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THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BELGRADE, VOL. LXXI, No. 1177, JANUARY–MARCH 2020

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THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The Review of International Affairs

ISSN 0486-6096

UDK 327

VOL. LXXI, No. 1177, JANUARY–MARCH 2020

Publisher

Institute of International Politics and Economics,
Belgrade, Makedonska 25

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Layout

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BiFS doo, Books and Periodicals, Supilova 10
11000 Belgrade, Serbia,
Tel/fax: +381 11 20 84 229
E-mail: bfsbooks@sezampro.rs

Printed by:

Donat Graf doo, Mike Alasa 52, Beograd

The Review of International Affairs is included in ERIH PLUS (European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences) <http://erihplus.nsd.no/>



The Review of International Affairs is the leading journal of national importance, classified M51, according to the classification by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, the Republic of Serbia.

Publishing of *The Review of International Affairs* is funded by
the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia

The Review of International Affairs

Vol. LXXI, No. 1177, January–March 2020

UDK 327 ISSN 0486-6096

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ARAB COUNTRIES ALONG THE MARITIME SILK ROAD

Costs and Benefits analysis¹

Nataša STANOJEVIĆ

Abstract: This article explores the potential effects of Chinese economic presence in the countries along the routes of the so-called Maritime Silk Road. Four Arab countries on the Maritime Silk Road were selected for analysis: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen. Potential and realized costs and benefits are being explored for both China and Arab countries. Two hypotheses are tested. The first is that investments of Chinese companies make it possible for the selected countries to join international trade flows, to diversify income and increase production and expand the range of products at reasonable costs. This is proved by an analysis of the sectoral distribution of current Chinese investment and the trend of investing in certain segments of Arab economies, mostly outside the energy sector. The second one is that some or all Arab countries along the Maritime Silk Road can increase exports to China, despite their low competitiveness, limited volume and range of products and high competitiveness of Chinese products on the other side. The application of the coefficient of conformity between Arab exports and China imports has shown that Arab countries have a chance to increase only exports of oil and organic chemicals to China. However, an analysis of trade statistics shows a dramatic increase in exports of many products that China itself exports at significantly more competitive prices, which is beyond any trade reason. Oriented towards broader and long-term national interests, China makes compromises in certain sectors for greater benefit in another sector or for higher-order benefits, such as geostrategic positions.

Keywords: Maritime Silk Road, Arab countries, FDI, infrastructure, foreign trade.

INTRODUCTION

Most Arab countries have oil-based economies, which means they cannot be classified into usual development categories. They are not developing countries

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2020”, financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

because they are too rich, but they are not developed because they lack the basic characteristics of developed economies - a high share of services in the economy (except for the UAE). The periods of growth and stagnation are shifting faster in this region than in any other part of the world. The most significant feature of these economies is instability, and it stems from the high dependence of these economies on an exogenous factor - changing oil prices in the world market. The causes of oil price changes are many, varied, and largely beyond the control of individual states. Oil price volatility is the cause of income volatility, and this is a source of many problems for these economies. For example, the implementation of sound fiscal policy becomes impossible due to sudden changes in the volume of income. Furthermore, governments are unable to adopt sustainable investment policies because they cannot count on recurring revenues. The same applies to the spending policy.

Another specific negative phenomenon of dependence on energy exports is a phenomenon called “Dutch disease”. In its core, it refers to the failure of a resource-rich economy to establish a competitive manufacturing sector. The share of industrial exports in total exports from Arab countries is lower than in any other region of the world. Discovery of new resources and later, the mere fact that a country has significant energy production, puts pressure on the appreciation of the domestic currency. High currency value makes domestic production relatively expensive, therefore less competitive. Furthermore, the high currency value leads to a higher standard, and this makes import cheaper than production. Thus, in all sectors, except resources, imports rise, while production and exports shrink. This further leads to an outflow of capital and manpower from the manufacturing sector, which eventually collapses and results in growing dependence not only on natural resources but also on the import of all other goods.

The final argument against having an economic development based on the wealth of oil and gas resources is the certainty of the depletion of their reserves.

Several Arab economies, such as Yemen and Egypt, lack abundant energy. These countries have oil in quantities that are not sufficient to keep the economy rich but sufficient to impede the development of other sectors.

A successful development strategy for these economies cannot be based on oil and gas exports.

On the other hand, the main goals of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) were less about export promotion but more about the employment of the growing capacity of the Chinese construction industry and placement of increased financial resources. The Belt and Road Initiative, as a global infrastructure projects include land and maritime roads, railway (standard and fast), airports, infrastructure facilities related to ports, construction of plants,

energy facilities (oil and gas pipelines and electric lines), but also development of industrial parks, economic corridors, and the like. All of these projects simultaneously mobilize China's over-expanded construction capacity and place excess funding, as host countries receive these investments as deferred and long-term loans.

From the stated objectives of Arab countries and China, it follows that these economies can realize significant mutual benefits based on Chinese FDI in non-energy sectors and on increased trade as a result of investments.

What can be an obstacle to this perfect scenario is the fact that the Chinese and Arab economies are also compatible in terms of the oil trade. China is the largest importer and the Arab region is the largest oil exporter in the world. If the economic relations of these regions are reduced to this scenario, Arab countries will not benefit significantly from joining the BRI.

The Belt and Road is made up of two main routes: the *Silk Road Economic Belt*, which connects the inland route from Asia to Europe, and the *21st-century Maritime Silk Road*, which connects the coastal areas of China, Southeast and South Asia, the Middle East and East Africa. According to the project, the Middle East has access to both the land and maritime parts of the BRI. However, due to security-related issues and the complex geopolitical situation in this region, very few routes pass through these countries for the time being.

There are several Arab countries in the Middle East and Africa on the Silk Road. Four Arab countries on the Maritime Silk Road were selected for the analysis: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen. These were selected for the case study because they belong to different types of economy, otherwise very similar Arab economies. Saudi Arabia is very rich, the typical oil economy. Oman has significant deposits and production of oil, but as a small country, it does not have funds that can compete with rich oil economies. Egypt has developed a few sectors in addition to the energy sector, while Yemen is the poorest and most underdeveloped country of the region.

All of these countries have untapped port potentials and poor transport and trade links, except Egypt, whose potentials are relatively well utilized, though not close to their own capacity. China's infrastructure projects offer new development concepts and possibility to diversify monolithic economies, of both rich and poor countries, and offer poorer economies a chance for economic development. The common interest field seems to be very broad.

Undoubtedly, the BRI brings significant advantages and benefits to China since the whole project is primarily and foremost tailored to Chinese interests. However, the impact and effects of the investments under this global project on other participant countries must be the subject of deeper research.

The first hypothesis is that Chinese companies' investments in infrastructure projects, as well as the construction of factories and industrial zones, enable less developed economies to become more involved in international trade flows, diversify revenues and increase the range of exported products at acceptable costs. By analysing the sectoral distribution of current Chinese investment, it should be assessed whether China in this region is only trying to pursue its interests in regular and secure oil supply, or whether its strategy, in addition to this primary objective, is to strengthen the economy of the entire region. If all investments are in the oil or the oil transportation sector, then there will be no significant benefit for these countries from Chinese investments. Placement of FDI outside the energy sector can ensure partial diversification of these economies, increase the volume, quality and export of their products.

The second hypothesis concerns the trade aspects of the BRI. As in the case of FDI, China's interests are expected to be primarily in trade arrangements, given that China is an initiator of the BRI project. However, there are indicators for the opposite hypothesis: Arab countries on the Maritime Silk Road, or at least some of them, can benefit from trade relations with China, despite the low competitiveness, limited scope and a reduced assortment of their products and high competitiveness of Chinese products.

The indicator for this hypothesis is as follows. China, as the biggest proponent of the so-called win-win strategy cooperation with assumed benefits for all sides, supports Arab countries, as partners in the BRI, in their aspirations to diversify their economies.

In its strategy for building relations with Arab countries (China's Arab Policy Paper, Part III, 2.4.), China stated its intention to support the import of more non-oil products from Arab countries, as an integral part of the development of overall economic cooperation. The aim is to balance the import-export relationship between China and these countries by improving the production structure.

Trade benefits will be determined by applying competitiveness indicator, specifically the *coefficient of conformity*, which determines the import-export correlation between the two countries in respect of certain groups of products. The aim is to determine if there is a production (excluding oil) in the countries of the region that would be competitive enough for the Chinese market. The expectations are not too high, given the wide range and productivity of Chinese production, but the assumption is that at least some of the Middle Eastern economies have specific products, which would meet Chinese import demand.

The first chapter gives an overview of theoretical assumptions about the effects of foreign investments and trade, with an emphasis on the potential benefits that China and selected Arab countries may yield from this kind of

international cooperation. These suggestions partly rely on the theoretical assumptions, but more on the acquired knowledge about Chinese development strategies and its way of doing business within the BRI. It is followed by empirical costs and benefits analysis for individual Arab countries on the Maritime Silk Road. The scale and sectors of allocation of Chinese investment, as well as its results, are then analysed. Besides, by application of the coefficient of conformity, a group of products whose export to China is likely to increase is determined for each country.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Potential benefits through foreign direct investments

Theoretically, the inflow of new capital has positive implications for the development of all economies involved in the investment project. The most common are: an increase in the total volume of a country's production by setting-up new enterprises, expansion of economic activities, generating new jobs, raising production quality if multinational companies (MNCs), transfer new technologies to their branches in a host country (Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991). MNCs can apply better organizational or management practices, improve productivity (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), gains from increased trade (if FDI is placed in tradable products) and gains from invested capital, although profits do not usually remain in the host country. Indirectly, this would further lead to the improvement of the macroeconomic environment, labour efficiency, and increasing competitiveness in the global market (Stanojević, 2019, p. 65).

Significant positive effects of FDI on economic growth are recorded by Hofmann (2013), Hlavacek and Bal-Domanska (2016) in the analysis of the effects of FDI in the Central European countries. However, most studies in quantitative terms do not result in a significant positive correlation between FDI and economic growth, and some studies have suggested negative effects of FDI on economic growth. The latter are researches of Bandelj and Mahutga (2010), Curwin and Mahutga (2013), Kentor and Boswell (2003) and Firebaugh (1992), who analysed the impact of FDI stock.

The Belt and Road Initiative is an opportunity for China to be one of the world's leading investors and thus achieve or maintain economic growth at a relatively high level. The Chinese government has significantly increased its support not only to state-owned companies, which have so far been the main investors but also to private ones. The administrative procedures for investment placement have been completely changed. The system in which the government needed to approve an investment was abolished and the simple registration of any company wishing to invest abroad was introduced (Global Markets, 2015, p. 1).

The strategy of investing in infrastructure projects has the potential to ensure the growth of the Chinese economy, but also of the countries on the BRI routes.

China's economy is benefiting enormously from the employment of its growing construction facilities and supporting industries, in which China is also a world leader: cement, steel and several mechanical engineering industries. Overseas infrastructure projects will absorb the current over-capacity of the Chinese construction industry and prevent a potential crisis of overproduction in this industry. Investing in infrastructure outside China at the right moment was crucial, as the booming growth would have led to overinvestment, and this to overcapacity (mainly housing), which was the prelude to all major financial crises in recent history.

The recipient countries of China's FDI should theoretically benefit from infrastructure development. An important mechanism of the influence of infrastructure on development is generating a production increase through market expansion (Prud'homme, 2004, pp. 15-16). The volume, state and efficiency of an infrastructure strongly influence the production and distribution of goods and services, as well as the living conditions of the population, i.e., the labour force. Transport infrastructure produces an increase in the commodity market by lowering transport costs and accelerating the delivery of perishable products. Market increase leads to the strengthening of competition, specialization, productivity growth and an increase in the volume of production (Stanojević, 2019, pp. 63-64). Infrastructure projects seize an opportunity directly through construction, which on the other hand create opportunities for an entire system of enterprises, from multinationals to local small and medium-sized businesses, which will benefit from new activities.

Potential benefits of trade growth

One of China's motives for including the Middle East region in the BRI is a potential increase in exports. The BRI adds to China's exports in two ways. Firstly, new routes, with new arrangements with the countries to which they lead, will enable China to conquer new export markets and maintain or expand the existing ones. Secondly, the new routes will significantly accelerate Chinese goods deliveries and reduce the cost of transport to Europe via the Middle East, but also to the Middle East countries, which will additionally have a positive impact on the increasing export of Chinese goods.

What is more important for this research is to determine whether the trade of Arab countries will suffer costs or gain benefits within the BRI. Arab countries' potential disadvantages of joining the BRI stem from the fact that almost all Chinese products are competitive in the Arab markets. Countries with some

production outside the oil sector should, in theory, collapse in the face of intense competition from Chinese companies.

However, this was also expected for other economies, given that China's industry is the largest, most developed, most competitive in the world. Nevertheless, the research shows the opposite results. Among the authors who have analysed the benefits of trading within the BRI, we will mention Bastian (2017), Zakić (2019), Chen and Yang (2016) who analysed Chinese investments in Central and Southeastern Europe and the Balkan countries. Their results highlight the positive and, in Bastian's research, even exceptional results. Spillover effects in the macroeconomic sense of this initiative are mostly visible through trade within the 16+1 mechanism. It gives the most obvious results, stating that especially exports from the CEEC to China were increased by 120% during this period (Bastian, 2017, p. 33).

The positive effects of Chinese presence in underdeveloped regions are also analysed for Africa. Almost all of the authors (Alden, 2005; Eisenman, 2012; Zakić, Radišić, 2018) found significant growth in African exports as a result of China's economic activities in the region.

The economies such as African, transitional European, as well as Arab are not competitive with the Chinese economy. So we think we need to statistically explore what kinds of advantages the Arab economies can potentially gain from new export markets, and which sectors are at risk of weakening. The goal is to determine what non-oil products these countries can export to China. A simple and very reliable method is the coefficient of conformity (CC). It is calculated in the following formula:

- The i stands for exporter country and j for importer partner;
- The subscript p shows different product groups;
- The X_{pw} stands for share of exports of product p in the overall export of country i ;
- The M_{pw} is share of imports of product p in the overall import of country j .

This actually determines the export-import structure of the two countries in terms of one product group. The UN SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) or HS (Harmonised Standard) classification is most commonly used. Given that the SITC basis does not have all the required data for Arab countries, we used HS.

The results of the CC analysis have a value between 0 and 1. Value 1 means perfect complementarity between export of the country *i* and import of the country *j*. By contrast, the values closer to 0 refer to a competitive trade structure.

We tested the product groups with the highest share of exports of each analysed country on the Maritime Silk Road. Products with high and relatively high coefficient values are likely to gain market position in the future due to China's growing presence and intensification of bilateral relations, as well as lower transportation costs.

The data obtained in this way represent only a theoretical possibility, that is, a potential, while its realization will depend on current trade arrangements.

EGYPT

Egypt is one of the lower middle-income economies, with a dramatic fall in household income after the Arab Spring, to the level of underdeveloped African countries. Egypt has oil, but energy reserves, production and export volumes are relatively small, so the economy does not have the problem of an overvalued exchange rate. Oil exports account for about 27% of Egypt's total exports, which, even in periods of high oil prices, does not generate significant surpluses to the country.

The second problem of the oil economy, de-industrialization, is not that evident, largely due to the exceptional advantages of its geographic location. Egypt has no developed industry other than the textile, but its economy is much more diverse than other Arab economies.

Except for oil, Egypt traditionally has large agricultural production in the Nile Valley, cotton and textile production, huge revenues from the Suez Canal, and slightly less from tourism.

In terms of trade, the energy sector is of paramount importance to China and accounts for about 70% of China's total imports. Chinese exports to Egypt are, on average, ten times higher than imports from this country, with the Chinese surplus' growing tendency. (Trade map, 2019).

Other products, which are important Egyptian export potential and at the same time show a high CC, are cotton, plastics, fruits and to a lesser extent, sulphur, lime and cement (Table 1).

Table 1: Coefficient of conformity of the most important export products of Egypt with import of China

Code	Product	CC
HS 27	Mineral fuel	0.9969
HS 52	Cotton	0.8642
HS 39	Plastics and articles thereof	0.9059
HS 08	Edible fruit and nuts	0.8927
HS 25	Salt; sulphur, lime and cement	0.7552

Source: Author's calculation

Much of these Egyptian export potentials to China have been realized. The value of exported fuel has doubled, but a significant increase has been reported in plastic exports, from \$9 million to \$72 million, cotton exports from \$3 million to \$12 million, and fruit exports tripled in 2016-2018, while cement exports generally stagnated.

Egypt's other key export products worldwide (textile fibres, copper and ores) showed a low CC with Chinese imports. Exports of copper and ores to China have indeed been reduced, but exports of fabrics and clothing from Egypt to China have quadrupled. As China is a major exporter of these products, statistics show the CC below 0.4. The growth of textile exports is probably the result of an agreement under another investment or trade arrangement.

Given the exceptional geographic location of the Suez Canal, at the intersection of two oceans and three continents, the Chinese government was very interested in investing, with the aim of accelerating the transport of Chinese goods to Europe, but also securing the access of its commercial ships from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. This provides China with more favourable conditions for using maritime routes toward Southern Europe. Egypt has a chance to make a major development shift based on large-scale foreign investment.

The largest investor in Egypt is the United Kingdom. Because of this Egypt's "dominant" partner, the penetration of Chinese companies was not welcomed and was preceded by public condemnation, pressure on host countries, and obstruction of Chinese projects.

Chinese companies have been investing heavily in Egypt since 2006, with larger investments coming no sooner than 2013. Egypt, after Saudi Arabia, is the

destination of China's largest investment among Arab countries, with \$25 billion invested in 30 projects (*China World Investment Tracker*, 2019).

Chinese investments placed outside the oil sector are of the greatest significance for the development of the Egyptian economy. Chinese companies have invested about \$7.5 billion, or one-third of the total investment in the energy sector. British investment, by contrast, is mostly made in the oil sector, which does not support economic development, though it does mobilize a significant portion of the workforce.

By 2019, Chinese companies, mostly state-owned, invested nearly \$10 billion in infrastructure projects that facilitate the transportation of Chinese goods to Europe. About \$2.6 billion was invested in the maritime and rail transport infrastructure of the Suez Canal, and \$5.7 billion in the real estate sector, mainly also in the Suez Canal zone. One of China's major projects in the Suez Canal is *China Ocean Shipping's investment* - COSCO, which invested about \$150 million in a joint project to operate and manage one of the Suez Canal terminals. For the construction of the second phase of the same port (Port Said East Port), *China Harbor Engineering* invested \$219 million to build a 1200-meter long pier (Scott, 2014, pp. 10-14). The same company built another port in the port of Al-Adabia, located at the southern entrance to the Suez Canal. The project was worth a billion dollars.

Over time, China has become the largest investor in the Suez Canal Industrial Area, covering six ports and an area of nearly 500 square kilometres. As a result, the Suez Canal has doubled the traffic flow between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and the port's capacity in terms of the number and size of vessels. Transit times between Asia and Europe are significantly reduced. This main transportation route between Asia and Europe has become even more important.

In the real estate sector, China's largest investment is *Tianjin Development*, which in the Suez Canal area has developed a special economic zone in the suburbs of Cairo - *Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area* (TEDA). The aim of this project is to enable Egyptian and Chinese companies to conduct trade and manufacturing activities in this area. So far, the Chinese company has invested about \$500 million in this project (China Global Investment Tracker, 2019).

SAUDI ARABIA

The discovery of oil in this country in 1936 and the beginning of its production in 1938 completely changed the state of the country and shaped its economy in the coming decades. Oil revenues account for about 90% of budget revenues, 80% of exports (World Trade, 2018) and about 50% of GDP (OPEC, 2019), which makes this country highly dependent on price fluctuations in the

world market. On the other hand, despite its oil wealth, Saudi Arabia is unable to provide enough jobs for its population, which has doubled in the past two decades, to about 33 million. Saudi Arabia’s enormous economic and political power is secured by its crucial role in OPEC, through which it exerts a significant influence on world oil price movements.

Saudi Arabia is very important to China because it is its largest supplier of oil. This is one of the few countries that make a trade surplus with China. Total Saudi Arabia exports to China yield about \$45 billion a year to this country, while imports from China are about \$17.5 billion (Trade Map). Around 12% of total Chinese fuel imports come from Saudi Arabia, while oil exports to China account for 15% of total Saudi oil exports (calculation based on Trade map data). Trade with non-oil products between the two countries is also growing.

The coefficient of conformity, as expected, shows an extremely high import-export match in terms of energy, but it is also high in the case of plastics and articles thereof whose main raw material is also oil (Table 2).

Table 2: Coefficient of conformity of the most important export products of Saudi Arabia with import of China

Code	Product	CC
HS 27	Mineral fuels	0.9998
HS 28	Inorganic chemicals	0.8661
HS 29	Organic chemicals	0.8488
HS 39	Plastics and articles thereof	0.7813
HS 76	Aluminium and articles thereof	0.8455

Source: Author’s calculation

The products presented in Table 2 have export growth potential in the Chinese market. So far, these potentials have been largely realized. Export of organic chemicals, aces and plastics doubled in 2016-2018, which is in line with the projected potentials. Inorganic chemicals and aluminium are exported at steady amounts.

Deviation from the forecast is a remarkable increase in exports of rubber and rubber products from Saudi Arabia to China. Exports have increased as much as 15 times in three years. The CC for tire exports was 0.52 and therefore was not envisaged as an export opportunity for Saudi Arabia. China has a significant import, and export of this product, but in the Saudi economy, it plays

a minor role and statistics confirm this fact. Its increase in exports of non-petroleum products is a result of a compromise to obtain large investment projects, which, given the size of Saudi Arabia, have far greater value than in other countries.

Saudi Arabia has been receiving significant Chinese investment since 2007. With \$1 billion in 2005, they reached \$37.55 billion in 2019 (China Investment Tracker). Only one-quarter of China's total FDI, about \$ 8.15 billion, has been invested in the oil and gas sector, which justifies Saudi expectations that joining the Chinese Belt and Road project can diversify this monolithic oil economy.

China invested mainly in transportation infrastructure and projects. Total investment in the transportation sector is more than \$6.5 billion, out of which \$3 billion placed to just one shipyard project - *King Salman International Complex* in 2018. A large number of investment infrastructure projects are allocated to railways. The company that implemented all the Chinese projects is *China Railway Construction*. The total contracted value of the projects is approximately \$5 billion, and by the end of 2019, the value of the investments was \$2.1 billion. Other investments in the construction industry (cement) and real estate construction reached \$5.4 billion by the end of 2019.

In addition to infrastructure projects, a relatively important place among Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia is the aluminium industry, with more than \$5 billion invested by Chinese companies in 2007. An important destination is the chemical industry, with an inflow of \$2.5 billion, as well as alternative energy sources. Export growth results are evident in the case of chemical products, whose exports to China increased from \$9.8 million to \$25 million between 2014 and 2018. In the case of aluminium, growth has also been recorded, but with big annual fluctuations, thus no general conclusion can be made on the effects of Chinese investment in this sector.

OMAN

China has a pronounced trade deficit with Oman, which is expected since its main trade product is oil. China's imports are ten times higher than its exports to this country (Trade map, 2018).

Energy sources account for 78% of Oman's exports to the world, 70% for oil and 8% for gas. In addition to energy, export products include organic chemicals and fertilisers, with 3-4% of exports. These products show a very high coefficient of compliance with China's imports (Table 3).

Table 3: Coefficient of conformity of the most important export products of Oman with import of China

Code	Product	CC
HS 27	Mineral fuels	0.9976
HS 29	Organic chemicals	0.9822
HS 31	Fertilisers	0.8644

Source: Author's calculation

However, export potentials beyond fuel were not realized. About 96% of Chinese imports from Oman are mineral fuels, and organic chemicals 3.7%.

The real exchange rate of the Omani rial against the yuan is very unfavourable. In oil and gas exports, this is not of particular importance, as their price is formed outside national economies. This is not the main reason, but it is an additional aggravating circumstance for China's non-oil imports from Oman.

Trade with China has not provided Oman with benefits, but Chinese investments have. The future prospects for the country's socio-economic development depend on its ability to attract more FDI to those outside the oil and gas sector. So far, very little investment has been placed in non-energy sectors, but Chinese companies are an exception.

Table 4: Chinese FDI in Oman

	Chinese Entity	Quantity in Millions	Sector	Subsector
2005	Sinohydro	150	Utilities	
2008	China National Building Material	160	Real estate	Construction
2009	Shandong Electric Power	720	Energy	
2015	Sinolight	300	Agriculture	
2016	Ningxia investors	240	Other	Industry
2016	Power Construction Corp	2,300	Energy	Gas
2016	Power Construction Corp	330	Energy	Gas
2018	CNPC	320	Energy	Oil
	Total	4,520		

Source: China Global Investment Tracker:
<https://www.aei.org/data/China-Global-Investment-Tracker>

China has invested about \$3 billion in the oil and petroleum and petrochemical industries, but about \$550 million has been invested outside the energy sector. Around \$300 million worth project to build the first sugar refinery in Oman in 2015 was implemented by Chinese company *Sinolight*. Production meets domestic needs and exports of sugar, which, according to the latest figures in 2017, doubled compared to 2016 (Trade map, 2018).

The location of the processing complex is important to China as it is located near the Oman port of Sohar in the Gulf of Oman. The second investment also includes a coastal belt and is carried out through a project to build an industrial park on the site of the fishing village of Duqm. The planned investments are about 10 billion, but for now the Chinese company - *Ningxia investors* has realized works worth \$240 million. China has provided access to the Oman coast, and Oman gains a chance to diversify its economy and secure some revenues from the non-oil sectors.

YEMEN

Yemen is the least developed country in the Middle East region with a GDP of \$944 per capita (World Bank, 2018). There are no significant reserves of oil or mineral resources, except for rock salt and marble. The scarcity of fertile land, as in all countries of the Arabian Peninsula, has led to dependence on food imports, which is one of the key problems for this poor country.

The already poor economy of Yemen has been further affected by numerous tribal conflicts that have plagued this country and, since 2015, by the civil war, which has left dramatic consequences on the country's economy and society.

Its geographic location is not attractive and the only potential for development is the port of Aden near the entrance to the Red Sea. It is a duty-free zone and is the most attractive destination for FDI placement in this country. Foreign direct investments in Yemen are not large, but since it is on the routes of the Maritime Silk Road, China is interested in expanding and modernizing these port facilities.

China's trade with Yemen is extremely small compared to other countries in the region. Yemen has a small amount of oil. In terms of reserves, in 2015, it ranked 28th and 64th in the world (EIA) in oil production. Nevertheless, as the rest of the economy is so weak, oil is still a major export product.

Accordingly, the coefficient of concurrence with oil imports to China is above 0.98 (Table 5). Other products showing a high coefficient of compliance with Chinese imports are ores, parts of electrical machinery and equipment and fish and seafood.

Table 5: Coefficient of conformity of the most important export products of Yemen with import of China

Product code	Product	CC
HS 27	Mineral fuels	0.9850
HS 26	Ores, slag and ash	0.9259
HS 85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof;	0.8655
HS 03	Fish and seafood	0.7246

Source: Author's calculation

These export potentials, except fuel exports, have not been realized. More than 98% of Chinese imports from Yemen are mineral fuels (Trade map, 2019).

In contrast to the (expected) low exports, Yemen benefits significantly from the investments made by Chinese companies, especially in the oilfield exploration (Sinopec) and telecommunications infrastructure (Huawei).

Since 2005, Chinese state-owned Sinopec, and since 2008 Sinochem, have been operating in the oil and gas exploration and production sectors in Yemen. There is no official information on Sinopec's investments, and Sinochem owns 17% of Block 10, Yemen's largest oil field, whose daily production was raised from 45,000 to about 70,000 barrels a day, thanks to Sinochem's technical improvements and investments. (Sinochem, 2019).

Table 6: Chinese FDI in Yemen

	Chinese Entity	Quantity in Millions	Sector	Subsector
2006	Sinoma	260	Real estate	Construction
2006	Genertec	220	Real estate	Construction
2007	China National Building Material	250	Real estate	Construction
2008	Sinochem	470	Energy	Oil
2013	China Communications Construction	510	Transport	Shipping
	Total	1,710		

Source: China Global Investment Tracker:

<https://www.aei.org/data/China-Global-Investment-Tracker>

Other Chinese investments are in line with the primary objective of the Belt and Road Initiative - engaging the Chinese construction industry. The largest project is aimed at the expansion and deepening of container ports in Aden and Mokha. The project started in 2013 and had an investment value of \$510 million. Chinese Sinoma, Genertec and CNBM have built cement plants by investing \$260, \$220 and \$250 million (table 6).

Although not producing spectacular results, Yemen's cement exports are increasing by an average of 10% per year, while imports in 2018 have been reduced to a third of the 2016's figure (Trade map, 2019). Chinese companies do not participate in the operations of these factories, but affordable construction costs and favourable credit conditions have provided for Yemen to make a significant step in developing its economy.

CONCLUSIONS

Building infrastructure and industry advancements are common needs and mutual benefits of China and countries in the region.

In terms of investment, benefits are measurable in some cases, in others not. The capacities available to the host countries have been significantly increased, and the development of transport infrastructure, an increase of ports' capacities, new roads and railways are visible. Benefits for the host countries include connections to international trade flows, but also an increase of direct revenues in most port facilities: the Suez Canal, Jeddah, Aden and potentially increased use of the Sohar port in Oman.

The potential risk associated with Chinese investments in infrastructure is over-indebtedness as a result of Chinese loans. Rich countries such as Saudi Arabia are not exposed to this risk. These countries have sufficient resources, and their budget can support large infrastructure projects. Chinese companies simply offered the most favourable conditions for construction works.

The risk of costs exceeding benefits is inversely proportional to the size of the economy. Eight out of the 68 countries are not able to repay their debts: Djibouti, Pakistan, Montenegro, Laos, Sri Lanka, etc. (Hurley, Morris and Portelance, 2018, p. 4). These are usually small economies with large infrastructure projects (Stanojevic, 2019, p. 71). In the four analysed countries, including Yemen, as a small and poor country, there was no over-indebtedness due to Chinese investment. Yet, in addition to the careful planning of the loan arrangement, small countries should insist on increasing the share of concessions or grants to the loan in order to reduce the risk of debt repayment, which also suits China's interests more.

Some countries on the Maritime Silk Road have increased their security risks by joining the BRI. Due to the geographic position at checkpoints accessing the Suez Canal, five countries have military bases in Djibouti: France, Italy, Japan, the USA and China. Great tensions were created by the establishment of a Chinese military base. Proximity of various military facilities produces tensions, and it is certainly a security risk for the East African region (Babić, 2019, p. 73). The countries included in this survey are not exposed to additional risks so far, but China's presence in volatile Yemen leaves room for international tensions to build up in this country.

In terms of trade, the results of the survey are quite layered in some segments.

The Arab countries along the Maritime Silk Road generally achieve an increase in exports to China, but also in exports generally, as a result of joining the BRI. In some countries, this increase is very positive for the economy, as it relates to sectors outside the oil and gas sector and makes it possible to diversify these monolithic economies. Some export growths have economic logic, others do not.

Examples of mutually beneficial cooperation that have contributed to Arab trade are Saudi Arabia's exports of chemical products and China's investment in the construction of Oman's sugar refineries. The first is the result of China's interest in the chemical sector in which it has invested heavily, and exports are the result of these FDIs. In the second case, Chinese companies provided themselves with a more prosperous project, and Oman realized the production it had not had before. The result is not a direct export of sugar to China, as Omani production is negligible from the perspective of the Chinese market, but export to other countries in the region, which generally lack food production.

On the other hand, there are some examples, which are not explained by economic logic and thus our statistical forecasts, but these results are generally predicted by another hypothesis. Such examples encompass a dramatic increase in exports to China of products that have not received Chinese investments, and exports not expected to take place due to the trade schemes between China and these countries. Those are the export of fabrics and clothing from Egypt to China, which has quadrupled in two years, Saudi exports of rubber, but also examples from research of other authors on the strong growth in exports of African and Balkan products to China. Thus gained benefits by low-competitive economies, represent, by contrast, a loss for China as the main initiator. But this is, most often, calculated cost.

The inconsistencies expressed by economic theories and the empirical research lead to the general conclusion that the Chinese economy in international relations must be understood in the light of the comprehensive system of the Chinese state. Other economies are generally of the Western types, even if they are not originally from the global West. Most economies going international

appear abroad not as a comprehensive economic system but as a set of companies. Due to its strong, centralized national economy, Chinese companies do not necessarily behave in accordance with economic logic. The state has the power and authority to make up for conscious losses to one company, for the sake of a larger project with another company. In a particular sector, China will make compromises (e.g., mass imports of fabrics from Egypt) to achieve higher or higher-order benefits, or benefits in another sector (e.g., control over six ports in the Suez Canal). China may decide that there are no economic benefits at all in one country for the sake of a long-term economic or geopolitical strategy (Pakistan). China's broader and long-term strategy does not necessarily have a negative impact on the future of host countries. The problem is the host countries usually do not take into account the Chinese broader perspective.

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ARAPSKJE ZEMLJIE NA POMORSKOM PUTU SVILE COST-BENEFIT ANALIZA

Apstrakt: Ovaj članak istražuje potencijalne efekte kineskog ekonomskog prisustva u zemljama duž trasa Pomorskog puta svile. Za analizu su odabrane četiri arapske zemlje na Pomorskom putu svile: Egipat, Saudijska Arabija, Oman i Jemen. Potencijalni i realizovani troškovi i koristi istražuju se i za Kinu i za arapske zemlje. Dve hipoteze su testirane. Prva je da investicije kineskih kompanija omogućavaju odabranim zemljama da se uključe u međunarodne trgovinske tokove, da diverzifikuju prihode, povećaju proizvodnju i prošire proizvodne asortimane, uz prihvatljive troškove. To je dokazano analizom sektorske raspodele kineskih investicija i trenda ulaganja u određene segmente arapskih privreda, uglavnom van energetskog sektora. Druga hipoteza je da neke ili sve arapske zemlje duž Pomorskog puta svile mogu povećati izvoz u Kinu, uprkos slaboj konkurentnosti, ograničenoj količini i asortimanu proizvoda i visokoj konkurentnosti kineskih proizvoda s druge strane. Primena koeficijenta podudarnosti između arapskog izvoza i uvoza iz Kine pokazala je da arapske zemlje imaju šansu da povećaju samo izvoz nafte i organskih hemikalija u Kinu. Međutim, analiza trgovinske statistike pokazuje dramatično povećanje izvoza mnogih proizvoda koje sama Kina izvozi po znatno konkurentnijim cenama, što je izvan ekonomske logike. Orijentisana ka širim i dugoročnim nacionalnim interesima, Kina čini kompromise u određenim sektorima radi veće koristi u drugom sektoru ili zarad sticanja prednosti višeg reda, poput geostrateških pozicija.

Ključne reči: Pomorski put svile, arapske zemlje, SDI, infrastruktura, spoljna trgovina.

received: 08.01.2020.

accepted: 30.01.2020.

LATIN AMERICA DURING THE FIRST TWO DECADES OF THE 20TH CENTURY: SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES

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Abstract: The authors are considering the complex socio-political and economic changes that occurred in Latin America during the first two decades of the 21st century. The starting hypothesis is that during this period, significant internal changes took place within the framework of Latin American regionalism, as well as with the region's relations with the world. All of these changes developed in accordance with the theory of complex interdependence and open regionalism that relies on neoliberal reforms. Furthermore, the authors have identified external variables that had directly influenced Latin American internal economic, political, and social development. The ideological breakup of the political consensus that existed in this region during the 1990s led to the emergence of new models of integration, cooperation with other blocs in the world, but also to the appearance of the first Latin American emerging power (Brazil). However, the most significant changes occurred in South America, where non-traditional political regimes, including the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, came to power at the beginning of the 21st century. All these regimes were defined as politically and economically anti-neoliberal but trying to adopt new state measures in order to solve deep social crises that convulsed the basis of Latin American democracy. When analyzing these events, the authors define two periods, taking into consideration the election results for evaluating the ideological changes and their consequences. The conclusion is that, at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century, and after the end of the election cycles in 15 countries of the region, there is a relatively balanced division of power between the progressive so-called leftist regimes and the rightist ones, which were in the majority in the second decade of the 21st century.

Keywords: Latin America, South America, economic and political transition, social crisis, ideological division, integration, new international position.

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SOME INTRODUCTORY NOTES

In order to understand socio-political and economic development tendencies of Latin America and evaluate the first two decades of the twenty-first century, it is necessary to consider internal causes but also external ones derived from transformations that occurred in the frame of the global scenario. The use of the comparative and analytical method would permit us to obtain not only the objective knowledge about the transformations that have taken place in that part of the world during this period but also a better understanding of the complex regional reality and its consequences.

There is no doubt that the end of bipolarity in international relations and the collapse of the corresponding international structure and previously functioning order, including their main actors and dominant ideologies, have caused numerous debates about the challenges of the new international order. In practice, the redefinition of the strategic hegemonies from the previous era and the new political scenario mostly based on neoliberal doctrine have been dominant tendencies. In parallel, national, regional, and global international security models have been in the process of redefinition, including the relativization of the traditional concept of sovereignty (Pajović 2010).

Following the analysis of these changes, it is possible to conclude that the international relations system has been transformed into one of a multipolar structure, division of power, new security models, sources, and individual or group potentials. This phenomenon has caused not only different systemic and structural changes but also the new multidimensional impact, both on global and regional levels. Our analysis indicates that this phenomenon is also the result of a complex interdependence that has opened new spaces for the emergence and formation of non-traditional power centers. The appearance of new emerging hegemonic actors with strategic capacity and growing economic-financial potentials has led to the formation of new alliances, regional and global models of cooperation and integration, but also rivalries in various parts of the world. In addition, this process is differentiated on subregional, regional, interregional or global levels and based on technological advances, transnationalization of the economy, commerce and socio-political, ideological and cultural changes. However, all these changes resulted from numerous dynamics embraced by globalization and processes, combined therein (Sanauja 2007).

In short, this phenomenon could also be directly linked to the solution of regional crisis outbreaks, military actions initiated in that direction, and the international geoeconomic positioning of a country or a region. Accordingly, a new international panorama has been oscillating between unipolarity and multipolarity, or combining both concepts into a new one named unimultipolarity (Phillips 2017, 82-94). The authors of this study consider that the

concept of uni-multipolarity would be a flexible framework used by the only global superpower of a post bipolar system of international relations in order to continue to maintain a strategy of defending or establishing its hegemony in different parts of the world. In addition, the practice has also shown that in specific situations and occasionally this global power needs the cooperation of other western actors.

In this context, it is important to emphasize that the significance of the West has changed and is currently understood as one of the various international communities composed of a group of countries with different objectives in their foreign policy, societies and governance based on democratic-liberal principles and neoliberal capitalist economies. After the fall of bipolarity, space was opened for the emergence of different types of rivalry or even conflicts within the West. In fact, this new structure of the West is no longer so unified in the age of globalization, given the existence of various conflicts, differences, discrepancies, disputes, economic-commercial and financial rivalry, political-social and cultural hegemonistic tendencies (Pajović 2015, 114-131).

This issue has generated significant discussions about the potential and ideological-political, economic and cultural character of the US as the only superpower from a previous historical period but with global activity. Meanwhile, also, in Latin America, there have been different opinions, positions and important analysis. For example, there is a consideration that the world is in the process of deep transformations, moving between globalization and de-globalization, the US and other emerging global leaders trying to lead the so-called “post-Western world.” In the report of the Center for Analysis and Dissemination of Paraguayan Economy (CADEP), there is also a consideration of the growing discrepancy between the existing order with many problems in functioning and another one in a forming process but challenging its power division and especially its leadership positions.

TRANSFORMED LATIN AMERICA CHALLENGES THE 21ST CENTURY

The initial hypothesis about the socio-political and economic development of Latin America, in the first two decades of the 21st century, is based on the evidence that after the neoliberal reform undertaken during the last two decades of the 20th century, the manifested ideological fragmentation caused significant changes in Latin American regionalism. In addition, the authors’ suggestion is to understand the concept of Latin American regionalism as a common strategy for the launching of many subregional and regional initiatives in the field of cooperation and integration. This trend was based on political affinity, geographic proximity, the same or very similar models of economic and social developments,

religious, cultural and linguistic similarities. Finally, our initial hypothesis is completed by the statement that the complex interdependence theory is the best theoretical framework for studying this phenomenon.

In accordance with the above-explained elements of our main hypothesis, it is necessary to underline that internal and external variables have had a direct influence on the course and the content of development processes in Latin America. In reality, the connection between these two variables and their interactions permitted us to identify different ideological trends that conditioned the socio-political and economic reconfiguration of Latin America directly at the beginning of the 21st century. Accordingly, it was possible to make a periodization of the development of Latin American regionalism into two phases: the first, influenced by the neoliberal school and, the second, as a result of the reaction of Latin American societies to the negative consequences of neoliberal economic reform. In any case, the sociopolitical and economic situation and trends in the region have to be studied keeping in mind the impacts of these consequences on further deepening of social disparities, the strengthening of social tensions, and the increasing of the overall poverty.

There is no doubt that the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century was the new and favourable period for intensive socio-political development and diversification of regional cooperation and integration. The concept of open regionalism was adopted as the strategy for democratic and economic transition with the parallel restructuring of national and regional agendas to achieve a more pragmatic and effective insertion into a system of international relations. High level of complex interdependence, manifested within the framework of the new open Latin-American regionalism, has substantially modified its political, economic, social, financial, scientific and technological, environmental, cultural or educational reality. For example, Professor Helio Jaguaribe, a internationally recognized Brazilian expert in international relations, insisted in his reflections about the place of Latin America in the era of globalization that the new model of integration is the only possible instrument for Latin American countries to compensate for the hegemonistic effects of globalization and unilateral aspirations of the US government. According to Jaguaribe, Latin American regionalism has to be based on regional and subregional integration models. However, he underlined that the actual situation, the potential and the perspectives of each country must be taken into consideration due to profound differences existing between South America, Mexico or Central America and the Caribbean. Certainly, he underlined that these new tendencies would probably lead to the fragmentation within the framework of the traditional Latin American regionalism, indicating that the future of South America will depend on the potential for a stable and reliable strategic alliance between Brazil and Argentina (Jaguaribe 2006). This prediction of future

development trends in Latin America emphasizes a dynamic differentiation on the subregional level, which would inevitably lead to the strengthening of interregional cooperation. Starting from this analysis and prediction, we believe that it would be necessary to follow the modifications of the development corridors in the region and, in particular, in South America, where IIRSA (The Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America) was established in 2000 as the first model of integration in the field of physical infrastructure.

Anyhow, we could add that this is also a period when numerous cooperation and integration agreements have been signed in the field of trade liberalization, together with new economic, political and social integration projects. Within this process, it was also possible to identify some unique experiences, such as the participation of one country in various regional or subregional integration initiatives and, in parallel, in those initiated with other regions in the world. For example, during that period, Mexico concluded a record of 50 Free Trade Agreements, including countries from three different continents (America, Asia, Europe), thus taking second place on the global level in this activity. These agreements are very important for the Mexican economy - 11th largest in the world, according to the Forbes Report Best Countries for Business in 2019 - because of reducing barriers to trade, tariffs and import quotas. Among the most important are: NAFTA (now transformed into USMCA); the Treaty of Transpacific Association; European Union - Mexico Trade Agreement; EFTA Free Trade Agreement; Mexico - Central America Free Trade Agreement; The Pacific Alliance; Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement; Mexico-Israel Free Trade Agreement, etc.

In conclusion, we can detect this very dynamic geoeconomic redesign of Latin America to be understood and analyzed as a multilevel process that encompasses different subregional, regional and inter-regional interactions, as well as those established with other regions or countries outside of Latin America. This process was based on the strict implementation of the neoliberal doctrine, controlled initially by the new and redefined state institutions with their remarkably reduced responsibilities during constitutional reforms undertaken as an important element of the democratic transition that occurred in the 1990s of the last century. In fact, the neoliberal redefinition of the welfare state model – which existed in Latin America previously - restricted quite numerous state prerogatives and instruments. Consequently, in this transitional period, there emerged new sociopolitical and economic actors, among which we emphasized the significance of non-state (non-governmental) actors, such as specialized agencies and institutes, banks, national and transnational companies, private foundations, universities, etc.

On the other side, nearly all of these integration initiatives were based on the need to formulate, adopt, promote and implement a new development model for Latin American countries, according to the suggestions of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), presented in the following very important documents: *Transformation of Production and More Equitable Distribution* (1990), *Sustainable Development: Production Transformation* (1991) and *Open Regionalism in Latin America – Economic Integration in the Service of Production Transformation and More Equitable Distribution* (1994). ECLAC explained this concept as the result of the new integration processes arisen from the increasing complex interdependence and the political affinity between Latin American countries. This trend was also stimulated by their economic similarities, the complementary level of economic development, market forces and by a series of specific intergovernmental agreements aiming at the establishment of various free zones throughout Latin America. Anyhow, it is also necessary to emphasize that this process was oriented to harmonize various regional interdependencies that resulted from trade liberalization and the implementation of the free market economy model. This observation points to the fact that open regionalism differs from the process of trade liberalization and the indiscriminate export promotion, having in mind that it contains integration mechanisms based on geographic advantages (proximity) and cultural unity (Klaveren 2018). This analytical framework made it possible to study the process of redefinition of the already existing integrative models in the region as well as the new ones, which were launched after the neoliberal reform. Additionally, it is important to note that the concept of open regionalism and the open market economy model appeared at the beginning of the 1990s when ECLAC tried to explain and direct integration processes conceptually in the light of NAFTA, the transformation of the Andean Pact into the Andean Community of Nations, MERCOSUR and individual experiences in the application of the neoliberal policy of trade liberalization.

During this period, a new geoeconomic structure was established, in accordance with the priorities of economic development, and subregional and regional integration in Latin America. The most significant representatives of this new development cycle were the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) or, for example, the Ibero-American Community of Nations (CIN) and Association of Caribbean States (ACS). Later, in 2001, the Bolivarian Alternative for Our America (ALBA) was founded. In any case, each of these initiatives introduced very important geoeconomic, political and ideological transformations of great impact both on a regional and international scope. It is also important to indicate that these integration initiatives were of the subregional and regional types, but some of them included the entire

American continent, or even linking Latin America with the Iberian Peninsula (Pajović 2008, 95-103).

For example, when analyzing the FTA in terms of the traditional integration theory, it is observable that it includes only trade liberalization and the methods and instruments for further flexibilization of the so-called trade-related issues. On the other hand, the FTA excluded any development planning or a strategy proceeding directly to tariff dismantling without a proper transitional adjustment period or an announcement of another developmental stage in order to achieve superior forms of integration. In summary, the analysis of the content of the FTAs shows definitely the predominance of commercial issues and the absence of any concern or measure for the promotion of equity. The authors of this study believe that this FTA dominant feature proposed by the US has caused resentment and indignation in Latin America, especially in those countries where progressive regimes have been in power.²

Furthermore, the analysis shows that this kind of project is characterized by an evident inequality between the US and Latin American volume of the economy and, especially, the technological capacities. According to Professor María de Monserrat Llairó - from the Faculty of Economic Sciences, the University of Buenos Aires - the existing great asymmetry among North American and Latin American companies in the field of financial resources, technological level of development and management capacity would unavoidably lead to “exclusionary specialization”. In practice, this situation would give to North American companies full control and command over all sectors of the added value, leaving a small space for South American companies as raw material and unprocessed agricultural products suppliers. Professor Llairó concluded that the FTA project is undoubtedly of a neoliberal character, which provides access of better and cheap North American products to the Latin American consumer society.

Finally, in regards to the new integration models that appeared in the Latin American region, we could underline that the most important of those were the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). Despite the differences existing between the member countries, it was obvious that the main objective was the strengthening of political cooperation on the governmental level in order to increase the Latin American negotiating position and power vis-à-vis its external partners (Falomir

² In Latin American political history the term progressive could be used to determine those political regimes which implemented new economic, social, educational and cultural measures in order to achieve faster economic and social development and incorporation of marginalized sectors of societies into political, economic, social and cultural emancipation. These regimes were of different ideological origins.

Lockhart 2013). It was a new strategy for a more successful international positioning and a more autonomous status in globalization (López-Aranda 2018). Nevertheless, we have to remember that the regulation of the trade that had the central role in the concept of traditional Latin American regionalism - during the so-called postliberal phase - is presented now as secondary, but not ignored since it has been an important element of integration. In addition, it is necessary to underline that the exclusion of the US and Canada from this process permits us to consider that the intention of the new Latin American regionalism is an alternative to the hemispheric regionalism launched by the US. Those integrative initiatives after the collapse of negotiations within the FTA initiated by the US have to be understood as a return to the traditional regional integration schemes, especially MERCOSUR - as a pillar of the entire integration network in Latin America and, in particular, in South America.

When considering the external variables that influenced and conditioned the overall development of Latin America during this period, it should be emphasized that progressive interaction between external and internal variables have produced various consequences and results in economic, political, commercial, technological, educational and cultural spheres. In this context, several important facts should be taken into consideration. Firstly, we have to note that the international position of Latin America in the first decade of the 21st century was remarkably strengthened by a successful economic and political transition, the implementation of a new development model that was compatible with the demands of globalization, including a high level of internationalization in the banking sector, production and trading strategies. In short, these structural changes were followed by increasing and diversifying of subregional, regional and inter-regional integration (Riggirozzi & Tussie 2012). Obviously, all these changes have made Latin America an increasingly attractive partner for cooperation and foreign investments. Secondly, there are several new and very important characteristics when analyzing Latin America's international position: the emergence of new political and economic partners, redefinition of relations with traditional hegemonic centers in the world, and the institutionalization of the new forms of cooperation with other economic and political blocs. The results of these dynamic processes are non-traditional alliances such as BRICS, G20, IBAS (Forum of Dialogue - India, Brazil and South Africa), the Asia-Pacific region, APEC, China, the European Union, etc.

It has to be said that there are opinions about China as one of the most relevant commercial and strategic partners of Latin America. This fact is relatively new and has caused a rivalry with the US and the EU by disrupting their global interests in this part of the world. The case of China is very special due to some new forms of cooperation, presence and influence. The principal fields of cooperation are the energy sector, copper, agriculture and food products and

commodities in general. The Chinese strategy towards Latin American countries also includes the establishment of a joint oil company with Venezuela, a significant number of investments in different projects in Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean countries. In addition, at the beginning of 2004, China became one of the major trading partners of MERCOSUR. On the other side, China notably increased imports from Latin America by 600%, and investments to nearly a billion dollars per year (Pajović 2013).

To recapitulate, China also sent some twenty military missions to several Latin American countries, demonstrating its intention to include this region in the Chinese global security and defense strategy even though Latin America is not the priority of the Belt and Road Initiative (2013). The main regional partners have been Brazil, Venezuela and Bolivia. Recently, and due to its geographic position, Suriname also appeared as a Chinese partner for the launching of satellites and spacecraft. Parallel to all these initiatives, it is important to underline that China continues steadily to maintain its presence in Cuba having a base for observing the US. In any case, Cuba has become the Chinese most important strategic partner in the Caribbean subregion. Finally, according to some experts in Latin American politics, the Chinese presence in this part of the world, despite its extremely pragmatic strategy, will primarily depend on the political situation in the region and especially on the leftist and populist regimes.

Other significant external variables with differentiated influences, reduced to some fields of cooperation and parts of the Latin American territory, represent Russia, Japan, South Korea, India, Turkey and, recently, Africa. Each of these countries has progressively strengthened its influence in specific areas of cooperation and a country or a subregion within Latin America. In conclusion, it can be stated that two particularly important consequences of the interactions between internal and external variables are the new development model of Latin American regionalism and the dynamic transformation of Brazil into an emerging power with global projections and activities. It is also the first time in the history of international relations that a Latin American country has emerged with broader global interests and pretensions.

The case of Brazil should be analyzed separately because, in this period, it has been the only Latin American country which has manifested sufficient potential strategy for activities and operations as a state with a status of a newly emerging power, being, at the same time, the center of regional hegemony, but with global interests and aspirations. This transformation process took place in the 1990s, and especially in the first decade of the 21st century. During this period, Brazil gained dominance and leadership in the Latin American region, and especially in South America. Brazil's domination over the entire region was

often faced with challenges by other regional actors, such as Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, the US and some alliances, but not always with similar ambitions.

Starting with January 2003 and during the two mandates of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil successfully implemented the strategy of establishing close cooperation with Africa. The strategic partnership established with Africa's states allowed Brazil to achieve a significant scope of cooperation in the fields of technology, energy, direct investments, as well as to provide help and knowledge to reduce poverty and hunger on this continent. Nevertheless, cultural ties were very important, having in mind the historical heritage established during colonial times. In addition, almost one half of Brazilians are of African descent, from slaves imported from Africa. African culture is a significant and organic part of Brazilian culture and identity: music, dance and the mix of religions and rituals, languages, etc. Finally, this historical heritage and close links have been additionally strengthened and diversified by the institutionalization of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa – CPLP) - with the following members: Portugal, Brazil, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor.

To conclude, the successful and progressive international positioning of Brazil is based on a significant human and territorial potential, a huge diversity of natural resources, energy potentials, experience in industrial production and distribution of biofuels, important technological advance and the possession of the last remaining rainforest (ecopower). During this period, the main characteristics of the accelerated economic and technological development of Brazil were its important advances in these fields and their application into production. The rapid development of the aircraft industry should also be noted, placing it among the most developed in the world. This is followed by the automobile, computer-IT and complex electrical and electronic appliance industries.

On the other side, the international position of Brazil is different in comparison to Russia, India or China, members of BRICS, with which it is often compared. There is no doubt that Brazil has the significant geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages of being surrounded by weaker and smaller states with common historical heritage from the colonial period, of having a developing liberal democracy in a stable phase, being in the vicinity of the US, and not being exhausted by wars, being an impressive global exporter, the leading MERCOSUR country, a member of the G-20 (developing countries), a member of BRICS, yet, also facing great problems in the domain of microeconomic reforms, the creation of a more adequate tax system and equalization, and trying to increase the annual growth (Pajović & Ivanović 2011).

THE CYCLE OF CRISIS OF THE SO-CALLED NEW LEFT AND THE RETURN OF THE RIGHTIST PARTIES TO POWER IN LATIN AMERICA

As it was explained, solving social problems and, especially poverty, has become a multidimensional challenge for new regimes. However, it was on their agenda as a priority not only to assure and assist with basic living resources to a significant part of the population but also, even more importantly, the objective was to resolve the historical phenomenon of socio-economic marginalization and ethno-linguistic discrimination (Roth/Manke 2018). When analyzing the undertaken reform measures in Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile or Argentina, it is observable that the so-called moderate leftist governments (Brazil, Chile, Argentina) were able to achieve and maintain a more stable and sustainable model of development than more radical and revolutionary regimes in Venezuela, or the government in Bolivia led by an indigenous leader. Moderate governments adopted economic and financial measures that generated solid economic growth, reducing poverty and inequality. These innovative social programs, although fiscally difficult to sustain, were based on the respect of the fundamental principles of the market economy and liberal democracy. In contrast to these experiences are the more radical and revolutionary regimes in power, led by Chaves and Morales. The strategy of the Bolivarian Revolution, for example, was to strengthen and expand state interventionism, with parallel inclusion of the principle of popular participation and direct democracy. Despite some short term and very important economic and social successes, this revolutionary strategy, renamed as the 21st Century Socialism, provoked severe internal and external conflicts, completely ignoring traditional democratic principles and, finally falling into a deep crisis because of the inability of its institutions to ensure the economic and institutional sustainability of the model. In the case of Bolivia, the regime managed to provide relatively high rates of economic growth, employment, modernization, especially in rural areas, inhabited by the indigenous population. Nevertheless, it fell into a deep constitutional crisis due to electoral manipulation and the unconstitutional running for office by the former president for the third time.

Some Latin American political analysts say that, by the end of President Barack Obama's second term, the leftist regimes in that part of the world began to lose elections or fall into a deep crisis (Espejel Pineda 2018, 69-84). In parallel, almost all integrational models established at that time by left-wing governments began to show signs of lagging and stagnation (UNASUR, CELAC and ALBA). On the other hand, new models of integration inspired anew by neo-liberalism have emerged: the Pacific Alliance, founded by Mexico, Columbia, Peru and Chile. This is how the right-wing regimes regained power, using leftist failures and

popular resentment due to economic downturns, resulting partly from the ripple effects of the global financial crisis, as well as big and politicized corruption scandals, political influence of powerful ultraconservative circles and movements, expanding influence of financial capital and the US diplomatic support and aid to the right-wing parties (Rossi 2017). Other factors also accelerated this process, such as the military coup in Honduras (2009), the parliamentary coup d'état against President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2012) or, more recently, the one against the Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff (2016). After the impeachment process, Vice President Michel Temer took power in 2016, and the extreme right-wing conservative and Senator Jair Bolsonaro became the President of Brazil in 2018. Meanwhile, in 2015, the Peronists lost power through elections after 12 years in power, and a new political stage in Argentina was initiated by Mauricio Macri, the leader of the right-wing parties and movements. In Chile, the conservative Sebastián Piñera came to power after the socialist President Michelle Bachelet in 2017. Finally, in November 2019, Evo Morales, the first indigenous president in the political history of Bolivia and the last survivor of South American leftist socio-political and economic transformation, was forced to leave the country after disputed elections and the outbreaks of violence and conflicts in the country.

In order to explain this profound political change in Latin America, analysts have pointed to several facts that possibly could have had an impact on this phenomenon. Here are some of them that are important and should be taken into consideration: the election of Donald Trump in the US and a dose of fear and uncertainty that this event caused in Latin America (Yákovlev 2017), the strengthening of right-wing populism and neo-nationalism in Europe, the increasing influence of evangelical Christian communities in Latin America and especially in Brazil, where those numerous religious communities are strongly conservative and socially very influential, as well as the Venezuelan crisis with all its consequences in the field of migrations, political instability of the region, or even the danger of a foreign military intervention.

Furthermore, in 2017 all right-wing governments in Latin America and the Caribbean (12) established the so-called Lima Group in Peru adopting a declaration about a “rupture“ of the “democratic order” and “violation of human rights” in Venezuela. The Lima Group focused exclusively on Venezuela and its internal problems, its financial crisis, social tensions in the society, increasing poverty, food and medication shortages, the international consequences of this crisis, taking into consideration the fact that China, Russia, Turkey and Iran are significant partners of this revolutionary regime. Besides, the Lima Group is ignoring other countries in the region where human rights and democracy are threatened, some of them being members of the group and governed by right-wing parties. To summarize, the US is not officially part of the group, but the

US has high level representatives attending nearly all of its meetings. In any case, the establishment of this alliance of right-wing parties in power indicates a strengthening of conservatism, further isolation of Cuba, and the increasing of the US influence on political movements in Latin America.

To directly influence the political tendencies in South America, mostly right-wing governments have recently formed a group called Forum for the Progress and Development of South America (Prosur). The group was founded by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, and Peru, and it represents essentially the anti-UNASUR strategy, accusing it of supporting and being too sympathetic to the revolutionary government in Venezuela. Taking into account the fact that the right-wing neo-liberal ideology is again present in the economic integration network in this region, with the establishment of the Pacific Alliance, one can expect an alignment and coordination of activities of the Lima, Prosur and Pacific Alliance groups, which would further strengthen the influence of this ideology.

It is well known that the Pacific Alliance is a model of regional integration launched in 2011 by Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The main objectives are to build a deeply integrated system that would provide free movement of goods, services, resources and people. But even more important is the aim to become a platform for political articulation, economic and commercial integration and projection into the world, with the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. Various prominent experts on Latin American integration issues believe that this group has initiated its activities successfully and very pragmatically, bringing Latin American regionalism back into the fragmentation phase due to the ideological differences regarding the model of economic development, but also of integration itself (Godoy López 2019, 85-98).

It is evident that the political mosaic of Latin America was ideologically enriched with the creation of the Puebla Group in July 2019. This group emerged to oppose, from the perspective of a regional unit, the neoliberal governments that took over in Latin America. Its objectives are to lead and bring together regional progressive thinkers, parties or movements, including the attitudes and opinions of the Sao Paulo Forum and UNASUR. In fact, the Puebla Group opposes neoliberalism by blaming it for the lack of growth, more equitable distribution of GDP, the increasing of social inequalities, the insisting on individualism and the concentration of wealth in very limited social circles. Therefore, no adequate answer could be given to the demands of the wider and poor sections of society. Historically, the Sao Paulo Forum (FSP) represents a very important and positivist incentive in the domain of organizing the Left in Latin America. In fact, the FSP is the conference of leftist political parties, organizations and movements from Latin America and the Caribbean. It was launched by the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) in 1990. At that time, the objective

was to debate the challenges of the new international scenario after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and also the consequences of the implementation of neoliberal policies adopted by the right-wing governments in the region.

FINAL REMARKS

Taking all these facts into consideration, we may conclude that the political panorama of Latin America is significantly more complicated at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century than in the previous two, which we have analyzed in this paper. The election results showed that in Latin America the regimes with different ideological orientations do coexist, which inevitably leads to a reduction in political affinities, a consensus regarding the economic development and integration models, but also problems in security issues in the region. Even though right-wing political forces are in power in the majority of Latin American countries - led by Brazil's extreme-rightist President Jair Bolsonaro - it is visible that this political block is not homogeneous due to the existing differences: extreme right, right and center-right parties. Certain differences between right-wing governments have materialized regarding many issues, particularly in foreign policy questions: the crisis in Venezuela and the possibility of a foreign military intervention taking place, the relations with the US and the further strengthening of its presence in Latin America, China as one of the most important strategic partners of Latin America and the political approach and attitudes towards the crisis hotspots in the world. In terms of internal politics, there are considerable differences, and let us just state that during the deep social crisis in Chile, the conservative President Sebastián Piñera was forced to reach a consensus in the Parliament with all political parties over constitutional changes that would guarantee a new social policy. In short, all right-wing governments will face, as their main obstacle, the increasing social dissatisfaction and differences which resulted from the application of the neoliberal model of development.

On the other side, the political changes in Mexico and Argentina, two very significant states in the region, were decisive for the strengthening of the so-called Latin American Left. No doubt it was an incentive for further promotion of progressive ideas at a time when the neoliberal model has already entered a crisis, demonstrating also its economic stagnation. With regard to Mexico and Argentina, we must point out that these two countries are also influential in the broader international context, given the fact that they are G20 members, Mexico is the 15th economy in the world and Argentina, despite the crisis, being the third economy in the region, is ranked 26th in the world. In addition, Mexico has free trade agreements with the US and Canada, the EU and 50 other countries in the world, while Argentina is the only member of MERCOSUR that does not belong

to the right. The ideological bloc also includes Costa Rica, El Salvador and Panama, where left-wing parties are in power, which will surely strengthen progressive initiatives in Latin America.

In conclusion, the first two decades of the 21st century showed a more heterogeneous and fragmented political structure of Latin America (Yákovlev 2016). During this period, we had a turn to the left and another to the right, but the complicated and antagonistic political-ideological range has endured. Considering ideologies of the political parties existing in Latin America, they could be catalogued as follows: the revolutionary and authoritarian left, the center-left, the center, the right, the center-right, and the only case of the extreme right - in Brazil.

It is also important to note that some of the new political leaders have shown a completely new model of taking part in politics during the election campaign. This refers especially to Nayib Bukele, the new and young president of El Salvador, who exclusively used social networks during the election campaign, showing the inability of traditional parties and state institutions to adapt to the changes and demands of society, and especially of the younger generations. According to Professor Malamud, this new practice indicates a great advantage and a lack of populism because it was transformed into digital populism, capable of establishing a direct relationship between the populist leader and the voter. Due to this possibility, the voter makes his decision independently of the traditional institutional channels (Malamud y Nuñez 2019, 1-10).

In addition, external variables will also influence the internal development of the region and its international position. It was mentioned earlier that apart from the US' strengthened influence, it is possible to detect a strategic presence of China and Russia, as well as the emergence of other economic and financial partners, such as the EU, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, India, South Africa, etc. The presence of other important world actors in Latin America could alleviate the US hegemony and prevent its military and unilateral interventions, as it has happened in the case of Venezuela.

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LATINSKA AMERIKA TOKOM PRVE DVE DEKADE 20. VEKA: SOCIOPOLITIČKE I EKONOMSKE PROMENE

Apstrakt: Autori se bave složenim društveno-političkim i ekonomskim promenama koje su se dogodile u Latinskoj Americi tokom prve dve dekade XXI veka. Polazna je hipoteza autora da je u tom periodu u okvirima latinskoameričkog regionalizma došlo do značajnih unutrašnjih promena, kao i u odnosu regiona sa svetom. Sve ove promene odigrale su se u skladu sa teorijom složene međuzavisnosti i otvorenog regionalizma koji se oslanja na neoliberalne reforme. Nadalje, autori su identifikovali i spoljne varijable koje su direktno uticale na unutrašnji razvoj Latinske Amerike s obzirom na činjenicu da je došlo do duboke ideološke diferencijacije po pitanju ekonomskog, političkog i društvenog razvoja. Ideološko raslojavanje političkog konsenzusa koji je postojao u regionu tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka doveo je i do pojave novih modela integracije, saradnje sa drugim blokovima u svetu ali i do pojave prve latinskoameričke sile u nastajanju (Brazil). Najznačajnije promene ipak su se dogodile u okvirima Južne Amerike gde su početkom XXI veka na vlast došli netradicionalni politički režimi, uključujući i Bolivarijanski revolucionarni u Venezueli. Svi ovi režimi bili su naglašeno protiv neoliberalizma kao političke i ekonomske doktrine pokušavajući da usvajanjem novih mera države pokrenu rešavanje duboke ekonomske krize koja je uzdrimala temelje latinskoameričke demokratije. U analizi ovih događaja autori su definisali dva perioda i na osnovu izbornih rezultata evaluirali ideološke promene i njihove posledice. Zaključak je da na početku treće decenije XXI veka i nakon okončanja izbornih ciklusa u 15 zemalja regiona dolazi do relativno uravnotežene podele vlasti između progresivnih levičarskih režima i desničarskih koji su bili u većini u drugoj deceniji XXI veka.

Ključne reči: Latinska Amerika, Južna Amerika, ekonomsko-politička tranzicija, socijalna kriza, ideološko raslojavanje, integracija, novi međunarodni položaj.

received: 31.01.2020.

accepted: 03.03.2020.

UDC 341.123
Bibliid 0543-3657, 71 (2020)
Vol. LXXI, No. 1177, pp. 42–60
review paper

THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ENCROACHMENT ON THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER UN BODIES- THE FUTURE OR THE BREAKDOWN OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

Jelica GORDANIĆ¹

Abstract: In recent decades, the encroachment of the Security Council on the competence and jurisdiction of the General Assembly and other UN bodies is noticeable. The encroachment indicates the tendency of the Security Council to broaden, arbitrarily, the definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly with respect to thematic debates on social, humanitarian, economic, and development issues. Thematic debates on AIDS, climate change and human rights had caused the anger of the Member States and raised a question about the jurisdiction of the Security Council comparing to the other UN bodies like the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The encroachment of the Security Council might have positive aspects in the development and popularization of the human security concept within the United Nations. The author concludes that the encroachment of the Security Council causes more damage than good effects for the United Nations. It shows a lack of coordination between main bodies, stagnation, and the marginalization of other main bodies in the UN system and arbitrarily boarding of “a threat to peace” and “the maintenance of international peace and security”.

Key words: the Security Council, encroachment, the General Assembly, threat to peace, AIDS, climate change, human security.

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2020”, financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

INTRODUCTION

The Security Council is a body primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security within the UN system. In the first decade of the UN, due to the Security Council's often veto abuse, academics have been wondering "whether the Security Council is fated to become like the human appendix, an atrophied organ with no useful function to perform (...) or that perhaps will be changed in any case by an improvement in the state of international relations." (Goodrich, 1958, p. 273) (Non) activities of the Security Council during the 1990s and 2000s, controversial admissions to the UN membership, scandals, and manipulations relating to peacekeeping operations as well as the controversial cooperation with certain regional organizations have cast a shadow over its reputation. In the legal literature the Security Council has been characterized as "increasingly intrusive and proactive (...) a superpower organ with contrasting aspirations of the majority of the members of the UN" (Rath, 2006, p. 61), "an oligarchic" and "an exclusive club" (Dimitrijević, 2009, p. 11). The Security Council has been compared with "an international police officer who has been centralized the application of international law" (Jovanović, 2015, p. 61).

The UN Charter contains no provision limiting the scope of the Security Council's actions regarding the General Assembly and other UN main bodies. Over the years, the UN member states have noticed the encroachment of the Security Council on the competence and jurisdiction of the General Assembly and the other UN bodies. The "encroachment" indicates the tendency of the Security Council to "broaden, arbitrarily, the definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, particularly with respect to thematic debates touching on social, humanitarian, or economic and development issues." (Sievers&Daws, 2014, p. 582) The Security Council has tried to justify this kind of practice, stating that discussions and actions on economic, humanitarian, and social issues are only considered within their importance for international peace and security.

The encroachment of the Security Council might be considered as a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, reduction of the authority of the other UN bodies as well as diminishing the Member States rights based on the UN membership. Also, the encroachment makes disagreements between the UN members. Developing countries consider encroachment as an abusive practice with the aim to strengthen the power of the Security Council. (Zifcak, 2009, p. 46) On the other side, the most developed countries have strategies and plans on considering social, humanitarian and developing issues within the Security Council in the future (Dröge, 2018, p. 1-7).

When did the encroachment of the Security Council begin, and what might be the consequences? Can the encroachment develop a new vision of the Security

Council and cause new directions and new aspects of the role of the Security Council? Is the encroachment just an (unhappy) phase within the Security Council? What are the consequences of the encroachment on the other UN bodies and their relation with the Security Council? These are some of the questions that require answers.

HOW DID IT ALL BEGIN?

During the first fifty years of its functioning, the Security Council was considering the maintenance of international peace and security. Pursuant to this authority, it may “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (UN Charter, article 39) and then “decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN Charter, article 39). With time, it has shown that among the permanent members of the Security Council “no consensus exists on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security and there is no agreement on how to respond even to those threats on which it does agree.” (Benard & Leaf, 2010, p. 1397) Acting under article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council has rarely determined the existence of a “breach of the peace” or “act of aggression”. It has normally considered it sufficient to determine a threat to the peace.

The concept of a threat to the peace has tended to expand over the years. The “expanded version” of a threat to the peace now covers “humanitarian emergencies, the overthrow of democratically elected leaders, extreme repression of civilian populations and cross-border refugee flows threatening regional security, and failure to hold perpetrators of major atrocities accountable” (Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, 2006, p. 32).

The late 20th century and early 21st century brought new global threats to international peace and security- terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, pandemics (AIDS), climate change and human rights. Many UN members expressed reservations about involving the Security Council in issues like climate change, AIDS and especially human rights, having in mind that such practice would result in the encroachment on the role of other organs such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, as well as interference in sovereign state affairs.

The Security Council and the AIDS problem

The encroachment on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies began with the Security Council’s debate on the impact of AIDS on peace and security in

Africa in 2000. Reflecting on some earlier discussions within the USA, the USA administration was behind the first major claim that AIDS was a security threat on the global level. The key moment in this process was the USA presidency of the Security Council in January 2000. During a month-long focus on Africa, the Security Council met to discuss the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa. Richard Holbrooke, then USA ambassador to the UN, played the central role in getting the issue on the Security Council's agenda. (McInnes & Rushton, 2010, p. 226-227)

Al Gore, the then vice president of the USA, during the AIDS debate, thanked the members of the Security Council for “their willingness to greet the dawn of this new millennium by exploring a brand-new definition of world security” emphasizing that “after more than 4,000 meetings stretching back more than half a century, the Security Council will discuss a health issue as a security threat.” (Security Council Press Release, 10 January 2000).

Academics have been wondering if the choice of the words “security threat” instead of “threat to peace” was deliberate. (de Wet, 2004, p. 173) If AIDS might be considered as a “security threat”, the Security Council would only be able to take binding action in terms of Chapter VII if the “threat to security” simultaneously amounted to a “threat to peace”. Many member states during the debate considered AIDS as a “threat to peace”. The representative of Argentina stated that a threat to peace should include a threat to human security and need not relate to the absence of war. Having in mind the fact that about 10 times more people in Africa died of AIDS in 1999 than in armed conflicts, some Member States considered that peace and security did not mean the absence of military conflict. It depended upon the socioeconomic realities of the nations (de Wet, 2004, pp. 173-174).

As a result of the debate, the Security Council adopted unanimously Resolution 1308 in July 2000. This was the first resolution to address the impact of AIDS worldwide. In the Resolution 1308, the Security Council encourages all interested Member States “to consider developing, in cooperation with the international community and UNAIDS, where appropriate, effective long-term strategies for HIV/AIDS education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment of their personnel, as an important part of their preparation for their participation in peacekeeping operations.”

Although adopted unanimously, Resolution 1308 had shown disagreement, even between the Security Council members. Russia, China and France were all initially opposed to discussing AIDS in the Security Council, although they were ultimately persuaded to support this Resolution. (McInnes & Rushton, 2010, p. 230)

The United Kingdom had certain doubts when it comes to the adoption of Resolution 1308. In the last days of negotiation over the text of Resolution 1308, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was concerned about the danger of exceeding the role of the Security Council. A telegram from the FCO to the mission in New York stated: “We remain concerned that the text as it stands does not obviously fall within the Security Council’s competence (...) Nevertheless, you should continue to support the US by shortening and amending the text” (McInnes & Rushton, 2010, p. 230).

The formal reason for putting AIDS on the agenda of the Security Council was that it could affect peacekeeping operations. Some Member States had the concept of human security on the mind as a theoretical basis for the AIDS debate in the Security Council.

The debate on AIDS was a controversial step forward of the Security Council and “the first enlargement of the concept of security to include more than an absence of insecurity, or war.” (Piot, 2014) The AIDS debate was at the same time an introduction into the enlargement of the concept of security, step forward to the humanization of the security, and the beginning of the encroachment of the Security Council into the jurisdiction of the General Assembly and other UN bodies.

Climate change and the Security Council

Probably the most famous and so far the most controversial case of the encroachment on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies happened in April 2007 when the Security Council held the first-ever debate on the impact of climate change on peace and security. The debate on climate change was an open debate with the aim of exploring the relationships between energy, security and climate.

Academics and security analysts have been warning for some time that climate change threatens water and food security, the allocation of resources, and coastal populations. In the future, these threats could increase forced migration, raise tensions, and trigger conflicts (Todić & Dimitrijević, 2012). Some academics consider climate change “a far greater threat to the world’s stability than international terrorism” (Brown, Hammill and McLeman, 2007, p. 1143).

The debate on climate change in the Security Council was a result of the lobbying by the United Kingdom, one of the (secret) opponents of the AIDS debate in 2000. The then President of the Security Council, Margaret Beckett, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, opened the debate with the words: “While there was some doubt about whether the Council was the right forum, the Council’s responsibility was the maintenance of international peace and

security, and climate change exacerbated many threats, including conflict and access to energy and food. The international community needed to recognize that there was a security impact from climate change, and begin to build a shared understanding of the relationship between energy, security and climate.” (Security Council Press release, 17 April 2007).

On the one side, the debate on climate change had indicated “general agreement on the importance of the topic”, but on the other side, it had indicated “wide differences in the perceptions of the specific nature of the security-related environmental problems as perceived by different countries” (Population Council, 2007, p. 421).

The Group of 77 accused the Security Council of violating the UN Charter, stating that its primary responsibility was maintaining international peace and security as set out in the Charter. All other issues, including those relating to economic and social development, are assigned by the Charter to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The Group of 77 considered that the Security Council had gone far beyond its mandate. Issues like climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and even terrorism are issues for general membership (Deen, 2007).

Liu Zhenmin, the representative of China in the Security Council, emphasized that “discussions on climate change should be conducted within the framework that allowed participation by all parties. The developing countries believed that the Security Council did not have the expertise and did not allow extensive participation in decision-making. It would not help produce widely acceptable proposals.” (Security Council Press release, 17 April 2007)

Vitaly Churkin, the representative of the Russian Federation, appealed to the international community “to consider the issue of climate change in all its aspects in a comprehensive manner and within the appropriate international forums, such as the World Meteorological Organization, the General Assembly and the Commission on Sustainable Development, among others. The Security Council should only deal with issues directly under its mandate.” (Security Council Press release, 17 April 2007)

Egypt’s representative expressed concern that the subject of climate change debate lay clearly and squarely within the realm and mandate of other bodies of the United Nations system, especially the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The Security Council’s encroachment on the mandates and responsibilities of other United Nations bodies, as well as indifference to the repeated cause demands by the Member States to put an end to that dangerous and unjustified practice. Also, the representative of South Africa expressed the opinion that the climate change debate did not fall within the mandate of the

Council and would be better addressed in other forums. (Security Council Press release, 17 April 2007)

On the other side, the climate change debate in the Security Council had received a lot of support from small island states. The Maldives expressed support for the debate considering that it is necessary to draw the world's attention to the urgency of climate change and its consequences. States of the Pacific Islands Forum emphasized that since no island was more than a few meters above the water, a sea-level increase of as little as half a meter would completely inundate those island States and threaten their populations. The Pacific Islands Forum expects from the Security Council "to keep the issue of climate change under continuous review" (Security Council Press release, 17 April 2007).

Another open debate on climate change was held in July 2011. The initiator of this debate was Germany. This debate had also caused the counterwork of many UN members. Raphael Archondo, representative of Bolivia in the Security Council emphasized that "climate change was a real threat to humanity and Mother Earth. But the Council should not deal with it because some of the main emitters of global greenhouse gases were permanent Council members and they had the right to veto." (Security Council Meeting Coverage, 20 July 2011) Besides the concern that the Security Council's discussion on climate change had undermined the mandate of other UN organs, the member states consider that the agenda is already too extensive and the Security Council should be directed to resolve existing crises before addressing future-oriented ones (Lappin, 2015).

The Security Council held a debate on "Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks" in July 2018. (UN News, 25 January 2019). In January 2019, the Security Council held one more debate on climate change. The initiative for this debate comes from the Dominican Republic.

Despite the opposition of numerous Member States, the Security Council continues with the encroachment on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies when it comes to climate change. Germany holds a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2019 and 2020, and it has announced that climate fragility will be one of its priorities. Having in mind mixed interest of the Security Council members' in climate change, Germany announced three challenges:

- adding value for all parties involved (the vulnerable developing countries as well as the permanent five countries in the Security Council);
- matching ambitions with resources (Germany's credibility as a climate policy leader needs to be maintained and engagement needs to be pushed at the highest level possible);
- managing expectations on possible Security Council progress on this non-traditional security issue in the next two years (Dröge, 2018, p. 1).

Human rights and the Security Council

Another example of the encroachment on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies was the Security Council's meeting on "Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Human Rights and the Prevention of Armed Conflict" on 18 April 2017. It was the first time the Council discussed human rights thematically.

Nikki Haley, the representative of the United States, said that warning signs of human rights violation could be seen in a number of countries, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Syria and Burundi, adding that the real investigations of those and other similar situations must be launched. Engagement of the Security Council in human rights violations should be "early and often" (Security Council Meetings Coverage, 18 April 2017)

The United Kingdom's representative considers that the Security Council had a clear role to play and there was, in fact, no encroachment on other United Nations entities. The UK emphasized that in Syria, the warning signs had led to civil war, the rise of extremism, the refugee crisis and the use of chemical weapons. The repeated abuse of the veto to block the Council's resolutions against human rights violations in Syria was unacceptable. Emphasizing the importance of the work of the OHCHR and the Human Rights Council, the United Kingdom commended their investigative mechanisms, saying they were providing objective and vital information on active or potential conflicts. The Security Council "could not discharge its Charter responsibilities fully without addressing human rights." (Security Council Meetings Coverage, 18 April 2017)

Sweden emphasized the importance of human rights to the work of the Security Council across all three phases of the conflict cycle: before, during and after. Monitoring respect for all human rights (civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights) must be an integral part of prevention. Responding early to violations and abuses of human rights can effectively prevent conflicts before they become a threat to regional and international peace and security. (Security Council, 18 April 2017)

Some countries consider the Security Council's engagement in human rights as a threat and interference in the sovereign state affairs. For example, Egypt expressed concern "about the fact that there are some who insist on using our shared goal of promoting human rights as a back door for interfering in the internal affairs of States and adding items that do not constitute a threat to international peace and security to the Council's agenda." (Security Council, 7926th meeting, 18 April 2017)

The Russian Federation's representative in the Security Council said that the United Nations had a broad range of human rights instruments, but the Security Council was not among them. Similarly to Russia, Kazakhstan pointed out "that

human rights are mentioned 15 times in the Charter of the United Nations, but not in Chapter VII, which implies that these rights cannot be forcibly imposed on States; rather they can be realized through diplomacy, mediation and inclusive dialogue.” Kazakhstan, as well as many other countries, believes that the Human Rights Council, its mechanisms and procedures, as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-General, play a key role in monitoring the observance of the human rights situation in all countries and have the appropriate mandate and experience to contribute to conflict prevention at an early stage. (Security Council, 7926th meeting, 18 April 2017)

Tekeda Alemu, the representative of Ethiopia, emphasized that the promotion and protection of human rights did not fall under the Security Council’s purview. The Human Rights Council was the primary body for addressing human rights questions, together with the relevant Committee of the General Assembly. Mr. Alemu stressed that the Council should remain focused on carrying out its mandated Charter responsibilities. He warned that the Security Council’s encroachment on other United Nations bodies would create unnecessary division and discord at a time when the Council could not find common ground on the most pressing issues. (Security Council, 7926th meeting, 18 April 2017)

Human rights are very sensitive issues for the Member States, especially having in mind abuses of human rights in the past as an excuse for highly controversial concepts of humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect. In the last three decades, the United Nations and the Security Council have been criticized a lot due to some abuses of the human rights concept. The United Nations have a lot of bodies specialized in human rights. It is a duty and responsibility of each member state to integrate the promotion and protection of human rights into their national policies. But the key to human rights promotion and development within the UN has to be close cooperation between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and all relevant bodies of the United Nations.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S ENCROACHMENT: A STEP FORWARD TO HUMAN SECURITY?

The encroachment of the Security Council on the jurisdiction of the General Assembly and the other UN bodies is a reflection of the current state in the United Nations. It shows a switch from “classic threats to peace” and “classic maintenance of international peace and security” towards new ones. All cases of encroachment were technically connected with threats to peace in a broader sense. New threats to peace such as HIV and diseases, climate change, human rights

can be characterized as the “non-traditional challenges – the so-called “gray area phenomena” (Brower&Chalk, 2003, p. 1)

Despite the disagreement of many UN Member States, the encroachment of the Security Council on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies is a reality. It will continue in the future, especially about climate change and human rights. Besides, some new issues might be considered by the Security Council in the future as a threat to peace.

It is necessary to ask: “What can be good sides of the Security Council’s encroachment? What are the future perspectives of the Security Council’s encroachment on the jurisdiction of the General Assembly and the other UN bodies?” So far, it has been obvious that new threats to peace have something in common- all of them are more individual-oriented than state-oriented. AIDS, human rights and climate change in the first place affect people. Having in mind this fact, possible good sides of the encroachment on the jurisdiction of other UN bodies could be the development and popularization of the human security within the Security Council as well as the security sector reform.

The term “human security” was introduced into the international discussion in the 1990s as a response to new (or more generalized) “downside risks” that could affect everyone (Howard-Hassmann, 2012, p. 89). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defined human security as both “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.” (UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994) The UNDP report identified risks of excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production, and international terrorism. Later, other risks such as the spread of disease were identified. The human security concept is focused on early warning and prevention of all these risks. Human security “was meant to be a counterweight to the view that the only form of security that mattered was state security, defined quite narrowly as “military defense of state interests and territory.” (Howard-Hassmann, 2012, p. 90)

The concept of human security also has a switch in the main object of security. In the case of human security, it is no longer the state object of concern (national or state security), nor traditional warfare (military security). In the case of human security, security is all about humanity at every level- individuals, groups and the global population (den Boer & de Wilde, 2008, p. 10). By the words of the ex-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.” (UNESCO, 1999)

Within the United Nations, there was not much understanding of the concept of human security during the 1990s and early 2000s. The Commission on Human Security in 2001 provided a report “Human security now” defining the aims of human security as the protection of “vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.” This report has been criticized as idealistic.

A well-known UN document, the report of the Secretary-General’s “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” focused on the old, classic and comprehensive system of collective security rather than moving beyond the confines of the traditional state-centric security paradigm. The fact is that the Report brought new threats to peace such as HIV and climate change, but it only broadened the classic concept of security with a new and wider range of threats. The state still remained an object of security, and all new threats were characterized as threats to its integrity. (Martin & Owen, 2010, p. 215)

The encroachment of the Security Council is an interesting example of developing human security within the United Nations. The UN Member States are aware of problems that might be caused by AIDS, climate change, human rights and the effects these threats might cause in the future. But, in the future, the Security Council should develop more person-centered debates on these problems, instead of a state-centered approach. All these threats first affect people and later, they might have a spillover effect on the state, region and the world. It is necessary for the Security Council to find a proper balance between human security and state security. Having in mind reputation, media coverage and the importance of the Security Council, this body should use its powers in good cause and develop and popularize the concept of human security.

Also, the popularization of human security might cause good preconditions for the security sector reform within the United Nations. The concept of the security sector reform was developed in response to a dysfunctional security sector and its implications for sustainable peace and development. This concept is based on the idea of reforming the security sector in order to enhance the effective and efficient provision of security not only for the state but also for its people. The security sector reform has an aim to establish an efficient security sector accountable for the people. (Bleiker & Krupanski, 2012, p. 37-38)

Security reforms are one of the most important aspects of UN reform, as well as the reform of the Security Council. Accepting and implementing security reforms and popularizing and developing the human security concept, the Security Council might not completely avoid encroachment accusations in the future, but it certainly can revive the Charter’s “We, the peoples of the United Nations”.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ENCROACHMENT ON THE OTHER UN BODIES

Despite some possible perspective of the Security Council's encroachment in the future, most UN Member States are disappointed about this kind of action. The encroachment of the Security Council is showing a lot when it comes to the current state in the United Nations. It shows a lack of coordination between main bodies, stagnation, and the marginalization of other main bodies in the UN system (especially the General Assembly) and the hegemony of the Security Council.

What does the UN Charter say about the jurisdiction of the General Assembly and the Security Council?

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and (except as provided in Article 12) may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or the Security Council or both on any such questions or matters (UN Charter, Article 10). Article 11 para. 1 of the UN Charter says that the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or the Security Council or both. On the other side, the Security Council is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security (UN Charter, Article 24, para 1) In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations (UN Charter, Article 24, para. 2).

At first glance, the General Assembly has almost limitless jurisdiction. It is in charge of discussion on any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter. Issues like AIDS, climate change and human rights are primary in the scope of the General Assembly, as well as some other main bodies like the Economic and Social Council and specialized agencies.

Having in mind all these facts, we should wonder: "Why the Security Council discusses on the issues not primary under its jurisdiction?" Unfortunately, the encroachment of the Security Council on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies is a result and a direct consequence of the marginalization of other main bodies within the UN.

The General Assembly has broad jurisdiction, but resolutions of the General Assembly are not obligatory. Also, the history of the General Assembly can be viewed in three phases- expansion (during the 1950s), stagnation (during the 1970s-1990s) and marginalization (since 1990s) (Smouts, 2000, p. 21). In its early days, the General Assembly was a crucial actor in all the changes within the UN.

During the 1970s, the focus of the General Assembly changed from peace and security to development, economic and social issues.

Academics criticize the General Assembly for the size of its “enormous annual agenda” and “repetitiveness of agenda items.” (Childers & Urquhart, 1994, p. 131) Due to its problematic agenda, repetitive items and non-obligatory resolutions, the General Assembly is often described as paper diplomacy without any significant effect.

Similarly to the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council has been criticized for the lack of effectiveness, too large and too unwieldy structure and failure to coordinate the overall direction in economic and social fields (Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 141-142). The Economic and Social Council has always been considered as a body subordinate to the General Assembly. That is why the Member States had always discussed economic and social issues in the General Assembly rather than the Economic and Social Council.

The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have lost a game in the United Nations and also have lost the respect of the international community, the Member States and the general public. The Security Council, despite the accusations of being hegemonic, oligarchic, too powerful and controversial, is the only respected body of the United Nations. Its encroachment is a result of the marginalization of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. But, can the marginalization of main bodies and encroachment of the Security Council be good for the future of the United Nations? The answer is certainly – no.

Revitalization of the General Assembly as a “cure” for the Security Council’s encroachment?

The United Nations need reform as soon as possible. The UN Charter is a precious and valuable legal document, but it is not good enough for the 21st century. The world needs better cooperation between main UN bodies, as well as different structure and jurisdiction of the main bodies. Beginning in its 60th session, the General Assembly has annually established an *Ad Hoc* Working Group (AHWG) on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly. The AHWG is making recommendations about the General Assembly’s revitalization to the general membership. The working group typically aims to negotiate a resolution that can be adopted by consensus in the General Assembly. The four key thematic clusters of these revitalization discussions have been:

- 1) enhancing the role and authority of the General Assembly,
- 2) the role of the General Assembly in the election of the Secretary-General,
- 3) improving the working methods of the General Assembly,

4) strengthening the institutional memory of the Office of the President of the General Assembly.

For many Member States, the desire to strengthen the General Assembly is a result of the perception of a large power disparity between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Major proponents of revitalization (such as the Non-Aligned Movement) argue that the Charter sought to establish the General Assembly and the Security Council as separate but equal bodies, with the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ. Having in mind the universal membership of the General Assembly, its decision-making process tends to be more divisive and slow-moving than the more exclusive Security Council, which also has the authority to produce legally binding decisions (Center for UN Reform, 2020).

The Non-Aligned Movement underlines close cooperation and coordination among all principal organs of the United Nations as highly indispensable in order to enable the United Nations to remain relevant and capable of meeting the existing, new and emerging threats and challenges. A balance between the two most important bodies of the UN systems (the General Assembly and the Security Council) could contribute in restoring the reputation of the UN and achieving the objectives envisaged by the Charter. (Gordanić, 2015, p. 62) The Non-Aligned Movement, as well as many Member States and even the P5 members, expresses its concern over the continuing encroachment by the Security Council on the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The Security Council should fully comply with international law and the United Nations Charter. (Fars News agency, 2018)

The *Ad hoc* working group for the revitalization of the General Assembly have discussed a number of recommendations to enhance its the role and authority- coordination between the presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly, more consistent implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions, organization of thematic debates on critical topics with participation by experts and national policy, improvement of the General Assembly's reputation in the media, etc.

During the thematic meetings and the debate of the *ad hoc* working group on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly in 2014, the Non-Aligned Movement and several Member States (India, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Cuba and Malaysia) have argued that in order to restore the General Assembly's role and authority, the Security Council's encroachment on the General Assembly had to be addressed. The Non-Aligned Movement suggested the addition of a paragraph noting that the General Assembly and the Security Council avoid the encroachment of each other's competencies. Such a direct reference to encroachment caused much debate between the US, the EU, Japan, and the Non-

Aligned Movement. A paragraph about encroachment did not reach consensus. (Jagtiani, 2014) Final text of Resolution 68/307 on the Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly reaffirms that the relationship between the principal organs of the United Nations is mutually reinforcing and complementary, in accordance with and with full respect for their respective functions, authority, powers and competencies as enshrined in the Charter, and in this regard stresses the importance of further ensuring increased cooperation, coordination and the exchange of information among the Presidents of the principal organs. Requests for better cooperation between the principal organs were a central part of the other resolutions on the revitalization of the General Assembly.

The marginalization of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council is a result of a long political process and a result of the slow marginalization of the United Nations. As long as the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council stay marginalized, the Security Council will continue the encroachment, despite the resentment of the UN Member States. The key goal of the UN reform has to be the balance and coordination between the Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as the democratization of the Security Council and enhancing the role and the authority of the General Assembly. (South Center, p. 145)

CONCLUSION

The encroachment of the Security Council on the jurisdiction of other UN bodies is a multilayered problem. It is not just the hegemony of the one UN body. It shows different approaches to a threat to peace; broadening of a threat to peace; humanization of security as well as the lack of cooperation and coordination between the main UN bodies. The Security Council has marginalized already marginalized main bodies even more. The Security Council's encroachment shows a breakdown of the United Nations and indicates the necessity of the UN reform.

The encroachment of the Security Council on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies also shows differences when it comes to the interpretation of the Charter. On one side, developed countries like the USA, United Kingdom, Germany, etc. broadly interpret the UN Charter, while on the other side, the Non-Aligned Movement interprets the Charter in a narrow manner. When it comes to the dangers of the broad interpretation of the Charter, there are a lot of issues that might be considered as a threat to international peace - not only AIDS, climate change or human rights. This might cause abuse in the future, and most Member States are afraid of possible abuses and even more of the encroachment of the Security Council.

The encroachment means overstepping the bounds, and overstepping the bounds means fear and dissatisfaction of the Member States. The Security Council has become too exclusive and too hegemonic. It is not an adequate representative of UN membership. The General Assembly is the most democratic body of the United Nations, consisted of all member states. Even marginalized, due to its democratic structure, it enjoys the trust of the UN membership. Encroachment undermines the UN system, causes disharmony between the Member States, as well as the legal insecurity. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the Charter. All encroachment cases are under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly.

Maybe in the future, in the new UN Charter, the maintenance of international peace and security and threats to peace will be defined in a broader and more detailed manner, so the encroachment of the Security Council on the jurisdiction of the other UN bodies will be a thing of the past.

Broad interpretations of threats to peace only cause the anger of general membership. Every UN main body should perform its role as it is written in the Charter, without overstepping the bounds. The UN's main bodies have to work on its coordination and cooperation and avoid duplication of jurisdiction and encroachment.

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PREKORAČENJE NADLEŽNOSTI SAVETA BEZBEDNOSTI: BUDUĆNOST ILI SLOM UJEDINJENIH NACIJA

Apstrakt: Poslednjih nekoliko decenija primetno je zadiranje i prekoračenje nadležnosti Saveta bezbednosti u oblasti koje tradicionalno pripadaju Generalnoj skupštini i drugim organima Ujedinjenih nacija. Zadiranje pokazuje tendenciju Saveta bezbednosti da proširuje definiciju pretnje međunarodnom miru i bezbednosti, posebno u pogledu tematskih debata u pogledu socijalnog, humanitarnog, ekonomskog i razvojnog karaktera. Tematske debate o AIDS-u, klimatskim promenama i ljudskim pravima su uzrokovale gnev velikog broja država članica i postavile pitanje u pogledu granica nadležnosti Saveta bezbednosti i drugih tela, poput Generalne skupštine i Ekonomskog i socijalnog saveta. Ovakve tendencije Saveta bezbednosti mogu imati određene pozitivne efekte na popularizaciju koncepta humane bezbednosti u Ujedinjenim nacijama. Autor zaključuje da zadiranje Saveta bezbednosti u nadležnosti drugih organa uzrokuje više negativnih nego pozitivnih efekata. Ovakva praksa pokazuje nedostatak koordinacije između glavnih organa UN, produbljuje marginalizaciju drugih UN organa i proširuje koncept pretnje miru i održanja međunarodnog mira i bezbednosti.

Ključne reči: Savet bezbednosti, Generalna skupština, pretnja miru, AIDS, klimatske promene, humana bezbednost.

received: 28.01.2020.

accepted: 21.02.2020.

IIFE'S AMBASSADORS FORUM

THE MULTILATERAL ROLE OF EGYPT: REPRESENTATIVE CONTRIBUTION IN SEARCH FOR EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Lecture by

H.E. Mr. Amr ALJOWAILY¹

Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to Serbia

at the

“Ambassadors Forum”

Institute of International Politics and Economics

Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 12:00 pm

Professor Dr. Branislav Đorđević,

Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics

Madame Jelica Gordanic,

Coordinator of Ambassadors' Forum

Excellencies Ambassadors,

Distinguished academics and guests,

I am pleased to be here today at the reputed Institute of International Politics and Economics and to salute Director Professor Dr. Branislav Đorđević, the Board and the members of the Institute for their intellectual contribution to the Belgrade Foreign Policy discussions.

I would also like to recognize Ambassador Namira Negm, Legal Counsel of the African Union and Ambassador Ashraf Swelam, Director General of Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding.

¹ While the main elements of this lecture reflect the official positions that Egypt undertook in the mentioned multilateral forums, the author has also added a number of analytical references which reflect his own opinion resulting from almost 25 years of professional and academic experiences with multilateralism. These references should be read, and referred to, bearing in mind this highlighted context.

Difficult questions should go to them, being the *real* experts, and easy ones to me, being your *guest* in Belgrade!

WHY SPEAK OF MULTILATERALISM HERE IN BELGRADE AND NOW?

It is by no coincidence that we choose the title of our conference today to be “The Multilateral Role of Egypt”.

- **Firstly**, the relationship between Cairo and Belgrade will always be remembered through their mutual leadership in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement, and by this striving, for a more just and equitable and democratic international order.
- **Secondly, in the last 4 years**, Egypt has assumed **3** consecutive leading roles in regional and global institutions, in an **almost unprecedented** three years in a row. This is instructive for exploring the interlinkages and the intricacies of multilateral relations of relevance to all students of international politics.
- **Thirdly**, I have had the honor and a chance to be personally involved in a number of these initiatives, throughout a diplomatic career that spanned for almost 25 years dealing with multilateral relations, ranging from an assisting role in representation to Bretton Woods Institutions to a more engaged contribution to the work of the United Nations in Geneva and New York.
- **Fourthly**, multilateralism is facing mounting challenges these days, which merits our heightened attention to safeguarding this salient dimension of global politics that groups the world together, and strives to safeguard the interests of small and medium states.

Multilateral diplomacy remains an integral subject of global politics. It is the framework governing the participation of our countries in the United Nations and other international organizations and specialized international agencies. It has become more open to the participation of all actors, including civil society institutions that you represent so ably here through your Institute in what is being termed by some, Multistakeholder Diplomacy.

REPRESENTATION AT THE UNSC, AND BY THE UNSC OF THE WIDER MEMBERSHIP

The almost unprecedented four years in a row, three leading multilateral contributions started with Egypt’s elected term in the Security Council, with two years of continuous contribution to the work of the Council. The main framework that governed the contribution of Egypt’s work to the Council is that it was one

of the three African members of the Council (A3), the only Arab member² and one of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus. This has led Egypt not only to undertake its intrinsic role in presenting its national vision, but also to play a pivotal role in those geopolitical groups to which it belongs. It rested on the fact that the Council itself, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, is mandated to have the primary task of maintaining international peace and security. We should note, however, that in carrying out this task, the Council acts on behalf of the Member States themselves, according to the first paragraph of the said Article; and in consistency with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as per Article 24(2) of the Charter. Hence, Egypt's membership in the Council was wholly conscious that the decisions of the Council should reflect the collective interest of the general membership of the United Nations as a whole. This influenced the determinants of Egypt's contributions to the Council, as they were solidly based on principled positions emanating from the purposes and principles of the United Nations itself as set out in the Charter, aiming to preserve the independence of the world Organization itself and protect the collective interests of the broader general membership.

In this broader framework of the representation of the general membership, Egypt has been active in stimulating the role of the 10 elected States in the membership of the Council, being one of them. The E10, a more telling nomenclature than the generic 'non-permanent' more general reference, put forward joint resolutions anchoring their co-ownership of the drafting process, which should not be limited to the so-called "pen holders" who had traditionally been restricted to the permanent members, or even only a limited number of them in many cases.

Egypt was keen to be involved, even gradually, in proposing draft resolutions to all member states of the Council. The Resolution on the Protection of Medical Facilities during Conflicts in May 2016³ was the result of cooperation among a number of the E10 and was adopted under Egypt's presidency of the Council, thus consolidating the expansion of ownership of decision-making in line with the other responsibilities of the elected States.

Another avenue of contributing to the substance of outcomes of the UNSC for elected members, even if not penholder, and hence indirectly, is through

² "As Egypt's membership in the UN Security Council came to an end, how did Egyptian diplomacy embark upon defending Arab and African interests?", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, available at <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/Egypt-culminates-in-the-end-of-its-membership-in-the-Security-Council-and-its-chairmanship-of-the-Counter-Terrorism-Committee.aspx>

³ Available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2286>

subsidiary bodies, of which Egypt chaired three: the Counter-Terrorism Committee and two of the Security Council Sanctions Committees on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq. This process of selection was an important step in reforming the working methods of the Security Council by making it more open to its 15 members, and not only restricted to the P5, as was the case before. It also enhanced transparency in general so that its work will be more accessible to the membership of the General Assembly as a whole. It is worth mentioning that a number of the resolutions put forward by Egypt to the Council were co-sponsored by a large number of the Member States in the General Assembly, such as the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council to combat the terrorist rhetoric⁴, whose concept and idea was presented by Egypt during its first presidency of the UNSC in May 2016.

In this context, Egypt's role as one of the three representatives of the African continent in the Council (the A3), where African issues took precedence, especially in view of being the only African country with concurrent membership in both the UN Security Council and the African Peace and Security Council was immensely important. Accordingly, Egypt was keen to organize a thematic discussion on the structure of African peace and security under Egypt's first presidency of the Council⁵, a pioneering step towards discussing cooperation between the two organizations at the holistic level and more comprehensive framework of conflict resolution, instead of the earlier, or even more traditional, partial view that was limited to peacekeeping as one aspect of the conflict resolution mechanism. In the general debate held in May 2016⁶, the objective was to transcend the limited conflict management approach in order to evaluate opportunities for cooperation in conflict resolution, as a whole, by including the stages of making, maintaining and consolidating peace, taking into account the progress of the African peace and security architecture and the complementarity of its components, as well as an integrated structure for peace and security, in order to examine how these two structures can integrate their roles in the maintenance of international peace and security.

At the same time, the Egyptian delegation in New York hosted the eleventh meeting of the African Peace and Security Council and the United Nations

⁴ Available at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2354\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2354(2017))

⁵ "African leaders discuss peace and security in closed meeting" Egypt Today, paragraph 4, available at <http://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/64517/African-leaders-discuss-peace-and-security-in-closed-meeting>

⁶ "Egypt Role in Peacekeeping Operations" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, paragraph 16, available at <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/ForeignPolicy/Pages/PeacekeepingAndConflictResolution.aspx>

Security Council⁷, also with the participation of the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission⁸, which contributed in the same direction to the resolution of African conflicts from a comprehensive perspective of those conflicts.

On the Arab level, under Egypt's first presidency of the Security Council, a joint consultative meeting between the UN Security Council and the Council of the League of Arab States⁹ was held as the first meeting¹⁰ between the two Councils¹¹, despite their establishment more than 70 years ago¹², along with the active participation of the Egyptian delegation in New York to follow up on the Arab issues on the agenda of the Security Council¹³.

AT THE UNSC: THE THEMATIC PRIORITIES

These were the priorities within Egypt's regional and political geographical groups, which went hand in hand with the thematic priorities that were mainly in the areas of counterterrorism and peacekeeping.

As for the fight against terrorism, the delegation of Egypt had the lead in introducing new topics that the Security Council has never dealt with in this regard, such as combating the intellectual foundations on which terrorist acts are based. This was announced by Egypt's first presidency of the Security Council

⁷ UNOAU Bulletin "The United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council meet for the 11th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting", available at https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unoau_bulletin-aug-oct_2017.pdf

⁸ "Dispatches from the Field: 11th AU-UN Annual Joint Consultative Meeting", What's in Blue, available at <https://www.whatsinblue.org/2017/09/dispatches-from-the-field-11th-au-un-annual-joint-consultative-meeting.php>

⁹ "In Cairo, UN Security Council consults with Arab League on regional, global issues" UN News, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/05/529932-cairo-un-security-council-consults-arab-league-regional-global-issues>

¹⁰ "UN Security Council Holds 'Unprecedented' Meeting with Arab League States in Cairo" Egyptian Streets, available at <https://egyptianstreets.com/2016/05/24/un-security-council-holds-unprecedented-meeting-with-arab-league-states-in-cairo/>

¹¹ "Briefing on Cooperation between the UN and the League of Arab States" Security Council Report, available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-08/briefing_on_cooperation_between_the_un_and_the_league_of_arab_states.php

¹² "Statement by Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on the occasion of the United Nations Day Cairo, Egyptian Diplomatic Club 22/11/2017", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, available at <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/Pages/StatementsDetails.aspx?StatementID=129>

¹³ Initial efforts were also exerted towards institutionalizing these consultations with regards to regularity of meetings, and methodology of preparations.

in May 2016. In May 2017, the second major contribution was to push for the completion of all aspects of the counterterrorism triangle. The Council had previously focused on combating foreign terrorist fighters on the one hand and combating funding on the other. The initiative of Egypt to push the Council to issue Resolution 2370¹⁴ was issued under its presidency in August 2017 to prevent the access to weapons by terrorists, to complete the third leg of the triangle.

Priority was also given to the thematic issues of peacekeeping; from a comprehensive perspective, linking all phases of conflict prevention, from prevention and peacemaking to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Egypt's Presidency of the Council in August 2017 organized a general debate on the linkage between peacekeeping operations and the concept of the sustainability of peace as a starting point for the Security Council to discuss the many ideas on the reform and development of peace missions and related United Nations mechanisms, in particular, the integration of the concept of "special political missions" and "Peacekeeping missions" so that the resources of the United Nations Secretariat would be integrated in support of a comprehensive settlement of ongoing conflicts.

A ministerial meeting, hosted by Egypt in May 2016, was one of the first to reflect on the concept of the interdependence of the mechanisms of peace and security under the heading of addressing the continued response of the Security Council to the resolution of conflicts within the framework of the UN Peace and Security Architecture. There is no doubt that this designation considers the mechanisms and resources of the United Nations in an integrated, complementary approach, maximizing their actual impact. Perhaps the main message of this meeting is that there is a continuous spectrum of activities that our global Organization must do to achieve the original goal of a comprehensive and just settlement of these existing international conflicts, together with the prevention of new conflicts or the re-emergence of conflicts that were already settled.

To achieve that goal, we should not only silence the sounds of guns; we should echo the calls for sustainable peace.

Egypt's role in the field of peacekeeping is not confined to conceptual aspects, but its significance is that Egypt's position among the troop-contributing and police-contributing countries during Egypt's two years of membership in the Security Council reflects its commitment to translating its active role in the political arena in the Security Council into action on the ground. During these two years, specifically from September 2015 to September 2017, Egypt's ranking rose from 16th to 8th globally, from third to second for the Francophonie, from ninth to fourth in Africa, from second to first among Arab countries, and from

¹⁴ Available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2370>

fourth to second globally for police contributors. At the same time, there was a commitment to expand women's participation, as the number of their police officers has increased four times during this period. The deployment of the first Egyptian military observer was already underway. Therefore, Egypt's commitment to supporting the UN peacekeeping has been enhanced by the fact that statements are accompanied by deeds and that decisions were drawn from the deliberations of the Security Council and the General Assembly to the field of troops and personnel participation.

FROM PEACE AND SECURITY TO DEVELOPMENT: ROUNDING THE MAIN PILLARS OF WORK OF THE UN

We may have gone to length the issues related to peace and security, considering that we focused on membership of the Security Council and considering the centrality of the maintenance of the service and security within the three pillars of the work of the Organization. Yet soon after the completion of the elected term at the UNSC, actually the day after 1 January 2018 when Egypt assumed the Chairmanship of the Group of 77 for the third time since its inception.

Throughout the year, Egypt strove to represent the interests of the Group and its Member States and to advance the Group's objectives and the values of equality and justice to which we aspire in the international system and the United Nations.

2018 turned out to be a critical year for the UN reform efforts in all fields. The pace of reform and the proposals submitted during the past year were exceptional. In 2018, the Group of 77 undertook a leading role in guiding reform toward achieving the desired effectiveness of the UN system, whether through supporting executive actions for the purpose of development or reforming the management and peace and security systems.

With regard to reforming the developmental system, based on the precious proposals of the Secretary-General and his team, the Group has been remarkably active in proposing a clear vision on the reform of the developmental system. The pivot remained "national ownership of developmental priorities", deciding on the support which could be provided by the international system as per national priorities, and saving a rightful place for developmental issues for their own merit, aside from the security and political realms which have their own mechanisms for considerations. Development is, and should remain, the main pillar of the work of the United Nations, with platforms fully devoted to its promotion according to the needs and views of developing countries, the primary addressees of such processes.

Also, the Group played a major role in addressing the reform of the “management and peace and security systems” in the Secretariat. With regard to management system reform, the Group pushed for the implementation of decentralization for the purpose of enabling the Organization to effectively fulfill its commitments. Furthermore, it supported the reinforcement of the accountability and transparency mechanisms, allowing for the efficient review of the Secretariat’s work by the Member States. Concerning the reform of the peace and security related secretariat structures, the Group supported the adoption of a comprehensive approach with a view to attaining harmony and coordination among the Secretariat’s relevant departments and enhance the ability of the Organization to effectively address peace and security challenges, especially via the preventive-diplomacy, focusing on the roots of conflicts, and supporting cooperation with regional organizations. Restructuring of the Secretariat extends beyond administrative aspects and organizational division of work. It entails an intrinsic alteration, even if slight, in the conceptual framework guiding the work of the Organization. For that reason, the jurisdiction of the intergovernmental machinery in overseeing such restructuring should not be overlooked. The contribution of the G77 needs to be looked at in this perspective¹⁵.

IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL COMMITMENTS:

Consistent with the global UN engagements in the past few years, especially the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, and a number of programs of action in sustainable development-related areas, the work of the Group of G77 under the presidency of Egypt included following-up over the implementation of these commitments. Well identified priorities included youth employment, eradication of poverty and enhancing capabilities for economic production. Challenges remained for achieving consensus on such issues, especially the orientation by some to revisit already agreed

¹⁵ While such restructuring initializes may end up receiving intergovernmental reform, others may face more resistance including if the source of ideas was from a certain part of the Secretariat. In my period as a delegate at the Permanent Mission in Geneva from 2003 to 2007 recall participating in long and numerous meetings to discuss proposals for merging a number of research and training institutions of the UN. Members of different departments of the Secretariat often approached us with diverging views of the restructuring proposals. Naturally, they were also driven by the potential impact of such a merger be on their own bureaucratic standing. Add to this is that several of these structures had their own governing bodies and other intergovernmental oversight machinery. It was an interesting interplay between the space available for initiative taking by the leadership of Secretariat, the affected spill over departments, and the intergovernmental machinery. A case that probably merits even more analytical study.

international commitment, attempt to limit the inherent responsibility of the international community to support financing development efforts¹⁶.

Egypt exerted strenuous efforts during its presidency regarding climate change and the difficulty that it poses to developing countries in their implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda. As President, on behalf of the developing states, Egypt has undergone negotiations at the “24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Egypt exerted its utmost to push the international efforts for the implementation and employment of all of the provisions of the Paris Climate Change Agreement, especially those concerned with the mobilization of financial resources necessary for supporting developing states’ efforts in facing climate change challenges, technology transfer and capacity building.¹⁷ In the same vein, the 14th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity that was held in Sharm Al-Sheikh, Egypt, in November 2018, was successful in terms of the ability of the Group to include its priorities in the outcomes of the Conference to push for the efforts of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Agenda.¹⁸

South-South cooperation¹⁹ and the efforts of the Group in preparing for the Second High-Level UN Conference on South-South Cooperation that was hosted by Buenos Aires in March 2019, demonstrated the ability of the Group to determine its priorities and synergize between its members. While preparing for such a high-profile conference²⁰, the Group asserted the principles of

¹⁶ The somewhat competing perspectives of levels of analysis for prescribing development strategies, and whether one should on the global systemic level, or rather emphasize the centrality of national measures by the individual state is traditionally addressed in deliberation in multilateral development forums, either explicitly or implicitly. The necessity to adjust global rules and structures to accommodate development needs, and/or the role of provision of assistance and preferential transfer of technology does also appear in the discussions. Often the wording used with regards to such difficult negotiating issues is watered down and reduced to a level of generality, resulting in a lack of full implementation of these commitments. ¹⁷ “statement by Mr. Sameh shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab republic of Egypt, at the handover ceremony of the Chairmanship of the Group of 77 (New York, 15 January 2019)” available at <https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=190115> “In his statement at the Group of 77 and China chairmanship Handover Ceremony in New York” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, available at <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/Collection.aspx>

¹⁸ “Outcomes (38)”, All in-session documents, COP 14, Convention on Biodiversity, available at <https://www.cbd.int/conferences/2018/cop-14/documents>

¹⁹ “Sc And G77 & China Brainstorming Meeting In Preparation For Bapa+40, 12 September 2018” South Centre, Available At <https://www.southcentre.int/sc-and-g77-china-brainstorming-meeting-in-preparation-for-bapa40-12-september-2018/>

²⁰ “CONCEPT NOTE G77 and China Geneva Chapter - South Centre Brainstorming meeting in preparation of the Second High-level United Nations Conference on South-South

cooperation, and the prism of converging interests that form the basis for South-South cooperation²¹, and hence among developing countries²².

At the beginning of 2018, the Egyptian Presidency prioritized the matter of “emerging technologies and their long-term effects on the interests of developing states”. The discussion in the ministerial meeting of the Group in September 2018 tackled “how the fast-moving technological transformations we are witnessing in today’s world and their effects on all aspects of life have come to represent a structural turning point, whose implications will certainly change lifestyles in various countries”. One such important aspect is their positive and negative effects on the work force. It is not to be forgotten that the access to these currently essential technologies is not equal, which put forth the North-South technological division, and within the same state as well. Throughout 2018, Egypt held briefing sessions with specialized research centers on the said issues, and international organizations, to raise the awareness thereof among the members of the Group and its delegations in New York with an end goal of tackling such issues in a deeper sense²³.

Also, Egypt’s priorities in 2018 included the firm addressing the women’s economic empowerment issue which is at the core of sustainable development efforts. In this context, the Egyptian Presidency “organized two high-level meetings with ministerial participation on the sidelines of the Economic and Social Council committees’ meetings”. In these meetings, the “financial inclusion of women”, as a top important empowerment mechanism, was addressed. Plus,

Cooperation (BAPA+40)”, pages 1 and 2, available at https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ev_180912_SC-G77-Brainstorming-meeting-BAPA40-prep_EN.pdf

²¹ Debates with regard to the role of South-South cooperation in many UN multilateral forums witness often interesting arguments about where the responsibility rests mostly, and the holistic versus partial approaches to the challenges of development. Often, debates that South-South cooperation should not be seen as diluting North-South cooperation, whereby there is a weighted responsibility on developed countries to support development efforts by developing countries in a commensurate proportion related to the comparative weight in the international economic system. It is not rare as well to hear interventions by developed countries insinuating to new geoeconomic realities, and the ascendancy of emerging economies which should assume a larger share in burden sharing, including if possible through South-South cooperation. A number of these rising economic powers have also embarked on a somewhat voluntary larger role, in a demonstration not only of solidarity, but also to reflect their aspiration for a larger role in another diplomatic platform, either in established multilateral institutions, or in the so-called minilateralism smaller forums.

²² For more information, see <https://www.unsouthsouth.org/>

²³ “President Sisi’s speech before FMs 42nd annual meeting of the Group of 77 States” State Information Service of Egypt, available at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/135390/President-Sisi’s-speech-before-FMs-42nd-annual-meeting-of-the-Group-of-77-States?lang=en-us>

senior officials shared their experiences across capitals, allowing for the initiation of a shared space based on mutual understanding of the challenges that concern them and suggesting some suitable solutions for the developing countries' circumstances.

This journey of leading the largest group of countries in multilateral diplomacy strove to preserve the policy space for developing countries, and for that matter for all countries in need of such space to realize their legitimate developmental goals. This multilateral role was soon to be complemented by yet another leading contribution. In fact, the “handing over” ceremony for Egypt's chairmanship of the G77 to Palestine was only around a month away from yet another similar ceremony, yet this time it was a “handing in” ceremony to assume the presidency of the African Union.

AU CHAIRMANSHIP

Now that we reviewed two global leadership roles that Egypt has undertaken, we come to the third in a row, which is its current chairmanship of the African Union. Three key priority areas were identified based on their high importance on the African landscape and their relevance to Agenda 2063.

Firstly: pushing forward the regional economic integration portfolio with special emphasis on infrastructure²⁴:

Since the Lagos Plan of Action in the 1980s and the Abuja Declaration in 1991, regional integration has witnessed various degrees of success within the five African regions, yet not achieved the end result of a common African market.

No real integration can be achieved without a proper interconnected infrastructure between African nations and a clearly drafted division of labour between the African Union, regional economic communities and regional mechanisms with the outlined responsibilities for each.

With this in mind and on the way to the first coordination meeting between the AU and RECs in Niamey in July 2019²⁵, Egypt is co-organizing two retreats among the Member States under the title “Road To Niamey” (one already

²⁴ “Egypt sorts out main priorities for Africa's development during its AU presidency” State Information Service of Egypt, paragraph 10, available at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/137320/Foreign-Ministry-Egypt-sorts-out-main-priorities-for-Africa's-development-during-its-AU-presidency?lang=en-us>

²⁵ “AUC, PRC and RECs sensitization and experience sharing seminar focused on the July 2019 Mid-Year Coordination meeting set to be held in Niger.” African Union Press Releases, available at <https://au.int/sw/node/36353>

convened on 11-12 April 2019²⁶ and the Second in Tunisia on 28-30 April)²⁷ dedicated to having a detailed discussion on the expected deliverables from the Niamey coordination Meeting²⁸.

With the belief that the Niamey meeting is not a goal in itself and that further work is needed on the “Road From Niamey” as opposed to the “Road To Niamey”, Egypt was keen to facilitate organizing other high-level events in the second half of the year, including a high-level event on the margins of the UNGA in September to sensitize the international community about the efforts done by the African continent in this regard and garner international support in addition to crafting a road map with practical steps for the post-Niamey period. From 25 to 29 November, Cairo hosted the African Union Infrastructure Week with more than 600 participants. It was preceded by the Bureau of the Ministerial Committee in charge of infrastructure, energy, transport and tourism on 24 November. Several ideas were proposed, including a list of 10 continental projects from the five regions, electrical grid interconnection and a network of African businesswomen in the field of infrastructure.

Secondly: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AFCFTA)²⁹:

Africa with a population of nearly 1.3 billion individuals and a combined GDP that surpasses 2 trillion dollars has an intra-trade share that does not exceed 13% according to the most optimistic estimates.

With this background in mind, African Leaders signed the ACFTA agreement in 2018 and the ratification of 22 Member States. Now more challenging work is awaiting us on negotiating the technical details of implementation, including

²⁶ “21. COMMENDS the efforts of the PSC in convening, in Cairo, Egypt from 29 to 31 October 2018, a Retreat dedicated to assessing the status of implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), with a view to laying a solid foundation for the reform of the PSC, as called for in Decision Assembly/AU.Dec.635 adopted in January 2017.” DECISION ON THE REPORT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL ON ITS ACTIVITIES AND THE STATE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA, available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf

²⁷ “A holistic approach to division of labor to accelerate Africa’s development.” African Union Press Releases, available at <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190412/holistic-approach-division-labor-accelerate-africas-development>

²⁸ “No shortcut to inclusive prosperity”- Cairo meeting to deliberate division of labour to drive Agenda 2063“African Union Press Releases, available at <https://au.int/sw/node/36340>

²⁹ “Egypt sorts out main priorities for Africa’s development during its AU presidency” State Information Service of Egypt, paragraph 10, available at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/137320/Foreign-Ministry-Egypt-sorts-out-main-priorities-for-Africa’s-development-during-its-AU-presidency?lang=en-us>

rules of origin and lists of exemptions, etc. These discussions are addressing technical specificities of a free trade area; a discussion that transcends and goes beyond the political announcement of entry into force of an agreement. The expertise accumulated by the AU partners can provide valuable input.

Within this context, Egypt hosted the first intra-African trade fair in December 2018³⁰ and a meeting of the African Ministers of Trade on its margins, where a technical discussion was initiated and is working on collaborating with international partners to avail the necessary expertise for African countries in this regard³¹.

Thirdly: The Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD):

Egypt's choice of this particular priority stems from its conviction that African Nations cannot achieve sustainable peace and realize development while their territories are still mired in or affected by armed conflicts. Relapse to conflict needs to be firmly and effectively addressed and prevented.

Africa is home to 8 ongoing wide-scale conflicts whose impact cuts across the entire continent, where 12 million IDPS (half of the world IDPS population) were forced to flee their homes and millions of others sought refuge in neighbouring countries. This chronic situation of recurring conflicts involves the continent in a vicious circle that hinders any prospect for development or any hope for stability.

The last African Union Assembly marked H.E. President Abd El Fattah Al Sisi with the challenging role of leader on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)³². Thus, Egypt is committed at the highest level to making use of its vast experience and contribution in peacekeeping and building and its

³⁰ “First intra-African trade fair kicks off in Cairo“, Ministry of Trade and Industry of Egypt, available at <http://www.mti.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/First-intra-African-trade-fair-kicks-off-in-Cairo.aspx> “Intra-African Trade Fair (IATF2018) opens Dec 11-17” State Information Service of Egypt, available at [http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/136622/Intra-African-Trade-Fair-\(IATF2018\)-opens-Dec-11-17?lang=en-us](http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/136622/Intra-African-Trade-Fair-(IATF2018)-opens-Dec-11-17?lang=en-us)

³¹ The Annex to the Declaration of the meeting is available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf

³² “MANDATES H.E. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, to be Leader of the revitalization and operationalization of the African Union Policy on PCRD.”, DECISION ON REVITALISING AND OPERATIONALISING THE AFRICAN UNION POLICY ON POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: PRACTICAL POLICY OPTIONS AND ADAPTIVE MEASURES FOR SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS ROOT CAUSES OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT CHALLENGES IN AFRICA, available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/36461-assembly_au_dec_713_-_748_xxxii_e.pdf

uninterrupted membership in the peacebuilding commission in the UN for 12 years³³ to garner the international support required to help the African continent out of this loop.

The first step is hosting the AUCPCRD Center in Cairo, whose mandate includes a wide array of activities including conducting studies, developing strategies, and putting forward action plans to enhance reconstruction after conflicts and foster development. Egypt worked hand in hand with the AUC to finalize the host agreement at the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development³⁴, which it hosted in December 2019 as the first version of an annual forum that will gather members from all over the world to discuss peace and development related topics³⁵.

Other priority areas include garnering support for youth initiatives and within this context, the first Arab African youth forum was held in Aswan in March 2019³⁶. The Embassy coordinated with Novi Sad authorities, as the Youth Capital of Europe, for a joint European African Arab Youth event, bringing our continents closer together not only in the present but even more so in the future in which the youth will lead-in.

In addition to the theme of the year chosen by the African Union “Refugees, Returnees And Internally Displaced, Towards Durable Solutions”, Egypt is putting the emphasis by dedicating the celebration of Africa day this year on 25 May across all its embassies in the African continent to this topic too³⁷. Egypt, throughout its year of chairmanship³⁸, aimed to leave a positive impact on the administration of the African Union Commission itself (increased internal coordination, ameliorating work methods and continuing the ongoing reform process) in addition to the aforementioned priority areas that closely affect

³³ “Egypt and Peacekeeping” CCCPA, paragraph 5, available at <https://www.cairopeacekeeping.org/en/egypt-and-peacekeeping>

³⁴ “Egypt to host African Union center on post-conflict reconstruction, development, Xinhua”, 2019-12-11 19:39:54, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/11/c_138623478.htm

³⁵ “AU summit 32: Egypt takes the wheel at the AU” ISS PSC Report, Egypt is repositioning itself in sub-Saharan Africa to pursue and protect its strategic interests, paragraphs 3 and 4, available at <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/au-summit-32-egypt-takes-the-wheel-at-the-au>

³⁶ “Arab and African Youth Platform” State Information Service of Egypt, available at <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/137958?lang=en-us>

³⁷ “Egypt Celebrates African Day 2017 on Thursday” State Information Service of Egypt, paragraph 8, available at <http://sis.gov.eg/Story/113139?lang=en-us>

³⁸ It is to be recalled here the extraordinary summit on institutional reform held in Addis Ababa 17-18 November, 1918 preceded by the Executive Council on 14-15 of the same month.

African nations and impact their peoples³⁹. Egypt carried with it the aspirations of the African Union to the wider multilateral forums in which it participated in the continent's name, such as the G20 Summit in Osaka 28-29 June 2019 and the G7 Summit held in France 25-26 August 2019. This is in addition to other forums that grouped all members of the African Union with other global partners such as the African Russian Summit held on 23-24 October 2019 in Sochi. In all such meetings, a representational and facilitative role was part and parcel of the duties of the chairmanship of the Union.

CONCLUSIONS

This representative role of Egypt has become integral to its foreign policy orientation, making the multilateral forums all but home. It is coupled with a clear distinction between attendance, and participation, whereby the latter strives to contribute meaningfully to multilateral processes with a clear view for a more just, equitable, democratic global political and economic order. Our gathering at the Institute promises to be yet another opportunity for this ongoing call, which would echo from Belgrade and Cairo as it did at the heydays of founding the Non-Aligned Movement.

³⁹ See “AU Executive Council concludes, adopting important resolutions on institutional and financial reform” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, paragraph 3, available at <https://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/News/Pages/fgfg.aspx>

BOOK REVIEWS

THE IDEOLOGY OF FAILED STATES: WHY INTERVENTION FAILS

Susan L. Woodward, *The Ideology of Failed states: Why Intervention Fails*, City University of New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 307.

In her latest book, Susan L. Woodward claims that a failed state is not a label but an ideology and comprehensive research on what we usually call the concept of failed states. Acknowledging the great reach and popularity of the term in the international sphere, she wonders what we mean when we use it and asks how such a concept maintains its widespread usage, despite great criticism and failure of state-building interventions in decades after the end of the Cold War. To answer this question, she has developed well systematized and profound explanations on the nature of the concept in eight chapters, offering critical insight on the international actors' state-building practice and identified the place of these phenomena in a historical and political context.

Starting from the first hypothesis that the term failed states actually represents an ideology, a set of beliefs providing shared meaning and social action, she notices a consensus about the self-explanatory nature of the concept, and therefore a great self-confidence among international actors promoting it when it comes to both a problem and a solution. Namely, whatever the specific problem is identified when using the term *failed state*, they all agree that it represents a major security threat to international order, which additionally brings to the conclusion that state-building intervention is necessary to be conducted. Having that in mind, she consequently raises the question of why such self-explanatory and self-confident ideology does not work in practice. With well systematized and profound data on the failure of state-building intervention practice, she highlights the problem of poor results, but what makes this research more valuable is a deep analysis of the conceptual vagueness and lack of theoretical basis.

In order to remove its veil of self-evidence and examine the essence, she stresses three major problems with this concept: theoretical, empirical, and political. When it comes to the first one, Professor Woodward correctly notes that there is a vague definition of the concept, mainly referring to the outcome that failed states produce, such as terrorism, organized crime, humanitarian crisis, regional conflicts. However, she claims that there is a little effort to identify the

causal mechanism, explaining why and how state failure causes the set of outcomes disturbing international peace. Following theoretical vagueness and the absence of a precise conceptual definition, she concludes that no operational definition is possible either. It seems that it is a widely accepted and presumed existence of a blanket connection, as some sort of 'conventional wisdom' across all actors involved. Lastly, the concept provokes a strong political backlash within the countries labelled as failed or fragile. Since the majority of them belong to poorer global South, they interpret the label as a threat of imminent intervention, rather than a program for institutional building and assistance.

In addition to deep explanations on the lack of theoretical and empirical foundation, in the first part of the book, Susan L. Woodward provides an incredible data about various security and development actors (UN and state agencies, international and bilateral donor organizations, financial institutions, NGOs) involved in measuring state fragility, their methodology, findings and different indices and lists of fragile states, such as state agencies and departments, international and regional organizations, financial institutions. Apart from providing us with reach and detailed data, she critically refers to the empirical difficulties and tendency to tautological conclusions within those actors' research, bringing us back to the problem of theoretical vagueness and her primary hypothesis.

What distinguishes this research on failed states from a vast literature (from Helman and Ratner's article officially establishing the term in 1994 to Fukuyama's proclamation that failed states were of primary concern for the World in the 21st century in 2004) is a comprehensive analysis on historical and political context in which the concept has emerged and developed. Namely, in the third chapter, Susan L. Woodward brought us back to the end of the Cold War, as a moment of transition in ordering new international system with the intention to identify critical junctures that provided a field for a new 'battle of concepts'(p.5), in which the concept of 'rogue state' won. It was the evaporation of the Soviet threat and the need for the creation of a new enemy to justify America's superpower that made it possible, she concludes. However, this was not just a security-related solution, highly supported by military officials in the George H.W. Bush Administration, but the one highly related to the development officials' concerns for their organizational survival that seemed to require a new strategic positioning. For both, military actors, such as NATO and development actors, such as the IMF, state failure became a 'conceptual framework for foreign economic and security policies' (p.2.) in the upcoming years. The link between security and development will be continuously examined through all chapters of the book as an important part of the equation within the idea of failed states.

Once she explained the variety of actors and purposes of using the term failed state, in the second part of the book, Professor Woodward goes further in

explanation of the idea of state-building as a unique and self-explained solution for the problem. Starting from the major argument that failed state – ‘a state that is unable to control its territory and uphold its internal legal order’ – represents a major security threat, she seeks to explain why and how state-building has been recognized as the only possible solution. Namely, despite the differences between indices and methodology in measuring fragility, all of them agree on the need for internationally led intervention to ‘fix, repair and build labelled state’. (p.7) Therefore, she asks what if this is wrong and how one can now that? The answer obviously lies in assessing the results of such programs, examined in detail and presented in Chapter 5.

Referring to a vast literature assessing the efficiency of state-building interventions and highlighting mostly discouraging findings among them since 1992, she aims to go further and refocus analysing what external actors actually do when they implement their program calling it state-building. The answer she offers is that the primary focus of external actors is to ‘build their own capacity to do state-building’ (p.124), whereas institutionalization as a goal within the program of state-building is achieved not in the labelled countries but within intervening actors and their organizational capacities. This conclusion brings us to the beginning of the book and a context in which the ideas emerged. Namely, if the major reason for choosing this concept was maintaining the roles of global actors in the post-Cold War international sphere, then the results of such practice confirm the argument. Therefore, the Professor’s argument should be understood in a historical context. Although she confirms the importance of criticism of practical results, with this argument Professor Woodward wants to prevent missing the major question – underlying reason for both the existence of the concept and the persistence of the practice based on it.

After an examination of the major theoretical problems with the concept, in Chapter 6, Professor Woodward examines the practice in order to identify what she perceives as major operational constraints. Namely, the way this concept is portrayed produces operational pathologies and practices that defeat the purpose previously identified in the programs of state-building practice. Three major operational constraints for external actors are the sovereign consent of the state, political will of responsible interlocutors and administrative capacities needed for local implementation of internationally led decisions and programs. The solutions aimed to address these issues in practices produce the opposite results since the measures aimed at overcoming these issues include taking over responsibilities in favour of external management and pushing the process of democratization and marketization, which finally results in various forms of co-governance or total bypassing the state. To prove her arguments, she refers to the OECD report assessing that in the last quarter of a century, the number of countries that managed to graduate out from the category of failed or fragile

ranges from zero to four. Additionally, this concept prevents improving the outcomes and changes in labelled countries in at least two ways. Firstly, by ‘camouflaging the actual issues that would need to be addressed’ (p.250), such as the root causes of causes or the state-building model that might bring sustainable peace and true economic development. Secondly, by ‘driving the attention from the crucial questions for labelled states’ (p.250), what specific state organization each of them needs to provide security and economic development.

Although one may conclude that the Professor’s approach towards the idea of state-building is highly critical, in the last chapters, she reaffirms the importance of the link between security and development, which is obviously part of the equation. Nevertheless, she claims that this link is only rhetorically supported within the idea of post-Cold War state-building practice, while at the same time two groups of actors are operating separately, with distinct organizational and financial principles, which eventually produce contradictory demands within labelled countries, creating unintended outcomes and operational constraints that were previously mentioned. What she proposes is the structural reform of these two groups of security and development institutions, created in the aftermath of World War II in the way they can serve their real purpose.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Professor Susan L. Woodward, besides being a distinguished scholar and a prominent professor of political science, has incredible policy experience in conflict and post-conflict areas, including the region of the Balkans. This provides her with a broad perspective and a comprehensive approach which has definitely shaped conclusions and assessments presented in this book as well. Therefore, this book represents a great contribution to the profound understanding of the concepts repeatedly used in international relations discourse in the last decades and a critical perspective on the practice that shaped the lives of many.

Sandra DAVIDOVIĆ

„THE BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE IN THE GLOBAL ARENA-CHINESE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES“

Cheng Yu, Song Lilei, Huang Lihe (eds.), *The Belt & Road Initiative in the Global Arena-Chinese and European Perspectives*, Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore, 2018, pp. 266.

We have in front of us one of the first books to offer meaningful analysis and discussion about the Belt and Road Initiative - one of the most significant economic projects of today, implemented by the People's Republic of China. This book is the result of an international forum entitled "The Belt and Road to a Better Future: China-Europe Youth Dialogue", which aimed to bring together young researchers from Europe and Asia to contribute to understanding strategies and goals of this significant project. This international forum was initiated by Dr. Yu Cheng, Dr. Lilei Song, and Dr. Lihe Huang from Tongji University.

The book is divided into four parts, and they are: 1. Comprehension and Communication on the Belt and Road Initiative, 2. Regional Cooperation in the Belt and Road Initiative, 3. Economic Cooperation in the Belt and Road Initiative and 4. Geopolitical Challenge in the Belt and Road Initiative. These four parts consist of fourteen scientific papers. The authors of these papers are: Yu Cheng, Dragana Mitrovic, Lihe Huang, Lilci Song and Zhao Qiqi, Agnes Szunomár, Piotr Bajor, Ikboljon Qoraboyev, Balázs Sarvaari and Anna Szeidovitz, Ida Musialkowska, Dimitry Doronin, Mireia Paulo, Filippan, Filippan and Junbo Jian.

In order to become more familiar with the purpose of the book, we will first introduce what the Belt and Road Initiative project stands for. The Belt and Road Initiative project was first introduced in September 2013 in Astana, Kazakhstan, when the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, visited this country. On that occasion, he proposed the project The Silk Road Economic Belt that would connect Asia and Europe. Subsequently, a month later, in Indonesia, President Xi Jinping also proposed a New Maritime Silk Road of the twenty-first century. President Xi Jinping also announced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, whose primary purpose was to support financing and cooperation within this project. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to restore the historic Silk Road and create Eurasian economic and cultural cooperation. This project covers 65 countries, more than a third of the world economy, and half of the world's population. The project aims to create economic corridors as well as political, economic, and cultural cooperation between Europe and Asia. The goal is to create a win-win situation in which all countries will benefit from significant economic opportunities and free trade agreements. The greatest benefit for the countries involved in this economic and

cultural project is the development of new, modern infrastructure such as roads, ports, railways and pipelines. In addition, the Initiative will have the effect of reducing travel costs and increasing the visibility of rare products. Economic cooperation will, according to the authors, also provide a more stable environment, which will primarily contribute to cooperation and understanding so that the economies of the countries involved can function smoothly.

The book *The Belt & Road Initiative in the Global Arena - Chinese and European Perspectives*, pays the most attention to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as their cooperation with the People's Republic of China within the Belt and Road Initiative. Special emphasis was given to Poland. Specifically, the book analyzes the activities and soft power of the People's Republic of China directed at the countries of CEE through 16 + 1 cooperation. The 16 + 1 cooperation began in 2012, and it aims to present the cultural diplomacy and a good image of the People's Republic of China vis-à-vis the CEE countries so that CEE citizens could accept the cooperation between the People's Republic of China and Europe under this project more easily. It is the CEE countries that represent the "bridge" between the European Union and China, and with their cooperation send a positive signal to other European countries that it is useful to participate in this significant project.

In addition to the CEE countries, the cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and the People's Republic of China as well as the cooperation between the Balkans and the People's Republic of China within the Belt and Road Initiative project was analyzed. The authors state that the People's Republic of China is one of the largest economic partners of all Central Asian countries and that economic cooperation in this region has increased in recent years. The authors also state that the bilateral relations of the countries of Central Asia and the People's Republic of China are warm, and above all, they refer to the bilateral relations of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with the People's Republic of China. The Belt and Road Initiative project is welcomed in that region, but the authors also point to the fact that the Central Asian region is an area of interest for other major powers, such as the EU, Russia, Turkey and the United States. According to this fact, the People's Republic of China may also face economic competition in the Central Asian region. Regarding the presence of the People's Republic of China within the Belt and Road Initiative in the Balkans, we must say that China's presence is also important in this region. Beijing considers the Republic of Serbia a key country in the Balkans and seeks to strengthen ties with the Republic of Serbia to strengthen ties with the entire Balkan region, according to Jian. However, as in the case of Central Asian countries, the countries of the Balkans also represent an area of interest of the great powers, and in this sense, the presence of the People's Republic of China in the Balkans can be treated as a challenge for the EU, Russia and Turkey.

The book also contains scientific papers that offer opportunities to look at the cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the field of the creative economy, as well as the possibilities and proposals for creating the so-called e-Silk Road through the fifth-generation digital industry (5G). The book also offers a significant view on Afghanistan, i.e., the challenges that the People's Republic of China may have in implementing the Belt and Road Initiative project in that country.

Significant work is the work of Yu Chang, who discusses the need for more detailed and comprehensive information and research about the Belt and Road Initiative project to familiarize the countries that are in the Initiative with the aspirations of the People's Republic of China. This is also evidenced by a recent study by the PEW Research Center, which discusses the divided opinion of the international public on the goals and nature of the Belt and Road Initiative.¹

The book *The Belt & Road Initiative at the Global Arena - Chinese and European Perspectives* is a significant study of one of the most important economic projects of today - the Belt and Road Initiative. This book describes in a meaningful and comprehensive way the aspirations of the People's Republic of China within the Belt and Road Initiative, especially in CEE, Central Asia, and in the Balkans. We must emphasize that the book also presents the challenges that the People's Republic of China may face in implementing this major project, as well as recommendations for removing possible obstacles. These recommendations mainly consist of a more intensive presence of the Belt and Road Initiative in the media, academia and the public so that people can become more familiar with the benefits of this project. This study will benefit many researchers in the fields of economics, international relations and political science, but it will also enable governments and decision-makers to take a closer look at the perspectives this project offers.

Mirela LONČAR

¹ <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/01/international-publics-divided-on-china/>, Accessed: 05.10.2019.

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Paper length:

Research papers should not exceed 6000 words including abstracts, references, acknowledgements and footnotes.

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A separate title page should be attached. This will be detached during the refereeing stage to maintain the anonymity of the author. The title page should include: The name(s) of the author(s); a concise and informative title; the affiliation(s) and address(es) of the author(s); the e-mail address of the author(s); the author(s) academic biography, up to 150 words, in the third persons. If the first author is not the corresponding author, this should be clearly indicated.

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Please, provide an abstract of 100 to 250 words in English. The abstract should not contain any undefined abbreviations or unspecified references. Please, provide 5 to 10 keywords which can be used for indexing purposes.

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The manuscript text file should be submitted in Word or other similar format. Use a normal, plain font (12-point Times New Roman) for text, line spacing 1 (single), justified. The title of the paper should be written in capital letters, bold, font size 14. Page setup margins should be 2.5 cm (top, bottom, left, right), paper size A4. Use italics for emphasis. Use the automatic page numbering function to number the pages. Abbreviations should be defined at first mention and used consistently thereafter.

Paper body:

An article may be divided into three levels of sub-divisions. Level one section should be introduced by a heading printed in capital letters, bold, centered. Level two sections should be introduced by a heading printed with the initial capital letter, centered. Level three sections should be introduced by a heading printed in Italic with the initial capital letter, centered. Paragraphs should be indented.

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Any quotation needs to be followed by reference including page number. Use single quotation marks, except where ‘a quotation is “within” a quotation’.

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Acknowledgments of people, grants, funds, etc. should be placed in footnote on the first page. The names of funding organizations should be written in full.

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(Miljus, 2009; Novičić, 2006; Vučić, 2011, Young, 1999).

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Author, A.A..(Year of Publication).*Title of work* [E-Reader Version]. Retrieved from <http://xxxx> or [doi:xxxx](https://doi.org/xxxx)

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Eggers, D. (2008). *The circle* [Kindle Version]. Retrieved from <http://www.amazon.com/>

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Serviss, G. P. (1911). A trip of terror. *In A Columbus of space* (pp. 17-32). New York, NY: Appleton.

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EC. (2002). Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal of the European Communities L201 37–47, 31 July (European Commission, Brussels).

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The REVIEW of International Affairs
/ editor-in-chief Slobodan Janković. - Vol. 1,
no. 1 (1950)- . - Beograd : Institute of
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(Beograd : Donat graf). - 24 cm

Tromesečno.

ISSN 0486-6096 = Review of International
Affairs

COBISS.SR-ID 3154178

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