



# THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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BELGRADE, VOL. LXXI, No. 1179, JULY–SEPTEMBER 2020

*Sandra DAVIDOVIĆ*

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IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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## DAYTON LEGACY – 25 YEARS OF BUILDING PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Sandra DAVIDOVIĆ<sup>1</sup>

*Abstract:* A quarter of a century since peace was achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement represents an occasion to consider the scope of the agreement and make an assessment of the Dayton peace legacy 25 years after. This paper discusses the circumstances that postponed the final peace agreement in Bosnia and prolonged the war for three years, as well as the political environment that finally instigated successful negotiations finalized in reaching the Dayton Agreement. From the moment the agreement entered into force until today, it has been an object of various criticisms, which have often neglected the complex circumstances in which it was reached, as well as the importance of its crucial achievement - peace. The Dayton Agreement, which put an end to the civil war, can only be assessed to a limited extent, having in mind that a significant time distance is still required. In this paper, the scope of the agreement's legacy will be considered in relation to two basic functions: peacebuilding and state-building in Bosnia, whereas we assume that these two functions are highly conditioned, and therefore any assessment should be understood in the wider context including both dimensions.

*Keywords:* Bosnia, civil war, Dayton agreement, peacebuilding, state-building.

### INTRODUCTION

One of the changes that marked the post-Cold War conceptual turmoil concerned the notion of the state. (Woodward, 2009a, p. 316.) Unlike the Cold War perception, according to which a strong state (sovereign state) was considered

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as a primary threat, the new interest of international actors in intervening is related to the reinterpreted concept of security, according to which weak and dysfunctional states (*fragile states*) are seen as a source of challenges and risk on both regional and global level. In this regard, the understanding of sovereignty has changed as well, which has started to be identified with the administrative capacity, rather than with the political content. Consequently, *state-building* appears to be a perfect reverse solution in this regard. Namely, if state sovereignty is defined in terms of institutional capacity, instead of the usual understanding of political independence, then the state-building interventionism appears as a means of strengthening sovereignty, not its undermining, which overcomes one of the basic criticisms on interventionism. Although the explicit interventions during the 1990s represent only two aspects of the vast state-failure debate – the humanitarian and spillover consequences of violent conflict over the state and the post-war state-building operations – the current international consensus that civil wars are a threat to global security, and that both international peace and local development depend on the complex state-building interventions to build effective and legitimate states, began with the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the negotiated peace agreement of November 1995. (Woodward, 2009a, p.320) Albeit it has passed 25 years since the war in Bosnia ended, this case still draws the attention of many, asking whether the large scope intervention of state-building in Bosnia, based on the framework of the Dayton Agreement, provided the foundation for sustainable peace and viable state apparatus. This is of particular importance since the Yugoslav cases of peacebuilding and state-building interventions are perceived as a starting point in setting the initial state-failure agenda. (Woodward, 2009a, p.319) Additionally, the breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has evolved into a highly illustrative example of a divide among the states in numerous issues of international law, most notably in their positions concerning people's right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of the state. Furthermore, the former Yugoslavia has come to be one of the most complex 'collections of challenges' facing international institutions and organizations with the post-Cold War order. It has tested the Western concept of security in an unprecedented way after the Second World War. Additionally, current security and political conditions in the region of the Balkans warn that any final closure of examination of the Yugoslav war would prevent us from new findings on its root causes and understanding of alternative political and institutional solutions. In an attempt to provide a modest contribution in assessing the reach of the Dayton Agreement, this paper seeks to examine its legacy, by analyzing the two major dimensions, establishing *sustainable peace* and creating an *effective state* as part of the larger framework of the state-building interventionism. The first dimension is related to the goal of ending atrocities and related peacebuilding efforts, while the second one touches upon

the effectiveness of state organization and the quality of governance created by the agreement. Although they are inextricably linked, it can be hardly denied that achieving peace was crucial in the building of any type of state in Bosnia, like any institutional capacity is unquestionably conditioned by the building of a sustainable peaceful environment. Therefore, we must consider the dual essence of this agreement and make an assessment within such a context. Vast criticism of the agreement largely ignores this essential duality, which results in outweighing its positive function (embodied in providing peace in Bosnia). Critiques of the functionality of the state represent an analysis of the program implementation only, with reducing the complexity of peacebuilding in Bosnia to the aspect of efficiency. Having in mind the political and historical environment in which the state-building program was carried out in Bosnia, the use of the state as a unit of analysis and focusing on endogenous political processes gives only superficial insights. In order to overcome those constraints, we will seek to consider the scope of peacebuilding in the context of the broader historical and political circumstances in which the agreement was reached.

### **CLASH OF NARRATIVES: FROM AGGRESSION TO ETHNIC WAR**

After two of the country's six constituent republics – Slovenia and Croatia, declared independence, the Yugoslav state failed. However, the label adopted by internationals was not “state failure”. (Woodward, 2009a, p. 321) Namely, in order to resolve complex legal issues arisen from the breakup of the country, the European Community's *ad hoc* commission of jurists – the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Arbitration Committee)<sup>2</sup> concluded in its first advisory opinion that “the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”. (Badinter Commission Opinion No. 1, 1991) Answering the question of whether the secession of some republics from the SFRY preserved its existence or caused its dissolution with all the republics being equal successors to the SFRY<sup>3</sup>, the commission avoided

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<sup>2</sup> The Committee was chaired by Robert Badinter, President of the French Constitutional Council, and was furthermore comprised of the Presidents of the German and Italian Constitutional Courts, the Belgian Court of Arbitration, and the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal.

<sup>3</sup> The President of the Arbitration Committee received the following letter from Lord Carrington, President of the Conference on Yugoslavia, on 20 November 1991: Serbia considers that those Republics which have declared or would declare themselves independent or sovereign have seceded or would secede from the SFRY which would otherwise continue to exist. Other republics on the contrary consider that there is no question of secession, but the question is one of disintegration or breaking-up of the SFRY as the result of the concurring will of a number of republics. They consider that the six republics are to be considered equal successors to the SFRY, without any of them or group of them being able to claim to be the continuation thereof.



resolving the equation which consisted of the clash between two principles: territorial integrity and self-determination. Contrary, by choosing to qualify this case using the somewhat invented political term, with no legal clarity, it created a space for further inconsistency in interpretation. Soon after “this camouflage for secession succeeded and fighting began over where the borders of the new states in this territory would be, the EU shifted to the principle of territorial integrity, applied now to the borders of the federal republics in the former state”. Therefore, “any challenge to these borders made with force would be an act of state aggression in violation of the UN Charter”. (Woodward, 2009a, p.321) This understanding has drastically affected the approach in resolving conflict in Bosnia in which each of three ethnic groups – Muslims, Serbs and Croats, were asking for their right of self-determination. This is, on the other hand, highly related to the broader issue of defining the nature of the Yugoslav war, which has deeply divided involved international actors and affected the scope, intensity and duration of the war, particularly in multinational Bosnia. Namely, as Susan Woodward states, there were two major interpretations of the nature of the Yugoslav war, and consequently of the Bosnian war, which is of particular interest for this paper. According to the first perception, mainly favored in the United States, but originally coming from Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Croatia, the war in Bosnia represented aggression of Serbia towards a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations.<sup>4</sup> The second interpretation qualified this conflict as a post-communist civil war, whereas it was mainly accepted in Europe and Canada, with minor acceptance in the US as well. (Woodward, 1995b, pp. 18-19) According to the nature of these interpretations, the proposed approach in resolving the conflict was contradictory and unclear from the beginning of international involvement, which reflected a wider crisis in leadership and relationship within Western countries. Based on the belief that the cause of the war in Bosnia was Serbian aggression, the proposed solution within the first group of opinion included punishment of the aggressors: political isolation, economic sanctions, and military threats. On the other hand, acknowledging three parties’ conflict, the second interpretation emphasized the importance of political consent of each of the conflicting sides, as part of a peaceful resolution. This was particularly important for the countries present on the ground (as part of UN peacekeeping mission), which claimed that an early ceasefire is an important precondition for the work of negotiators. (Woodward, 1995b, p. 19) On the contrary, the first approach has treated the early ceasefire as the recognition of the Serbian territorial advantage, which will consequently result in awarding the aggression. The years before the agreement were marked by a clash of those

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<sup>4</sup> Soon after declaring independence and recognition by the European Communities and the United States, Bosnia became a Member State of the United Nations on May 22, 1992.

narratives and bloody consequences caused by the absence of a unique approach and strategy to end a war. The disagreement in defining the causes of the war, and America's tendency to favor a solution based on the first interpretation of the conflict, together with an unwillingness to engage militarily in the war, prolonged the uncertainty and postponed the final agreement, which cost more than 100,000 victims and over two million refugees. This seems to confirm an uncertainty of the concept of the state-building interventionism, showing how politicized its implementation appears to be. Although introduced as a response to security challenges based on local ownership, ultimately, the content and the form (the timing as well in the case of Bosnia) of the program of state-building were deeply linked to the interests of the intervening states. However, as it will be presented later, a major criticism on the lack of creating effective governance in Bosnia and implementing foreign-based arrangements will come from organizations and countries that determined a state-building agenda based on their political and security needs in the region, which frequently did not correspond to the Bosnian reality and therefore tied hands of local actors in becoming accountable for the post-war transition.

### **THE PRE-DAYTON PERIOD - YEARS OF WAR**

Encouraged by the recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence, the Muslim and Croatian parties in the Bosnian parliament<sup>5</sup> passed a Memorandum of Sovereignty on October 15, 1991. The Serbian party declared the Memorandum unconstitutional, primarily because it was not voted by a two-thirds majority, which was required by the Republic constitution. The European Community initially rejected the request for the recognition of Bosnia, demanding a referendum in which all citizens of that republic would participate.<sup>6</sup> However, one cannot deny that the EC should have known that the Serbian Democratic Party would oppose the referendum since the major aim of the party was to prevent Serbs to become a minority in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Woodward, 1995b, p. 274) Namely, when Yugoslavia came to the point of dissolution in 1991, for Serbs it was the ending of a state in which they all lived together. For others, it was a continued movement towards self-determination. In the context of Bosnia, Serbs preferred to remain part of the

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<sup>5</sup> The Parliament was constituted after first democratic elections in 1990 and ruled by three ethnic-based parties that gained the majority of votes: the Party of Democratic Action representing Muslims, the Croatian Democratic Union representing Croats and the Serbian Democratic Party representing Bosnian Serbs.

<sup>6</sup> It was an opinion of the Badinter Commission that the referendum should include the majority of voters from each of three major ethnic groups, in order to be perceived as legitimate.

Yugoslav federation to becoming a permanent minority in a newly independent state. Hence, the referendum vote divided Bosnia along ethnic lines. While Muslims (represented 44 percent of the republic's population) and Croats (17 percent of the republic's population) strongly favored independence, Serbs (31 percent of the republic's population) opposed any secession of Bosnia and boycotted it, declaring it unconstitutional. After 99% of the valid votes favored independence, the Muslim-Croat coalition declared independence on March 3, 1992. (Paris, 2004, p. 97) Although the Badinter's opinion on the referendum was obviously ignored, the European Community and the United States recognized the country's independence a few days after. The premature recognition created great resistance among Serbs whose demands for self-determination, as previously in Croatia, were largely ignored. It was not clear that without resolving their right to self-determination, Serbs would not accept a sovereign Bosnia. This became clear soon after the recognition. (Woodward, 1995b, p. 278) Following the resignations of the Serbian representatives in the collective Bosnian presidency, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence on 7 April 1992.<sup>7</sup> According to the party, the independence of Bosnia would result in Serbs becoming "a national minority in an Islamic state". (Toal, Dahlman, 2011, p. 110) However, once Bosnia's independence was recognized<sup>8</sup>, there was a lack of internationally led military engagement aimed at protecting the newly created state. Namely, the belief that the Yugoslav war does not represent a significant threat to the national security of major Western countries, together with the disunity of allies regarding both causes and approach in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, prevented large scale international involvement.

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<sup>7</sup> Previously the Serbian Democratic Party formed the Assembly of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina and held a referendum about remaining within Yugoslavia. In January 1992, the assembly declared the creation of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Serb controlled part of Bosnia.

<sup>8</sup> Encouraged by the recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence, the Muslim and Croat parties in the Bosnian parliament passed a Memorandum of Sovereignty by a simple majority on October 15, 1991. The Serbian party declared the memorandum unconstitutional, primarily because it was not passed by a two-thirds majority which was required by the republican constitution. The European Community Arbitration Commission initially rejected the request for the recognition of Bosnia, demanding a referendum in which all citizens of that republic will participate. The vote divided Bosnia along ethnic lines. While Muslims (represented 44 percent of the republic's population) and Croats (17 percent of republic's population) strongly favored independence, Serbs (31 percent of republic's population) opposed any secession of Bosnia and opposed it, declaring it unconstitutional. After 99% of valid votes favored independence, the Muslim-Croat coalition declared independence on March 3, 1992. The European Community and the United States recognized the country's independence a few days after. This was a prelude to a bloody Bosnian war, which will prove to be one of the major threats to the post-Cold War security institutions.

Finally, the reluctance of engagement of the remaining superpower in the early stages of war contributed to an unclear approach in resolving the war.<sup>9</sup> However, it became clear soon that what was seen as a conflict of minor importance was transformed into a bloody civil war and major security threat in Europe after the Second World War. From declaring Bosnia's independence in March 1992, up to the Dayton Agreement reached in November 1995, "sporadic fighting between paramilitary groups of the three major ethnic groups<sup>10</sup> developed into a full-scale civil war, despite several short-lived cease-fires". (Paris, 2004, p. 98) On the battlefield, Serbs had more success and managed to conquer 70% of the country's territory by the end of 1993. In parallel with war atrocities, there were several internationally led attempts to mediate a negotiation of the settlement of the conflict. These attempts, mainly consisted of the European Communities' diplomatic initiatives, repeatedly proved the incapability of the EC newly established foreign policy to deal with serious security threats. Affected by capability – expectation trap that marked its engagement throughout the entire Yugoslav war, together with the fact that they were politically and militarily marginalized by the US, they failed to achieve a necessary ceasefire. The initial response of the international community towards the war was a deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping mission<sup>11</sup>, aimed at ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid, which was far from enough to reduce the violence. Later extensions of the mandate of the UNPROFOR to protect civilian 'safe areas' will prove to be a great failure, mainly because the peacekeeping mandate of the mission, together with present humanitarian organizations were neither prepared nor equipped for the war. By the summer, the situation had become alarmingly dangerous, resulting in the withdrawal of the International Committee of the Red Cross from Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Woodward, 1995b, p. 281) America's support for Bosnia's territorial integrity and lack of will to engage militarily, together with the European Communities' unarticulated attempts to reach an agreement between the warring parties, blocked the possibility of effectively curbing the war until the summer of 1995.

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<sup>9</sup> The United States considered war a European problem, with Secretary of State James Baker stating that "we don't have a dog in this fight".

<sup>10</sup> The Bosnian Serb Army, Muslim-dominated Bosnian Army and Bosnian Croat Army were reinforced by military and paramilitary forces from Serbia and Croatia and volunteers mainly from Muslim countries.

<sup>11</sup> This mission was a simple extension of the existing UNPROFOR operation in Croatia.

### **THE DAYTON AGREEMENT: REALITY BETWEEN PEACE AND EFFICIENCY**

In terms of the American decision to militarily engage in the war, it is important to refer to a timing and changed political and security context, followed by the post-Cold War ‘battle of concepts’. Ethnic warfare in Bosnia was the locus of humanitarian interventionist outrage in the first half of the 1990s, and US policy and attitudes towards it delineated the extent of early humanitarian interventionism. (Wertheim, 2010 p. 151) Named as ‘The Endgame Strategy’, a new diplomatic approach was aimed to end the war and to maintain a single, though divided, state in which the warring parties would be separated. (Mokhiber and Young, Frontline 2015) The 1992 reality was finally accepted, but it became crucially marked by the horrific consequences of the war that deepened ethnic divisions in a way that would prevent reconciliation to this day. Additionally, at the time of opting for the Dayton format conference, due to the bombing of Serbian positions by the NATO pact, as well as the allied Croat-Bosniak offensive actions on the ground, the Serbian side was at a loss for the first time in relation to the size of the territory it controls. Namely, compared to three-quarters of the territory that was under Serbian control, in October 1995 this amount was reduced to 49%, approximately as much as was foreseen in previous peace initiatives. On the other hand, Croats controlled 21% of the territory (slightly more than international calculations), while Bosniaks controlled the remaining 31% of the territory of the former socialist republic. The situation on the ground seemed to suit the negotiating objectives, which proved that the outcome of the agreement was meant to formalize the situation on the ground when it became acceptable. Of course, neither side has fulfilled its maximalist demands, primarily in terms of the possible unification of the Serb and Croat dominated parts of the territory with neighboring countries. In these circumstances, it took three weeks of American led negotiations to achieve the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was finally reached on 21 November 1995 and formally signed in Paris on December 14. Although it will become a commonplace to state that the Dayton Agreement was an agreement “designed to end the war, not to build the state”, the result was a comprehensive peace plan that looked beyond the immediate cessation of hostilities to the prospects for long-term stability and the reconstruction of a multi-ethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consisting of eleven annexes, devoted to dealing with different aspects of building peace in Bosnia, it represented both military resolution and a sustainable framework for peacebuilding and state-building. Regarding the first aim of negotiations - ending of hostilities, the parties agreed to establish a durable cessation of hostilities, to withdraw their military forces from four-kilometer-wide “zone of separation” dividing the two entities, to negotiate numerical limits on military forces, to ensure free movement of civilians

throughout of Bosnia, including the return of refugees to their homes, and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. (Paris, R. 2004, p.99) In terms of international military presence, the agreement called for the establishment of a multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO command to monitor the implementation of the military aspects of Annex 1, as well as “to assist in the implementation of nonmilitary aspects, such as providing security for elections and helping ensure the relocation of refugees and displaced persons”. (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 1a 1995)

Regarding the political and legal framework, the country was divided into two ethnic subunits - the entities, the “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, consisted of areas mainly controlled by Muslims and Croats and the “Republic of Srpska” controlled by Serbs, with a clear division in power and responsibilities between national and entity-level governments. (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex IV, 1995) Annex IV, which includes the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has split the country into two parts, based on the war-time separation lines, thus creating two ethnically distinct regions in the country. This arrangement was the subject of vast criticism, which suggested that it confirms ethnic division and creates a system that would prevent reconciliation in the future. However, having Croats and Muslims, who are together in a formal federation but have different goals, and Serbs in the Republic of Srpska having other aims, with little space for overlapping, the only way to get these people to stay in one country was to have a very decentralized state. Therefore, the power-sharing became essential in order to reach an agreement that every party could sign. Bosnian Serbs won recognition of the Republic of Srpska as a Bosnian Serb entity within the larger state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As an entity, the Republic of Srpska is not an independent country, meaning that Serbs did not achieve their maximalist goals that could be seen as a full secession. But it is given the power most often associated with sovereignty - the right to maintain its own army and police force governing the Bosnian municipalities bordering Serbia within a contiguous territory, and a Serbian political structure. (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex IV, 1995) Along with self-governance as an entity, the Dayton Accord permits the Republic of Srpska to have a ‘special parallel relationship’ with Yugoslavia, meaning Serbia.

When it comes to the political organization, the Constitution specifies that “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state” ruled by the collective body - The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croatian, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serbian, directly elected from the territory of the Republic of Srpska. (Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex IV 1995) Additionally, the equal representation of the divided country is provided by establishing a bicameral parliament, consisting of two chambers - the House of Peoples and the House

of Representatives. This framework reflected the needs of each side to be fully represented, autonomous, and free in developing their own national identity based on the internal right of self-determination. It is obvious that the agreement explicitly sought to transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy based on the belief that the building of a (liberal-democratic) state is a precondition for sustainable peace and the rule of law. The theoretical basis was found in the idea of liberal peace, which assumes that the building a liberal-democratic state creates preconditions for a peaceful and stable environment. Article 2.1 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina claims that “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections”. (Dayton Peace Agreement, Article 1, Annex IV 1995) However, one cannot deny that the three-way division “reflects the entrenched ethnic positions adopted during the war and persisting in the post-war environment.” (Richmond, Franks, 2009 p. 55). It is an undeniable argument that although the Dayton Accords put in place a decentralized structure of government in order to bring all three sides of the conflict to the negotiating table, it ultimately institutionalized the ethno-religious differences created by the civil war. (Richmond, Franks, 2009, p. 54). This was quickly proved at the first test for the newly created states - the first post-war election in Bosnia in 1996. Namely, the results soon confirmed that the system established resulted in the reelection of politicians chosen mostly due to their ethnic belonging rather than political aspirations, which Horowitz described as ‘ethnic outbidding’. Additionally, this has created the issue of governance. Namely, instead of holding their own leaders accountable for public policies, the population has been divided over the years between those who see a new enemy or scapegoat for their difficult times in the imperious representatives of the international community and those who are increasingly impatient that the international community will not fully acknowledge its *de facto* international “protectorate” and thus take over and govern directly. Between these two camps lies a large silent mass increasingly apathetic because they see the outsiders as the “boss.” (Hopmann, USIP 1999 p. 8) However, the problem with this type of criticism lies in the fact that it denies the issue referring to a general problem of the state-building practices in which the imposed model “misunderstands the reality of actual countries, which operate differently and often more effectively than the standard by which they are being judged, and is in conflict with the goals of peace and development that state-building aims to achieve.” (Woodward, 2009a, p. 318)

Unlike formal protectorates established under the United Nations Security Council resolutions, such as the one in Kosovo, Bosnia was established as a sovereign state, although with a quite “flexible Dayton framework that authorized internationals to crucially shape post-conflict agenda in Bosnia while being unaccountable towards local population.” (Chandler, 2007, p. 337) This attitude

opposes quite a common argument that the Dayton Agreement has tied the hands of the international community and created a complex set of political institutions that stymie the building of a strong centralized state and continue to enable ethnically-based political parties to dominate the policy-making process. Thus, criticism of the poor transition towards local ownership and a lack of success in building strong institutions of a central state, institutionalizing ethnic divisions, should take into consideration a responsibility of the external mechanisms of regulation as well. After decades of the state-building operations, it seems that the responsibility lies within international, at least as much within local actors, so the criticism should be referred to both sides. This is a general constraint of the state-building programs since the majority of those belonging to the labeled states interpret the label as a threat of imminent intervention, rather than a program for institutional building and assistance. (Woodward, 2017c, p.181) “Pushing countries too soon into competitive electoral politics not only risks stoking war, sectarianism and terrorism, but it also makes the future consolidation of democracy more difficult” (Mansfield, Snyder 2005 p.39) – meaning that imposing the liberal peacebuilding theory can often cause more harm than good. Generally, the poor results of the state-building interventions appear to be a part of this highly criticized concept itself. Indeed, despite many efforts to learn lessons and improve outcomes, most practitioners and researchers concede that there are no successes from which to learn. Many interventions had to be repeated when violence resumed, as in Angola, Liberia, Haiti, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. (Woodward, 2009a, p. 316) The 2016 OECD report presented results showing that in the last quarter of a century, the number of countries that managed to graduate out from the category of failed or fragile ranges from zero to four. (OECD DAC 2014, p. 16.)

This is why critics of the Dayton Agreement seem accepted only to some extent since the agreement itself provided a sustainable peace, although one has to be aware that success itself can be differently understood. While some define success as simply as “the establishment of stability and a rule of law,” others view it as a more complex and multi-layered concept. (Seth, 2005 p. 2) Unlike many agreements in the Balkans that have sown the seeds of potential future conflicts, the Dayton Agreement achieved its basic peacebuilding goals, with indisputable shortcomings in the field of management and building efficient institutions. However, criticism in this regard lacks in highlighting external responsibility. As it has been proven many times before, any peace process in the Balkans needs to be understood as a complex political dynamic between local and international actors in time and space.

In this regard, it is useful to refer to the perspective that highlights the importance of the peace dimension of the agreement. Trapara places the Dayton Accords in the category of *generous peace*, using a realistic classification of *vengeful*



and *generous peace*. Namely, comparing it to the Versailles Agreement as an example of the first type of agreement, he finds in the Dayton Agreement precisely the characteristics of a generous peace (Trapara, 2016, p. 54) which, with some deviations<sup>12</sup>, enabled all parties to significantly achieve their political and national ambitions in Bosnia. Donald Horowitz points out that it is often true that the majority population is more discontented with ethnic power-sharing schemes than are minorities, at least in Northern Ireland, Belgium, and Bosnia. (Horowitz, 2014, p. 18) In the case of Bosnia, this can be related to the identity issue of warring parties. Namely, major criticism and request for revision of the agreement are coming from Muslims in Bosnia, asking for “unitary identity”. However, the Dayton Agreement “wrote down” the identity of Bosnia in a way that best suits its history, with an organization able to preserve its independence and territorial integrity. Providing the entities with the characteristics of statehood is a repetition of the previous orientation of constituent peoples, giving the entities the right to special parallel ties with neighboring states. (Trapara, 2016, p. 56) One cannot deny that with its complex history and mixture of identities throughout historical processes, any attempt in further unification of the state would be non-viable. On the contrary, as Trapara rightly points out “without particular identities, there is no identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. This represented the essence of the Dayton Agreement, and at the same time, the most sustainable solution to the Bosnian identity issue in relation to all others ever tried. However, we are witnessing a large scale of criticism of the effectiveness of the system in Bosnia, which is based on the demand for the unitarization of the state in order to allegedly improve the effectiveness, which is contrary to the spirit of the Dayton Agreement. To some extent, it can be expected that such demands come from Bosniaks who, through calls for unitarization, seek to preserve a unitary Bosnia and thus ensure the survival of the state for which they fought. Since they did not achieve their maximalist demands through the Dayton format, requests for unitarization under the guise of demands for improving the efficiency of the system represent a continuous struggle for an independent and unitary Bosnia. This finally provokes intolerance among Serbs and continues to penetrate the Republic of Srpska’s aversion to remain within a federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina. This circle of maximalist demands returns the problem to the pre-Dayton period and creates security challenges that overcome the problems of the non-functionality of Dayton’s Bosnia and create the seeds of potential conflicts. The years before the Dayton Agreement showed that insisting on the maximalist goals of either side in Bosnia was not a fertile ground for lasting peace, which is the most significant value in the region drastically affected by wars and destruction. Lastly, similar sayings on

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<sup>12</sup> Such as the absence of the third - Croatian entity, or leaving the status of Brcko unresolved.

the non-viability of Dayton's Bosnia come from the major sponsors of the agreement. This is a paradox since the outsiders firstly created the state by institutionalizing ethnically defined political rights for previously explained reasons. Additionally, while requiring extensive decentralization as a model in other state-building ventures (such as Kosovo and Macedonia), foreigners seem to be "working hard to reverse the powers granted by the Dayton Peace Accord, in 1995, to local and entity governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to build a strong and capacious central government instead". By contrast, it was argued that centralization in Bosnia and Herzegovina was necessary because the duplication of functions of so many layers of government was unsustainable. (Woodward, 2009a, p. 326) Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that between peace and the efficiency of public administration, there is a categorical space for improvement, which does not necessarily have to be in the form of unitarization because it essentially jeopardizes the identity of divided ethnic communities. Somewhat paradoxically, the division in the case of Bosnia meant securing the right to self-determination within one state. Alternative solutions would potentially upset the balance that ensured the major achievement of the Dayton negotiations - peace in a multinational Bosnia.

## CONCLUSION

The disunity of international actors towards the war in Bosnia and the refusal to accept the reality, based on the ethnic division and the aspirations of each side to achieve its goals in the war, filled the Bosnian 'powder keg' for three years before the Dayton Agreement was finally reached. When it became clear that the lesson that had to be learned in Croatia was repeated and that unilateral punishment of one side could not stop the bloodshed, the reality gave rise to an agreement that was able to force all warring parties to negotiate. Of course, this was preceded by military intervention and the redrawing of territorial gains in the bloody years of the war. Large-scale criticism of the ineffectiveness of divided Bosnia in recent years seems to come from those who have not understood that a highly decentralized Bosnia is the only possible solution in the situation where each ethnic group is asserting its right to self-determination. This right in the context of Bosnia protects particular identities, but at the same time maintains its statehood. Finally, Dayton's Bosnia represents a compromise between the demand for self-determination and the prevention of further disintegration that led to the devastation of war. It is undisputed that the space between peace and effective governance is a space for the improvement of the system, but it does not necessarily mean unitarization since this can endanger the foundation of 25 years lasting peace. Sayings that the accords provided peace for two and a half decades, but at "the price of a state carved up along ethnic lines and hostage to

nationalism” (Sito-Sucic, Guardian, 2015), have to be understood in the context of a comprehensive reach of the agreement. Since the dilemma regarding the nature of the war was never actually resolved, despite the formal admission of Bosnia to the United Nations and qualification of the war as Serbian aggression, in practice, the international community had to seek a compromise between the three warring parties. Therefore, the Dayton Agreement was an expression of the reality that was largely ignored in the years of war that preceded the agreement. The agreement finally represented a compromise between the aspirations of different warring parties, which was the core principle of the second approach, acknowledging three warring parties’ goals that remain relevant even today in a peaceful environment. When criticizing the concept of Dayton’s peace, one has to keep in mind that the goal of the agreement was to end wars between parties who were engaged in a bitter contest over the kind of state and borders they sought. Finally, but somewhat paradoxically, the Dayton Agreement became an agreement that confirmed the territorial gains, though only after those gains were corrected by NATO military intervention and became acceptable to the patrons of the agreement. It is undeniable that the brutality of the war influenced America’s determination to engage, but the question remains whether the brutality and greatest suffering of civilian casualties in the post-Second World War Europe was a justified cost for the late engagement and favorable territorial percentage as a condition for the final peace agreement.

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## NASLEĐE DEJTONA – 25 GODINA IZGRADNJE MIRA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

*Apstrakt:* Dvadeset peta godišnjica od potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, kojim je okončan rat u Bosni i Hercegovini, predstavlja povod da se razmotre njegovi dometi i oceni dvoipodecenijsko nasleđe. Od trenutka kada je stupio na snagu do danas, ovaj sporazum je bio predmet različitih kritika, koje su često zanemarivale složene okolnosti u kojima je postignut, kao i važnost njegovog ključnog postignuća – mira. Zbog toga, ovaj rad razmatra okolnosti koje su odložile postizanje konačnog mirovnog sporazuma u Bosni i Hercegovini i produžile građanski rat za tri godine, kao i političke okolnosti koje su dovele do pregovora koji su završeni konačnim postizanjem mirovnog sporazuma. Opšti okvirni sporazum za mir u BiH, kojim je okončan građanski rat, može se analizirati samo delimično, imajući u vidu značaj vremenske distance koja je potrebna za razumevanje njegovog šireg značaja. Stoga, rad nastoji da rezultate sporazuma predstavi u odnosu na dva osnovna cilja: izgradnju mira i izgradnju države u Bosni, imajući u vidu da su oni međusobno uslovljeni, te da svaku procenu njihove ostvarenosti treba shvatiti u širem kontekstu koji uključuje obe dimenzije.

*Ključne reči:* Bosna i Hercegovina, građanski rat, Dejtonski sporazum, izgradnja mira, izgradnja države.

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## PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA— STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO?

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*Abstract.* The aim of the article is to analyze the main challenges related to the unilaterally declared permanent neutrality of the Republic of Moldova. This decision was made in complicated historical and geopolitical circumstances after the war in Transnistria was “frozen”, and foreign forces were deployed on its territory. Permanent neutrality was seen as the best way for Moldova to maintain stability and territorial integrity. Moldova has not yet resolved the “frozen conflict” on its territory. Although the situation has largely stabilized in the meantime with the help of the international community, the division is leading to economic and political instability and carries the risk of new conflicts and tensions. Also, Moldova has not received international recognition of its permanent neutrality status, while the Russian troops continue to infringe its sovereignty and internal security. As a result, questions about the sustainability of that status are increasingly being asked. Despite all the dilemmas, Moldova remains determined to establish permanent neutrality as a basic principle of its foreign and security policy. Permanent neutrality is still considered to be the best way to respond to external influences and internal divisions and thus to preserve the stability and territorial integrity of the country. At the same time, neutral status does not exclude a certain type of security cooperation with Western institutions in order to ensure or, at the very least, implicitly guarantee the security of the state.

*Keywords:* neutrality, Moldova, “frozen conflict”, Transnistria, Russia, NATO, EU.

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## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Over the course of history, the area in which the Republic of Moldova is located has often been a kind of a playground for key actors on the global stage, and it seems to be the same today. Moldova proclaimed independence in August 1991, as a former federal constituent unit of the Soviet Union. Hostilities between the newly created Republic of Moldova and the Autonomous Region of Transnistria quickly developed into a military confrontation. This ended with the signing of a ceasefire agreement in July 1992. Afterward, the trilateral peacekeeping forces and the Operational Group of Russian Forces were deployed in the security zone along the Dniester River (Ozhiganov, 1997, pp. 183-184). Moldova hoped that declaring permanent neutrality with the Constitution would allow it to defend its territorial integrity and consolidate peace and stability on its territory. Bearing in mind that by declaring permanent neutrality Moldova prohibited the deployment of troops from other states on its territory, it was also perceived as a convenient way of leading to the removal of the Russian military forces from the eastern part of the country and, indirectly, settling the Transnistrian conflict. But more than 25 years later, the Russian troops are still present in Transnistria, challenging Moldova's authority over that part of the country. At the same time, Moldova's unilaterally declared neutrality is not recognized internationally and does not receive sufficient support from the wider international community. It, therefore, raises the issues of relevance, resilience, and sustainability of this status.

Moldova's permanent neutrality cannot be understood unless it considers the actual complexities of its regional and geopolitical status, particularly in light of the expansion of the EU and NATO powers in areas of traditional Russian interest. The issue of Moldova's security is largely intertwined with the complex and conflicting interests and policies of the mentioned actors, which further complicates the situation in the country. In this context, the policy of permanent neutrality can be seen as part of a balanced foreign policy by which Moldova seeks to respond to the internal divisions and external challenges it faces. There is a pragmatic desire of Moldova to avoid tensions and conflicts on its territory, as well as the provocation of Russia at the core of this policy. At the same time, Moldova wants to build national armed forces that will be able to defend the country and enable it to participate in international peacekeeping missions. By contributing to the international system of collective security, Moldova seeks to ensure and improve its national security. In this context, its commitment to developing strong ties and cooperation with the European Union and NATO in the field of security should be seen.

To achieve this, first are presented the basic theoretical assumptions of the concept of neutrality and then an overview of the selected literature - the one

dealing with the issue of neutrality in general and the one dealing with such a status of Moldova. After that, we look back at the circumstances that led to the decision to declare permanent neutrality by the Constitution. In addition, key documents in the field of foreign policy, national security, and defense are analyzed, which, citing Moldova's commitment to pursue a policy of permanent neutrality, further strengthen the legal basis and define the content of this concept. The internal and external circumstances which determine Moldova's current strategic orientation, the specifics of its permanent neutrality, as well as the challenges and perspectives of its functionality in the contemporary geopolitical context are given particular attention. Consideration is given to the limitations resulting from the lack of foreign recognition of Moldova's military neutrality, as well as the fact that this country is divided by a "frozen" conflict in the Transnistrian region, where the Russian forces have been stationed for years (Kennedy, 2016, p. 524). Such facts are undermining its democracy, territorial integrity, and maneuvering rights in foreign relations. In that context, the specifics of the geopolitical situation in Moldova are analyzed, the character and its foreign policy trends are assessed, and the evolution of its relations with the European Union and NATO is monitored. The possibilities of cooperation with the EU within the Common Security and Defense Policy are highlighted as well as the cooperation developed with NATO within the Partnership for Peace program. Moldova's permanent military neutrality is also observed in the context of Russia's interests, as well as the influence that NATO-Russia relations have on it. The specified objectives of the research determined the concept and influenced the structure of the paper.

## **NEUTRALITY AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT AND A LITERATURE REVIEW**

Neutrality, like any other, most commonly used political concept, is, as Devine observes, an essentially contested concept (Devine, 2011, p. 335). The understanding of neutrality has changed over time, and the discussion of neutrality is dominated by three views and a theoretical standpoint. In the conventional and realistic understanding, as Joenniemi notes, the emphasis is on "abstinence, isolationism, individualism, and self-sufficiency" (Joenniemi, 1989, p. 178). Proponents of this view find very little understanding for neutrality because, as Agius points out, they oppose that stance with the sovereignty and logic of its protection by the use of force, not by refraining from conflict. Referring to Morgentau, Agius further states that realism is dominated by an approach that views neutral states as small, weak, amoral, and passive players in the international system (Agius, 2011, pp. 371-372). In a realistic view, as Beyer and Hoffman note, neutrality is seen as one of two possible foreign policy



choices, leaving small states with the option of either joining the alliance or declaring neutrality in the hope of being left alone. Therefore, it is assumed that neutrality is a strategy of weak states that are often on the border of the sphere of influence of the superpowers (Beyer & Hofmann, 2011, p. 287). The second line of thinking about neutrality is a constructivist approach that takes into account ideas, identities and interactions in the international system because it starts from the fact that important aspects are not given to it, but are historically and socially constructed (Agius, 2016, p. 71). Observing the role of neutral states in the process of European integration, Agius underlines their capacity to impact the process positively by contributing to the EU's soft security. It is considered very important that neutral states can contribute to the European security structures thanks to their experience and expertise in special areas (Agius, 2011, p. 381). The concept of neutrality can also be viewed through the prism of institutionalism. Neutrality is seen as an international institution based on norms, rules, and widely understood conventions that regulate the relations between the warring parties and neutral states and thus contribute to international stability. Austin points out that neutrality, which is also an expression of state sovereignty, depends on the influence of institutions, whose role is to determine the scope of the conflict and limit the use of force. Although he does not fundamentally deny the importance of force in state relations, the author concludes that history shows that the institution of neutrality can contribute to international stability in such a way that realism and the use of force cannot (Austin, 1998, pp. 37-56).

Thus, the concept of neutrality is not new and has been sufficiently discussed in the academic and professional literature. However, controversies regarding its essence, whether temporary or permanent, as well as the rights and obligations arising from this status, still exist. Also, the authors analyzed the legal, security, and political aspects of the concept of permanent neutrality of Moldova in order to shed light on the specifics of this concept, which, despite all efforts, remained very contradictory. This research is theoretically supported by publications that generally address the issue of neutrality in areas such as political science, international relations, and international law (Agius, Joenniemi, Beyer, Hofmann, Austin, Andrén, Subedi, Vetschera, Raymond, Karsh, Brian, and others), as well as the work of authors that specifically address the issues of necessity, sustainability, functionality, vulnerability, and sustainability of the Republic of Moldova's status in modern circumstances (Grosso, Burian and Dorul, Cebotari, Vengler, Pîntea, Helly and Panainte, Ungureanu and the others).

For Andrén, neutrality is an elusive concept, both simple and complicated at the same time. He points out that in international law, neutrality means a relationship during the war, and it is defined as a relationship of impartiality taken by third countries towards the warring parties, which is recognized by the warring parties and creates rights and duties between neutral states and warring parties.

He also states that the state can seek and receive international recognition of the status of permanent neutrality, but also that in peacetime it can unilaterally declare its intention of a general character to remain permanently neutral. However, neither, as Andrén concludes, is an absolute guarantee that the state will not be attacked if war breaks out (Andrén, 1991, p. 69). The simple definition of permanent neutrality given by Subedi is that a state that adopts such a policy must respect the rules of neutrality in all future wars (Subedi, 1993, pp. 241-242). Vetschera points out that a permanently neutral state has an obligation to refrain from starting future conflicts in addition to remaining neutral in the event of a war between two or more states (Vetschera, 1985, p. 52). When it comes to how a neutral state should behave in peacetime, Raymond states, referring to the interpretations of the Swiss government from 1954, that it has obligations not only to refrain from starting a war but also to defend its neutrality by avoiding all activities that could involve it in future conflicts (Raymond, 1997, p. 125).

Analyzing the geopolitical and legal aspects of the status of permanent neutrality, especially of the small states, Karsh states that permanent neutrality is constant non-alignment in peacetime in order to establish the basis for neutrality in wartime, which finally depends on the interests of the warring parties. In that context, he points out that, strategically speaking, the neutrality of a small state can be endangered if a state that wants war is motivated to endanger its territory in order to use it for military or economic purposes. Karsh also declares that the geostrategic position is perhaps the most important limitation of states' survival, since states, unlike people, cannot choose their neighbors. Since their location is constant, they have to find the best ways and means to be on good terms with their neighbors, especially the stronger ones. Thus, as Karsh concludes, the actions and interactions of states, as well as the friendships and enmities between them, are largely determined by the geostrategic reality (Karsh, 2011, pp. 42-81).

Starting from the fact that the territorial aspect, the geopolitical situation, demographic status, and military vulnerability make it difficult for small states to guarantee their own security, Burian and Dorul emphasize that neutrality is their way of survival (Burian & Dorul, 2016, pp. 61-69). On the other hand, as Pinteá, Helly and Panainte point out, despite all the state's efforts to conduct foreign and domestic policy in accordance with the concept of permanent neutrality, history shows that the state cannot avoid the problem of guaranteeing such a status which, in case of war, always depended on the will of the warring parties - "weighing the advantages over the disadvantages arising from the violation of this status" (Pinteá, Helly & Panainte, 2011, p. 29).

As Wengler notes, it can be seen from the general principles of international law that other states are not permitted to attack a neutral state in peacetime or expose it to pressure from the threat of attack. However, as he points out, it is

more important to deny other states the right to put pressure on a neutral state in any way which might jeopardize its neutrality (Wengler, 1964, p. 376).

### **THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY OF MOLDOVA AND THE INTERNAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THIS STATUS**

Understanding the permanent neutrality of Moldova is not possible without knowing the basic reasons that in a certain historical context were behind the policy which resulted in the decision to declare it by the Constitution. The interethnic problems and internal tensions, which later led to the division of Moldova, manifested themselves in the late 1980s when the policy of decentralization caused the release of repressed nationalist sentiments by the majority of the Moldovan-Romanian ethnic population. The increasing trend towards “Romanization” in Moldova has caused local tensions in most multiethnic regions of the country. The law of 1989, which introduced Romanian as the only state language in Moldova (Закон о функционировании языков на территории Молдавской ССР, 1989, ст. 1)<sup>2</sup> provoked a reaction from the Russophone population that began their own secessionist movements, worried about the loss of status, and encouraged by misinformation from Moscow. The strongest resistance appeared in the region of Transnistria, whose Supreme Council voted to establish a separate state as part of the Soviet Union in September 1990 (Istomin & Bolgova, 2016, p. 3).

In August 1991, Moldova declared independence, and soon after that, the Chisinau government tried to put Transnistria under its control. This led to a brief armed conflict in 1992, which ended after the intervention of the 14th Soviet Army on the side of the separatists forcing the Moldovan forces to withdraw.<sup>3</sup> The Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict was signed in July 1992, after which the Joint Peacekeeping Forces and the so-called Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) were deployed in the Transnistrian region (Klein, 2019, p. 21).

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<sup>2</sup> According to Article 1 of this Law, “the state language of the Moldavian SSR is the Moldavian language, which functions on the basis of the Latin alphabet. The Moldovan language as a state language is used in all spheres of political, economic, social, and cultural life and, in this regard, performs the function of the language of interethnic communication on the territory of the Republic”. The Moldovan language written in Latin script is actually Romanian, which was also confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova on December 5, 2013 (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> As Klein stated, after the end of the Second World War, the 14th Army of the Soviet Union was stationed in Transnistria so that it could intervene in Southeast Europe if necessary.

The peace and stability achieved in Moldova in the 1990s were extremely fragile. The conflict in Transnistria was “frozen” with the constant presence of foreign troops (Конституция Республики Молдова, 1994, ст. 11, то. 1, 2). These circumstances, together with the lack of military capabilities, determined Moldova to unilaterally declare the status of permanent neutrality by the Constitution. In Article 11 of the 1994 Constitution, Moldova’s permanent neutrality was declared and, accordingly, the deployment of troops of other states on its territory is prohibited. The Constitution also stipulates that the provisions relating to the sovereign, independent and unitary character of the state, as well as provisions on the permanent neutrality of the state, can be amended only by a referendum, with the approval of a majority of citizens registered to vote (Конституция Республики Молдова, 1994, ст. 142, то. 1). It does not give more details about obligations, rights, or other criteria that arise from the neutrality status, and therefore leaves them to be interpreted by other legal acts. Following its adoption, several key documents in the field of foreign policy and security were adopted, by which Moldova, among other things, reaffirmed its status of permanent neutrality. While the concept of neutrality is not fully articulated, these documents demonstrate the continuity with which Moldova persists in its efforts to uphold the status of neutrality as a fundamental principle of its foreign and security policies.

Foreign Policy Concept adopted in February 1995 states that Moldova pursues a policy of permanent neutrality, pledging not to participate in military conflicts, in politico-military or economic alliances aimed at preparing for war, not allowing the use of its territory to station foreign bases and not own, produce or test nuclear weapons (Республика Молдова Парламент, 1995, ст. 187). The Military Doctrine adopted in the same year states that it is determined by Moldova’s foreign and domestic politics and the permanent neutrality proclaimed by the Constitution, and that it has a defensive character only. Moldova does not accept war (except in the case of self-defense) as a means of achieving political objectives. As has been pointed out, it advocates a friendly foreign policy, maintains its military defense without undermining the security of other countries and overall security. In addition, Moldova does not allow its territory to be used for aggressive actions against other states and the deployment of foreign troops, except in cases provided by international agreements on peacekeeping contingents. Potential sources of the military danger include, but are not limited to, other countries’ territorial claims, their attempts to interfere in internal affairs to destabilize the country’s political situation, and the presence of foreign troops.

The first National Security Concept of Moldova, also introduced in 1995, was replaced with a new Concept in May 2008 (Военной доктрине Республики Молдова, 1995, ст. 429). Both documents affirm the provisions of Article 11 of the Constitution, which declares Moldova’s permanent neutrality and thus

states that this country is not a member of military blocs and does not accept the deployment of military forces or arms of other countries and military blocs on its territory. Furthermore, a newer document intends to offer a wider interpretation of the status of permanent neutrality, declaring it as the underlying principle and the cornerstone of the concept of national security. Accordingly, all actions undertaken by Moldova's entire national security system, which aims to ensure national security, are based on this principle. In this regard, as further stated, this country makes efforts to ensure that other subjects of international law respect its declared permanent neutrality (Концепции национальной безопасности Республики Молдова, 2008, ст. 357).

Permanent neutrality has also found its place in the National Security Strategy of Moldova from 2011, which states that this status will be taken into consideration in the process of pursuing national interests. It is then repeated that permanent neutrality presupposes that the state is not a member of military alliances and does not allow the deployment of foreign military troops or weapons of other states and military alliances on its territory (Стратегии национальной безопасности Республики Молдова, 2011, ст. 499). At the request of President Igor Dodon, the draft of the new National Security Strategy, prepared in 2016 with the assistance of international partners, was withdrawn from the procedure in June 2017 with a clarification that it did not correspond to the geopolitical reality and was not in line with Moldova's national interests and permanent neutrality (European Commission, 2018, p. 5). In the meantime, in March 2016, the Parliament adopted a political declaration on the inviolability of Moldova's sovereignty, independence, and permanent neutrality. The declaration notes, among other things, that the permanent neutrality declared by the Constitution is not only an indicator of the state's peaceful nature, but also a rational requirement for securing peace and stability in Moldova and the region as a whole. Challenging the constitutional principle of permanent neutrality, as well as actions aimed at its abolition, can be understood as a direct attack on the Constitution, peace, and tranquility of the state, as well as the security of its citizens (Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 2016).

Two years later, in July 2018, the Parliament adopted the National Defense Strategy and its Action Plan for the period 2018 to 2022, which states that the state's defense policy is affected, among other things, by the status of permanent neutrality established by the Constitution. In addition to repeating that this status implies the non-acceptance of the deployment of troops from other countries on its territory and the renunciation of participation in armed conflicts, it points out that in peacetime neutrality presupposes the building of good friendly relations based on mutual respect and consensus. At the same time, as mentioned, neutrality does not mean isolation, nor does it mean that Moldova will only be a "user of security", but also that it will contribute actively to international security

through its participation. It was stated that, *inter alia*, the opportunities for international cooperation will be used to advance the country's national security and defense interests (Национальной стратегии обороны и Плана действий по внедрению Национальной стратегии обороны на 2018–2022 годы, 2018, ст. 441). A few months later the Military strategy and its Action plan, which also refers to the period from 2018 to 2022, were adopted. They also addressed the issue of the permanent neutrality of Moldova. Claiming that the international security environment is characterized by a range of security risks and threats that affect regional security, the Military Strategy underlines that, despite the declared status of permanent neutrality, Moldova must face them. It is also stated that protecting the neutrality status does not exclude, but defines the need for one's own military defense capacities. There is also a clear determination that, in addition to maintaining a neutral status, Moldova cooperates with other countries and international organizations to preserve international peace and security. At the same time, it is concluded that this status will not prevent the examination and acceptance of other international organizations and countries' military experience, as well as cooperation with them in order to develop national military and defense capacities (Правительство Постановление об утверждении Военной стратегии и Плана действий по ее реализации на 2018-2022 годы, 2018, ст. 1110).

Therefore, legally speaking, the Constitution adopted in 1994 determined the strategic options of Moldova in a permanent sense. Although it is clear that Moldova's permanent neutrality is unsustainable without real and strict international guarantees of its neutrality, a review of key economic, security, and defense policy documents shows that the country has not given up on pursuing this status as a basic principle of its foreign and security policy (Grosu, 2017, pp. 44-45).

### **THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONTEXT OF MOLDOVA AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ITS POLICY OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY**

Moldova, one of the poorest countries in Europe, faces systemic corruption, lack of transparency, structural deficits, including the weak institutions. Endemic political instability is illustrated in the difficulty of finding consensus among political parties, unstable coalition governments, frequent early elections, numerous political and financial scandals, anti-government protests. The country is also deeply divided because Moldova has not formed single national consciousness, which is also reflected in the citizens' various orientations and foreign-policy affinities. In these conditions, certain foreign regional actors' geopolitical interests affect the internal political environment and the state's capacity to integrate effectively, which is a factor that further destabilizes Moldova.

The most pronounced is the influence of Russia, which, with its military, cultural and political presence in Transnistria, as well as its economic ties with Chisinau, remains crucial to Moldova's future stability. The European Union has also become an important factor in Moldova's economic and political development following its enlargement to Romania. It supports Moldova's attempts to establish a stable state as it is situated along the EU borders of Europe, and its fragility can have very negative security implications for the EU itself. The Union is assuming that Moldova can achieve stability by promoting its pro-European orientation. However, this strategy is contrary to Russian interests, which could lead to an increase in social tensions and further destabilization (Kosárová & Ušiak, 2017, p. 52). As Bitzinger noted in 1991, if an Eastern European country wants to separate itself from Moscow, it should behave in a way that does not call Russia's core security interests into question or automatically weaken them. As he pointed out, it should seek to maintain "neighborly" relations with Russia, while its foreign policy, although not pro-Russian, at least should not be anti-Russian (Bitzinger, 1991, pp. 285-287).

Various external actors' strategic influence and conflict of interest are reflected in their support for certain political actors and political parties, divided between pro-European and pro-Russian factions (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2020a, p. 48).<sup>4</sup> Although the office of the Prime Minister and most of the ministries had been occupied by pro-European party leaders since 2009, with the election of the leader of the Socialist Party in the 2016 presidential election, I. Dodon, the pro-Russian political forces have gained their voice. His choice is partly due to the fact that pro-democracy and pro-European parties, which had been in power since 2009, had not been able to effectively implement the necessary reforms, and had largely discredited themselves and the entire European integration project (Tudoroiu, 2015, p. 655). At the same time, the election of Dodon marked a shift in foreign policy priorities and an increase in Russian influence in Moldova (Lins de Albuquerque & Hedenskog, 2016, p. 16).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> More than 20,000 supporters of the pro-Russian Socialist Party demonstrated on November 18, 2018, in Chisinau, demanding that Moldova become a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and cancel the Association Agreement signed in 2014 with the EU. Earlier, in early February 2018, at least 10 local councils symbolically supported reunification with Romania, while the following month, about 10,000 demonstrators gathered in downtown Chisinau on the same occasion.

<sup>5</sup> During the election campaign, I. Dodon advocated the renewal of economic ties with Russia, the cancellation of the Association Agreement with the EU. He also suggested that Moldova should be federalized, in a similar way as Russia once proposed (Kozak Memorandum). As for the permanent military neutrality of Moldova, I. Dodon called for the formation of a trilateral commission of the USA, the EU, and Russia, which would guarantee the inviolability of this status.

Due to the difficulty of finding a compromise between the political parties, mainly the pro-Russian Socialist Party on the one hand and the pro-European ruling parties on the other, instability soon shifted to the state level (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2018, p. 55). In 2018, the Supreme Court of Moldova temporarily suspended President I. Dodon's powers three times because he led to an institutional blockade by refusing to appoint new ministers to the Government and to sign laws (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2020a, p. 55). The internal political crisis continued in the year 2019. At the parliamentary elections held in late February 2019, the pro-Russian Socialist Party won the most seats, 35 out of 101, followed by the Democratic Party and the pro-European ACUM bloc. The elections were held in line with the current controversial mixed electoral system, which replaced the old proportional system.<sup>6</sup> The Government changed twice in 2019. In June, a coalition of ACUM and the Socialist Party succeeded the Democratic-led government. Just five months later, on November 12, the Socialist Party deputies backed by the Democratic Party deputies voted for no-confidence against the Government (Emerson & Cenusa, 2018, pp. 15-16).<sup>7</sup> On 14 November 2019, Dodon appointed a new minority government, headed by Ion Chicu, as an independent candidate (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2020b, p. 48).

The politicization of governmental institutions has severely undermined the credibility of democracy and the rule of law in Moldova. According to Cenusa, the change in the electoral system is one more proof that a corrupt approach to governance prevails in Moldova because the political interests of the parties are more important than the public and national interests (Cenusa, 2017). In the circumstances of open political disputes, corruption, and inefficiency of the Government and other state institutions, Moldova cannot implement the necessary reforms effectively. In addition to being politically fragile and economically weak, Moldova is exposed to the influence of various external actors who are trying to attain their interests in the region. Compared to Moldova, they have greater cultural, political, and military potential and rely on large ethnic groups which then show separatist tendencies.

Referring to Ukraine, Ciurea stresses that neutrality must not always be an effective means to achieve stability. Neutrality has not prevented the annexation of Crimea and the war at Donbas, as the author points out. The solution, he says, would be to join NATO as an alliance strong enough to respond to Russia

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<sup>6</sup> Critics of the new electoral system point out that it favors large and developed political parties.

<sup>7</sup> The founder of the Democratic Party is the oligarch in exile Vladimir Plathoniuc, who is believed to have been preventing an effective anti-corruption campaign for years.



(Ciurea, 2015). Dungaciu claims that prolonging Moldova's neutral status is a mistake, having in mind that this status is definitely inaccurate since, as he points out, foreign troops are still stationed on its territory. Of course, as he concludes, this process should be managed carefully and intelligently, always taking into consideration the development of events in the eastern part of the country (Dungaciu, 2015, p. 42). For Ungureanu, permanent neutrality generates multidimensional instability, which is why it needs to be examined in the context of the new threats, risks, and vulnerabilities that this country is facing (Ungureanu, 2017, pp. 116-137). Burian and Dorul view things differently. They point out that any sudden change in foreign policy could lead to a reaction from different ethnic groups, which could also jeopardize Moldova's territorial integrity. Also, they advocate the independence and individuality of foreign policy, as well as the maintenance of its permanent neutrality. They interpret neutrality as a kind of guarantee of the absence of any foreign interference which, as they claim, should guarantee the independence of Moldova's foreign policy and allow it to cooperate with all countries around the world. Burian and Dorul believe that if neutral states increase their credibility and convince the international community of their neutrality, they will exclude the possibility of its infringement (Burian & Dorul, pp. 61-70).

Recently there have been noticeable attempts by Moldova to explicitly call for international acceptance of a permanent neutrality status. Moldova's president, I. Dodon, addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 September 2019, requesting *de facto* recognition and respect for this status. He underlined that the Constitution had proclaimed permanent neutrality, as well as that any effort to challenge it would deepen internal disputes and divisions. This, as he also said, also undermined any possibility of finding a solution to the "frozen" conflict in Transnistria and, indirectly, improving peace and security across the region. I. Dodon also referred to Austria's neutrality. However, the status of Moldova's neutrality was proclaimed in circumstances when that country already had a "frozen conflict" and foreign troops on its territory, while Austria's permanent neutrality was proclaimed after the last foreign soldier left its territory (Rendl, 1998, p. 162).<sup>8</sup> Having regard to the pro-Russian orientation of the political party of the Moldovan President, his speech was criticized on the grounds that he stated Russia's position, which promotes Moldova's permanent neutrality due to fear of further NATO expansion to the East (Socor, 2019).

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<sup>8</sup> In contrast to Moldova, the permanent neutrality of Austria was negotiated and agreed at the international level. The withdrawal of allied forces was agreed upon as part of those negotiations. The whole process was closely linked to the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

Given the poor economic situation of Moldova, permanent neutrality should allow it to work closely with neighboring countries and the West and maintain good relations with Russia. This is also seen as an opportunity to, without political preferences, cooperate with different foreign markets to encourage and develop a very weak national economy. Neutrality also relieves Moldova of its obligation to invest significant economic resources to consolidate its system of defense. As Viotti noted in 1990, neutral states have considerably lower costs for not having to maintain a large, permanent army. Such a political position helps them to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty, relying above all on the overall atmosphere of East-West relations (Viotti, 1990, p. 5).

So, in order to understand the nature of the permanent neutrality of Moldova, we should keep in mind that this country is placed between two opposing security structures, the Euro-Atlantic area of NATO and the sphere of interest of Russia. These actors have a major impact on Moldova's internal political situation, and therefore on its foreign policy. In these circumstances, the security of the state can be achieved only through a balanced foreign policy that will take into account the complex contradictions of the interests of the EU, NATO, and Russia in the region.

### **RELATIONS BETWEEN MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA AND THE PLACE OF ITS PERMANENT NEUTRALITY**

Since declaring independence, Moldova has hesitated to stay close to Russia, primarily due to Russia's unique position in handling the Transnistrian conflict. Moldova refused to accede to the Treaty of Collective Security of 15 May 1992, even before its Constitution declared permanent neutrality. And although it participated in the work of the Commonwealth of Independent States, it did not sign air defense and joint border protection agreements that were adopted within this organization. The status of neutrality was supposed, among other things, to serve as an argument for the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces and security equipment from the eastern part of the country. However, they are still present in this region against the will of Moldova, which is why their current relations can be viewed through the lens of the "frozen conflict" in Transnistria. It is important to start from the fact that Russia's approach to the issue of unrecognized states as a whole, as well as Transnistria, is based on the principles of pragmatism and directly depends on its national and geopolitical interests. According to Fischer, Russia is a major foreign player and mediator in all peace processes, but at the same time, its military presence and political participation make it a side of the conflict (Fischer, 2016, p. 9). With the help of the so-called Operational Group of Russian Forces, as well as participation in the Joint Peacekeeping Force, Russia provides the necessary support for the functioning

of Transnistria. However, it is characteristic that the independence of this self-proclaimed republic was not officially recognized by Russia itself (Rusakovich, 2016; Евразийское Приднестровье, 2014).<sup>9</sup>

As Sizov claims, the reasons for that are of a geopolitical, foreign, and economic nature. Moreover, Russia is satisfied with the scope and status of its military forces in Transnistria and is not ready for further deterioration of relations with the West. The fact that Transnistria does not border Russia plays an important role in Russia's cautious stance, so its recognition would be impractical and would only complicate the situation further, without the possibility of providing absolute support and protection (Сизов, 2017, стр. 126-127).

Transnistria also has a symbolic significance for Russia because it has historically attached great strategic and economic significance to the Black Sea region. Russia is also using its military presence to prevent Moldova and other post-Soviet countries from turning their foreign policies towards Euro-Atlantic integration. In that context, keeping Moldova's permanent military neutrality is in Russia's interest, which is why Russia is promoting it on an international level. In April 2008, Russia appealed to Moldova's military neutrality at the NATO Summit in Bucharest when it came to a potential invitation to Ukraine and Georgia to enter into NATO membership negotiations (Makarychev, 2010, p. 3). As Friedman once remarked, in the hands of NATO or some other Western power, Moldova might become a tool against Russia. Russia, as this author further points out, understands this clearly and does all it can to create a pro-Russian state in Moldova, or at least unstable enough that no one can use it to threaten the Russians (Friedman, 2010). That NATO enlargement to the East is an important security issue for Russia indicates Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's statement from October 2014. In the statement, he said that Transnistria would have the right to political self-determination if Moldova renounced its permanent neutrality status (Ofitserov-Belskiy & Sushenstov, 2018, p 287).

However, a neutral status in itself is not enough for Russia, but it also needs real levers of influence, thanks to which it could shape Moldova's foreign policy, not only in the short-term but also in the long-term. In that context, when it comes to resolving the conflict in Transnistria, Russia has its own interests and is determined to realize them. It wants to keep up the key role in reaching an agreement, as well as to stay the main external "guarantor" of the agreement by continuing its military presence (Karniewicz, Petrovická & Wunsch, 2010, p. 6). Through an unbalanced constitutional arrangement predicted by the Kozak Memorandum, Moscow tried to impose a political solution that would ensure

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<sup>9</sup> Russia's annexation of Crimea has strengthened the arguments for Transnistria's accession to Russia. In mid-April 2014, the Transnistrian Supreme Council called on the Russian leadership to decide on its recognition as a sovereign independent state.

the continuation of the Russian military presence and influence on the creation of Moldova's domestic and foreign policy (Ofitserov-Belskiy & Sushenstov, 2018, p. 286).

The national security of Moldova is closely linked to regional security. With the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the situation in Donbas and Crimea began to impact Transnistria and, consequently, Moldova. There have been fears that Russia plans to take control of the entire Southeast of Ukraine to secure access to Transnistria and the strategically important Black Sea region. In May 2015, Kyiv suspended the agreement on land transport, which reduced the danger that Moscow would use Transnistria as a base for potential offensive actions in Moldova or the opening of another front in Western Ukraine (Klein, 2019, p. 26). Besides the deteriorating regional security situation, Moldova has also faced increasing influence from Russia. Furthermore, Russia's military involvement, resources, and logistical funding have guaranteed Transnistria's existence for years (Popescu, 2005, p. 24). Now Russia is beginning to conduct joint exercises together with the troops in this breakaway region. This is contrary to its official policy of supporting Moldova's permanent neutrality status. Instead of securing demilitarization, Russia is striving to maintain and strengthen its military presence in the east of the country.

In 2017, Moldova's parliament adopted a resolution calling for the Russian troops to be withdrawn from its territory. The document stressed that the existence and strengthening of Russia's military force in the eastern part of the country are in infringement of constitutional provisions, especially as regards Moldova's freedom, territorial integrity, and permanent neutrality, as well as the principles of international law. Russian ammunition, weapons, and military equipment on the territory of Moldova are cited as a constant threat to regional and European security and stability in general. In this context, the international community is called upon to support the initiative to keep the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Moldova (Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, 2017). However, the Operational Group of Russian Forces conducted a joint military exercise with the troops of Transnistria again. Moldova called on Russia to withdraw its forces, and a few months later, in June 2018, it submitted a draft of the resolution to the UN General Assembly calling on Russia to immediately and unconditionally withdraw troops and arms from Moldova (General Assembly UN, 2018). Presenting the draft resolution, the Minister noted that the Russian forces were stationed in the eastern part of his country without its consent. These are, as he pointed out, the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, stressing that the proposed resolution is not, in any way, an offer for confrontation, nor is it intended to politicize this issue. Before the resolution was put to the vote, the Russian representative suggested postponing the consideration of the draft, noting that the text was not the result of the

preliminary consultations and that Moldova itself was divided on this issue (UN, 2018). Despite the UN resolution, the Russian and Transnistrian troops continued to conduct joint military exercises (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2020a).<sup>10</sup>

The National defense strategy adopted in 2018 also opposes the Russian military presence in Transnistria. There is a considerable military capacity of the separatist armed troops in Transnistria, which is said to be supported from abroad. It is further pointed out that the Russian military formations are illegally on the territory of Moldova, contrary to the Constitution of that country. These separatist and foreign troops, as noted, have significant operational capabilities and are capable of forming intervention forces at any time. Their military capability would empower the government on the left bank of the Dniester and Russia to achieve its geopolitical goals, which is why it presents a significant threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova. Given Russia's policy towards the West and some neighboring countries, including Moldova, it is expected that its influence will continue and grow through diplomatic, cultural, educational, economic and military pressures, spreading of disinformation, and even political corruption. It was concluded, however, that Moldova intends to continue an open, transparent dialog with Russia to find solutions to issues of common interest, including the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces and the destruction and/or evacuation of stockpiles of ammunition stored on its territory (Постановление об утверждении Национальной Дастратегии обороны и Плана действий по внедрению Национальной стратегии обороны на 2018–2022 годы, 2018).

The danger of hostile use of military and paramilitary formations from the left bank of the Dniester was recognized as a threat in the Military Strategy of Moldova adopted in October 2018. The possibility of using these forces to incite, spread and provoke conflicts based on interethnic, historical, religious, social, and other differences to destabilize Moldovan society, as pointed out, represents a serious military threat to the country's security. There are fears that in the given international context, these forces could be used to destabilize the situation in the entire region. In addition to infringing Moldova's neutrality status, the presence of the Russian troops is said to nurture military potential and give military support to the regime on the left bank of the Dniester. This obviously violates the provisions of the Agreement on the Principles for the Peaceful Settlement of Armed Conflicts, according to which the Russian troops must

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<sup>10</sup> Evidence of internal divisions soon arrived from Moldova itself, after the resolution was criticized by pro-Russian President I. Dodon. He also reiterated on September 18, 2018, that the Russian forces should stay in Transnistria until the final solution to the conflict is reached.

keep neutrality. Given the current tensions between Russia and Ukraine, it was concluded that they might be a source of regional destabilization.<sup>11</sup> The risk of the spread of the Ukrainian conflict and the zone of instability to the borders of Moldova was also recognized as a military threat. In these circumstances, as has been pointed out further, certain extremist-oriented social groups, including illegal armed groups on the Dniester's left bank, may be encouraged to launch actions characteristic of a hybrid war on Moldova's territory (Постановление об утверждении Военной стратегии и Плана действий по ее реализации на 2018-2022 годы, 2018).

Thus, Moldova disputes the legitimacy of the Russian presence and demands that Moscow withdraws its soldiers from that region, in line with the commitments made at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999. Nevertheless, despite Chisinau's aforementioned complaints, there are opinions that the Russian military presence not only provided the necessary security guarantees of Transnistria, but also that this is the main reason why there were no major military conflicts in the region after the "freezing." The withdrawal of the Russian troops is seen as part of a wider security arrangement in Europe that can be implemented as part of the settlement of the dispute between Chisinau and Tiraspol (Istomin & Bolgova, 2016, p. 3). As Beyer and Wolff note, Russia's influence in Moldova is part of a bigger geopolitical game in which the "frozen conflict" in Transnistria has significant instrumental value. Furthermore, Russia's long-standing presence, Transnistria's financial reliance, and the cultural and social inclination of the majority of its citizens to Moscow have, over time, established and strengthened Russia's position in the region. With this support, Transnistria has, over time, consolidated into a kind of self-governing territorial entity, which has some of the attributes traditionally associated with a sovereign state. These include a functioning government, a military force of its own, a permanent population, and effective control of the territory. Furthermore, unlike the rest of Moldova, Transnistria has never been part of the cultural space of Romania, and its inhabitants rely on Russia as the protector of their cultural identity (Beyer & Wolff, 2016, p. 339). Russia, as Nuriyev points out, has always considered itself a great power to be surrounded by semi-sovereign buffer states. Even today, Russia plays a key role in the security situation in the entire post-Soviet region, while all recent political steps by Russia are also aimed at strengthening its position in this part of the world (Nuriyev, 2018, pp. 6-19). Despite these obstacles, Moldova insists that Russian soldiers should be replaced by members of the peacekeeping forces (Jović-Lazić, 2015, p. 239). At the same time, all activities

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<sup>11</sup> According to the agreement of July 21, 1992, in addition to the OGRV, there is a Russian contingent on the left bank of the Dniester as part of the Joint Peacekeeping Force. This strategy, as it is pointed out, makes a difference between those two military units.

that are undertaken in the interests of national security, Moldova seeks to implement in accordance with the principles of permanent military neutrality (Manolache & Trofimov, 2013, pp. 14-28).

### **COOPERATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND ITS PERMANENT NEUTRALITY**

Since becoming independent, Moldova has declared its affiliation to Europe and, therefore, its wish to move forward on the path of European integration. The competition in the post-Soviet space between Russia and the West had also periodically had a negative impact on the atmosphere in Moldova, but the involvement of the international community in that country was very limited for a long time. Nevertheless, expecting Moldova to become its neighbor after enlargement to Romania, the Union's approach has become more proactive. The Union, therefore, sent representatives to the negotiations on the status of Transnistria for the first time in 2002. The EU and the United States agreed that the implementation of the proposed Kozak Memorandum would effectively make it possible for Transnistria and thus Russia to paralyze any new government, veto key foreign policy decisions and keep the Russian troops in Transnistria. The EU and US officials soon put strong pressure on the then-president of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, to drop the deal (Beyer & Wolff, 2016, pp. 339-340).

In an effort to maintain stability at its new borders, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was formulated by the Union in 2004. In that context, the EU has recognized the strategic role of Moldova and the frozen conflict in Transnistria as a serious threat to its security. The growing interest of the Union in the region has increased its presence in Moldova. An EU special representative has been appointed and a European Commission delegation has been set up in Chisinau. In late 2005, the European Union also launched the Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Moldova and Ukraine, with the aim of contributing to the stabilization of the region by increasing security at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border (Dura, 2009, p. 276).<sup>12</sup> As observers, the European Union and the United States have been participating in negotiations to resolve the 'frozen conflict' in Transnistria (the so-called 5 + 2 format) since October 2005 (OSCE).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> This mission is deployed to respond to smuggling and trafficking of drugs, weapons, and people across Moldova's eastern border with Ukraine, especially along the part controlled by the Transnistrian authorities. It is also believed that by reducing illegal revenues and creating conditions for Transnistria to be integrated into Moldova's customs area, this mission can contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

<sup>13</sup> Since 2005, the European Union and the United States have joined a five-member negotiating team composed of representatives of the opposing parties (Moldova and Transnistria),

The fact that the frozen conflict poses a major challenge to regional security, along with Chisinau's interest in establishing close cooperation with the EU, has over time put dialogue on security and defense issues on the agenda. Cooperation within the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) between the Union and the so-called partner countries implies their participation in EU missions and operations (Pintea, Helly & Panainte, 2011, p. 39). Moldova has consistently demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the EU in this sector while keeping a permanent neutrality status. The concept of Moldova's national security from 2008 sees participation in the CSDP missions as an important aspect of the development of bilateral political relations with the EU and a factor that indirectly contributes to increasing Moldova's security on the European continent. It is also explicitly mentioned that, in its national security policy, Moldova is guided by the principle of respect for the status of permanent neutrality (Закон об утверждении Концепции национальной безопасности Республики, 2008).

Over time, Moldova has taken important steps to strengthen its ties with the EU in the area of the CSDP. The Working Group for CSDP as the main inter-institutional body with the task to plan and coordinate capacities for participation in operations, missions, and related activities and to give recommendations for improving cooperation with the EU in this area was established by Moldova in 2010. The 2011 National Security Strategy states that Moldova's close relations with the EU member states include the maintenance of active, constructive dialogue, the exchange of experience, the implementation of joint projects, the application of European standards, and security practices. It is, therefore, highlighted that the process of European integration should give the necessary instruments for the defense and promotion of the state's national interests and that Moldova's national security cannot be imagined outside the context of European security. In order to improve national and regional stability, attention should be given to intensifying cooperation with the EU in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defense Policy. Moldova is ready to cooperate with the EU on conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Постановление об утверждении Стратегии национальной безопасности Республика Молдова, 2011). The Framework Agreement Moldova's Participation in EU Crisis Management Operations was signed in 2012.

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mediators (OSCE, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine) as observers. The goal of the 5 + 2 talks is to establish the parameters of a comprehensive solution based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders, with the special status of Transnistria within Moldova. About the progress of the negotiations see more in: <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-moldova/119488>.



It has been in force since July 2013 (Council Decision, 2012; Agreement, 2013). The following year, in June 2014, Moldova and the EU signed an Association Agreement which provides, *inter alia*, for intensive political dialogue and strengthening practical cooperation in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. By participating in civilian and military crisis management operations, as well as in certain Union exercises and training, Moldova is expected to contribute to international security and crisis management, both regionally and globally (Association Agreement, 2014).

In order to establish a legal framework for the fulfillment of obligations undertaken in the framework of agreements concluded with the EU and other international organizations, Moldova adopted the Law on participation in international missions and operations in 2015 (Закон об участии Республики Молдова в международных миссиях и операциях, 2015). So far, Moldova has contributed by sending experts to the EU Security Force Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) and the EU Military Advisory Mission to the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA). Moldova sent the first delegate to the position of an expert on gender problems and human rights in the Mali mission in 2014, and its military specialist was sent to the Central African Republic the following year, where he took the place of the liaison officer. During 2016 and 2017, one expert from Moldova was in the EU mission in Mali, and after October 2018, there were two (DG NEAR, 2017, p. 5). In 2017, Moldova and the EU concluded an Agreement on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information, which further sets out the general conditions for its participation in EU operations (Agreement, 2017).

The principles of participation of Moldova in international peacekeeping operations derive from its neutral status, basic national interests, and international obligations. As mentioned in the Introduction to the National Defense Strategy from 2018, Moldova aspires to EU integration and, therefore, to the approximation to European principles and values. As it opens up new possibilities for cooperation, the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, which seeks to establish a pan-European security system, is seen as a document of particular importance to member states and partner countries. Finally, Moldova appreciates the commitment of the European Union to support a peaceful solution to the Transnistrian conflict and expresses its willingness to increase its contribution to international missions and operations under the auspices of the EU, the UN, and the OSCE (Постановление об утверждении Национальной стратегии обороны и Плана действий по внедрению Национальной стратегии обороны на 2018–2022 годы, 2018).

Moldova's overall contribution to peacekeeping missions remains very modest as it undergoes a period of modernization of the armed forces, has a limited budget, and faces internal security constraints. However, given that, in the context

of European integration aspirations and the Association Agreement, Moldova has concluded an agreement establishing a framework for participation in EU crisis management operations, and its participation in Union-led missions is expected to increase.

The status of permanent neutrality is not in conflict with the CSDP of the European Union. By working closely with the EU, as Subedi points out, neutral states do not lose the freedom to act in order to protect the vital national and foreign policy interests needed to maintain that status (Subedi, 1993, p. 245). Furthermore, by participating in the CSDP, neutral states strengthen their position and capacity to respond more effectively to modern security challenges (Subedi, 1995, pp. 399–412).

### **MOLDOVA'S COOPERATION WITH NATO IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND THE PLACE OF ITS PERMANENT NEUTRALITY**

After Moldova's independence, a comprehensive reform of the security sector and the modernization of the armed forces were needed to ensure the security and defense of the country. In view of the lack of economic potential, Moldova, in cooperation with NATO, has seen an opportunity to gain support to strengthen national institutions and move closer to Euro-Atlantic standards in this field. Bearing in mind that NATO has a long history of cooperation with neutral countries or ones that do not aspire to membership, that commitment was not in conflict with the constitutionally declared neutrality of Moldova.

Relations with NATO were established in 1992 when Moldova joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.<sup>14</sup> Bilateral cooperation was established on 16 March 1994 with Moldova's accession to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). At the signing ceremony, the then President underscored Moldova's policy of neutrality, emphasizing that his country does not belong to the military structures of the CIS and that joining the PfP does not open up the possibility of membership of NATO. At the same time, he expressed confidence that participation in the PfP program would help strengthen Moldova's territorial integrity, political independence, and national security. The following year, in 1995, the Individual Partnership Program (IPP) was adopted as a framework for Moldova's participation in the Partnership for Peace. Although Moldova's membership in the Partnership for Peace was mostly of a formal nature during this period, in the summer of 1996, Moldovan troops for the first time

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<sup>14</sup> This forum for dialogue was inherited in 1997 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which brings together all allies and partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.

participated in the PfP “Peace Shield 96” maneuvers in Ukraine and “Cooperative Determination 96” in Bulgaria. The first PfP exercises were held in Moldova in May 1997 (Waters, 1998, pp. 81-84). In the same year, the National Army of Moldova joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). After that, Moldova agreed with all the official goals for achieving interoperability of national forces with NATO forces, in order to participate in multinational operations. In 1997, Moldova established permanent contact with NATO after the country’s ambassador to Belgium had become a representative of NATO (Molodilo, 2013, p. 35). Two years later, on May 11, 1999, the 22nd Peace Battalion was established as the first unit of the Moldovan Armed Forces compliant with NATO standards with the task of participating in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions. Since then, members of the 22nd Battalion have participated as military observers in international operations in Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, Armenia, Germany, Sweden, and the United States, as well as in UN missions in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and South Sudan (MOD RM, 2016).

The concept of the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IAPP) was introduced at the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague with a vision of deepening ties between NATO and partner countries. The adoption of the Moldova-NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan on 19 May 2006 marked a more intensive form of cooperation that created the conditions for regular and structured dialogue, including dialogue at the political level. This document clearly states that cooperation with NATO is based on respect for the permanent neutrality of Moldova. It is further noted that as a neutral country, Moldova is implementing the IAPP with the goal of deepening cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic structures and institutions, improving the reform process, and modernizing its national security and defense sector, strengthening democratic control of the military, etc. The issue of cooperation with NATO is also mentioned in the 2008 Concept of National Security of Moldova. Considering that Moldova does not aim to join NATO, its relations with this organization, as has been stated, have the character of pragmatic relations, while respecting its constitutional principle of permanent neutrality. Moldova’s 2011 National Security Strategy also devotes space to cooperation with NATO (Закон об утверждении Концепции национальной безопасности Республики, 2008). This cooperation is, as has been stated, implemented within the boundaries of the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and, in practice, in accordance with the Moldova-NATO Individual Action Plan. In this way, Moldova contributes to the consolidation of European security and stability, which in turn, as it is pointed out, has a positive impact on its national security. Such a strategy is expected to ensure the transformation of Moldova from a customer to a source of regional security and stability, and its further participation

in the PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will allow it to incorporate and apply foreign experience to reform the security and defense sector. It is particularly stressed that cooperation with NATO does not affect Moldova's status of permanent neutrality and does not go beyond the constitutional framework. It further states that through the process of deepening cooperation with NATO, achieved in 2006 with the launch of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IAPP), Moldova aims to acquire the necessary tools and practices for building a functioning national security sector capable of dealing with new and conventional threats and risks. It is said that the IAPP is related to the reform of the national security sector in accordance with European standards and practices in the field of security. As concluded in this document, Moldova should use cooperation with NATO to strengthen national capacities with a view to preventing and managing crisis situations and their consequences (Постановление об утверждении Стратегии национальной безопасности Республики Молдова, 2011).

A liaison office for NATO opened in Chisinau in 2017. In the same year, the Individual Partnership Action Plan between Moldova and NATO was adopted, which defined the priority areas and common goals of cooperation in the next two years. It is envisaged that a number of actions will be taken to reform and modernize the security sector, develop the armed forces, strengthen defense capabilities, and combat new security threats. These include organizing political consultations on security and defense issues, continuing to participate in the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo (KFOR) to enhance the interoperability of the national armed forces and contributing to the promotion of security and stability in Europe, capitalizing on NATO's peace and security program assistance and capacity building for emergency response and crisis management (GRM, 2017). It is important to note that this document pays attention to the neutrality of Moldova, too. Namely, it is explicitly mentioned that during the period of implementation of this document, Moldova must carry out its activities in compliance with the Constitutional Court's decision on the interpretation of Article 11 of the Constitution on the country's permanent neutrality. The decision, released on May 2, 2017, states that the Republic of Moldova's involvement in collective security structures, such as the United Nations security system, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations, those seeking to enforce joint sanctions on aggressors and those infringing international law, is not contrary to the neutrality status of the country (IPAP, 2017). So far, cooperation with non-NATO countries has indicated the potential that neutral states may have for the development of an international system of collective security.

Moldova's readiness to intensify and deepen relations with NATO, while respecting the status of permanent neutrality, was also confirmed in the 2018 National Defense Strategy. It points out that the development of regional and

international events has conditioned the consolidation, development, and modernization of the defense system as an urgent need and a strategic imperative of national importance, requiring considerable efforts to achieve conceptual-normative and practical adaptation. Among other things, Moldova's national interests are related to its participation in ensuring international security. Cooperation with NATO is observed in this context and states that it has been developed in different fields and aspects, starting with education and science, development of defense capabilities (for example, Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative), military exercises, disaster management, raising levels of interoperability until the implementation of projects for the development of the defense system (Постановление об утверждении Национальной стратегии обороны и Плана действий по внедрению Национальной стратегии обороны на 2018–2022 годы, 2018).

Thus, Moldova's cooperation with NATO has increased over time as the Alliance has expanded and provided increasing assistance to modernize the Moldovan army in line with NATO standards. Moldova has seen an opportunity in this cooperation to strengthen its security and create conditions for its army to contribute to international peacekeeping missions. To date, more than 40 Moldovan troops, with UN approval, have participated in NATO-led multinational operations. These included the NATO Training Mission in Iraq and NATO-led Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR). Moldova acquired the status of NATO's "operational partner" for the mission in Kosovo (KFOR) in 2012. Among others, the KFOR mission was supported by the Moldovan Platoon Infantry Manoeuvre and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (NATO, 2018). Based on the above, it seems that the position expressed by Waters in 1998 has not lost its relevance. As the author points out, the Moldovan government is always ready to recognize the benefits of participating in the Partnership for Peace, highlighting that cooperation with NATO is not contrary to its policy of permanent neutrality. At the same time, as he further notes, it also clearly indicates that a neutral status prevents Moldova from participating in military structures under Russian leadership (Waters, 1998, p. 84).

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since gaining independence, Moldova has faced a number of challenges that it has, among other things, tried to address by unilaterally declaring its permanent neutrality with the Constitution. Despite the "freezing" of the conflict on its territory, permanent neutrality was seen as the most effective way to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was also intended to serve as a further argument for the withdrawal of Russian soldiers and military equipment from Transnistria. Due to the great division of Moldovan society, constant neutrality

was expected to help its reintegration. Notwithstanding drastic changes in the spectrum of powers on the world stage, the explanations given are still valid today.

A balanced foreign policy is in Moldova's national security interest, while permanent neutrality can be seen as a strategy for the survival of the country and the most appropriate way of reducing additional external and internal political pressures. Viewed from the outside, Moldova constitutes a buffer zone between key geopolitical players, with the danger of becoming a geopolitical battlefield. Its position is, therefore, very complex and it is influenced, on the one hand, by various interests of NATO and the West in general, and, on the other, Russia. The current situation in the region, caused by the Ukrainian crisis, further increases security risks in Moldova itself. Seen from the inside, the unresolved conflict in Transnistria is a constant source of tension, and together with Russia's military presence in the region represents a major obstacle to the country's sustainable military neutrality.

Russia wants to stay a key factor in Transnistria, despite international commitments to withdraw its troops, as well as strong objections from Moldova. It is trying to keep direct power and control in the region. At the same time, Russia has requested international recognition of Moldova's neutrality in its attempts to limit Western activities in its sphere of influence and, above all, in its fear of further expansion of NATO to the East. However, this status is internally challenged by the existence of the Russian armed forces and defense equipment in Transnistria, and it reduces the possibilities for it to be recognized and guaranteed at the International level.

In addition, the status of permanent neutrality is the basis for Moldova's national security policy being institutionalized. Moldova insists on respecting this status in its relations with other countries and international organizations. In all key documents that this country has signed, both with NATO and the EU, the principle of permanent neutrality is set out. Moldova wants to present itself as a reliable partner in the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security, which is why it participates in the international peacekeeping missions of the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and in NATO missions when there is a UN mandate. This gives it the ability to benefit from the other neutral countries' experiences, while the national army has the opportunity to achieve a greater degree of professionalism and operational experience. The importance of the above is huge, keeping in mind that Moldova has a very small budget for a defense that does not meet its army's needs, as well as its security problems, risks, and threats.

Due to the risk of instability in the region, the International community must make more efforts to create the conditions for Moldova to support its policy of permanent neutrality and overcome many challenges it faces. The most important of them is certainly resolving the "frozen conflict" in Transnistria. Additionally,

as Rumer notes, relations with Russia remain an essential element of the economic, political, and security equations of Moldova. Moldova cannot risk poor relations with Russia, and it should be carefully handled. As this author states, neither the European Union nor the United States are capable of replacing Russia in that equation. Careful balancing between Russia and the West is key to the future of Moldova, and to suggest anything else could have serious consequences for this country (Rumer, 2017).

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## **STALNA NEUTRALNOST REPUBLIKE MOLDAVIJE – STRATEGIJA ZA OPSTANAK IZMEĐU RUSIJE I NATO?**

*Apstrakt:* Cilj članka je da analizira glavne izazove povezane sa jednostrano proglašenom trajnom neutralnošću Republike Moldavije. Ova odluka je doneta u komplikovanim istorijskim i geopolitičkim okolnostima, nakon što je rat u Pridnjestrovlju „zamrznut”, a strane oružane snage raspoređene na njenoj teritoriji. Stalna neutralnost se videla kao najbolji način da Moldavija očuva stabilnost i teritorijalni integritet. Moldavija još uvek nije rešila „zamrznuti sukob” na svojoj teritoriji. Iako se u međuvremenu situacija u velikoj meri stabilizovala uz pomoć međunarodne zajednice, podela dovodi do ekonomskih i političkih nestabilnosti i nosi rizik od novih sukoba i napetosti. Takođe, Moldavija nije dobila međunarodno priznanje svog statusa stalne neutralnosti, dok ruske trupe i dalje krše njen suverenitet i unutrašnju bezbednost. Kao rezultat, sve se češće se postavljaju pitanja o održivosti tog statusa. Uprkos svim dilemama, Moldavija je i dalje odlučna da uspostavi stalnu neutralnost kao osnovno načelo svoje spoljne i bezbednosne politike. Stalna neutralnost se i dalje smatra najboljim načinom da se odgovori na spoljne uticaje i unutrašnje podele i tako doprinese očuvanju stabilnosti i teritorijalnog integriteta zemlje. Istovremeno, neutralni status ne isključuje određenu vrstu bezbednosne saradnje sa zapadnim institucijama kako bi se osigurala, ili u najmanju ruku, implicitno garantovala bezbednost države.

*Ključne reči:* neutralnost, Moldavija, „zamrznuti konflikt”, Pridnjestrovlje, Rusija, EU, NATO.

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## **POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CHANGES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

Slobodan M. RADOJEVIĆ<sup>1</sup>

*Abstract:* The paper elaborates on the geostrategic significance of the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Sea in the past, as a precondition for consideration of current and future events in this macro-region. The author firstly considers the manifestation of the power, influence and interests of the great powers in the Mediterranean through a historical and spatial perspective. The paper analyses political and economic changes in the Mediterranean through the theoretical and practical approach of great powers' navies engagement. The author points out that the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean will further increase in the future, as a result of constant regional and global aspirations to increase the political and economic dynamics of this region. The growing competition between the United States and China will have a direct impact on the Mediterranean. The author concludes that the Mediterranean will remain a „testing polygon“ for the United States, China and Russia, and a region in which political and economic processes and strategic changes in the world could be witnessed most obviously.

*Keywords:* Mediterranean, Mediterranean Sea, strategic changes, political and economic processes, United States, China, Russia.

### **THE MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH HISTORY**

The great French historian Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), who studied the history of the Mediterranean, claimed that the Mediterranean Sea was part of the largest landmass in the world. He stated in a brilliant essayist style that the Mediterranean was a kind of planet, where goods and people have been moving since ancient times. Braudel also argued that it was on these three connected continents that people found a great stage for their history and that the crucial events took place there. (Brouel 2007, 33-34). For several centuries the

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Mediterranean Sea has been the most important geopolitical and geostrategic center of the world (Diaconu 2008, 43). Namely, for thousands of years, the Mediterranean was a strategic region. Empires rose and fell in the Mediterranean (Greenwood 1993, 2). Also, the Mediterranean Sea, “plays a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size” (Mahan 1890, 33). The Mediterranean Sea is rightly considered the cradle of the power of large fleets (Gorškov 1979, 113). The first large fleets were built in the Mediterranean, i.e., the navies that were the guarantor of the power of these states. In fact, naval power was a significant component in the growth and maintenance of the earliest civilizations of the Mediterranean.

The past of the Mediterranean offers ample opportunities to study the conquest, the movement of peoples, the emergence and disappearance of empires and colonial empires, the many circumstances and personalities of which the destinies of states and peoples depended. (Živojinović 1980, 9). The history of the Mediterranean abounds in turbulent events where politics and wars are constantly intertwined, and economic and religious conflicts are constantly looming behind them. The struggle for domination in the Mediterranean testifies to the constant efforts of the early civilizations, and later of the great powers, to reach its shores, strengthen, expand and suppress other nations and states on them.

The position of the Mediterranean has geopolitical and geostrategic influence, which throughout history to these days have manifested themselves directly and complexly on the surrounding countries, as well as on the entire world. After the Second World War, the political picture of the Mediterranean changed drastically. Colonial powers – Great Britain, France and Italy, are losing their possessions in the Mediterranean regions. Weakened Great Britain could no longer protect its geostrategic interests and positions, so its place was taken by the United States, which established naval and air bases in the Mediterranean and formed a strong naval strike force – the Sixth Fleet.

Since major geographical discoveries, the central role of the Mediterranean has gradually decreased. However, in modern times, by the XX century, the Mediterranean did not lose its relevance, and in the XXI century, it became the main arena of competition between the great powers and economic and cultural exchange. Today, the interests of the great powers such as the United States, Russia and China, as well as other regional powers, are intertwined in the Mediterranean. In addition to the old actors, China is gradually becoming stronger in the Mediterranean economically, diplomatically, and eventually geostrategically. (Mordechai 2018, 54-69). Namely, in the Mediterranean today, as it was in the past, it is most obvious that the navies serve as a guarantor of securing maritime trade in the way that theoretically explained Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914)



and Julian Corbett (1854-1922) (Black 2006; Parker 2003; Adamczyk, Rutkowska 2018, 1-16; Luttwak 1974; Naj 2012; Горшков 1979).

Through the theoretical framework of the application of naval suasion and maritime diplomacy according to Edward Luttwak, Joseph Nye and Sergey Gorshkov, we can also observe the actions of the navies of the United States, Russia, and China in the Mediterranean (Rowlands 2012, 93-109; Widén 2011, 715-733; Li 2009, 144-169; Cheng 2011, 1-12; Chang 2018, 148–156).

On the other hand, the Mediterranean basin is a region of great challenges due to the pressures of globalization, demographic growth in all non-European countries of the region, and potential unrest (Kissinger 2002, 53, 54). Today, the Mediterranean region abounds in local disputes that are of territorial, national, or religious origin. In general, the Mediterranean is “geostrategically and politically an extremely sensitive area and a potential crisis hotspot due to different political, military-political orientations, levels of economic development, social turmoil, wars, recent civil wars and revolutions in Arab countries.” (Radojević 2017a, 55).

In this paper, the focus is on political, economic and strategic changes and processes that are a consequence of the actions of the great powers. The influence of the European Union as an important actor in the Mediterranean is largely limited due to differences between member states and their different historical, political, cultural, social and economic presence, and influence in the Mediterranean states. The European Union has several regional concepts and strategies for the Mediterranean, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy. Also, the European Union is present with its naval forces in several naval security operations. For purposes of this study, consideration of the EU as a geostrategic and geopolitical actor in the Mediterranean will be indirectly analyzed. (For further reading see: Pierini, 2017; Frankenthal 2019; Khader & Amirah-Fernández, 2020).

Today, the Mediterranean Sea is an unavoidable and most dangerous migrant route caused by crises and wars in the coastal states and hinterland of the Mediterranean. (International Organization for Migration [IOM] 2018; [IOM] 2017; Steinhilper, Gruijters 2018, 515-533). In fact, in recent years, the Mediterranean Sea has become a “maritime cemetery” in which a large number of migrants and refugees have died. (Tazzioli 2015, 2-6). The control of the migrant crisis and the rescue of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea includes the naval forces of the European Mediterranean countries, but also the multinational naval forces of the European Union.

## **GEOSTRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA**

The Mediterranean consists of a series of compact, mountainous peninsulas, interrupted by vital plains: the Iberian, Apennine and Balkan peninsulas, Asia Minor and North Africa. In fact, the Mediterranean Sea is much more than a single body of water, it is a “complex of seas”. (Braudel, 1972, 23-27).

According to some authors, the Mediterranean, in addition to the area of all countries that reach the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, includes the entire area that gravitates economically towards the countries on the shores of this sea. (Martinez, Murdock, and Schaeffer 2013, 8-10). Although they do not have direct access to the sea, UNESCO, in addition to Portugal, Jordan, Serbia and North Macedonia, has included Andorra, San Marino and the Vatican in the Mediterranean countries because they are located in the region, gravitate to the area, or are related to the Mediterranean culture, history and tradition. (Adamo and Garonna 2009, 73-84).

The Mediterranean encompasses the Mediterranean Sea, which is a vast intercontinental sea of the Atlantic Ocean, located between Europe, Asia and Africa, and which by its position does not divide, but connects these continents. It represents the central part of the Mediterranean towards which a large part of the mainland of the three continents of “the Old World” gravitates (Marjanović 1983, 213). The Mediterranean Sea is connected to the Atlantic Ocean by the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. As a border of three continents and a crossroads of important sea and air routes, it is an extremely important economic, traffic, and strategically unique region. It is the most important and sensitive part of the Atlantic-Mediterranean-Asian world waterway. It has a very important military-geographical position between the Atlantic and Indian waters, between the mainland of Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as between the industrialized countries of Europe, without key raw materials, and the underdeveloped and rich countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

The Apennine Peninsula, Sicily and the submarine threshold between Tunisia and Sicily divide the Mediterranean Sea into two basins, the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. The economic-geographical and strategic characteristics of the eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean differ significantly. Unlike the Western Mediterranean, the eastern part of the Mediterranean is a zone of more tensions. In the eastern part of the Mediterranean, tensions between Greece and Turkey occasionally occur, often ending in the deployment of large naval and military forces. Namely, in this part, Greece and Turkey are in conflict over Cyprus. There are also the leading Arab countries and Israel as an “outspoken ally of the West”. The Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the civil

war in Syria are burdening this region. There are oil pipelines in the Eastern Mediterranean, significant natural gas deposits have been discovered, and there is also one of the most important artificial sea waterways – the Suez Canal. By interpreting the geopolitical significance of the Mediterranean, it becomes clear why for centuries the Mediterranean Sea has been a space of strategic importance in the conflict of great powers for domination and influence in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Namely, the Mediterranean with the Middle East is very rich in raw materials, the most important of which is oil and gas, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Also, dominance over the Mediterranean part of the African continent and the Middle East enables the control of the sea and air routes to the Atlantic, Western and Southern Europe, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the great powers have continuously throughout history sought to achieve their supremacy on this sea, and to achieve such a goal they have used naval and air forces to secure supremacy at sea and in the air. The struggle for domination in the Mediterranean testifies to the constant efforts of the great powers to reach its shores, strengthen, expand, and suppress others on them. Their rivalry and attempts to oust each other lead to occasional wars in the Mediterranean and the coastal states. (Živojinović 1980, 9).

The global role of the Mediterranean Sea began to grow again after the Second World War. Such a development of the situation was caused, above all, by the very nature of the Cold War. Let us recall, one of the earliest elements of what became a containment policy was the Truman Doctrine, according to which the United States provided direct assistance (mostly financial and economic, but also military) and strategic protection to Greece and Turkey in order to help these Mediterranean countries to face the Soviet threat (Diaconu 2008, 45). With geostrategic pressures on Greece and Turkey, as well as the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Soviet policy was directed towards the development of diplomatic relations with Iran and certain Arab states. In this way, the USSR penetrated deep into the areas of the special strategic interest of Great Britain and later the United States (Cvrtila 2004, 19-20). The activities of the USSR in the eastern part of the Mediterranean were connected with securing the Black Sea basin, which the Soviet Navy considered as its “own sea”.

Later, the strategic rivalry between the two superpowers intensified rapidly throughout the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union perceived the Mediterranean as a region vital for the success of possible “major strategic offensive operations along several major directions (and in several theatres of operations)” (Diaconu 2008, 45). In the late 1960s, the Mediterranean became a region of almost open conflict between the two superpowers. Also, the USSR provided great assistance and sent military advisers to Syria and Egypt, while the United States strongly supported Israel, and later Egypt. (Diaconu 2008, 45). Libya developed

cooperation with the USSR after coming to power of Muammar Gaddafi on 1 September 1969.

Even in modern conditions, the Mediterranean Sea is gaining more and more importance. In fact, the Mediterranean Sea “lies at the center of a security nexus whose geopolitical importance has increased since the end of the Cold War“. (Germond and Grove 2010, 1). Therefore, it is not surprising that the first joint post-Cold War NATO activities were related to the Mediterranean area. (Čehulić Vukadinović 2010, 237).

The geostrategic importance of the Atlantic Ocean tends to decrease since Euro-Atlantic maritime communications are no longer endangered. In contrast, from the point of view of Western European countries, the Mediterranean Sea, surrounded by crises and instabilities that affect maritime communications, is gaining increasing geostrategic significance.

The geostrategic position of the Mediterranean is determined and encompassed by geopolitical relations and the grouping of strategic elements. The Mediterranean as a sea area has a special place within the naval and air strategy, because using the freedom of navigation, strong naval forces with a significant air component, as well as strategic nuclear submarines can deploy in it. The Mediterranean Sea and its international legal regime allow the naval presence of non-Mediterranean countries. With such a position, it increases the possibility of efficient application of the most modern combat systems possessed by the great powers` navies. (Marjanović 1983, 212). The fragmented waters of the Mediterranean Sea can also have their tactical, operational and strategic application. Namely, the long sea coast, numerous bays and coves provide excellent conditions for the deployment and replenishment of warships. There are numerous islands with ports in the Mediterranean Sea, of which Cyprus, Crete and Malta are the most important in the military sense. Even in modern war conditions, these islands are of great importance and serve as a support for the actions of naval forces and systems and as „unsinkable aircraft carriers“, i.e., they have airports and bases (214). The depth of the Mediterranean Sea and the relief of the bottom provide optimal conditions for the use of submarines. In addition, air supremacy is key to conducting land and naval operations in the Mediterranean. Achieving air supremacy in this sea is partly facilitated by its relatively small width, the availability of a large number of air bases on land, and especially on the islands, as well as the presence of aircraft carriers. The eastern and western basins are important for the actions of larger naval forces. The western basin is important because of the Atlantic – the Mediterranean Sea and Europe – Northwest Africa connection and because of the increase in the depth of NATO’s special battlefield in Europe and the Mediterranean. These benefits were especially used during the intervention in Libya in 2011 (Radojević 2017b). The eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea has an extremely important military-

geographical position in relation to the wider area between the three continents, due to strategic raw materials in the Middle East, connection with the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, as well as political, economic and military influences and interventions (Marjanović 1983, 214). During the war in Syria, the NATO naval and air forces (primarily the United States) and the Russian naval and air forces operated from the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea.

In fact, the Mediterranean has an ideal position and can be used as an operational zone in relation to continental Europe, internal Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic – practically, in relation to the world's crisis hotspots. The position of the Mediterranean in Rimland emphasizes its exceptional geopolitical and geostrategic significance. The Mediterranean is a part of Rimland where geopolitically very important sea straits and corridors are located: Gibraltar, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Suez Canal and the most important internal sea corridor on the earth's surface, the corridor of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea about 6,000 kilometers long. (Pavić 1971a, 86). The general features of the Mediterranean Sea in Rimland are “dictated” by the interests and the presence of the great powers as well as the ongoing processes of the militarization of the region (Pavić 1971b, 399; Celac et al. 2019).

As a geographical area, it is not just a physical link in terms of traffic connections between the US military allies in Eurasia. The Mediterranean is more than that, precisely because of its geographical position. It is the backbone of the land, sea and air routes that in peace, but also wars, forms lines of connection with the allies along the southern edge of Eurasia. Thus, the Mediterranean, with its sea and air routes, has a special place in the geostrategic picture of the world in case the classic and limited nuclear war. (Božić 1974, 188-191).

In fact, as Vukovic concludes, the Mediterranean is “currently the most important global geostrategic hub of cross-cutting interests of major and regional powers.” (Vuković 2017, 269). Also, the military aspects of the geostrategic position are very important when considering political and economic aspects. Namely, the geostrategic significance of the Mediterranean is closely connected with the geoeconomic significance, first of all, its traffic and energy dimension.

## **GEOECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN**

Strategic key world waterways pass through the Mediterranean Sea, with around 7,000 merchant vessels sailing them daily. (Mays 2013, 34). Approximately 80% of global trade by volume and over 70% of global trade by value is transported by sea ([UNCTAD] 2018). Also, the Mediterranean Sea is an area of transit and exchange that accounts for about 30% of the world's maritime trade,

as well as 25% of the world's maritime oil transport. Also, most of the European Union's maritime trade with Asia and the Middle East takes place via the Mediterranean Sea lines of communications. The Mediterranean is also part of a key energy and communication infrastructure. It currently includes four gas pipelines connecting Europe and North Africa, a large number of liquefied petroleum gas terminals, as well as important submarine communication cables. The discovery of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the exploitation of existing reserves in the Southern and Southeastern Mediterranean, suggests that this region will remain an important supplier of energy to Europe in the foreseeable future. (Behr et al. 2013, 25).

Since as much as 65% of European oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean, the energy security of this region is important for NATO. (Weissenbacher, 2012, 458) A safe and stable environment in this region is not only important for Western importing countries, but also for energy producers in the region, as well as for all countries involved in oil and gas transit. Therefore, NATO influences energy security through forms of partnership and cooperation (Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and NATO Middle East Initiative) with countries rich in oil and gas, the wider Mediterranean region, the Middle East and Central Asia. (Čehulić Vukadinović 2010, 257). Oil, as a strategic raw material, is the most important of all factors that determine the geopolitical and geostrategic position of the wider Mediterranean region, with complex and global consequences for the economic, political, and military structure in modern international relations. In the Mediterranean, due to the complex political and economic situation, which has a global scale, the oil wealth of the Mediterranean countries has influenced the entire region to gain even greater geopolitical and geostrategic significance. Oil wealth has an irreplaceable positive impact on the development, wealth and power of states and has changed the entire life mile of Arab states, as well as the entire life, consciousness, and even the history of those countries. However, in addition to the stated positive impact, oil also had a negative impact on the Mediterranean countries. They have very often been the target of pressure, and especially since the discovery of new sites and larger reserves. For the NATO countries, the Mediterranean is of vital importance, considering the fact that the countries of Western Europe do not have a sufficient amount of oil, but in the largest percentage, they supply this raw material from the Arab countries through the Mediterranean.

Nebojsa Vukovic points out that having in mind all the facts, both in the field of transport and energy, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Mediterranean with areas that gravitate to it geographically (primarily the Middle East), is the most important part of the 'global economic flow' and geoeconomic hub of key importance in the world (Vuković 2017, 275).

The dependence of the United States and NATO members on the transportation of Middle Eastern oil transported by sea through the Mediterranean Sea gives it great strategic importance. In addition, North Africa and the Middle East have almost 5% of the world's proven oil reserves and about 5% of the confirmed gas reserves. (Hafner, Tagliapietra and El Elandalousi 2012, ii). The North African countries of the Mediterranean, primarily Libya, Algeria and Egypt, are rich in oil and gas. An additional geostrategic importance of these sites is that they are located outside the Middle East conflict zone. In these countries, there are ports for loading oil and from these countries, gas pipelines run to European NATO member states. Namely, coastal refineries and oil pipelines in the Mediterranean are geostrategically very sensitive locations.

Today, the geostrategic and geoeconomic role of the Mediterranean Sea for the United States, the EU and NATO countries is growing even more because, above all, their long-term stability and prosperity are connected with the stability in the Mediterranean region, i.e., in the Middle East and North Africa. Besides, in the last decade, the geostrategic and geoeconomic role of the Mediterranean has increased for China and Russia. Therefore, the geostrategic and geoeconomic role of the Mediterranean could be studied in the framework of strategic and security studies. (see Radojević 2018, 77-94).

### **INTERESTS OF THE GREAT POWERS AND STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN**

The interests of the great powers in the Mediterranean date far back in time and represent the initiators of great strategic changes in this macro-region. The Mediterranean engagement of the United States is old and multiple. Ian O. Lesser states that for over 200 years the United States has been an economic, diplomatic, and security actor in this region. Lesser also claims that the recent security situation on Europe's southern periphery, and in Europe itself, confirms the central place of the Mediterranean in transatlantic issues. (Lesser 2015, 1). During the two world wars, as well as the Cold War, the transatlantic engagement of the United States has always been significant in the Mediterranean, even if this aspect of US strategy was often subordinated to demands in other parts of the European continent. (Lesser 2015, 1).

Immediately after the Second World War, the United States recognized the importance of the Mediterranean region for projecting power and began to form a fleet in the Mediterranean. In the coming years, the US Mediterranean Fleet will be formed, which will strengthen, and its task will be very important in contemporary circumstances. That is why it can be rightly said that the initial confrontation between the United States and the USSR before the formation of NATO and the beginning of the Cold War was in the Mediterranean. Also, one

of the most famous programs of US foreign policy, the Marshall Plan, started in the Mediterranean region (Dillery 2006, 9).

After the formation of NATO, the US Mediterranean (Sixth) Fleet will be given clear tasks and roles, the backbone of which is the projection of US power and keeping Europe and the Mediterranean under constant surveillance. The US presence in that region of the Mediterranean embodied in the Sixth Fleet is perceived as vital, not only for US and NATO interests but also for US non-NATO interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. (Greenwood 1993, 7; Calleya 2019). On the other hand, impoverished and war-exhausted European states could not form a fleet of such a force in the Mediterranean. In fact, the Cold War policy and the aggravation of the situation in Europe were an additional justification for the existence of a strong American fleet in the Mediterranean.

It is rightly considered that the Cold War, before it came to light in its original form, already had a small history that preceded it in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, then in Europe, and only later in Asia. Due to its military superiority in the air and at sea from 1945 to 1947, the United States forced, if not coerced, the USSR to political retreat in the Mediterranean in a broader sense. (Božić 1974, 109). Hence the special geostrategic significance of the Mediterranean for the global strategy of the United States (1974, 188-189).

However, the United States usually does not perceive the Mediterranean as a coherent strategic space and area of interest for the United States *per se*. In the political context, the traditional approach of the United States was to divide the Mediterranean along geopolitical lines into Europe, including Turkey on the one hand, and the Middle East and North Africa on the other (Lesser 2015, 5).

The Mediterranean for the United States is an indispensable area for the operational presence and use of strong and diverse naval and air forces and missile carriers for strategic and operational purposes, in order to protect interests; an area for the use of naval forces (strike and combat groups for different purposes) in different types of operations in military interventions; an area for maneuvering and regrouping naval forces (sending parts or entire formations of the strike or combat groups) from the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean or *vice versa*, as well as an area where the most important interests are the provision of unhindered naval communications for economic and military reasons. The United States mainly views the Mediterranean in a broader context. In fact, for the United States, its main importance lies in the security of their access to oil reserves in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. For the United States, the Mediterranean is the basis for the projection of power in the Persian Gulf. This was demonstrated during the Gulf War. Some 90% of the troops and military materiel sent to the Gulf passed through or above the Mediterranean. (Lesser 1998, 220).



For the United States, a naval presence in the Mediterranean and strong military positions in the coastal seas are a condition for a successful strategy and security in Europe. In this region, the policy of threats, pressure and force materialized through the forces of the US Sixth Fleet, and later the Standing NATO Naval Force. (Zoppo 1982; Vukadinović 1986). The United States and NATO intervened with naval and air forces during the war in the former SFRY, FRY and Libya. Based on research and analyzed data from NATO naval and air operations, and especially operations in which force was used, their impact on political changes in the countries against which they were conducted was shown. (see in Radojević 2017b). Also, the United States and its allies have repeatedly intervened with naval and air forces during the war in Syria from the Eastern Mediterranean to target government forces. (Blomdahl 2019, 536-555). On the other hand, Russia has repeatedly targeted the targets of the “Islamic State” from warships and submarines from the Mediterranean Sea, and on two occasions from warships from the Caspian Sea.

Thus, during the Ukrainian crisis, NATO increased its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Eastern Mediterranean is considered the Achilles’ heel of the post-Cold War era of the Western world. (Litsas 2018, 169-190). The Eastern Mediterranean is a “geostrategic seam” between Europe and the Middle East. The region has been a “strategic anchor” for the United States for over seventy years. It serves in strengthening Europe and limiting instability in the Middle East. Today, the United States and its allies are struggling to keep the Eastern Mediterranean “transatlantically” anchored, while dramatically acknowledging the region’s new economic, political, and security reality. As Syria enters its seventh year of conflict, Russia and Iran deepen their military “footprint” in the region, and Turkey, as a member of NATO, radically changes its domestic and foreign policies, the strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for the United States is growing. (Foggo 2019).

Modern Russia, like the Soviet Union, pursued a policy of slow but stable strategic and economic penetration into the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia’s main goal is to ensure the widest possible influence in the region, which is rapidly gaining in importance because of its energy reserves and key strategic position. (Stergiou 2012). Throughout its history, Russia has strived to achieve a more significant presence in the Mediterranean, especially by deploying naval forces. The deployment of Russia’s naval forces in the Mediterranean was accompanied by Russia’s new Naval Doctrine, published in July 2015. (Морская доктрина Российской Федерации 2015). This doctrine indicated Russia’s intentions to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Russia’s broader foreign and security goals. The doctrine also states a number

of other goals, including the construction of a modern navy equipped with better new weapons systems. (Connolly 2017). Namely, Russia continues to modernize its armed forces, especially the Navy. In this way, Russia strives to apply the so-called showing the flag in the Mediterranean Sea, which is a demonstration of naval power (Thornton 2018, Thornton 2019). In fact, showing the flag is such an adopted and impressive maritime activity, that the phrase is a term to demonstrate the sea power of a country.

Russia has grown from a “green-water” navy to a “blue-water” navy in the past few years, clearly expressing its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Litsas 2016, 56-73). Some authors point out that “Russian hegemonic tendencies in the region” are reflected in the re-establishment of the Fifth Operational Squadron and the deployment of naval forces that took part in the Syrian civil war. Russia has also expanded its naval base in Tartus, Syria, and secured a long-term lease which will allow it to develop further this naval base. (Rubin and Eiran 2019, 989-990). During the war in Syria and the fight against the “Islamic State”, Russia deployed strong naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Namely, Russia conducted an operation in the Mediterranean Sea, engaging its naval forces (warships, submarines) and air forces for strikes on vital points, military and economic potentials of the “Islamic State”. Russia also regularly holds naval exercises and increases the presence of naval forces in the Mediterranean. In August 2018, Russia conducted a large exercise in the Mediterranean, which included 25 warships from the fleets of the North, Baltic and Black Sea, together with strategic bombers. This naval presence in the region also enables Russia to develop closer cooperation with other global powers. In 2015 Russia also signed an agreement with Cyprus, which allows Russian navy ships to access Cypriot ports and may include other aspects of military cooperation. Moreover, Russia also signed an agreement with Spain, which is a member of the EU and NATO, which allows Russian ships access to its ports.

During the war in Syria, Russian warships patrolled near the coast in support of the Assad government. Russia also deployed its naval forces in the Mediterranean off the coast of Libya in support of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the military leader of the eastern faction in Libya. (Srivastava 2016, 11; Zulfqar 2018, 121-147). In fact, Russia’s entry into the region was facilitated by the withdrawal of the US Navy from the Mediterranean. In recent years, the Sixth Fleet, active in the region during the Cold War, has reduced its permanent presence to one command ship based in Italy and four destroyers equipped with AEGIS (multi-purpose anti-aircraft missile system) based at the Spanish naval base Rota. The withdrawal of the US from the region is not total. So, in April 2018, a US Navy Virginia class submarine participated in a cruise missile attack on targets in Syria. Shortly thereafter, the US deployed a carrier battle group in this region (Rubin and Eiran 2019, 989-990). In April 2019, two aircraft carriers

sailed into the Mediterranean. On that occasion, from the command bridge of the aircraft carrier, the US Ambassador to Russia, Jon Huntsman, said that the US aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean were a signal that warned Russia: “When you have 200,000 tons of diplomacy that is cruising in the Mediterranean – this is what I call diplomacy. This is forward-operating diplomacy, nothing else needs to be said” (Pleitgen 2019; Рискин 2019).

Russia’s goals in the Mediterranean are to ensure a sufficient maritime presence to control maritime traffic from the Black Sea region to the countries of the Mediterranean basin and to secure economic and political interests in the Mediterranean. The naval presence in the Mediterranean also gives Russia the opportunity to expand its presence and influence in strategically important regions of the Middle East and North Africa.

In addition to the Russians, Chinese warships appeared in the Mediterranean in the last decade. The Mediterranean is becoming a zone of growing interest for China, given that the wider Mediterranean region is not only an important source of energy but also a channel for the export of this rising power to Europe. China is present in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, where its Navy is active in the fight against piracy. (Radojević 2012, 81-82). In doing so, it oversees this area by protecting its merchant maritime interests and maritime communications (Jérôme 2016; Rocha e Silva 2015, 708-732). China is also concerned about unrest and crises in the wider Middle East region and their possible consequences for China’s internal stability. In military terms, this was reflected in the visits of the Chinese naval forces to European Mediterranean ports, joint exercises with Russia, Turkey, as well as the Chinese evacuation operation by sea during the Libyan war in 2011. (van der Putten 2016, 337–351). In May 2015, China and Russia conducted a significant ten-day naval exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean (Ekman 2018, 18).

Given the strategic position of the Mediterranean, China has strengthened its presence in the region by acquiring, modernizing, building, expanding and managing the most important Mediterranean ports and terminals in Algeria, Egypt, Greece, Israel and Turkey. (Chaziza 2018, 59) In fact, the Mediterranean is the ultimate western arm of the initiative for this growing power’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The initiative was personified and announced by President Xi Jinping (习近平) (see more in Jingping 2017, 543-566). As stated by Stepić (2019, 75-96) the Belt and Road Initiative (“One Belt, One Road”), i.e., “The New Silk Road”, which consists of the land “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “Maritime Silk Road for the 21st Century”, represents the networking of Eurasia (and Africa) with geocommunication and geoeconomic routes that will ensure Chinese penetration and primacy. China’s involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean is growing, marked by the provision of strongholds in Piraeus, as well as other steps of an economic and strategic nature in the region within the

“Silk Road Strategy“. (Skordeli 2015, 59-76; Casarini 2015). Due to contracts regarding the port Piraeus, Greece received the biggest amount of investment (Zakić and Radišić, 2019, 59). The port of Piraeus has a central strategic position in the Mediterranean and enables efficient further transport of goods by sea, road or rail. In fact, Piraeus is a geoeconomic hub between the East, the West and Africa (Müller-Markus 2016, 2). The presence of the Chinese naval forces in the Mediterranean increases the importance of a number of economic issues: the port of Piraeus has become an important starting point for Chinese products to Europe, and Chinese investments in transport infrastructure are beginning to affect the other logistics and port hubs in the area. Also, China and Italy signed an agreement of using the port of Trieste, which has huge strategic potential for the Chinese BRI, as it provides a link to the landlocked countries of Austria, Hungary, the Czechia, Slovakia, and Serbia.

These are large investments of Chinese corporations in transport and port facilities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, such as the largest investments in the development of the Suez Canal, the lease of the Turkish port of Ambarlı in Istanbul, the expansion of the southern Israeli port of Ashdod and the management of the northern Haifa port. Also, China has smaller investments in port facilities in Cyprus and Lebanon in the region (Rubin and Eiran 2019, 989-990). Besides, China is expanding its financial investments in the Mediterranean hinterland by investing in railway and road infrastructure in Southeast Europe. China collaborates with North Macedonia in preparing a feasibility study for railway modernization. China signed a memorandum of understanding with Serbia and Hungary for the reconstruction of the Belgrade-Budapest railway link (Arase 2015, 1-11). All this will facilitate the transport of Chinese exports from Greek ports to European markets (Đorđević and Ladevac, 2016). In fact, Chinese goods reaching Piraeus could be transported by rail through North Macedonia and then Serbia to Hungary (Chaziza 2018, 59). In this way, China can use the Mediterranean's potential to become a major distribution hub for Chinese goods destined for the European Union, its largest trading partner. (Chaziza 2018, 55; Duchâtel and Duplaix 2018, 1-56). However, the Mediterranean region is extremely geopolitically unstable, and in the coming years will require this growing power to increase its efforts to protect its financial interests.

In addition, these investments combined with the increased presence of the Chinese naval forces could create more significant geopolitical and security effects. Actually, the Mediterranean countries could increasingly support Chinese positions in the region and beyond (Ekman 2018, 20). At the same time, it is important to note that China skillfully used the financial crisis in the smaller countries of the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Malta, and Cyprus) to position itself in strategically important areas. It is quite clear that due to the location of the region at the crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, control of the Eastern

Mediterranean will continue to be vital to global geopolitics. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean will continue to be a key to the global geopolitical balance of power, especially with China becoming a new player in the region. (Vamvakas 2014, 124-140).

## CONCLUSIONS

Throughout history, the Mediterranean has been the cradle of the world's most important civilizations. For centuries, the Mediterranean Sea has been a strategically important area in which civilizations and the Mediterranean countries, and later the great powers, are fighting for influence in Europe, Africa and Asia. Therefore, this sea is considered the cradle of the power of large fleets. In the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Sea, on this largest stage of world history, where the biggest and most significant events took place, the impermeability of the importance of space was once again confirmed.

Due to its geographical position, the Mediterranean is the backbone of the sea, air and land routes that connect Europe, Africa and Asia. Therefore, the Mediterranean is an extremely important economic, transport and strategically unique region. It is the most important and sensitive part of the Atlantic-Mediterranean-Asian world waterway. Also, the Mediterranean with the Middle East is very rich in energy, especially oil and gas. A large share of European oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean. The discovery and exploitation of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean suggest that this region will be a zone of more pronounced tensions between the great and regional powers in the foreseeable future.

The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Mediterranean will further increase in the future as a result of constant regional and global aspirations, which have the potential to significantly increase the political and economic dynamics in this region. The growing competition between the United States and China will have a direct impact on the Mediterranean. The global shift in the focus of power from the Atlantic to the Pacific has reduced the presence of the US naval forces in the region. On the other hand, in the Mediterranean, there is a competition between the US, China and Russia, as well as other regional powers. Especially since the Mediterranean Sea is one of the most important maritime communications in the world for global trade. In fact, due to the growing interconnectedness and the importance of the world maritime communications, the Mediterranean Sea is an unavoidable link of this system. In addition, geopolitical crises, conflicts and wars in other parts of the world, and especially in the wider Mediterranean region, are likely to increasingly affect the security of the Mediterranean. Besides, due to crises and wars in the

Mediterranean region, the Mediterranean Sea has become an unavoidable and most dangerous migrant route.

The presence of naval forces of the great powers in the Mediterranean, as well as naval suasion and coercion by showing weapons in various exercises in the Mediterranean, confirm again the thesis about the use of warships to achieve political and economic goals. In the Mediterranean, it is the navies that enable the maintenance of political and military control over selected sea areas and the neighboring land, thus creating the conditions for the great powers to pursue their political and economic interests. In this region, the great powers are guided by the principle that the control over maritime communications, ports and the most important strongholds is of great importance for its overall development, security and prosperity. Actually, the Mediterranean is the extreme western arm of the Belt and Road Initiative for this growing power. Chinese financial investment in port development and other maritime infrastructure in the Mediterranean should be viewed in the context of broader Chinese infrastructure activities under the Belt and Road Initiative. In the last decade, China's naval activity in the Mediterranean Sea has been growing. China is gradually becoming stronger economically, politically, diplomatically, and eventually geostrategically in the Mediterranean. Securing investment in a region of extreme geopolitical instability will be a difficult test for China's foreign policy in the coming years. China does not have a comprehensive strategy regarding business in the Mediterranean region but instead prefers to cooperate bilaterally with each country. Also, Russia needs a showing the flag in the region to defend its economic and political interests, which it is very successfully realizing with the forces of the Navy. Access to the Mediterranean is very important for Russia and China, which are trying to gain the ability to manage economic, diplomatic and security flows through geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. Therefore, the United States will have to use all its resources – diplomatic, security, military and naval resources, as well as economic investments – to maintain the balance of power in a multipolar world whose creation is currently seen in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

It is quite certain the Mediterranean will definitely remain a geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic crossroads of three continents in which very important political and economic processes and strategic changes are taking place that affect all Mediterranean countries, but also the whole world. Therefore, it is of special importance to understand the significance of these processes and changes in the multipolar world created in the wider region of the Mediterranean.

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## **POLITIČKE I STRATEGIJSKE PROMENE U SREDOZEMLJU**

*Apstrakt:* U radu se polazi od geostrategijskog značaja Sredozemlja i Sredozemnog mora u prošlosti što predstavlja svojevrstan uvod u razmatranje sadašnjih i budućih događaja u ovom makroregionu. Autor najpre kroz istorijsku i prostornu perspektivu razmatra ispoljavanje moći, uticaja i interesa velikih sila u Sredozemlju. U radu se kroz teoriju i praksu upotrebe ratnih mornarica velikih sila posmatraju političke i ekonomske promene u Sredozemlju. Autor ukazuje da će se geopolitički i geostrategijski značaj Sredozemlja dodatno povećati u budućnosti, kao rezultat stalnih regionalnih i globalnih težnji da se politička i ekonomska dinamika ovog regiona poveća. Sve izraženija rastuća konkurencija između SAD i Kine imaće direktan uticaj na Sredozemlje. Autor zaključuje da će Sredozemlje ostati “poligon” za nadmetanje SAD, Kine i Rusije i region u kome se najočiglednije mogu sagledati politički i ekonomski procesi i strategijske promene u svetu.

*Ključne reči:* Sredozemlje, Sredozemno more, strategijske promene, politički i ekonomski procesi, SAD, Kina, Rusija.

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## CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN AFRICA IN LIGHT OF THE NEW CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

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*Abstract:* Ever since the African states regained their independence in the second half of the twentieth century, there has been an idea among African political elites about mutual cooperation among their independent states. The spirit of Pan-Africanism was a mainstream discourse within African political, intellectual, and cultural elites throughout the twentieth century. The Pan-African idea was soon concretized into the Organization of African Unity, which was replaced in 2002 by the African Union as we know it today. Yet, despite numerous initiatives, monetary unions, regional economic committees, and the establishment of the African Union as an umbrella organization, the effects of African integration were not good enough. The African Union did not have the strength to impose common policies on all its members, funding remained a permanent problem, and regional economic committees were suffering from the “spaghetti bowl effect” caused by numerous overlaps in membership. Perhaps the biggest problem lies in the fact that African citizens have not been able to feel the benefits of integration, despite sporadic improvements in macroeconomic indicators. New momentum in African integration happened in the spring of 2018 with the launch of a new initiative called the African Continental Free Trade Agreement - AfCFTA. The new agreement differs from the previous agreements in the number of signatories. It has been signed by all countries of the continent (except Eritrea), and it has already been ratified by most of them. The agreement has clear implementation strategies and evaluation criteria. However, we must re-examine whether the new agreement will succeed in overcoming the obstacles that have dulled previous regional initiatives and whether it will succeed in overcoming new obstacles that will emerge in the future.

*Keywords:* AfCFTA, African Union, integration, free trade.

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## INTRODUCTION

There has been an idea among African political elites about mutual cooperation among their independent states ever since the African states regained their independence in the second half of the twentieth century. The idea was long-planned, and the first significant and official document was the Abuja Agreement, signed in 1991. Yet, despite numerous initiatives, the effects of African integration were not good enough. In 2018 and 2019, a new comprehensive regional initiative emerged in Africa – the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). In this paper, we seek to identify and analyze the factors that will affect the implementation of this agreement and to shed light on its future. We first begin by analyzing the importance of regional integration for economic performance. Then we discuss the present structure of African regional structures on which the AfCFTA agreement should be implemented. Finally, we discuss the agreement itself: the framework and goals of the agreement, the expected benefits and challenges that have already occurred and will occur in the future of the implementation process.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONALISM FOR THE ECONOMY – BROAD OVERVIEW

Traders and businessmen have always strived for regional integration in order to expand their markets. The first regional trade bloc worth mentioning was the mighty Hanseatic League, which was the most important European trade organization from the thirteenth to the first half of the fifteenth century. After the collapse of the Hanseatic League, the idea of regional integration experienced its revival in the second half of the 20th century. In the period after the Second World War, there has been a growing interest in integrating national economies at regional levels, and regionalism has become the mainstream of European political thought. However, it is interesting to mention that the first modern regional economic integration took place in Africa in 1910 with the formation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). It was established by an independent Boer colony and British colonies (present-day countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Eswatini,<sup>2</sup> and South Africa). (Mwhasa 2007, p. 9).

We can identify trade, development, political stability, and security as the main motives for economic integration in developing countries in general that can be said for African countries as well (Pangestu, Scollay 2001, pp. 4-6).

Generally, the benefits of economic integration are larger markets, greater competition, and the realization of economies of scale (Hoekman et al., 2002).

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<sup>2</sup> Former Swaziland, changed its name on 19 April 2018. (Times of Swaziland 18.05.2018.)

Regional economic groups eliminate or reduce trade tariffs and other non-tariff barriers (NTB) (Mwhasa 2007, p. 2). Free trade is expected to lead to a rapid increase in trade volume, which would likely lead to rapid economic growth. These gains result from the dynamic effects of integration, which are cumulative in nature and lead to growth. Thus, the contribution of regional economic integration to economic growth will be greater if there are economies of scale, which is made possible by increased market size (Yang, Gupta, 2005, pp. 22-24).

Economic integration can only enhance growth if it promotes investment in both physical and human capital. According to Todaro and Smith, developing countries should go beyond greater trade with one another and move in the direction of economic integration (Todaro, Smith, 2015: 650). Increased investment is likely to encourage multinational corporations to invest and produce within the integrated economies to avoid trade restrictions imposed on nonmember states. Regional economic integration can serve a useful economic purpose beyond the direct gains from trade liberalization, by reducing uncertainties and improving credibility and thus making it easier for the private sector to plan and invest. In order to reduce uncertainties and improve the credibility of the regional integration endeavor, Fernandez lists several activities and mechanisms that should be implemented. The first two activities are: good signaling to the investors and providing them with good insurance for their investments. The third mechanism (rather than the activity) is bargaining power with third countries that comes naturally with the membership in a regional block. The fourth is a coordination mechanism available within the regional bloc that allows an even distribution of gains from regional integration (Fernandez, 1997, pp. 15-20).

In relation to political aspects, many regional economic communities have been driven by political rather than economic goals. These political objectives include, among others, security, governance, democracy, and human rights (Hoekman et al. 2002). The recent Sahel G5 initiative is a good example to prove this point.

As concluded by Todaro and Smith, the developing countries at approximate stages of industrial development with similar market sizes and a strong interest to rationalize their joint industrial growth patterns stand to benefit from the combined inward and outward-looking economic integration. They continue to argue that regional groupings of small nations like those of Africa can create the economic conditions for accelerating their joint development effort and also encourage development in the long-run. For this reason, economic integration should be seen as a means to promote a balanced division of labor among a group of countries, each of which is too small to benefit from such a division of labor by itself. In fact, without integration, each individual country may not provide enough domestic market size and potential to achieve economies of scale (Todaro and Smith 2015).



All the authors mentioned so far talk about the positive effects of economic integration such as trade creation, GDP and investment growth, but there is a negative side to it as well. Jacob Viner, although a proponent of free trade, points out that the process of trade creation and trade diversion occurs simultaneously because several member countries (of any FTA) will be trading concurrently with different members and nonmember countries (Viner 1950). Moreover, there are no guarantees that countries will use their comparative advantages better just because they are integrating.

When we analyze the situation in Africa in particular, we can see a few more negative aspects of economic integration and regionalism. Firstly, Fredrik Söderbaum points out that imitating the EU's institutional design will not be suitable for the African social context (Söderbaum 2014). Secondly, Morten Bøas states that many political leaders in Africa engage in symbolic and discursive activities — praising the goals of regionalism and regional organizations, signing cooperation treaties and agreements just as an image-boosting exercise for themselves. They are taking part in “summitry regionalism” as Bøas calls it while remaining uncommitted to the jointly agreed policies. Some leaders show demonstrative support and loyalty towards one another in order to raise the status, image and formal sovereignty of their often-authoritarian regimes, both domestically and internationally (Bøas et al. 2005). Jeffrey Herbst also agrees with this claim but adds that this misplaced enthusiasm of African leaders should not be interpreted as a failure because even they can do some positive things while trying to boost their image (Herbst 2007). Thirdly, William Reno introduces another concept called “shadow regionalism.” Shadow regionalism refers to a particular type of state where corrupt politicians are sheltered by the formal facade of political power based upon informal markets. There is a strong transnational dimension of these informal activities, which can also enhance our understanding of informal regional activities. Building on Reno's concept, “shadow regionalism” suggests that regime actors use their power positions within the state apparatus in order to establish a complex mode of regionalism characterized by informality and the search for personal gain. Shadow regionalism tends to exist in those places where patron-client relationships are the strongest. Reno claims that even a small number of so-called shadow agents may block or even destroy egalitarian forms of development and regional organizations. Hence, shadow activities undermine the regulatory capacity of the state as well as regional organizations. Those who promote it may actively seek to preserve existing boundary disparities (e.g., customs, monetary, fiscal, and normative). Consequently, political leaders who resist formal regionalism may do this as a deliberate strategy to maintain the status quo and avoid disrupting their lucrative activities (Reno 1995).

## STATUS OF INTRA-AFRICAN INTEGRATION IN LIGHT OF THE AFCFTA

In this section, we analyze the circumstances and the foundations on which the AfCFTA agreement will be implemented. We highlight the macro and micro-challenges that will hinder the implementation of the agreement. As macro-challenges, we emphasize the very structure of the current intra-African integration. Other factors, such as the inadequate political and economic system of individual countries as well as security challenges, are considered to be micro-challenges.

The framework for African integration was set up in 1991 when the Treaty (of) establishing the African Economic Community was signed (the treaty is better known as the Abuja Treaty). The Abuja Treaty set out the vision of African financial and monetary integration in the six-phase treaty. After an African common market was established, an African monetary union was to be realized through the creation of a single African central bank and a single African currency. The vision saw the continent moving from a common market towards a monetary union. In practice, this has not happened (yet) (ARIA IX 2019, p. 2). The Abuja Treaty enabled the creation of eight regional economic communities (RECs)<sup>3</sup> which are the pillars of African integration until this day. Yet these RECs have many shortcomings, the largest of which is overlapping membership, also known as the “spaghetti bowl effect”<sup>4</sup>. Kenya is an absolute champion with membership in as many as four communities (CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, and IGAD). Only twelve African countries belong to a single REC; thirty-three of them belong to two RECs, and eight countries belong to three RECs (ARII Report 2016, p. 13).

Although they have similar objectives, the RECs were established independently and differ in both structure and activity. Consequently, this has led to a different level of internal integration within different RECs. Some have achieved tangible outcomes in key areas of integration, while others struggled to meet even the basic form of integration. Several RECs have moved individually towards financial and monetary union, while others have not. (ARIA IX 2019, p. 2). Three monetary unions are currently operating in Africa — the West African CFA franc, covering

<sup>3</sup> There are eight regional communities: CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and UMA (ARII Report 2016, p. 13).

<sup>4</sup> The Spaghetti bowl effect is the term coined by Jagdish Bhagwati, professor of economics and law at Columbia University. He claims that FTAs are paradoxically counter-productive in promoting free trade. According to Bhagwati, too many overlapping FTAs would allow countries to adopt discriminatory trade policies and reduce the economic benefits of trade. The Spaghetti bowl effect enables discriminatory trade policy because the same commodity is submitted to different tariffs in various domestic trade systems due to their difference in preferences. Among Asian nations, the effect is also known as the “noodle bowl effect” (Bhagwati 1995 p. 4).

most francophone countries in West Africa; the Central African CFA franc, covering six countries of Central Africa, and the Common Monetary Area, linking Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa. None of the monetary unions is conterminous with any of the eight RECs — each of the monetary unions is an isolated island of deeper integration within one of the RECs.

Five of eight RECs have set macroeconomic and monetary convergence targets in order to reduce the difference in the integration among the RECs. But these convergence criteria differ from one REC to another. An additional problem is that the member countries within these RECs have not converged enough. (ARIA IX 2019, pp. 2-3).

When we look at some of the RECs individually, we can clearly see the difference in convergence criteria. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) utilizes budget deficit average, annual inflation and public debt-to-GDP ratio, Central Bank financing of budget deficits, and an exchange rate volatility as convergence criteria. Moreover, the SADC aimed for a common market by 2015, a monetary union by 2016, and a single currency by 2018. These targets proved to be overly ambitious.

The EAC uses average annual inflation, FX reserves, fiscal deficit, and public debt as indicators. The EAC is the most advanced REC in regional integration. Unlike the SADC, the EAC countries were successful in establishing a common market in January 2010. Member states of this REC made constant progress in implementing common standards, rules of origin, and a common external tariff and completely eliminating internal tariffs (ARIA IX 2019, p. 6).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) focused on creating a monetary union. The ECOWAS convergence criteria were realigned in 2014 to pursue merging the West African Monetary Zone and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries into a single monetary zone by the beginning of 2020. (ARIA IX 2019, p. 3). The creation of a new currency named Eco that will partly replace the CFA franc is planned for 2020.

Infrastructure, peace and security and political factors are perceived as micro-challenges. Adequate infrastructure is the key driver of economic growth and sustainable development across the African continent. Furthermore, infrastructure is the key factor that facilitates regional integration as well. It enables export-oriented companies to access regional (and international) markets quickly, cheaply, and efficiently. Unfortunately, this key factor is missing in Africa. For example, road density in Africa is only a quarter of the world average (Mafusire and others, 2010; African Energy Forum, 2016). Only 25% of the continent's road network is paved, while the world average exceeds 50% (ARIA IX 2019, p. 20). There are nine highways across the continent with a total length of 56,683 kilometers. (The construction of the tenth is planned.) Many sections of these

highways are not completed or have been significantly damaged; even their maintenance is a serious problem. The lack of access roads and local interconnections makes the Trans-African Highway Network rather a more beautiful vision of the future than a significant infrastructure network in the present. The situation is similar regarding the railway network that is outdated and not standardized in all parts of the continent. These are mostly rails from the colonial times. In an area of 29.6 million km<sup>2</sup>, there is only 89,000 km of the railway, which means a density of 2.5 km per 1,000 km<sup>2</sup>. For comparison, the rail network density in Europe is 40 km per 1,000 km<sup>2</sup> (International Union of Railways Synopsis 2012; AU-web site).

Air traffic is also underdeveloped. It mainly takes place from three major centers: Johannesburg, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa. From almost any African country, it is easier to find a connection with the former colonial metropolis than with another African country. Sometimes an absurd situation occurs that a connection between the two African countries takes place via London or Paris. For that reason, the Air Transport Market (SAATM) is a flagship project under Agenda 2063<sup>5</sup>. The goal is to liberalize and unify “the African skies”. Thus far twenty-three countries signed the agreement, but the map of united African skies has a big barrier in the middle of the continent because Rwanda is the only Central African country that signed the Treaty. This project facilitates the free movement of people and goods, enhances the continent’s integration and connectivity and fosters tourism and trade. It will definitely reduce ticket prices and facilitate the development of intra-continental tourism. Moreover, this will positively affect the idea of African Union passport which is in its inception. It is expected to support the Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade and the AfCFTA. The AU Commission estimates that this deal will generate up to 300,000 direct and up to 2 million indirect jobs. (ARIA IX 2019, p. 22) Therefore, we can conclude that insufficient investment in infrastructure constrains the African countries’ ability to fully profit from the growth and job creation opportunities that will arise from the AfCFTA (ARIA IX 2019, p. 18). However, positive impulses are emerging: infrastructure development in Africa reached \$81.6 billion in 2017, which is an increase of 22% from 2016. (ARIA IX 2019, p. 23).

Although in poor condition, African infrastructure has not been neglected. Contrary to popular belief, intra-African investments in infrastructure are not

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<sup>5</sup> AGENDA 2063 is an African strategy for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future. The goal is to reach inclusive and sustainable development. The agenda is defined by ten structural programs covering different areas, from infrastructure projects to the preservation of cultural, intangible heritage. The AfCFTA is included in the Agenda as the third pillar (African Union web site).

insignificant. During the period 2013–2019, it amounted to \$80–90 billion annually (ARIA IX 2019, p. 25).

Peace and security are the second micro-challenge that we analyze. Peace and security are necessary conditions for pursuing regional integration. Including the AfCFTA, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a core component of the AU Peace and Security Council, and it is the AU's central institution for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts. (Khadiagala, 2018, p. 5). We can identify three types of security challenges in Africa: inter-communal violence and civil war, terrorism, and smuggling. Each of them represents a serious challenge to the regional integrations initiative, the AfCFTA included. In countries affected by the civil war, we can always question the legitimacy of the government signing the agreement. That can undermine the implementation of the AfCFTA in the long run. As for terrorism – although a threat – it paradoxically represents an opportunity for regional cooperation. That is the case with the Sahel G5 initiative<sup>6</sup> where five countries combined their forces in order to combat ISIS-related groups in the region. They are moving towards creating an integrated defiance system while strengthening their individual armies in the process. Smuggling is easily enforceable in Africa because of porous borders that are not well secured due to the inaccessible terrain and modest security capacities of most African countries. This criminal activity can hinder the economic benefits of integration due to contraband.

The last of the micro-challenges are political factors. Besides the usual fear of sovereignty loss (that always arises when it comes to regional integration), we should not neglect rivalries that may arise between some countries in the long run, such as Ethiopia versus Egypt, or the Republic of South Africa versus the rest. There is also the “Nigeria factor”. Nigeria reluctantly signed the Treaty and has not ratified it yet. As one of the strongest economies in the continent, Nigeria's government is concerned that the AfCFTA will weaken Nigeria's position. Therefore, there is a possibility that Nigeria would act as a Trojan horse and try to sabotage the AfCFTA or sway it in its favor in order to maintain its own dominant position.

## **AFRICAN CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT**

### **Framework of the agreement**

The AfCFTA agreement has three layers. The first layer is a framework agreement that defines general terms, the purposes and intentions of the

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<sup>6</sup> Members of the Sahel G5 initiative are Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad.

agreement, establishes its primary definitions and outlines its scope. The framework agreement also creates the institutional framework for implementing the AfCFTA. Moreover, this layer relates the agreement to other relevant international and regional treaties and agreements.

The second layer comprises the protocols of the agreement, which cover trade in goods, trade in services, rules and procedures for the settlement of disputes, investment, competition policy, and intellectual property rights.

The third layer contains the annexes, lists, and schedules to the protocols. The purpose of this is to articulate the provisions of the protocols in detail (ARIA IX 2019, p. 43).

The implementation of the agreement is divided into two phases. Phase I is divided into three sectors (which is comprised of layer two), each of these sectors is covered by a special annex to the protocol (which is comprised of layer three). They are the following:

- 1) The Protocol on Trade in Goods, which covers customs and administrative cooperation, cooperation in the field of transit trade, technical and (Phyto)sanitary standards, the establishment of integrated customs controls (negotiations are still ongoing) and rules on identification product's country of origin (negotiations are still ongoing).

- 2) The protocol on the exchange of services. This protocol covers three segments which are Most Favorable Nation (MFN) exemption policies, an annex of air transport, and schedules of specific commitments in services related to the MFN. The last one is still being negotiated.

- 3) Protocol on the settlement of disputes

Phase II negotiations started in February 2020, its structure has already been drafted. It consists of three sectors: 1) protocol on competition policy, 2) protocol on intellectual property, 3) protocol on investment.

The key negotiating principle of the AfCFTA is to build on and improve the legislative of the existing REC free trade agreements but not reverse what had been agreed previously. This is regulated by article 19 of the AfCFTA agreement that defines the relationship among the AfCFTA and Africa's pre-existing free trade agreements. In any conflict cases among the AfCFTA and RECs, the AfCFTA is to prevail, but with one crucial caveat: if the RECs have achieved greater levels of integration among themselves than it is prescribed by the AfCFTA, the AfCFTA will not reverse what has already been achieved (AfCFTA Agreement Article 19).

### **Expected benefits and future goals**

On 30 May 2019, the AfCFTA became officially effective, having more than 22 states that ratified the Treaty (Golubski 01.06.2019). Implementing the AfCFTA is not just about trade. It is more than that, it is about dispelling the “fear of failure” embodied in the inability to enforce the AU decisions and initiatives (ARIA IX 2019, p. 1). But certainly, since we are talking about a trade agreement, the biggest expected benefit is the increase in trade volume. The UNECA has predicted the rise of intra-African trade by 15 to 25%, or \$50 billion to \$70 billion, by 2040. (Signe, Van de Ven 2019, p. 2)

It is widely known that tariffs are not the main cause that hinders trade. Trade facilitation within the AfCFTA must address non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that burden businesses even more than traditional tariffs. The gains from tariff reductions are little when compared to gains from eliminating NTBs and increasing regulatory collaboration (Vanzetti, Peters and Knebel, 2018). So, the AfCFTA has many provisions to deal with NTBs. Dealing with non-tariff barriers is handled by articles 3-10 of AfCFTA Trade in goods protocol, annex 5. It includes, among other things, the use of a common categorization system for NTBs to improve transparency. Moreover, it promotes several new measures such as the establishment of national monitoring committees. They imply cooperation in the field of sanitary and phytosanitary standardization, and implementation of technical regulations, assessment and accreditation methodology. (Compiled annexes 5, 6 and 7)

Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is another important dimension of intra-African trade as well. ICBT contributes about 30-40% of total intra-regional trade in the SADC region and 40% in the COMESA region (Nshimbi and Moyo, 2017). In the absence of formal job opportunities, ICBT is crucial for a normal life, particularly for Africa’s most vulnerable people, such as women and youth. ICBT has proven more responsive to food crises than formal trade. Because it is largely practiced by the officially unemployed and micro, small and medium enterprises, it is important for strategies of inclusion (ARIA IX 2019, p. 84). Therefore, the goal of the AfCFTA should not be to stop ICBT but to transform it into the legal business through subsidies or other incentives. Even a small flat tax revenue that could be collected from ICBT traders can be a great income for the local economy. At the same time, those traders can get at least some sense of security.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, the AfCFTA has a much larger appetite than just trade, the master plan of African integration is for the AfCFTA to outgrow itself and become a single market. A six-step road map has been put in place in order to achieve this goal: 1) the AfCFTA and regional free trade arrangements will serve as propulsion for deeper integration, 2)

Liberalization of all trade within the AfCFTA, 3) Merger of all of the continent's free trade agreements, 4) The African continental customs union will be formed in order to replace all of the regional ones, 5) The African common market that implies freedom of capital, labor and services will be put in place, 6) At the final stage, the African single market will be formed. This would imply deep economic harmonization, common policies, joint cohesion funds, etc. Thus far only the first step has been implemented (ARIA IX 2019, p. 55).

### **Challenges facing the AfCFTA agreement**

Conceptually, a key issue that must be addressed in order to successfully implement the AfCFTA will be how to synchronize the different economic systems of African economies and enable them to work in their common interest. Bearing in mind the huge discrepancy in size, population and resources of these nations, the question is to what extent it is really possible to achieve that.

Operationally, the biggest problem in Phase I had proven to be the Most-favored nation (MFN) principle. The reason for that is a unique, unorthodox approach to matters concerning MFN. The MFN clause of the AfCFTA does two things:

First of all, it recognizes that the AfCFTA will not immediately equalize with deeper trade liberalizations on the continent. In other words, it will preserve continental preferences, thus allowing the RECs to continue giving each other better treatments than those predicted by the AfCFTA. This is clearly stated in article 18, paragraph 1 of the AfCFTA agreement (AfCFTA Agreement article 18). Therefore, the AfCFTA creates no MFN obligation in the standard sense of the term: state parties may maintain more favorable treatment with the AfCFTA and non-AfCFTA parties without providing them to all AfCFTA parties. Strictly speaking, these provisions should not be named MFN because it is not granting MFN rights to any party. It is rather an exception to MFN than an expression of the principle itself.

Second of all, lack of implementation of the MFN principle in the traditional sense means that principles of conditionality, reciprocity and non-discrimination will not be incorporated. Because of this unique approach, the definition of a third country within the AfCFTA is obscure — it could be either one AfCFTA party alongside others or (more often), a country that is not a party to the AfCFTA. It remains unclear how a clause aimed at creating equality in treatment among parties to an agreement can have conditions that could lead to discrimination.

Furthermore, the unorthodox MFN approach also creates various classes of the AfCFTA parties with various levels of rights within the AfCFTA — most



of whom would face discrimination if they cannot reciprocate the better treatment accorded to third countries. So although this provision was clearly seeking to prevent any outlaw actions, it will probably complicate the AfCFTA market place rather than consolidating it (ARIA IX 2019, p. 54). As mentioned above, this absence could result in situations where products from third parties imported into African countries are treated more favorably than the same products imported from African countries to other African countries. These problems became apparent during the Phase I negotiations. The lack of a traditional MFN also risks the creation of a patchwork of rights and obligations that differ across each of the parties to the Treaty. It means that the AfCFTA may not promote intra-African value chains to the degree policymakers would wish. Moreover, the absence of a traditional MFN clause could be a significant problem for the remaining 10% of tariffs, which are not subject to immediate and full liberalization. The faith of the remaining tariffs is still to be determined by the state parties in the ongoing negotiations. The extent to which a lack of a level playing field for African products will hinder intra-African trade will depend on which products are included in the 10% not immediately subject to liberalization. While most of the ongoing AfCFTA debate on schedules focus on tariffs, it is vital not to forget the sector of services. Not only do services make a significant contribution to manufacturing value chains, but they will also play a key role in intra-African integration and the future of continental trade (Signe, Van de Ven, 2019, pp. 4-5). Commitments in services and the remaining 10% of products that will remain under tariffs are still being negotiated in Phase I.

Since there are no concrete results of Phase II, we need to anticipate the problems that might arise. As we said, Phase II negotiations focus on competition protocols, intellectual property, and investment. Multiple dilemmas occur regarding objectives of these protocols: should they be conservative or liberal, centralized, or autonomous. In the case of the African Investment Protocol, should the objective be to provide market access to foreign investors, or rather, promote and facilitate grassroots investment? Similarly, regarding the Protocol on Competition, is it better to create the regional intra-African competition super authority or promote the creation of the national competition authorities' network? Finally, should the Intellectual Property Protocol seek to harmonize the variety of overlapping regional and national intellectual property regimes? Or should it strive to develop an exclusive African protocol that would prioritize on specific issues relevant to Africa, such as the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural heritage? Is it possible to do both? Moreover, the MFN problem mentioned above will affect these sectors as well (Signe, Van de Ven 2019, p. 7).

Last but not the least of the problems that must be addressed is the financing of the entire project. Only a few of AfCFTA countries actually have the budget

to pay for the technical assistance that the AfCFTA may require. One way to resolve this challenge would be to engage the existing RECs to finance initiatives related to technical support and capacity building, but the question is whether this option is realistic given the fact that the AU itself faces huge funding problems.

## CONCLUSION

It is clear that the AfCFTA is just a transitory phase in the bigger picture of African integration. Nevertheless, the AfCFTA is a big and important step on whose success further course of African integration will depend. The eventual failure of the AfCFTA will likely set back the African integration processes for at least a decade. Moreover, it would seriously damage the credibility of any future local initiatives. Officials of the African Union, in particular, are aware of this and do not want to allow failure. Yet, there are many challenges, both circumstantial and within the Treaty itself. Overlapping membership within the RECs is the most obvious problem that needs to be handled. It remains to be seen how the AfCFTA regulatory bodies will cope with political pressures in the implementation of Phase I. These pressures will inevitably come due to the conflicting national interests. Phase II negotiations will represent a challenge both on the conceptual and practical levels. During these negotiations, policymakers must be careful not to add additional layers of complexity to an existing quagmire of regional agreements. Moreover, the capacity to implement all of these measures (both in Phase I and II) is unknown. It is more based on the belief that African capacities have matured enough to handle such a task than on the actual evidence that the capacity is sufficient. This is an additional reason to keep the solutions simple. It is vital not to favor the trade of goods at the expense of the services sector because Africa's services exports tend to grow faster than merchandise exports.

It is impossible to say whether the AfCFTA will be able to achieve its proclaimed goal of full economic integration, which is unattainable even for the European Union, but the AfCFTA is definitely the first step towards a more united and more independent continent.

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## **IZAZOVI I DOSTIGNUĆA INTEGRACIONIH PROCESA UNUTAR AFRIKE U SVETLU NOVOG KONTINENTALNOG SPORAZUMA O SLOBODNOJ TRGOVINI**

*Apstrakt:* Od kada su afričke države povratile svoju samostalnost u drugoj polovini dvadesetog veka, među afričkim političkim elitama postoji ideja o povezivanju i saradnji njihovih iznova suverenih država. Duh Pan-Afrikanizma predstavljao je glavni diskurs unutar afričkih političkih, intelektualnih i kulturnih elita tokom čitavog dvadesetog veka. Pan-afrička ideja je ubrzo konkretizovana u Organizaciju afričkog jedinstva koja je 2002. zamenjena Afričkom unijom kakvu danas poznajemo. Ipak, uprkos brojnim inicijativama, monetarnim unijama, regionalnim ekonomskim komitetima i osnivanju Afričke Unije kao krovne organizacije, efekti afričkih integracija nisu bili dovoljno dobri. Afrička Unija nije imala dovoljno snage da nametne zajedničke politike svim svojim članovima, finansiranje je (p)ostalo permanentan problem, a regionalni ekonomski komiteti su se međusobno gušili. Možda i najveći problem leži u činjenici da građani afričkih zemalja nisu mogli da osete korist od integracija, bez obzira na sporadična poboljšanja u makroekonomskim pokazateljima. Novi zamajac u afričkim integracijama dogodio se u proleće 2018. godine pokretanjem nove inicijative pod nazivom Afrički kontinentalni sporazum o slobodnoj trgovini – AfCFTA. Novi sporazum razlikuje se od prethodnih po tome što je potpisan od svih država kontinenta (osim Eritreje) i već sada ratifikovan od većine. Sporazum poseduje jasne implementacione strategije i kriterijume vrednovanja. Međutim, ostaje nam da preispitamo da li će novi sporazum uspeti da prevaziđe prepreke koje su umrtvile prethodne regionalne inicijative, i da li će uspeti da prevaziđe nove prepreke koje će se pojaviti u budućnosti.

*Cljučne reči:* AfCFTA, Afrička Unija, integracija, slobodna trgovina.

*Received:* 26/5/2020

*Accepted:* 13/8/2020

## BOOK REVIEWS

### GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCES OF EXTERNAL POWERS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Arlinda Rrustemi, Rob de Wijk, Connor Dunlop, Jovana Perovska, Lirije Palushi, *Geopolitical influences of external powers in the Western Balkans*, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2019, pp. 207.

This study analyses the influence of external powers in the Western Balkans region in various spheres of influence. It considers economic, political, religious, cultural, and security-related factors and their impact on the future of peace and state-building processes. This report examines how and to what extent multiple external actors are increasing their influence over the political elites and peoples of the Western Balkans countries.

The Eastern actors have been increasingly using hybrid threats (disinformation warfare, covert operations to win the hearts and minds of the population by Russia), spreading violent extremism (Gulf countries), potentially debt-trapping some Western Balkans countries (China), violating the EU laws on arms trade (Gulf countries) and implementing identity reengineering (Gulf countries, Iran, Russia, Turkey) in order to advance their geopolitical interests. Indeed, the Eastern actors often adopt a holistic approach in focusing on winning the hearts and minds of the Western Balkans population.

These security risks can derail the stability of the region in the long term with negative ramifications towards the EU and NATO integration processes as well as EU regional policies. It has been found that for political reasons, the West is now less attractive to the Western Balkans. Engagement with Eastern partners often seems more appealing: it is easier to obtain grants for projects, leadership styles are more similar, and local elites feel more secure about their own positions and the maintenance of the status quo, effectively perpetuating the grip on power by illiberal elites.

This book provides an analysis of how influential powers use various foreign policy tools – whether military/security, economic, political/diplomatic, or cultural/religious – in the region and how it impacts the Western Balkan countries, but also the EU and NATO in terms of their enlargement.

The central objective of this report is to outline policy recommendations that can holistically deal with the challenges posed by the Western and Eastern actors in

the Western Balkans region. In aiming to bolster peace and security in the Western Balkans region, the policy recommendations are grouped from general to specific, focusing on aspects of law, economic, security, and social affairs.

Generally, the region may be at a turning point where populations torn between the West and the East may begin gravitating more towards the latter. The West, therefore, needs to craft a response soon to avert further instability in the region.

The first part of the book called *Understanding Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans* is actually an introduction. It includes a brief historical overview of the wartime events in the Western Balkans in which were involved many of the great powers of the time. Historically, the Western Balkans was at the heart of war from Kosovo Polje to battles between the Russians and Ottomans in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, to the First and Second World Wars, and lastly the 90's wars.

In this section, the authors define the future relationship of the forces of the great powers in the Western Balkan countries as the subject of research. Previously, it seemed clear that the future of this region was the integration into the European Union. Today, this scenario is completely uncertain. The main reasons for this are the lack of economic progress, the lack of consolidation of democracies, but also the loss of perspectives towards the EU integration due to the slowing down of the process of EU enlargement. Overall, the region seems to be prone to insecurity and instability and may be susceptible to outside influences. Therefore, the main task of the research is to identify the mechanisms of influence of major international actors in the Western Balkans. International influencers in the region vary: some promote liberal values, such as democracy, the rule of law and open society; others instigate non-democratic values, focusing power on a few individuals. "The changes of global international order and the competition between democratic and non-democratic values are mirrored in the Western Balkans" (p. 13).

The impact of the EU and the US is not analyzed separately, only this introductory chapter provides an overview of the investments, loans and financial support they have provided so far. These key influencers have not been explored by a complex methodology, which has underpinned the influences of other entities. Joining the Balkans with this political current is the right way forward for the authors of this book, and the impacts of non-Western actors were analyzed to determine ways to diminish them.

Theoretical approaches in current research areas in geopolitics: first, hybrid threats and political warfare, and second, identity politics in post-conflict zones.

The methodology used in this book combines qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative methods are life story interviews with local and international authorities. The report qualitatively employs a minimum of 100 life story interviews with local communities (governments, NGOs, IOs, academia, journalists, and

community representatives) as well as IR and regional experts to provide in-depth analysis of influential powers' foreign policy in the Western Balkans.

Quantitative methods are specific and complex. They are based on five data sets not widely available. Those are: Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC Index), Integrated Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS), Temporally Extended, Regular, Reproducible International Event Records (TERRIER), the Phoenix Dataset, and Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT).

The book focuses on the impact of the following countries on the Western Balkans: Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), as well as Iran, China, the Russian Federation, and Turkey. The impact of each of these countries has been analyzed from several aspects: impact trends in the Western Balkans, as measured by quantitative methods, and separately by economic, political, security and cultural influence trends, based on qualitative methods.

Following these analyzes, a comparative account of the influence of the West and the East on the Western Balkans is given. The authors state that the West is not as engaged in the Western Balkans as it used to be. "While the West lacks a coherent policy towards the region's progress, other Eastern powers are using the momentum to promote their foreign policy and shift the region toward their strategic interests" (p. 150).

Despite a strong pro-Western and pro-NATO context, this book can potentially be very meaningful to key actors in the Western Balkans, dealing with international relations in the fields of politics, economics, religion and culture. This is particularly true of the abundance of data and summaries of each individual aspect of the international relations of each of the Western Balkan countries, which are based on extensive qualitative research. It is even more relevant to researchers dealing with international relations and in particular the Western Balkans countries. Researchers able to access databases from different institutions can use this book as a methodological guide for deep exploration of layered international interactions and influences. The book can be used in a methodological sense as a guide to any region or country to explore. To researchers engaged outside institutions with access to these specific databases, this book can be used as a source of data in further research of the Western Balkan countries in their abundance of international interactions and influences.

*Nataša STANOJEVIĆ*



## **A QUEST FOR MODERN ARMIES FORMATION: COULD IDEOLOGY REALLY HELP?**

Kucera, Tomas. (2018). *The Military and Liberal Society – Societal-Military Relations in Western Europe*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge. pp. 215, ISBN: 978-1-138-65760-1

It is common wisdom that not all the major politico–security disputes were solved in the aftermath of the Cold War. On the contrary, numerous hypotheses assume the complication of global problems at a multilateral level. What is widely argued among scholars is that international relations could be understood through internal processes occurring within the sovereign countries. One such example is militarization and the role of the armed forces within modern societies as a precondition for intensified cooperation among the countries. Over the last decades, with the establishment of the modern armies, a central dilemma in military studies was how to determine the reverse causal societal-military relations in the specific geographic area, which might correspond to regional security dynamics.

One such academic endeavor is a monograph authored by Tomas Kucera “The Military and Liberal Society: Societal-Military Relations in Western Europe”, which was published in 2018. This book focuses on how some meta-ideologies could shape the function, type, mission, and ethos of the armed forces in liberal societies after the Cold War was over. The qualitative approach this author undertakes is based on a multiple case study, and compounds (West) Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Swedish armed forces. The central research question of this book, as the author posits, is to inspect the extent to which the liberal ideology of the Western European societies determines their military policies, and consequently the structure, tasks, missions, and functioning of their armies. This research differentiates two correlated concepts: the liberal ideology and military policy. Kucera believes that military policy conceptualizes three respective segments: the mission of contemporary militaries, their composition, and their dependency on institutional culture, and he elaborates on each of these segments thoroughly.

The book is organized into five thematic chapters which all complement each other. In the first one, the author begins with a theoretical assessment of causal mechanisms that come from modern societies towards the military. He deploys reconstruction of a theory of liberal societal-military relations, which implies that international structure, no matter how it is organized, heavily influences internal political occurrences within all the countries of the international system. Thus, shaping the internal processes with their key involved actors, the structure of the system (unipolar, bipolar, multipolar...) and its occurrences, indirectly shape the strategic outlook of militaries worldwide. It begins with a sociological analysis of a modern soldier and the concept of the liberal state. Kucera does not purely imply

the theoretical concept of the liberal state, but rather, points out towards the contemporary states with liberal ideologies.

The central part of the book advances the knowledge of military strategy, through three case studies, out of which one is historical – West Germany. Its rearmament and liberal armed forces building are one aspect of the analysis, while the other deals with the post-Cold War transformation of the Bundeswehr. The author dedicates two chapters to describe the process of West German's armed forces rearmament based on liberal premises. In the third chapter, the author argues that NATO aggression without the UN mandate in FR Yugoslavia was an event that triggered German's very first military engagement outside its reunited territory. This intervention has increased the legitimacy of the Bundeswehr in the eyes of the domestic public and has alleviated further public consents for its foreign engagements (with an exception of Iraq in 2003).

The fourth chapter analyzes the Swedish armed forces establishment, its nonalignment policy and active participation within the UN peacekeeping as a prerequisite of such analysis for Swedish case. Thus, the author identifies a discrepancy between the tradition arising from the total defense concept in the late sixties and seventies, and the force for international participation. Even though the Swedish armed forces were actively involved in the UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, their formation is characterized by its adaptability, which the author of this book coins as a “cosmopolitan army”.

The fifth chapter describes the strategic culture of organizing British military policy in the XX century. The author identifies several key tasks of the British armed forces, namely – imperial policing and counterinsurgency missions. According to his arguments, the UK's army was the one which was the most dependable on the international crises. The Gulf War, interventions in the Balkans, the Kosovo crisis, interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, were only some of the major events which derived new purposes and new strategic orientations of the British army.

This book promoted the idea that liberalism, as a meta-ideology, influences the military policy of the societies based in Western Europe. The author identifies several prerequisites through which modern European societies shape their military compositions. These compound three constitutional specifics of modern militaries: military mission, the physical composition of the armed forces, and their institutional culture, which includes military ethos and professional identity as two sub-constituencies. The military mission has not been substantively changed in accordance with the author's stance. On the contrary, Kucera casts an argument that describes liberalism as an internationally potential peace provider, but which has failed in practice. This is why having a modernized military could provide countries to deal with security challenges in a “more liberal way”. The military mission is, thus, specified in accordance with new tasks such as preservation of

international law and order, as well as the large-scale violations of human rights. As the author underlines, militaries of liberal societies should be perceived as an instrument of international justice rather than a tool of national interest.

The author concludes that the United Kingdom and Germany exist as the two poles. While the imperial history of the British Empire rendered practices and norms of its military force, in the post-Cold War era it was easy to justify the British troops' presence across the globe by the "force for good" phrase. On the other hand, the author argues that Germany lays completely opposite of the UK, as the German society was not ready to see and justify its troops' engagement outside the country during the nineties. This was obviously due to historic reasons, after which foreign military assertiveness was not widely accepted by the public. Sweden stays in between these two cases. It was militarily neutral for a long time, but it also pioneered the UN peacekeeping missions' participation. This discrepancy between engagement in international affairs beyond the Swedish borders and staying militarily neutral is a controversy that shapes the military ethos of the Swedish armed forces.

Given that liberalism and its norms are promoted as the highest *virtue*, it seems that this book's author overemphasizes ideology as a driving factor of the military culture, rather than including other structural and social factors that shape the military ethos. He recognizes the importance of the international system but simultaneously neglects the relative influence coming from domestic political actors and elites which figure political debate over the usage of military force abroad. Even though Kucera intended to determine the compatibility of military means with strategic ends in liberal societies, he failed to do so. The choice of the UK, Sweden, and Germany as the cases for research was a good idea, but the author's justification for choosing this case is gloomy. The last objection which could be addressed towards this research is the problematic level of analysis. The author sequences liberalism as an ideology rather than placing it into a theoretical framework as one of the dominant discourses of international relations or security studies. This decreased the epistemic contribution of this research in terms of potential theory re-conceptualization by the findings obtained from the case studies.

*Nenad STEKIĆ*

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### *Paper length:*

Research papers should be 5500 – 8000 words long without references.

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A separate title page should be attached. This will be detached during the refereeing stage to maintain the anonymity of the author. The title page should include: The name(s) of the author(s); a concise and informative title; the affiliation(s) and address (es) of the author(s); the e-mail address of the author (s); the author(s) academic biography, up to 150 words, in the third persons. If the first author is not the corresponding author, this should be clearly indicated.

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*Acknowledgments:*

Acknowledgments of people, grants, funds, etc. should be placed in footnote on the first page. The names of funding organizations should be written in full.

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(Miljus, 2009; Novičić, 2006; Vučić, 2011, Young, 1999).

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Hemingway, E. (1999). The killers. In J. Updike & K. Kenison (Eds.), *The best American short stories of the century* (pp. 78-80). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

### **How to Cite an Introduction, Preface, Foreword, or Afterword in APA Format:**

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Last, F. M. (Year Published). Section title, In F. M. Last & F. M. Last (Eds.), Book/anthology (pp. Pages), City, State: Publisher.

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Sanders, S. R. (2007). Introduction, In L. Williford & M. Martone (Eds.), Touchstone anthology of contemporary creative nonfiction: Work from 1970 to present (pp. 148-151), New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Masur, L. P. (2011). Preface, In The Civil War: A concise history (pp. Iv-Xii), Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

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Author, A.A..(Publication Year). Article title, *Periodical Title*, Volume(Issue), pp.-pp.

*RLA format example:*

Nevin, A. (1990). The changing of teacher education special education, *Teacher Education and Special Education: The Journal of the Teacher Education Division of the Council for Exceptional Children*, 13(3-4), 147-148.

#### **Citing a journal article found online:**

*RLA format structure:*

Author, A.A..(Publication Year).Article title, Periodical Title, Volume(Issue), pp.-pp. doi:XX.XXXXXX or Retrieved from journal URL

*RLA format structure:*

Jameson, J. (2013). E-Leadership in higher education: The fifth “age” of educational technology research, *British Journal of Educational Technology*, 44(6), 889-915. doi: 10.1111/bjet.12103

### ***Magazine citation***

Author, A.A.. (Year, month of Publication). Article title. *Magazine Title*, Volume(Issue), pp.-pp.

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Tumulty, K. (2006, April). Should they stay or should they go? *Time*, 167(15), 3-40.



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Author, A.A. (Year, Month of Publication). Article title. *Magazine Title*, Volume(Issue), Retrieved from <http://xxxx>

*RLA format structure:*

Tumulty, K. (2006, April). Should they stay or should they go? *Time*, 167(15) Retrieved from <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1179361,00.html>

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Author, A.A.. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Article title. *Magazine Title*, pp. xx-xx.

*RLA format structure:*

Rosenberg, G. (1997, March 31). Electronic discovery proves an effective legal weapon. *The New York Times*, p. D5.

#### **Citing a newspaper article found online:**

*RLA format structure:*

Author, A.A. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Article title. *Newspaper Title*, Retrieved from newspaper homepage URL

*RLA format structure:*

Rosenberg, G. (1997, March 31). Electronic discovery proves an effective legal weapon. *The New York Times*, Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com>

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#### **Citing a general website article with an author:**

*RLA format structure:*

Author, A.A.. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Article title. Retrieved from URL

*RLA format structure:*

Simmons, B. (2015, January 9). The tale of two Flaccos. Retrieved from <http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-tale-of-two-flaccos/>

**Citing a general website article without an author:**

*RLA format structure:*

Article title. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Retrieved from URL

*RLA format structure:*

Teen posed as doctor at West Palm Beach hospital: police. (2015, January 16). Retrieved from <http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Teen-Posed-as-Doctor-at-West-Palm-Beach-Hospital-Police-288810831.html>

***Lecture citation***

**Citing online lecture notes or presentation slides:**

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Author, A.A..(Publication Year). Name or title of lecture [file format]. Retrieved from URL

*RLA format structure:*

Saito, T. (2012). Technology and me: A personal timeline of educational technology [Powerpoint slides]. Retrieved from <http://www.slideshare.net/Bclari25/educational-technologyppt>

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Author, A.A..(Publication Year).Entry title. In *Encyclopedia title*, (Vol. XX, pp. XX). City, State of publication: Publisher.

*RLA format structure:*

Kammen, C., & Wilson, A.H. (2012). Monuments.In*Encyclopedia of local history*. (pp. 363-364) Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

***Institutions as authors and legal documents***

**Citing an institution document:**

*RLA format structure:*

World Bank.(2010). World development report—Development and climate change.The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA.

United Nations. (2006, November 9). Delivering as one. Report of the Secretary-General's HighLevel Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, New York.

EC. (2002). Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal of the European Communities L201 37–47, 31 July (European Commission, Brussels).

### **Citing a court decision:**

Court decisions should be referenced as fully as possible (type and number of the decision, date of adoption, publication in which it was published).

*RLA format structure:*

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.14, 181 (June27)(separate opinion of Judge Ago).

### **Citing a law:**

*RLA format structure:*

Name of the law, Official Publication where the law was published. Number (Year).

*RLA format structure:*

Zakon o spoljnim poslovima, Službeni glasnik RS.Br. 116 (2007).

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