70 YEARS IIPE

THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

The Review of International Affairs

The Review of International Affairs

The Review of International Affairs

Contents

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOW DID THE NEW AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT COALITION CHANGE ITS REFUGEE POLICY?

Ana KOSTIĆ[1]

Abstract: Since 2015 more than one million migrants from the Middle East, Africa and Asia have arrived on the European soil. The phenomenon of the "European Refugee Crisis" impacted on increased security risk, new economic and social issues as well as on political and geopolitical pressures overall on the European Union and its member states. In order to face the crisis, the European Union and its members had turned to operational actions and political pressures in accordance with its principles of foreign and security politics.

This article will focus on a particular member state, Austria, and its political action toward the crisis. Even though Austria was characterized as a part of the "western group of member states", with the arrival of the new government coalition which was a collaboration of the Austrian People's Party (conservative party, ÖVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (far-right part, FPÖ), it tended more to the politics of the eastern group of states especially when it came to the European refugee crisis. Following this, new issues/questions emerged: What are the biggest concerns of the new government coalition? What changes did the Austrian new government implement into European Asylum Law? What is the new treatment for migrants in Austria?

Key words: European refugee crisis, European Union, Austria, Austria's people party, Freedom Party of Austria.

---

[1] Ana Kostić, Department of Political Science, University of Wien, ana.kostic096@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

A few years ago, the world was faced with one of the greatest human migrations in which more than 65 million people were forcibly displaced as a result of violent conflicts and natural disasters (Refugee crisis in Europe, 2016). Trying to escape all the misfortunes that came with war or even death, people mainly from the Middle East, Africa and Asia arrived on the European soil. Their journey led them mostly over the Mediterranean Sea, in overcrowded and unsafe boats where thousands of people drowned. Without any personal documents and without a legal transfer to Europe, for the "blessed" ones the next stop of their life-changing voyage was some south European shore and for those less lucky, a mass graveyard known as the sea. Around 90% of refugees and migrants trying to reach the EU have paid organized criminals and people-smugglers to get them across borders (Directorate-General for Communication (European Commission, 2018). A large public outcry led to intensified rescue missions. During this period, a vast number of humanitarian organizations, including UNHCR, participated in a series of large-scale media advocacy exercises in order to motivate other European countries to offer their help. A dramatic rise in attention to the refugee crisis followed in the second half of 2015 (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, Moore, 2015, p. 6).

In the period between 2015 and 2016, the EU dealt with a remarkable inflow of more than 1 million refugees and migrants, most of them escaping the war and terror in Syria and its neighboring countries. The EU had introduced a range of countermeasures to deal with the migrant crisis. In order to resolve all the issues and conflicts, it was necessary to combine the efforts for resolving the root causes of the migrant crisis and to provide care and help to the people in need of humanitarian support both inside and outside of the EU. These measures were first implemented by relocating asylum seekers in Europe, resettling people in need from neighboring countries and returning people if they did not have the qualifications for asylum. The EU was resolving these problems in the manner of improving security at its borders, reducing migrant smuggling and providing safe ways for people to legally enter the EU.

The European migration policy advanced when the European Agenda on Migration, which was proposed by the European Commission, was implemented in May of 2015, but despite all the above-mentioned, refugees were still not equally welcomed in all of the EU member countries.

The Agenda is built upon four pillars:

1. "Reducing the incentives for irregular migration: the focus is on addressing the root causes behind irregular migration in non-EU countries, dismantling smuggling and trafficking networks and defining actions for the better application of return policies.

2. Saving lives and securing the external borders: this involves better management of the external border, in particular through solidarity towards those Member States that are located at the external borders and improving the efficiency of border crossings.

3. Strengthening the common asylum policy: with the increases in the flows of asylum seekers, the EU's asylum policies need to be based on solidarity towards those needing international protection as well as among the EU Member States, whose full application of the common rules must be ensured through systematic monitoring.

4. Developing a new policy on legal migration: in view of the future demographic challenges the EU is facing, the new policy needs to focus on attracting workers that the EU economy needs, particularly by facilitating entry and the recognition of qualifications." (European Agenda on Migration, 2018)

Since the refugees did not want to stay in provided, designated camps in certain European countries, they tried to reach countries that were economically more stable. *The massive flow of migrants has also caused deep rifts within the European Union as a whole, with some countries strongly opposing the very idea of sharing the burden that is accepting a certain number of migrants and integrating them into their societies.* (Vukoičić, 2017, p. 72) Afraid of possible complications, as a consequence of different religions and increased number of foreign job seekers in its market, Poland and Hungary refused to take any of the asylum seekers. The Czech Republic initially accepted 12 people, but after doing so it completely "closed the door" for other refugees. As a response to such behavior and because of the avoidance to implement the migration policy of the EU, the European Commission began legal actions against all three-member states (Tisdall, 2017).

In the first years of the refugee crisis, Austria followed the migration policy directed by the EU, but as time went by, their government started operating out of the determined policy frames. Major deviations from the EU rules, Austria made under the rule of the new government coalition, a collaboration of the Austrian People's Party (conservative party, ÖVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (far-right party, FPÖ).

Such actions of the Austrian government are unsurprising given the presence of right-wing populist, who acted much like their colleagues in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Since the European Union is divided when it comes to the question of the refugee crisis, what comes in hindsight is that Austria because of tightening its migrant politics, unlike other west European countries, is slowly "migrating" from the "West" to the "East" European guidelines and policies.

The new government coalition also implemented new restrictions, regarding its inner politics, and thus affected migrants and refugees in the country as well as

all other citizens. This article will provide an analysis of the current refugee crisis and its impact on Europe from the viewpoint of Austria.

AUSTRIAN EVENTFUL HISTORY OF HELPING REFUGEES – BUT FOR HOW MUCH LONGER?

> *'If I am ever required to be a refugee, I hope to make it to Austria.'*
> *James Michener, The Bridge at Andau (1957)*

Austria has a long and significant history of accepting refugees, which reached its peak in the 20th century. As a result of its actions in World War II, Austria had moral and political obligations to accept people in distress in the following period. Not long after proclaiming its political neutrality, Austria showed its capability to take in and provide shelter for a huge number of people in need. One of Austria's first humanitarian acts was towards the Hungarians when Austria welcomed a significant number of refugees after the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. A similar event occurred in 1968 when Austria opened its borders to let in thousands of Czechoslovakians after the "Prague Spring" and also during the Balkan war in 1995, taking in people fleeing former Yugoslavia. The fact that proved religion was never taken into consideration for approving or declining asylum seekers, was Austria's willingness to equally welcome Muslims from the former Yugoslavia as well as Catholics from Croatia or Orthodox Serbs. The question is, can we imagine that today?

When trains full of refugees started crossing through Austria, it was apparent that women, the elderly, babies and small children represented the minority. However, the majority consisted of able-bodied men between the ages of 20 and 35. As a result, the following crucial questions emerged: Where would be all the refugees settled since migrant camps were already full to overflowing? How successfully could they really be integrated? And above all: How and where to find work for them?

Christoph Schönborn, the cardinal of the Catholic Church, urged all the EU member states to equally participate and share the refugee "burden." He made it clear, that the Syrian refugee crisis was one of the greatest humanitarian challenges in the past decades 'which will change all our lives' (Pongratz-Lippitt, 2016). He deplored the failure of EU countries to share "equally" the refugee burden.

Even though highly publicized migrant crimes increased the fear amongst Austrian citizens and had led to a negative attitude towards immigrants, Werner Faymann and Schönborn were continually promoting and insisting on the Austrian open-door policy. In the following period, more precisely by the end of 2015, almost 100,000 people applied for asylum in Austria. According to statistics, Austria had

more asylum seekers per capita than Germany or Sweden and even more than the US and Canada together. Having fully exhausted its resources faced with an unexpected number of refugees, Austria was forced to change its refugee policy and close its borders (Pongratz-Lippitt, 2016).

The situation in Europe became even tenser. Religion seemed to have a crucial role in the migrant issue dividing Europe and European bishops. First signs of rebellion happened in the eastern EU countries that rejected to implement the EU refugee policy to the full extension. Austria decided to establish border fences as well as to reduce the number of asylum seekers that entered its borders. How the principles of welcoming refugees were taken into question was best illustrated in the stance of a certain bishop of Burgenland, the most eastern province of Austria, who faced Austrian authorities rejecting to implement erecting a border fence on church land, justifying it as being against Christianity, but shortly after warning Europe to stop being "too naive" regarding the intentions for Islamization of Europe (Pongratz-Lippitt, 2016).

This widely undesirable political situation in the EU was caused by enormous refugee waves that shook European countries, mostly those which were considered wealthy and stable, to their cores. Even though Vienna has a crucial role in the sustainability of peaceful coexistence with migrants and is a center for international cooperation and inter-religious dialogue, its purpose as a "bridge" between the east and west is fading.

The rise of right-wing populism in Austria

Since World War II, the Austrian political scene was characterized by the predominance of the two biggest parties: the conservative Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ). In order to prevent political disbalance and fascism, the cooperation of these two parties was crucial for ensuring further political harmony in the country. Therefore, this collaboration was institutionalized in the system of Austro-Corporatism that resulted in the so-called system of Proporz, defined with political influence proportionally divided between the parties. (Heinisch, 2008, p. 44 as cited in Danner, 2014, p.12) Even though the domination of the two "big" parties was ever-present, a new party that also influenced the country's stability emerged - the Austrian Freedom Party FPÖ - guided by liberal economic and national ideologies (Pelinka, 2002a, p. 4, as cited in Danner, 2014, p. 12).

The rise of the third party in Austria had a huge effect on the importance of Austro- Corporatism, which ended with a major deterioration in the 1980s. The failure was a result of internal developments in the country, such as privatization

of prior nationalized industries and banks, as well as the entrance into the European Single Market (Pelinka, 2002, p. 8). National election of the FPÖ was followed by other changes that occurred at that time such as joining the European Union in 1995 and the introduction of the Euro as a currency in 2002 (Pelinka, 2002b, p. 8ff. as cited in Danner, 2014, p.13).

Finally, in 2000 the rise of the right-wing populist and national-conservative political party resulted in the formation of a government coalition between the Freedom Party FPÖ and the People's Party ÖVP. This newly created "Schwarz-Blau" government shocked the entire European Union, as it presented political failure in the long-term trends of keeping the right-wing FPÖ out of the Austrian government (Jandl, Kraler, 2003). The new government was overflown with judgments coming from both inside and outside of the country, which led to the deception of (mainly symbolic) sanctions towards the Austrian government, coming from the leaders of other EU member states. Opposite to their intention, the sanctions that had taken full effect had a drastic negative outcome. They negatively impacted the quality of life in Austria and as a result introduced more inconvenience in the matter of citizens wanting to defend the "attacked Austria".

The sanctions also accelerated the reaching of an agreement, providing for the compensation of World War II slave laborers (mostly Eastern Europeans), as well as the restitution of expropriated property. They also led to the resignation of the FPÖ's charismatic leader, Jorge Häider, as party chairman, and heightened scrutiny of the government's performance with respect to human rights and policies in regard to minorities and immigrants. From the beginning, however, it was clear that the FPÖ would try to reform aliens legislation as the immigration policy has long been one of its central campaign issues. Finally, in July 2002, the Parliament adopted major amendments to the Aliens Act and the Asylum Law (Jandl, Kraler, 2003).

The reforms brought in 2002 did not deviate from the former line of legislation, but new regulations in three important areas were established:

1. Labor immigration- limited mainly to crucial personnel, where the minimum wage for prospective migrants was around 2,000 per month.

2. Seasonal work- employment in such areas was greatly grounded on allowing such laborers in areas outside agriculture and tourism and extending the employment period to up to one year.[2]

3. "Integration courses"- all new immigrants who were coming from non-EU third countries (plus those who have been living in Austria since 1998) were obligated to participate in integration courses. These courses were based mainly on learning German as a native language, learning the history of Austria and being

---

[2] This regulation stud on the contrary to the first regulation and it was not welcomed because it could bring thousands of foreign workers in Austria.

introduced to the political aspects of Austria. If immigrants did not attend, they would be exposed to sanctions, both financial and legal, their residence titles would be denied, etc. In the worst-case scenario, the non-compliant foreigners would have been deported from Austria. (Jandl, Kraler 2003)

Government coalition Kurz-Strache

'We don't need an upper limit or the upper limit to be reduced by half - we need zero immigration, actually minus immigration, because all illegal individuals and criminals belong outside of the country.'

Heinz-Christian Strache, The leader of the Austrian Freedom Party

After the break-down of the second Schüssel government in 2007, the political polarization has been recreated.

Office	Since	Parties
Schüssel I	2000	ÖVP-FPÖ
Schüssel II	2003	ÖVP-FPÖ/BZÖ
Gusenbauer	2007	SPÖ-ÖVP
Faymann I	2008	SPÖ-ÖVP
Faymann II	2013	SPÖ-ÖVP
Kern	2016	SPÖ-ÖVP
Kurz	2017	ÖVP-FPÖ

But in the elections in 2017, the new government coalition was voted. The European group of right-wing governments counted a new member, the Austrian government coalition, which combines two Austrian political parties: the Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the People's Party (ÖVP). The leader of the ÖVP, Sebastian Kurz, as chancellor and the leader of FPÖ, and Heinz-Christian Strache, as vice-chancellor, govern in the government coalition named Kurz. This coalition of the conservative People's Party of Austria (OVP) and the anti-immigration Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) made Austria the only western European country with a far-right component in its governing coalition (Factbox, 2017). This placed Austria alongside its neighbors Hungary and the Czech Republic where right-wing-populist parties have been in power for years.

Since Austrian political and party systems tended to stay polarized,[3] the government coalition which would include the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO),

---

[3] Polarized in terms of cooperating in government coalition between the Austrian People's Party ÖVP and the Social Democratic Party of Austria.

was generally avoided. Labeled as a political party whose orientations were Eurosceptic and nationalistic, with anti-immigration policies. The election of such a party woke up the entire European Union (Malone, 2014).

Far-right parties, including this one in Austria, reached their peak gaining significant support from their citizens parallel with the increasing number of asylum seekers, referring to the European refugee crisis in 2014 and 2015 (Steinmayr, 2017). It is remarkable, how much crucial influence and political change the inflow of migrants in the country introduced.

Closing the borders

In the Schengen area, there are no typical boarder-passes, and one does not need to use a passport while traveling from one country to one of the other 26 European countries. (Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained, 2016) The Balkan route, which was established in accordance with the European Union, was a designated route for migrants who arrived at the south Shore of the EU (Grece), leading them to the center of Europe and to the countries within the Schengen area. As a response to the European migrant crisis, Austria had, between November 2015 and January 2016, installed border-barrier fences between Slovenia and Italy. The barriers were to be kilometers long, for instance on the Slovenian border, and they were to be placed on the most crowded border-crossings, where the migrants were screened and processed by the police (Bender, Pop, 2015). The second barrier-fence Austria installed on the Italian border in 2016 (Europe migrants: Austria builds Brenner border centre despite criticism, 2016).

Austria took over the rotating six-month presidency of the EU from Bulgaria in July of 2018, and the new government of Austria has the plan to utilize the presidency of the European Union in 2018. According to Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, Austria will put efforts into shifting the bloc's focus from resettling refugees within the European Union towards keeping further waves of migrants outside the bloc's external borders.

'Our aim is very clear – that in Europe there should not only be a dispute over redistribution (of refugees) but also, at last, a shift of focus towards securing external borders'. Sebastian Kurz on the 9th March (Gotey, 2018).

Cutting funds

The right-wing coalition of Austria brought to light their plan to obstruct and heavily limit benefits, such as social help in the form of payments for all the foreigners who cannot speak German, which includes migrants and refugees as well. Such a

plan could potentially bring a backlash from the EU directed at Austria and could even bring legal "inconvenience."

The Chancellor in Vienna announced the plan, which as previously stated, would disable all foreigners from receiving the main benefit payments in the timespan of five years.

'The fundamental rule we will introduce is that German will become the key to accessing the full minimum benefit,' Chancellor Sebastian Kurz stated. 'That means that whoever has insufficient language skills will not be able to claim the full minimum benefit.' By rough estimations, half of the individuals who receive the minimum welfare payments are foreign citizens, which Chancellor Sebastian Kurz described as "frightening."

Following the plan, the main benefit payment would be limited to 563 euro per month, which would increase to 863 euro per month once the individual acquired a German-language certificate.

Austria's government, which rose to power last year with the help of the far-right representatives, has displayed a hard, potentially ruthless stance on asylum-seekers and immigration in general and withdrawing benefits could be regarded as a "not welcome" sign for individuals thinking of migrating to Austria.

Conflict with Brussels?

Now since Austria is expected to treat EU citizens equally as Austrian people, under the EU's freedom of movement directive, the new plan was bound to introduce problems coming from the EU.

'Freedom of establishment is the freedom to work in all of Europe. Freedom of establishment is not the freedom to seek out the best social benefits system and, in that sense, this waiting period is in my opinion a step in the right direction,' Kurz implied. But in March, the Constitutional Court voted down the reform which stated that anyone receiving the main minimum benefit must have lived in Austria for five of the last six years.

Austrian public opinion about migrant integration is divided

In September of 2018, "Statistics Austria" published the results of a survey in their statistical yearbook for migration and integration in Austria (Statistisches Jahrbuch für Migration & Integration). They asked citizens of Austria for their opinions regarding the integration of migrants and whether they thought that the integration was successfully working. The results showed that 45% of the population, without the background involving migration, responded positively, while 55% responded with skepticism. Now, these statistics should not be surprising given

the fact that Austria's citizens have recently given 58% of their votes to the two main far-right, anti-immigrant parties, but it does come off as a surprise when the last 8 years are taken into consideration (Fray, 2018).

The percentage of citizens of Austrian nationality who thought the integration was working "very well" or "rather well" increased steadily, from 30.8% in 2010 to 48.6% in 2014. The numbers showed a substantial increase in favor of positive attitudes towards integration.

'All Austrian states but Kärnten, known as the stronghold state of the anti-immigrant FPÖ party (the far-right Freedom Party of Austria), have been displaying a greater openness to immigrants'

(Czaika, Di Lillo, 2018).

However, all that changed in 2015. Since then, the widely positive opinion on integration and its success has continuously shifted up and down: 40.5% in 2015, up to 48.1% in 2016 and then 36.5% in 2017, but then it went surprisingly back up to 45% in 2018. On a wider spectrum, the results of conducted research indicate that anti- and pro-immigration opinions remained relatively in "harmony" across the state in previous time, and this applies to the majority of Europe. So, then, where does the source of these sudden shifts lie? Well, of course, the obvious change that comes to everyone's mind is the migrant crisis. According to statistics, roughly 865,000 people moved to Austria between 2013 and 2017.

'If we follow the assumption that approval and disapproval in the population are at a relatively constant ratio of 50:50, then the disapproving half is more articulate nowadays, and also politically more mobilized.'

- Rita Garstenauer, director of the Centre for Migration Research (Lindsay, 2018)

Now, even though the portion of Austrians that disapprove immigration may very well not be increasing, the facts state that they are getting more organized and are ensuring that their opinions are being heard. On the other hand, the migrant crisis has also "inspired" pro-immigration groups, who also ensured their voices were being heard by organizing various protests for a more "humane" asylum policy. However, Austria's current government under Sebastian Kurz, an individual responsible for having closed the Balkans Route as the Minister of Integration and Foreign Affairs, is enforcing a clear policy of forced deportation in Austria (Lindsay, 2018).

Austrian presidency of the Council of the European Union

On July 1st, 2018, Austria took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The fact that a government of a country that was to lead the

European Union for the next six months consisted of conservative and right-wing populist parties frightened the whole European Union.

According to the Program of the Presidency for the Council of the European Union (see under Programme of the Austrian Presidency) for the second half of the 2018, it was announced that Austria was aware of the severest consequences which the European refugee crisis brought and that major changes regarding the tightening of the current refugee policies should be considered top priority.

Security and the fight against illegal migration

The fight against illegal migration and providing high-level security in Europe were regarded as a mandatory mission by the Austrian government in the following Presidency. The consequences of the European largest migration crisis could even be felt in countries which were labeled as the most desired by refugees, which resulted in increased concerns about how far the uncontrolled migration inflow could go. The importance of this fact and enabling the EU to cooperate in order to deal with the problem were highlighted. The solution was grounded on reforming the Common European Asylum System and on concentrating and intensifying support for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency FRONTEX, which should provide additional protection on the EU's external borders. Furthermore, working closely with the "third" countries was fundamental in order to establish an effective return policy, such as to support people in distress by manner of providing protection even before they enter the EU, while simultaneously segregating those people not in need of protection and stopping them from illegally entering the EU (Programme of the Austrian Presidency, p. 8).

In order to counter organized crime, the Austrian government encouraged the idea of efficient cooperation and information exchange between the security authorities of individual Member states. Moreover, combined forces at the level of the European Union were mentioned as necessary, aiming to combat terror threats and radicalizations of all kinds (Programme of the Austrian Presidency, p. 20).

External aspects of migration

During its Presidency, Austria will focus on the external aspects of migration so it could establish more adequate migrant control. This includes partnerships between the EU member states and relevant countries of migrant origin and transit. Political stabilization and maintaining economic and social development, human rights and stable governance were designated mandatory aims for the control of illegal migration, in addition with the fight against human trafficking, creation of sustainable protection capacities in the relevant regions as well as securing return, readmission and reintegration (Programme of the Austrian Presidency, p. 22).

Asylum and migration

The establishment of strict asylum and migration systems[4] were the main goals that would ensure uncontrolled migration and reduce migratory pressure on the EU Member States. In that sense, the Austrian Presidency aims to make contributions towards finding a solution to achieve more efficient negotiations on the reforming of the Common European Asylum System.

Austria will also promote better and more advanced common return policy in the cooperation with the third countries, by applying the principle "Less for Less."[5] Moreover, the cooperation with migrant-relevant countries of origin and transit should be placed under a firm footing under the European migration partnership framework in order to achieve increased targeted efforts in the third countries (Programme of the Austrian Presidency, p. 34-35).

CONCLUSION

Since Europe is being faced with the largest migration crisis after the Second World War, where previously migrant inflow had caused structural "inconvenience" in certain countries, people's fear of possible further uncontrolled migration resulted in the loss of trust in the European Union's capacity to act in a crisis. One of the consequences of the astonishingly high number of migrant inflow in Europe, particularly in Austria, was a rise of the right-wing parties in the national government. Even though Austria has an eventful history of helping refugees, the waves of refugees in past years have increased extremist and terrorist activities and introduced new threats in crime, leading Austrian citizens to change their attitude and to elect conservative and right-wing populist parties. At the end of 2017, the new coalition consisted of FPÖ and ÖVP entered the national government of Austria, bringing more radical approaches in dealing with not only refugees and migrants, but affecting also current policies, targeting low and middle-class income receiving households. These actions placed Austria right next to eastern countries of the European Union, which under the right-wing parties displayed anti-immigrant attitudes, leaving the EU skeptical regarding further dealings with such coalitions that led certain member states.

Starting from July 1st, 2018, Austria took over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, announcing tighter asylum policies. The Austrian Presidency is aiming to contribute to the Union in matters of internal security, by

---

[4] Based on distiction between refugees and migrants

[5] (i. e. links to visa or economic policy and concerted restrictive measures)

placing the focus on asylum and migration issues, on protecting the external borders, on fighting radicalization, terrorism and organized crime.

The world was caught off guard when the migration crisis arose, a crisis with devastating consequences that brought many changes to life in general. Unable to stay afloat of the situation, many innocent people fleeing their homeland lost their lives, but also many criminals took advantage of other people's misery to fill their pockets or enter the Euro zone. We do not know what the future will bring, and which crisis is next in line on the list of never-ending struggles the human race has to endure on its path of survival, and we can only work to make this world a better place for all and the future as bright as possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Austria plans benefit cuts for non-German speaking foreigners, refugees. DW made for minds. Accessed from https://www.dw.com/en/austria-plans-benefit-cuts-for-non-german-speaking-foreigners-refugees/a-43965191

Bender, R., Pop,V. Austria to Build Fence on Slovenia Border to Slow Flow of Migrants. *The Wall Street Journal*. Accessed from https://www.wsj.com/articles/austria-to-build-fence-on-slovenia-border-to-slow-flow-of-migrants-1446024586?alg=y

Berry M.,Garcia-Blanco I., Moore K. (2015). Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries. *UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency*. Accessed from http://orca.cf.ac.uk/87078/1/UNHCR-%20FINAL% 20REPORT.pdf

Czaika M., Di Lillo A. "The geography of anti-immigrant attitudes across Europe, 2002–2014" in Frey Lindsay. Austrian Immigration: Activists Energized But Opinion All Over The Place. *Forbes*. Accessed September 17, 2018, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/freylindsay/2018/09/17/austrian-immigration-activists-energized-but-opinion-all-over-the-place/#57cdd14721a1

Danner, K. (2014). 'Austrians First!' – Election Campaigns by Right-Wing Populist Parties. A Comparative Case Study between the Austrian Freedom Party and the Austrian People's Party in the National Legislative Elections 2013.

Directorate-General for Communication. (European Commission). The EU and the migration crisis. Accessed November 10, 2017, from https://publications. europa.eu/ en/publication-detail/-/publication/e9465e4f-b2e4-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1/ language-en

Europe migrants: Austria builds Brenner border centre despite criticism. *BBC*. Accessed from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36022914

European Agenda on Migration. European Commission. Migration and Home Affairs. *EC. Europa.EU*. Accessed October, 08, 2018,from https://ec.europa.eu /home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en

Factbox: Key policies of Austria's conservative/far-right coalition. *Reuters*. Accessed from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-politics-coalition-policies-f/factbox-key-policies-of-austrias-conservative-far-right-coalition-idUSK BN1E92QW

Frey, L. (2018). Austrian Immigration: Activists Energized But Opinion All Over The Place. *Forbes*. Accessed from https://www.forbes.com/sites/freylindsay /2018/09/17/austrian-immigration-activists-energized-but-opinion-all-over-the-place/#57cdd 14721a1

Garstenauer, R. Austrian Immigration: Activists Energized But Opinion All Over The Place. *Forbes*.

Gotev, G. (2018). Austria plans to put immigration and borders at heart of EU presidency. *Euractiv*. Accessed from https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/ news/austria-plans-to-put-immigration-and-borders-at-heart-of-eu-presidency/

Jandl, M., Kraler, A. (2003). Austria: A Country of Immigration? *The online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute*. Accessed from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ article/austria-country-immigration

Malone, J. (2014). *Examining the Rise of Right Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe*. College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University. Accessed from https://digitacommons.csbsju.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044& context=honors_theses

Pelinka, A. (2002a). Die FPÖ im internationalen Vergleich. *Conflict and Communication*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002. Accessed from http://www.cco.regener-online.de/2002_1 /pdf_ 2002_1/pelinka.pdf

Pongratz-Lippitt C. (2016). Austria has a proud history of helping refugees – but for how much longer? *The Guardian*. Accessed from https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2016/jun/10/austria-refugees-migration-crisis-eu_

Programme of the Austrian Presidency. Presidency of the Council of the European Union 1 July – 31 December 2018. *Federal Chancellery of Austria*.

Refugee crisis in Europe. European Civil Protection And Humanitarian Aid Operations. *EC.Europa.EU*. Accessed from http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis

Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained. *BBC News*. Accessed from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13194723

Steinmayr, A. (2017): Did the Refugee Crisis Contribute to the Recent Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe? Accessed August 10, 2018, from https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-steinmayr-december.pdf

Tisdall, S. (2017). Divided Europe seeks a long-term answer to a refugee crisis that needs a solution now. *The Guardian.* Accessed from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/22/divided-europe-refugee-crisis-italy-serbia-greece

Vukoičić, J. (2017). Migrations and multiculturalism-the future of ethnic politics in Europe. *The Review of International Affairs,* Vol. LXVIII, No. 1168, October–December 2017. Accessed from https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/pdf/ria/2017/RIA-1168_2017.pdf

KAKO JE NOVA KOALICIJA AUSTRIJSKE VLADE IZMENILA SVOJU POLITIKU U POGLEDU IZBEGLICA?

Apstrakt: Od 2015. godine više od million migranata sa Bliskog istoka, Afrike i Azije pridošli su na Evropsko tlo. Fenomen "Evropska izbeglička kriza" prouzrokovao je povećan rizik bezbednosti, nove ekonomske i socijalne probleme kao i političke i geopolitičke pritiske uopšte na Evropsku uniju kao i na njene države članice. Suočavajući se sa krizom, Evropska unija okrenula se političkim akcijama u skladu sa njenim principima spoljnje i bezbednosne politike.

Ovaj članak fokusiran je na Austriju kao članicu Evropske unije i njene političke poduhvate prema krizi. Iako Austrija pripada "zapadnoj grupi država", sa dolaskom nove vlade odnosno koalicije izmedju Narodne partije Austrije (konzervativne partije, *nem.* ÖVP) i Slobodarske partije Austrije (desničarske partije, *nem.* FPÖ), Austrija teži ka politici istočnih članica posebno kada je reč o izbegličkoj krizi. Imajući u obziru navedeno, proistakla su nova pitanja: Koje su najveće brige nove koalicije? Koje promene je Austrija implementirala u Evropski zakon o azilu? Koji je novi tretman za migrante u Austriji?

Ključne reči: Evropska izbeglička kriza, Austrija, Narodna partija Austrije, Slobodarska partija Austrije.

EVERLASTING UNSETTLED SINO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS: IS THE `16+1` INITIATIVE MUTUAL BENEFIT OR POINT OF DIVERGENCE?

Nenad STEKIĆ[1]

Abstract: The paper investigates to what extent the Chinese geopolitical position is prone to change in the 21st century, in the context of its policy towards the EU and especially sub-initiatives such as the "16+1". To address this issue, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) postulates developed by Charles P. Kindleberger will be employed. Besides its wide application within IR research, this theory is fruitful as it presents a solid basis for exact indicators which can be established and compared. While the first two premises according to which China is the world's benevolent leader are not questioned (large and growing economy as well as being political and military power), there is the third one according to which a hegemon must commit to the system, which needs to be perceived as mutually beneficial for other great powers and important state-actors. The "16+1" initiative will serve as a case study and will demonstrate that China's foreign policy is far from being only a middle range power. The author starts with testing the first two postulates of the theory on Chinese economic presence in the Central and Eastern Europe space, followed by China's commitment to the international system in which the "16+1" initiative will be analyzed as a challenging factor for its relations with the EU. This paper points out the Sino-European cooperation model which presents the basis for creating the EU's attitude towards this and recent similar Chinese initiatives.

Key words: China, the European Union, economic relations, hegemonic stability theory, 16+1 initiative, investments.

[1] Nenad Stekić, Research Assistant, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. E-mail: nenad.stekic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

INTRODUCTION

Establishing the European Communities along with their rudimental foreign policy components in the early 1950s did not directly lead to the development of modern Sino-European relations. It took more than twenty years for them to be officially introduced in 1975.[2] The European pillar of relations with China has been transmitted, due to internal supranational political reforms in the EU, from the European Economic Communities to a specialized body under the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Following a very shifting global political outlook, they have been highly variable throughout different periods. There were several waves of academic considerations about maintaining the Sino-European relations, while an effective debate over their changing nature has been exposed in three most dominant discourses. The first one in the early stages of cooperation was about noticing coincidences in behaviour between the two sides (Lin et al., 2003). However, not so many mutual coincidences (except common willingness for economic growth) between the two sides were noticed.

The interests of one party in another were stemming from current political turmoil and short-to-middle term goals in foreign policies of both sides.

Chan sums up that "absence of fundamental geopolitical conflicts between the EU and China in the post-Cold War era has facilitated the process of engagement" (2010, p. 2). The argument according to which the Sino-European relations have had significant ups and downs was exposed by Algieri. He claimed that "growing importance" of relations had been seen in early 1980, while in the next decade no significant steps were taken to improve them further (Algieri, 2002). Also, Brown points out that the prioritisation of dimensions and fields in which two partners are about to cooperate (both in political and economic issues), was one of the characteristics of early debates (Brown, 2014). The third group of considerations was conceptualized to focus on China's rise. While some recognized the importance of democratization in that process (Legro, 2007), the general conclusion of early academic debates could be summed up as the perception of "threat" of China's rise (Möller, 2002; Brown, 2014). Relatively new academic corpus debate tends to focus right on the relations based on perceptions of the potential rise of both sides.

Thus, there are claims such as that "varied perceptions of the implications of China's rise have shaped policy preferences in ways that are inconsistent with concerns over the threat of an impending power transition" (Brown, 2014, p. 4). Jing Men argues that Sino-European era has started very late since the Western

---

[2] Even though there are many views on what exactly forms the "European" fragment of the Sino-European relations, for the purposes of this article, the "European" will refer to both EU Member States` space, along with its near neighbourhood involving the Western Balkan countries, regarding their inclusion within "16+1" initiative.

European countries were "encouraged by the US-China rapprochement," which followed mutual recognition of China by most of them (Men, 2007, p. 2). Perception as an important element of analysis has not been denounced not even in the work of some realists such as Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller (Brown, 2014). After several challenges in the Sino-European relations have been overcome, the two sides started with a modern phase of relations, based on peace and security, prosperity, and most importantly – economic cooperation. Liu Zuokui argues that the perception of China is influenced by vast factors including globalization and the European sovereign debt crisis, the poor image of the Chinese people abroad, but also by the public surveys conducted in the USA (Zuokui, 2017). The most populous country in the world and the European supranational entity create a unique intertwined foreign policy within the international system. An instrument which enables twenty-eight countries to speak with a "single voice" in relations to the third parties, the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU on the one hand, and Chinese foreign policy which has been steadily developing followed by heavy economic presence all across the globe, form this *sui generis* relations. Though some claim that relations between the EU and China are relations between France/Germany and China (Weske, 2007), this paper will shed light to the EU CFSP as a referring object from the European side.[3]

The key issue of this analysis is focused on determining whether the level of Chinese "hegemony" in the economic sphere through sub-initiatives could present a new model for involvement in global affairs. This inconsistency is rather the reason for lack of robustness in explaining the causal effects of the supranational foreign policy of the EU.

In this regard, many authors recognize a deficiency in the scientific explanation of such nature (Algieri, 2002; Jing, 2007; Brown, 2014; Arežina, 2015). Preliminary literature review on this topic has shown the existence of a significant level of consensus in the academic debate over the theoretical application to a *sui generis* supranational – specific national foreign policy relation.

---

[3] In this regard, it is of utmost importance to define what is under the umbrella of "European" side of foreign relations. Beside China, initiative "16+1" gathers sixteen more countries of Central and East Europe, out of which five are outside the EU full membership. The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European security and defence policy (ESDP) are based on legal acts, including legally binding international agreements, and on political documents. The EU Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue in the framework of CFSP, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed restrictive measures. Applicant countries are also required to progressively align with EU statements, and to apply restrictive measures when and where required. Having in mind candidate status of all Balkan countries willing to enter the EU (out of which Montenegro and Serbia have already started negotiations for full membership), Sino-European relations could cover both EU and non-EU countries within "16+1" initiative.

The author starts with a presumption that there have always existed factors and inputs which caused varying important stages within the interrelated connections and which have been determining the Sino-European relations in the widest sense (such as Tiananmen occurrences, China's membership within the WTO, the World Economic Crisis, etc.). Unlike classical bilateral relations, Sino-European ones have more or less developed *ad hoc* than on a permanent and structured basis. Based on the presented literature review, it can be concluded that the Sino-European relations in early stages were rather Eurocentric and introspected through the lens of European side as a small "leader" in this bilateral regime. In this sense, a very dynamic academic debate on the nature of the Sino-European relations was inspired by adding not so structural factors into the analysis – the perception of Chinese rise. Robert Jervis developed a thesis on a personal misperception of "otherness" in creating foreign state policy. Even though he was developing his thesis quite early (1968), this author laid the foundation of individual decision-making factors within international politics and thus, contributed to the potential understanding of the creation of bilateral relations (Jervis, 1968). He further concluded that even in the most complex political systems, foreign policy was being significantly influenced by and was made on an individual level (1968, p. 192).

In line with the initial argumentation of the article, among diverse factors that have been determining the EU and China links, the best known modern one which determines the Sino-European relations, is the Belt and Road Initiative, more specifically the "16+1" sub-initiative. This article starts by presenting the most notable academic debates over nature and scientific feasibility of the HST, as well as on its early conceptualizations. As it has experienced its renaissance within modern IR research, all the three presumptions of the theory shall be presented. The one according to which the hegemon must commit to the system, which needs to be perceived as mutually beneficial for other great powers and important state-actors, will be dismantled to several kinds of argumentations and will present a basis for presenting the conclusions and findings of this paper. The key research question on which this paper will seek to provide an answer is whether the varying nature of the Sino-European relations in terms of the hegemonic rise of China is dependable on sub-initiatives such as the "16+1". It will also be pointed out the eventual approximation of the two partners into a "G2" club, as a model for a new economic axis of the 21st century.

In this context, the "16+1" initiative shall serve as a case study. The data presented in this article are based on the available World Bank Data indicators. Descriptive statistics will be one of the deployed methods, along with the content analysis of key bilateral agreements and documents from China's and the EU's administration.

Theorizing the Hegemonic Stability Theory:
China as an upgrading praxis

The debates over what forms a real global hegemon[4] within the theories of international relations have been emerging since the beginning of modern IR theory. After the World War II, even though there were some attempts (Krasner 1976, Webb & Krassner, 1989, Spiezio, 1990), efforts to empirically determine a leader in a bipolar world were unsuccessful.

The interest of academics nowadays has dramatically decreased, with only several empirical analyses of the HST postulates (Hubbard, 2010). The strategic moment is a crucial characteristic of the "hegemon". At the very end of the 20th century, and during the last decade, both the EU and China were advocating a comprehensive and strategic component of cooperation in all fields. As the outcome of most of the diplomatic initiatives, two sides have signed "EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation",[5] a document which revived and brought up to the strategic level modern links between the two partners (EEAS, 2013).

As claimed by many academic authors, economic dimension is inevitable in the Sino-European analysis (Algieri 2002; Weske, 2007; Geeraerts, 2013), as China pledges to become a new world's hegemon or at least its economic superpower (Brown, 2014). Whether deploying theories on different levels such as middle range theories and micro theories as a subsequent part of never found "meta-theory" of international relations, empirical research in this field could not advance due to non-aligned methodological decisions and vast complicity of the theoretical framework, while some positive findings slightly improve the theory (Hubbard, 2010). The HST provides only normative robust arguments on what forms a status of global hegemon (Kindleberger, 1973), but it does not take into account the changeable structure of international system along with the possibility to create qualitatively new international structure type. Relatively vivid conceptual discussions within IR, take into account which type of "hegemonic" behaviour China takes in the modern international system. For instance, there are claims according to which Chinese role within modern globalized society could be analyzed through three lenses: the changes of structure in international politics, respective identity differences among

---

[4] The term "hegemon" should be understood as a concept derived from theoretical debates among the HST authors, and thus, does not indicate any negative mark of certain country, but refer to the role that leading superpower (could) have in international system.

[5] The document regulates and addresses strategic axis of activities between the two partners such as infrastructure development, transport, science, peace & security, prosperity, energy, urbanisation, social progress, etc. The document sets three pillars on which the EU and China will base their annual summits: (the annual High Level Strategic Dialogue, the annual High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, and the bi-annual People-to-People Dialogue. More available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf

the EU and China, and emerging multilayered and culturally diversified polarity between the two actors (Geeraerts, 2013, p. 54).

An observed gap in scientific literature relates to the sphere in which the hegemon must accomplish itself. In this article, the author argues that the "commitment" (expressed by the *will* to participate in global affairs), besides the traditionally accepted political presence, could be also demonstrated in active economic presence within specific regions. Instead of testing the first two arguments of the HST, their multilevel collision will be deployed in regards to the current analysis.

The HST casts an argument according to which the international regime will operate smoothly and experience periods of stability only if dominated by one powerful national economy. Consequently, the "absence of a hegemon is associated with a disorder in the world system and undesirable outcomes for individual states" (Snidal, 1985, p. 1). This general premise has been elaborated through three normative arguments that could be summed as:

a) The hegemon must have a large and growing economy and developed technology;

b) The hegemon must possess politico-military soft and hard power;

c) The hegemon must have the will and readiness to take the leading role within the international system (Kindleberger, 1973).

Most of the available economic indicators reveal that Chinese constant growth is indisputable.

Taking into account an extremely high ratio of Chinese export-oriented economy, it is important to expand an argument according to which China is a producing and not a consuming nation (see Chart 1). Unlike many socialist countries, it had a very successful economic transition in terms of adapting to the global economy outreach. Similarly, excluding other countries with strict government-protected industrial sectors, China's success lays in its so-called "dual-track" approach, which Lin describes as "gradual and pragmatic" (Lin, 2013).

Table 1. The Trend towards multi-polarity: Share of World GDP (in %)

	1995	2007	2020	2030	Trends 2007-2030
USA	21.7	19.4	18.3	16.6	2.8 ↓
EU28*	24.5	20.8	18.6	15.6	5.2 ↓
China	5.5	10.1	17.7	22.7 ↑	12.6
Russia	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.7	0.2 ↓
Japan	8.3	6.0	4.6	3.6	2.4 ↓

*Without Croatia which joined the EU in 2013.

Source: Adapted information by Economic Intelligence Unit; Taken from: Geeraerts, 2013, p. 57.

With the protection of unviable firms in the primary sector, it "simultaneously liberalised the entry of private enterprises, joint ventures and foreign direct investment in labour-intensive sectors in which China had a comparative advantage but that were repressed before the transition" (2013, p. 263). Although the high and growing level of exportation, China's ratio of import of goods and services does not create a big share in its total GDP (World Bank Data, 2017). When in 1986 China resolutely decided to resume its membership within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it meant its joining back to the world`s economic system (Marković, 2014).

The expressive progress of China's economic rise has occurred at the very beginning of this century and has been multiplied several times nowadays. According to the World Bank Global Prospects programme, China will continue measuring its economic growth, maintaining 6.4% of growth per annum until 2019 (World Bank Global Prospects, 2017).

Chart 1: Import and Export ratio of China between 1990-2016 (USD millions)

Source: World Bank Data, 2017[6] (Compiled data)

With a permanent seat within the United Nations Security Council, China also plays a key role in preserving global peace and stability. It is ranked as the third country with most powerful military capacities, taking the first place in the Asian area (Global Fire Power, 2017).

---

[6] According to the World Bank Data explanation, imports and exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services received and sent to / from the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.

More available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS &id=1ff4a498&report_name=Popular-Indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y (Accessed on: 17.10.2017.)

Its increase of defence budget has even described as the "brave move" towards the real multilateralism, which none of the other potential superpowers were ready for (Kagan, 1998). William Cohen (2007, p. 683) claimed that China was "destined to behave as other emerging powers had in the past"; specifically, China will "resume its place as East Asia's hegemonic power and extend its influence wherever it can in the rest of the world". Hard power alone is insufficient to confer 'great power' status (Kim, 1998, p. 6). But some assume that China is boosting its military capability in order to emerge as a great power regionally and eventually globally, thus to be capable of confronting the US.[7] Measuring the Chinese military capabilities and strengths is more adequate by observing how China acts "*in-theatre*", or in any potential military scenario, such as the tensions in the South China Sea.[8] Notwithstanding this argument on politico-military hegemony and predominance in global affairs, in terms of the HST, China measures rise in something that its scholars call "comprehensive national power – CNP", a syntagm which relates to precise calculation of the national both soft and hard powers (Zhang, 2010), and according to which China ranks as one of the world`s top nations. All of the above-mentioned normative arguments give China the attributes of a theory-significant case which can be observed, and the status of "upgrading praxis" of the theory. Data from Table 1 and Chart 1 show the long-term tendencies of stability of the Chinese economy. Next chapters will discuss the Chinese willingness to involve in global affairs through economic initiatives.

GENERATING MODERN SINO-EUROPEAN RELATIONS THROUGH THE "16+1" SUB-INITIATIVE

The first two adapted assumptions of the HST provide an assessment of the third and most significant argument of the theory. Duncan Snidal was among the ones who provided comprehensive argumentation on the limits of the HST and the range of its (empirical) application to specific situations (Snidal, 1985). These theory principles were primarily based on the economic nature of political relations among countries. Thus, the author believes the third argument according to which the hegemon must commit to the international system, could be modified from having purely political to economic nature. This was initially introduced by Michael Webb & Stephen Krassner, who differentiated the HST into two sub-theoretical discourses: the collective goods and the security version of this theory (Webb &

---

[7] China is among the top of military global superpowers in accordance with the annual Military Balance reports. See more at: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance (29.10.2017)

[8] For detailed China`s military capabilities, see more at: https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection (Accessed on: 13.10.2017)

Krasner, 1989). According to them, the security version of the HST, "does not assume that states have a common interest in international economic liberalization and stability. If the pattern of relative gains threatens the security of powerful states, international economic liberalization will be restricted even though those states could have increased their absolute welfare by participating in a more open system" (1989, p. 185). Following that line of argumentation, that would mean the hegemon's commitment to the international system should not necessarily be exposed in political affairs only but could be accepted for economic areas as well.

For the purposes of this article, a matrix of indicators developed by Webb and Krasner will be used to re-assess the Chinese presence within the 16+1 geographic area. Further conceptualizations of the theory along with its methodological issues for research design have been vivid since the theory has been established.

There was a vast number of empirical studies that used precise indicators for measuring economic "hegemony" and predominance within the international system (Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1975; Krasner, 1976). Those indicators would involve the main macroeconomic measures such as goods and services import and export, general GDP trends, FDIs (net inflows), from data series taken from the World Bank Data values. For the purpose of this article, the sub-initiative "16+1" is subject to empirical examination.[9] Re-assessment of the Chinese economic presence must take into account the new circumstances that involve politico-economic strategic competition between the two sides or their similarities.

Chart 2: Export and import of goods and services 2008, 2012 and 2016 ($ millions)[10]

Source: World Bank Data, 2017; (aggregated data for sixteen countries of CEE region)

---

[9] A several-years old, structured annual forum, which gathers countries of the Central and Eastern Europe and China, to develop comprehensive (predominantly) economic policies and ways of cooperation.

[10] The "16+1" designation in terms of these charts involves sixteen Central and Eastern European countries, and therefore, excludes China for which separate values have been shown.

Sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not that much prone to import goods and services, nor to do their export, in comparison to single China's values or the EU28 ones (see Chart 2). Two more observations from this Chart should be noticed. First, the EU28 import ratio is constantly decreasing, along with its export trends that are also declining. This could be caused by its general slow-down in the economic ratio and not by a higher EU dependency on import/export. Aggregated data for sixteen CEE countries show the minimal share of export/import when compared to the EU28 one. This presents an opportunity for China to further invest and export its goods. The charts above have shown general trends of imports of goods and services of the European side of "16+1" region, as well as the very high ratio of the import-based need for all EU member states. To achieve deeper insight than the nominal numbers, the export-import interrelation could be more adequately analyzed if observed through the percentage of GDP per annum respectively.

Chart 3. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)

	2000	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
China	21,24	35,9	32,0	24,3	26,2	26,4	25,4	24,5	24,0	21,9	19,6
EU	34,39	38,2	38,8	34,6	38,3	41,0	42,2	42,3	42,6	43,3	43,0
16+1		48,6	48,5	43,8	50,9	56,3	58,2	59,3	59,7	60,2	58,5

Source: World Bank Data, 2017 (Aggregated data)

Chart 3 shows that if observed through this indicator, the CEE countries are *de facto* increasing the export ratio in the last several years. On the other side, China's decline in percentage is a consequence of its permanent GDP growth. Therefore, the share of export cannot be conceived as a smaller ratio. Unlike the CEE countries, the EU as a whole is stagnating in the export ratio which can be the first signal for its non-adequate growth policy.

Regarding China, investments beyond its borders in 2010 were almost 10% of its GDP, while in 2011 it was 11.1% (Xin, 2010). On the other side, the CEE countries receive not only the Chinese investments but also others, such as from other EU member states and the third parties.

According to the World Bank Data, aggregated foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the CEE countries do not overcome 35 billion US dollars *per annum*. Some assessments predict that China is spending several billion Euros a year in the CEE region (Reuters, 2016; Spiegel, 2017).[11] No more concrete and robust data on this issue were found. In China's strategies of development, investments are recognized as impetus which could demonstrate Chinese openness towards the world. The Thirteen Plan for a five-year period announces two significant measures: deeper participation in supranational power structures, more international co-operation, and encouraging people of China to share the fruits of economic growth to bridge the existing welfare gaps. The willingness to involve deeper in global affairs was explicitly demonstrated. For "measuring" Chinese benevolence, data from an annual series of public opinion surveys in key European countries presented by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, will be used.

Table 2. International views on China:
Favourability of China within the public opinion

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Germany	34	26	29	30	34	29	28	28	34	28	34
France	47	28	41	41	51	40	42	47	50	33	44
Russia	60	60	58	60	63	62	62	64	79	n/a	70
USA	42	39	50	49	51	40	37	35	38	37	44
Japan	29	14	26	26	34	15	5	7	9	11	13
Turkey	25	24	16	20	18	22	27	21	18	n/a	33
Average	39,50	31,83	36,67	37,67	41,83	34,67	33,50	33,67	38,00	27,25	39,67

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies;
https://chinapower.csis.org/global-views (29.10.2017)

---

[11] German daily newspapers Spiegel announced that China would get closer to the Eastern EU Member States through huge package of 10 billion dollars investments, especially to Poland, indicating that Western Europe investors were not able to increase "intra-EU" investment circle. More at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/with-10-billion-dollar-credit-line-china-deepens-presence-in-central-europe-a-833811.html (31.10.2017)

DISCUSSING THE CHINA`S BENEVOLENT COMMITMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Even the most HST- sceptic oriented authors admit that a vast number of critics did not destroy its analytic foundations (Gowa, 1989). The research question from the beginning of this paper was set to provide an answer if China's case presents the possibility for hegemonic stability theory-upgrade through its benevolent behaviour? Although the "benevolent hegemon" was conceptualized at the very beginning of theorizing (Kindleberger, 1973), this benevolence has hardly been exposed by any of major superpowers. Chinese significant economic investments all across the globe are *sui generis* example of such behaviour within international relations. Another issue which is significant is the defining the "long-term" period of theoretical arguments. It is quite unclear what constitutes the sufficient period of time in which all those arguments should be observed. In another scenario, the G2 as a new model for establishing the global hegemon in economic and financial affairs could occur.

It is for all the reasons the EU attitudes towards the initiative (Franco-German axis; Visegrad Group countries attitudes; other related attitudes), were quite positive towards China (Möller, 2002). The hegemon and its behaviour must be perceived and accepted positively by a wider consensus of the international community. It must be formed as mutually beneficial for other great powers and important state-actors. Perceptions of Europeans towards China, in general, are not investigated that much in academic practice.

Some empirical views, however, stand on distinction of the European Union member states attitudes towards China, spreading them into four fluctuating groups: assertive industrialists, ideological free-traders, accommodating mercantilists and European followers (Fox & Godement, 2009). Not only the EU member states, but even the CEE countries were dispersed into all of the groups (2009: 5). On the other side, there were some empirical studies that shed light on how the Chinese people percept the EU in general (Chan, 2010). All the perception studies are one-way oriented (i.e. Chinese people towards the EU in general and *vice versa*, or group of the EU Member States' public opinions towards the specific policy of China) and thus not adequate for generalization and deeper analysis (see Table 2).

All of these factors imply that classical interpretations of the HST as a "meta-theory" of IR should be denounced in terms of its corrections and further upgrades. It would be impossible to deploy only one out of three arguments of the HST in analysing the multilateral and bilateral relations among the major world powers (notwithstanding China, the EU or any other party). The HST has experienced some serious objections in academic considerations. The focus and interest on rebutting the first argument are most common within academics since it gets most space for empirical investigations. Despite that the economic indicators

are easily measurable and thus, subject to different methodologies, they offer a solid basis for their direct comparison.

Eichengreen argues that there are problems with three concepts of this theory: hegemony, the power the hegemon is assumed to possess, and the regime whose stability is ostensibly enhanced by the exercise of hegemonic power (1987, p. 3). He continues with an explanation of the last concept and points out the nature of a regime which should recognize its leader, concluding that this process is very slow (Eichengreen, 1987).

On the other side, if the normative *de lege ferenda* argument according to which the world *needs to have* its predominant leader is taken into account, the HST is quite successful in explaining the Sino-European relations on a middle-range term. Furthermore, it is of utmost importance to determine whether a theory with economic postulates could be applied to describe and even predict solely political relations between China and the EU. Some describe future China's relations with Central and Eastern Europe as "dependent on the overall EU posture towards China's interests in the region" (Dimitrijević & Jokanović, 2016). In the end, this paper has shown that there is an inconvenient convergence from the Europeanization of the Sino-European relations towards the Chinese angle of their perception.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article pointed out to most significant academic debates over the Sino-European relations and their changing nature. The author intended to demonstrate Chinese commitment to the international (economic) system through its wide and comprehensive BRI policy, by using the "16+1" example. The discussion and results have shown that China's foreign policy is far from being a middle-range power. Its economic presence through giant sub-initiatives is a key factor in shaping the Chinese foreign policy towards the third parties. Its willingness to invest heavily in the CEE region's infrastructure is recognized as a tendency of nearing the general European market for Chinese goods. Thus, establishing stable economic relations is for sure an opportunity for so-called "*spill-over*" effect, in which cooperation in all other major areas could be achieved.

The notion of "hegemon's commitment to the system" inevitably involves an economic dimension. If the postulate that "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (Kindleberger, 1973) is accepted, then in Chinese case the normative moment of the HST should be avoided. Having a "hegemonic" role does not indicate it is necessarily a coercive player within the international arena; moreover, as Kindleberger claimed, it could be a benevolent actor. Thus, the benevolence in China's case is explicitly expressed in vast

investments all across the globe. Generating more than 11% of total world's GDP, China along with the EU, which forms some of 20% of total world`s GDP, could become a real new economic leader in the near future (World Bank Data, 2017). Debates among scholars concerning the potential "G2" scenario, in which China and the EU could take global economic leadership, are more often being actualized in global discourse. Some scholars predict that world economic hegemony will be soon established through "G2" scenario, in which the EU will be joined by China (Geeraerts, 2013).

Geeraerts argues that the G2 will present the first economic tier of multilayered polarity (2013, p. 58), while Scott recognized this dyad as the "strategic axis for the 21st century" (Scott, 2007). If international economic institutions are widely understood to be "in need of reformation and repair" and for a new or reworked system to have credibility, China would need to have input into the process (Desai, 2006, p. 2). This became visible in 2017 roundtable "Promoting an Open, Invigorated and Inclusive World Growth", where the WTO director general announced: "China's commitment to increased openness will help to drive the economy forward. There is an opportunity now to accelerate reform and focus more on the sustainability and quality of growth" (WTO, 2017). So far, it seems that China did not play assertive economic policy towards the global institution creation.

But through various initiatives, it has demonstrated that international institutionalism should not necessarily be used as a means to the global presence. The future of the Sino-European relations highly depends on the mutual agreement of Europe and China about particular strategic areas in which further cooperation should be built. An attempt to provide an overview of the Sino-European relations with their everlasting variable nature will be put highly on the academic agenda in future (Shirk, 2007). Whether the "16+1" initiative foster the cooperation and China's rise followed by balanced Sino-European relations, will notably depend on the Chinese will to assume a global leadership and to achieve its growth policy.

LITERATURE

Algieri, F. (2002). EU economic relations with China: an institutionalist perspective. *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 169, 64-77.

Arežina, S. (2015). The New Silk Road–China's nexus to Europe. *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 66 (1158-1159), 32-54.

Brown, S. A. W. (2014). *Power, perception and policymaking: the foreign policies of the US and the EU towards China.* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow).

Chan, K. (2010). Images, visibility and the prospects of soft power of the EU in Asia: the case of China. *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 8(2), 133-147.

CSIS Global Views. (2017). Retrieved October 29, 2017, from https://chinapower. csis.org/global-views

Dimitrijević, D., & Jokanović, N. (2016). China's New Silk Road Development Strategy. *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 67(1161), 101-123.

EEAS (2013). EU-China Agenda for Strategic Cooperation; Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_ agenda_en.pdf (29.10.2017)

Fox, J., & Godement, F. (2009). *A power audit of EU-China relations*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.

Geeraerts, G. (2013). The Changing Global Context of China-EU Relations. *China International Studies*, Vol.42 (September/October), 53-69.

Gilpin, R. (1975). *US power and the multinational corporation*. New York: Basic Books.

Global Fire Power (2017). Global Military Strength Ranking. Retrieved Octrober 21, 2017, from: https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp

Hubbard, Jese (2010). Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis, The *International Studies and Research Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 2, 382-398.

Jervis, R. (1968). Hypotheses on misperception, *World Politics*, Vol. 20(3), 454-479.

Kagan, R. (1998). The benevolent empire, *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 42(2), 24-35.

Kindleberger, C. (1973). *The formation of financial centers: A study in comparative economic history*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kindleberger, C. P. (1973). The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Available at *https:/www. cambridge. org/core/terms. https://doi. org/10.1017 S, 337951417*, 197-98.

Krasner, S. D. (1976). State power and the structure of international trade. *World Politics*, Vol. 28(3), 317-347.

Legro, J. W. (2007). What China will want: the future intentions of a rising power. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 5(3), 515-534.

Lin, J. Y. (2013). Demystifying the Chinese economy, *Australian Economic Review*, Vol.46(3), 259-268.

Lin, J. Y., Cai, F., & Li, Z. (2003). *The China miracle: Development strategy and economic reform*. Chinese University Press.

Marković, V. (2014). The People`s Republic of China and accession to the World Trade Organization–Reform of copyright legislation. *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 65, No. 1153–1154, 84-95.

Men, Jing. (2007) *"The EU-China Strategic Partnership: Achievements and Challenges"*. European Policy Paper No. 12, November 2007. [Policy Paper]

Möller, K. (2002). Diplomatic relations and mutual strategic perceptions: China and the European Union. *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 169, 10-32.

Reuters. China in modern world. Retrieved October 28, 2018, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-eastern-europe-fund-idUSKBN13105N

Scott, D. (2007). China and the EU: a strategic axis for the twenty-first century?. *International Relations*, Vol. 21(1), 23-45.

Shirk, Susan (2007). *China: Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Snidal, D. (1985). The limits of hegemonic stability theory. *International organization*, Vol. 39(4), 579-614.

Spiegel (2017). Beijing Sets its Sights on Central Europe. Retrieved October, 31, 2018, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/with-10-billion-dollar-credit-line-china-deepens-presence-in-central-europe-a-833811.html

Spiezio, K. E. (1990). British Hegemony and Major Power War, 1815–1939: An Empirical Test of Gilpin's Model of Hegemonic Governance. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.34(2), 165-181.

Wang, Y. (2009). The identity dilemmas of EU normative power: observations from Chinese traditional culture, In: Gerrits, André (ed.), *Normative Power Europe in a Changing Wolrd* (pp. 67-76). Netherlands: Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Webb, M. C., & Krasner, S. D. (1989). Hegemonic stability theory: an empirical assessment. *Review of International Studies*, Vol.15(2), 183-198.

Weske, S. (2007). The role of France and Germany in EU-China relations. *CAP Working Paper*. Retrieved August 29, 2018, from from: http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/2007_eu-china_weske.pdf

World Bank Data. (2017). China and EU GDP share in global GDP. Retrieved October 24, 2017, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=1W-CN-EU&view=chart

World Bank Data. (2017). Internet source, Retrieved October 17, 2018, from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS&id=1ff4a498&report_name=Popular-Indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y

World Bank Prospects (2017). Retrieved October, 30, 2018, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects#data

WTO. (2018). Round table on Global development. Retrieved September 28, 2017, from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/dgra_12sep17_e.htm

Zhang, W. (2010). China's cultural future: from soft power to comprehensive national power. *International journal of Cultural policy*, Vol. 16(4), 383-402.

Nenad **STEKIĆ**

TRAJNO NEDEFINISANI KINESKO-EVROPSKI ODNOSI: DA LI JE INICIJATIVA „16+1" ZAJEDNIČKI BENEFIT ILI TAČKA RAZILAŽENJA?

Apstrakt: Ovaj članak istražuje do koje mere je kineska geopolitička pozicija spremna na promene u 21. veku, u kontekstu njene politike prema Evropskoj uniji, i naročito, subinicijativama poput „16+1". Kako bi adekvatno bilo odgovoreno na ovo pitanje, biće korišćeni postulati teorije hegemonske stabilnosti Čarlsa Kindlbergera. Osim rasprostranjene upotrebe u istraživanjima međunarodnih odnosa, ova teorija predstavlja plodotvornu bazu jer pruža indikatore koji mogu da budu upoređivani. Dok prve dve premise, shodno kojima je Kina benevolentni lider, nisu upitne (velika i rastuća privreda, kao i vojna i politička moć), postoji treća, prema kojoj hegemon mora da bude posvećen sistemu, koji treba da ga percipira kao uzajamno korisnog člana međunarodne zajednice od strane velikih sila i ostalih važnih državnih aktera. Inicijativa „16+1" će služiti kao studija slučaja i pokazaće da je spoljna politika Kine daleko od statusa sile srednjeg dometa. Autor počinje testiranjem prva dva postulata teorije, na primeru ekonomskog prisustva Kine u prostoru Centralne i Istočne Evrope, praćen kineskom posvećenošću međunarodnom sistemu u kom će inicijativa „16+1" biti analizirana kao izazov odnosima sa Evropskom unijom. Ovaj papir ukazuje na model saradnje koji predstavlja osnovu za stvaranje stavova Evropske unije prema ovoj, i sličnim kineskim inicijativama.

Ključne reči: Kina, Evropska unija, ekonomski odnosi, teorija hegemonske stabilnosti, inicijativa "16+1", investicije.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ARMS RACE – A STRATEGY THAT ALWAYS WORKS?

Ksenia GALTSOVA[1]

Abstract: The present article focuses on the current arms race between the USA and Russia with the aim to investigate if it will lead to a constant increase of the military budget and eventually to the collapse of the Russian economy. Therefore, it briefly mentions the Cold War time arms race and then draws parallels with the present situation. The Russian military budget has been rising since the 2000s; however, dramatic changes have occurred in the military sector since the Munich Speech in 2007. Hence, a correlation between international events and budget is analyzed in the article. In order to approach the research question, it is necessary to discuss two geopolitical crises that both powers are involved in - the Ukrainian crisis and the Syrian Civil War. Here it is important to highlight that Russia did not provoke either one, while the USA could be taken responsible for both.

Key words: arms race, the Cold War, the USA, Russia, the Syrian conflict, the Ukrainian crisis, rivalry.

INTRODUCTION

For a few years now various news channels have been claiming we are in the midst of a new Cold War. However, these claims did not seem as serious and obvious when they started as they seem now in 2018. The seriousness of these

---

claims became apparent after Antonio Gutteres stated that "The Cold War is back with a vengeance, but with a difference" at the opening of the UN Security Council meeting in April 2018. (BBC, 2018). The new Cold War has inherited many features of the old Cold War; such as the confrontation between East and West, proxy wars and the arms race. However, the question is how much in common do the features of the past and present have? Will the old strategy serve as well as it did before? This article will tackle one of the principal U.S. Cold War strategies: the arms race. The aim of this work is to analyze if an arms race strategy could work in the modern Cold War and result in the instability of Russia's economy.

In the past, the arms race exhausted the reserves of the Soviet Union and led to her collapse. It has to be mentioned that many various factors such as the command economy, lack of innovations, large military spending and absence of business caused economic collapse. But this article will focus only on one objective, which is military overspending. Analyzing the current Russian economic situation, one may notice that even though it has experienced a period of downfall, its military budget has risen throughout the past decades. As many experts claim, when it comes to international affairs, usually the Russian government strategy is purely responsive. This is exemplified with cases such as the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the Ukrainian crisis and certain events within the Syrian conflict. A similarity between all of the mentioned examples is that Russia had to increase spending on its military capabilities. Another similarity is how all Russia's actions were met with sanctions imposed by the western countries (with the exception for the Georgian war). Consequently, the Russian currency crashed, and its economy is still heavily influenced by sanctions that do not allow for a full recovery due to the oil prices dropping in late 2014. So, has Russia learnt its lessons from the past or does the U.S. strategy always work?

OUTLINE

In order to tackle the question of the effectiveness of the arms race strategy, we should examine the American tactic, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and its impact on the Soviet economy and military budget.

To assess the present situation two key events that are the main reasons of sanctions on Russia will be briefly analyzed - namely the Ukrainian crisis and the following annexation of Crimea and Russia's involvement in the Syrian Civil War. What is important to highlight here is that the chain of events that followed both of these events was not provoked by the Kremlin, but was instead a responsive tactic.

Russia was dragged into the Ukrainian crisis, while the Crimea annexation was a highly controversial political move that Russia attempted to justify via security concerns. By severing relations with Kiev, Moscow lost her strategic partner in commerce and the gas export market as well as access to European market through the Ukrainian territory.

Regarding the Syrian conflict, for a long time, Russia abstained from involvement, although she has always supported Bashar al-Assad. Hence, there is a need to analyze a decision that brought the Russian military forces into Syria. The consequences and cost of this military involvement for Moscow are also worth exploring. These two events brought economic and political consequences, and even to some degree political isolation to Russia.

THE COLD WAR TIME ARMS RACE

The main goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative introduced in 1983, was to reduce the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out between the two super powers. (Holm, 1986). This supposed to be accomplished by improving defense capabilities, thus making the first strike either impossible or not very effective. The SDI was created to prevent possible Soviet aggression since it was irrelevant to conduct an attack when there was a low chance of missiles reaching their strategic targets. This could be seen as leverage over the USSR since, without missile strike superiority, it would not have many leverages left over the USA. Therefore, it would lead to a more stable and strategic relationship between the two blocs.

Another agenda of the SDI was to make the Soviets feel insecure, so they would increase military spending and eventually drag themselves into an arms race aimed at devastating the Soviet economy and resources. In fact, the SDI was another wave of the arms race that had roots in the after-war months. The USA showed its intentions to move the arms race to a different dimension - space, so the Soviets would start pouring finances in R & D. (Polynov, 2005, p.99). It is a well-known fact that both techniques proved to be working well, and the American goals were achieved. The Communist Party was annually raising the military budget and investing more and more in R & D, while often cutting the social budget. However, other spheres such as the automotive industry or innovations also suffered from inadequate funding.

In addition to the aforementioned techniques, Reagan's administration built the arms race as a multi-layered strategy. A threat to militarize the space was not the only trick used by the White House in order to exhaust the Soviet resources. President Reagan had intentions to create other consequences similar to the Vietnam War out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by financing the

mujahedeen. It started with a relatively modest aid of $30 million and by the end of the war, it was raised up to $630 million in annual help. (Goldman, 2016, p. 1). Along with that, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan showed that the USSR was not that militarily powerful when it came to conventional forces. The ten-year-long Afghan War caused exhaustion to the Soviet economy and shook her image of a superpower.

It is hard to find actual numbers that would show the Soviet military budget since every source gives conflicting information due to the Soviet secret policy. However, one thing in common between all the sources is that the budget was rising, especially in the 70s-80s. (Harrison, 2003).

Undoubtedly, there were many other reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed. However, both the Star Wars and the Afghan war destroyed the weak Soviet economy and showed the insufficiency of the communist system. Eventually, it could be considered as the main reason for the fall of the Empire that finished the Cold War.

THE TURNING POINT

There is no smoke without fire. Another arms race would not occur without reason. So, what was the turning point when relations between the USA and Russia deteriorated? For the purpose of this research, this has to be clarified to determine from what point we should start analyzing the Russian military spending. That year will then serve as the starting point for assessing the hard data.

At the beginning of the new millennia, relations between Washington and Moscow seemed promising. Namely, both leaders, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin showed they were eager to cooperate at the Summit in Slovenia. This was well demonstrated by President Bush's famous statement following the meeting: "I looked the man in the eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul." (BBC, 2001). Vladimir Putin also made a move towards strengthening the relations between the two capitals. As he said in the interview to Oliver Stone: "I remember one of our last meetings with President Clinton in Moscow. During this meeting I said, 'we should consider an option that Russia might join NATO.' Clinton replied, 'Why not?'" Putin recalled."(Sputnik, 2017). However, the honeymoon did not last long. The first disagreement occurred after Russia, along with France and Germany, had strongly opposed the American Iraq invasion without further investigation. At the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin could accept that the United States is the sole world hegemony. However, after the invasion of Iraq, he started seeing the US as a threat because of its growing geopolitical ambitions. (Sakwa, 2008, p. 249).

After starting a war in Iraq, the US attempted to expand its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet republics by supporting color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan between 2003 and 2005. The ultimate goal was to have the upper hand in the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as to divert the closest (in both meanings of the word) alliance of Russia in Eastern Europe from Moscow sphere of influence. Another concern of the Russian government was a fear that the revolutions in the post-Soviet republics would cause a spillover effect, thus bringing uprisings financially and ideologically supported by the western powers. Along with that, the EU and NATO were expanding eastwards to former zones of the Soviet influence. All together it was interpreted as a threat to Russian political and economic interests. Hence, it resulted in Putin's Munich Speech in 2007.

This was the first time Russia stated that it was not satisfied with its position in the world, accusing the USA of dominating international relations and calling for multipolar world order.

'I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world…It results in the fact that no one feels safe… Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course, such a policy stimulates an arms race…' (Putin, 2007).

Therefore, the international community together has to change the world order from unipolar to multipolar. This could be interpreted from two different angles: first, Russia sought a fairer international order with no hegemony that checks its power in different regions; second, Russia attempted to secure its place as one of the great powers, thus being able to influence world order and dominate its neighbors.

Nevertheless, the Munich speech could be taken as a starting point of the escalating conflict between the two powers following the New Cold war and the arms race. President Putin openly stated that as a country that had its independent policy for more than a thousand years, Russia would not tolerate other powers dictating how to act on both domestic and international levels. (Putin, 2007) Moreover, Vladimir Putin heavily criticized NATO and the United States by saying:

"an almost uncontained hyper-use of force - military force - in international relations. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations." (Stent, 2008, p. 1096).

However, in 2007, the Munich speech was not the only signal of Russia's discontentment with the current world order and its desire to change it. The second signal was an introduction of State Armament Plan 2007-2015. (Sakwa,

2008, p. 251). As Sergey Ivanov, then-Defense Minister said the program intended to 'replace 45% of entire arsenal… procurement of new capabilities and the maintenance of existing assets…' (Mills, 2017, p. 17). One week-long conflict with Georgia demonstrated that Russian military forces performance was far from the level that the Munich Speech would require from a country with intentions to change the global order. Therefore, it showed a necessity to conduct a military reform that was carried by Medvedev a few months after the conflict. (Mills, 2017, p. 18).

As a result, relations between Moscow and Washington reached its peak of distrust in 2007, which has brought another arms race to international politics. As it was mentioned at the start of this chapter, it is crucial to identify the turning point in order to find the starting year relevant for this research in the analysis of Russia's military budget.

NEW ARMS RACE

After the fall of the Soviet Union, military forces in the newly emerged Russian Federation were at the lowest level ever. During Yeltsin's presidency, the military budget was dropping every year. Therefore, when Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, both the army and military equipment were on a high priority agenda, especially due to the fact that the Chechen War was not over. We could then see stable growth in the military budget that eventually brought Russia to become the third top military spender in the world in 2016. (Kottasova, 2017). According to SIPRI, between 2000 and 2007 the budget went up by roughly $16 billion hitting $37.698 billion of allocated military spending. ("SIPRI Military Expenditure Database") To stress the growth, the military budget was only $15.548 in 1999. ("SIPRI Military Expenditure Database").

Ukrainian Crisis

For decades, Ukraine was among the most important allies for Russia. Its territory served as a buffer zone, was used as a gas transfer from Russia to Europe, and its southern coast was used as a station for the Russian Navy. Last but not least, Ukraine was a trade partner. However, nowadays President Putin and President Poroshenko can hardly find common ground, and a resolution of the conflict does not seem possible in the immediate future. This situation harms both parties, especially Russia since the Ukrainian conflict served as the main reason for sanctions that are heavily damaging the Russian economy. Hence, one may conclude that severing relations with Kiev was against Moscow's interests. Therefore, it is necessary to see what factors led to the crisis. This is important for the research in order to show that the Kremlin reacted, i.e. did not initially

act towards Ukraine. The actions taken required large military spending in a hard economic situation.

In late 2013, former Ukrainian President Yanukovych decided not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. Instead, he signed an agreement with Russia that it would buy $15 billion debt and reduce gas prices. (BBC, 2014). This decision brought people to the streets of Kiev and later the protests turned into a revolution that forced Viktor Yanukovych to flee the country in February 2014. It is necessary to point out that these protests had a strong anti-Russian tone. Therefore, the violation of Russian nationals' rights residing in Ukraine was reported by the Kremlin. This served as a justification for organizing a referendum in the Crimean province (mostly populated with Russian ethnic) and its following re-integration with Russia.

As we all know, the annexation or re-integration of the Crimean peninsula (depending on your political stance) and support for the rebellion in Eastern Ukraine made Moscow pay a significant price: sanctions imposed by the Western countries, a certain degree of political isolation and military and financial aid to Donetsk and Luhansk. (Milne, 2014). Therefore, one may conclude that Russia would be better off if the Ukrainian government remained a puppet in the Kremlin's hands. This brings us to the conclusion that Crimea rejoining Russia or the military uprising in the East were not Putin's grand strategy, they were instead responsive actions.

One year after events in Kiev in an interview with CNN, Barack Obama said: 'Mr. Putin made his decision around Crimea and Ukraine not because of his grand strategy. But essentially he was caught off balance by the protests in the Maydan and Yanukovych then fleeing after we brokered a deal to transition power in Ukraine.' (Obama, 2018). This is legitimate proof of the U.S. meddling in Ukraine. This can be interpreted from multiple angles. First, this was an attempt to expand the EU, and later NATO, eastwards towards the border with Russia. Second, it could be a provocation trap that the Kremlin fell into. More precisely, the White House understood that the possibility of Ukraine's membership in the western alliance would not be tolerated or ignored by Moscow. So in response, the American actions actually did create a situation where Russia had to risk her stable position in the international arena and economy in order to secure its borders while dumping money into Crimea, East Ukraine and increasing its military budget. All of these events resulted in an arms race that was similar to that of the previous century (where the USA successfully implemented the SDI strategy). To compare the numbers, Russia's military budget for 2013 was $57.500 billion; it was increased by almost $9 billion in 2015. ("SIPRI Military Expenditure Database"). It is crucial to take into account that the Ruble significantly dropped in 2014. While in 2013 average exchange rate was RUB 31,84 for $1, in 2015 it became RUB 61,29 for $1.

("Курс ЦБ- Курс валют ЦБ РФ). If we calculate the military budget in the ruble, we will see that the budget rise was dramatically higher, especially since the economy was experiencing a severe decline.

Based on the conducted research in this sub-chapter, one may conclude that the USA not only played a role in the Ukrainian crisis but also succeeded in dragging Russia into the arms race.

Interference in the Syrian Civil War

There is one major similarity that could be found between the Afghan war and the Syrian conflict, and that is their resemblance to a proxy war. Both conflicts could be considered proxies of the USA and USSR (later Russia). However, a pure proxy war is defined as a conflict where major powers do not participate but only provide a different kind of assistance to warring factions. In the case of the war in Afghanistan, there was direct Soviet involvement; while both the USA and Russia have boots on the ground in Syria. However, both wars are obvious examples of the power struggle in the given regions between the two powers.

One more point to bring up: the White House plotted against Assad from the beginning of the revolution by secretly supporting the rebels and providing them with weapons. (McKernan, 2017). The reason behind that was not only to eliminate Russia's influence in Syria but also to destroy support for the Palestinian cause, thus guaranteeing safety for its closest friend in the region - Israel. Nevertheless, after the conflict escalated it turned into a situation where the USA and Russia were fighting over influence in Syria and the Middle East. Along with that, it fueled the already ongoing arms race.

President Putin made a decision to send troops into Syria after President Assad had asked for military support in the fall of 2015. It would be naïve to think that behind the Russian military presence is only a noble cause. First, there is a geographical benefit for the Kremlin supporting and winning the Civil war for Bashar al-Assad. Iran is a close and strong ally of Russia, and to some extent, this could be said about Iraq too. By fighting against the Syrian opposition, Moscow would ensure that Syria remains its ally, and Lebanon would come together with Syria. If we look at the map, we will see that these four countries create a corridor with access to both the Caspian and Mediterranean Sea and that they surround Saudi Arabia from one side. Hence, maintaining stability in Syria is an important task for Russia's strategic interests in the Middle East and the Gulf. On top of this, another strong priority was to keep the existing naval base. In fact, there are a few naval and air bases in the area since the intervention in the conflict. Another benefit is the infrastructure contracts that remain once

the war is over. Last but not least, Moscow comprehends that if the current government falls, Syria will follow the same scenario as Iraq and Libya. This means losing the last alliance on the Mediterranean coast to Washington.

Analyzing the numbers provided by SIPRI, we could see that military budget for 2016 went up roughly by $4 billion reaching $70.345 billion. ("SIPRI Military Expenditure Database"). However, the budget increase was not supposed to cover only the expenses from the Syrian conflict. $1,4 billion should also be spent on the nuclear weapons system. (Sputnik, 2013)

Undoubtedly, Washington sees potential danger to U.S. interests in the scenario of no government change in Syria. This is why Syria has become a battlefield for the USA and Russia, together with Iran. Such confrontation is another reason for the arms race escalation. However, the U.S.'s initial plan of power change in Syria did not predict Russia's intervention since the previous experience in Iraq and Libya showed lack of actions from Moscow. However, the Syrian conflict has taken a different path and has continued to fuel the arms race.

CONCLUSION

Since 2007 Russia has been actively increasing its military budget and rearming its forces. It proved to be quite successful. Russia's military should not be underestimated since the conventional forces have undergone reforms and have been rearmed. This raised concerns among the western powers, thus giving a start to the arms race following the new Cold War. At first sight, it reminds us of the events that took place in the 70's when Ronald Reagan approved the Strategic Defense Initiative in order to undermine the Soviet economy. During that period, the USSR reacted to U.S. provocations and primarily focused on military development while underinvesting in manufactures in order to produce competitive products for both domestic and international markets.

Nowadays, Moscow has reacted to U.S. foreign policy towards Ukraine and Syria, which led to serious economic sanctions. Russia's economy was heavily influenced by sanctions introduced by the USA and its allies. Along with that, the increased military budget harmed the unstable economy as well.

One would think that Moscow has fallen into the same trap again like during the Cold War. However, it seems that Russia learnt its lessons because, for the first time in this century, the military budget went down from $70.345 billion to $65.421 billion in 2017. (Majumdar, et al., 2017). The budget for 2018 was deducted even more to $ 42.3 billion. (Bershidsky, 2017). This could be viewed from two angles. First, the Kremlin avoided repeating the same mistake that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, the economic sanctions have

fulfilled their mission and caused an even more severe economic decline that does not allow higher military spending.

As we could see from the research conducted above, the New Cold War bears similar features to the old Cold War: the same blocs and the same tactics. However, one way or another, Putin's decision to reduce the military budget shows that the American strategy does not always prove to be successful and that the arms race shall not destabilize the country from inside like it once did.

REFERENCES

Anderton, C. H. (1989). Arms Race Modeling: Problems and Prospects. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 33 (2), 346-367. Retrieved May 05, 2018, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/173958.

BBC. (2001, June). EUROPE | Bush and Putin: Best of friends. Retrieved April 27, 2018, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1392791.stm

Bershidsky, L. (2017, December). Russia's Military Is Leaner, But Meaner. *Bloomberg.* Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-14/russia-s-military-is-leaner-but-meaner

Brokered it & broke it: Obama on Kiev deal that paved path to bloodshed. (2015, February 02). Retrieved May 12, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GeV9grU6ERM

Goldman, J. (2016). *The Central Intelligence Agency: An encyclopedia of covert ops, intelligence gathering, and spies.* Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC.

Harrison, M. (2003). How much did the Soviets Really Spend on Defence? New Evidence from the Close of the Brezhnev Era. Department of Economics University of Warwick and Center for Russian & East European Studies University of Birmingham. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://www.academia.edu/2865041/How_much_did_the_Soviets_really_spend_on_defence_New_evidence_from_the_close_of_the_Brezhnev_era?auto=download

Hollist, W.L. (1977). An Analysis of Arms Processes in the United States and the Soviet Union. *International Studies Quarterly,* 21 (3), 503-528. Retrieved May 05, 2018, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/173958.

Holm, H. (1986). Star Wars. *Journal of Peace Research,* 23 (1), 1-8. Retrieved April 28, 2018, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/423493

Kottasova, I. (2017, April). Russia is now the world's third largest military spender. *CNN.* Retrieved May 5, 2018, from http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/24/news/russia-military-spending/index.html

Majumdar, D., Edwards, M., Bandow, D., Collina, T. Z., Killough, C., & Yun, P. (2017). Did Russia Just Cut Its Defense Budget by a Whopping 25 Percent? *The National Interest*. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from http://national interest.org/blog/the-buzz/did-russia-just-cut-its-defense-budget-by-whopping-25-19831

Mills, C. (2017, January). Russia's Rearmament Programme. House of Commons. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from https://researchbriefings. parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7877

Milne, S. (2014, April). It's not Russia that's pushed Ukraine to the brink of war . *The Guardian*. Retrieved May 5, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict

Obama, B. (2015, February 2). Brokered it & broke it [Interview]. Retrieved May 7, 2018, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GeV9grU6ERM

Oliker, O., Crane, K., Schwartz, L.H., Yusupov, C. (2009). *Russian Foreign Policy Sources and Implications*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Полынов, М.Ф. [Polynov, M. F.] (2005). Гонка Вооружений как Метод Изматывания СССР США. [Arms Race as a method of exhaustion of the USSR by the USA]. *Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета,* 2 (3), 92-103.

Putin, V. (2007, February). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Retrieved May 01, 2018, from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034

Russia to Up Nuclear Weapons Spending 50% by 2016. (2013, October 08). *Sputnik*. Retrieved from https://sputniknews.com/military/2013100818400 4336-Russia-to-Up-Nuclear-Weapons-Spending-50-by-2016/

Sakwa, R. (2008). 'New Cold War' or Twenty Years' Crisis? Russia and International Politics. *The Royal Institute of International Affairs,* 84 (2), 241-267. Retrieved May 05, 2018, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25144764

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Retrieved May 01, 2018, from https://www.sipri. org/databases/milex.

Stent, A. E. (2008). Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy. *Europe-Asia Studies,* 60 (6), 1089-1106. Accessed from http://www.jstor.org/ stable/20451574.

Syria crisis: UN chief says Cold War is back. (2018, April). *BBC*. Retrieved April 27, 2018, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43759873

Trust but Verify: Putin Asked if Russia Could Join NATO to Gauge Bloc Intentions. *Sputnik,* Retrieved July 20, 2018, from https://sputniknews.com/ politics/201706041054299612-putin-russia-nato-request-analysis/.

Ukraine crisis: Timeline. (2014, November). *BBC*. Retrieved May 5, 2018, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.

Курс ЦБ - Курс валют ЦБ РФ. Retrieved May 7, 2018, from https://www.kursvaliut.ru/

Ksenia GALTSOVA

TRKA U NAORUŽANJU- UVEK USPEŠNA STRATEGIJA?

Apstrakt: Predstavljeni članak se fokusira na trenutnu trku u naoružanju između Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i Rusije sa ciljem da istraži da li će dotična trka dovesti do kontinuiranog porasta vojnog budžeta i eventualno dovesti do kolapsa Ruske ekonomije. Dakle, članak kratko pominje trku u naoružanju tokom Hladnog rata i potom povlači paralele sa trenutnom situacijom. Ruski vojni budžet je u porastu od dvehiljaditih godina, međutim dramatične promene u vojnom sektoru se dešavaju od Minhenskog govora iz 2007. Otuda, korelacija između međunarodnih događaja i vojnog budžeta je predmet analize članka. Međutim, da bi se prišlo istraživačkom pitanju neophodno je prvo prodiskutovati o dve geopolitičke krize u kojima su obe strane uključene: Ukrajinska kriza i Sirijski građanski rat. Neophodno je ovde istaći da Rusija nije izazvala nijedan od ovih sukoba dok se može uzeti da su Sjedinjene Američke Države odgovorne za oba.

Ključne reči: trka u naoružanju, Hladni rad, Sjedinjene Američke Države, Rusija, Sirijski konflikt, Ukrajinska kriza, rivalitet.

TURKEY'S KURDISH CONFLICT:
GENESIS AND A POLITICAL CONTEXT

Stefan JOJIĆ[1]

Abstract: The Kurdish issue, that is, the independence aspiration of the largest nation in the world without a state, is the subject of study from a wide variety of aspects. This article deals with the explanation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey from the historical and foreign-policy aspect, as well as with the genesis and the Turkey-Kurdish conflict transformation. The author has also attempted to identify key domestic and international factors that have shaped the Turkey-Kurdish relationship over time. The aspirations of the Turkish Kurds, as a rule, included the taking of ideological standpoints opposite to those of the ruling Turkish political elites. During the XX century, at the time of the secular and pro-Western orientation of Turkish politics, the Kurdish liberation movement was at first painted with religious colors while during the Cold war it was heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideas. This also was a period when the Kurdish question was exclusively the internal issue of Turkey. In the 1990s, the Kurdish political organizations laid the foundations for their ideological transformation into civic-liberal movements, which among other factors contributed to the increase of international public interest for their problems. Today, Turkey's Kurdish conflict is primarily determined by the dynamic of the Syrian civil war, where the Kurdish liberation movement is being consolidated.

Key words: Turkey, Kurds, Kurdish issue, PKK, Kurdistan Workers Party, Kurdish nationalism, Syrian civil war.

INTRODUCTION

The Kurds, with a population of over 30 million, are the world's largest ethnic group without a state. The Kurdish population lives on the territories of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and in fewer numbers in ex-Soviet Caucasus

---

[1] Stefan Jojić, Ph.D. Candidate at Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. E-mail: stefan.jojic@yahoo.com

republics. Mountainous and natural resources rich[2] territory of Kurdistan was for centuries under control of the most dominant empires of the Middle East – the Persian and Ottoman empires. During the Ottoman rule, Kurdish tribal leaders enjoyed certain degree autonomy, while the territory they lived on was freely called Kurdistan, unlike the praxis of most of the XX century.

At the end of World War I, the Treaty of Sevres offered the Kurds broad autonomy in the areas of Ottoman Kurdistan, with the possibility of full independence later on. Nationalist victory in the Turkish war of independence brought the Treaty of Servers to an end, while the new Treaty of Lausanne did not include any of the rights offered by the previous treaty. By the caliphate abolishment and the foundation of the secular Republic of Turkey, Islam was eliminated from politics and most of the public life.[3] That way, a link that kept the Kurds bound to the Turkish state for centuries was gone. Hand by hand with the creation and the emancipation of the Turkish nation, Kurdish ethnic identity was systematically suppressed. Suddenly, they are not Ummah brothers and sisters anymore, but "Mountain Turks" who forgot their "Turkishness" (Zeydanlioglu, 2008, p. 7). According to the Treaty of Lausanne, minority status was recognized only to non-Muslim citizens, such as Greek, Armenians and Jews (Gunter, 2008, p. 99). To the Kurdish ethnic group was not recognized any specificity in relation to the dominant Turkish population, hence, no fundamental minority rights, such as the right of official use of the Kurdish language.[4] Exactly opposite, the Kurdish language, their tradition, a specific way of life and every other form of dissimilarity were systematically suppressed during the century, with the goal of the complete assimilation of the Kurds.

Dissatisfied with treatment by the state, the Kurds during the 20s and 30s rose to rebellions several times. The best know is Sheikh Said rebellion, led by Kurdish tribal leader and quenched in blood by the Turkish armed forces.[5] Some

---

[2] Primarily, with oil and water. Nature's mercy, however, is Kurdish curse at the same time. Since Kurdish ethnic areas are resources rich, four sovereign nations have imperative of controlling those territories, which, to a great extent, make Kurdish attempts to get their own state difficult.

[3] Principles of secularism and nationalism, together with "Sevres syndrome", decisively determined the shaping of political processes in Turkey during the XX century.

[4] Good example of how valuable national unity and homogeneity were for new Turkish ruling elites are words of Ismet Ineni, Ataturk's closest associate, said after ethnic clashes and population exchange during and after World War I: "Entire Anatolia has become ethnically, religiously and spiritually homogenous, which will considerably ease the creation of united Turkish state, without national minorities" (Lalić, 1997, p. 126).

[5] There is no agreement among historians whether Sheikh Said rebellion was primarily religious or ethno-national in its nature. However, "the explicit goal of the revolt was to establish an independent Kurdish state in which Islamic principles, violated by a secular Turkey… would be respected" (Gunter, 2009, p. 179).

authors believe that Kurdish revolts from the early XX century were easily suppressed mainly due to tribalism, one of the characteristics of the Kurdish ethnos of that time, and the fact that there was no central authority which would coordinate different interests of tribal leaders (See Mella, 2005). The disunity of the Kurds, together with a military-technical superiority of the Turkish army allowed the Turkish government to suppress every Kurdish rebellion and give them a blow from which their political elites could not recover for decades. Rebellion crushes were followed by state repression towards Kurdish citizens and their rights and forced displacement of the Kurds from eastern Anatolia to the city centers in the west, where, as a minority population, they were susceptible to assimilation.

AWAKENING OF THE KURDISH NATIONALISM

The Turkish Constitution of 1961 brought more freedom on the field of political association. These rights encouraged "foundation of trade unions and student organizations which would play an important role in the Turkish politics of the 1970s" (Celik, 2012, p. 246). One of the organizations formed was a group of Kurdish revolutionaries gathered around Abdullah Ocalan, which during the 70s worked on spreading of national feelings among the Kurdish population. Reasons for the fail of the Turkish state to subsume the Kurds under the umbrella of the Turkish nation, among other factors, can be found in the exclusive nature of Turkish nationalism. In contrast to the civic form of nationalism, which ties national affiliation for citizenship and citizens' free will, ethnic formulation binds nationality to a common ancestor. Alienation of the Kurds was, therefore, induced by the fact that "'Turkishness', rather than less exclusionary categories such as territory and Islam, came to define the core of the Turkish state and citizenship" (Somer, 2004, p. 241). The Kurdish national awakening was additionally encouraged by the "economic deprivation, social injustice and physical displacement, as well as ideas of ethnic identity, all of which combined in the late 1970s to create the conditions for revolt" (McDowall, 2007, p. 404).

In 1978, Ocalan and his followers founded *the Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK). The ideological basis of the PKK, beside Kurdish nationalism oriented towards the awakening of Kurdish national feelings, was compounded of Marxist-Leninist ideas, which implied the class struggle. They had no intention of repeating mistakes of the Kurdish rebellions from the beginning of the century. Since the tribal division was still sharp, the PKK saw an enemy in Kurdish landlords and tribal leaders, who had certain interests in preserving the *status quo*. The PKK members actively participated in ideological clashes of the left and right, which were shaking the Turkish political scene during the 70s. Their early

days' activities included actions such as the organization of the strikes and street demonstrations or spreading propaganda with the goal of mobilization of the Kurds for the upcoming battle.

Turkey's 1980 coup and then the 1981 Constitution worsened the position of the Kurdish population. The constitution through some of its provisions led to limiting even speaking or writing in Kurdish (Gunter, 2008, p. 5). Following the coup, Turkish southeast where the Kurds consisted majority of the population was labeled as a threat to national unity, while "repression and assimilation of the Kurds reached its peak" (Zeydanlioglu, 2008, p. 11). Some imprisoned PKK members, arrested during the police raids in the south-east, in the forthcoming years, initiated a chain of hunger strikes and self-burnings to draw public attention to poor prison conditions and ill-treatment by the guards. Under such circumstances, the PKK, which grew into the paramilitary organization during the early years of the military junta, in 1985 started with armed attacks on Turkish security personnel.

TURKEY-KURDISH WAR

After the attacks on its security personnel intensified, the Turkish government resorted to creative solutions to cope with the security challenges in its southeast. During 1985, the government, in areas populated by the Kurds, installed "village guards", paramilitary units made of local Kurds designed for prevention and defense of the PKK attacks. In addition, in 1987 Ankara declared the state of emergency (OHAL) which merged ten regions into one super-region, with the governor at its head. During its 15-year lifetime, numerous examples of violence towards civilians were registered, especially towards individuals with connections to the PKK, which was meanwhile declared the terrorist organization by the Turkish government. Conditions created by the Gulf war provided the PKK with a capability of using the territory of Iraq Kurds (*de facto)* autonomous entity for attacking Turkish security forces and the establishment of logistics centers. In order to smash guerilla groups, The Turkish armed forces in 1992 launched cross-border operation, together with Iraq Kurdish groups rival to the PKK. In spite of heavy losses the PKK suffered, the Turks have not succeeded to eliminate their cells in northern Iraq, while after withdrawal peace among rival Kurdish groups was restored.

Side by side with armed struggle against the PKK members, the Turkish government was fighting the public opinion, suppressing and sharply punishing every attempt of expression of public sympathy or compassion with Kurdish actions. According to Article 312 of the Turkish penal code, "mere verbal or written support for Kurdish rights could lead one to be charged with 'provoking hatred or animosity between groups of different race, religion, region or social

class"" (Gunter, 2008, p. 6). All-inclusive criminalization practically led to a denial of the Kurdish problem and establishment of taboo around the Kurdish issue in public life of Turkey (Yildiz, 2012, p. 153). During Turgut Ozal's presidency, the government attempted to shift the approach for solving the Kurdish problem. Ozal broke the official taboo by using term "Kurd" and tried to initiate a more liberal approach towards dealing with the Kurdish problem, in areas such as the use of language (Noi, 2012, p. 16). President Ozal, who himself was half-Kurd, in 1993 initiated negotiations with the PKK which resulted in militants' unilateral cease-fire in March same year.

With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the collapse of communism, the ideological base of the PKK has changed, where ideals about the independent Kurdish state completely prevailed Marxist-Leninist principles and ideas about a classless society. Since the early 90s, the PKK has begun with distancing from communist ideas on behalf of ethno-national, with a struggle for Kurdish rights and freedoms as fundamental principles. Side by side with the PKK's ideological transformation, there are attempts of prominent Kurdish political figures to organize into a strong organization, capable of participating in the field of legal and institutionalized political contest in Turkey. After pro-Kurdish and leftist *People's Labor Party* was forbidden in 1993 by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, a number of its ex-members founded *the Democratic Party*, which also got disbanded the following year. Six members of the party were arrested and condemned to multiyear sentences for the promotion of Kurdish nationalism and collaboration with the PKK, while the whole case attracted the attention of the international community and pro-human-rights organizations. In 1994, lawyer Murat Bozlak founded *the People's Democracy Party,* which became a backbone of the Kurdish legal political struggle in Turkey until the Constitutional Court forbade it in 2003. However, none of these parties could reach the election threshold of 10% and enter the Turkish parliament. Consequently, their actions were limited to the local level and areas where the Kurdish population was a majority.

A liberal attitude towards solving the Kurdish issue was abandoned soon after Ozal's sudden death in April 1993. In less than a month, tens of unarmed Turkish army recruits were killed in an ambush attack. Although the PKK never took responsibility for this attack, the Turkish government launched a large-scale campaign - military in the southeast and political one against anyone who could be connected to the PKK. The conflict intensified during the 90s when thousands of people were killed, hundreds of thousands lost their homes, while Kurdish peasants were exposed to humiliating behavior, torture and careless violation of their property rights (Zeydanlioglu, 2008, p. 12). Apparently, lack of reactions of relevant international political factors encouraged Turkish ruling elites to carry on with its repressive measures oriented towards a violent and

unilateral solution of the conflict. On the other hand, the PKK during the 90s carried out a series of bomb attacks all over Turkey. Except for the limited success of inflicting damage in sudden attacks, the PKK did not have much luck in direct clashes with the Turkish armed forces in southeastern Anatolia, where they suffered heavy losses. During the 90s the Turks succeeded to marginalize the PKK as a military threat, additionally weakened by Ocalan's imprudent decision from 1995 to attack the forces of Masoud Barzani, leader of Iraq Kurdish group and rival to the PKK (Gunter, 2008, p. 6). With a goal of eliminating the PKK's cells on the territory of northern Iraq, the Turkish armed forces launched cross-border operations in 1995 and 1997, but without the success of giving the Kurds the final blow.

OCALAN'S ARREST

Ocalan, even since before the full escalation of the Turkey-Kurdish conflict, was located in Syria from where he led the rebellion. He was forced to flee when the Syrian government, under Turkey's pressure (Tanasković, 2011, p. 110), had to deny him hospitality in 1998. In February 1999, Turkey's secret service operatives located and arrested Ocalan in Kenya. Turkish authorities charged him for the death of more than 30 000 people during the 15-year conflict, which faced him with a possibility of the death penalty. First days of his imprisonment were portrayed by the world-wide Kurdish protests when angry masses attacked diplomatic missions of the states they found responsible for Ocalan's kidnapping, which they viewed as the arrest. To everyone's surprise, jailed Ocalan called for dialogue and peaceful solution: "I really love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother was Turkish… Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service" – are the first Ocalan's words after imprisonment, profusely broadcasted by the Turkish TV stations (The New York Times, 1999). On March 18, Ocalan's lawyer conveyed his message to the public: "A solution based on the unity and independence of Turkey, which would guarantee peace and real democracy and create conditions for the peaceful coexistence of all peoples in peace, is also our innermost wish" (International Action Center, 1999). Many in Turkey's ruling political circles saw this drastic change of tone only as his attempt to save his own skin and hence did not want to take it as a serious platform for a political solution of the conflict. In August 1999, Ocalan went even further and called the PKK guerrillas to withdraw their forces out of Turkey, for the sake of securing the basic preconditions for the political dialogue. However, the Turkish government rejected all of these initiatives.

Armed clashes have stopped after the PKK's withdrawal, while Ocalan's calls for peace and democracy woke up the domestic and international public. Voices that called for compromise and concessions with the Kurds were getting louder

and surprisingly were coming from the side of prominent political figures. Ocalan, on the other hand, was skillfully using publicity and gladly replying to the "imagined" interlocutors from the Turkish political establishment, simulating negotiations that way. Although the government refused to accept any talks with Ocalan and the PKK, they apparently left the communication channels opened. In the process of informal negotiations, both Ocalan and Turkey endeavored to get as much as possible out of new circumstances. Turkey rulers, as clear winners, highly valued recently achieved peace period and, in that sense, Ocalan alive was of great importance. On the other hand, potential instability which the PKK represented for the Turkish government was "the capital" by which Ocalan strived to "trade" the basic human rights for the Kurds.

Kurdish informal diplomacy was in the offensive these days – they attempted to present their problems to OSCE and other relevant international organizations and individuals, who must have found Ocalan's calls for democracy attractive. Their efforts were very significant after the Turkish court in November 1999 rejected Ocalan's complaint and confirmed June's death sentence. The European Court of Human Rights appealed to Turkey to delay the execution. Following the initiative of international courts and organizations for human rights, the execution was then put in the middle of Turkey's efforts to join the European Union (EU). The German ambassador in Turkey, Joachim Vergau, warned Ankara that Turkey would not get the EU membership candidacy on the forthcoming Helsinki Summit if Ocalan got executed (The Guardian, 1999). All coalition government parties, except the extreme rightist *The Nationalist Movement Party* (MHP), agreed to postpone Ocalan's execution until Turkey got its candidacy status. In 2002 his sentence was definitely commuted to life imprisonment. Ocalan's arrest, the decreased threat to national security and EU attractiveness, altogether affected creating a new atmosphere in the process of solving the Turkey-Kurdish conflict (Somer, 2004, p. 235). New circumstances made it possible to shift the focus of the Kurdish fight for basic human rights from the domain of the use of force to the field of legal political struggle.

"THE DEMOCRATIC OPENING" OF THE AK PARTY

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) coming to power in 2002 meant a more liberal approach to the Kurdish issue, which was one of Erdogan's pre-election promises. Because of the nature of The Copenhagen criteria and partly due to the diplomatic initiative of Kurdish organizations and lobbies, the question of Kurdish rights was taken into the middle of Turkish efforts to start with EU accession negotiations. Solving the Kurdish issue that way became the indicator of the "democraticness" and proof of the maturity of Turkish society on its route to the EU. In that sense, the government initiated several reform packages

oriented towards the harmonization of Turkish legislative with EU standards.[6] As a result, restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language were eased, so the Kurdish language could have been heard on the state-owned TV stations since 2004. In his historic speech in Diyarbakir, Erdogan admitted past mistakes and promised to Kurdish crowd that the government would resolve problems with "more democracy, more civil rights and more prosperity" (Al Jazeera, 2005). The EU recognized his efforts and Turkey's accession negotiations were initiated in October 2005. In spite of government's goodwill and symbolic concessions, key issues, which would include the Constitution change on the matters of life importance for the Kurds, have not been solved. The PKK leadership, dissatisfied with the achievements of the peaceful years, has renewed low-intensity conflicts in the southeast of the country. Since, regarding the numbers of fighters, it was not as strong as in the 90s, the PKK changed its tactic – in the new circumstances they relied primarily on the small groups of fighters and shootings from a distance or an ambush while avoiding a direct clash with the Turkish armed forces. Sporadic fighting with occasional periods of the unilateral ceasefire lasted until 2009.

In 2009 Erdogan announced a new initiative for solving the Kurdish issue, known as "the Kurdish opening" or "the democratic opening." The goal of the initiative was the promotion of Kurdish rights or as the Turkish Interior Minister said, "solving problems with an egalitarian approach through democratization" (Today.az, 2010). Erdogan could not count on the support of the biggest opposition parties: *The Republican People's Party* saw the initiative as an attack on the states indivisibility, while nationalist MHP continued with its military-based rhetoric (Yildiz, 2012, p. 156). The initiative achieved certain concessions with the Kurds, primarily those oriented towards easing of the linguistic barriers – it was allowed to use Kurdish titles for toponyms, while legal barriers for the Kurdish language and literature at universities and for speaking Kurdish during prison visits were eliminated (Gunter, 2011). However, the Constitutional Court ban of pro-Kurdish *Democratic Society Party* meant the *de facto* end of the initiative. That way, the Turkish side was left without any possible legal negotiator from the Kurdish side since the government never wanted to accept negotiations with imprisoned Ocalan.[7] In fact, it seems that Erdogan on the field of solving the

---

[6] As the AKP's ambitious foreign policy was formulated on the basis of "zero problems with neighbors" principle (Jojić, 2018, p. 63; Lazić, 2017, pp. 59-60), the new government had an additional motive to initiate the Kurdish issue resolution process.

[7] In 2003, the Constitutional Court of Turkey forbade *the People's Democracy Party,* whose place of leading Kurdish party was taken by *the Democratic People's Party* (DEHAP). In 2005 DEHAP transformed into *the Democratic Society Party,* which will lead the Kurdish political struggle until December 2009. *The Peace and Democracy Party* quickly became the strongest Kurdish party. In 2014, it merged with several other Kurdish political movements into *the People Democratic Party*

Kurdish issue never wanted an equal partner in any of the Kurdish parties or figures. The AKP did not want to accept any intermediate between the state and the Kurdish population, neither to give any Kurdish party legitimacy and exclusive rights to defend the Kurdish interests. In this way, the AKP has sought to gain and retain as more as possible votes of the Kurdish minority and thereby increase its chances for absolute victory in the elections. Instead of concretizing the democratic opening, the Turkish government, through the concept of "fraternally harmony", sought to gain the support of conservative Kurds.[8] In that sense, common features of the Turks and Kurds were promoted, such as common religion and multi-centuries history[9]. The ruling conservative AKP saw Islam as a bond between the Kurds and Turks, through which they emphasized "unity", "oneness" and "sameness", while the Kurds used Islam to highlight the "diversity", "difference" and "injustice" (Sarigil & Fazlioglu, 2013, pp. 559-562).

Dissatisfied with achieved over the past year, the PKK in 2010 officially renewed the insurgency in the southeast. Tensions grew in 2001 when inspired by "the Arab awakening" the Kurds occupied streets in the eastern Anatolia. Although "the Kurdish awakening" has never happened, protests demanding decentralization and Ocalan's freedom continued in 2012 as well, which was followed by the escalation of armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security forces. Erdogan's new initiative on winter 2012/2013 ceased the fighting. In addressing to his party members, Erdogan said that government was "once more – with ambition and patience – in an honest effort to end violence and terror" (BBC, 2013). As a response to this new initiative, the PKK guerrillas in 2013, once more, withdrew to the territory of northern Iraq.

SYRIAN CIVIL WAR IMPLICATIONS

According to Arin (2015, p. 13), "after great acclamation by the AKP and resistance from neo-fascist MHP, the Erdogan Administration used delaying tactic to postpone the process of democratization in Turkey. While the PKK insisted on the third side mediation in the peace process (Salih, 2015, p. 8), the HDP demands were nothing less than recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic minority, giving the Kurdish language official status and broad autonomy for southeastern parts of Anatolia (Arin, 2015, p. 14). The HDP co-president,

---

(HDP), which today is the dominant pro-Kurdish party and leading advocate of civic and liberal values on the Turkish political scene.

[8] The religious narrative provided the AKP with considerable support among Kurdish voters (Janković, 2013, p. 142).

[9] The desecuritization of religion, i.e. „releasing the previously restrained Islamic character of the Turkish society"(Jeftić-Šarčević & Tančić, 2012, p. 110), certainly eased this process.

Salahattin Demirtas, as a solution proposed democratic autonomy as "a governing system in which groups of people govern through their own autonomous laws" and "radical democracy" which would "build such a system, putting into practice a truly democratic understanding through concrete policies" (Demirtas, 2015, pp. 32-33). No serious progress had been made, both due to government's unwillingness to make concessions on the issues of vital importance to the Kurds and the increasingly complicated situation in Syria. Siege of the Kurdish border town of Kobani in northern Syria by the terrorists of the Islamic State (ISIL) and the passivity of Turkey during the siege, provoked frustration among the Kurds in Turkey, who expressed their protests on the streets of Turkish cities. The terrorist attack in the Turkish city of Suruc in July 2015, brought the definite end of negotiations and a two-year peace period. The Islamic state took responsibility for the attack in which more than 30 Kurds were killed. Three days later, in retaliation attack, a group of PKK supporters killed two Turkish policemen. It was good enough reason for the Turkish government to remilitarize the Kurdish question.[10] The Kurdish question, once again, became "a factor of significant internal instability and division" (Janković, 2016, p. 17). In response to increasing terrorism, the Turkish security forces in July 2015 launched massive counterterrorism operations in the southeast, including nationwide police raids against the ISIL and the PKK members and their collaborators.

The situation for the Kurds got particularly difficult after the Turkish government began with *Operation Euphrates Shield* (OES) in August 2016. Namely, the Turkish armed forces, jointly with Syrian opposition groups close to Turkey, launched the military operation in northern Syria with a goal of expelling the ISIL out of the narrow belt along the Turkey-Syrian border. Even though operation included actions against the ISIL terrorists, its main cause can be found in the disproportionate territorial expansion of Rojava, the entity under the control of Syrian Kurds. The territory covered by OES, which included cities as al-Bab, Jarabulus and Azaz, was an area through which Syrian Kurds intended to connect their compact eastern part of the entity with Afrin enclave in the far

---

[10] It is hard to believe that the death of two police officers in the attack for which the PKK never took responsibility, was the true and only reason for re-securitization of Kurdish question in Turkey. The decision was primarily determined by unexpected the HDP election success in June 2015, when they became the first pro-Kurdish party to reach to 10% threshold and enter the parliament, as well as by the situation in Syria, where Syrian Kurds, after they broke the siege of Kobani, launched an offensive against the Islamic state. After the failed coup in July 2016, pro-Kurdish parties and activists got under the additional surveillance of the Turkish government, this time even more sensitive to any potential form of conspiracy. Soon after, both of the HDP co-presidents and several prominent members and parliamentarians were arrested for keeping close ties to the PKK.

northeast of Syria. That option presented a nightmare for Ankara, concerned that the PKK would consequently gain more territory to develop its logistics network, while the Kurdish movement would gain one more valuable actor for the overall Independent Kurdistan struggle.[11] The OES successfully ended in March 2017, with the capture of al-Bab the northernmost ISIL stronghold, which definitely repelled Ankara's fears of the establishment of semi-independent Kurdish entity along complete Turkey-Syrian border. In January 2018, Turkey launched a new operation called *Olive Branch*, this time directly oriented towards Syrian Kurds and their forces stationed in the western enclave around the city of Afrin. Due to technical and numerical advantage, forces under Turkish operative command captured territory of the entire enclave in less than 70 days, making Manbij and Tell Rifaat the only cities west of the Euphrates under Kurdish control. Spreading of operations to the east was prevented by the diplomatic initiative of the United States of America and the agreement made with Turkey about the PKK's withdrawal east of the river.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

During the Ottomans period, the caliphate and Islam were the factors that decisively defined Turkey-Kurdish relations. By the limiting of the role of Islam and the establishment of the secular Republic of Turkey, the bond between the Kurds and the Turkish state was gone. The aggressive and exclusive nature of Turkish nationalism from the beginning of the XX century, as well as the traumas from the end of World War I, determined state's repressive policy towards the Kurds during the century. The bipolar structure of the international political system to a great extent eased Turkey's policy since, due to its geostrategic importance, the question of its minorities' status and rights was never raised by Turkish Western allies. After the awakening of Kurdish nationalism in the second half of XX century, the Turkey-Kurdish conflict escalated and turned into an armed struggle. During that period, the achievement of any long-term solution was impossible. The Kurdish status improved during the first decade of the 2000s when the satisfaction of the fundamental human rights for the Kurds has become the indicator of Turkey's democratization process on its path to the EU. Today, factors that decisively define Turkey-Kurdish relations and determine their conflict nature are the strengthening of the HDP and their positioning as liberal political power, the dynamics of the Syrian war and freezing of Turkey's Euro-integration process.

---

[11] Another reason for concern was the ideological and historical closeness of the PKK and *the Democratic Union Party,* the ruling party of Rojava. Also, two parties share the affiliation to the same umbrella organization, *Kurdistan Communities Union.*

The dichotomy of "the Kurdish cause" - "the Kurdish problem," that is, the opposite views that the Kurdish and Turkish political elites have about resolving the Kurdish issue, gives good evidence how distant are the stances of the two sides. For the Kurds, "the Kurdish cause" is a struggle for their historical right to rule their own fate, while "the Kurdish problem" for the Turks represents a historical obligation not to allow Sevres reprise and splitting of the state along its ethno-national lines.

It seems that the Kurdish struggle, as a rule, meant taking the ideological standpoint opposite to the dominant political mood in Turkey. During the period of radical secularism in Turkey, the Kurdish uprisings were religious in its nature. During the Cold War, when Turkey was the most important member of the eastern wing of the NATO alliance, Kurdish nationalism was influenced by Marxist-Leninist thoughts. Today, the Kurdish political movement in Turkey, which attempts to impose itself as an alternative to the conservative AKP rule, is primarily guided by liberal and civic ideas.

Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, dealing with the Kurdish issue was exclusively Turkey's internal issue, so the militaristic approach of issue resolution was in effect. During the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the Kurdish issue was placed in the context of Turkey's Euro-integration process, while the realization of the fundamental human rights for the Kurds was seen as a proof of Turkish society's maturity. Nowadays, when Turkey is more than ever distant from the Western allies, phrases like "sovereign state", "internal issue" or "counterterrorism" are the main feature of the discourse on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. While in unstable states, Iraq and Syria, the Kurds managed to achieve and increase their autonomy. In the case of the strong Turkish state, their reach is quite limited. Moreover, Turkey is today sufficiently capable and willing not only to limit Kurdish efforts domestically, but also to decisively involve into Kurdish attempts in neighboring states. Consequently, the potential reach of Kurdish movement efforts in Turkey is more limited than ever.

REFERENCES

Al Jazeera (2005, August 30). Turkish PM Addresses Kurdish question. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/08/200841015451927942.html

Arin, K. (2015). Turkey and the Kurds – From War to Reconciliation, *Center for Right-Wing Studies Working Papers,* Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3229m63b

BBC. (2013, February 04). Abdullah Ocalan: A bridge between Kurds and Turks? Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21314776

Celik, A. B. (2012). Ethnopolitical Conflict in Turkey: From the Denial of Kurds to Peaceful Co-existence? In D. Landis & R. D. Albert (Eds.), *Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives* (pp. 241-260). New York: Springer.

Demirtas, S. (2015). The Middle East, the Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey, and Radical Democracy. *Turkish Policy Quarterly,* Winter 2015, 27-33.

Gunter, M. M. (2008). *The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gunter, M. M. (2009). *The A to Z of the Kurds.* Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Gunter, M. M. (2011). Kurdish nationalism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. *Foreign Policy,* Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/08/kurdish-nationalism-in-the-aftermath-of-the-arab-spring/

International Action Center. (1999). Statement From Abdullah Ocalan – March 18, 1999. Retrieved from http://iacenter.org/archive1999/ocaln399.htm

Janković, S. (2013). Turska na Bliskom istoku [Turkey in the Middle East]. In M. Djurković & A. Raković (eds.), *Turska: regionalna sila [Turkey: regional force]* (pp. 137-158). Beograd: Institut za evropske studije.

Janković, S. (2016). Vectors of Turkish Foreign Policy: What Remains of the Strategy for 2023? *International Problems,* 68 (1), 7-23.

Jeftić-Šarčević, N. & Tančić, D. (2012). New Projections of the Turkish Politics in XXI century (Turkey and the European Union). *Review of International Affairs*, 63 (1146), 106-118.

Jojić, S. (2018). Snaženje pozicije Turske na Zapadnom Balkanu: uzroci i posledice [Strengthening of Turkey in the Western Balkans: causes and consequences]. *Međunarodna politika,* 69 (1170), 59-77.

Lalić, V. (1997). *Turska bez Ataturka [Turkey without Ataturk].* Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Lazić, V. (2017). Politički, ekonomski i kulturni aspekti prisustva Turske u BiH od 2003. godine [Political, economic and cultural aspects of Turkey's presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2003]. *Međunarodna politika,* 68 (1166/1167), 56-76.

McDowall, D. (2007). *A Modern History of the Kurds.* London: I.B. Tauris.

Mella, J. (2005). *Kurdistan and the Kurds: A Divided Homeland and a Nation without State.* London: Western Kurdistan Association Publications.

Noi, A. U. (2012). The Arab Spring, It's Effects on the Kurds, and the Approaches of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq on the Kurdish Issue. *Middle East Review of International Affairs,* 16 (2), 15-29.

Salih, C. (2015). Turkey, the Kurds and the Fight Against Islamic State. *European Council on Foreign Relations.* Retrieved from https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/turkey_the_kurds_and_the_fight_against_islamic_state4043

Sarigil, Z., Fazlioglu, O. (2013). Religion and ethno-nationalism: Turkey's Kurdish issue. *Nations and Nationalism,* 19 (3), 551-571.

Somer, M. (2004). Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications. *Middle East Journal,* 58 (2), 236-253.

Tanasković, D. (2011). *Neoosmanizam: Doktrina i spoljnopolitička praksa.* Beograd: Službeni glasnik

The Guardian (1999, November 25). Ocalan's Death Sentence Upheld. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/nov/25/kurds.marktran

The New York Times (1999, February 21). Turks vs. Kurds: Turning Point? Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/21/world/turks-vs-kurds-turning-point.html

Today.az (2010, January 09). Turkey's govt to send bills on Kurdish opening to Parliament. Retrieved from http://www.today.az/news/regions/59156.html

Yildiz, K. (2012). Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Pathways to Progress. *Insight Turkey,* 14 (4), 151-173.

Zeydanlioglu, W. (2008). "The White Turkish Man's Burden": Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey. *Cambridge Scholars Publishing,* pp. 1-17, Accessed November 01, 2018 from https://www.academia.edu/2204693/_The_White_Turkish_Man_s_Burden_Orientalism_Kemalism_and_the_Kurds_in_Turkey

TURSKO-KURDSKI KONFLIKT:
GENEZA SUKOBA I NJEGOV POLITIČKI KONTEKST

Apstrakt: Kurdsko pitanje, odnosno težnja najvećeg naroda na svetu bez svoje države za osamostaljenjem, predmet je proučavanja sa najrazličitijih aspekata. Ovaj rad bavi se objašnjavanjem „kurdskog pitanja" u Turskoj, sa istorijskog i spoljnopolitičkog aspekta, kao i genezom i transformacijom tursko-kurdskog konflikata. Takođe, autor je pokušao da identifikuje ključne domaće i međunarodne činioce koji su tokom vremena oblikovali tursko-kurdski odnos. Nastojanja turskih Kurda su, kao po pravilu, podrazumevala zauzimanje suprotnog ideološkog stanovišta u odnosu na vladajuće raspoloženje u Turskoj. Tokom dvadesetog veka, u vreme sekularne i pro-zapadne orijentacije turske politike, kurdski oslobodilački pokret je, najpre, bio obojen religioznim bojama, da bi tokom hladnog rata poprimio marksističko-lenjiističke obrise. To ju ujedno i period kada je kurdsko pitanje predstavljalo isključivo unutrašnje pitanje

Turske. Do interesovanje međunarodne javnosti za problem Kurda u Turskoj dolazi tokom devedesetih godina, otkada kurdski politički pokreti uspotavljaju temelje za svoju ideološku transformaciju u građansko-liberalne pokrete. Danas, tursko-kurdski konflikt je primarno određen dinamikom sirijskog građanskog rata, gde je došlo do konsolidacije kurdskog faktora.

BOOK REVIEW

CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISCOURSE: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES

Chow, Pok Yin S. (Pok Yin Stephenson) (2018). *Cultural rights in international law and discourse: contemporary challenges and interdisciplinary perspectives*. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff. pp. 302.

Cultural rights are formally recognized and confirmed in numerous international declarations, covenants and resolutions, however, it seems that this area of human rights still suffers from ambiguity. In this book, the author highlighted the peculiar relationship between culture and human rights in the international legal order, successfully revealing misconceptions and conundrums surrounding the heterogeneous concept of 'culture.'

This book raises several challenging 'cultural questions' to be answered by the state and the communities involved, for instance - what are we trying to protect? Having in mind that culture represents a dynamical and fluid process rather than a strictly normative set of values and beliefs, the author rightly notes the danger of protecting the mere notion of culture, rather than cultural rights of individuals. Thus, the author is positioning individuals as the primary subjects of protection, emphasizing that an individual's access to culture is an indispensable part of his/hers personal development.

While exploring the progressive development of cultural rights, the author analyses relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as two important instruments in establishing and recognizing cultural rights, along with the subsequent instruments and jurisprudence. Stephenson thoroughly interprets the work of treaty bodies and their 'quasi-judicial' role, observing that the treaty bodies in order to protect cultural rights often exceed their monitoring role. Hence, their decisions receive *de facto* recognition, although are not binding *per se*.

Following the conflict between women's rights and cultural rights, he indicates the necessary limitations of cultural rights, including negative practices attributed to customs and traditions which infringe upon other

human rights. In this respect, he systematically examines whether law properly addresses the position of women in the context of cultural practices, as well as the law's ability to address the nuances and contradictions of culture and cultural rights in general.

Furthermore, the author demonstrates that minority rights although different from cultural rights are also strongly interdependent and indivisible. In addition, culture is not strictly separate from religion – those two entities mutually influence each other in the context of one's identity formation. The author finds that it is the strong interconnection between culture and other various concepts and influences that makes it difficult to grasp and adequately promote cultural rights.

The author has shown how contemporary anthropological notion of culture has substantially shaped cultural rights, and in which manner this extensive concept of culture could be specifically applied in the work of the treaty bodies. In this respect, Stephenson suggests the concept of intracategorical intersectionality, through which the unique situation of each individual can be considered in order to understand the paradoxes and dilemmas associated with an individual's practice of culture.

The ability to comprehend and to transcend various aspects of human rights - law, politics, culture, anthropology, sociology, religion, philosophy – hence, to offer a profound interdisciplinary insight into the mutable area of culture and cultural rights is what distinguishes this book. It offers an excellent opportunity, especially for the states and treaty bodies, to reflect on how contemporary anthropological findings should be used as a heuristic device in order to understand and protect the dynamic and constantly evolving area of cultural rights.

Finally, having in mind its eclectic approach and its contribution to the complexity of the intellectual debate on cultural rights and its limitations, this book would be of great benefit to a wide range of public – from legal scholars, international law practitioners, and law students, to anthropologists, sociologists, and decision-makers in the field of culture.

Vanja PAVIĆEVIĆ

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

Formatting & Style

Paper length:

Research papers should not exceed 6000 words including abstracts, references,acknowledgements and footnotes.

Title page:

A separate title page should be attached. This will be detached during the refereeing stage to maintain the anonymity of the author. The title page should include: The name(s) of the author(s); a concise and informative title; the affiliation(s) and address (es) of the author(s); the e-mail address of the author (s); the author(s) academic biography, up to 150 words, in the third persons. If the first author is not the correspondingauthor, this should be clearly indicated.

Abstract:

Please, provide an abstract of 100 to 250 words in English. The abstract should not contain any undefined abbreviations or unspecified references. Please, provide 5 to 10 keywords which can be used for indexing purposes.

Formatting:

The manuscript text file should be submitted in Word or other similar format. Use a normal, plain font (12-point Times New Roman) for text, line spacing 1 (single), justified. The title of the paper should be written in capital letters, bold, font size 14. Page setup margins should be 2.5 cm (top, bottom, left, right), paper size A4. Use italics for emphasis. Use the automatic page numbering function to number the pages. Abbreviations should be defined at first mention and used consistently thereafter.

Paper body:

An article may be divided into three levels of sub-divisions. Level one section should be introduced by a heading printed in capital letters, bold, centered. Level two sections should be introduced by a heading printed with the initial capital letter, centered. Level three sections should be introduced by a heading printedin Italic with the initial capital letter, centered. Paragraphs should be indented.

Quotations:

Any quotation needs to be followed by reference including page number. Use single quotation marks, except where 'a quotation is "within" a quotation'.

Permissions:

Authors wishing to include figures, tables, or text passages that have already been published elsewhere are required to obtain permission from the copyright owner(s) for both the print and online format and to include evidence that such permission has been granted when submitting their papers. Any material received without such evidence will be assumed to originate from the authors.

Footnotes:

Use a normal, plain font (10-point Times New Roman). Footnotes can be used to give additional information. They should not consist solely of a reference citation, and they should never include the bibliographic details of a reference. Footnotes to the text are numbered consecutively; those to tables should be indicated by superscript lower-case letters (or asterisks for significance values and other statistical data). Footnotes to the title or the authors of the article are not given reference symbols.

Acknowledgments:

Acknowledgments of people, grants, funds, etc. should be placed in footnote on the first page. The names of funding organizations should be written in full.

Title, abstract and key words in Serbian:

Title, abstract and key words in Serbian language should be included at the bottom of the text, after the reference list.

References

Citations in text

Follow the author-date method of in-text citation. This means that the author's last name and the year of publication for the source should appear in the text. For legal documents citations should be put in footnotes and cited according to the reference list instructions (see below).

Example:

(Dimitrijević, 2003, p. 33).

When referring to the several works by the same author, provide all the years of publication chronologically after the author's name.

Example:

(Dimitrijević, 2003, 2007).

If there are several works by the same author published in the same year, provide further specification using letters (a, b, c, ...) after the year of publication.

Example:

(Radakovic, 2001a, p. 101)

When referring to the several works by different authors, provide the authors' names in brackets following the alphabetical order, separating authors by semi/colon.

Example:

(Miljus, 2009; Novičić, 2006; Vučić, 2011, Young, 1999).

List of references

The list of references should only include works that are cited in the text and that have been published or accepted for publication. The references should be listed in accordance with the APA Style. (See: http://www.apastyle.org/). Reference list entries should be alphabetized by the last names of the first author of each work. The works by the same author should be listed chronologically from the most to the least recent ones. All references should be in original language. If the reference is not in English translate title of the reference - in square brackets.

Book citation

Citing a book in print:

Author, A.A..(Year of Publication).*Title of work*. Publisher City, State: Publisher.

RIA format example:

Finney, J. (1970). *Time and again*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Citing an e-book from an e-reader:

E-book is short for "electronic book." It is a digital version of a book that can be read on a computer, e-reader (Kindle, Nook, etc.), or other electronic device.

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A..(Year of Publication).*Title of work* [E-Reader Version]. Retrieved from http://xxxx or doi:xxxx

RIA format example:

Eggers, D. (2008). *The circle* [Kindle Version]. Retrieved from http://www.amazon.com/

Citing a book found in a database:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A..(Year of Publication).*Title of work*. Retrieved from http://xxxx or doi:xxxx

RIA format example:

Sayre, Rebecca K., Devercelli, A.E., Neuman, M.J., &Wodon, Q. (2015). *Investment in early childhood development: Review of the world bank's recent experience.* doi: 10.1596/978-1-4648-0403-8

Book chapters, Articles in Thematic collections of papers,
Published Conference proceedings citations

Citing a chapter in print:

RIA format structure:

Last, F. M. (Year Published). Title of chapter In F. M.Last Editor (Ed.), *Title of book/anthology* (pp. Pages). Publisher City, State: Publisher.

RIA format example:

Serviss, G. P. (1911). A trip of terror.*In A Columbus of space* (pp. 17-32). New York, NY: Appleton.
Hemingway, E. (1999). The killers. In J. Updike & K. Kenison (Eds.), *The best American short stories of the century* (pp.78-80). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

How to Cite an Introduction, Preface, Foreword,
or Afterword in APA Format:

RIA format structure:

Last, F. M. (Year Published). Section title [Section Type]. In F. M. Last & F. M. Last (Eds.),*Book/anthology* (pp. Pages). City, State: Publisher.

RIA format example:

Sanders, S. R. (2007).[Introduction]. In L. Williford& M. Martone (Eds.), *Touchstone anthology of contemporary creative nonfiction: Work from 1970 to present* (pp. 148-151). New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Masur, L. P. (2011). Preface. In The Civil War: *A concise history* (pp. Iv-Xii). Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Journal article citation

Citing a journal article in print:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A..(Publication Year).Article title.*Periodical Title*, Volume(Issue), pp.-pp.

RIA format example:

Nevin, A. (1990). The changing of teacher education special education. Teacher Education and Special Education: *The Journal of the Teacher Education Division of the Council for Exceptional Children*, 13(3-4), 147-148.

Citing a journal article found online:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A..(Publication Year).Article title.*Periodical Title*, Volume(Issue), pp.-pp. doi:XX.XXXXX or Retrieved from journal URL

RIA format structure:

Jameson, J. (2013). E-Leadership in higher education: The fifth "age" of educational technology research. *British Journal of Educational Technology*, 44(6), 889-915. doi: 10.1111/bjet.12103

Magazine citation

Author, A.A.. (Year, month of Publication).Article title.*Magazine Title*, Volume(Issue), pp.-pp.

RIA format structure:

Tumulty, K. (2006, April). Should they stay or should they go? *Time*, 167(15), 3-40.
Citing a magazine article found online

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A.. (Year, Month of Publication). Article title. *Magazine Title*, Volume(Issue), Retrieved from http://xxxx

RIA format structure:

Tumulty, K. (2006, April). Should they stay or should they go? *Time,* 167(15) Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1179361,00.html

Newspaper citation

Citing a newspaper article in print:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A.. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Article title.*Magazine Title*, pp. xx-xx.

RIA format structure:

Rosenberg, G. (1997, March 31). Electronic discovery proves an effective legal weapon.*The New York Times*, p. D5.

Citing a newspaper article found online:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A.. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Article title.*Newspaper Title*, Retrieved from newspaper homepage URL

RIA format structure:

Rosenberg, G. (1997, March 31). Electronic discovery proves an effective legal weapon.*The New York Times*, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com

Website citation

Citing a general website article with an author:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A.. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Article title. Retrieved from URL

RIA format structure:

Simmons, B. (2015, January 9). The tale of two Flaccos. Retrieved from http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-tale-of-two-flaccos/

Citing a general website article without an author:

RIA format structure:

Article title. (Year, Month Date of Publication). Retrieved from URL

RIA format structure:

Teen posed as doctor at West Palm Beach hospital: police. (2015, January 16). Retrieved from http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Teen-Posed-as-Doctor-at-West-Palm-Beach-Hospital-Police-288810831.html

Lecture citation

Citing online lecture notes or presentation slides:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A..(Publication Year). Name or title of lecture [file format]. Retrieved from URL

RIA format structure:

Saito, T. (2012). Technology and me: A personal timeline of educational technology [Powerpoint slides]. Retrieved from http://www.slideshare.net/Bclari25/educational-technology-ppt

Encyclopedia citation

Citing an encyclopedia entry in print:

RIA format structure:

Author, A.A..(Publication Year).Entry title. In *Encyclopedia title*, (Vol. XX, pp. XX).City, State of publication: Publisher.

RIA format structure:

Kammen, C., & Wilson, A.H. (2012). Monuments.In*Encyclopedia of local history*. (pp. 363-364) Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.

Institutions as authors and legal documents

Citing an institution document:

RIA format structure:

World Bank.(2010). World development report—Development and climate change.The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA.

United Nations. (2006, November 9). Delivering as one. Report of the Secretary-General's HighLevel Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, New York.

EC. (2002). Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), Official Journal of the European Communities L201 37–47, 31 July (European Commission, Brussels).

Citing a court decision:

Court decisions should be referenced as fully as possible (type and number of the decision, date of adoption, publication in which it was published).

RIA format structure:

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.14, 181 (June27)(separate opinion of Judge Ago).

Citing a law:

RIA format structure:

Name of the law, Official Publication where the law was published. Number (Year).

RIA format structure:

Zakon o spoljnim poslovima, Službeni glasnik RS.Br. 116 (2007).

EDITORIAL POLICY

The journal *The Review of International Affairs* is dedicated to international legal, economic, political and security relations. Established in 1950 as the first Yugoslav scholarly journal in its field, The Review of International Affairs is one of the oldest and best-known periodicals in the Balkans that cover research in International Relations.

The journal *The Review of International Affairs* publishes original papers and review articles. The journal also publishes lectures given by foreign ambassadors at the IIPE's Ambassadorial Forum, as well as a substantial book review section that identifies the most salient work of both emerging and enduring scholars of International Studies.

The journal is published quarterly in English with abstracts both in English and Serbian. In Serbia, readers are the diplomatic representatives of foreign countries, foreign news agencies, universities, research institutions, and prominent political, academic, economic and cultural figures. Abroad, readers are the diplomatic representatives of Serbia, policy-makers at the national and international levels, chambers of commerce, companies, universities, research institutes etc. The journal is distributed in more than 150 countries.

EDITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The Editor and the Editorial Staff are responsible for deciding which articles submitted to *The Review of International Affairs* will be published. They are guided by the Editorial Policy and constrained by legal requirements in force regarding libel, copyright infringement and plagiarism.

The Editor reserves the right to decide not to publish submitted manuscripts in case it is found that they do not meet relevant standards concerning the content and formal aspects. The Editorial Staff will inform the authors whether the manuscript is accepted for publication within a reasonable period from the date of the manuscript submission.

The Editor and the Editorial Staff must hold no conflict of interest with regard to the articles they consider for publication.

The Editor and the Editorial Staff shall evaluate manuscripts for their intellectual content free from any racial, gender, sexual, religious, ethnic, or political bias.

The Editor and the Editorial Staff must not use unpublished materials disclosed in submitted manuscripts without the express written consent of the authors. The information and ideas presented in submitted manuscripts shall be kept confidential and must not be used for personal gain.

The Editor and the Editorial Staff shall take all reasonable measures to ensure that the reviewers remain anonymous to the authors before, during and after the evaluation process and the authors remain anonymous to reviewers until the end of the review procedure.

AUTHORS' RESPONSIBILITIES

The authors warrant that their manuscript is their original work, that it has not been published before and is not under consideration for publication elsewhere. Parallel submission of the same paper to another journal constitutes a misconduct and eliminates the manuscript from consideration by *The Review of International Affairs*. The authors also warrant that the manuscript is not and will not be published elsewhere in any language without the consent of the copyright holder.

In case a submitted manuscript is a result of a research project, or its previous version has been presented at a conference in the form of an oral presentation (under the same or similar title), detailed information about the project, the conference, etc. shall be provided in the footnote at the beginning of the text. A paper that has already been published in another journal cannot be reprinted in *The Review of International Affairs*.

It is the responsibility of each author to ensure that papers submitted are written with ethical standards in mind. The authors affirm that the article contains no unfounded or unlawful statements and does not violate the rights of third parties. The Publisher will not be held legally responsible should there be any claims for compensation.

After the manuscript acceptance, before the publishing, the authors are obliged to pay an author's fee of 3000 dinars (25 EUR for authors from abroad).

Reporting standards

A submitted manuscript should contain sufficient details and references to permit reviewers and, subsequently, readers verify the claims presented in it. The deliberate presentation of false claims is a violation of ethical standards. Books and conference reviews should be accurate and they should present an objective perspective.

The authors are exclusively responsible for the contents of their submissions and must make sure that they have permission from all involved parties to make the data public.

The authors wishing to include figures, tables or other materials that have already been published elsewhere are required to obtain permission from the copyright holder(s). Any material received without such evidence will be assumed to originate from the authors.

Authorship

The authors must make sure that only the persons who have contributed significantly to the content of the manuscript are listed as their authors.

If persons other than the authors were involved in important aspects of the research project and the preparation of the manuscript, their contribution should be acknowledged in a footnote or the Acknowledgments section.

Acknowledgment of Sources

The authors are required to properly cite sources that have significantly influenced their research and their manuscript. Information received in a private conversation or correspondence with third parties, in reviewing project applications, manuscripts and similar materials, must not be used without the express written consent of the information source.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism, where someone assumes another's ideas, words, or other creative expressions as one's own, is a clear violation of scientific ethics. Plagiarism may also involve a violation of copyright law, punishable by legal action.

Plagiarism includes the following:

Word for word, or almost word for word copying, or purposely paraphrasing portions of another author's work without clearly indicating the source or marking the copied fragment (for example, using quotation marks);

Copying equations, figures or tables from someone else's paper without properly citing the source and/or without permission from the original author or the copyright holder.

Any paper which shows obvious signs of plagiarism will be automatically rejected and the authors will be permanently banned from publishing in the journal.

In case plagiarism is discovered in a paper that has already been published by the journal, it will be retracted in accordance with the procedure described below under *Retraction policy*, and the authors will *be permanently banned from publishing in the journal.*

Conflict of interest

The authors should disclose in their manuscript any financial or other substantive conflict of interest that might have influenced the presented results or their interpretation.

Fundamental errors in published works

When an author discovers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published work, it is the author's obligation to promptly notify the journal Editor or publisher and cooperate with the Editor to retract or correct the paper.

By submitting a manuscript, the authors agree to abide by the *Review of International Affairs*'s Editorial Policies.

REVIEWERS' RESPONSIBILITIES

The reviewers are required to provide written, competent and unbiased feedback in a timely manner on the scholarly merits and the scientific value of the manuscript.

The reviewers assess manuscript for the compliance with the profile of the journal, the relevance of the investigated topic and applied methods, the originality and scientific relevance of information presented in the manuscript, the presentation style and scholarly apparatus.

The reviewers should alert the Editor to any well-founded suspicions or the knowledge of possible violations of ethical standards by the authors. The reviewers should recognize relevant published works that have not been cited by the authors and alert the Editor to substantial similarities between a reviewed manuscript and any manuscript published or under consideration for publication elsewhere, in the event they are aware of such. The reviewers should also alert the Editor to a parallel submission of the same paper to another journal, in the event they are aware of such.

The reviewers must not have the conflict of interest with respect to the research, the authors and/or the funding sources for the research. If such conflicts exist, the reviewers must report them to the Editor without delay.

Any selected referee who feels unqualified to review the research reported in a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the Editor without delay.

Reviews must be conducted objectively. Personal criticism of the author is inappropriate. The reviewers should express their views clearly with supporting arguments.

Any manuscripts received for review must be treated as a confidential document. The reviewers must not use unpublished materials disclosed in submitted manuscripts without the express written consent of the authors. The information and ideas presented in submitted manuscripts shall be kept confidential and must not be used for personal gain.

REVIEW PROCEDURE

The submitted manuscripts are subject to a peer review process. The purpose of peer review is to assists the Editor-in-Chief in making editorial decisions and through the editorial communications with the author it may also assist the author in improving the paper. The review is anonymous and conducted by the reviewers.

Reviews must be finished in the period of 30 days after the date on which the manuscript was received by the reviewers.

The choice of the reviewers is at the Editors' discretion. The reviewers must be knowledgeable about the subject area of the manuscript; they must not be from the authors' own institution and they should not have recent joint publications with any of the authors.

In the main review phase, the Editor sends submitted papers to two reviewers, both experts in the field. The reviewers' evaluation form contains a checklist in order to help referees cover all aspects that can decide the fate of a submission. In the final section of the evaluation form, the reviewers must include observations and suggestions aimed at improving the submitted manuscript; these are sent to the authors, without the names of the reviewers.

All of the reviewers of a paper act independently and they are not aware of each other's identities. If the decisions of the two reviewers are not the same (accept/reject), the Editor may assign additional reviewers.

During the review process, the Editor may require the authors to provide additional information (including raw data) if they are necessary for the evaluation of the scholarly

merit of the manuscript. These materials shall be kept confidential and must not be used for personal gain.

The Editorial team shall ensure reasonable quality control for the reviews. With respect to the reviewers whose reviews are convincingly questioned by the authors, special attention will be paid to ensure that the reviews are objective and high in academic standard. When there is any doubt with regard to the objectivity of the reviews or the quality of the review, additional reviewers will be assigned.

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

Anyone may inform the editors and/or Editorial Staff at any time of suspected unethical behaviour or any type of misconduct by giving the necessary information/evidence to start an investigation.

Investigation

Editor-in-Chief will consult with the Editorial Board on decisions regarding the initiation of an investigation.

During an investigation, any evidence should be treated as strictly confidential and only made available to those strictly involved in investigating.

The accused will always be given the chance to respond to any charges made against them.

The Editor-in-Chief, in consultation with the Editorial Board, and, when appropriate, further consultation with a small group of experts should make any decision regarding the course of action to be taken using the evidence available. The possible outcomes are as follows (these can be used separately or jointly):

Publication of a formal announcement or editorial describing the misconduct.

Informing the author's (or reviewer's) head of department or employer of any misconduct by means of a formal letter.

The formal, announced retraction of publications from the journal in accordance with the Retraction Policy (see below).

A ban on submissions from an individual for a defined period.

Referring a case to a professional organization or legal authority for further investigation and action.

When dealing with unethical behaviour, the Editorial Staff will rely on the guidelines and recommendations provided by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE): http://publicationethics.org/resources/.

RETRACTION POLICY

Legal limitations of the publisher, copyright holder or author(s), infringements of professional ethical codes, such as multiple submissions, bogus claims of authorship,

plagiarism, fraudulent use of data or any major misconduct require retraction of an article. Occasionally a retraction can be used to correct errors in submission or publication. The main reason for withdrawal or retraction is to correct the mistake while preserving the integrity of science; it is not to punish the author.

Standards for dealing with retractions have been developed by a number of library and scholarly bodies, and this practice has been adopted for an article retraction by *The Review of International Affairs*: in the electronic version of the retraction note, a link is made to the original article. In the electronic version of the original article, a link is made to the retraction note where it is clearly stated that the article has been retracted. The original article is retained unchanged, save for a watermark on the PDF indicating on each page that it is "retracted."

COPYRIGHT

DISCLAIMER

Selected publications

JOURNALS:

The Review of International Affairs
A journal of international relations
Published quarterly in English

Međunarodna politika
A journal of international relations
Published quarterly in Serbian

Međunarodni problemi
International problems
A scholarly journal in Serbian and English
Published quarterly

Evropsko zakonodavstvo
A scholarly journal for European Union law
Published quarterly in Serbian

BOOKS:

Upotreba sile u međunarodnim odnosima, Žaklina Novičić (ur.), broširano, 2018, 286 str.

Dragoljub Todić, *Ujedinjene nacije, međunarodni ugovori i životna sredina*, broširano, 2018, 372 str.

Dobrica D. Vesić, *Konstruktivna i kreativna destrukcija – u ekonomiji i menadžmentu*, tvrd povez, 2018, 222 str.

Budućnost saradnje Kine i Srbije, Ivona Lađevac (ur.), broširano, 2018, 150 str.

Dragan Petrović, *Kraljevina SHS i Sovjetska Rusija (SSSR) 1918–1929*, tvrd povez, 2018, 402 str.

Srbija i svet u 2017. godini, Dušan Proroković, Vladimir Trapara (ur.), broširano, 2018, 244 str.

Ivana Božić Miljković, *Ekonomije balkanskih zemalja na početku XXI veka*, broširano, 2018, 204 str.

Kosovo: sui generis or precedent in international relations, Dušan Proroković (ur.), tvrd povez, 2018, 344 str.

Initiatives of the 'New Silk Road' – Achievements and Challenges, Duško Dimitrijević, Huang Ping (ur.), broširano, 2017, 530 str.

SPAJAJUĆI ISTOK I ZAPAD – Spomenica profesora Predraga Simića, Jasminka Simić (prir.), tvrd povez, 2017, 624 str.

Međunarodno javno pravo i međunarodni odnosi – BIBLIOGRAFIJA 1834–2016., Đorđe Lopičić, Jelena Lopičić Jančić, (prir.), tvrd povez, 2017, 912 str.

Dragan Petrović, *Kraljevina Jugoslavija i SSSR 1935–1941*, broširano, 2017, 496 str.

Balkanska migrantska ruta: između politike prava i bezbednosti, Slobodan Janković, Zoran Pavlović, Dragana Dabić (ur.), broširano, 2017, 406 str.

Ana Pantelić, *Suzbijanje siromaštva i zemljama u razvoju*, tvrd povez, 2017, 396 str.

Aleksandar Jazić, *Vanredne situacije i savremeni trendovi razvoja sistema zaštita*, broširano, 2017, 128 str.

Ivan Dujić, *Novi svet i Evropa: od početka procesa globalizacije do globalne finansijske i migracione krize*, broširano, 2017, 322 str.

Vladimir Trapara, *Vreme „resetovanja": Odnosi Rusije i Sjedinjenih Država u periodu od 2009. do 2012. godine,* broširano, 2017, 414 str.

Social and Economic Problems and Challenges in Contemporary World, Procedings, Branislav Đorđević, Taro Tsukimura and Ivona Lađevac (eds.), broširano, 2017, 264 str.

Ljubomir Šubara, Milenko Dželetović, *Evro i monetarna integracija Evrope*, broširano, 2017, 436 str.

Danube and the New Silk Road, Procedings, Duško Dimitrijević (ed.), broširano, 2016, 560 str.

Savremeni međunarodni ekonomski i pravni poredak, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić (ur.), broširano, 2016, 330 str.

Dobrica D. Vesić, *Preduzetništvo i preduzetnički menadžment*, tvrd povez, 2016, 328 str.

Uticaj vojne neutralnosti Srbije na bezbednost i stabilnost u Evropi, Srđan Korać (ur.), broširano, 2016, 284 str.

Srbija i Evropska unija – pripreme za pregovore o poglavljima 23 i 24, Aleksandar Jazić, Slobodan Janković, Dragan Đukanović (ur.), broširano, 2016, 206 str.