deploying troops on other country’s soil, the dominant power by default provides security to the subordinate state while making it an integral part of its hierarchy. The integrated subordinate state also becomes an important part of the overall strategic design of the dominant power, especially if the possibilities of making alternative security choices by the subordinate are absent (Lake 2007, pp. 62-63). The absence of an alternative choice is the central point in which the hierarchy of the dominant power culminates.

Lake’s concept of hierarchy based on legitimate authority in the context of unipolar international order is debatable in terms of whether the authority is welcomed or must be accepted by smaller actors who are compelled to “get along with it” simply because there are no alternatives. That is not to say the US hegemony is based solely on coercion; however, we should not ignore the temporary dominant power willingness to sustain the unipolar structure by excluding other potential competitors on whom the leading power cannot impose its will. Although the hegemon’s order is certainly beneficial and attractive, the success of such international order has been accomplished partly by aggressive expansion or by filling the vacuum left by the end of the bipolar system. The NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and more recently in the Western Balkans is probably the most obvious example, although we can see a somewhat similar trend in East and Southeast Asia, where US efforts are aimed at controlling the Chinese influence in the region that bears great economic and strategic

significance for the United States hegemony. As a matter of fact, when certain rising powers make the bid for their own hierarchy or try to establish authority in certain regions, the US as a leading power does not act with restraint as a benevolent hegemon would; rather, it acts assertively and (in some cases) preventively in order to contain and control the rising powers' ambitions. Therefore, we should bear in mind that the *status quo* does not represent a neutral position. On the contrary, it constitutes a set of acquired interests which the *status quo* states seek to maintain along with their advantageous position in the contemporary system (Buzan 1983, p. 178). Thus, the United States' actions are to be expected, especially if Washington's temporary standing in international politics seems to be threatened by the perception of the rising state. The US constant military presence in the rimlands of Eurasia, which does not subside despite the ideas of American retrenchment, is probably the most obvious example of the hegemon's desire to stay present and deny the potential outreach of some rising powers.

The structure that has benefited the current dominating power thus far is gradually being altered; however, changes are slow while the global hegemon is still persistent in sustaining its leading position and status. Liberal capitalism, which represents the ideological core of the Western-led order, is accepted as a default operative system on which states interact with each other in international society. However, this does not mean that such an "ideational package" is equally accepted as a working environment in the domestic field of politics of some rising challengers. Namely, Russia during the last decade became much more traditionally orientated, propagating traditional values that are not in line with the Western liberal mindset. These ideological traits based on tradition are viewed as a blessing not only in Russia but also in some other Asian and Eastern European states. Moreover, the need and importance of traditional values in the Russian society is regarded as an essential-strategic objective for the upcoming decade, which is also defined in state documents such as "Strategies of development of education in Russian Federation" and somewhat briefly explained in "National security strategy of Russian Federation" (Patrušev 2020, Dugin 2016). Though at the first glance, these value-oriented traits may seem marginal since they are not directly focused on the idea of a market-based economy and capitalism, essentially they are challenging the American overall ideological narrative.

Although Ikenberry is right when he describes the post-Cold War order led by the US idea of the free-market economy as effective and accepted by all participants of international politics, the idea of the order's durability led by the current hegemon is less sustainable (Ikenberry 2008, p. 28). Namely, some rising states (as undercompensated states) have difficulties accepting the hierarchy of the dominant power simply because it will only widen the gap between their current position and their future ambitions as great powers. The logic which

follows is: if the risers accept the hierarchy of the dominant power, they also accept the legitimacy of the order as well as their current position in that order, which they are trying to change in the first place. The problem that derives from this is that the unipolar order does not recognize the alterations in power capabilities among the actors; this problem essentially calls for change in the distribution of authority as one of the central benefits wielded by great powers. Since such alterations are absent, rising powers have further incentive to change the order or dislodge the dominant power as the primary holder of the system.

The problem with the acceptance of the hegemon's authority can be traced back to Galtung's notion of top-dog and underdog relations as well. Although the smaller states may accept the hierarchy and see clear benefits stemming from it such as maritime security, trade, production and secured exports to bigger markets, access to energy sources, etc.; the rising challengers, on the other hand, can perceive hierarchy as a potential constraint that can limit their future ambitions such as reclaiming former territories, expanding economic and industrial reach, expanding military capabilities and lastly altering the visage of regional or global order to better suit their growing geopolitical needs. Furthermore, agreeing to external hierarchy one must also acknowledge that his position in that system will remain inferior, given that the rising power would need to align its future goals with the already established political framework of the leading authority in that hierarchy. In the contemporary unipolar structure, this is relatively obvious. Leading European powers ceded their authority to the US in order to survive the Cold War; however, once they accepted the external authority, their political behaviour remained mostly unchanged despite the dramatic structural alternations after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The hierarchy once accepted as legitimate can hardly be altered, especially if the bearer of the system remains strong or his position is unchallenged by other potential authorities. Contemporary rising powers are well aware of such a "trap". Furthermore, their reserved behaviour regarding the temporary institutions of the international order as well as their steady efforts to build parallel institutions are a fine representation of the rising powers' intentions on how the structure of the international order may be changed. In the next part of this article, we will examine different strategies and traits of contemporary revisionist states and how their revisionist efforts challenge not the international system but rather the leading power authority in that system.

STRATEGICAL OUTLINE OF MEASURED REVISIONISM

Explaining the idea of measured revisionism, Mazarr writes that the concept is not an overly aggressive or adventuristic worldview, essentially given that such states recognize the value of the rule-based order. As previously argued, most

of the rising powers did excel in an already established system of rules and relations. However, their rising ambitions and power capabilities drive them to demand the transformation of certain elements of the contemporary order, which consequentially invokes revisionism in some aspects of world politics (Mazarr 2015, p. 11).

If we could compare measured revisionists to an already established categorization of revisionist states, presented by Randall Schweller, they could be placed somewhere in between jackals and wolves, or between spoilers and shirkers (Schweller 1994, 2014). Schweller, as a well-known author who has extensively explored the idea of revisionism, did suggest the concept of limited revisionism in his earlier book “*Deadly Imbalances*”. However, the idea was developed in accordance with the Second World War environment, in which limited revisionist states were dependent on the so-called “wolves” or powerful revisionists, with whom they (limited revisionists) could bandwagon and hope for a beneficial change in the international order (Schweller 1998, p. 22). Measured revisionists, on the other hand, represent some of the contemporary rising powers, which are only second in line behind the dominating *status quo* coalition. These states cannot bandwagon simply because they have no one to bandwagon with. Today’s revisionists are at the forefront of the venture that is trying to alter the political layout of the international order. Measured revisionists can be defined as states that are eager for change, but they lack sufficient power capabilities and, more importantly, ideological foundations to seriously alter the contemporary international order. Nevertheless, it does not mean that they cannot change the magnitude of the hegemon’s authority and hopefully create a more favourable environment for their own geopolitical development. Ikenberry provides a fine depiction of measured revisionism: “They (potential revisionists) wish to enhance their position within the system, but they are not trying to replace it” (Ikenberry 2014, p. 8).

Delegitimizing the leading power’s authority is one of the primary tools of measured revisionism that could indicate the beginning of the power transition process, in which rising powers voice their dissatisfaction with the current order while laying the foundation for a new one (Schweller and Pu 2011, p. 44). Although we could argue that the process of measured revisionism starts before delegitimation, for example, when there are first glimpses of power shifts, essentially such occurrences bear no clear intent. As we mentioned in the first part of the paper revisionists signal their intent and dissatisfaction that leads towards other actions that can potentially change the visage of the particular order. Delegitimation, however benign it may seem, does signal certain intentions towards the subject and its given status in the international society.

According to Stephen Walt, the strategy of delegitimation is not intended to challenge the US power directly; instead, it is focused on undermining the belief

that the United States primacy is “automatic” or morally acceptable (Walt 2005, p. 125). Delegitimation, in truth, seeks to make others resent the hegemon’s dominance, thus making it harder for the dominant power to maintain its authority. Though the concept of delegitimation is focused on disproving the hegemon’s position on moral grounds, we should note that delegitimizing one’s position can also imply its incapability to maintain the former line of work and its overall capabilities to deliver on promises and fulfil obligations. By practicing such strategies, revisionists do not necessarily alter the founding principles of the international order while still being able to undermine the hegemon, which ultimately allows them to transform the power relations as well as their own position in the future international order.

As a strategy of measured revisionism, delegitimization can also be a byproduct of great power asymmetry between the hegemon and the challengers. Since potential revisionists cannot reach power parity with the dominant power, they are inclined to probe the hegemon’s resolve and his political commitment in different world regions or different spheres of international politics. The process of gauging the hegemon’s resolve includes complex strategies, “campaigns in the grey zone” as Mazarr calls them, comprising a variety of state and non-state instruments of power, which are all essentially ambiguous and very elusive in their core (Mazarr 2016, pp. 43-53). The reason why contemporary revisionists choose not to openly engage with the *status quo* power is not solely based on great power asymmetry and lack of power parity but, it also indicates that modern revisionists recognize the increasing interdependence in the global society and the importance of the leading power’s position for the stability of the system. Therefore, modern revisionists can also be described as spoilers or disruptors that question the legitimacy of the current order; however, due to their embeddedness in the international economy and institutions, their revisionism is ultimately held in check (Duke 2017, p. 76).

The concept of probing represents the next aspect of measured revisionism and how modern revisionists attempt to challenge and possibly make changes in the *status quo*. Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel define probing as a low-risk and low-intensity endeavour aimed at gauging an adversary’s power and will to maintain influence and security over a region. Such action avoids direct military confrontation while being focused on the outer rims of the adversary’s (hegemon’s) commitments and interests. Probing is used by rising actors that wish to challenge the great power, and it is used at times when the great power is seemingly beginning its retreat (Mitchell and Grygiel 2016). Though when examining this strategic behaviour, we should keep in mind the political background of the authors, there is no doubt that the rising challengers are partaking in such probing politics that test not only the United States commitment but its authority as well. By targeting the hegemon’s outer reaches

of power, the adversaries focus on the weak spots and less attractive points in the hegemon's strategic planning. From the dominating power's standpoint, this may not seem important; on the other hand, for allies and other inferior states that seek protection from the hegemon, this can result in a change of strategic orientation. Thus, the leading power's authority in outer regions may be compromised, which will consequentially reflect on the perception of hierarchy among subordinates and whom they should really rely on in the future.

Hybrid warfare is probably the most visible manifestation of probing behaviour. This type of warfare can be designated as a conflict that has a starting point without the exact moment of victory, which combines a wide spectrum of "measures other than war" with the usage of conventional armed forces that direct their operations towards other combatants and non-combatants in a specific theatre of war. (Hoffman 2017: pp. 43-44, Vuković 2018: pp. 15-18, Pejić 2019: pp. 429-431). Though the term is closely related to the Ukrainian crisis and Frank Hoffman's new definition of this phenomenon, which directly binds it to the Russian operations in Ukraine, in truth, this type of warfare tactics has also been practiced by other powers, such as China and Iran. However, we should keep in mind that though hybrid warfare is becoming a somewhat *modus-operandi* for rising challengers in their efforts to quell the American influence in some parts of the world, there is no clear evidence that the US is capable or willing to practice such type of warfare for the time being (Khodarenok, Zinchenko 2016).

The Chinese growing geostrategic assertiveness in the South China Sea, which is reflected in its maritime infrastructure projects on the disputed islands, also corresponds with hybrid and probing tactics (Deutsche Welle 2017). Though there is no open military confrontation, both sides in this maritime region have been wary of each other's moves and how it can potentially reflect on other smaller countries, ultimately impacting the regional order. Lastly, Hezbollah's dedication to the Syrian president, the growing Iranian influence in the Middle East, as well as Tehran's unrelenting politics that are targeting the Saudis, represent political practices that also belong to the family of hybrid warfare. Similar to other challengers, Iranian ambitions are directed towards reforming the regional hierarchy, pushing the United States out by focusing pressure on its regional allies.

The process that also corresponds with delegitimation of US authority and probing tactics is the idea of soft and internal balancing. In a traditional sense, states balance against power or, as Stephen Walt argued in his older work, states can also balance against threats (Walt 1987, pp. 17-50). Soft balancing is a subtle strategy that allows other actors to limit the US abilities to impose its preferences on others by employing conscious and coordinated diplomatic action (Brooks 2012, pp. 36-39). Robert Pape writes that soft balancing basically signals a commitment to resist future ambitions of the current superpower (Pape 2005, pp. 36-39). Internal balancing also represents a viable political strategy, somewhat

similar to probing, which allows potential revisionists to contain American power. According to Walt, internal balancing is focused on challenging the hegemon with asymmetrical measures in the spheres where his overwhelming power has no greater effect (Walt 2006, pp. 99-106). Although terrorism or guerilla warfare are usually marked as frequent tactics for internal balancing efforts against the US, contemporary military efforts in the form of hybrid warfare may also represent viable strategies for this type of balancing. The effectiveness of these strategies lies not only in their subtle form of utilization but also in their self-reinforcing nature. Both soft and internal balancing may or may not provoke the hegemon to extend its efforts to suppress the adversaries' political intentions. If the hegemon chooses not to react, he might be marked as a declining power, thus giving the challengers further incentives; on the other hand, if the hegemon reacts, he risks potential overextension in areas or spheres which are not in his primary domain.

For some challengers, balancing seems to be a rather efficient strategy in curbing the American presence in some regions of the world. Russia is probably the best example here since it successfully managed to “outplay” the American strategic efforts in Georgia, Syria and Ukraine while positioning itself as a reliable partner in the MENA region. Restoring its strong role in the “Near Abroad” as well as providing military support for the Syrian legitimate government, Russia made its intentions public regarding her interest in these vital regions. Moreover, Russian military actions in these regions, which were mostly based on employing conventional forces, also indicated that Russia is capable of balancing the external-western presence in a more traditional manner. The problem that Russia faces, as well as some other rising powers, is the lack of cohesiveness among the rising powers and their actions that makes broader balancing efforts against Washington a rather complicated task. Although some of the rising powers participate in certain international forums, the SCO and the BRICS being the most prominent ones, there are no wider efforts in terms of establishing a unique political front as it exists among the *status quo* coalition.

The problem with this lies in unequal power distribution among the challengers, which Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth explained in their book “*America Abroad*”. Based on Barry Buzan's previous model, they established a framework of 1+1+X, where 1 represents the dominating power or the US; China, the first leading rising power, is also depicted as 1, while all other rising powers are categorized by X (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016, pp. 64-72). In this manner, the changing unipolar order will be delegated among the *status quo* state and a leading rising power, while all others will most likely have to follow in their footsteps. Although this formula is questionable, regarding the X position, it does explain why there is no deeper political engagement among the revisionists. While the potential challengers want to change the hierarchy of the temporary order,

essentially they do not view any of their “compatriots” as a suitable replacement for the current hegemon. Apparently, replacing one unipole with another one is not the solution the challengers are searching for. As the matter of fact, the Russian insistence on multipolar discourse in international politics, which is often being pushed in their foreign policy agenda, is probably the best representation of how modern-measured revisionists see the future of world politics. Furthermore, in Chinese foreign politics, the discourse of the multipolar world is also relatively present. China, as an economic giant, sees herself on the same level as the West in terms of overall industrial capacity. However, in aspects of governing relations even on the regional level, China is not perceived as a trustworthy subject (Johnston 2003, pp. 25-38). The “trustworthiness” issue with China primarily stems from her relations with regional countries and growing Chinese assertiveness towards territorial claims with her neighbours. Besides the well-known disputes in the South-China Sea, Beijing also holds territorial disputes with almost all of its land neighbours. Although the Chinese government did practice peaceful ways in resolving these issues through diplomacy, in recent clashes with Indian armed forces, many smaller countries in the region raised serious concern regarding the Chinese efforts in reclaiming some of its disputed territories (Jokanović 2014, Krishnankutty 2020, Peace Palace Library 2016, Council on Foreign Relations 2020). In that regard, Beijing’s political attitude towards the region is somewhat similar to the American approach towards some smaller countries that did not follow the narrative of great power. We had witnessed on numerous occasions that American democracy and liberalism are relatively reserved concepts if the country in question does not abide by the rule of the hegemon. Though American and Chinese approaches are not equivalent, neither in scope nor intensity, they certainly raise a similar amount of suspicion among smaller regional actors that are or were hoping for a different kind of leadership. That being said, we should keep in mind that the strategies implemented by some rising powers are not “brand” new nor exclusive for the contemporary challengers. Similar strategic behaviour could have been observed in the politics of other western powers when they strived to position themselves as great powers in the system.

Reluctance to openly balance against the US authority can also demonstrate a lack of trust among the challengers. In other words, the rising powers do not have enough confidence in their allies or partners and their commitment to actually contribute to the same objective, which is to change the current political layout. As Walt argues, forming any kind of anti-American coalition would be a frustrating effort. Such an alliance would still be substantially weaker than the US, which could induce rifts and uncertainties among the members (Walt 2005, pp. 98-99). Therefore, adversaries engage in soft balancing, the probing of the hegemon’s power and campaigns in the grey zone, which all represent different

strategies of measured revisionism, i.e., an effort to limit the hegemon's authority while not directly provoking it or creating unnecessary distortions across the international system.

Delegitimizing authority in such a manner implies that modern revisionists, unlike their predecessors, are not risk-takers but rather risk-averse states. This comes from the already mentioned asymmetry of power, as well as from their uncertain perception of the hegemon's actual decline. Despite various predictions on US hegemony decline, regarding its economic and military capabilities of sustaining its global presence, the United States is still actively present in almost all spheres of international politics that bear some kind of strategic significance for the hegemon (Симић and Живојиновић 2011; Joffe 2009; Nye 2010; Cox 2007; Strange 1987). Nevertheless, the last two American administrations have already hinted and even proposed that the US global presence is becoming a burdensome task and should be reassessed. Both Obama's and Trump's election campaign narratives had been focused on the idea of limiting American engagement in Eurasia, which suggested that the American government will implement retrenchment strategies. Yet, once the President is in office, hegemonic policies seem to be in check as usual. American engagement in the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, the back and forth politics with China and North Korea, the newly asserted stance toward the Iranian nuclear problem, as well as the US military covert operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East, represent mixed signals whether the US is actually implementing the politics of retrenchment or not.²

² See: Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Obama the Carpenter: The President's National Security Legacy", Brookings, Washington, DC., May 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/obama-the-carpenter-the-presidents-national-security-legacy/>; Derek Chollet, The Myth of American Disengagement, Defence One, 20 May 2016, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/05/myth-american-disengagement/128483/>; Kim Ghattas, Obama's struggle to realise anti-war rhetoric, BBC News, Washington, 21 December 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35123915/>; George E. Condon Jr., Obama's Legacy and the "Endless" War, the Atlantic, 15 October 2015; <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/obamas-legacy-and-the-endless-war/443193/>; Michael Crowley, Obama's Ukraine policy in shambles, Politico Magazine, 02/29/2016, <https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/obama-ukraine-russia-putin-219783>; Steven A. Cook, Trump's Syria Policy Isn't Retrenchment. It's Pandering, Foreign Policy, 9 April 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/09/trumps-syria-policy-isnt-retrenchment-its-pandering/>; Peter Harris, Why Trump Won't Retrench: The Militarist Redoubt in American Foreign Policy, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 133 Number 4 2018, pp. 611-640; Quint Forgey, Trump warns U.S. 'may have to get in wars', Politico Magazine, 10/21/2019; <https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/21/trump-united-states-wars-iran-053341>; Stephen Collinson, Trump's warning to Iran raises fears of war — and confusion, CNN, 16 Sept. 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/16/politics/us-iran-saudi-arabia-yemen/index.html>; Sam Meyerson, President Trump's Iran Policy: The Specter of a Needless War, Harvard Political Review, 18 October 2019, <https://harvardpolitics.com/world/iran-war/>.

Retrenchment as a strategy implies a policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a decline of relative power (MacDonalnd and Parent 2011, p. 11). Most commonly, retrenchment strategies may occur when there is disequilibrium between states' global commitments and available resources, in other words, when states experience the so-called "Lippmann Gap" (Lippmann 1943, pp. 7-8). In addition, retrenchment policies may be initiated by the rising power or other actors, which by default induce the perception of the relative decline of the dominating state (Haynes 2015, p. 492). Although the decline may not be the primary case for revisionists growing assertiveness, the rise of power among other actors certainly contributes to the notion that the gap of relative strength has grown thinner. As Fareed Zakaria notes, "every year the balance shifts"; and while American power is still unparalleled, many of the rising actors and potential challengers have grown at the expense of western countries, which are locked in a slow demographically determined decline. As Zakaria further underlines, in every realm except the military, visible shifts in power are more than obvious (Zakaria 2008, pp. 41-42). In that respect, measured revisionists are aware that the hegemon will not be able to hold equally on all fronts of power; therefore, small mistakes can overtime cumulate to a larger strategical difficulty. As Professor Dragan Simić writes, none of the great powers that were facing a relative decline had managed to preventively stop the rise of other powers; moreover, entering such a race, the leading power would only hasten its demise. For a dominating power, facing an increasingly rising competition-opposition, the strategic resemblance of its interests and commitments can represent a crucial step that can prevent further aggression from such challengers that are constantly rising on the world's power ladder (Simić 2012, p. 320).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The research results of this paper can be summarized by referring to a couple of key aspects of the subject matter under consideration. The first aspect points to the differences between rising powers and revisionist powers. These two categories, which have been mistakenly presented as synonyms in some of the older academic literature, actually differ in terms of strategic choices and political behaviour. While the latter cannot go without the former, meaning that a revisionist power must be a rising power as well, their strategical incentives differ in terms of politics and relations towards the ruling hegemon or coalition. We should note that revisionist politics do not necessarily derive from the internal structure of the rising power, but are rather provoked by the structure of the order itself. As Galtung had already explained in his theory of aggression, the restrictive structure of the environment can invoke aggressive behaviour, which propels change. The rigidity of the unipolar order and its monopolistic nature

could be a major incentive for the rising powers to adopt revisionist policies in order to change the scope and reach of the hegemon.

Unipolarity as a system, in contrast to traditional understating of anarchy and the international order, is based on a hierarchy of the leading power and its authority seemingly established as a default “work environment” in international politics. Although the authority of the United States is accepted to a certain extent, we should keep in mind that the absence of other poles of power has largely contributed to the overall legitimacy of the dominating power’s authority. In other words, unipolarity represents a permissive variable that allows the growth of the US authority. In such an environment, it is debatable whether the authority is welcomed or whether it is accepted simply because there are no other alternatives. The unipolar power has the interest to preserve such a state of affairs, excluding other potential competitors or curbing their attempts to change the current state of affairs. The dichotomy that propels change in the contemporary international order can be seen in the hegemon’s will to sustain its position as a wielder of global authority and in the rising powers’ growing ambitions to create a more suitable political environment in which they are not constrained by the imposing hierarchy of the unipolar order.

Measured revisionists, due to their limits in power and the overall structure of the contemporary global political-economic environment, cannot hope to change the visage of the international order as it was done in the past. Modern revisionists are primarily interested in changing the scope and intensity of the United States authority and how it functions in different regions of the world. The main problem from the revisionists’ perspective is not in the fundamental layout of the contemporary order, which helped the rising powers in the first place, but rather in the hierarchy that is deemed detrimental to the rising powers’ future interests. However, the predicament that the revisionists are facing is based on their dependency, especially in economic terms, on the hegemon and his ability to sustain the framework of the international order. In other words, contemporary rising powers dissatisfied with the American global governance have neither the capacities nor political will to govern over the global society, henceforth the attribute “measured”. The revisionists (though eager to initiate change) are only aiming at particular aspects of the international order.

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ODMERENI REVIZIONIZAM: PROMENA ODNOSA MOĆI IZMEĐU STATUS KVO SILA I IZAZIVAČA U SAVREMENOM MEĐUNARODNOM PORETKU

Apstrakt: U ovom radu pokušaćemo da upostavimo konceptualni okvir kako sile u usponu i revizionisti sagledavaju svoju poziciju u savremenom međunarodnom poretku. Problematika rada fokusirana je na strukturu unipolarnog poretka i pojavu hijerarhije u takvom poretku, koja različito utiče na aktere svetske politike. Naime, sile u usponu kao i potencijalni izazivači na različite načine procenjuju svoju buduću poziciju u međunarodnom poretku. Ipak, s obzirom na složenost savremenog međunarodnog poretka kao i sve veću međuzavisnost svih aktera u njemu, revizionizam kao metod promene status kvo-a drugačije funkcioniše nego što je to bio slučaj u prethodnim epohama međunarodne politike. Opseg savremenog revizionizma je u mnogome ograničen što je inače posledica strukture unipolarnog poretka, ali takođe proizilazi i iz činjenice da savremeni revizionisti ne poseduju ideološku potporu koja bi služila kao alternativa fundamentalnim principima na kome počiva savremeni poredak. Zbog ovoga savremeni revizionizam se može odrediti kao odmeren ili mek, koji nije usmeren ka promeni glavnih principa poretka, već je fokusiran na promenu hijerarhije koja omogućava vodećoj sili da rukovodi međunarodnim poretkom. Problematika strukture unipolarnog poretka i kako se ona odražava na potencijalne revizioniste analizirana je iz kvalitativne perspektive. Cilj ovog rada je da sagleda razlike između sila u usponu i potencijalnih revizionista kao i da predstavi strateške opcije koje su dostupne revizionistima u cilju ispunjenja širih geopolitičkih ciljeva.

Glavne reči: odmereni revizionizam, međunarodni poredak, sile u usponu, unipolarnost, status quo.

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75 YEARS OF UNITED NATIONS*

*Select addresses at the conference: "United Nations – Between Vision and Reality", held in Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, on October 22 2020.

Address by Simona-Mirela Miculescu
Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of UNOB,
held on web conference:

“United Nations – Between Vision and Reality”

Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

As always, the Institute of International Politics and Economics is a solid partner for the United Nations, organizing this time an interesting round table to celebrate UN's 75th anniversary that makes us reflect and give our views on the dichotomy “Vision – Reality”! Thank you so much for this opportunity, but also for your constant support and friendship!

As it was when the UN Charter was devised and signed, the world remains riddled with crises and immense challenges. What else has changed? While it is difficult to completely step back and look at such a length of time, a few things are certain. The world of human relations, at the widest level, has become more complex, interwoven and interdependent, due to the revolutions in technology, information-sharing, and the use of instantaneous media, than it could possibly have ever been in human history. By the present year 2020, this rate of change on a world-wide scale has also increased to an unprecedented level.

Earlier in this history, known and generally understood rulebooks shaped war and peace. Not so anymore. The world has become more ruleless, and the institutions which were created in part to regulate the application of multi-national rules – the UN in particular – find themselves in a strange situation where rules are applied less and less when it comes to inter-state relations.

Accordingly, the nature of power itself has also changed. Material strength is probably still the biggest factor in the power of individual states, but now in 2020, the most powerful actors draw almost as much upon networks, relationships, and information. Unfortunately, from the point of view of the UN and its original objectives, the actors more often use these new forms of power to compete with each other than to cooperate with each other.

We see all this in the immediate issues affecting southeast Europe. The internal problems of the region mirror those seen throughout the world: the reality of increased material inequality, the crisis of welfare systems and, thereby, lack of confidence in governments. Also, the primacy of self-interested survival and corruption in politics.

Similarly, geo-political interests are still too rarely of any help in stabilizing regional and sub-regional problems. Here in Serbia, the EU's internal issues have left many EU countries with less appetite for letting others in and have raised the bar compared to where it stood ten or twenty years ago. Candidates for membership, such as Serbia, naturally, therefore, face much more cynical public opinion about the value of membership altogether. The shifting tides of the world power can also make other options seem just as (if not more) attractive.

So, especially for smaller states and regions, the changing nature of global disorder makes manoeuvring even more challenging, seemingly with less control over their population's own destinies.

So the role for the UN, nominally still the standard-bearer of the international order instead of chaos, has also become exponentially more difficult. Ironically, this has also made succeeding in this role all the more urgent.

The current pandemic seems almost tailor-made for reminding us how essential multilateral cooperation really is to human survival. Amidst the noise of domestic and international politics, attention to most essential issues, those on which human survival really depends — like controlling disease and preserving the ecosystems which make any life possible — tend to get completely lost from the thinking of many people.

The pandemic thus arrives as a sobering reminder of what is actually the most important. As the disease rapidly spread across the globe, Secretary-General Guterres used the opportunity to underline to the UN Member States that “to overcome today's fragilities and challenges we need more international cooperation — not less. Strengthened multilateral institutions — not a retreat from them.”

It is still far more difficult to convince people of this than it should be. The world does not just wake up from its slumber one day to discover everyone has realized how interdependent we actually all are. Will it take another cataclysm to trigger this awakening, such as the Second World War? We all hope it does not.

But as things stand, and far too often, the UN itself risks to become just another confused actor, subject to the whims of its stronger Member nations, and struggling to cope with the rate of the transformations taking place all around us.

I do not have magical answers in mind, but what I am sure of is that the need to consider these questions is as urgent, perhaps more urgent than it has ever been during the past 75 years.

With that in mind, I offer some food for thought as you address this difficult subject: the space between the Vision and the Reality of the United Nations, and how it might help move from the latter towards the former!

First, the UN needs to become better at what most successful countries and organizations are already ahead of: namely, strategic communications. It has to use media platforms that help its noble ideals compete more strongly in the current chaos of the worldwide marketplace of ideas. It needs to find ever better ways to speak to a larger audience, at different layers of society, in weaker countries and stronger ones, to the voiceless as well as to the noisemakers.

Second, the digital revolution has drastically changed the nature of power, and power can always be exploited either for a greater good or for narrower interests. I believe the UN needs to concentrate much more on adapting to these changing realities, as many successful states have done.

Third, the UN must remain in the lead on the matter of balancing Justice with Peace when it comes to the past conflict. Perhaps this is a subject for future days and discussions, but I think it is also worthy of mention because it is so much in the minds of people in the Western Balkans since the recent wars of this region.

Allow me to close by expressing my fundamental optimism that the truth of interdependence underlying human life always re-emerges. The vision of the United Nations was itself born of this fact. The present pandemic, as destructive as it is, can also help as a new wake up call, in this respect. The difficult and painful reality with which the UN must cope today can also be helped in this way to move the world closer again to the UN vision, set forth 75 years ago.

I believe we have a hard task in front of us of better grappling with our rapidly transforming context. From then on, we may be able to transform our ideas and practices accordingly. And the level of the harmonization of the Vision and the Reality will increase significantly!

Hvala!

Address by
Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics,
Branislav Đorđević, at the conference

“The United Nations – Between Vision and Reality”

Belgrade, 22 October 2020

Ladies and gentlemen, Your Excellencies,

The United Nations was formed at a time when, figuratively speaking, barrels of rifles, cannons and tanks had not yet cooled from the still ongoing bloodiest conflict in the history of mankind, in which, according to the most common sources, 48.2 million people lost their lives.

When representatives of fifty countries, including Yugoslavia, met in San Francisco on 25 April 1945, the creation of a single and powerful umbrella world organization was expected. Its beacon would be primarily to achieve world peace, unlike the League of Nations, which moved into history precisely because it could not provide it.

World peace, as the ideal to which it aspires, has remained the leitmotif of the UN to this day, although we should not forget other important areas the UN dealt with, such as human rights, disarmament, humanitarian aid, international development, food, children's program, preservation of cultural heritage, world health, etc.

Dear friends,

Perhaps this is the proper moment to focus exclusively on the results of the UN's work, its 44,000 employees, and the budget of more than three billion dollars.

Undoubtedly, world peace is a precondition for universal development. Individuals, non-governmental organizations, states, international institutions, etc., all participate in peacebuilding. Realistically observed, the question arises in which and what kind of peacebuilding can individuals participate in if the modern world is seriously facing poverty and infectious diseases, among which is the latest pandemic of the disease COVID-19.

The facts, which are rather disturbing, speak best in support of the above statement:

- 868 million people in the world are chronically malnourished.
- 2 billion people do not have access to basic medicines.
- 738 million do not have safe drinking water.
- one billion and 600 million do not have adequate accommodation.
- the same number of people do not have electricity.
- two and a half billion do not have adequate hygienic conditions.
- 796 million adults are illiterate.
- 218 million children (aged 5 to 17) work as soldiers, prostitutes, or servants.
- almost 11 million children die of hunger every year, and more than half a million women die during pregnancy or childbirth.
- in Sub-Saharan Africa, the average life expectancy in the last 20 years has been reduced from 50 to 46.
- while in developed countries less than one child out of 100 children dies before the age of five, in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, this ratio is one child out of 10, and in 14 countries even one out of five.

We have to admit that the data are frightening!

Dear colleagues,

It is indisputable that the UN, i.e., the Security Council, is doing a great deal for world peace, but there is a lingering question of whether that is enough. I will refer to only one aspect of these efforts, that is, only to UN peacekeeping operations.

Since the establishment of peacekeeping missions in 1948 until today, the UN has conducted 71 peacekeeping missions involving personnel from more than 120 countries. According to official data from just a few days ago, from 1948 until today, 3,993 “peacekeepers” have lost their lives, of which 167 were members of UNPROFOR.

At the moment, the UN is implementing 13 peacekeeping missions, with 94,875 people, and during this year alone, 86 people lost their lives in UN peacekeeping missions.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I wish to remind you that Serbia has contributed and continues to contribute to world security, first through its peaceful policy and then through its engagement in UN peacekeeping missions.

The former Yugoslavia participated in five peacekeeping missions, which is the same number of missions in which the Republic of Serbia is currently participating.

Since 2002, Serbia has had around 4,000 military personnel in peacekeeping missions.

I will share two more facts that I believe most people do not know. Namely, in the MINUSCA mission in the Central African Republic, Serbia has a hospital, which is the only European hospital in the UN missions in Africa. Secondly, at this moment, out of the total number of Serbian “peacekeepers”, 12 percent are women, and our country is immensely proud of this.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We will agree that globalization has given rise to new security threats and turned towards non-military and asymmetric threats, which became totalitarian and produced a demand for global security cooperation where the UN has an irreplaceable role.

Nevertheless, the number of wars currently ongoing in the world, with the constant threat of terrorism in every part of the planet and other threats humanity faces, including the Coronavirus pandemic, unequivocally raises the question of whether the Third World War is already in progress?

There are numerous ways to ensure world peace, and the most responsible for finding them are wealthy and powerful countries and international organizations, with the UN carrying out a particularly important role. Everything that is being done in the field of UN reform, which, to be honest, was very slow, should provide a framework for modern international relations and confrontation with new security threats.

Finally, the idea of universal peace and cooperative security based on cooperation is far from achievable, but we must not forget that the UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell.

BOOK REVIEWS

POLITICAL ISLAMISTS IN TURKEY AND THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT

Recep Dogan, *Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement*, Springer International Publishing, 2019, pp. 263.

In his study, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington, describes the Republic of Turkey as a “torn country” – torn between the values and ideas of the West and its foundation as a Middle Eastern Muslim society.¹ This point of view leads to the question: *Quo vadis* Turkey? Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first President of the Republic of Turkey, made a radical cut with the Ottoman past and Islam and formed the Republic of Turkey based on two key principles: Turkish nationalism and secularism. Namely, Atatürk’s Turkey tried to distance itself from religion in order to achieve the modernization and prosperity of “the other”, which was embodied in the West. Today, almost a hundred years since the establishment of the secular Republic of Turkey, we see that the country has undergone a significant social and political transformation and formed a new anti-secular face in the 21st century.

To explain the causes of the collapse of secularists and the military, as well as the triumph of anti-secularism in Turkey in the 21st century, Recep Dogan, Researcher and Senior Lecturer of Islamic Studies at Wisdom College, Australia, analyzed the activities of two key Islamic actors in Turkey - The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gülen Movement (Hizmet Movement). The result of his research is the book entitled *Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement*.

The book consists of eight chapters, and they are: 1. Introduction, 2. Political Islam, 3. The Gülen Movement, 4. From a Strategic Alliance to a Terrorist Organization: The History of the Relationship Between AKP and the Gülen Movement from 2001 to 2019, 5. Turkey’s Future Directions Under Erdoğan’s Regime, 6. The Political Theology of Political Islamists of Turkey, 7. The Political Theology of the Gülen Movement, and 8. Conclusion: Comparison of the Two Groups.

The aim of this study is to shed light on the causes of the cooperation, and later the conflict between the AKP and the Gülen Movement. Dogan defines the

¹ Huntington, Samuel P., „The Clash of Civilizations?“, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993., pp. 22-49.

AKP and the Gülen Movement as religious groups, which propagate certain political theologies. Namely, the AKP represents Political Islam, while Gülen's Movement advocates Civil Islam, the author states. It was the difference in ideology, worldview, and different interpretations of Islam that caused the dramatic split between the AKP and the Gülen Movement.

The second and third chapters of this book provide a definition and description of these two "religious groups". Dogan finds that their interpretations of Islam are different. He defines that for Political Islamists there is no difference between religion and politics. Islam is *Din wa-Dawlah* - religion and state. Dogan argues that Political Islamists use religion as a tool for their political goals and interests. He believes that the AKP has the agenda of Political Islam. This party was pragmatic after coming to power and defended certain democratic principles, protection of human rights, the rule of law, adherence to the principles and values of the European Union. In this well-written study, the author explains how the AKP used the call for democracy to gain international support. Namely, the AKP needed the West to finally square accounts with the secularists and put the army under civilian control. In that endeavor, the AKP was supported by another Islamic actor - the Gülen Movement (Hizmet Movement). Namely, these two actors had the same goal, and that was to deal with a common enemy - the army and secularists. The author also defines the Gülen Movement as a movement of Civil Islam that is not focused on politics but the spiritual development of Muslims. Dogan sees the "different" interpretations of Islam as the key difference between the two groups.

The AKP had significant cooperation with the Gülen Movement from 2002 to 2013. Their common interest was to defeat the common enemy embodied in the secularists. However, when the military was placed under civilian control, the first conflicts of these two actors arose over the distribution of political power. Conflicts and disagreements began in 2013 with corruption investigations and culminated in 2016 when a coup attempt took place in Turkey. The AKP and President of the Republic of Turkey Erdoğan accused the Gülen Movement of the coup attempt in 2016, but they rejected the accusations.

The fourth and central chapter of this book, *From the Strategic Alliance to a Terrorist Organization: The History of the Relationship between the AKP and the Gülen Movement from 2001 to 2019* comprehensively explains the causes and consequences of the confrontation between these two actors. In other chapters, the author deals with the political theologies of both groups. Namely, in order to determine the differences between these actors, Dogan analyzes their attitudes to democracy, to secularism, to relations with the West and relations with non-Muslims, to nationalism, to the Ummah, to the Caliphate, to the Sharia and extremism. The author also provides his prediction of the future of the Republic of Turkey under Erdoğan's regime and concludes that the future of Turkey will depend on the outcome of the struggle between these two groups.

Although the book *Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement* is rich in important data and provides a critical view of the ruling party's activities in the Republic of Turkey, we must emphasize that this study lacks a more detailed and deeper critique of the Gülen Movement, which would contribute to the quality of the study and a more important understanding of the true nature of this Islamic movement. Also, the author omits the analysis of the events from December 2016, when the Russian ambassador Andrei Karlov was killed in Turkey. Furthermore, the analysis of the connection between the Gülen Movement and the American Central Intelligence Agency - the CIA, was omitted. In any case, the book makes it clear that Sunni Islam is the main feature of today's Turkey.

However, it will be interesting to observe the further course of social and political conditions in Turkey, given the fact that the opposition won the 2019 local election and won seats in Istanbul and Ankara.² Also, the dominant influence of the Islamic factor had the opposite effect among some Turkish citizens, so that DW writes in its article about the growing number of atheists in Turkey.³

We hope that the book *Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement* will be of benefit to all academic researchers of the Politology of Religion, Political Sciences and International Relations, and help them to better understand contemporary political circumstances and processes in the Republic of Turkey and also the nature of their causes and consequences.

Mirela LONČAR

² <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2020>, Accessed: 10 May 2020.

³ <https://www.dw.com/en/atheism-grows-in-turkey-as-recep-tayyip-erdogan-urges-islam/a-47018029>, Accessed: 10 May 2020.

SAFEGUARDING THE LIVING TRADITIONS – LEGAL CHALLENGES IN THE PROTECTION OF THE INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE

Pier Luigi Petrillo, (Ed.) *The Legal Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage – A Comparative Perspective*, Springer Nature, Switzerland, 2019, pp. 266.

What is the ‘intangible cultural heritage’? What kind of diverse living expressions and traditions does this term encompass? How the intangible cultural heritage impacts the local community, creating social cohesion through the transmission to future generations? What are the best mechanisms of protection available to signatories of the UNESCO 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage?

According to the UNESCO 2003 Convention, the intangible cultural heritage means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups, and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. It is transmitted to future generations through oral expressions, music, rituals, performing arts, traditional crafts, etc.

Often neglected in the past, the intangible dimension of cultural heritage is gaining growing importance in the international community. It raises important questions and debates, especially bearing in mind the following reasons: Firstly, the legal concept of territory over which a State exercises its sovereignty is not always the same as the concept of cultural environment where the intangible elements exist. Plenty of intangible elements inscribed in the UNESCO Representative List derived from the territory of two or more States, therefore possessing a transboundary character. Inadequate protection of the intangible cross-border elements by one State, as well as the issue of determining the country of origin from which the intangible element originates, can lead to transnational disputes. This situation can be especially problematic, having in mind the lack of an efficient mechanism dedicated to the resolution of disputes regarding cultural heritage in general.

Secondly, the intangible cultural heritage provides local communities with a sense of pride and identity while, at the same time, it encourages tolerance and respect for other people and their traditions. This is of the utmost interest when it comes to preventing conflict in a multi-ethnic territory. Finally, cultural heritage, in general, represents an important factor in the construction of the national and cultural identity, especially for the State nations and ethnic communities that were under colonial rule in the past.

The above-mentioned arguments, as well as the questions underlined, make *The Legal Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* book noteworthy, not

only from a legal point of view but also from a wider, multidisciplinary perspective. The backbone of this book is centred around the implementation of the UNESCO 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which provides the State parties with an operational framework for safeguarding their intangible treasures. Following the 15-year period, its legal and practical influence was processed through the examination of national administrative and policy measures. The 2003 UNESCO Convention analyses the case studies concerning the intangible cultural heritage protection on a national level, demonstrating new and innovative models of legislation and envisaged cultural policy mechanisms. Additionally, to raise awareness on the topic, several field types of research were conducted in cooperation with local communities through various educational projects.

Structurally speaking, this book is divided into six sections. Besides the introduction and conclusion, the remaining sections are devoted to a certain region – America (Brazil, Mexico), Asia (Japan, Korea), the Middle East and Africa (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Burkina Faso), and Europe (Cyprus, Spain, Italy). This structure is clear and convenient as the reader can access a specific country and its intangible cultural heritage, which is embodied in a separate chapter or a whole book. The book tries to offer us the answers to all the above questions from a legal point of view while increasing public awareness regarding specific intangible elements. A thorough analysis in protecting the intangible cultural heritage is elaborated by international high-profile heritage experts and involved national and international research institutions.

From traditional medicine, woodcrafts, and agricultural practices, through the Mediterranean culinary tradition, Cyprus poetic duelling and lace-making, to oral traditions and songs which often depict the national history of a certain country, all the processed, colourful examples provide valuable insight into the twofold value of the intangible cultural heritage. At the local level, they contribute to social cohesion, intercultural tolerance, and economic survival of the community in question, while, at the national level, they contribute to the strengthening of collective memory, traditions, and identity.

The intangible cultural heritage is created to preserve different cultural expressions of the people. Therefore, analysing the intangible cultural heritage only through legal, thus sometimes rigid formulations can seem to be too strict and limited. The question which needs to be addressed is how to legally encompass something so fragile and sometimes even perishable such as the intangible cultural heritage but, at the same time, to leave enough space for it to develop? And not only to develop but why not – to even change its content through the process of transmission from generation to generation?

Leaving no important questions unanswered while preserving the main focus on legal protection, this book provides valuable insight into examples of good international practice in the protection of intangible cultural heritage, taking into account the specificities of each country.

Vanja PAVIĆEVIĆ

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EC. (2002). Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal of the European Communities L201 37–47, 31 July (European Commission, Brussels).

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