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NORTH EAST OF ARGENTINA – A STRATEGIC REGION



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TWO CENTURIES OF THE ITALIAN – SERBIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (19TH – 21ST CENTURY)

Stanislav SRETENović¹

Abstract: The history of Italo-Serbian diplomatic, i.e., political, economic and cultural relations in the 19th and 20th centuries can be seen in two ways: as a series of events and processes that would acquire their full meaning only with the accession of Serbia to the European Union where Italy is one of the founders and represents one of the key actors; or, as a series of ups and downs in relations, unexpected events and processes, accidental and ideologically orientated contacts of individuals and groups, accurate or inaccurate Italian perceptions of Serbs and vice versa, which in fact did little to dispel mutual stereotypes and help establish a deeper relationship between the two peoples and their states.

Key words: Serbia, Italy, Serbs, Italians, history of Serbo-Italian relations, diplomacy, Giuseppe Mazzini, Great Wars.

The history of Italo-Serbian diplomatic, i.e., political, economic and cultural relations in the 19th and 20th centuries can be seen in two ways: as a series of events and processes that would acquire their full meaning only with the accession of Serbia to the European Union where Italy is one of the founders and represents one of the key actors; or, as a series of ups and downs in relations, unexpected events and processes, accidental and ideologically orientated contacts of individuals and groups, accurate or inaccurate Italian perceptions of Serbs and vice versa, which in fact did little to dispel mutual stereotypes and help establish a deeper relationship between the two peoples and their states.

This twofold approach in fact reflects the different political culture, mentalities, ideology, time and ways of looking at the Italian and Serbian past. Even today a researcher and scholar of Italo-Serbian relations will have difficulty resisting the dilemmas that once occupied the minds of many Italians and Serbs: the idea of the state or the romantic passion of the 19th century; the Cavourian

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or the Mazzinian approach to politics; the “right” or the “left”; monarchy or republic; the imperial or national principle; church or state; autocracy or democracy; centralism or regionalism; the wealthy North or the underprivileged South; national or European identity, or both.

However, the aim of this text is not to pass judgment on these events or interpretations of the past of these two peoples and states; instead, it hopes to critically approach their relations, place them in a broader European context, and explain the decision-making process on both sides as well as the existence of economic interests or cultural influences and transfers, which almost always went from Italy to Serbia and rarely in the opposite direction. This imbalance was the main characteristic of Italo-Serbian relations in long-lasting processes, whereby the ambitions of both Italy and Serbia had often surpassed their real power and capabilities. Other characteristics of these relations include: geographic proximity, relative economic compatibility and the cultural differences of the two peoples.

The Italian unification of 1861 profoundly changed the diplomatic, political, economic and cultural map of Europe. Italy was a newcomer in the club of the great powers, which it entered with frustration because it constantly had to prove itself as a great power. Serbia was a small, weak state that spent the 19th century in an incessant struggle for independence from centuries-long Ottoman rule, and the Serbian ambition for national unification had often surpassed its realistic demographic and material capabilities. However, through the Adriatic Sea and the Balkan rivers, the ideas of the Italian Risorgimento easily reached Serbia, whose central geographic position in the Balkans, commercial potential and large reserves of raw materials did not escape Italian businessmen. Although Italians and Serbs were drawn closer by their aspirations for unity under national rather than foreign dynasties in an anti-Habsburg context (the Houses of Savoy, Karađorđević, Obrenović and Petrović), they still had many cultural differences as the result of the traditions of the distant past (classical antiquity and the Middle Ages), language, and religious affiliation: the Italian devotion to Catholicism and the Vatican, and the Serbian attachment to Eastern Orthodoxy embodied in its own autocephalous church. With this historical legacy, Italy and Serbia were allies and victors in World War I. They both contributed to the dissolution and disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but quickly became rivals on the Adriatic because of Serbian support to Croatian and Slovenian anti-Italian nationalism under the guise of pro-Yugoslav ideology. Then, the ideological burdens of fascism and communism for decades hampered Italo-Serbian relations, which were restored to their real basis only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the tragic war in the former Yugoslavia.

THE SARDINIAN LEGACY OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY AND AUTONOMOUS SERBIA (1861-1878)

Italo-Serbian relations were first established in the Middle Ages; however, due to their nature and chronological distance, they will not be discussed in this paper. Nevertheless, some 19th- and 20th century authors, especially Serbian, recalled these ancient relations in a bid to bolster Italo-Serbian rapprochement by providing some historical depth. In fact, in the first half of the 19th century, the relations of these two peoples rarely went beyond the level of ideas and notional speculations. There were many Italians and Serbs who, carried away by Romantic zeal, considered the possibility of cooperation between their respective national movements, while the influence of the Italian Risorgimento did have some importance for the shaping of Serbian national aspirations (Anzilotti (1920). From 1849 on, as a consequence of the “Spring of Nations”, the Serbs started founding their own national organizations with plans of insurrection following the Italian model.

Among prominent Italians of the 19th century, there were two figures of cultural and political interest for the Slavic world including the Serbs and Serbia: the philosopher and patriot Giuseppe Mazzini² (1805, Genoa – 1872, Pisa) and the linguist and journalist Niccolo Tommaseo³ (1802, Sebenico/Šibenik – 1874, Firenze). Mazzini was a revolutionary of republican and democratic convictions who became a symbol of the national principle in Europe. By the end of the 1850s, his ideas had become accepted by a few liberals in Serbia, at the time an autonomous principality of the Ottoman Empire. From his accession in 1860 Prince Mihajlo Obrenović saw Serbia in the role of the Balkan Piedmont. Unlike Mazzini, Tommaseo was a liberal Catholic who was in favour of Italy as a federal republic under the leadership of the Holy See. Born in Sebenico and educated in Spalato, he grew up in contact with the Croats and the Serbs from Dalmatia, where he became acquainted with the ideas of the Illyrian movement. In addition, during his life, he maintained correspondence with Petar II Petrović-Njegoš and Medo Pucić (Stipčević (1970)).

In the mid-19th century, besides these personal contacts and intellectual influences the establishment of continuous, official diplomatic and economic relations between one Italian kingdom – the Kingdom of Sardinia, with Torino as its capital – and the Principality of Serbia was of importance. In March 1849, with the support of the diplomatic representative of Sardinia in Constantinople

² Mazzini's letters and newspaper articles on Slavs were collected and published in: Mazzini (1939); Serbian translation: Macini (2005).

³ Tommaseo (1841-1842).

and the consent of the Ottoman Porte, the Sardinian Consul Marcello Cerruti (1808, Genoa – 1896, Rome) arrived in Serbia (Тамбова, 2007, 57-58). Although young, Cerruti was already an experienced diplomat who would go on to become the ambassador in Constantinople, and an important associate of Camillo Cavour (1810-1861). Cerruti kept contacts with Avram Petronijević (Поповић, 2012), one of the most important members of the *Ustavobranitelji* (Defenders of the Constitution) regime and with Ilija Garašanin (Мекензи, 1987), Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his stay in Serbia in 1849, he worked to provide care for Italian volunteers who had escaped across the border from Hungary to Belgrade after the failure of the Hungarian Revolution. He also invested efforts to further the rapprochement between the Serbs, and through the Serbs, the South Slavs and Hungarians, to advance anti-Austrian plans, and tried to influence Serbian newspapers to write affirmatively on Italian aspirations for unification. During this period, among the unsatisfied Hungarians in the Austrian Empire a Savoyan colonel called Baron Alessandro Monti (1818, Brescia-1854, Torino) arrived to Belgrade and worked to collect information about the possibility of cooperation between the Hungarians and the Serbs.

The Kingdom of Sardinia became particularly important for Serbia with regard to Russia after the Treaty of Paris of 1856 which ended the Crimean War. With this peace treaty, Sardinia became one of the guarantors of the international status of Serbia, a role that strengthened its morale and political positions in the small Balkan principality. From that moment, relations with Serbia became one of the important questions of the Sardinian foreign policy. This was the reason behind the deployment of Francesco Astengo in 1859 to Serbia as the envoy of the Kingdom of Sardinia. A very able consul born in Savona in Liguria, Astengo spent a year as the representative of King Victor Emmanuel II (Vittorio Emanuele II) in Belgrade (Тамбова, 2007, 73-83.). Unusually for diplomats at the time, he had a very friendly and close relationship with the Serbs and was accepted by them with particular warmth. Owing to his behaviour and activities, he managed to reach different layers of the Serbian society, not settling for the usual and often isolated contacts with the ruling elite. In his dispatches, he gave important testimonies on the Serbian society, the mentality of the people, the political elite and the behaviour of his fellow consuls in Belgrade. Probably because of his emphasized openness, he won the favour of the elderly Prince Miloš Obrenović, who was already familiar with Italians through Bartolomeo Cunierti (Куниберти, 1901), his personal doctor and man of confidence. Prince Miloš used to talk and travel around Serbia with Astengo, addressing him as “my son Stanko” and later awarded him Serbian citizenship (Тамбова, 2007, 100-107). Due to the reputation his country had acquired in Serbia after the Italian victories against the Austrians at Magenta and Solferino, Astengo witnessed the gathering of crowds in front of the Sardinian consulate

in Belgrade shouting “Long live Italy”, “Long live King Vittorio Emmanuelle” and “Long live Cavour”, as if the Serbs had won these victories. At that time, Astengo received instructions from his government to investigate the possibility of storing weapons for a Serbian insurrection against the Habsburgs along the banks of the Danube. However, this plan never came to fruition, and Astengo was ordered to discontinue interest in armament matters and focus his attention on the Serbian trade.

The trade prospects of Serbia in 1860-1861 were addressed by Astengo’s successor in Belgrade Vincenzo Durio (Тамбора, 2007, 117-122). Having previously served as the Sardinian consul in Galatz (Galați), a Romanian town on the Danube, Durio was a consul with a rich experience in the Balkans and one of the rare diplomats that knew the Turkish language. In his dispatches, Durio carefully examined the Danube – that European fluvial trade “boulevard”, which links a huge number of peoples – and thought of different regional political combinations, critically analyzing the Serbian society, its lack of aristocracy and small fledgling bourgeois class. Durio noted with regret the poverty of Belgrade and the lack of industrial and developed commercial activities on the Sava and Danube rivers. But politically, when Cavour won his military and diplomatic victories, making Italian unification certain, Durio received instructions from his government to try to ease the tensions in the Balkans provoked by Serbian national aspirations. Events in Serbia, among the Serbs in Hungary and in the Balkans, continued to be followed by Durio’s successor in Belgrade Stefano Scovasso, another experienced Sardinian diplomat.

However, from 1861, the diplomacy of the new Kingdom of Italy, with Florence as its capital, did not maintain full continuity with the diplomatic efforts of the Kingdom of Sardinia in Serbia. The Italian diplomacy ordered its representatives in Serbia and the Balkans to work toward the reconciliation of the Ottoman Empire and the Serbs and the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans (Алексић-Пејковић 1979). It was with these instructions that Luigi Joannini came to Belgrade as the Consul General of Italy (1868-1879). It is important to note that at the time the young Kingdom of Italy was concentrated on the resolution of numerous problems of its internal policy and the consolidation of its position as a new great power on the international stage. It was not anymore about the diplomacy and policy of one Italian kingdom, the Kingdom of Sardinia, in the struggle for the unification of the Apennine Peninsula. Nevertheless, until the late 1860, Italy pursued an anti-Austrian policy and was sympathetic to Serbian aspirations. Furthermore, Italy expanded its territory through the acquisition of the region of Venice in 1866 and the city of Rome in 1871, which became the capital of the Kingdom, a development that opened the complex question of the relations between the state and the Vatican.

In the period after 1871, with the reserved attitude of state officials, the Irredentist movement (from Italian *irredenta* – unredeemed) developed among Italians, in 1876 launching the struggle for the unification of the remaining provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that were seen as Italian, such as Dalmatia, an area also inhabited by Croats and Serbs. At that time, interest in Serbia reappeared among Italians (Алексић-Пејковић, 2015). In the name of good Italo-Serbian relations, in 1874 the sculptor Enrico Pazzi was commissioned to make the monument in the Theatre Square in Belgrade to Mihailo Obrenović, a great admirer of the Italian Risorgimento. During the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876, the Italian journalist Nicola Lazzaro visited Serbia and wrote an important account of this conflict (Lazzaro, 1877)⁴. Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule also cooperated with the Italians (Екмечић, 2019). The leaders of the Herzegovina Uprising (1875-1878), especially Mićo Ljubibratić, had contacts with Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807, Nice – 1882, Caprera) and met him on the island of Caprera near Sardinia before travelling to Rome. The two movements, Italian and Serbian, planned to strengthen their ties, to reform and democratize. The result of these intentions was the deployment of a contingent of the International Legion, consisting mostly of Garibaldi's volunteers, to fight on the side of the Herzegovina Uprising; it then moved to Serbia, where a unit was created to participate in the Serbo-Turkish War on the Drina river.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND INDEPENDENT SERBIA AND THEIR EVOLUTION (1879-1915)

At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, as one of the great powers Italy supported the views of Jovan Ristić (Ристић, с. а.), the envoy of Prince Milan Obrenović and the leader of the Serbian delegation who, as the representative of a small polity, did not have the right of decision. As a result of the international recognition of the Principality of Serbia as an independent state at the Congress, in January 1879 Italo-Serbian diplomatic relations were raised to the level of Plenipotentiary Ministers (Serbian - *poslanik na strani*) of Italy in Belgrade and of Serbia in Rome. Giuseppe Tornielli, the first Italian representative with that title, soon arrived in Serbia (1879-1881).

Besides the official diplomatic relations between the two countries, Italians and Serbs established contacts due to the policy of economic colonization pursued by Austria-Hungary, the powerful neighbor of both Italy and Serbia. As a consequence of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

⁴ Serbian translation: Лазаро (2006); See also: Алексић-Пејковић (1985).

from 1879 the Empire began settling some of its rural population from its different parts to this province, which had been under Ottoman control for centuries and was mostly inhabited by Serbs; in this process, a part of the Italian-speaking population of Tyrol was settled in the village of Mahovljani near Banja Luka (Екмечић, 2019).

While Italy tried to resolve its relations with Austria-Hungary by entering the Triple Alliance in 1882 (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy), Serbia, following its rapprochement with the Dual Monarchy (the so-called 'Secret' Austro-Serbian Convention of 1881), was proclaimed a kingdom and focused its policy on the South-eastern Balkans, fighting an unsuccessful war against Bulgaria three years later (1885). As a member of the Triple Alliance, Italy pursued less of a "continental" and more of a "Mediterranean" policy and the main proponent of this policy was Francesco Crispi (1819, Ribera-1901, Napoli), who served several terms as Prime Minister and minister of different fields. In the Balkans and the Adriatic, this meant that the interest of the official Italian policy for Serbia had decreased, while it increased regarding independent Montenegro and the Albanian tribes in the Ottoman Empire.

In fact, the Kingdom of Italy increased interest in Northern Africa, where it wished to build its colonial empire. However, at the end of the 19th century, in 1896, the Italian foreign policy changed once again, with the consequences of this turnaround affecting Serbia. That year, after its defeat in the Battle of Adwa in Ethiopia and the fall of Crispi's second cabinet (1893-1896), Italy chose to return to its "European" and "continental" policy. Still a member of the Triple Alliance, it got closer to France, its "Latin sister" and rival, with the aim of entering the Paris stock exchange, at the time the most important equity market. Italy also counted on French support to expand its influence in the Balkans and on the eastern coast of the Adriatic. With these ambitions, the Italian government played a diplomatic "waltz" between France and Austria-Hungary, trying not to sever its alliance with the latter (Milza, 1981). The Italian policy took a more specific form in 1901, when Italian engineers and investors worked together with the French on plans for the construction of an Adriatic railway to connect San Giovanni di Medua on the Albanian coast of the Ottoman Empire and Russia, via Serbia and Romania. There were also plans to create a French-Italian-Russian-Serbian consortium for the railway construction, the idea supported by Milenko Vesnić, the Serbian Plenipotentiary Minister in Rome (1901-1902), and his successor Milovan Milovanović (1903-1907) (Ђорђевић, 1962; Мекензи, 2007). In 1908, the Italian government supported a similar project of a railway route between the Adriatic and the Black Sea via Serbia. However, the Italian government withdrew from the project because of the rivalry of privately owned banks - the French *Banque impériale ottomane* and the Italian *Banca commerciale*. The latter had been advised to invest independently in the mines in the Asian part of

the Ottoman Empire, while the project of the Adriatic railway fell through as a result of the breakout of the Annexation crisis. During the crisis, the poet and future Plenipotentiary Minister to Italy, Jovan Dučić, was sent by the Serbian government as a journalist to Rome on a propaganda mission against the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Doutchitch, 1908).

Thus, in the first decade of the 20th century, the traditionally good Italian-Serbian relations entered a period of crisis. The interests of the Italian and Serbian governments were at odds (Живојиновић, 2013): while Serbia strove to unite its co-nationals to the detriment of the declining Ottoman Empire and possibly even reach the sea in Northern Albania, Italy supported the creation of an autonomous Albanian principality in its orbit; while Serbia supported the expressions of Yugoslav nationalism in Austria-Hungary, the Italian public opinion saw in this hidden anti-Italian plans; while Serbia saw Montenegro headed by the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty as another Serbian state, Italy established ties between this dynasty and its royal house of Savoy through the marriage (1896) of the future King Victor Emmanuel III to Princess Elena (Jelena), one of King Nikola's daughters. Despite the diverging interests of the two states at the time, a part of the Serbian public opinion portrayed Italy as a young, prosperous, enthusiastic and civilized country that should be a model for Serbia. Inherited from the 19th century, the idea that Serbia should represent the Piedmont of the Balkans was particularly propagated in the Serbian society through the construction of the cult of the state by the newspapers *Serbian Piedmont* (1903-1905) and *Piedmont* (1911-1915)⁵.

However, while in March and April 1911 Italy celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the state in Turin, Florence and Rome, the Italo-Turkish War which broke out six months later, in September 1911, was more relevant for Serbia. Italian successes in the war had shown that the Ottoman Empire was not invincible. This encouraged the Serbian government of Milovan Milovanović (1911/12), an experienced diplomat and former envoy to Rome, to work on the realization of the Balkan League against the “sick man upon the Bosphorus”. Moreover, the Italo-Turkish War had a certain impact on the strengthening of cultural and trade relations between Italy and Serbia: during the war many Italians expelled from Turkey passed through Belgrade, including Dr. Ettore Luigi Aschieri, previously the founder and director of the Ottoman library in Salonika, who became the first reader for the Italian language at the University of Belgrade; at the same time the export of Serbian livestock to Italy increased. During the Balkan Wars, the Italian military attaché in Serbia, Carlo Papa

⁵ This tradition was later followed by the *Yugoslav Piedmont* (1920-1921) and the *New Piedmont* (1927).

Castiglione, approvingly noted the organization and operations of the Serbian army while his government strengthened its relations with Montenegro and got closer to its ally Austria-Hungary in the matter of the creation of an independent Albanian state (1913) and keeping Serbia landlocked. However, the outbreak of World War I in 1914 split the Italian political elite and public opinion into the supporters and opponents of Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Entente, while many advocates of the change of its allied camp had Serbophile feelings.

ITALO-SERBIAN RELATIONS DURING THE GREAT WAR: BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND RIVALRY (1915-1920)

While the Serbian government's Niš Declaration of December 1914 on the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one state passed unnoticed by the Serbian allies, it troubled Italy because its own plans were in direct opposition to Croatian and Slovenian territorial claims supported by Serbia under the Yugoslav mask. Italy then switched allegiance and entered the war in April 1915 on the side of the Entente after having signed the Treaty of London, which promised that it would receive the Austro-Hungarian territories on which the Croatian and Slovenian national movements had pretensions (Istria, Quarnaro and Dalmatia). From April 1915, Serbia *de facto* became an Italian ally and rival in the struggle for the Austro-Hungarian legacy in the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea.

At that time, two views on the country's relations with Serbia were formulated on the Italian political scene and in the public opinion. The first, personified in Sidney Sonnino (1847, Pisa-1922, Rome), Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1914 to 1919, argued in favor of the expansion of Serbia in Central Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sirmium (Srem) (Sonnino, 1922). This view was against the creation of a Yugoslav state on the eastern coast of the Adriatic because it feared that such a state would be a potential threat to Italy in that region and a future minion of Italy's great allies and rivals – France and Russia. The second was embodied in Gaetano Salvemini (1873, Molfetta-1957, Sorrento), a liberal socialist, political publicist and historian, who at the beginning of the war supported the creation of "Great Serbia" and later the formation of a Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia as a barrier to German expansionism. This strategic and ideological dilemma regarding Serbia born during World War I persisted for a long time among Italian politicians and the public opinion.

However, on the battlefield, the Italian navy was a key participant in the Allied evacuation of the Serbian army and a part of civilians from the Albanian Adriatic coast (Garibaldi Quattrini, 1918; Nicotra, 1923; Leva, 1935; Ђордани, 2015) after October 1915 and the Serbian retreat through Montenegro and Albania (Сретеновић/Sretenović, 2016). The Italian Plenipotentiary Minister to Serbia, Baron Nicola Squitti (1912-1916), also took part in the retreat. During the Serbian

retreat, Gabrielle D'Annunzio wrote a poem on the Serbian nation, steering the Italian public opinion in favor of the Serbs (D'Annunzio, 1915), while the Italian press reported on the displacement of the Serbian court and refugees⁶. From 1916, on the Macedonian (Salonika) Front, the Italian army numbering around 50.000 troops, with its 35th Division under the command of General Carlo Petitti di Roreto, fought side-by-side with the Allied armies, showing its respect for the Serbian army and particularly its general (*vojvoda*) Živojin Mišić⁷.

However, in 1917, the fall of tsarist Russia, the Italian defeat at Caporetto (Kobaridi) and the entry of the United States of America into the conflict completely changed the political and military situation in Europe, which of course had an impact on the Balkans. With the loss of its secular Orthodox and Slavic Russian ally, Serbia grew closer to France and Great Britain. The Yugoslav program of the Serbian government increased in importance after the promulgation of the Corfu Declaration in July 1917 and the support of the United States. From that moment, some Italian politicians firmly pledged to work towards the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and were strongly in favor of the creation of a unified South Slavic state. These ideas were supported by liberal conservatives such as Luigi Albertini (1871, Ancona-1941, Rome), the editor of the influential daily newspaper *Corriere della Sera* and member of the Italian Senate. He propagated ideas about the creation of Yugoslavia, an agreement on territorial division and friendly relations with this imagined eastern neighbor. But even the most moderate of Italian ideas were met with uncompromising responses from Croatian and Slovenian nationalists supported by Serbs in the name of pro-Yugoslav ideology. In fact, the policy of nationalities was a strong means of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, although it did not offer an answer to the key question: how to reconcile the territorial pretensions of two or more nationalist movements?

Moreover, the Italian victory in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto and the Armistice of Villa Giusti on 3 November 1918, led to tensions between Italian soldiers and Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian prisoners from the Austro-Hungarian army, who were supported by Serbia. Nevertheless, the relations between allies and rivals, Italy and Serbia, were decided both on the “ground” in the disputed regions and at the international level: the Inter-Allied Commission of Control allowed Italy to occupy all territories promised to her by the Treaty of London. In the regions contested by the Italians and Croats, Slovenes and

⁶ “Re Pietro di Serbia a Valona”, *La Stampa*, Torino, 24 Dicembre 1915, p. 1.; “Tre giorni fra i profughi della Serbia”, *La Stampa*, Torino, 29 Dicembre 1915, p. 3.; “Il principe ereditario di Serbia arriverà stamane a Roma”, *La Stampa*, Torino, 16 Marzo 1916, p. 1.

⁷ See Italian testimonies: Fraccaroli (1915); Fraccaroli (1916); Carpi (1917); Galli (1934).

Serbs, a race for the occupation of these territories and the bringing of the opposing side to a *fait accompli* began between the Italian and the Serbian army supported by the French *Armée d'Orient*. In addition, many Italians took advantage of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary to demand their unification with the motherland. Thus, the Italian National Council of Fiume proclaimed the unification of this city with Italy, although this had not been included in the Treaty of London, while the Croats claimed the city was theirs, citing their majority in the suburbs and representing themselves as the “Slavic” population.

At the Paris Peace Conference, the conflicting claims of the Italian and the Serbian delegations led the Italians to withdraw from the negotiations (Mitrović, 1969). Invoking the principle of nationality, the Serbian delegation presented its maximalist demands, which entailed the unification of Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Dalmatia and Northern Albania with the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SCS) proclaimed in Belgrade on 1 December 1918. Its arguments, based on the research and views of Jovan Cvijić, seemed acceptable, especially within the French circles in which this Serbian scholar had some influence (Трговчевић, 1987). Nevertheless, the French delegation was in favor of a compromise solution, while the Italian demands were firmly opposed by the American president Woodrow Wilson, the most influential champion of the principle of nationality at the Paris Peace Conference. Not being in a position to resolve the territorial dispute between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS, the Conference decided to leave the matter to be resolved in bilateral negotiations between the two opposing sides.

ITALY’S “MUTILATED VICTORY” AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE CHANGING RELATIONS WITH THE SERBS IN THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES/YUGOSLAVIA (1920-1943)

Italy and Serbia were thus allies and victors in World War I. But while Italy was a dissatisfied power and felt that its victory had been “mutilated” (Italian: *vittoria mutilata*) because it had not reached its goals at the peace conference, Serbia was satisfied but its victory had been paid with numerous casualties and the material devastation of national territory. Because of its sacrifices, Serbia was held in high esteem by the Allies and enjoyed the support of France, which sought to keep the Kingdom SCS under its influence but without endangering its relations with Italy (Sretenović, 2008). Nevertheless, the change in Italo-Serbian relations occurred only after Wilson’s retirement from politics in the United States and the election of Giovanni Giolitti (1842, Mondovì-1928, Cavour), a seasoned liberal politician, as the Prime Minister of Italy, along with the appointment of Count Carlo Sforza (1872, Lucca-1952, Rome), the former Plenipotentiary

Minister at the Serbian court during the war (1916-1918) and an admirer of Nikola Pašić, as Minister of Foreign Affairs (Срочира, 1937; Sforza, 1938). They wished to improve the Italian alliance with France and to strengthen relations with Serbs, who wielded the power in the Kingdom of SCS but were faced with interior problems in the consolidation of their new state. In return for Istria and Quarnaro, they were willing to renounce Italian claims in Albania and to withdraw from Dalmatia, with the exception of the city of Zara (Zadar), which had an Italian ethnic majority. The two Italian politicians pledged to pursue “democratic internationalism” - intensive political, economic and cultural cooperation with the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans. The territorial dispute with the Kingdom of SCS was settled on 12 November 1920 with the Treaty of Rapallo. On the same day the Anti-Habsburg Convention was signed and the independence of the city-state of Fiume (Rijeka) was confirmed. In Italy the Treaty was perceived as a great success, except in circles around the poet and politician Gabriele D’Annunzio, an admirer of the Serbs who, as we saw, had taken part in the pro-Serbian propaganda during the war, and among hardcore politicians who thought that the relinquishment of Dalmatia represented a threat to the Italian domination on the Adriatic Sea. In fact, the Serbs gained the most: they secured Italy’s recognition of the Kingdom of SCS, its withdrawal from Dalmatia and the end of its support for the independence of Montenegro. However, at home, Serbian politicians faced strong opposition from the Croats and Slovenes, who saw the Treaty of Rapallo as unfair and as having “sold” (betrayed) their interests. The relations between the two countries deteriorated again in 1922 as a result of the slow Italian withdrawal from the last remaining occupational sector in Dalmatia and the pro-Italian coup in Fiume (Живојиновић, 2012). They stabilized again after the signing of the Conventions in Santa Margherita in October 1922. This series of documents settled some delineation matters, including economic, cultural and minority questions between the two countries, with Italy confirming it would withdraw from the contested occupational sector.

After the rise of Benito Mussolini (1883, Predapio-1945, Giulino) to power in Italy at the end of October 1922, the relations between the two countries continued to improve. A former socialist, Mussolini had discussed the Adriatic question several times in the sense of an Italian-Yugoslav friendship as expressed by Salvemini during the war. In fact, the Fascist ruler first of all wanted to consolidate his regime and, acting in that direction, the Italian parliament ratified the Conventions of Santa Margherita in February 1923. Offering friendly relations between the two countries, Mussolini managed to persuade the Serbs to accept the dissolution of the Free State of Fiume with the consent of France, which acted in favor of keeping both its Italian and Serbian alliance. Symbolically, on Saint Sava’s day 1924, a Serbian religious day celebrated on 27 January, the

Treaty of Rome was resigned, defining the border between the two countries: the city of Fiume went to Italy and its suburb Sušak to the Kingdom of SCS. In addition to the part dissolving the Free State of Fiume, the Treaty contained a part about the friendship and cooperation of the two countries, *de facto* supporting the Yugoslav unitary state. In fact, the Treaty of Rome put an end to the Italian obsession and fears of the enemy on its eastern border and paved the way for Italian political, economic and cultural influence in the Kingdom of SCS and the Balkans (Sretenović (2007). The symbol of these relations became the new Italian Plenipotentiary Minister in Belgrade, General Alessandro Bodrero (1924–1928), known and personally esteemed by King Alexander I Karađorđević from the Salonika Front and the wartime period. The construction of a new building of the Italian legation in Belgrade began in 1924 and was completed in 1926, representing the long tradition of relations between Italians and Serbs (Borghese, 2005). In addition, the Italian military cemetery in Belgrade became the Italo-Serbian memorial site (*lieu de mémoire*) used for commemorative events on anniversaries of the Great War⁸.

But Mussolini soon changed his views and began talking of Italian Dalmatia and referring to Yugoslavia as an artificial creation of the “Versailles world order”. Italian influence increased in Albania, in whose internal struggles the Kingdom of SCS was also involved in a bid to bring a Serbophile pretender to power and prevent the hostilities from spilling over onto the large Albanian minority in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the Italian influence prevailed and Mussolini signed two alliance treaties with Albania in 1926 and 1927, which was perceived in the Kingdom of SCS as a provocation. The Crown sent poet Milan Rakić (1927–1933) to Rome as its Plenipotentiary Minister, who could do little to improve the deteriorating relations between the two governments. In spite of the ratification of the conventions signed in Nettuno by the Italian parliament, Italy began pursuing a policy of “surrounding” the Kingdom of SCS and cooperating with the “revisionists” – Hungary and Bulgaria.

During the establishment of King Alexander’s personal dictatorship and the renaming of the country as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, the relations with Italy reached their lowest point and remained so throughout the first half of the 1930s. Mussolini expected Yugoslavia to dissolve amid internal frictions, which he encouraged by supporting the Croatian and Macedonian separatist movements that carried out the assassination of King Alexander I in Marseilles in October 1934. However, his relationship with France led to another turnaround in his policy toward the Serbs. In January 1935 in Rome, he signed a series of agreements with Pierre Laval, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs,

⁸ “The service for the Italian soldiers”, *Politika* (12 November 1927), 3.

which had an effect on the improvement of Italo-Yugoslav relations. A rapprochement with Italy was also part of the policy of the new Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović (1935-1939), who thought that this could weaken Croatian and Macedonian separatism (Ђурковић, 2013; Симић, 2019). Italo-Yugoslav negotiations about a treaty of friendship began, with Jovan Dučić, a poet like his predecessor and Plenipotentiary Minister in Rome from 1933 to 1937, playing a key role (Сретенковић, 2002). A result of the improvement of the relationship between Rome and Belgrade was the relocation of the Italian-speaking inhabitants from the village of Mahovljani in Bosnia to Italy in 1936. The treaty signed in Belgrade on 25 March 1937 by Stojadinović and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano (1903, Livorno-1944, Verona) was used to stabilize Italo-Yugoslav relations. The treaty covered several fields of mutual interest and included three sections: a treaty of friendship, a trade agreement and a few joint statements. With this treaty, Italy abandoned its policy of encouraging the breakup of Yugoslavia; it promised to intern Croatian extremists and cooperate with the Yugoslav police on this matter; and both sides agreed to respect the sovereignty of Albania. Italy then tried to restore trade with Yugoslavia, which was directed towards Germany after the introduction of the League of Nations economic sanctions against Italy because of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935/36). In Rome, this treaty was called the “horizontal axis” and Ciano believed it could end German political and cultural expansion in the Balkans and replace it with Italian influence. But among the Serbs the rapprochement with Italy was sharply criticized in circles which were in favor of strengthening ties with one of the two great powers in Europe of that time – Great Britain and Germany. In fact, during the entire interwar period, despite the instability of political relations, economic relations saw the opposite trend: Italy was one of the major economic partners of the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia. In the late 1930s, cultural cooperation between Italy and the Kingdom intensified, which was confirmed by the creation of a Dante Alighieri Society committee (*Società Dante Alighieri*) in 1939 and the opening of the Italian Cultural Institute in Belgrade in February 1940 (Santoro, 2005, 270).

In the context of the improvement of Italo-Yugoslav economic and cultural relations, the fall of the Stojadinović government in February 1939 was received negatively in Italy. Mussolini was at odds with Prince Pavle Karadžević and the Anglophile faction among the Serbs, trying at the same time to outwit German actions in the Balkans. After the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia (March 1939), Italy invaded Albania (April 1939) and began supporting Albanian separatism in Kosovo, which once again soured the political relations between Rome and Belgrade. After the signing of the Pact of Steel with Germany in May 1939, Mussolini began thinking about Italy’s own space in the Adriatic Sea and

the Mediterranean. It was with these plans that he entered World War II in the summer of 1940.

Already in May 1940, Mussolini asked Ante Pavelić to organize a revolution in Croatia and ordered his army to prepare for war against Yugoslavia and Greece. Ciano told Hitler about the necessity of breaking up Yugoslavia, “a typical Versailles creation” which, according to him, had an anti-Italian function, but this was not met with approval by the Nazi leader, who saw the whole Balkans as a sphere of his own influence. The Serbian refusal to enter the Tripartite Pact provoked Hitler’s radical reaction in the form of an attack against Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, while Italy limited its actions to following its German ally. At the suggestion of Italy, Berlin accepted the rise of the Ustashe movement to power in Croatia, but despite years-long Fascist propaganda, the breakup of Yugoslavia found Mussolini unprepared. The plans for exclusively Italian control of the Adriatic Sea could not be realized because the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) was to become the German access point to the Mediterranean Sea. While Giovanni Maver (1891, Curzola/Korčula-1970, Rome), one of the founding fathers of Italian Slavonic studies, wrote about Italo-Croatian literary ties without mentioning the Serbs⁹, Italian Albania annexed Kosovo and Western Macedonia, while Rome supported the creation of independent Montenegro under Italian protection (Maver, 1942).

However, the Italian presence in the violently restructured Balkans brought the Italian administration and army into direct contact with the Serbs in the occupied territories (Caccamo, Monzali, 2008). In ISC, many Serbs saw the Italian army as a rescuer from the Ustashe’s executions. In response to the Ustashe’s crimes, the Serbs began joining one of their two resistance movements – a communist and a royalist one, while Mussolini’s policy of violent Italianization in Slovenia, Dalmatia and Albania provoked the creation of Croatian, Slovenian and Albanian national-communist Partisan movements. Soon, the difficult Italian position in the Balkans led some units of the Italian army to undertake some independent political initiatives, often contradicting orders from Rome. This was the case with the Italian Second Army stationed in Dalmatia and Croatia. Faced with the results of the Fascist policy in Dalmatia and Bosnia, which had strengthened Croatian nationalism and extremism towards the Serbs and Jews, as well as the communist movement, the command of the Second Army decided to implement a different occupational policy from the regime-proclaimed one. Its aim was to limit the Fascist civil government, protect the Serbian and the Jewish population and cooperate with Serbian units in the royalist movement (Николић, 2009). The policy of the Second Army led to many quarrels between

⁹ See the previous works of this author: Maver (1924); Maver (1929).

the Ustashe and German leaders on one side and the Italian army on the other side (Horstenau, 2013). However, this policy in the Balkans allowed the Italians to control these wide territories with relatively low casualties until the announcement of the armistice (capitulation) on 8 September 1943. After this date, Italian soldiers showed a clear anti-German and anti-fascist tendency, expressed in their wish to fight against Nazi Germany and cooperate with Yugoslav partisans who became Italian allies.

ITALY AND SERBS IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA (1943-1991)

The fall of Italy in 1943 strengthened communist forces in the Balkans, which took over an important part of Italian armaments. The disappearance of the Italian presence in the Balkans had an impact on the weakening of the Serb-dominated forces of the movement led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, who lost an important source of support, help, and supplies. Based on its anti-Italian and anti-German rhetoric, the communist movement managed to attract many Croatian and Slovenian nationalists to its side. Under the Yugoslav name, they violently established their rule in Istria and Dalmatia, intending to seize these territories from Italy immediately after the Italian capitulation. The first communist crimes against the local Italian civilian population were committed in this period, particularly in Pizino (Pazin) in Istria and Spalato (Split) in Dalmatia (Pupo, 2006).

In fact, one of the results of the political and military collapse of Mussolini's Italy was the reopening of the territorial question between the Italians on one side and the Croats and the Slovenians supported by the Serbs on the other. Already at the end of March 1941, as an act of support for the Serbian officers who had organized the coup against the Tripartite Pact, the British indicated the possibility of changing the Yugoslav border with Italy. During the war, in an effort to secure Croatian and Slovenian participation in the monarchist movement, the representatives of the royal government repeated the British suggestion on several occasions. This idea was accepted by Yugoslav communists who, after the Soviet victories in 1943 and the shift in Churchill's attitude toward the Serbs, increasingly grew in strength to the detriment of Mihailović's movement. In October 1944, during the liberation of Belgrade by Yugoslav, mostly Serbian Partisans and the Red Army, an Italian partisan brigade ("Garibaldi") entered the Serbian capital, symbolically serving Soviet and Yugoslav communist internationalism. In 1945, following the withdrawal of German troops from the Balkans, Croatian Partisan units, including Serbs from Dalmatia, Lika, Banija and Kordun, hurried to occupy the Italian territories they had claimed: Zara (Zadar), Quarnaro (Kvarner), Fiume (Rijeka), Istria (Istra), Venezia-Giulia (Julijska Krajina) and Trieste (Trst). The occupation of these

territories was followed by a new wave of crimes against the Italian civilian population and “ethnic cleansing”. In late April and early May 1945, the Yugoslav Partisans took Trieste and Gorizia (Gorica), from which they withdrew in June, only after an Anglo-American ultimatum and the lack of full Soviet support (Dimitrijević, Bogetić, 2009).

Consequently, negotiations on a peace treaty with Italy started in September 1945. The aspirations of the Yugoslav delegation led by the Slovene communist ideologist Edvard Kardelj were maximalist and based on the Habsburg legacy: it demanded the reinstating of the Italo-Habsburg border from 1866 as well as “Venetian Slavia”, the Slovenian-speaking part of Friuli (Furlanija). The Italian delegation, headed by Alcide De Gasperi (1881, Pieve Tesino-1954, Borgo Valsugana), a Christian-Democrat and Prime Minister who would go on to become one of the founding fathers of the European Union decided to give up the border of 1924. Inspired by the ideas of 1944 of the still active Salvemini, it proposed the implementation of the “Wilsonian line” defined after World War I and based on the principle of nationality: Italy would hold Western Istria, Gorizia and Trieste and asked for the autonomy of its former territories. The peace treaty with Italy was signed on 10 February 1947 in Paris. Italy retained Gorizia, while Trieste with the coast up to Pirano (Piran) represented the Free Territory of Trieste. The peace treaty signified, in fact, the political and economic restructuration of Italy, which had lost its colonies and was thrown out from the Balkans. The Italian and Yugoslav communist parties had different perceptions of the new political reality: while the Italian Communist Party won about one-third of votes at the elections, participated in governments and pledged to cede former Italian territories to Yugoslavia in the name of proletarian internationalism, the all-powerful Communist Party of Yugoslavia was ready, in the name of the same proletarian internationalism, to leave historical parts of Serbia (Kosovo) to the neighboring communist Albania which, not unlike Yugoslavia, had developed anti-Italian propaganda. These international and internal circumstances led to the exodus of the remaining Italian inhabitants of Istria, Fiume and Dalmatia by the mid-1950s. Even some Italian communists, mostly of working-class origin, left these territories, disappointed with the extremism of their Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian comrades.

Nevertheless, having signed the peace treaty, republican Italy wished to restore the economic and trade position it had for decades enjoyed in the Balkans (Botta, Garzia, 2004). Already in November 1947, the two countries signed several commercial treaties, treaties on the payment of reparations and fishing in the Adriatic Sea. According to these treaties, Italy was to deliver machines and machine products to Yugoslavia for its five-year plan. The reasons for this new rapprochement were not only economic but also political. The Republic of Italy wished, despite belonging to the Western world, to have friendly relations with

communist countries and play the role of a bridge between the two opposed blocks. But instead of these Italian aspirations, the political relationship with Titoist Yugoslavia remained very difficult, especially because of the incidents around the delineation of the new border on the ground, Yugoslav demands for the extradition of war criminals and the question of the future of the Free Territory of Trieste. The Yugoslav ambassadors sent to Rome in that period were mostly apparatchiks of the Communist Party of Croatia (Mladen Iveković, Vladimir Velebit, Pavle Gregorić, Darko Čenej, Ivo Vejvoda) and did little to contribute to the improvement of relations.

The relations between the two countries started to change after 1948, after the Tito-Stalin split, which dealt a heavy blow to the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Western support to Yugoslavia signified indeed an attempt of pushing back Soviet troops to the East and the creation of a buffer zone between Italy, Austria and the Communist bloc. At that time, the British and the Americans pressured Italy to improve its relations with Belgrade because of Italian interest: the strengthening of anti-Soviet Yugoslavia would push back the Soviet threat from Italian borders. The pressure on Italy was effective and a Memorandum was signed in October 1954 in London, stipulating that “Zone A” of the Free Territory of Trieste would be under the control of Italy and “Zone B” under the control of Yugoslavia. The consequence of this decision was the exodus of the last wave of the Italian population from Istria. They settled mostly in the region of Veneto, in Trieste and Gorizia, and their presence on the Eastern border had a certain political impact on Italian internal relations. Some groups of Italians, mostly of a communist persuasion, remained in Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, the political relations of the two countries remained cold during the years following the London memorandum. However, due to geographical proximity and the compatibility of the two economies, like in the interwar period, trade relations were at odds with political ones. Italy insisted on inter-state and inter-border trade and thus Rome and Belgrade signed commercial treaties in 1955 and 1962. The Italian car manufacturer Fiat invested in the production of *Zastava* from Kragujevac in Serbia (Gašić, 2017). At the beginning of the 1960s, Italy was Yugoslavia’s leading import partner and its second trading partner for exports. Italy exported chemical and plastic products, machines, cars and clothing, while Yugoslavia exported wood, metal and meat. However, over the years, the majority of the Italian political elite failed to realistically assess the weakness of Tito’s regime, especially its autarchic and xenophobe Yugoslav national communism, which was at the ideological root of his rule and was also reflected in the country’s economy.

The new shift in relations between Italy and Yugoslavia occurred under the influence of the general political situation in Europe and the world. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 worried the Italian political elite because it

had confirmed the aggressive intentions of Moscow. For many Italian politicians, the Prague events showed the need for the consolidation of relations with their eastern neighbor and for supporting the strengthening of Yugoslavia as a barrier to Soviet penetration towards the West. They sought ways to resolve the territorial question between the two countries. The improvement of relations with Yugoslavia was championed by Giuseppe Medici (1907-2000), Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1968 and 1972/73, a realistic politician of the Christian Democracy political party from the region of Emilia, which had a very developed economic exchange with Yugoslavia, and Aldo Moro (1916-1978), a politician from Puglia, one of the leaders of the Christian Democracy, who served several terms as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1963 and 1978. Moro believed that mankind was in the middle of the process of emancipation and spiritual revival characterized by the values of solidarity, equality and peace. According to him, Italian foreign policy needed to champion these values, advocate the overcoming of the bloc division and contribute to maintaining peace. He thought that Italy should intensify cooperation with neutral and non-aligned border countries such as Austria and Yugoslavia and develop a strong policy of close ties with peoples from the Mediterranean area. In fact, based on these foreign policy ideas, in internal affairs he wanted to get closer to the Italian Communist Party (ICP) and enable its participation in the government. After the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation, the ICP developed close relations with Josip Broz Tito despite opposition from Trieste communists and entered the government of the Christian Democrat majority.

Across the Adriatic Sea, the beginning of the 1970s brought a renewal of internal tensions between the South Slav people. In an effort to draw attention away from internal problems, especially from the dissatisfaction of the Croats, the Yugoslav dictator Tito underlined the importance of improving relations with Italy, which he visited officially in 1971. Two years later, the negotiations of the two governments on an all-inclusive agreement began, in which, on the Yugoslav side, the Serbian communists played an important role. The negotiations were successful and ended with the signing of the Italian-Yugoslav agreement in Osimo near Ancona on 10 November 1975 (Bucarelli et alii, 2015). On the Yugoslav side, the agreement was signed by Miloš Minić, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1972-1978). The same year, Borisav Jović (Јовић, 2014) was sent to Rome as Ambassador (1975-1979). The Osimo Agreements consisted of a political agreement with 10 appendixes, an agreement on the development of economic relations with four appendixes and four notes. Within the framework of the agreed intensification of economic cooperation, an examination of the plans for the establishment of a fluvial link with Serbia was anticipated: the waterway would go from Monfalcone to Belgrade and the Danube via Gorizia,

Ljubljana and the Sava River. Through Belgrade Italy would be linked to the navigable routes of Central Europe and the Black Sea.

However, the Osimo Agreement was not received well by Italian refugees (*esuli*) from Yugoslavia settled in Italy. Trying to defend the agreement in the eyes of dissatisfied refugees, the Italian government asked for some economic exemptions for the regions of Trieste and Gorizia, where they were mostly settled. It also asked for the agreement to be linked to the Helsinki Final Act signed in August 1975 which guaranteed the respect of human rights and the principle that the borders in Europe could not be changed by force. Moro then said that Yugoslavia as an “independent, united and appeased” country was in Italy’s interest.

The Osimo Agreement opened a new period in the relationship between Italy and communist Yugoslavia. It signified the Italian cessation of the border question which was decided, in fact, by the victorious powers of World War II. The Agreement allowed Tito to satisfy Croatian and Slovenian nationalism, representing its regime as capable of defending the interests of these peoples. In Italy, it was one of the first results of the political rapprochement between center-right and center-left parties and the Communist Party, with the aim of achieving a wide democratic consensus on Italian actions at the international level.

ITALY, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, AND SERBIA (1991 TO THE PRESENT)

The fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the German unification and the crisis and war in Yugoslavia were reflected in Italy in the dissolution of the Italian Communist Party (Botta, Garzia, 2004). Since then, the Italian foreign policy towards Serbia evolved from the defense of the “Yugoslav” idea, to participation in pressures and regional plans of the international community, to the military and peacekeeping return of Italy in the Balkans and Serbia.

During the period of the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Belgrade became the focal point of the first Italian initiatives in the Danubian-Balkan region. In 1989 Italy launched the idea about a Central European Association that would include four (Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary), five (with Czechoslovakia) or six (with Poland) members. This plan was transformed into the Central European Initiative with the possibility of entrance for other states and was promoted by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gianni de Michelis (1940, Venezia-2019, Venezia), a Socialist politician from the region of Veneto who was particularly interested in Adriatic and Balkan questions. He also supported the Adriatic Initiative, an agreement with Yugoslavia on cooperation

in the fields of communications, tourism and environmental protection. Starting from September 1989 this Initiative was also opened for Greece and Albania. The aim of Italian initiatives was to contribute to the stabilization of East European countries by bringing them closer to Western democracies. Italy wished to increase its role and importance as a bridge towards the European Economic Community (EEC) and at the same time to restrain the increasingly important political, economic and cultural influence of Germany in Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, Italy harbored the unrealistic intention of contributing to the strengthening of integrative processes that would create the basis for a “new Yugoslavia”. In June 1991, at the moment of the proclamation of independence of Croatia and Slovenia, Italy acted with the intention of reforming and transforming Yugoslavia into a confederation of republics. During 1992, the Italian position moved towards the recognition of the secessionist republics, since no solutions were reached through negotiations. The reasons for this shift in the Italian position were the deterioration of the situation on the ground, the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and wars, as well as fear of a split within European governments regarding Germany’s and the Vatican’s recognition of Slovenia and Croatia before reaching an agreement with partners within the EEC.

But the Italian position was also influenced by internal policy and regional factors (Botta, Garzia, 2004). From the moment when it assumed a favorable position toward the preservation and reformation of Yugoslavia, the government in Rome received strong criticism and was pressured to recognize Croatia and Slovenia by important parts of its political elite and public opinion. Particularly strong pressure came from political circles in the regions of Veneto and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, which were close to the government and belonged to the parliamentary majority. In fact, from 1978, the two Italian regions in the northeast had ties with Croatia and Slovenia through the Alps-Adriatic Working Community, a regional group also included three Austrian Landers as well as Lombardy, Trentino-Alto-Adige, three Hungarian regions and the German province of Bavaria. Created as an Italian initiative, the Alps-Adriatic group was aimed at developing multilateral cooperation of regions which had different political and economic structures, but had in the past belonged to one common “Central European identity” within the Habsburg Empire. With time, a particular political solidarity within the framework of this group was created, which proved highly efficient in the moment of the break of Yugoslavia. In summer 1991, some local Italian politicians, such as Christian Democrats Adriano Biasutti (1941-2010) and Gianfranco Cremonese (1940-2018), as presidents of the regions Veneto and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, launched an initiative in support of Slovenian and Croatian independence, going against the official Italian policy. They provided very strong media support for their ideas and initiated lobbying within the government and national institutions through the Christian Democracy political

party. The activities of the two presidents of the regions were met with understanding and support in the political circles of Rome, especially the Minister of Transport Carlo Bernini (1936-2011), another politician from Veneto, who saw economic advantages in the secession of the two richest Yugoslav republics. This policy was also supported by the President of the Republic Francesco Cossiga (1928, Sassari-2010, Rome), a Christian Democrat who leaned on Biasutti and had a good reputation in ex-communist political circles in Zagreb and Ljubljana. It was thought in Trieste and Venetia that Croatia and Slovenia, without the support of Belgrade, which was seen as the successor of hardcore communism, would lose much of Yugoslavia's supposed former strength and that they would no longer represent a threat on the eastern border. It was also believed that the need for economic exchange and political dialogue would lead to conciliatory views on all sides and to the opening of the borders. However, what had escaped the politicians from the Italian northeast was the possibility that a premature recognition of the two republics could radicalize the crisis and allow it to spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In fact, the principle of self-determination of Yugoslav republics could not be fully applied without taking into account the demands of the Serbs who, besides Serbia, also inhabited other parts of Yugoslavia and were a constitutional nation in them.

However, during the crisis and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, although interested, turned its attention away from the Balkans, mostly on the wishes of the United States, which openly interfered in the conflict (Botta, Garzia, 2004). Italy was not a member of the Contact Group and found itself on the margins of Brussels and United Nations mediation. The position of Italy was once again shaped by internal policy. The period from 1992 to 1994 was fraught with economic and financial problems and corruption scandals in political and business circles. Many Italian politicians were prosecuted with consequences on the whole Italian political life: an entire generation of politicians changed and important political parties such as Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party disappeared, while new ones emerged.

Nevertheless, after the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, Italy restored its role in former Yugoslavia by deploying 2000 soldiers to Bosnia and Herzegovina under the command of NATO and by participating in the Contact Group for the implementation of the peace settlement. With the end of the war in Bosnia and the normalization of relations with Croatia and Slovenia, Italy restored its traditionally good relations with Serbia (and Montenegro within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), whose international sanctions had been removed. The Italian government supported the return of Belgrade into the international community and contributed to the progressive normalization of Serbian economic life by facilitating the founding of Italian companies in Serbia. Moreover, Italy supported the normalization of Serbian political life and its

democratization. During the crisis that broke out in 1998/99 about the southern Serbian province of Kosovo, the position of Italian diplomacy was moderate. During the negotiations in Rambouillet, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamberto Dini (1931, Florence) tried to separate the position of Rome from that of Washington, London and Berlin and avoid the use of force against Serbia. But Dini's initiative was strongly criticized by the American delegation and was not taken into account.

However, Italy participated in the NATO campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia despite upsetting a part of the public opinion and the new governmental majority of the center-left led by Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema (1949, Rome), secretary of the Democratic Party of the Left (former communists). At that moment, war against Serbia was opposed by a part of the Democratic Party of the Left, the Greens, the Italian communists and some Catholics. Within the Government, Dini continued to publicly show his doubts about the correctness of the decision regarding the war, while the Minister of Defense Carlo Scognamiglio (Varese, 1944), as well as Senator Francesco Cossiga, opted for the confirmation of the Atlantic alliance. The participation in diplomatic negotiations and war operations during the crisis and the war in Kosovo restored Italy's role and status in the group of five countries of the Western world, which it had lost during the war in Bosnia. The political changes in Serbia in 2000, as well as Serbia's return to its historical name in 2006, were received in Italy with aspirations of contributing to the democratization, political stability and economic development not only of Serbia but also of Southeastern Europe in general.

THE CONTINUITY OF GOOD RELATIONS: ITALY AND SERBIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The rich and intense history of Italo-Serbian relations in the last two centuries represents the basis for the development of good relations between the two countries and peoples today. Instead of ups and downs in their relationship, historically speaking, Italy is a partner, a model and a supporter of Serbia in its development and search for a stable position in regional and European relations.

Within these long-lasting processes, the geographic proximity and economic compatibility of the two countries contributed to deeper mutual knowledge of Italians and Serbs and to the enrichment of their mutual relations through their cultural differences, regardless of the shifts in everyday policy. Today, Italy is one of the most important countries of the European Union which supports Serbia's European aspirations. From 2009, Italy and Serbia are strategic partners on Serbia's path towards full membership in the European Union. For decades in the past, Italy played a key role in Serbian trade, heavily investing in the Serbian

economy and contributing to the employment of Serbian workers. Traditionally it is one of Serbia's three leading export and import partners. Italians gladly come to Serbia as businessmen, cultural actors or tourists, helping to build a good image of Serbia in Italy and Europe.

Thus, Italy continues to contribute significantly to Serbia finding its place in the family of European peoples, where none is better or worse than another, the place where it belongs by its natural potentials, rich past and prosperous culture.

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DVA VEKA ITALIJANSKO SRPSKIH DIPLOMATSKIH ODNOSA (19. I 20. VEK)

Apstrakt: Istorija italijansko-srpskih diplomatskih, tj. političkih, ekonomskih i kulturnih odnosa u 19. i 20. veku mogla bi se sagledati na dva načina: kao niz događaja i procesa koji bi svoj pun smisao dobili tek pristupanjem Srbije Evropskoj uniji gde je Italija jedan od osnivača i predstavlja jednog od ključnih aktera; ili, kao niz uspona i padova u odnosima, neočekivanih događaja i procesa, slučajnih i ideološki orijentisanih kontakata pojedinaca i grupa, ispravnih ili pogrešnih percepcija Italijana o Srbima ili Srba o Italijanima koji, u stvari, nisu doprineli prevazilaženju međusobnih stereotipa i doprineli produbljivanju odnosa dva naroda i države.

Ključne reči: Srbija, Italija, istorija srpsko-italijanskih odnosa, diplomatija, Đuzepe Macini, Svetski ratovi.

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GERMANY'S ROLE IN EUROPE: WHY NOT HEGEMON?

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Abstract. There is an ongoing debate about Germany's role in Europe in global academic and intellectual circles. The debate on the role of Germany in Europe gained momentum with its reunification in 1990, only to become current after the onset of the financial and economic crisis of 2008, and we further expect it to develop after the potential withdrawal of the UK from the European Union. In this debate, one can find various determinants of Germany's role, from being a civilian force, a central force, an insecure force, all the way to being a reluctant hegemon. Due to Europe's sensitive past and the sentiment German hegemony evokes in Europe, the paper will specifically address this issue. In the paper, we will initially address the concept of hegemony and then analyse whether Germany has these characteristics today. Subsequently, the question of hegemony will be considered in the contemporary context, both in international relations and with regard to the acceptance such concept has in the post-World War II liberal-democratic system of Germany. Finally, an assessment will be made of whether Germany occupies the place of a hegemonic power in Europe and whether it falls within Germany's priorities for the future.

Key words: hegemony, hegemon, dominant position, Germany, Europe, German reunification, Eurozone crisis.

INTRODUCTION

It can be noted that the debate on the role of Germany in Europe is present to a great extent in global academic and intellectual circles. This has been one of the main topics in European discourse since the German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990. The debate becomes current after the onset of the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and its resolution by the creation of financial mechanisms 2011-2012. Germany has played a key role in these processes and, in the opinion of numerous authors, succeeded in imposing

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its solution. We expect that the debate on the role of Germany in Europe will be further heated after the now almost certain UK's exit from the European Union.

We believe that Germany's role in the European structure is already dominant, especially within the European Union, which covers a major part of the continent. Germany's economic strength was apparent even before the 1990 reunification, so by joining of the most developed state of the former Eastern bloc, its economic parameters, after initial costs and reforms in the eastern part of the country, would significantly rebound compared to those of other major EU member states. Upon rounding off its sovereignty in the early 1990s, a convergence from economic to political power and influence followed, both within the EU and through the EU policies towards surrounding countries, and even entire Europe. It should be added that the desirability of the German social system and the strengthening of cultural influence has been a permanent process since the end of World War II. We believe that the German influence reached its current peak when the members adopted the German model of resolving the Euro crisis. In the academic debate, various determinants of Germany's role in Europe could be found after the 1990 reunification, from being a civilian force, a central force, a trade force, an insecure force, etc. After solving the Eurozone crisis according to German standards and requirements, Germany is gradually characterized as a hegemon - halfway hegemon, reluctant hegemon, benign hegemon.

In this text, we want to examine whether Germany is a hegemon by the practices set by theory. The article will strictly adhere to European frameworks - mostly the EU and its immediate neighbourhood. We especially note this, because the theoretical study of hegemony is most commonly about the global hegemony, which goes beyond the scope of this paper and the topic we are examining. However, due to a limited framework of this article, the very important question of the probable hegemonic influence of the USA and Russia in Europe cannot be adequately addressed here.

Since the problem is modelled, it is clear that we will, for the most part, move within the framework of rationalist theory, trying to provide an answer. We consider it important to investigate this issue because studying the role of Germany in the European system is important and unavoidable because of the role it plays in Europe today, as well as for Europe's sensitive past and the sentiment German hegemony evokes in Europe.

The article is divided into three parts. In the first part, we will specify the definitions of hegemony. In the second part, we will verify whether Germany fulfils the conditions given in the theory to be named hegemon, that is, whether the elements of the definition can be applied in the case of Germany. In the third part, we will examine whether Germany can be characterized as a potential hegemon in terms of research to date.

HEGEMONY – ELEMENTARY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERM

We are aware of the fact that due to the given frameworks it is not possible to present all definitions of the term and here we will point out only some of them.

According to the Historical Dictionary of International Relations, there are two main uses of the term hegemony. The first, often but not exclusively found in realism, considers hegemony to occur when a state, known as a hegemon, dominates the international system, achieved by means of military and economic power. The second is used by the critical theory that also fits into some theories of international political economy. Inspired by the work of Antonio Gramsci, this usage refers to situations in which the ideas of socially dominant groups and classes permeate thinking and culture to such a degree that they are able to gain subconscious acceptance among other, subordinate groups of their ideology, norms and values. The hegemonic groups thus gain perceived legitimacy for their dominance in the international system. John J. Mearsheimer is the most prominent theorist of the first usage of the term and Robert W. Cox of the second explication of hegemony (Lamb, Robertson-Snape, 2017, p. 141).

We will begin with Mearsheimer. He refers to Robert Gilpin when he defines a hegemon as a state that is so powerful that it dominates all other states in a system (Gilpin, 1981, p. 29). Mearsheimer states that hegemony means domination over the system, and he makes a distinction between the global hegemon and the regional hegemon that dominates a single geographical area. Mearsheimer believes that it is impossible for any country to achieve global hegemony except in the case of explicit nuclear superiority, and the best outcome a great power can hope for is to become a regional hegemon and control another nearby land-accessible region. When he talks about the power of states, he argues that power is based on material capacities and that states have two types of power: latent, broadly based on the wealth of the state and population, and military power derived from latent power. The military power is largely based on the size and strength of the ground forces, but also the air and naval forces that serve to support the ground forces (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 75-76, 91-92).

Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf define a hegemon as a single, extremely powerful state that exerts a dominant influence on the global system. By gaining unrivalled power, the hegemon changes the existing system by creating and imposing rules that preserve its own dominant position, demonstrating the power to maintain order in the global system to its advantage. Talking about global wars and victorious powers, Joseph Nye points out that the hegemon, and the dominant global leader, is capable of dictating the rules governing international political and economic relations (Kegley, Wittkopf, 2004, p. 171).

Some authors see hegemony much more lenient in the relationship between the dominant state and other states in the system. Duncan Snidal draws attention to this when he argues that the hegemon might be coercive, using its superior power resources to impose its preferred order on others who were left worse off than otherwise; or benevolent, creating an order that benefited not only itself but others as well (Snidal, 1985, p. 579–614).

According to Michael Mann, hegemony is by rule a certain form of domination (Mann, 2003, p. 331). According to Heinrich Triepel, hegemony is a weak form of power (or a milder form of exercise of power) as a particular substitute for domination over other states and peoples. The beginning of practicing this behaviour was when Sparta began to sign allied treaties with other *poleis*, giving up conquest and its accession policies (Triepel, 1938, p. 343). According to Michael Doyle too, Sparta was hegemonic, but confined its dominance to the foreign policy of other *poleis* without affecting the political and economic order, nor the issues of their constitution and market regulation, much less trying to adapt these to its needs (while Athens meddled with internal affairs). According to Doyle, we speak about the hegemony when there is a system of relationships between centres, one of which is stronger than the other (Doyle, 1984, p. 54, 58, 81).

As we said at the beginning of the chapter, the second explanation of the term hegemony is based on Antony Gramsci's views and the contribution made by Robert Cox. Here we will briefly look at their approach. According to Gramsci, the notion of hegemony affords an understanding of the state as a distinctive mode of rule achieved through the consent the masses give to the social, political and legal ideas and institutions cultivated by the ruling classes. In this way, the state plays an 'educative and formative role' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 242). As Gramsci made clear, the key to hegemonic power is the consent of the ruled to be ruled – or, more precisely, it derives from the perception on the part of those in the subordinate classes that their interests are also being served by the 'system' and that they have a meaningful stake in it (Devetak, George, Percy, 2017, p. 178).

Robert W. Cox applied Gramsci's hegemonic concept of internal governance and developed it further to relations among nations. He insists that hegemony is not achieved purely with instruments of material power, but is part of a process in which ideas and ideologies socialise states and institutions into adopting certain policies and practices, cultivating certain conceptions of the state's role and purpose, and consenting to certain world order arrangements (Cox, 1983, p. 164). Hegemony, as Cox understands it, is a form of dominance where the pre-eminent state in the international system (the United States, *cf.* R.C) creates a world order consistent with its ideology and values. This serves to maintain the pre-eminence of that state, and its ruling classes can yet secure some degree of consent from other states and classes by offering 'some measure or the prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful' (Cox, 1987, p. 7).


There is a set of theories that argue the establishment of hegemony for global domination by a single great power is a necessary condition for global order in economic transactions and international military security. This theory assumes that a stable world order requires a dominant world leader to punish aggressors who threaten the *status quo* and prevent the explosive competition of protracted rivalries between the competing major powers from escalating into a major systemic war (Kegley, Wittkopf, 2004, p. 172). Or as it is said in another place, according to this theory, international economic openness and stability among capitalist states are most likely at times when only one dominant state exists in the international system and thus achieves hegemony. An international regime develops based on the norms, values, practices and goals of the hegemon (Lamb, Robertson-Snape, 2017, p. 139-140). Most applications of hegemonic theories define hegemony in terms of dominance in global finance, trade, and naval power (Carlsnaes, Risse, Simmons, 2013, p. 584). Therefore, we are discussing then Europe in European finance, trade, and land power.

As we could see, the theories do not agree on the definition of hegemony and the relationship between states that is described as hegemony. Some theorists are stricter about the conditions that a hegemon needs to fulfil, while others have a milder approach, and there are those whose approach in addition to material power respects norms, values, and ideology. This leads to the disagreement between the authors in the assessment of the role of modern Germany in Europe.

IS GERMANY A HEGEMON?

Upon presenting the theoretical starting points, in this section, we will examine whether Germany has hegemonic characteristics.


According to Mearsheimer, the great powers are always looking for the opportunity to gain power at the expense of their rivals, with hegemony being their ultimate goal (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 61, 195-202). Therefore, for a state to be considered a hegemon, it must dominate over the system, which requires latent power, that is, a large population and the strongest economy, as well as a respectable military power. In terms of latent power in Europe, Germany has the largest population (Chart 1), except for Russia, which, due to its geographical location, can be subjected to Eurasian power and the most powerful economy (Charts 2 and Table 1). In addition, it has a central position on the continent as a significant contributor to further wealth acquisition, then a dominant political influence in the European Union, which we have seen during the Eurozone crisis, significant ideological, cultural and cultural influence, etc.

Chart 1: Total population of the EU member states in 2018.²

Source: Population and labour market, Total population (National accounts), European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Statistical Annex of European Economy, Autumn 2018, Cut-off date: 22 October 2018, p. 10-11. Accessed on 22.10.2018 at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/saee_autumn_2018_en.pdf

The German economy is the largest one in Europe with USD 3.997 trillion in 2018 and the fourth largest in the world (Chart 2). It is far ahead of its closest competitors, such as the UK with 2.825, France with 2.778 and Italy with USD 2.074 trillion in 2018, and outperforms other European countries by far. With the UK leaving the European Union, the dominance of the German economy over the trade, economic, financial and monetary bloc will be even more convincing, which will indirectly affect its overall position in Europe.

Chart 2: Ten Biggest Economies in the world in 2018 according GDP (current US\$)



Source: The World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. Data from the database: World Development Indicators. Last update: 10/28/2019. Accessed on 01.11. 2019 at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=BR-CN-DE-IN-IT-CA-JP-FR-US-GB&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=2018&view=chart

The data in the following table (Table 1) correspond to the previously reported data on the advantage of the German economy over others in Europe. We can see that Germany's share of the world economy in 2018 is 4.75%, leading in front of the UK 3.31%, France 3.29% and Italy 4.46%. The difference is much more pronounced when it comes to the value of goods exports, with Germany leading the way with USD 1.561 billion, followed by France with 581.2 billion, Italy with 546.6 billion, the UK with 485.7 billion and Spain with USD 345.2 billion.² As we can see from the figures given on population and wealth, Germany has a significant advantage over its "competitors" in the hegemonic position in Europe.

² Source: World Bank Group. Accessed on 02.10.2019 at <https://data.worldbank.org/topic/trade?end=2018&locations=FR-DE-IT-ES-GB&start=1960>


Table 1: List of Countries by GDP (Nominal) in 2018.

Rank	Country/Economy	Share (%)
1	United States	24.2
2	China	15.9
3	Japan	5.98
4	Germany	4.75
5	United Kingdom	3.31
6	France	3.29
7	India	3.17
8	Italy	2.46
9	Brazil	2.25
10	Canada	2.04

Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (October-2018). Edited 13 Mar 2019. Accessed on 01.11.2019 at <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-gdp.php>

As for military power, things are different. Germany cannot be said to dominate in this aspect, whether in the number of troops (Chart 3) or the military budget allocations (Chart 4). In terms of the number of troops and support staff in 2017, Germany (180,000) is surpassed by Italy with 347,000, followed by France with 307,000, Spain with 196,000 and the UK with 148,000 troops. In terms of military spending during 2017, France at 60.4 billion and the UK at 46.4 billion surpass Germany's USD 45.4 billion. Also, the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, India and Russia are in the world top, ahead of Germany in terms of military spending.

Chart 3: Armed forces personnel, total – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom




Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance. The World Bank Data. Accessed on 02.10.2019 at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?end=2017&locations=FR-DE-IT-ES-GB&start=1985&view=chart>

Before becoming German foreign affairs minister, Guido Westerwelle, head of the Free Democratic Party, when speaking about Germany's foreign policy priorities for the *Spiegel*, said that engagement in Afghanistan was not based on altruism and Germans were there to protect security interests. According to the magazine *Vreme*, German President Horst Keller raised a similar remark when he said that military force could be used in Afghanistan to defend German interests, which cost him his functions afterwards. In this viewpoint, Keller had the support of the then-current Ministry of Defence, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg.

Although this ambition exists, restrictions in military terms are high, especially with regard to nuclear weapons that Germany does not possess, while France and the UK, as well as Russia, which are in Germany's immediate neighbourhood, do have. Of course, the United States plays a very important role here, as a nuclear power providing nuclear protection to its NATO allies, including Germany, which is a dedicated member of the NATO – military alliance spread throughout the almost entire continent. Due to the USA's dominant position within the alliance and Germany's military disadvantages, it is clear that Germany cannot be considered a hegemon. The USA's supremacy in Europe is still very strong in both political and cultural aspects.

The argument in favour of Germany on this point is given by Edward Luttwak, who laid down the concept of geo-economics in the early 1990s. According to him, the role of military force is disappearing and “exchange methods” have “replaced military methods” - “disposing capital instead of armed force, innovation in civilian area instead of military-technical advancement, penetration of markets instead of garrisons and bases.” States choose which means to use and replace the “logic of conflict”, i.e. war, where one wins and the other loses, with the “exchange method”. Some countries are more geo-economically active than others (Luttwak, 1990, p. 17-24). According to Markovic and the Reich, “the German Deutschmark can reach far beyond panzer (German tanks from World War II, *cf. V.F.*) in expanding German power” (Hellmann, 1996, p. 27). As historian Andreas Rödter argued, “In the 1980s, François Mitterand talked about the German atom bomb, by which he meant the Deutschmark and the Bundesbank. At a time when economic power is more important than military power, Germany is quite simply strongest and that’s why Germany has to use this strength constructively and strategically in Europe” (Walter, Martens, 2018, Hannich, 2011, p. 19). The argumentation may also be supported by the Muhnkler’s claim that “Germany’s political power grew disproportionately as the importance of military power as an indirect factor in the production of political power disappeared with the end of the east-west conflict” (Münkler, 2016, p. 36).

Chart 4: Military expenditure (current USD) – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom⁷



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. The World Bank Data. Accessed on 02.10.2019 at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2017&locations=FR-DE-IT-ES-GB&start=1985&view=chart>

So far, we have been able to see that German power is indisputable, that Germany has an advantage in several economic areas, and that this advantage is not drastic, to which we will return. We can say that it dominates, especially in the European Union and its policies, but at the moment we cannot say that it dominates the whole system. According to the assessment of Hans Kundnani, after the unification and economic recovery upon it, Germany is more willing to impose desires on others. Within the EU, the German economy is too big for all of its neighbours but not big enough for Germany to impose hegemony (Kundnani, 2011, p. 43). Margaret Thatcher also spoke of the strength of Germany when she said that “a united Germany is simply too big and powerful to be one more actor in Europe” (Hyde-Price, 2007, p. 68). The question remains, can Germany be considered a hegemon despite all the power it has?

We will return to Mearsheimer once again, who claims that “a country that is substantially more powerful than other great powers in the system is not hegemonic, because it is, by definition, facing other great powers” (taking mid-nineteenth-century Britain as an example, though having been the richest and having been called a hegemon, it really was not, because it had other powerful states in Europe competing in the multipolar system). Germany is particularly far from the role of a hegemon if we consider his other claim that “countries that achieve regional hegemony want to prevent the great powers from doing the same in other regions because they do not want equal competitors” (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 75-76). Therefore, we cannot consider Germany to be hegemonic by the Mearsheimer criteria.

One of the arguments that denied hegemony within the EU was always that there was no single member state that had the material power to exert its will on the others. Germany might be the Union’s largest economy but its share of the EU’s GDP (in 2016) was 21%, which compared with the UK’s at 16%, France at 16%, and Italy at 11%. This is different from cases such as Mercosur or the Eurasian Economic Union, which are dominated by the economic weight of Brazil and Russia, respectively (Della Sala, 2018). This is supported by the fact that during the peak of its hegemonic power in 1860 (Lamb, Robertson-Snape, 2017, p. 58-60),³ the UK controlled 68% of Europe’s wealth, France 14%, and Prussia 10%, and a decade later, in 1870, the UK had 64%, Germany 16% and France 13%. During the same period of hegemony, from 1866 to 1870, it had the smallest army in Europe compared to other forces of the time - Austria, France, Prussia, Russia and Italy (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 367- 370), which again allows authors to dispute the crucial role of military power as an element characterizing a hegemon.

³ The same authors claim that the USA as a hegemonic power was producing near 50 percent of global gross domestic product and also had a monopoly of nuclear weapons between 1945 and 1949 in the first phase, and in the second the USA was the world’s only superpower in 1991.

If Germany cannot be classified under the criteria of a “firm hegemon”, can it be classified as a hegemon under milder criteria? When it is said that hegemony is a form of dominance defined by rules (M. Mann), we believe that it does not fit the normative framework governing the European Union, despite the disproportionately greater influence that Germany has on that organization. The normative frameworks in the Union are set up for the equality of states to be respected, especially in the European Council and the EU Council, except in situations where decisions are reached by qualified majority. Then, in terms of country governance (H. Tripel), despite our belief that it exerts influence over individual EU countries, especially Central and Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe, we believe that Germany is far from ruling over any of them. We might agree that Germany is as a force “first among equals” (H. Münkler) and “centre that is stronger than others” and that it can influence foreign policy (M. Doyle), but we believe that this is not about hegemony but only the influence of one powerful state on others in the given system.

Now we want to examine the genuine standpoints with regard to the ideas and support that those ideas have. Liberal-democratic principles have been strong in Germany in the last seventy years, when, after 1945, it rejected all nationalist and hegemonic aspirations. During this period, Germany fully devoted itself to multilateralism, cooperation between countries, building Euro-Atlantic organizations, fostering a free civil society and political system, while respecting human rights and social justice. At the moment, there are no significant political and social forces that could require the state to establish German-dominated hegemony in Europe as we saw in the past. Being surrounded by democratic states and partners from organizations such as NATO, the EU, the OECD, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and in accordance with the theories of democratic peace, the restoration of German hegemony in Europe based on aggression, nationalism and militarism is not possible. As Robert Kagan argues, today, it is impossible to imagine Germany returning to any version of its complicated past. The Germans have arguably become the most liberal and pacific people in the world, everyone’s choice to take on the now unclaimed mantle of the “leader of the free world” (Kagan, 2019, p. 109).

We believe that the only hegemonic impulse comes from economic and trade elites whose interest is to secure their investments in the surrounding countries, open markets and freedom to placement goods and capital and their pressure on the state. The relationship between the German state and business would be an example of what Luttwak calls “mutual manipulation”. German companies are lobbying the German government to adopt policies that promote their interests, and in turn, they help politicians increase growth and, in particular, employment, which is a major measure of German policy success. This coexistence is particularly intense between the state, especially the minister of economy and exporters, who provide for nearly

half of Germany's GDP and two-thirds of total German growth in the last decade. This disproportionate contribution of exporters to growth means that German politicians are particularly dependent on exporters (Kundnani, 2011, p. 41).

However, the discourse of the political elite who unreservedly supports this order is not imperialistic (as it was from Wilhelm II to Hitler) but liberal, allowing the support of the Union and other states in the Union. The most striking example of regional support for this kind of German discourse is as follows: As former Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski said in a speech in Berlin on November 2011, he feared German power less than he was beginning to fear Germany inactivity and urged Germany to lead Europe (Kundnani, 2012, Kagan, 2019, p. 109). The ideological framework in which Germany acts is part of the broader liberal-democratic and market-capitalist system of the West, dominated by the USA, which in the German version has a slightly more pronounced social component, as well as in other continental European countries. Thus, there is nothing additional nor different in the German acting for which it can be said that ideologically, hegemonic influence is exclusively German and therefore possibly controversial.

We can say that in some respects Germany is more powerful (and not in all - military power) and more influential than other European countries, but it does not make it hegemonic. There may be indications that Germany has acted as a hegemon in some respects when solving the Eurozone crisis, but even then, its behaviour was assessed as non-hegemonic. "Although Germany is now more powerful within the EU than it has ever been, it is far from being hegemon – and not because of its 'reluctance' to lead, but rather because it is not able or willing to make the sacrifices that hegemony entails" (Kundnani, 2012). Hans Kundnani explains in the text that Germany missed its opportunity during the Eurozone crisis to oblige itself as a hegemon and to create conditions for the stability of the system, but instead, by following the short-term interests of imposing an economic austerity model contributed to instability in the Eurozone. This is also contrary to Münkler's view of hegemony, as we have stated, in which collective goods are protected by hegemons and other states benefit.

GERMANY AS A POTENTIAL HEGEMON

In the previous section, we presented the theories and then made the assessment that Germany is not a hegemon. In this section, we want to examine whether Germany will become a hegemon in the coming period.

Slobodan Samardžić sees it as a the necessity for the Union to accept the national leadership of the most powerful member state in it, Germany, with the assistance of its close states and the tacit consent of other states and the contribution of transnational business circles and European expertise, if they do

not wish to reject integration achievements in the last sixty years. As Samardžić states, this would not be a system of integration guided by democratic principles because of the current tendencies of the new authoritarianism to which the imperial pattern of politics and the ruling system of power correspond (Samardžić, 2015, p. 20). Former Swiss MP Andreas Gross speaks of the creation of German Europe as one of three options in the coming period, when he states that Germany will actually take over the power, along with the French president and several European institutions, which Angela Merkel already does (Pejović, 2015, p. 18). As Proroković states, “Germany is not only the leading Central European country, but has all the potential to become its hegemon, to dominate Central Europe in the political, cultural and economic fields” (Proroković, 2014, p. 234).

Here we will again refer to Mearsheimer, who claims that the potential hegemon means more than the most powerful state in the system. It is a great power with so much current military capacity and so much potential power that it has a very good chance to dominate and control all the other great powers in its region. The potential hegemon does not need the resources to fight all rivals at once, but he must have a certain chance of defeating each opponent individually, as well as a realistic prospect of defeating some of them together. However, the key relationship here is the power gap between the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state in the system: there must be a distinctive gap between them. For a state to be qualified as a potential hegemon, the state must possess - to a reasonably greater degree - the strongest ground army and the highest latent power (state wealth and total population size, *cf.* V.F) than all the states in its region (Mearsheimer, 2017, p. 78-79). We believe that this is not the case and we do not expect it to become such in the coming period, primarily because of its commitment to domestic politics, where Germany is seen as part of the Euro-Atlantic community and not as a hegemon. Only if serious changes occur in the domestic political arena and such a direction is chosen, there is a chance to move towards establishing its hegemony. Nevertheless, as Münkler said, the electorate in Germany is overwhelmingly resistant to populism (Münkler, 2016, p. 123).

We would point out here to Vincenzo Della Sala claims that “Germany had always gone along with the narrative that it was a member state like all the rest and that its national interests were perfectly aligned with the aims of creating an ever-closer union.” Internally, states still pursue their interests and while no one state is hegemonic, some states are seen to dominate over others (Della Sala, 2018). Similarly, Münkler states that “Europeans have invested everything in removing international mistrust and preventing the emergence of a new sinister aspiration for intra-European hegemony through international treaties, economic relations and, in particular, through the internal democratization of states” (Münkler, 2009, p. 59).

CONCLUSION

Finally, after the argumentation presented, we believe that there are some indications and even that some circles are leading towards establishing hegemony, but this will hardly happen because Germany's position is not so dominant over other major countries in the European system, while in terms of military, the power of domination does not exist. The main prerequisite, in any case, is a domestic political will, which also seems far away. We do not want to dismiss as a possibility a serious common threat that, as a catalyst, could encourage Germany to be more engaged in this direction in order to ensure the security of the political and economic system in Europe.

We believe that Germany is not a hegemon in Europe and that this is not a priority for Germany in the future. Its fate is for the time being tied up to the EU and NATO frameworks, where it has the upper hand and even dominance in numerous political, economic and other issues, but this does not make it hegemonic nor it is its priority in the period ahead. According to Münkler, Germany does not even want it, because it wants to address what it has practiced well in the past: shadow leadership - rather influence than leadership, restraint in creating expectations and demands, self-restraint to occasional blocking of intentions and development of activities that are not in accordance with Germany's own interests (Münkler, 2016, p. 129). There is another reason for this as Le Gloannes claims: "If it started acting on its own, it would raise suspicion and coalitions against it, obstruction, and tension where other countries would unite. In this manner, it avoids it and uses the EU to pursue its interests. In addition, there are numerous political and economic benefits" (Le Gloannes, 2001, p. 12). Similarly, as Waltz observed, "hegemony leads to balance through all the centuries we can contemplate" (Waltz, 1993, p. 44–79). Finally, the question that arises is which standpoint the only superpower, the USA, would take if put in a situation of established German hegemony in Europe, despite their disengagement in Europe due to a shift in focus to the Pacific and their invitations to Germany to assume greater responsibility in security matters.

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POLOŽAJ NEMAČKE U EVROPI: ZBOG ČEGA NIJE HEGEMON?

Apstrakt: U svetskim akademskim i intelektualnim krugovima, aktuelna je rasprava o položaju Nemačke u Evropi. Debata o ulozi Nemačke u Evropi je dobila na zamahu ujedinjenjem 1990. godine, da bi se aktuelizovala posle početka finansijske i ekonomske krize 2008. godine, a očekujemo da će se dodatno razviti posle eventualnog izlaska Velike Britanije iz Evropske unije. U toj raspravi se mogu naći različite odrednice uloge Nemačke, od toga da je civilna sila, centralna sila, nesigurna sila do toga da je nevoljni hegemon. Zbog osetljive prošlosti i

sentimenata koje izaziva u Evropi nemačka hegemonija, rad će se posebno baviti ovim pitanjem. U radu ćemo poći od pojma hegemonije, a zatim ćemo analizirati da li Nemačka danas ima te karakteristike. Zatim, razmotriće se pitanje hegemonije u savremenom kontekstu, kako u međunarodnim odnosima tako i u pogledu podrške takvom konceptu u liberalno-demokratskom sistemu Nemačke posle Drugog svetskog rata. Na kraju, biće izložene ocene da li Nemačka zauzima mesto hegemonu u Evropi i da li to spada u prioritete Nemačke u narednom periodu.

Ključne reči: hegemonija, hegemon, dominantan položaj, Nemačka, Evropa, ujedinjenje Nemačke, kriza evrozone.

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RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN CRISIS WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION: COMPARISON OF HUMANITARIAN AID FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN AND LEBANON

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Abstract: The crisis created by the conflicts in Syria was the largest displacement crisis in the world according to the report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 2016. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan were among the first countries to respond to the Syrian crisis and were directly affected by it because these countries share boundaries as well as historical relations with Syria. These countries are considered the most common abode for Syrian refugees. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to identify the nature of the humanitarian assistance received by Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan as low-income countries and what are the most critical problems they faced. The research also looks at how the Syrian refugee crisis can be dealt with and responded by these countries. Through this comparison, many important points have been reached regarding the status of refugees within the Middle East region and the response mechanism in developing countries. However, many countries in the region do not have a clear policy applicable to refugee protection and are not a party to international refugee protection conventions. Therefore, no special legal status protects and regulates refugees in many countries in the region.

Keywords: Humanitarian aid, the refugee crisis, the Middle East and North Africa, wars and conflicts.

INTRODUCTION

Wars and conflicts, coupled with natural disasters around the world, have forced millions of people to migrate. Given the statistics related to the magnitude of this problem, even if it does not reflect the fact that not all cases of forced migration are registered and documented, this phenomenon is increasing day after day. This

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increase in the number of displaced persons constitutes a threat to human rights and requires the international community and its organizations to intervene quickly to stop this phenomenon and to put forward practical solutions.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statistics show in its annual reports on forced migration that the magnitude of this phenomenon has increased significantly. For example, The UNHCR 2010 report “UNHCR Global Trends 2010” indicates that 43.7 million people have been forcibly displaced. This report also indicates that this figure is the highest in the phenomenon of forced displacement in recent 15 years (UNHCR, 2018). Again, in the report prepared at the end of 2017, entitled “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016”, it indicated that the number of forcibly displaced reached 68.5 million people. The report notes that Turkey occupies the first place among countries hosting refugees in the world. Lebanon is ranked fourth and Jordan tenth (UNHCR, 2017). In comparison between these two reports, it can be observed that there is a significant increase in the number of people who are forced to leave their homes, and at the same time, there is a growing phenomenon of forced migration without retreat.

Asylum seekers and displaced persons are people fleeing from developing countries experiencing conflict and war or running away from situations in which their human rights are violated, and ethnic minorities are persecuted (Hatton, 2011). The continuation of wars and conflicts coinciding with the so-called Arab Spring has led to a massive movement of displaced people and refugees from the Middle East and North Africa. Through this mobility of refugees and displaced persons, the region has become one of the world’s most hosting areas for the people who are forcibly displaced. The Syrian crisis was the most influential on the global mobility of the displaced, specifically in the Middle East (Ahsan, 2016, p. 61-69).

Syrian refugees have formed a real crisis within the Middle East. On the one hand, the problems of refugees have been compounded and, on the other hand, the large influx of refugees into neighboring countries has posed a serious challenge to those countries. In Jordan and Lebanon, the growing number of refugees has created a real crisis in those countries that lack the necessary equipment to deal with the basic needs of refugees. These countries are unable to meet the needs of their citizens. Therefore, it is difficult for them to meet the needs of large numbers of refugees all by themselves without cooperating with associations, NGOs, and international organizations in providing humanitarian assistance (Achilli, 2017, p. 8-11).

Given the refugee situation in the world, the possibility of returning to a country of origin or resettlement has become limited. However, refugees face many problems at various levels in host countries, specifically, the inability to access the formal labor market and essential services. The deteriorating situation of

refugees in host countries may lead them to plan to migrate again to another country, and therefore the focus should be on supporting refugees and improving their conditions in host countries. Despite this trend, there are many barriers to this. The presence of refugees in host countries is an additional burden to the main economic, financial, and political problems of these countries. There is also insufficient and slow support from donor countries that often provide basic humanitarian services such as food, housing, and health care, and those services still do not resolve the issue of integration and livelihood development. This is one of the most prominent problems of shared responsibility in the refugee issue (Papademetriou and Fratzke, 2016).

Sharing responsibility in dealing with the refugee crisis is, therefore, a fundamental principle and an urgent need to respond effectively to the refugee crisis at the international level. Considering the refugee crisis in Syria, the neighboring Middle Eastern and North African countries with low and medium-income are destinations for Syrian asylum seekers. This suggests that the geographical location played an essential role in this issue. These countries have hosted most of the refugees fleeing conflicts more than the richer and farther countries. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on shared responsibility among countries for the refugee crisis and the creation of mechanisms to address the refugee crisis and provide them with the necessary benefits, in addition to supporting host countries (Martin et al., 2018). This necessity comes from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees asserted that “international solidarity and national responsibility were mutually reinforcing concepts where national authorities had the principal responsibility to provide asylum, but the international community would cooperate with governments that faced an unduly heavy burden in carrying out their responsibilities.” (Martin et al. 2019). However, this provision is only advisory and does not oblige states to participate in burden-sharing arrangements. Similarly, there are no enforceable international and regional treaties that oblige states to share the asylum related burdens of another state. Many criteria cannot be integrated into a global burden-sharing proposal that applies in each case of the mass influx. The state is likely to participate in burden-sharing schemes if such participation and cooperation serve its political, financial, and other interests. Similarly, if there are clear humanitarian and ethical reasons for protecting displaced groups or there is a strong public opinion acting in this way, they may choose to act. The most critical factor affecting the willingness of states to share the burden in refugee emergencies lies in the historical, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with the displaced community and the involvement of a strong state in such a burden (Ineli-Ciger, 2015). Sharing the burden of refugees and caring for them more equitably is an urgent need for the international community (DESA, 2017). The development of new programs and the improvement of the existing programs may make it easier to share the burden with host countries (UNHCR, 2018, p. 1-5). Despite the

political, economic, social, and environmental effects of refugees on countries hosting them for long periods, the impact of refugees on these countries is not permanently negative. The promotion and development of refugees in host countries are mitigating the negative aspects and enabling refugees to make a positive contribution to a host community. These negative aspects can be reduced by development projects targeting both refugees and host communities. Thus, development assistance and development projects targeting both refugees and host communities can contribute significantly to mitigating the adverse effects of the refugee crisis (Gomez et al., 2011).

OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this paper is to focus on the problems faced by refugees in poor or low-income countries and how they deal with the refugee crisis. To achieve this objective, a comparative study was conducted on the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon and Jordan and the problems they face, and the mechanisms used by these countries in dealing with the crisis.

METHODOLOGY

To achieve these goals, we:

Reviewed the literature on the Syrian crisis and analyzed challenges faced by Syrian refugees in host countries.

Identify the main problems faced by Syrian refugees and their host countries, specifically in Lebanon and in Jordan.

Identify the humanitarian assistance provided by these countries in dealing with refugees to assess the mechanisms of assistance and the characteristics of humanitarian assistance in developing countries.

We will conclude this discussion by referring to the structure of humanitarian assistance in these countries in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis and will refer to the international humanitarian assistance to these countries and refugees and their effectiveness in responding to the crisis and to strengthening support for refugees in countries affected by the crisis. Besides, the legal framework for the protection of refugees in host countries will be identified.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS AND DISPLACEMENT WITHIN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Middle East and North Africa are one of the most important regions in terms of migration rates, which are witnessing voluntary and forced migration

movements due to wars and conflicts. The countries of the region have made many efforts to cooperate at the regional and international levels in order to shape and develop the migration policy. Morocco, for example, has developed a new immigration policy due to increasing legal and illegal immigration within its territory. After regional cooperation on migration began in the region in the 1950s, nearly half of the countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Yemen) in the region have established ministries of migration. With the outbreak of conflicts and the intensification of forced migration and asylum inside and outside the region, the countries of the region have signed several agreements with several international organizations to help strengthen cooperation in the field of migration management. Therefore, international organizations and neighboring countries of the conflict such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon have played a significant role in dealing with the refugee crisis. However, the continued conflict in the region has made program responses limited by political instability, lack of information, and lack of funding resources. Accordingly, the coordination and management of migration policies are essential to ensure the protection of refugees within the region (El Fergany, 2015, p. 3-7).

The asylum in the Middle East and North Africa is not recent, and it is approaching 70 years. However, recent wars, conflicts, and the ensuing violence and instability in the region have led millions of people to flee to various countries of the world. The vast majority of the population was fleeing from violence to neighboring countries. This situation placed the most significant burden on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, particularly poor countries such as Jordan and Lebanon (Islam and Amanda, 2017). For example, the Palestinian Nakba in 1948 and the setback in 1967 caused large numbers of Palestinians to move to Arab countries, especially to Jordan due to neighboring borders (Abu Omar, 2010).

In recent years, the Middle East and North Africa region have been witnessing the so-called Arab Spring revolutions. These revolutions turned into conflicts and the most violent conflicts were in Syria. Syria's wars and conflicts have prompted millions of people to leave their homes and flee to neighboring countries. The Syrian crisis is the biggest displacement crisis in the world, where about 6.5 million people are displaced in Syria, five million others are displaced in the neighboring Syrian countries (Kvittingen et al., 2018).

Neighboring countries have accepted Syrian refugees, although most have not signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Their response was basically to provide access to minimum life-saving assistance. At this stage, the local governments and the residents dealt with the outcome of the Syrian crisis between social and economic challenges and considered refugees as a destabilizing factor in the region. There was, therefore, an urgent need for intervention and support from the international community. This need arises through the significant challenges

faced by refugees in many countries in the region, such as restrictions on their social and economic rights and employment opportunities (Khallaf, 2013).

Water, sanitation and hygiene, women's protection and empowerment, livelihood and economic recovery, education and child protection, emergency supplies, healthcare, safety, and protection are some of the most urgent humanitarian assistance needed by refugees and displaced Syrians in Syria and neighboring countries. The size and magnitude of these needs vary from country to country (International Rescue Committee, 2016). However, the assistance and services provided to refugees by host countries have become unsustainable over time and have turned into an unwillingness to take new refugees, as well as a kind of hostility and violence against refugees (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, p. 457-473). However, other arguments may contradict this view. For example, to qualify for a dedicated source of the World Bank funding on the pretext of meeting the needs of refugees and their host communities, host governments must meet specific criteria. One of the most important rules is that a government should have an appropriate framework for refugee protection. The adequacy of the refugee protection framework in a country is determined through consultation between the World Bank and the UNHCR on a host country's commitment to "international or regional instruments such as the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, or the adoption of national policies and/or practices consistent with international refugee protection standards." (Montemurro and Wendt, 2017, p. 8).

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN LEBANON AND JORDAN

Lebanon and Jordan host refugees from various Arab countries such as Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. The registered refugees (together with UNHCR and UNRWA) account for about half of the total population in both cases. Both countries' handling and responding to the Syrian crisis are linked with previous experiences with refugee groups from other countries as well as the political, social, and economic changes of both countries. For example, Jordan and Lebanon do not consider Syrian refugees as mere temporary guests; this is because of their prior experience with Palestinian refugees who entered their territory as temporary guests in 1948 and still reside there until now. Therefore, Lebanon and Jordan imposed restrictions on the entry and movement of refugees in its territory, perhaps for fear of repeating this experience with Syrian refugees. With these procedures, as well as lack of funding for international humanitarian aid, Syrian refugees are severely affected through various attempts of leaving the two countries and seeking asylum in other countries. However, the general situation of refugees in Lebanon can be described as worse than in Jordan. When comparing the legal status of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, both countries have not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, and both countries do not have special laws on

refugees and asylum. In Jordan, the UNHCR registers Syrians as refugees, while the Lebanese government does not recognize the register of the UNHCR as legal. In order to limit the entry of more refugees into its territory, it accepted only refugees registered with the UNHCR and those who have Lebanese sponsors. This makes Syrian refugees vulnerable to arrest as illegal immigrants. More than half of the displaced refugees in Lebanon have no legal papers. The legal procedures towards Syrian refugees in Lebanon increase the vulnerability of refugees because of the obstruction of movement in the country and thus impede access to health care and other humanitarian services. This, therefore, creates differences in dealing with and responding to the Syrian crisis by governments and international organizations. For example, in the case of housing and transportation, Jordan has established official refugee camps for Syrian refugees, while Lebanon has rejected them. Nevertheless, both countries have developed regulations that specify and tighten the movement of Syrian refugees in their territory. The Lebanese government has mostly left the humanitarian response to various local and international organizations without the official approval of the establishment of refugee camps, while the Jordanian government is directing all Syrian refugees to stay in one camp in an attempt to control and respond to the Syrian crisis (Lenner and Schmelter, 2016).

In an attempt to arrive at an objective comparison between the two countries in dealing with the refugee crisis, it is necessary to identify the impact of refugees on a host country as well as the impact of the legal situation on refugees themselves in both countries. For a proper comparison, this comparison will be addressed under the headings of Jordan and then Lebanon separately.

Lebanon

Lebanon has not followed a clear approach in dealing with Syrian refugees fleeing from the conflict in Syria since 2011. This can be traced back to the fact that Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees. Moreover, it has no national legislation or specific policy dealing with refugees. However, the Lebanese government has put in place a comprehensive policy dealing with the Syrian exodus to Lebanese territory, which is working to limit the arrival of Syrian refugees to Lebanon and encouraging their return to Syria. This also created legal procedures that make the situation of Syrian refugees legally dangerous. This shows that there are two options for Syrians either to leave Lebanon or to live with very complex legal procedures (Janmyr, 2016, p. 58-78). Some Lebanese municipalities have also illegally imposed curfews on Syrian refugees at night (Betts and Memişoğlu, 2017). Also, Syrian refugees' lack of legal status in Lebanon causes challenges for the education of refugee children and makes a gap

between international policy in protecting the rights of refugee children and applying them on the ground (Buckner et al., 2017).

Perhaps these measures are due to some demographic and economic issues. Meanwhile, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is more than one million refugees in a country with a population of 4 million. This makes Lebanese society look at Syrian refugees as a burden on the economy and pressure on resources and services (Harb et al., 2018). On the ground, it can be seen that these strict laws contain discrimination as they did not include all refugees and are essentially aimed at preventing the entry of poor refugees (Frangieh, 2015). In a further look at the position of the Lebanese government in dealing with the refugee crisis, it can be said that the Lebanese government's policy on Syrian refugees is aimed at reducing the number of Syrians in Lebanon (Janmyr, 2016).

Jordan

At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, there were great efforts of the Jordanian government and the Jordanian people to respond to the crisis. Many international and local humanitarian programs have been developed to enable Syrian refugees to access basic services and resources. However, many factors, such as gender, age, and disability, have affected refugees' access to essential assistance and services. The accumulation of the crisis and the length of time affected the absorptive capacity of the Jordanian society, and there is a clear limitation in humanitarian assistance. This is reflected in the negative strategies developed by refugees in addressing the consequences of the crisis, such as reducing food consumption, withdrawing children from schools, and engaging in informal employment. Therefore, the continuation of the crisis has greatly affected the well-being of Syrian refugee families in Jordan, of which humanitarian assistance is the main element (UNHCR, 2015b). Thus, restrictions and lack of opportunities in Jordan have led many refugees to secondary migration. The continuation and aggravation of the conflict in Syria, the loss of hope of returning to the motherland and the deteriorating situation in Jordan have led Syrian refugees to plan an irregular migration from Jordan to Europe (Kvittingen et al., 2018).

One of the repercussions of the crisis facing Syrian refugees is that 67% of them live below the poverty line and depend primarily on humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs. However, the insufficient and diminishing of this humanitarian assistance has harmed various aspects of their lives. For example, this situation led to negative strategic plans adopted by refugees to address the shortage of resources, and that led to problems in health, education, and work (European Commission, 2018).

Through the previous review, we note that Syrian refugees have created challenges in host countries, specifically in Lebanon and Jordan, through pressure on the limited services and resources of these countries. This situation has led to the urgent need for humanitarian assistance for both refugees and host countries. Besides, it has challenged the government in dealing with the Syrian crisis and necessitated the development of emergency plans and response to the crisis through local and international channels.

Although both countries welcomed Palestinian refugees in 1948, Lebanon still has no policy to protect refugees and refuses to establish camps in their territory. On the contrary, Jordan has worked to develop plans and strategies to deal with the refugee crisis over the years, starting with the Palestinian and Iraqi crisis and ending with the Syrian crisis.

Given the legal status of Syrian refugees in both countries, Jordan and Lebanon have not signed the international conventions protecting refugees and regulating their entry into their territory. Since Jordan and Lebanon are not part of the 1951 Convention, they do not have special asylum laws. Consequently, the legal status of Syrian refugees in both countries is linked to some governmental procedures for accepting or not accepting refugees registered with the UNHCR. This situation has exacerbated the crisis faced by refugees in both countries and made them more vulnerable at many levels.

In terms of responding to the crisis, humanitarian assistance, and international cooperation, we find that Jordan is working with its simple conditions and capabilities and through cooperation with international and regional institutions to improve the situation of refugees and legalize their presence in Jordan. At the same time, Lebanon has created laws aimed at preventing Syrian refugees from entering its territory and deporting those in Lebanese territory to their country or other countries. Looking at both cases, one can observe the fragile policy of the Jordanian government in accepting and integrating refugees and the Lebanese government's policy of rejecting the presence of Syrian refugees in its territory. At the community level, sectarianism has played an important role in accepting refugees, dealing with them, and providing humanitarian assistance. Lebanon has been more sensitive to this issue than Jordan, and this has affected the response to the Syrian crisis at the local level.

In terms of accepting refugees and dealing with the crisis in general, the Jordanian government is trying to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis by assembling them into one camp. This camp considered one of the biggest camps established in 2012 in an attempt to cope and control the Syrian crisis. But, the Lebanese government refuses to build any refugee camps because of the experience with Palestinian refugees who used the camps as centers for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict management from its land.

Given that the current crisis has resulted from the long period of conflict and lack of humanitarian assistance, the continuation of the conflict in Syria and the deterioration of the situation of Syrian refugees in the Middle East, particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, have prompted many of them to plan the irregular migration to European countries. Despite the historical ties and the commonalities between Jordan and Syria, the economic conditions in Jordan have led to social tension. Syrian refugees are considered a risk factor for the Jordanian economy. The limitations in the labor market, mobility restrictions, and the legal situation were all important factors that prompted those Syrians who have the resources to leave the Middle East towards Europe.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN JORDAN AND LEBANON

Jordan and Lebanon have developed strategic plans to respond to the crisis of Syrian refugees they have hosted in their territory. Through the 2017-2019 response plan, Jordan aimed to develop short and long-term plans to ensure better integration of critical humanitarian response measures and medium-term interventions. Jordan also aims at meeting the needs of those affected by the Syrian crisis, including refugees themselves and the Jordanian society. The Jordanian government has allocated a budget of 7.642 billion dollars in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the Syrian crisis in many things, such as education and social protection. Nevertheless, to maintain continuity in responding to the refugee crisis, Jordan needed to turn to the international community and seek humanitarian aid. This is based on the implementation of its plans through funding from the United Nations programs and the European Union. The Lebanese government has also set up Lebanon's Crisis Response Plan for the period 2017 to 2020. It aims at responding to the needs of both the population and the vulnerable groups affected by the Syrian crisis through the provision of assistance and protecting vulnerable groups of refugees and local populations (Islam, 2017). Despite this, the Lebanese government refused to approve the establishment of Syrian refugee camps, and Syrian refugees in Lebanon continued to be seen as a significant risk factor that could destabilize Lebanon's political stability (Healy and Tiller, 2013).

Local governments and municipalities are essential partners of the international community in dealing with the refugee crisis. Municipalities play a crucial role in responding to the refugee crisis through the development of joint projects that support refugees in various respects. In general, knowledge of the extent to which the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis requires knowledge of the policy directed towards refugees in a host country. In Lebanon and Jordan, responses to Syrian refugees vary depending on the region in which they are sought. In Lebanon, Sunni areas were more welcoming to Syrian refugees than Shiite areas,

and the sectarian factor because of Sunni identity played a significant role in the response. The response of Jordan to the Syrian crisis was based on tribal affiliation and historical relations with Syrians. However, the economic situation of Jordan has forced the host municipalities to seek support from the central government and international organizations located in Jordan (Betts et al., 2017).

The legal status of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, and the restrictions imposed by the two governments on mobility, in addition to the economic and social conditions of the two countries, led to dependence on humanitarian aid in the first place. The inability to reach the labor market or the restrictions that can be imposed on the employment of refugees within a host country leads to the exploitation of refugees in informal employment and the prevalence of child labor. Humanitarian assistance and international intervention are, therefore, unavoidable in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan and Lebanon.

The conflict in Syria has led to the biggest humanitarian crisis for decades. As the conflict continues and escalates, humanitarian needs have reached a crisis stage for refugees themselves and their host community. The Syrian crisis has become a regional one that requires an emergency response from host governments, the international community, and humanitarian organizations. The needs of refugees are increasing significantly, and this constitutes financial, logistical, and security burden on host countries and humanitarian organizations. Thus, support for Syrian refugees in host countries is becoming increasingly fragile with the length of their stay. In Lebanon, Syrian refugees live in the most deprived areas and deplorable housing conditions. They form pressure on the health sector, education, and social services and compete with the local population in the labor market in these areas. This situation generates hatred between refugees and indigenous people. International humanitarian assistance must, therefore, focus on meeting the needs of both poor refugees and host communities. In the first stage, emphasis should be placed on providing basic services as well as psychosocial support programs for the most vulnerable (MOVEMENT, 2015).

Given the size of the crisis and the needs of humanitarian assistance, it is clear that the deficit in the international response and the lack of funding for refugees and host countries can be seen. This affects the plans of host countries to respond to crises. The weakness and inadequacy of the international response are reflected in the continuous rise in the percentage of refugees below the poverty line in Lebanon as well as educational problems such as hundreds of thousands of refugee children outside schools. The weak infrastructure of host countries and the absence or lack of development of the necessary programs to protect refugees has further complicated issues related to health, education, and access to other services. Thus, the type and quantity of humanitarian aid and the role of the government in responding to the crisis remained very limited. Instead, the response to the crisis

stands in its entirety on the role of the international institutions working in the humanitarian field in both countries.

CONCLUSION

The need for this study stems from the belief that the international responsibility should be shared effectively in dealing with the refugee crisis that has overwhelmed poor host countries. As well as the need to provide humanitarian development assistance aimed at strengthening the integration of refugees in the community and enabling them to contribute positively to host communities.

In recent years, the escalation of the conflict in Syria has led to a crisis that is considered the largest in the world, and this has directly affected the neighboring countries through the refugee crisis. Lebanon and Jordan are the most significant countries hosting Syrian refugees after Turkey. Given the economic situation and poverty of these countries, the refugee crisis in both countries has made humanitarian assistance to refugees and host countries an urgent necessity. Therefore, the international response to the Syrian crisis requires working to support refugees and their host countries within the region. It is clear from this study that there are fractures regarding the international sharing of refugee responsibility. This is illustrated by the worsening of refugees' problems in these countries, the essential indicators being the inability to meet their basic needs, and the lack or uncertainty of the laws regarding their protection. In the case of supporting international cooperation by sharing the responsibility of Syrian refugees, there are multiple initiatives by many countries, but they are arguably inadequate. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a global humanitarian aid structure based on a substantial international contribution with apparent effects during a specific period of the refugee crisis in low-income countries.

In this article, a comparative review of Lebanon and Jordan's response to the Syrian crisis were presented. Through this comparison, many important points have been reached regarding the status of refugees within the Middle East region and the response mechanism in developing countries. These points are:

Refugees in these countries suffer from the inability to meet basic needs, and the inaccessibility of many essential services, including formal education, legal employment, and health care.

Lack of a specific approach and clear policy in both Lebanon and Jordan in dealing with the Syrian refugee issues. This may be because these countries are not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention for the Protection of Refugees.

There is no special legal status to protect refugees and regulate many of their affairs in Lebanon & Jordan, and this has led to challenges, especially in the issue of education for refugee children.

Despite the experience of these countries in dealing with Palestinian refugees and refugees from other countries over the decades, they have not been able to reach a clear approach or develop strategies and policies aimed at protecting refugees and dealing with their crisis. This is maybe because these countries have low income and lack means to support this population.

The failing of the international sharing of responsibility for refugees has prompted Lebanon & Jordan to develop policies aimed at reducing the number of refugees due to the economic burden and pressure that refugees place on their host countries.

One of the most critical problems in sharing responsibility in responding to the refugee crisis is the lack of an international legal framework that forces states to share the burden and responsibility in the refugee crisis.

However, many countries in the region do not have a clear policy applicable to refugee protection and are not a party to international refugee protection conventions. There is, therefore, no special legal status that protects and regulates refugees in many countries in the region. This, in turn, exacerbates the refugee crisis over the years and the emergence of many problems affecting refugees themselves and host countries. Based on these findings, we recommend a) developing a model of the burden-sharing plan in the refugee crisis among countries with many relations with the displaced community, such as political, historical, border, religious, cultural, and other; and b) developing a mechanism to impose shared responsibility for responding to the refugee crisis.

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ODGOVOR NA SIRIJSKU KRIZU U REGIONU BLISKOG ISTOKA: POREĐENJE HUMANITARNE POMOĆI SIRIJSKIM IZBEGLICAMA U JORDANU I LIBANU

Apstrakt: Prema izveštaju Visokog poverenika UN-a za izbeglice iz 2016. godine, kriza koja je nastala nakon sukoba u Siriji predstavlja najveću migratornu krizu na svetu. Turska, Liban i Jordan bili su među prvim zemljama koje su odgovorile na sirijsku krizu. Takodje, oni su i prve zemlje koje su direktno pogođene ovom krizom jer neposredno dele granice i istorijske odnose sa Sirijom. U ovim zemljama najčešće borave sirijske izbeglice. Svrha ove studije je da identifikuje prirodu humanitarne pomoći koju primaju sirijske izbeglice u Libanu i Jordanu obzirom da su to zemlje s niskim prihodima i koji su to najkritičniji problemi s kojima se ove zemlje iz tog razloga suočavaju. Istraživanje takođe razmatra kako se ove zemlje mogu nositi sa sirijskom izbegličkom krizom. Putem ovog poređenja uočeni su važni problem vezani za status izbeglica u regionu Bliskog istoka i kako zemlje u razvoju reaguju na ovakvu krizu. Mnoge zemlje u ovom regionu nemaju jasnu politiku primenjivu na zaštitu izbeglica i nisu ugovornice međunarodnih konvencija o zaštiti izbeglica. Stoga nijedan poseban pravni status ne štiti i ne reguliše status izbeglica u mnogim zemljama ovog regiona.

Glavne reči: Humanitarna pomoć, izbeglička kriza, Bliski istok i Severna Afrika, ratovi i sukobi.

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CURIOUS CASE OF NORTHEAST ASIA: EXTERNAL BALANCING MEETS STRATEGIC CULTURE

Mihajlo KOPANJA¹

Abstract: This paper analyzes the situation in Northeast Asia from the perspective of the rise of power of China in recent decades and the reaction of China's neighbors Japan and South Korea. Following the propositions of the balance-of-power theory, mainly envisioned through the neorealist paradigm, there exists a discrepancy in the expected reaction of Japan and South Korea to the Chinese rise. Because of China's relative superiority in power over Japan and South Korea, the balance-of-power theory posits that the two states would pursue a strategy of external balancing by aligning themselves in order to be able to counteract the Chinese rise in power. Yet, there have been no signs of Japan and South Korea pursuing such a strategy. On the contrary, a series of disputes between the two states in the past couple of years point to Japan and South Korea getting further away from each other. By employing the neoclassical realist approach, this paper argues that historical animosity between Japan and South Korea stretching back to the early twentieth century, shaped their strategic culture in a way that is hindering Japan and South Korea to make the strategic choice to balance externally.

Key words: Northeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea, balance-of-power, external balancing, strategic culture, neoclassical realism.

INTRODUCTION

For the past couple of decades, the neorealist paradigm in International Relations is being struck with a particular empirical puzzle: why the rise of China

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has not been followed by the establishment of a balancing coalition to counter such a rise? By no means does this puzzle represent a novelty in existing research, with authors already pointed to such an inconsistency between theoretical propositions and events unfolding in reality (Layne, 1997; Cha, 2000; Christensen, 1999). Simply put, from the neorealist perspective, in an anarchical system, whenever one state's power increases other states tend to increase their own power in order to survive in the system. According to Kenneth Waltz, this represents the core of the balance-of-power theory because it occurs whenever two conditions are met: anarchical system and state survival motive (Waltz, 2010, p. 121). With the steady rise in Chinese power over the years and their re-emergence as a global actor, the question of why there is not a balancing coalition to counter the Chinese rise is becoming increasingly more relevant, both in theoretical and empirical terms. Although propositions of neorealism never intended to be used to explain concrete policies of states, (Waltz, 1996; 2010), such a continuous divergence from its theoretical predictions puts significant strain on the explanatory power of neorealism. This led Steve Chan to rightfully assert that this case can be seen as 'yet another critical test for [neo]realism' (Chan, 2010, p. 388) because the conception of balance-of-power represents the core to the neorealist approach to international politics (Buzan et al. 1993, p. 86).

Most authors focus primarily on the US response to the rise of China (Christensen, 1999; Glaser, 2015). Although nominally not a part of East Asia, the US role in East Asian politics is significant, and many authors consider the US as an integral part of the East Asian system (Kissinger, 2014; McDougall, 2007). But to reduce the entirety of security concerns in East Asia, in general, to a competition between China and the US is highly problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the stopping power of water, as Mearsheimer puts it (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 114-119), impedes the ability of the US to counter China alone. Secondly, while the US and China undoubtedly are the two greatest powers in East Asia, they are not without viable contenders. Both Japan and South Korea (ROK) are far from being considered as irrelevant regarding East Asian politics and security. Finally, the effects of the rise of power of one state are more impactful on neighboring states, rather than that afar with behavior relevant to the balance-of-power theory's propositions would firstly display themselves in the neighborhood of the rising power.

Thus, a more curious question is not related to the US role in East Asia, but to Northeast Asian states and their almost ambivalent behavior to the rise of China, namely Japan and South Korea (ROK). While there is merit in observing East Asia in general, Northeast Asia is more relevant because it exhibits worrisome security challenges, and, unlike Southeast Asia which exhibits similar trends, majority of major East Asian powers (including the US) are located or have a permanent presence there (McDougall, 2007, p. 7; Ganguly et al., 2017, p. 2). Leaving the US aside, there has been little to no collective action undertaken by two most relevant

Northeast Asian states, Japan and ROK, in order to balance the Chinese rise in power. Not only that these two states are not striving to form a coalition to balance China but evidence from recent months points to the rise of tensions between them (McCurry, 2019; Glaser and Skylar Mastro, 2019; Arrington and Yeo, 2019; Sposato, 2019). The curiosity behind the case of Northeast Asia lies precisely in the behavior of Japan and ROK, which defy the theoretical predictions of the balance-of-power theory in not establishing a coalition to balance the rise of China.

Accepting the limitations of neorealism, this paper follows the neoclassical realist research agenda in providing an explanation to the curious case of Northeast Asia. Focusing on the lack of external balancing behavior by Japan and ROK, this paper hypothesizes that strategic cultures of these two states are intervening in Japan and ROK response to the systemic stimuli which in theory, ought to lead to them towards aligning to balance China. In order to corroborate this claim, firstly, the paper will provide an overview of the balance-of-power theory applied to Northeast Asia. By showing how the case of Northeast Asia fulfills, for the most part, the criteria for balancing to happen, foundations for explaining the reasons for its lack will be given by highlighting how historic antagonisms between Japan and ROK shaped their strategic cultures and in doing so averted the possibility of them aligning in order to balance China.

BALANCE-OF-POWER AND NORTHEAST ASIA

Although balance-of-power represents the core of the realist approach to the study of international politics, there is no consensus among authors on the core meaning behind it. Throughout the years, many authors of the realist camp dwelled deep into the precise meaning of balance-of-power, but without reaching a general consensus which could be almost universally applied (Morgenthau 1948; Haas, 1953; Wight, 1966; Aron, 2001; Nye, 2007; Waltz, 2010; Bull, 2012). With such a plurality in observations, an in-depth analysis of different approaches to the meaning behind balance-of-power goes beyond the scope of this paper and represents a topic in its own right. But central to the notion is when the relative power of one state increases, other states tend to increase their own power in order to match the rise in power of the first state. They can achieve this in two ways, either by the internal power buildup or externally by establishing a coalition with other states (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 17; Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 32-36; Waltz, 2010, p. 118). Preference is placed upon internal balancing because of the nature of the anarchic and the self-help world. Yet, internal balancing, is in general, difficult to implement unless there exists relative equality in economic, demographic and military characteristics, as well as natural resources between two states (Taliaferro, 2006). This leads many states to be forced to balance by external means and establish a coalition.

Taking this into account, the case of Northeast Asia displays virtually all general criteria for Japan and ROK to establish a coalition. Chinese power has been rapidly increasing for the past several decades, both in economic and military terms, with China also increasing its foreign engagement both regionally and globally. China overtook Japan as the second-largest economy in the world and is taking an extensive program of reform and modernization of its armed forces (Yasuyuki and Masayuki, 2019, p. 61-67). In the past decade, the Chinese not only doubled its military budget, from \$76.4 billion to \$150.5 billion but undertook an extensive program of improving the quality of its forces and equipment (Ross, 2004, p. 283-285; Satake and Maeda, 2019, p. 217). In fact, across the region, defense spending is on the rise, with East Asian states accounting for two-thirds of the entire defense spending in Asia (Military Balance, 2018; Tan, 2015, p. 24; Kissinger, 2015, p. 178)². But more importantly, as Henry Kissinger points out, ‘China affirms explicitly and all other key players implicitly, the option of military force in pursuit of core national interests’ (Kissinger, 2015, p. 178). Following this claim, the Northeast Asian states not only are arming themselves, but they are also intent on using their military assets.

While the previous claim of the arming of the Northeast Asian states could be interpreted as a sign of internal balancing by Japan and ROK, the two states are individually far from being able to match Chinese power. Although some argue that even without the help of the US, the Northeast Asian states are individually able to deter China with conventional military assets (Beckley, 2017), we believe that it is hardly unlikely. Firstly, Chinese military spending is larger even when Japan and ROK are observed together (Military Balance, 2018). Secondly, its demographic and economic potential is far superior to each of these states both individually and seen together. Finally, China possesses nuclear weapons. While there is a possibility that individually Japan and ROK can deter China for some time, a more protracted conflict will favor China over Japan or ROK. This makes the external balancing of Japan and ROK a more rational option with a more probable chance of success and survival in the international arena. Yet, they are not doing that, with statistical data pointing to an absence of balancing the Chinese rise not only in Northeast Asia but Asia-Pacific in general (Chan, 2010, p. 403). Even with the limitations in pursuing a strategy of internal balancing and greater rationality in pursuing external balancing, there is not only a lack of Japan and ROK approaching one another but, in fact, them drifting apart. Throughout the past couple of years, there has been a series of disputes between Japan and ROK regarding trade, intelligence sharing and war reparations. Instead of forming a coalition, they are getting further away.

Over the years, the standard conception of balance-of-power has been challenged by authors. Christensen and Snyder elegantly summed it up by stating that the ‘balance-

² For an overview of the military arms of Northeast Asian states see: Tan, 2015; Military Balance, 2018; Beckley, 2017.

of-power theory has become too parsimonious to yield determinate predictions about state alliance strategies' (Christensen and Snyder, 1990, p. 167). Similarly, Walt states that the 'balance-of-power theory is not wrong; it is merely incomplete' (Walt, 2002a, p. 134). The parsimony problem of balance-of-power has been addressed in several ways by some of the most relevant authors focusing on perceived offensive/defensive balance, balance-of-interest, and balance-of-threat. For Christensen and Snyder, the crucial variable which can lead to either chain-ganging (which can be thought of as a more complex variation of external balancing³) or buck-passing is the elite's perception of whether defense or offense enjoys the advantage (Christensen and Snyder, 1990); for Schweller, it is the elite's perception on the state's orientation, either status quo or revisionist, which leads them to either balance or bandwagon (Schweller, 1994); for Walt, it is the elite's perception what state is the greatest source of threat and not which is the most powerful state (Walt, 1987).

However, all of these modifications of balance-of-power exhibit similar problems when applied to Northeast Asia. Simply put, they all have built within them a notion of perception by primarily the political elites, without providing a more rigorous notion on the causes of such perception. While this paper is not refuting the role of perceptions, on the contrary, supporting it to a certain degree, reducing it to a simple logic of if the political elites perceive X or Y, this leads to balancing or not balancing, is problematic. Simply put, in democratic societies like Japan and ROK (McDougall, 2007, p. 18-19), political elites are a constantly changing category. As aforementioned, questioning the lack of balancing China is present in academic literature for more than two decades. In that time, both Japan and ROK changed their political elite several times. While these modifications can account for their relations with China improving and deteriorating, they still cannot account for the almost total absence of the Japan-ROK coalition. These modifications improve the explanatory power of balance-of-power, but still fail to account for a prolonged absence of external balancing in a situation where China is not only getting more powerful but also more engaged in regional and world affairs.

Bandwagoning and Buck-passing in Northeast Asia

To a certain point, even the standard, neorealist balance-of-power theory can accept the lack of external balancing, by expecting Japan and ROK to either bandwagon with China or attempt to implement the strategy of buck-passing. Both

³ Christensen and Snyder define chain-ganging as committing 'unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be indispensable to the maintenance of the balance' (Christensen and Snyder, 1990, p. 138). Thus, the central notion of chain-ganging is the existence of an alliance, like in the case of external balancing. This allows, for the purposes of this paper, to make a slight simplification of the idea of chain-ganging without losing the strength of the argument.

concepts are intrinsic to the balance-of-power theory and represent specific strategies, which states implement in response to the rise in power of another state. Bandwagoning represents the notion of a state aligning with the stronger side while buck-passing represents transferring the responsibility of balancing to another state (Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 2010; Walt, 1987). Observed in this way, the lack of external balancing by Japan and ROK can be explained relatively easy by providing evidence of them either joining China or attempting to pass over the burden of balancing to another state. This behavior is even more emphasized in the modifications of the balance-of-power theory provided in the previous chapter.

In the case of bandwagoning, although there is contradictory research on the frequency of its occurrence in international practice (Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1994), Northeast Asia does not seem to exhibit signs of bandwagoning behavior by Japan and ROK. While both states have extensive economic ties with China, they are far from joining the Chinese side, although the two cases are somewhat different. What is similar, from the perspective of Walt's balance-of-threat, is the fact that Japan and ROK are strong states, have potential and available allies, and there is still peace in Northeast Asia which are the three crucial determinants that point to balancing rather than bandwagoning (Walt, 1987, p. 29-32). Nevertheless, the centrality of the notion of perceived threat makes the cases of Japan and ROK different from the perspective of balance-of-threat. While Japan explicitly sees China, along with North Korea, as the main strategic threat (Auslin, 2016, p. 129), the situation of ROK is a bit more complex. ROK is strategically hedging China and the US for more than two decades⁴, with the changes in leadership bringing at times closer cooperation between ROK and China (Ross, 1999, p. 85; Hwang, 2018, p. 55-57). Yet, the deployment of THAAD in ROK, Chinese incursions into ROK airspace, and the lack of strong Chinese condemnation of North Korean nuclear program, point to deterioration of good relations between ROK and China from the first part of this decade (Ganguly et al., 2017; Lee, 2017; Hwang 2018; Chang 2018). While seemingly China is aware of a potential hazard of threat perception, by utilizing what is dubbed 'charm offensive' to mitigate such possibilities (Beeson and Li, 2012; Arežina, 2014: 48-53), China's activities in both the East and the South China Sea, issues with Taiwan, support for North Korea and dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Dimitrijević, 2011; Dimitrijević, 2013; Jokanović, 2014; Arežina, 2014, p. 61-63; Kato, 2019, p. 47) can be perceived as aggressive, especially when remembering the aforementioned explicit readiness to use military force. This makes it difficult to adequately assess whether ROK perceives China as a threat or not, but surely does not point to ROK bandwagoning with China. Similarly, from Schweller's

⁴ For a paper focusing on strategic hedging of Japan, see: Stanković, 2017.

perspective, it is doubtful that Japan and ROK are revisionist states since they have enjoyed relative prosperity in the existing status quo. From the perspective of balance-of-interest, it is highly doubtful that Japan and ROK can be considered revisionist states, with the Chinese rise having the potential to undermine their position in Northeast Asia.

Christensen and Snyder's modification does not quite focus on account bandwagoning, but rather more on buck-passing. Buck-passing is perhaps more relevant with research pointing that Japan and ROK are essentially attempting to pass-the-buck to the US (Lind, 2004). But the US pursuit of the grand strategy of offshore balancing, visible in increasing the US push towards isolationism under Donald Trump, brings into question the commitment of the US to the region. While Trump did announce the desire to withdraw the US troops from Northeast Asia, the US withdrawal from the region has been somewhat present since the Clinton administration, even with the strategy of 'Pivot to Asia' primarily because of its failure (Lee, 2018, p. 357-359,360). Pursuing a grand strategy of offshore balancing stipulates for the US to disengage from its military commitments in... Japan and South Korea` (Layne, 1997, p. 112), standing aside and leaving Japan and ROK to contain China as long as possible (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016, p. 75). In essence, this means that the US is the one passing-the-buck to Japan and ROK and not the other way around (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016, p. 73-74). To include perceptual factors as well, because the US pursued onshore balancing in Northeast Asia throughout the Cold War (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2016, p. 75), their switch to offshore balancing can easily be interpreted as abandoning Japan and ROK, requiring them to externally balance, especially having in mind the geographic proximity of China to Japan and ROK (Chan, 2010, p. 395).

STRATEGIC CULTURES OF JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA AND THEIR EFFECTS ON EXTERNAL BALANCING

Summing up the previous chapter, Japan and ROK do not have the means to successfully balance China internally, are not bandwagoning, nor do they have whom to effectively buck-pass, leaving external balancing as the only rational option to pursue; an option which they are not pursuing. Rather, Japan and ROK are currently engaged in a series of disputes and issues which in fact led China to step up and moderate in late August 2019 (Glaser and Skylar Mastro, 2019). If we move beyond the current two decades of the Chinese rise and observe the history of Japan-ROK relations in the past century, there has been a constant presence of a hindrance in their relations, historic enmity between the two. While authors mostly point to historic antagonisms between China and Japan, historical 'baggage' between Japan and ROK is on pair, if not more significant (Tan, 2015: 25-26). For decades, researches focusing on Area Studies of Northeast Asia pointed to mutual enmity

as the main factor in the unpredictability in their relations (Cha, 2000, p. 262). In fact, animosity between Japan and ROK has been continuous throughout the period following World War II, with Northeast Asia being virtually the only place around Eurasia without a multilateral alliance (Cha, 2000, p. 285; 2009/10, p. 158). Their mutual enmity, conceptualized through strategic culture, within the neoclassical realist paradigm, can provide an explanation for the lack of external balancing of Japan and ROK through their alignment.

Although rudimentary neoclassical realist research can be observed earlier (Trapara, 2017, p. 229), it was Gideon Rose's review article that kick-started the approach (Rose, 1998). Explained as an amalgamation of classical and neorealism (Rose, 1998, p. 146; Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 4), existing between structural and constructivist approaches (Rose, 1998: 152), neoclassical realism takes into account both system and unit-level variables in explaining international realities. To a certain point, this paper already dwelled into neoclassical realism with Walt, Schweller and Christensen and Snyder's modifications being considered early neoclassical realist works (Taliaferro, 2000/01, p. 135). But with neoclassical realism going through three stages of development (Ripsman et al. 2016, p. 16-57), their limitations are striving to be overcome by employing the research agenda of the latest stage. Earlier models of neoclassical realist models saw systemic stimuli as the independent variable, which filtered through intervening variables of perceptions, decision making and policy implementation led to the state's policy response (Ripsman et al. 2016, p. 31). But this model was rightfully criticized for cherry-picking its intervening variables as well as leaving them not adequately conceptualized (Ripsman et al. 2016, p. 58; Walt, 2002b). In fact, this paper did the same in the case of perceptions. This notion was recognized by neoclassical realists, who modified the model more rigorously by highlighting four crucial intervening variables: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic institutions (Ripsman et al. 2016, p. 59).

The place of strategic culture in this model is specific because it impacts not only perceptions but decision making and policy implementation, increasing its power over policy responses of states (Ripsman et al. 2016, p. 59). Like balance-of-power, there exists an extensive debate on the concept of strategic culture (Johnston, 1995; Gray, 1999; Glenn, 2009). In essence, strategic culture represents 'collective assumptions and expectations...[that]...constrain state's behavior...by defining what are acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices' (Ripsman et al. 2016, p. 67). These assumptions and expectations are derived to a large degree from one state's 'ideational history' (Johnston, 1995, p. 63). While the international system provides imperatives for a state to behave in a certain way, the beliefs of the political elite and the general population (to a certain degree) can limit the range of strategic options and freedom of action of a state, making it unable to respond adequately to systemic pressures. This makes historic enmity between Japan and ROK

important in their decisions on acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices. Thus, Japan-ROK enmity hinders their ability to adequately respond to the rise of China by aligning in order to externally balance China.

Intervening ‘might’ of strategic culture on external balancing

With strategic culture being rooted in the ideational histories of states, historical experiences of states can become critical in understanding the limitations strategic culture imposes on defining strategic choices. Although Mearsheimer might be correct in stating that ‘past behavior is usually not a reliable indicator of future behavior’ (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 384), past behavior of others can influence the ways in which we perceive their behavior. Historical experience need not be automatically equated to a certain value of strategic culture, especially vis-à-vis another state, but more often than not they can. If two states share a history of conflict, the rearmament of one is doubtful to be seen with ignorance by the other side. But, we would be cautious about raising the importance of strategic culture to the premier level and then generalize it on all cases. While undoubtedly relevant, it requires us to discern the impact history of conflict between two states had on them, and how they impacted their views and perceptions of one another, on a case to case basis. By accepting these limitations of the intervening ‘might’ of strategic culture on the causal effects of systemic stimuli on state behavior, the historic enmity between Japan and ROK falls into the category of higher ‘might’ of strategic culture.

Seemingly, East Asia, in general, represents a fertile setting for the impact of historical experience on strategic culture and its shaping of political affairs. As Beeson and Li state ‘East Asia is, after all, a region whose history has often been violent and traumatic, and where the past continues to cast a long shadow over the present’ (Beeson and Li, 2012, p. 35), with similar notions being highlighted by other authors (Ganguly et al., 2017, p. 2; Tan, 2015, p. 30). In the case of Japan and ROK, even though their historic interactions stretch many centuries in the past, the roots of their enmity, impacting current affairs, can be traced to the beginning of the twentieth century and the Japanese colonial rule of ROK. With Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese war, in 1894-1895 and 1904-1905, Korea firstly became a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and a colony in 1910 (McDougall, 2007, p. 180). During this time, the Japanese oppressive regime of the Koreans, stretching until the end of World War II, shaped the foundations of negative views of ROK towards Japan. Specifically, perhaps the most crucial issues which are still influencing their relations are the issue of ‘comfort women’ and forced labor of Koreans before and during World War II, Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japanese political elite, legality of the Annexation treaty, and Japanese apology for their actions during World War II (Rozman and Lee, 2006; Min, 2003; Yamazaki,

2004; Shibuichi, 2005; Van Dyke, 2006; Choi, 2010; Kim, 2014). While these are mostly views of ROK, the Japanese see the reoccurrence of these questions mostly as Japan is a convenient target to gain popular support in ROK (Rozman and Lee, 2006, p. 780-783), with all their strives to improve mutual relations meeting cold response from the side of ROK (Mitrović, 2015, p. 20). Japanese politicians have repeatedly apologized, albeit some might interpret the formulations of those apologies unconvincing (Yamazaki, 2004). More importantly, the Japanese do not see it as a question for which the responsibility current generation should bare (Kim, 2014, p. 86-87). In a sense, it can be interpreted that the Japanese position is to leave the past in the past, not entirely disproving the Japanese actions but believing that it ought not to be of importance in today's affairs.

Although most of these issues are derived from events stretching back more than half a century, they still affect their mutual relations, as evident in the current trade dispute, which is attributed to the ROK Supreme Court ruling which allows its citizens to sue Japanese companies for damages during World War II (Green, 2019). These events somewhat corroborate the claim of Victor Cha, which attributed historic enmity for explaining the 'day-to-day antagonism in Japan-ROK interaction' (Cha, 2000, p. 262). In fact, Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell quote Cha's works as being an example of incorporation of strategic culture into the research design (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 70), although Cha was explicit in stating that, in the case of Japan and ROK, historic enmity is of secondary importance (Cha, 2000, p. 262,284). While Cha's notion that the consistency of historic enmity between Japan and ROK cannot explain longer fluctuations in their relations has merit to it (Cha, 2000, p. 265), it does not explain why Japan and ROK were never able to be allies. His starting point of a quasi-alliance, where states share an ally, without being aligned themselves (Cha, 2000, p. 262), means that his model does not take much into account the possibility of the two to become allies. Furthermore, Cha argues that 'when American resolve is perceived as weak, Japan-ROK relations exhibit significantly less contention and greater cooperation over bilateral issues' (Cha, 2000, p. 263), which is currently failing its empirical test. The US has never been more ambivalent in its 'triangular alliance' in Northeast Asia, and yet the relations between Japan and ROK are approaching rock bottom. While Cha's model is relevant, it rests upon the US being a part of the equation, thus questioning its applicability in the case where Japan and ROK ought to externally balance by aligning themselves to counter the Chinese rise.

To argue that these events, which contributed to historic enmity between Japan and ROK, are not only evident in their day-to-day interactions, but also in shaping their strategic culture, allows for a more compelling account of their behavior. The evidence that mutual animosity is persistent between them is visible in the ways the two view each other. Only 25 percent of South Koreans view the Japanese favorably, while 21 percent of the Japanese view South Koreans favorably (Pew Research

Center, 2014). More significantly, in the case of ROK, this represents deterioration, with a 25 percent increase in unfavorable opinion since 2008 (Tan, 2015, p. 26). The historical burden molded collective assumptions of one another, influencing the ways in which the two perceive the other side. With ROK placing Japan as the historic enemy and the Japanese view of no action being enough to finally put an end to these historic issues, the collective assumptions and expectations can be discerned as being that of a Japan as a historic aggressor and ROK as unreliable. Translated into a hindrance to strategic choices aligning with the aggressor and the unreliable one, is a questionable strategy to pursue. Under the rising imperative for external balancing, such assumptions about the other side can be explained as the strategy of 'better no ally than such an ally'. While their mutual cooperation is acceptable to a certain degree, placing trust for your own safety in the hands of the other, perceived in such a way, is more foolish than relying on your own strength alone in potential conflict to come. The burden of history in the case of the Japan-ROK relations shapes their strategic culture-making external balancing which rests upon one another an unacceptable strategic choice to pursue.

CONCLUSION

The curiosity of the case of Northeast Asia exists mostly if one takes notions of rationality and more standard approaches to balance-of-power as a starting point. Strive for making a parsimonious causal logic that can be almost virtually applied, while theoretically sound, leaves too many unknowns if wishing to understand specific events unfolding in reality. When applied to the case of Northeast Asia, the propositions of standard approaches to the balance-of-power theory pointed to the satisfaction of virtually all criteria for Japan and ROK to pursue the strategy of external balancing. China is larger, has a bigger economy, has a larger military which is in the process of qualitative upgrade and is getting more engaged both regionally and globally. With both Japan and ROK cannot be considered weak states, but rather more as middle powers, and have available allies who can also be impacted by the Chinese rise, their bandwagoning with China is also neither theoretically sound nor seen in reality. Buck-passing, while the most promising, having in mind the US engagement in the region, is still far-fetched when observed in the context of current relations and not only the steady withdrawal of the US from the region and the push for isolationism but also attempts of the US to pass-the-buck to Japan and ROK. Observed in such a way, the limitations of balance-of-power to provide an explanation for the case of Northeast Asia become apparent because the cause does not lead to an expected outcome.

Through the neoclassical realist view, such a discrepancy between cause and outcome can be overcome when the strategic cultures of Japan and ROK are taken into account. Although highlighting historic enmity between Japan and ROK as the

main explanation in their mutual relations is not a novel idea, observed through its shaping of strategic culture, gives not only more satisfactory explanation of the lack of Japan-ROK alignment in order to balance China but also stronger theoretical grounds for framing such an intervening factor. The inclusion of strategic culture into the balance-of-power equation in the case of Japan and ROK provides an explanation why the cause does not lead to an expected outcome. With its ability to intervene in ways state responds to systemic stimuli by constraining the freedom of action through providing acceptable and unacceptable strategic choices, strategic culture molded on historic enmity between Japan and ROK established assumptions and expectations these states have of each other. The view of Japan as the historic aggressor by ROK and the view of ROK as an unreliable partner by Japan, constrain their ability to externally balance China by aligning themselves. Thus, systemic stimuli caused by the rise in the discrepancy of relative power between China, on one side, and Japan and ROK on the other, did not lead to the historical burden because severe historic enmity shaped Japan and ROK's strategic culture, whose intervening 'might' is preventing adequate policy response.

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NEOBIČAN SLUČAJ SEVEROISTOČNE AZIJE: SPOLJNO URAVNOTEŽENJE I STRATEŠKA KULTURA

Apstrakt: Ovaj rad analizira situaciju u severoistočnoj Aziji iz perspektive rasta moći Kine poslednjih decenija i reakcije na takav uspon kineskih suseda Japana i Južne Koreje. Uzimajući u obzir predloge teorije ravnoteže snaga, koja je uglavnom zamišljena kroz neorealističku paradigmu, postoji nesklad u očekivanoj reakciji Japana i Južne Koreje na uspon Kine. Zbog relativne superiornosti moći Kine u odnosu na Japan i Južnu Koreju, teorija ravnoteže snaga kaže da bi ove dve države trebalo da sprovedu strategiju spoljnog uravnoteženja usklađivanjem sebe kako bi se mogle suprostaviti porastu moći Kine. Ipak, nema znakova da se Japan i Južna Koreja bave takvom strategijom. Suprotno tome, niz sporova između dve države u proteklih nekoliko godina upućuje na to da se Japan i Južna Koreja udaljavaju jedna od druge. Primenjujući neoklasicistički realistički pristup, ovaj rad tvrdi da istorijsko neprijateljstvo između Japana i Južne Koreje koje traje još od početka dvadesetog veka, oblikuje njihovu stratešku kulturu na način koji koči Japan i Južnu Koreju da donesu strateške izbore za spoljno uravnoteženje.

Ključne reči: severoistočna Azija, Kina, Japan, Južna Koreja, ravnoteža snaga, spoljno uravnoteženje, strateška kultura, neoklasični realizam.

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ITALO-SERBIAN INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

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Abstract: The intercultural relations between Serbia and Italy have always been an important and prolific bridge for bringing closer the two nations based on common democratic values. It is also true that the intercultural relations between Serbia and Italy have also passed periods of crisis and misunderstandings, especially during the wars of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This article, firstly, intends to analyse some cultural aspects and facts, principally based on semantic and translation stereotypes that constituted real forces of alienation between the two nations, despite the fact that in the Southeast European geopolitical system Italy, Serbia, Romania and Greece have common interests. Secondly, this study intends to re-evaluate the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations under the perspective and approach of modern cultural diplomacy.

Key words: intercultural relations, cultural diplomacy, Italo-Serbian relations, geopolitical system, semiotic and translation stereotypes.

In the past, the intercultural relations between Serbia and Italy have been studied through the historical and political prism both by Italian and Serbian scholars and analysts. Naturally, our intention is not to rewrite the history of the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations, an attempt that would be impossible in just one article, but to summarise some important key factors that could explain the periods of strengthening or weakening of the intercultural relations between the two nations. We use the term nation and not State since the Serbian nation in its

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modern history did not always coincide with a unique national Serbian State because of the multi-ethnic construction of Yugoslavia.

It would be useful to underline the fact that historically Italy, Serbia, Greece and Romania share a common denominator. These states were founded in the 19th century as national States in Southeast Europe sharing the idea of freedom based on common democratic values and struggling against the despotic authorities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire as well. Actually, the European democratic values, respect for human rights and the idea of freedom, constitute general principles and notions commonly used. Surprisingly, the democratic values and human rights, nowadays, are still considered irrelevant by many states, societies and cultural traditions around the world. In these states, other values and other principles are more important. That means, that the common denominator of the democratic values is not given in any circumstances, but constitutes the profound wheel of a certain society.

In particular, if we examine the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations from an Italian point of view, then we realise that the Italian foreign cultural policy generally operates via two principal organizations: the institutes of Italian culture (Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, 2019) and the Committees of the Dante Alighieri's Society (Società Dante, 2019). At the moment, there are 83 institutes of Italian culture [Istituti di Cultura Italiana]² that operate around the world and promote the Italian language and culture. Among them, there is also the Institute of Italian culture in Belgrade (ICT, 2019). In addition, the Dante Alighieri Society, founded in 1889 by Giosuè Carducci (Società Dante, 2019) and other significant Italian scholars, at the moment counts 81 committees in Italy and 401 committees around the world, constituting a major organisation with the most expanded network for the promotion of the Italian language and culture abroad. Stefano Santoro in *L'Italia e l'Europa orientale: diplomazia culturale e propaganda 1918-1943* explains³ (Santoro, 2005, pp. 270-271) how the Dante Alighieri committee in

² The abbreviation of the Italian culture institutes is IIC.

³ According to Santoro, S. (2005) in *L'Italia e l'Europa orientale: diplomazia culturale e propaganda 1918-1943*. Milano: FrancoAngeli, pp. 270-271: In seguito ad una sollecitazione del direttore generale della Propaganda Geisser Celesia, nel Febbraio 1939 il presidente della Dante Alighieri Felicioni aveva manifestato il «vivo desiderio [...] che – nel rinnovato clima dei rapporti italo-jugoslavi» - venisse istituito un comitato della Dante «a Belgrado o in qualche altro centro del Paese amico». Il comitato della Dante di Belgrado era destinato tuttavia ad avere vita breve. Nel settembre 1939, in seguito all'avvio della creazione dell'Istituto di cultura italiana di Belgrado, la sede centrale della Dante aveva «deciso di modificare conseguentemente il programma dell'attività del comitato locale», in accordo con la Direzione generale degli italiani all'estero. In una prima fase si tentò di far coesistere le due istituzioni... Il comitato della Dante sopravvisse ancora per qualche tempo, ma privato di ogni autonomia e possibilità di azione, controllato dall'Istituto di cultura e sorvegliato strettamente da Felicioni, zelante esecutore degli ordini del ministero tendenti a paralizzare sempre più l'attività della società all'estero a beneficio degli Istituti di cultura italiana.

Belgrade founded in February of 1939 lasted only a few months until September of 1939 when the Institute of Italian culture in Belgrade was founded. In the last decades, the Dante Alighieri Society is present in the Serbian territory with three committees in Šabac, Novi Sad and Niš. The successful work on the language and culture of the Nis committee under the presidency of Professor Slavica Mitić Paolillo brought the Italian language to be chosen by the 95% of the students as the second foreign language after the English in this area.

Unfortunately, the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations passed through a deep crisis during the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. The reason was the impartial Italian policy and open collaboration with the German policy to sustain Slovenian and Croat acts against Belgrade. The Italian policy was mainly influenced by the Vatican thesis and by Austrian and German planning, creating a semantic stereotype considering the Orthodox Serbians as “the others”, while Slovenian and Croat actions were fully justified for the Italian public opinion. Nevertheless, the Italian foreign policy invested much in Croatia, and on 3 October 2003 Croatia unilaterally declared its exclusive economic zone in the Adriatic Sea, an act that was practically equivalent to the control of the Adriatic Sea (Quercia, Eichberg, 2003). However, the problematic period of the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations finally had come to an end. The first important step that determines a change of the Italian cultural policy approach was the 6 June 2006 accord between the Dante Alighieri Society in Rome and the Belgrade’s University ‘Braća Karić’, stipulated by Bruno Bottai and Gordana Ajdukovic, for the promotion of the Italian language and culture, the scientific and cultural collaboration between the institutions and the exchange of professors and students (Adnkronos, 2019).

During the last decade, the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations were continuously strengthening and expanding due to the bilateral collaboration of Italian and Serbian educational, research, cultural and economic institutions. The implementation of the modern cultural diplomacy between the two states also brings closer the two nations, deconstructing at the same time the old semiotic and translation stereotypes for “the others”.

The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD) provides a modern definition of cultural diplomacy (ICD, 2019):

Cultural Diplomacy may best be described as a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation, promote national interests and beyond; Cultural diplomacy can be practiced by either the public sector, private sector or civil society.

The application of cultural diplomacy is defined as (Quercia, Eichberg, 2003, p. 9):

Cultural diplomacy in practice (or applied cultural diplomacy) is the application and implementation of the theory of cultural diplomacy, including all models that have been practiced throughout history by individual, community, state or institutional actors. These models include, for example, diverse cultural exchange programs, international delegations (e.g., American jazz ambassadors) or sports competitions. The examples are uniquely able to affect intercultural and interfaith understanding and promote reconciliation.

Finally, the importance and principles of cultural diplomacy are very significant (Quercia, Eichberg, 2003, p. 9):

In an increasingly globalized, interdependent world, in which the proliferation of mass communication technology ensures we all have greater access to each other than ever before, cultural diplomacy is critical to fostering peace & stability throughout the world. Cultural diplomacy, when learned and applied at all levels, possesses the unique ability to influence the “Global Public Opinion” and ideology of individuals, communities, cultures or nations, which can accelerate the realization of the 5 principles below. By accomplishing the first principle, one enables the second, which in turn enables the third until the fifth ultimate principle of global peace and stability is achieved. The principles are:

1. Respect & Recognition of Cultural Diversity & Heritage
2. Global Intercultural Dialogue
3. Justice, Equality & Interdependence
4. The Protection of International Human Rights
5. Global Peace & Stability (ICD, 2019).

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also adopted cultural diplomacy as a policy instrument. Specifically, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers culture as an essential element of the Italian identity and as an important patrimony both tangible and intangible. Thus, the promotion of culture is one of the fundamental instruments of Italian foreign policy (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2019). The implementation and the realisation of the promotion of Italian culture abroad is based on the network of the Italian institutes of culture, the Italian schools abroad, the Italian research projects, the cultural and scientific accords and collaborations, the Italian archaeological missions, the fellowships, the CLIQ certification of the Italian language and other cultural actions.

In conclusion, the implementation of cultural diplomacy between the two nations could be positive and productive when it is based on real common democratic values, interests and respect. On the contrary, applying the American jazz ambassadors, as a model of cultural diplomacy in radical Islamic territories, probably would not be a productive approach, as the American music is

considered by radicals as a decadent subculture. Mark Donfried⁴ in *The power of culture for communication, international cooperation and peace*, says that (2013, p.62): “Sometimes it is artificial if I talk about my culture and you talk about your culture; it is somewhat artificial. But if we do something together, if we try to tackle a global challenge together, then it is easier, we will learn about each other on the way, we will build trust on the way”. It is more than obvious that the Italo-Serbian intercultural relations, within constructive cultural diplomacy from both parts, could be expanded and become deeper and strengthened in the future. The development of the five above-mentioned principles of cultural diplomacy, not only between Serbia and Italy but also in collaboration with other partners that share the same common democratic and human rights values in Southeast Europe, like Romania and Greece, could be a proved, positive, long-term policy for the stabilisation of the area.

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⁴ Donfried, M. (2013), “The power of culture for communication, international cooperation and peace” in *La Diplomazia Culturale. Forza del dialogo, potere della cultura, le opportunità per l'Italia*, Roma: Aracne.

ITALIJANSKO-SRPSKI MEĐUKULTURNI ODNOSI I KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA

Apstrakt. Međukulturni odnosi Srbije i Italije uvek su bili važan i plodan most za zbližavanje dve nacije na temelju zajedničkih demokratskih vrednosti. Istina je i da su međukulturni odnosi Srbije i Italije takođe prošli razdoblja krize i nesporazuma, posebno tokom ratova prilikom raspada Jugoslavije. Ovaj članak, prvo ima nameru da analizira neke kulturne aspekte i činjenice, uglavnom utemeljene na semantičkim i prevodilačkim stereotipima koji su predstavljali stvarne sile otuđenja između dva naroda, uprkos činjenici da u geopolitičkom sastavu jugoistočne Evrope Italija, Srbija, Rumunija i Grčka imaju zajedničke interese. Drugo, ova studija namerava da preispita italijansko-srpske međukulturne odnose kroz prizmu i prustupe moderne kulturne diplomatije.

Ključne reči: međukulturni odnosi, kulturna diplomatija, italijansko-srpski odnosi, geopolitički sistem, semantički i prevodilački stereotipi.

DOCUMENTS

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA MR. ALEKSANDAR VUČIĆ

at the General Assembly of the United Nations

Mr. President,
Mr. Secretary-General,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I have the honor to address you as the President of the Republic of Serbia, country of good and honest people, who gave me their trust and honored me to represent them here in front of you, in a world where they – through their hard work- regain the place that belongs to them.

Last time I was here, two years ago, in this same place it was said that the situation in the world was harder than in previous 2016. I wouldn't say that in 2019 it is any easier; on the contrary. My dear friends, you have noticed that all of us like children gather in this big hall when we need to hear what great powers think about us and our future. A bit scared a bit worried we are happy that it is finished and we were not mentioned in their speeches. Unfortunately, we look with mockery those who were mentioned, because we were not in their shoes. And in such a way, we have survived another year. And I do not speak about one but about all great powers. I come from a small country, indeed the biggest one in the Western Balkans, which had suffered the most in the World War One, I come from people that had survived the most ferocious sufferings and Jasenovac genocide in the WWII and people who more than anything wants to have peace, stability and possibility to progress in the 21st century.

Former Yugoslavia and its legal successor Serbia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Today we are on our EU path and it is a strategic commitment of our country, but stronger than ever in this distinguished hall and at any other place we will advocate not only respect for the right, independence and

sovereignty of small countries, but also always to be capable to preserve equality and our right to freedom and independent decision-making, by acting together.

That's why I am going to speak about Serbia and the region; because one does not go without the other. Let me paraphrase Ernest Hemingway – Serbia is not an island, but – I proudly say, part of the Balkans and it is stronger if those around it are stronger. That is why I strive for the region, almost to the same extent I strive for Serbia.

That is why we are so eager for the Balkans to accept the policy of cooperation; that's why we will always strive for talking to each other. We'll always advocate the policy of peace and cooperation, because it is the only way for creating the necessary stability, without which there is no economic growth and progress.

I am coming from the country which had to face terribly difficult reforms in 2014. We were on the brim of bankruptcy and total disaster. Today, Serbia has no problems with public finance and I want to say wonderful news to the citizens of my country. We expect that one of the biggest world credit agencies even tomorrow will not only increase the outlook but also the credit rating of our country.

According to projections by the IMF experts, GDP of Serbia will cumulatively grow by 12.5% or 4% a year in coming 3 years. This result will not be reached by any other country in the region.

The IMF envisages that GDP per capita, which is an adequate indicator of the living standards, will be 10.394 US dollars in 2023. It is an increase of about 45% comparing to 7.207 US dollars from the last year; so, almost twice more in only five years.

Precisely with its stable economic situation, Serbia attracted in the first 7 months of this year 2.32 billion euro foreign direct investment, which is much more than in the same period last year, and it was the most successful year for Serbia. And finally, Serbia has far the lowest unemployment rate in the region -10.3%.

Additionally, we invest in the future of Serbia through knowledge, and now we are known for export of IT products and software – last year, that export exceeded one billion euro.

Now, there is an important question:

Do we live well; do people in the region live well? No. We need decades of peace, hard and diligent work and great successes in order to bring ourselves closer to the developed European countries. Nevertheless, under such conditions and due to the economic progress, Serbia chose the independent foreign policy, independent decision-making as its path towards the future, and that is why we do not hide anywhere and not even in this hall, but we praise with good and friendly relations we have with the People's Republic of China, Russian Federation and with better and better relations with the USA. Because our job is to take care of our people

and we do not care what someone else in the world might tell us. Whether we were buying gas or chocolates, we chose the most quality and the most affordable goods, and we do not care what other big powers think of the respective, because we think we are entitled to think and decide about our own destiny and what's the best for our own people, and not what other big and powerful ones think.

You all know that we are facing problems regarding territorial integrity of Serbia, actually that we are facing the pending issue of Kosovo and Metohija.

The unresolved problem of Kosovo and Metohija affects more than anything economic progress and future of the young ones in the region and in Serbia. That is why I will speak about efforts to resolve it, despite all the obstacles.

Serbian writer and diplomat Jovan Dučić used to say that “enemies are only our friends in disguise that are apart from us only by some kind of misunderstanding or prejudice”. The centuries-long problem of Kosovo and Metohija is far from misunderstanding or prejudice, but we have courageously and realistically, with will and faith, started the quest for lasting solution.

Nobody cares more about solution of this difficult burden than Serbia, because it would provide to our country, but also to the entire region, peace, stability, cooperation, economic prosperity and progress on the European path. That is why we expect the world, especially big powers, to see, understand and support our positions and arguments, as well as not to support moves that are going in opposite direction, like they did in crucial years- 1999 and 2008.

Like the American President John Kennedy said: “We cannot negotiate with people who say what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable.” That is why the lasting solution- the way I see it- should be reached in such a way that neither of the Parties would gain everything, but they would gain enough.

Even though we do not recognize the unilaterally declared independence of the so-called “Kosovo”, just like less and less countries does, because in accordance with the legally binding UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Kosovo and Metohija is the Autonomous Province within the Republic of Serbia, under the administration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo- UNMIK, in desire for peace and stability, we had the dialogue with Albanians who live there, and with the facilitation of the European Union. We reached- with our concessions- certain progress and witnessed it by signing the Brussels Agreement. However, obligations taken by the respective Agreement were met only by Serbia. We continued the dialogue despite frequent tensions and incidents in Kosovo and Metohija and despite various unilateral moves of Priština, which made it difficult, all until it stopped due to the most unreasonable unilateral moves of all- due to 100% tariffs on import of Serbian goods, which actually means full termination of flow of goods. Since they imposed tariffs, on 21 November 2018, we lost about 350 million euro until 21 August this year. Tariffs that are still in force also jeopardize

normal and dignified life of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. In all this time, Serbia reacted moderately and responsibly to Priština's unilateral acts not imposing counter-measures and trying to calm the situation down.

Not only interests of Belgrade and Priština are intertwined through the problem of Kosovo and Metohija, but also those of various international stakeholders. And as long as it continues in that way, Kosmet will be a source of endless political manipulations and instabilities. That is precisely why the presence of the United Nations through work of UNMIK is necessary as a guarantee of safety for Serbs living there.

Despite everything, I believe that the agreement between Serbs and Albanians is of utmost importance for stability of the Balkans, and that those two nations have a role in our region that Winston Churchill meant for France and Germany, when he spoke of uniting Europe. We are ready to continue to make efforts for reaching solution for the issue of Kosovo and Metohija. If that weren't the case, we would not be starting to build highway section next year from Nis to Priština.

Serbia has always been a cross-road and as such it became the seat of the Transport Community. We have finished highway towards the North Macedonia; in the beginning of November we inaugurate highway towards Bulgaria, we are building highway towards Montenegro, and there is an ongoing plan to connect with Romania by a better road.

We build railroads towards Hungary, modernize railroads towards Montenegro and North Macedonia, and it is my wish to revive the railroad between Belgrade and Sarajevo.

Three days ago I had a big and important meeting with Prime Ministers of the North Macedonia and Albania. And we agreed to start working for ourselves, for our region, not to unite but to enable free flow of goods, capital and services, to start creating common market; to start with something a bit revolutionary, because nations in the Balkans do not need to serve only to the others, but together they can do the best and the greatest thing for themselves. Until today we fought for who is going to be in favor of one, two or three big powers and which power would create a better future for us. I am not naïve at all and I know that in the future we will depend on the big ones to a great extent, but everything we can do ourselves, we shouldn't and we would not leave to the others. And that is why the Balkans should belong to the Balkans' nations, sovereign and free people that will know how to fight in the best way for their own future. We want the same for all other nations worldwide and we will always fight for that in this distinguished institution.

In about ten days, Serbia is starting to build also a highway between Belgrade and Sarajevo, just like we have already built many roads and railroads or just like we are building them, because we want to be closer to all our neighbors, to get to know and understand each other better. And there is also a highway to Banja Luka. Then,

there will be less accumulation of easy political points by cross-border insults, and more cooperation. One of the ways to achieve the respective is establishment of the Regional Economic Zone. And no one should be afraid that the idea of a new Yugoslavia is hiding behind this idea or that it is an expression of desire for Serbian hegemony, just because it is coming from Belgrade. I believe that small, divided markets of ours in the Western Balkans would be far more interesting to everyone if we would act together. And the Regional Economic Zone would not be a substitute for the European Union, but it could be an expression of our concern for ourselves, at least until we finalize that long process of accessing the European integration.

Distinguished Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Serbia respects all Member States of the United Nations and their territorial integrity and sovereignty. We have never asked, nor will we ever ask for something that is not ours. We expect to get the same level of respect. We do not give ourselves the right to divide the world into a good or bad one, or to evaluate what is right or what is wrong, but we are proud of our freedom-loving tradition and contribution which, throughout history, we had been giving in fight for law and justice.

We advocate that all open issues in the world are to be resolved in peaceful manner and through dialogue, with respect of the international law and applicable UN Resolutions. We want to cherish old friendships and build new ones. That is why we proudly say here in this big and the most important hall throughout the world that we will do our best to improve our cooperation with African, all Asian and Latin American countries. That's also the way how we see the future of Serbia and the future of world. Friendship, however, is not something that was given once and for ever; it should be kept and continuously nurtured and in that regard you can always rely on Serbia.

And as I said – we are on our path towards the European Union and we have partnership relations with Western countries, including more and more intensive cooperation with the USA, but we are proud of our excellent relations with Russia and China. Cooperation with friendly African, Asia-Pacific and Latin American countries is also in focus of the Serbian foreign policy.

“If there is anything that a man can do well, I say let him do it. Give him a chance.” With these words of great statesman Abraham Lincoln – Honest Abe, I would like to thank you for your attention.

And at the very end, I would just use few Serbian words which will be very well understood in the entire region:

Balkan balkanskim narodima! Živela Srbija!

New York, September 26th 2019

IIPE'S AMBASSADORS FORUM

NORTH EAST OF ARGENTINA – A STRATEGIC REGION

Food security, interconnection and environment

Estanislao A. ZAWELS¹

The paper discusses a region that is very far from the Balkans and Europe but still has some similarities. Besides, I believe that nothing that happens in this world should be strange to us, because never like today we can say that we live in a global village or as an Argentine thinker Juan Bautista Alberdi said some 160 years ago, we are living in “the people’s world”.

HISTORY

Discovered by Spain in 1516, by Juan de Solis, it was then populated mainly by the Guaranis people. The first city, Sancti Spiritu, was founded in 1527, near today’s city of Rosario.

An important moment in the region was the arrival of the Jesuits, from 1608 until 1777, when the Society of Jesus was expelled from the Spanish Empire and abolished by Pope Clement XIV. They organized the Guaraní people in missions or cities, improving their agricultural skills and brought cows, with meat, milk, and leather. They created a mix property system, with individual property and collective property. Their economy was based on barter. They introduced the work of iron, silver, wood, gold, textiles, crockery, musical instruments, hats, etc. Reading, writing and mathematics were compulsory for boys and girls.

Unfortunately, the region was threatened, like other regions of the Spanish Empire, by other European powers - the Portuguese, the British and the French. The Portuguese through the Bandeirantes all along the 16th and the 19th centuries, the British at the beginning of the 19th century and again in the mid-19th century. This time together with the French Empire.

In 1860, there was a war between Paraguay and the Triple Alliance of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. This was a very destructive war, as was the Civil

¹ His Excellence Mr. Estanislao A. Zawels, Ambassador of Argentina in Republic of Serbia

War in the US, almost at the same time. The male population of Paraguay was severely curtailed.

Perhaps the most important landmark of this region was the recent creation of MERCOSUR. It is a Common Market for Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. It started in 1991, with the signing of the Treaty of Asunción and before that the Declaration of Foz de Iguazu. This economic area comprises 13 million square kilometers and almost 300 million inhabitants, as well as the greatest supply of fresh water in the world and a huge surface of arable land.

FRESH WATER RESERVE

This region of Argentina, together with the regional extensions of the rivers and aquifers, is part of one of the biggest reserves of fresh water on the planet.

This is not neutral information nowadays when we are witnessing increasing desertification worldwide due to climate change and wasteful land use.

Particularly important is the Guaraní Aquifer, which covers an underground area of 1.2 million square kilometers. It has between 50 and 500 meters of thickness. This surface is four times the size of Italy or more than two times the size of France.

The Iberá wetland, in the Province of Corrientes, has 45.000 square kilometers, and the Delta of the Paraná around 14.000 square kilometers. Both are important reserves of biodiversity and wildlife.

On the surface, this region is also crossed by some of the most important rivers in the world, like the Paraná, of 4.800 km, the Paraguay, of 2.695 km, the Uruguay, of 1.830 km, the Iguazú, of 1.060 km, and the Bermejo of 1.060 km, to mention only the biggest.

REGIONAL AND WORLD INTERCONNECTION

The waterway Paraná Paraguay consists of 3.400 km of navigable rivers, from Matto Grosso to the Rio de la Plata. It is running through five countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It covers 700.000 square km and is populated by 40 million inhabitants.

Only in its first 500 km, from the Rio de la Plata in Argentina, there are more than 40 modern ports for merchant ships, with grain processing plants, and access to railway and highways. This year, it implies the use of 2.500 merchant ships, 4.300 barges, 184.000 railway wagons, 4 million truck trips, and more than 30 million tons of goods transported. It is important to know that the maritime or fluvial transport is twice as cheap as railway transport, and four times cheaper than road transport.

The waterway is still under development, but already you can sail with barges and train barges from Rosario to Asunción of Paraguay, some 1.000 km upriver. Its draft is around 10 feet all year long. From the Rio de la Plata to Rosario, you can sail with merchant ships because its draft is 36 feet.

The Waterway Paraná Paraguay is one of the most important tools for economic integration within the MERCOSUR.

FOOD SECURITY

Talking about food security is the first theme regarding food availability. This is important to have into account because there is a tendency in certain regions to consider food safety as food security.

World demographics, including Africa, indicate that the world population is still increasing fast. At the same time, hundreds of millions of people are leaving poverty behind, like in Asia. All of these shows that there is, and will be, a need for more food. But it will also be needed more diverse and quality food to attend changing food diets.

Going back to Africa, what is happening in the Sahel is an extreme example of the challenges that we face. In the next 30 years, its population will grow from 70 million to 210 million. The Sahel is today a semi-arid area, with already a huge proportion of the young population, and prone to violence due to radicalization. Only imagine what could be the consequences of this phenomenon of overpopulation.

One of those consequences will be a food security crisis. Climate change is aggravating this crisis.

What is needed, besides education and jobs for young people, is food availability. Food locally produced with state of the art technology to overcome aridity and climate uncertainty.

Let us look at what happened in Argentina in the last 30 years. An Agriculture revolution in Argentina allowed increasing its production from 30 M tons in the 90 to 130 M tons in the 2019 crop.

A big part of this revolution is due to the use of a combination of high tech and low-cost technologies. Basically, the package was Genetically Modified Seeds, Field rotation, Direct Till, and Silo Bags.

GMO means that you need much fewer insecticides and a big improvement of yields. For more than 30 years of its use, there are no reports of illness due to GMOs. Today, in Argentina, we have developed GMO seeds resistant to drought, not yet released for production. Imagine the wide applications that they could have in semi-arid areas.

Direct Till means that you implant the seed directly on the land, without tilling and returning the land. That means less use of gas oil, more moisture, and less land erosion.

Silo Bags means: a) that you can keep your crop in your land without investing in expensive silos and b) that you do not have to sell your crop at the same time as everybody else.

The N.E. region of Argentina is at the center of this revolution. 50% of the soybean production in Argentina is within a radius of 300 Km from the Waterway. More precisely, to the City of Rosario and its surroundings, where 20 ports and big crushing facilities for flour, oil and biodiesel, are located. This is known as the Soy Cluster of Rosario, the biggest in the world.

ENVIRONMENT AND ECOTOURISM

The N.E. region of Argentina covers an area that goes from south of the Capricorn Tropic (Latitude S. 25) to the Rio de la Plata (Latitude S. 34). With a climate that goes from the temperate of the humid Pampa to a warmer subtropical without a dry season. It is one of the main world reserves of fresh water and has an important role to play regarding the world environment.

Argentina today has and has always had a very active policy to protect its environment. It has pioneered in creating Protected areas; the first one was in 1903, which became the National Park of Nahuel Huapi in Patagonia. Today Argentina has 47.784 km² of land, which are national parks and more than 10.000 km² of sea National Parks.

In the N.E. region, there are 13 National and Reserves Parks. They add 4,886 square kilometers of protected biodiversity. The main parks are the Iguazú falls, Impenetrable, Iberá wetlands (RAMSAR), Pilcomayo, Palm tree (RAMSAR), and the Delta of the Paraná (RAMSAR).

Only to mention one of those national parks, I will refer to the Iberá National Park, in the Province of Corrientes. It is the second biggest wetland in the world. It has more than 500 hundred species of fauna: 344 species of birds; 40 species of amphibians; 50 species of reptiles; 57 species of mammals and; 125 species of fishes.

It is possible to observe quite easily and very close to your lodging all kinds of birds, alligators, capybaras, howling monkeys, swamp deer, anteaters, foxes, etc.

Ecotourism is among one of the possibilities for tourism in the N.E. region. There are also numerous historic landmarks like the Jesuit missions, thermal waters, boating, including kayaking, rowing, sailing, also sport fishing and, of course, interesting cities like Rosario, Santa Fe, Corrientes, Posadas, Colón, etc.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the North East region of Argentina can be considered as a strategic zone for at least four reasons:

1 – It is part of the largest fresh water reserve in the world, the Guaraní Aquifer and important rivers. It is also an environmental treasure that can be appreciated.

2 - The Waterway Paraná Paraguay, connects five countries Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and more than 40 million inhabitants.

3 - This waterway crosses and connects one of the biggest and most fertile lands in the world, including the Argentine Pampa, which together with the use of high-tech agriculture, contributes to food security.

4 - This region of Argentina, with its important biodiversity, amazing wetland landscapes and old culture, allows visitors of all over the world to approach this marvels with all the comfort of modern tourism.

Thank you.

BOOK REVIEWS

POLITICAL USAGE OF TRAUMA

Vjeran Pavlaković, Davor Pauković (eds.), *Framing the Nation and Collective Identities: Political Rituals and Cultural Memory of the Twentieth-Century Traumas in Croatia*, Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2019

Recently, a rising interest in the scholarly and academic literature has been given to the issues of framing cultural memory of various societies around the globe, but especially those that have experienced a certain form of collective trauma. The region of Southeastern Europe, or more precisely the ex-Yugoslav region, whose states and societies have endured tremendous sufferings throughout the twentieth century in multiple wars and under totalitarian regimes, therefore presents a fertile ground for research centered on memory, collective identities and trauma. Moreover, this part of the world still continues to be insufficiently explored which is why the contribution of these kinds of researches is of significant importance for a better understanding of the processes of identity-formation and memory-framing of past traumatic events as well as their politicization and ideologization on an everyday basis, which have an outstanding impact on people's lives, their political identification and affiliation, and ultimately understanding of the world around them.

A fresh perspective on the above-mentioned issues has been presented in the book edited by Vjeran Pavlaković and Davor Pauković, two Croatian historians who demonstrated interest and successfully conducted previous researches on various topics related to the Republic of Croatia and its practices of memorialization. This book, which actually presents a collection of eleven individual articles by prominent scholars of different academic backgrounds in fields such as nationalism studies, transitional justice, political culture, linguistics, Europeanization, international relations and history, presents a compelling body of academic studies with strong focus on commemorative practices as one of the forms of political ritualization of the past and their (mis) use in the process of both top-down and bottom-up memory (re) creation by various memory actors ("mnemonic actors") through their frequent transformation from places

of shared memory and remembrance to an ideological battlefield of different political, religious and civic figures and groups in the Republic of Croatia.¹

The analysis concentrates on seven commemorative events in total, five commemorating victims of the Second World War (Jasenovac, Bleiburg, Brezovica, Jazovka and Srb) and the remaining two - the victim and the victorious face of the Homeland War (Vukovar and Knin), selected in accordance with the important role they played in the construction of the narrative at the core of contemporary Croatian national identity but also because of their inherently contested character. Throughout their research, which spans from 2014 to 2017, the authors have relied on diverse methodological approaches, including fieldwork and ethnographic observations, complex data analysis through graphs and algorithms, media representation and narrative analysis of commemorative speeches as well as their public reception through transitional justice approach and face-to-face interviews.

Structurally speaking, the book is divided into five sections, an Introduction and four thematized parts that encompass several individual articles offering differing insights and perspectives on the particular analyzed topic. This kind of structure is rather advantageous since it leaves the possibility for the reader either to approach the whole body of work in its totality, or, in line with his/her own interest, and to select articles according to the topic and the perspective of the author.

Preceded by the introductory note in which the historical facts, subject of analysis and the structure of the book are outlined, the first part presents theoretical deliberations on cultural memory and commemorations in Croatia from sociocultural, philosophical and linguistical perspective. After a theoretical introduction to contemporary debates about cultural memory, the subsequent parts present empirically analyzed concrete cases. The second part expands on the analysis of contested commemorative sites serving as places of memory for the victims of communist and fascist forces in Croatia during the Second World War, namely Bleiburg and Jazovka as symbols of communist crimes on one hand, and Jasenovac as the embodiment of Ustashe's genocidal policies on the other, in the context of narrative (re) creation and existing disputes. The third part of the research, and the most elaborate one, centered on the accounts of the triumph of Knin and sacredness of Vukovar, includes different forms of memorialization of the Homeland War and influence of various domestic actors (war veterans, sport fan groups, the Catholic Church) over this process. However, memorialization is influenced also by outside actors (diaspora, Croatian MEPs

¹ Scholars that have contributed to this edition, aside from already mentioned editors, are Tamara Banjeglav, Dario Brentin, Ana Ljubojević, Pero Maldini, Ana Milošević, Benedikt Perak, Ivor Sokolić, Renato Stanković and Nikolina Židek.

and ICTY) and therefore, the final chapter covers the (re) shaping of dominant war narratives away from home and the mutual influence of outside and inside groups and institutions on each other in establishing the official statehood narrative at the core of Croatian contemporary national identity.

Grounded on a thorough and detailed analysis, essentially, this book depicts the process of imagining, constructing and shaping cultural memory and symbolic rituals in the Republic of Croatia through which this memory is expressed, exercised and embodied. Throughout the research, its contributors carefully dissect and disentangle this complicated societal activity and thus reveal not only its sociological and political aspect but also its more latent psychological side. It shows the importance of narrative re- and de-construction in the process of framing and formatting national identity by various memory actors, being far away from a completed act, but instead presenting a continuous and perpetual process of connecting the past, the present and the envisaged future.

Additionally, the conducted researches quite clearly demonstrate the captivity of contemporary Croatian national identity in the wartime traumatic past, but also in the permanent war of memory in the present, defined and modeled by the disturbing events, whose conflicting sides are political parties and other prominent institutions and groups from different spheres of the society and abroad. With their own agenda and particularistic interest, they do not hesitate to manipulate and exploit the vulnerable memory of a traumatized society in the struggle for power and symbolic dominance in the public sphere. This way, the argument goes, instead of creating a space of shared memory and understanding, memory actors only further alienate certain elements of the Croatian society, as well as the imagined “Self” from the “Other”, fixing the “insurmountable” symbolic but also factual boundaries between them, and heightening the potential for exacerbating fragile inter-ethnic and neighborly relations.

The presented academic peace, therefore, instead of providing concrete answers allows us to have comprehensible and intelligible insight into the complex socio-psychological processes of identity-formation, myth-making and narrative-construction in collectives shaped by the endured traumas and sufferings, such as the presented example of the Republic of Croatia. Although spatiotemporally limited, the research innovative contribution is far-reaching, creating the possibility for understanding and grasping similar processes not only in the historically and politically comparable ex-Yugoslav region but also in other post-conflict societies around the globe. Consequently, this original publication deserves attention not only from the academic and scholarly circles in the fields of social and political sciences but also the wider public interested in contemporary questions of nation-building, memory and identity.

Natalija SAVIĆ

EU PRIVATE LAW AS A LAST RESORT AGAINST (EUROPEAN) CULTURAL PROPERTY FRAGMENTATION?

Matthias Weller, *Rethinking EU Cultural Property Law – Towards Private Enforcement*, Nomos Verlag, Germany (Baden-Baden), pp. 174, 2018.

Cultural Property Law, with its distinguished cross-border dimension, represents a complex legal amalgam containing both public and private international law questions, and along with the separate legal regime of the European Union, it often leads to fragmented and unsatisfying solutions. Professor Matthias Weller took a brave and successful step towards illuminating numerous private international law issues in this legal mosaic, which often includes various national jurisdictions and substantive laws.

This book¹ emphasizes the significance and complementary function of private enforcement, as a crucial ‘supplement’ for the effective restitution of looted cultural property under Public International Law. In that regard, numerous innovative solutions were suggested by this renowned scholar. He considers, *inter alia*, that the establishment of general EU jurisdiction *in rem* (not limited to cultural goods only), together with harmonization of EU anti-seizure statutes (either by revising the Directive 2014/60² or adopting a new EU instrument), could lead to greater clarification, while acknowledging anti-seizure customary public international law rules would contribute to legal certainty. Article 90 of the Belgian Code of Private International Law³ was referred to as a good example for the EU in harmonizing the choice of law rule. Additionally, having in mind that the UNIDROIT 1995 Convention on stolen or illegally exported cultural

¹ This book is based on a Study commissioned by the European Parliament in the context of its European Added Value Assessment of possible future legislative action.

² Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (Recast), Official Journal of the European Union, L 159/1.

³ Art. 90. of the Belgian Code of Private International Law: Law applicable to cultural property - If an item, which a State considers as being included in its cultural heritage, has left the territory of that State in a way, which is considered to be illegitimate at the time of the exportation by the law of that State, the revindication by the State is governed by the law of that State, as it is applicable at that time, or at the choice of the latter, by the law of the State on the territory of which the item is located at the time of revindication. Nevertheless, if the law of the State that considers the item part of its cultural heritage does not grant any protection to the possessor in good faith, the latter may invoke the protection, that is attributed to him by the law of the State on the territory of which the item is located at the time of revindication.

objects, which represents a very important legal instrument, allows only for states to be signatories, the author urges that the EU motivate (since it cannot be one of them) all remaining Member States to approach, in order to gain a greater harmonization. Hence, he suggests that the second chapter of the UNIDROIT Convention, which deals with restitution of stolen cultural objects, could be incorporated into the EU secondary law, i.e. the Directive 2014/60, (which in that case should be renamed,) or in a self-standing EU instrument.

Prof. Weller thoroughly examines the controversial subject of Nazi-looted art and the (potential) retroactive legislation, correctly noting that the retroactive solutions would not be in line with guarantees under the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Human rights, and national constitutional guarantees. Therefore, he is calling for the further support and consistency of the Washington restitution principles in a restatement form that would collect and analyze the Spoliation Advisory Panel's recommendations in the Member States.⁴

The author comprehensively analyzes the concept of immunity from a seizure while the cultural object is on temporary loan in a foreign state, considering it widely accepted and well justified. However, he underlines the importance of achieving a balance, thus not allowing for the denial of justice, embodied in a potentially unconditional immunity for Nazi-looted art. In that regard, he calls for the clarification of the Directive 2014/60, in order not to affect national anti-seizure laws or a future EU instrument.

The author does not neglect complementary measures, on the contrary - he pays special attention to them and suggests the cross-linking of the existing provenance research, while at the same time highlights the need for additional research on data protection law, funded by the EU, in respect to the limits of exchange and/or central collecting of provenance data. Guiding us through diverse and interesting case-law, prof. Weller shows us the frequent inadequacy of Public International Cultural Property Law in dealing with restitution claims, therefore, he underlines the need to improve private enforcement for creating an effective regulatory framework.

This book contains an elaborative section dedicated to dispute resolutions. Namely, prof. Weller suggests that the EU could support the general mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution and maybe even establish a specific institution for dealing with contested cultural property – for example, an EU Agency on Cultural Property, while correctly pointing a visible lack of experts in the field within leading arbitration institutions.

⁴ On 3 December 1998, 44 governments participating in the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets endorsed non-binding principles to assist in resolving issues relating to Nazi-looted art, known as the Washington principles.

When it comes to Cultural Property Law, scholars seldom go beyond a plain discussion of noting all the shortcomings of this area which is very much pervaded by different branches of law, jurisdictions, regimes, and interests, thus, simply calling for the ‘international community’ or the ‘lawmaker’ to respond and find an acceptable solution. What distinguishes this book from other works on the topic is the ability of the author to describe the complex legal framework in a very effective and concise fashion, hence to offer applicable and innovative rules which could overcome the above-mentioned problems.

Finally, by calling for the *understanding of Europe’s history, in particular from 1933 to 1945, by creating a legal framework that supports awareness about the history and provenance, as well as each individual’s historical responsibility and thereby steps towards just and fair solutions*, this book contributes greatly to the understanding of the existing and potential problems related to Cultural Property Law, but also makes a unique legal and ethical contribution from the private perspective of EU law.

Vanja PAVIĆEVIĆ

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Serviss, G. P. (1911). A trip of terror.*In A Columbus of space* (pp. 17-32). New York, NY: Appleton.

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Masur, L. P. (2011). Preface. In *The Civil War: A concise history* (pp. Iv-Xii). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

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Rosenberg, G. (1997, March 31). Electronic discovery proves an effective legal weapon. *The New York Times*, p. D5.

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Rosenberg, G. (1997, March 31). Electronic discovery proves an effective legal weapon. *The New York Times*, Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com>

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United Nations. (2006, November 9). Delivering as one. Report of the Secretary-General's HighLevel Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, New York.

EC. (2002). Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal of the European Communities L201 37–47, 31 July (European Commission, Brussels).

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