SPECIAL ISSUE

ON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Branislav Radeljić
ON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Emma De Angelis
THE EU’S HISTORICAL NARRATIVE AND ENLARGEMENT TO EASTERN EUROPE

Nick Stevenson
EUROPEAN FREEDOM AND EUROPEAN MEMORY

Bo Stråth
THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN IDENTITY AS AN ESCAPE FORWARD

Dora Kostakopoulou
POLITICAL ALCHEMIES, IDENTITY GAMES AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT INSTABILITY

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Editors’ note

This special thematic issue of the Review of International Affairs addresses a highly debatable concept of European identity. Numerous discussions have pointed out that the advocacy and applicability of ‘European identity’ can vary and, more importantly, often depend on given circumstances. This is why questions such as ‘What is Europe?’ and ‘Is a European identity possible?’ cannot provide clear-cut answers. In fact, a geographical definition and official statements are not enough, meaning that, apart from them, we need to take into consideration various other factors such as the political climate across the board, the economic performance of the participating members and, of course, the social willingness that will define how far the pursuit of the project can advance.

The five contributions to this special issue approach the concept of European identity from rather different perspectives. For Branislav Radeljić, such a concept is risky, not only because it lacks proper definition that can make its applicability more problematic, but also because it could lead to the establishment of additional boundaries, visible and less so among the present European polity. In his analysis, Radeljić insists on the relevance of solidarity, (in)tolerance, integration and he emphasizes that each of these can affect the European project negatively.

Emma De Angelis looks at European Parliamentary debates and their role in constructing identity for the European Union. This is framed by a discussion of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ of European integration, who espoused the idea of uniting Europe based on Western European values. Although the concept of European identity was officially launched during the then European Community’s summit in Copenhagen in 1973, she notes that its relevance gained full recognition only with the debates about the Union’s Eastern enlargement, a region that did not share Western historical identity. By saying so, De Angelis indicates that such an experience would be even more complex in the case of Turkey.

Nick Stevenson offers an historical and sociological reading of the present European economic crisis. In reviewing some of the most prominent scholarly work in the field, he offers fresh ideas about European cultural identity,
democracy and human rights in the European context. He sets this against a background of globalization seen here as a justification for the willful implementation of a set of neoliberal policies across the European continent. After such a shift in the political-economic terrain, and in light of the current crisis, Stevenson seeks to offer alternative ways forward.

For Bo Stråth, it is important to acknowledge that the concept of European identity was a product of a specific historical situation and in this respect, such an identity provided Europe with normative rather than a territorial dimension. However, the 2008 financial crisis and the consequent euro crisis have engendered debates that are more concerned with nationalism and European mechanisms in order to respond to the crises, leaving aside the concept of European identity. Indeed, in light of various European crises, Stråth argues that the political and economic realities tend to supersede the politics of identity.

Finally, Dora Kostakopoulou questions whether it is even possible to talk about a European identity, given the Eurozone crisis. Before doing so, she considers the dichotomy of national identities and European identity and the ways in which the European Union is conceptualized and the types of European identity that emerge. Still given the current oscillations and lack of clear perspectives with regard to the concept of European identity, Kostakopoulou is skeptical over the question of what remains of such an identity.
ABSTRACT

This article elaborates on the ideas surrounding the concept of European identity by looking both at the official documents of the European Union and academic literature on the topic. The analysis offered points out that the concept itself is highly questionable, not only because it does not offer a clear definition or limitations of such an identity and thus challenges further theorizing and applicability in practice, but also since it runs the risk of alienating the constituent parties and the peoples of the present European polity even further.

Key words: European Union, European identity, Europeans, non-Europeans.

Introduction

Questions such as ‘What is Europe?’, ‘Who is European and who is not?’, and ‘Is a European identity possible?’ are heard regularly. Nowadays, the term ‘Europe’ is often used as a synonym for the European Union, thus to describe the process of European integration, a project that initially characterized the post-Second World War progress in Western Europe. The six signatories of the 1957 Treaty of Rome agreed to work together towards a better future, primarily focusing on economic advancement and political stability. In regard to the

1 Branislav Radeljić, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, University of East London, UK. E-mail: B.Radeljic@uel.ac.uk.
founding fathers, they seemed to be convinced about their European project. Later, in his memoirs, Jean Monnet, a chief architect of European unity, noted that “the essential thing [was] to hold fast to the few fixed principles that [had] guided us since the beginning: gradually to create among Europeans the broadest common interest, served by common democratic institutions.”

From an academic viewpoint, the European project is often, quite rightly, viewed as a big work-in-progress, yet some question the very sustainability of the project. One author described it as “an animal in motion,” without “fixed” destination and “not something quite separate from and independent of the states that set it up.” While seeing the Community’s evolution as a puzzling business and “a strange creature, a kind of hybrid,” the author underlined: “The world of the Community is full of paradox and irony.”

However, over a couple of decades the European project advanced to the extent that many peripheral countries, not directly involved in the union, wished to apply for membership of the European Community. At the same time, the Community was continuously faced with growing numbers of immigrants, from both and outside of Europe. The gastarbeiter (as the Germans called anyone coming to work in their country, including citizens of other EC Member States but, of course, who were subjected to different regulations) or the extracomunitari (as the Italians called anyone coming from outside of the EC), were allowed to come and reside in various EC states on a temporary basis, and many decided to remain permanently in their host country. This aspect became startlingly apparent during the 1973 oil crisis when many European governments offered to subsidize immigrants to return to their homelands, as there was no actual need for them. This policy was not successful and as illustrated by Milton Esman, the post-1973 development in France faced “very high rates of unemployment, approaching 50 percent, produced sentiments of resentment, isolation, and powerlessness” and resulted in “a street culture with the familiar accompaniment of drugs, violence-prone street gangs, petty crime, and hatred of mainstream French society.”

Thus, in addition to addressing a new set of economic problems, the Europeans realized that the initial ambition to shape the Community based on ideas that are primarily congruent with Roman Catholicism (the founding fathers of the EC – Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman – were all

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4 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
Christian Democrats and devoted Catholics) were likely to encounter serious obstacles. Aware of the circumstances, the Heads of State or Government of the nine Members States of the EC met at the Copenhagen European Summit in mid-December 1973 to discuss the ongoing challenges and to suggest solutions. In fact, it was at this meeting that the representatives decided to introduce the common concept of European identity into their foreign relations. Accordingly, this article elaborates on the ideas following the introduction of the concept and its accommodation both within official EU and academic discourses.

Origins

At the Copenhagen European Summit of 1973, the Representatives of the nine Member States of the European Community justified their decision to introduce the concept of European identity as a necessary step in order “to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.” At that event, the Declaration on European Identity was released, consisting of three sections: The Unity of the Nine Member Countries of the Community, The European Identity in Relation to the World, and The Dynamic Nature of the Construction of a United Europe.

The first section of the declaration briefly acknowledged the existence of selfish behavior that had undermined relations between European countries but, more importantly, stressed the capacity of the nine Member States of the Community to “overcome their past enmities” and therefore adopt the idea of unity as “a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common.” Accordingly, the Nine agreed to preserve their national cultures, the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights, all perceived as fundamental elements of European identity. As the nine representatives noted:

“The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing

7 As some scholars put it, “the historical foundations of the European Union are undeniably Christian-Democratic, a capacious political tradition that accommodates temperate offshoots of conservative political Catholicism as well as a social Catholicism” (Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, “The Politicization of European Identities,” in Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds), European Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 14).
9 Ibid., pp. 118–122.
10 Ibid., p. 118.
convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European identity its originality and its own dynamism.\textsuperscript{11}

The second section of the declaration served to assure the non-Member States that “European unification is not directed against anyone, nor it is inspired by a desire for power.”\textsuperscript{12} The representatives stressed the relevance of close relations with the others: while relations with the Mediterranean, African countries, and the Middle East deserved greater cooperation “over the establishment of peace, stability and progress,” while the relations with the United States of America had to be preserved due to the “values and aspirations based on a common heritage.”\textsuperscript{13}

Finally, the third section briefly explained how the Nine understood the future development of a European identity. According to them, it “will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe” and by becoming such a powerful tool, the Europeans “will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{14} Thus, European identity was imagined as a strong construct that would complement and sustain the economic and political aspects of European integration. However, from a contemporary perspective and with the benefit of hindsight, it would seem that the Nine were overambitious in their plans.

Although the three sections of the declaration tried to bring some rather contrasting points together, they did not offer any clear idea regarding how to achieve a common, supranational or European identity. For example, the nine representatives viewed a common European civilization as a sufficient ideal capable of dominating the existing diversity of national cultures within Europe, but still did not suggest any strategies. In addition, the Nine wrongly argued that European unification and consequent development of a European identity were not directed against the non-Member States, even though it had already become clear that being a European state outside the European Common Market was highly frustrating.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, what seems most surprising is that the Nine limited themselves and their ideas to the then participating members only, thereby excluding any thoughts about the future composition of the Community and how, if enlarged, European identity might develop differently.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 119.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 120.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 122.
\textsuperscript{15} For example, for a detailed analysis of the EC’s discriminatory policies towards the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see Branislav Radeljić, “Questionable Relationship: European Economic Community and Yugoslavia until 1968,” \textit{Currents of History}, Issue 2010/1, pp.112–27.
Since 1973, the European Union has enlarged five times. So far, every single enlargement has suggested that the frontiers of Europe are shifting and that some states and regions that at one point in the past had been excluded from debates of European enlargement were granted EU membership status. For example, the discourse about the Other(s) in Europe was very present during the breakup of the Yugoslav federation. Some writings noted that the wars in Yugoslavia “shocked the civilized West”\footnote{Sonia Lucarelli,} and encouraged an endless debate about the Balkans as a region:

“Today, the very word ‘Balkans’ conjures up images of intrigue, war, and human suffering on a scale abhorrent to Western society. To some people, the Balkan countries lack a clear Western orientation and carry far too much cultural baggage to belong in the European club. Western leaders refer to the region as the back door to Europe, the Balkan powder keg, or Europe’s doorstep. What these euphemisms hide is, perhaps, the wish that the Balkans were located anywhere other than in Europe.”\footnote{André Gerolymatos,}

Even though European policy-makers tried to address the wider European public and to justify their involvement in the Yugoslav crisis and consequent decisions to terminate the existence of the singular Balkan state, the public paid more attention to their national representatives, rather than their EU equivalents. In terms of the overall situation in Brussels in this period, The Wall Street Journal offered a rather damming indictment stating that: “All the talk about creating in the minds of citizens, a sense of loyalty and attachment to the EC is not worth much now, given that the new total structure will be as obscure as the Holy Roman Empire … One may be called upon to die for the EC in war, but will not be able to say quite what one is dying for.”\footnote{“How to Cross the EC Pain Barrier,” Wall Street Journal, 4 March 1992.} In fact, contrary to the enthusiasm of the Brussels elite, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty showed that the Europeans were not very convinced about the new Union and their position within it. Soledad García analyzed Eurobarometer surveys and concluded that a big majority of respondents in Member States prioritized their national identity over their EU identity: “One of the reasons why European Union identity is relatively weak, appears to be dissatisfaction of citizens concerning information from the Commission and their national government … Equally discouraging has been the decreasing proportion of respondents who recognized benefits from European integration or who thought that membership is a good thing.”\footnote{Soledad García,}
Since the early 1990s the EU’s position towards the previously mentioned European otherness has significantly changed as Slovenia, the ex-Yugoslav republic, Romania and Bulgaria, joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 respectively. These enlargements confirmed that Western Europe, once imagined as an unreachable region of the European landmass, was no longer at such a distance. The consequent Berlin Declaration (2007) marked the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome and while proudly listing European successes of the previous decades, stressed the EU’s ambition to preserve “the identities and diverse traditions of its Member States.”

Nevertheless, the participants admitted that we, as Europeans, are facing “major challenges which do not stop at national borders” and used the term ‘EU’ as a response to these challenges, but referred to ‘Europe’ in order to mark a common future.

However, is European identity strong and durable enough to address the above-mentioned challenges? In her analysis, Montserrat Guibernau correctly warns that nation-states sometimes “employ the EU as an excuse for action or inaction within the domestic arena and, sometimes they even refer to the EU as a scapegoat, thus fuelling nationalism and reinforcing national identity” – an approach that is even better explained if we take European identity as a “non-emotional identity, in contrast with the powerful and emotionally charged national identities of our time.”

In addition, as pointed out by some other writings, “[a] European identity … cannot be based on any one language, as most national identities are. A European identity is also not based on any clear borders, a capital, or a pre-existing state with long-held symbols and institutions.”

**Challenges**

Many Europeans cannot identify with Europe as a whole, but as French, German or Italian, or even prefer to limit themselves further, to a particular region of their own country. This tendency has become even more obvious after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union. In his study, Jürgen Habermas questions whether a European identity in such circumstances is necessary and whether transnational civic solidarity is even possible. In his view, the 2004

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21 Ibid.
enlargement represented an immediate challenge for the Union, as it was obvious that “active political interventions will be necessary to bridge the gaps in socio-economic development between the old and new members.” The discrepancies between the old, pre-2004 members, and new, post-2004 members “will aggravate conflicts over the distribution of the scarce resources of a comparatively small EU budget, conflicts between net contributors and net beneficiaries, core and periphery, old recipients in Southern and new recipients in Eastern Europe, small and large member states, and so forth.”

In order to minimize the existing concerns, Habermas perceived the European Union Constitution as an instrument which, while deepening integration, strengthening decision-making processes and reducing democratic deficit, could be “a vehicle for forming a European identity, if [the governments] accepted an admittedly risky and unavoidably time-consuming change in their accustomed way of doing business, and if they involved the citizens themselves in the process of shaping the constitution through referenda.” As we witnessed, the involvement of the citizens resulted in the rejection of the constitution in France and the Netherlands, in May and June 2005, and led to the creation of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007. However, what appears more indicative is the fact that the Union will not manage to transform into a political community characterized by its own (European) identity due to the lack of a common language, tradition and history.

In regard to transnational civic solidarity, Habermas warns that it “cannot be produced solely through the strong negative duties of a universalistic morality of justice,” but through open national arenas in which “a self-propelling process of shared political opinion- and will-formation on European issues can develop above the national level.” In this view, national differences – language, tradition and history – are of secondary relevance, whereas priority is given to the citizens of Europe, who while taking an active part in European affairs, will focus more on a common European benefit, rather than the national one. However, this involvement largely depends on the institutions of the EU that are responsible for providing space for the genuine citizen participation in public life. Here, Habermas insists on the relevance of building mutual trust and as he puts it, “increasing trust is not only a result but also a presupposition of a shared process of political opinion- and will-formation” and, therefore, “the path to a

25 Ibid., pp. 69–70.
26 Ibid., p. 71.
27 Ibid., p. 76.
28 Ibid., pp. 80–81.
democratic deepening of the Union and to the requisite mutual networking of national public spheres can only proceed via such an already accumulated capital of trust.”

With 2008 earmarked as the European year of intercultural dialogue, the European Parliament and the Council agreed that “a fundamental step is promoting the participation of each citizen, men and women on an equal footing, of each Member State and of European society as a whole in an intercultural dialogue, in particular through the structured cooperation with civil society. It contributes to creating a sense of European identity, by embracing differences and shaping the various aspects of belonging to a community.” Later, the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue confirmed some of these notions and further clarified: “If there is a European identity to be realized, it will be based on shared fundamental values, respect for common heritage and cultural diversity as well as respect for the equal dignity of every individual.” In this way, intercultural dialogue was seen as a mechanism to manage “multiple cultural affiliations in a multicultural environment. It is a mechanism to constantly achieve a new identity balance, responding to new openings and experiences and adding new layers to identity without relinquishing one’s roots.”

Nonetheless, official documents and conclusions about the year of intercultural dialogue did not say much about European identity. I identify three possible reasons for such omission. First, multicultural environment can hardly generate identity balance at the EU level. As already noted, the concept of European identity was introduced when the European officials realized that having an exclusively Christian democratic polity was not possible and that an unexpected influx of immigrants of non-European descent needed to be addressed. Some post-Maastricht debates concerning Muslim headscarves in ———

29 Ibid., p. 81.
32 Ibid.
Europe have reconfirmed that culture is part of identity, capable of affecting identity balance.34 This is where the main dilemma emerges: if the advocates of a European identity favour cultural diversity, then where are the problems with headscarves coming from? In his study, Anthony Smith sees culture as a relevant point of departure and notes that cultural identity is connected to national identity but, more importantly for our analysis here, underlines that a collective cultural identity incorporates three distinct features: a shared continuity, shared memories and a common destiny.35 These features, taken individually or as a group, represent an ever-growing challenge within a substantially enlarged EU, thus being much more difficult to deal with today than it was in the 1970s or 1980s.

A second possible reason for largely overlooking the notion of European identity during the year of intercultural dialogue is concerned with the very nature of the European Union. Every new enlargement adds new layers to identity formation, thus further challenging and complicating work that is already in progress. The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 are particularly indicative of this trend: the EU welcomed some countries from Central and Eastern Europe, concurrently provoking a reemergence of well-versed debates about their backwardness.36 Therein it is only Western Europe that is seen to be marked by fully democratic societies, while the rest of the continent is yet to go through transitions (or Westernization), often encouraging an exclusionary institutional approach. Smith’s study lessens this gravity by believing in the European “family of cultures” and different involvement and contribution of its constituent parties: although “Europeans differ among themselves as much as from non-Europeans in respect of language…, territory…, law…, religion … and economic and political system…, as well as in terms of ethnicity and culture,” still “there are shared traditions, legal and political, and shared heritages, religious and cultural. Not all Europeans share in all of them… But at one time or another all Europe’s communities have participated in at least some of these traditions and heritages, in some degree.”37

37 Anthony D. Smith, op. cit., p. 70.
Smith is right to argue that differences and efforts did manage to bring the parties together at some point in the past in order to enjoy mutual benefits of collaboration and peaceful coexistence. However, these ideas are still dominated by the term ‘shared’ and not ‘common’ and it is this missing transfer that provides space for further questions about the possibility of having a common European identity. In fact, while thinking about the nature of European integration, Smith himself insists that

“[i]t is important here to distinguish between families of culture and political or economic unions. The latter are usually deliberate creations; they are consciously willed unities, rationally constructed sets of institutions, the kind of frameworks that some European states are trying to hasten and others to delay. Families of culture, like a lingua franca, tend to come into being over long time-spans and are the product of particular historical circumstances, often unanticipated and unintentional. Such cultural realities are no less potent for being so often inchoate and uninstitutionalized. Thus the sentiments and identities that underpin the Islamic umma or community of Muslims are no less significant than any official Islamic social and political institutions.”

Achieving a common European identity is much more complicated than creating a political or economic union. Apart from requiring more time and effort, the responsibility for a common identity lies in the hands of the EU citizens, thus it is the French, the Swedes, the Bulgarians and many more who are expected to ignore or at least put on hold their national identity for the sake of a common European one. At the same time, this process would be even more problematic for European large non-Christian minorities many of whom have struggled with policies of acculturation, assimilation and integration within the host society. Often, these minorities prefer to continue cultivating their own, imported identity and therefore would have to go through two phases of identity formation, first one focused on the acceptance of national identity of the host country and second one focused on the switch from a new national to supranational, i.e. European identity. The success of such a process is highly questionable as, for example, the importance of Islam in Muslim communities in Europe seems to be on the rise. According to one study, “[i]n France, 85 percent of Muslim students describe their religious beliefs as ‘very important,’ versus 35 percent of non-Muslims. In Germany, too, religiosity is more widespread among Muslim immigrants than among natives — 81 percent of Turks come from a religious background, versus 23 percent of Germans.”

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38 Ibid., p. 71.
A final possible reason why the year of intercultural dialogue did not come with any serious discussions of European identity has to do with solidarity and tolerance. I agree with William Sweet’s separation of the two terms: while tolerance “suggests the existence of important differences among individuals (as in the notion of religious tolerance),” solidarity “implies that what differences exist among the individuals concerned are not important — that there is a recognition of common interests, and a willingness to engage in actions with others, even if it involves sacrifices on our part.”

However, answering two questions — ‘How far should tolerance go?’ and ‘Is solidarity possible?’ — is not an easy task. In regard to the former, the present European Union obviously struggles with the tolerance. For example, apart from seeing the burqa as a symbol for “the repression that women can suffer in Islam” and a threat to “security, sexual equality and secularism,” some European governments would like to see it banned although “banning it altogether would be an infringement on the individual rights which their culture normally struggles to protect.” Such an approach shows that these governments are ready to express intolerance towards their Muslim minorities. In regard to the question of solidarity, without a good record of tolerance, it is impossible to achieve solidarity on a large scale and across the different barriers that characterize the enlarged EU.

Following the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, the Brussels officials optimistically noted that:

“[i]f the counties are to grow together into a viable political union, the people of Europe must be prepared for a European solidarity. This solidarity must be stronger than the universal solidarity … European solidarity — the readiness to open one’s wallet and to commit one’s life to others because they, too, are Europeans — is not something that can be imposed from above. It must be more than institutional solidarity. It must be felt by Europeans as individuals.”

This sound statement suggests that the concept of European solidarity rests heavily on the willingness of the citizens of Europe. Contrary to intolerance that is often caused by the official decisions, thus from above, solidarity is expected to develop and strengthen as a grass root phenomenon. This discrepancy is due to the

fact that notions of (in)tolerance are primarily relevant for discourses about the relations between ‘original’ Europeans and European otherness, whereas solidarity is mainly embodied in discourses about cooperation among the original Europeans only. Still, even this kind of solidarity can be questioned by looking at how, for example, Italians perceive a growing influx of Romanian nationals.43

Thus, the path towards a European identity faces various obstacles from the very beginning. Talks about tolerance, the first link in the chain, are often dominated by discussions of different acts of intolerance that further complicate the viability of European solidarity. This solidarity, as correctly warned by Tzvetan Todorov, is a true prerequisite for the European identity project. However, in his assessment of the present situation across the enlarged EU, Todorov notes that “[n]obody wants to die so that customs barriers can be lowered, and nobody willingly parts with some of her income if she doesn’t feel she has anything in common with those who will benefit from her contribution. Now the European peoples do not have the impression that they have a common democratic life; so everyone simply looks after herself.”44 These words do not strengthen the concept of European solidarity, but rather point out its limitations. As he goes on to suggest, “solidarity cannot come into being without the people feeling a sense of solidarity for each other, and this feeling comes in turn from democratic participation, from the common choice of a destiny.”45

Prospects

Without knowing whether there will be any significant progress in generating tolerance and solidarity across the European Union, discussions about European identity and European citizenship are highly speculative. Although in 2004 EU representatives seemed confident when saying that “Europe’s identity is something that must be negotiated by its peoples and institutions..., so that European values, traditions, and conceptions of life can live on and be effective,”46 they have not managed to bring the two sides closer together. Accordingly, I identify some of the dominant dilemmas that further

45 Ibid.
46 Kurt Biedenkopf et al., op. cit.
question the ideal of European identity.

First, the relevance of national identity is still very strong across the European Union and it is difficult to predict the extent to which the postmodernist understanding of the nation-state and national identity will manage to become the dominant perspective. Apart from existing EU Member States and their national pride, identity issues of prospective members deserve attention, as well. For example, the break-up of Yugoslavia represented an opportunity for the newly established states to foster and promote their own identity that was suppressed before the state crisis and consequent wars. Thus, Croatia and Kosovo, to name just two, could find it difficult to understand the value of ‘replacing’ their own identities with a European identity, even if it could benefit both of them.

Second, future enlargements are likely to accentuate questions of tolerance and solidarity, thus negatively affecting the construction of European identity. If Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo become members of the EU, its Muslim population will amount to over 100 million. But are the Brussels decision-makers ready to face a more obvious presence of Islam in the EU? According to one scholar, “the accession of Muslim countries and the rise of far-right mobilization and violence, can only be addressed effectively under a broad consensus among its members. Across Europe, however, the citizens are split regarding its cultural identity and social model.” This split is accentuated still further by the fact that immigration and the Islamization of immigrants in the EU is regulated by the individual Member States, not the Union. Indeed, extreme differences between Germany and the Netherlands in relation to the legal status of Islam represent an additional challenge to the idea of European identity.

As Fariba Salehi summarized it: “The most powerful modern institution that homogenizes and standardizes identity is the nation-state. The nation-state is a gigantic culture industry. A postmodern critique of the nation-state offers a radically different reading of the nation-state, by describing it as an apparatus of power that produces mega-narratives of identity in the name of ‘people.’ A postmodern theory of the nation-state deconstructs the nationalistic amount of the nation-state, and anchors the question of ‘national’ identity in the locus of the ‘other,’ and in so doing erases its totalizing boundaries, challenges the political and ideological manoeuvres that assume an essentialist core in the imagined communities, and argues for the hybridity and ambivalence of national identity” (Fariba Salehi, “A Postmodern Conception of the Nation State,” in Athena S. Leoussi (ed), Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Transaction, London, 2001, p. 252).


In Germany, the state and religious institutions are not separated; while the Jewish community, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church are all recognized by the state, Islam is not. In the Netherlands, the state and religious institutions are separated; the Dutch system allows all religions to establish their own institutions, including Islam.
Third, as alluded to in the previous dilemma, the fact that the European Union does not speak with a single voice is an added difficulty. In his 1997 study, García understood this trend as a result of different economic and political interests that were not sufficiently explained to the citizens: “This is due to the fact that there is considerable ambiguity in national governments’ agendas attached to Economic and Monetary Union which shows them unwilling to appear responsible for the hard choices that need to be made.”50 More importantly, as García rightly predicted, the 2004 enlargement increased the “elite ambiguity, since there seem to be many antagonistic groups in the societies of these countries with often incompatible goals, which extends to their incipient civil societies.”51 Given the present circumstances, the increasing national and regional differentiations are likely to continue and further question the success of a supranational, European identity.

Finally, while recognizing both inter-governmental and supranational approaches to policy-making, European Union representatives recognize their own reservations in regard to future integration of the Union, in general. It is this flexibility that can determine the nature of European identity: while the first approach indicates that the national governments have little interest in deepening “integration by shifting power from their own national to the federal level as long as the status quo seems to be secure,” the second approach suggests that “as soon as the alternative to the status quo is the end of the integration and as soon as it is not about the failure of a specific policy or a specific treaty but about the EU’s very existence, even decisions to abandon one more aspect of the cherished national sovereignty might be acceptable as the lesser evil.”52

**Conclusion**

In his remarkable account, Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, defined a united Europe as a “grouping that is unique in the density and quantity of its commercial exchanges, a comparative oasis of monetary order and even of financial equilibrium, and a considerable reserve of internal growth. It possesses a demographic, historical and cultural wealth, homogenous even in its extreme diversity, which, doubtless, no other region of the world can claim.”53 Apart from acknowledging the dominance of economic dimension in the process of European integration, this definition indicated the

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51 Ibid., p. 206.
existence of strong ties that link all Europeans and dominate existing diversities. Accordingly, the idea of ‘United in diversity’ became the official motto of the EU, in the year 2000.

In contrast with the official optimistic pronouncements and further wishes, academic scholarship continues to question the entire notion of European unity and of a common European identity. While some of the available opinions have continued to believe that “[a]ny attempt to reduce contemporary Europe to a single idea is bound to fail” noting that “Europeans differ about almost everything imaginable,”54 others have decided to give European identity a chance to flourish: “In reality, identity resides not in diversity itself, but in the status accorded to it. In this way, a purely negative and relative trait is transformed into an absolute positive quality; difference becomes identity, and plurality unity … In this sense, European unity can be assumed by the European Union and contribute to the reinforcement of its project.”55 In my view, this invitation is extended to both the Brussels elite and European citizens, but will they manage to speak with a single voice?

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The European Parliament’s quest to provide a legitimising discourse for European Union enlargement led it to develop a compelling historical narrative to justify the entry of eight Central and Eastern European countries in 2004. This narrative was however built through the lens of Western European elaborations of historical myths and memory. Central and Eastern European representatives did not in fact share this historical identity, and use of the historical narrative fell by the wayside in debates of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession between 2004 and 2007.

Key words: European Parliament, identity, memory, myths, narratives, enlargement.

Introduction

The European Parliament (EP) is a key actor in the construction of an identity for the European Union (EU). As the only directly elected institution within the EU’s structure, and the largest conglomerate of politicians within the European arena, it has ever since its inception strived to give voice and shape to ideas about Europe, the nature and goals of the process of European integration, and the identity and values on which this process is based. This quest for the construction of a European identity was especially evident in the EP’s debates of subsequent enlargement rounds, when the need to justify the entry of new members into the European ‘club’ also provided a unique opportunity to actually define and refine the criteria for entering the club — not just in terms
of the actual, practical criteria imposed by the EU as a whole, but also in terms of the ideational foundations of the project.

Over four decades of enlargement debates, the EP developed a strong identity discourse based on political, historical and cultural elements. The debates on the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, which were held regularly between 1999 and 2004 as part of the EP’s increased involvement in the enlargement process, were characterised above all by the construction of a strong historical narrative to strengthen the legitimacy of eight new countries that had, until barely a decade before, been on the opposite political and economic side of the Iron Curtain. They provided an opportunity for the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to reflect upon and articulate their ideas about ‘Europe’ and about its historical identity, and were in this sense much more about the existing (largely Western) members of the EU and their shared project rather than about Central and Eastern Europe per se. The constructed historical narrative was therefore a Western European narrative — and the extent to which it actually resonated with Central and Eastern Europeans, and if they would actually subscribe to it during or after the enlargement process, is a question that will also be addressed towards the end of this piece.

On Historical Narratives and Collective Identities

The European Parliament’s enlargement debates in the post-Cold War period gave prominence to new themes alongside that of political identity. The debates on the fifth enlargement, in particular, were characterised by the presence of a strong historical narrative that flanked the existing political features of the European identity constructed by MEPs in the previous three decades. In articulating this historical narrative and inserting it alongside political values in their legitimisation of the accession of ten new countries between 1997 and 2004, MEPs attempted to go beyond a purely political identity in their construction of ‘Europe’: this article explores the contents of this narrative, its use in parliamentary discourse, and its limits within the wider enlargement debate.

It is widely accepted in social identity theory that history, or rather shared historical narratives, constitute a fundamental element in the construction and re-construction of collective identities. The past is often mobilised in order to justify or legitimise the present, and it is interpreted and understood in function of contemporary concerns and needs. This interpretation and re-interpretation of

the past constructs ‘myths’ that give meaning to the present and provide a shared framework for political debate.3

Myths can be defined as “a special kind of story about the past that symbolises the values of a group and legitimates their claims” — as for instance does Peter Burke in his work on European memory.4 Such myths are largely produced by political and cultural elites and are based on the construction of historical narratives that are then used as a frame of reference for political debate. They provide a source of political legitimacy, not necessarily based on historical continuity, but also, potentially, a legitimacy founded on a “sharp break with the past due to traumatic experiences or policy failures.”5 In this sense, historical events (or a specific selection of historical events) are interpreted and constructed into a historical narrative that shapes collective memory. History, memory and identity are thus inexorably interconnected to the extent that the meaning constructed through a historical narrative provides political legitimacy and cohesion to a community.6 Historians have a long tradition of looking at the role of myths and collective memory in the foundations of national identities. For instance, George Mosse analysed the creation of the “Myth of the War Experience” in post-WWI Europe, and Germany in particular, as the attribution of meaning to a hitherto meaningless experience by taking it through a process of memorialisation, institutionalisation, and even trivialisation that transforms a recent historical experience into a key element of political culture.7 Henry Rousso’s analysis of the way the French have remembered, or removed, their Vichy past, provides a further example of how history and memory have played out in a selective form of remembering a troubling past through different phases of French public life.8 The role of history in the construction of collective identities is therefore well documented, and it may not come as much of a surprise

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4 Peter Burke, “Foundation Myths and Collective Identities in Early Modern Europe,” in Bo Stråth, Europe and the Other and Europe as Other, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2001, pp. 113–122.


6 Bo Stråth, “Introduction: Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Community,” op. cit.


that a historical narrative of Europe did in fact also emerge in the European Parliament’s identity discourse on enlargement.

European Parliament discourse developed a strong historical narrative that provided legitimisation for the process of European integration as undertaken by the European Union: this discourse emerged most clearly during the debates on the fifth enlargement, after having been present but largely understated and never fully articulated in previous enlargement debates. The striking difference between the second and third enlargements as opposed to the fifth was, of course, the end of the Cold War, which greatly affected the way in which MEPs elaborated their historical narrative in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. If ‘history’ was mainly used as the spectre of past conflict and in order to justify cooperation among former enemies as a new political course during the Cold War, in what Ole Wæver referred to as Europe’s past being Europe’s ‘other’ in the construction of European identity,9 after the conclusion of the Cold War the order of the previous fifty years was called into question and the need to revisit the EC’s role in this history arose. This development manifested itself in many ways throughout Europe. The end of the Cold War opened a Pandora’s Box of contested histories between different nationalities in prospective member states, from the Baltic states to the former Czechoslovakia and to the bloody conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, while at the same time redefining the terms within which the existing members had previously been able to define the EC’s place in history. The European Parliament’s discourse on the fifth enlargement reflected this reality by articulating not a single historical theme, but a variety of historical references that, reprised by different actors at different times, formed a complex and heterogeneous narrative. Whether these themes can be seen to constitute a “historical narrative of Europe,” much along the lines of historical narratives that are at the basis of the construction of collective identities,10 will hopefully be clearer at the end of this analysis.

Opening the Gates: The End of the Cold War and the Challenge of Redefining ‘Europe’

The sudden collapse of the Iron Curtain brought back to the surface continent-wide historical debates that had thus far remained dormant within the discursive frame provided by the Cold War. The year 1989 represented a


watershed in the political, military and security, economic, and ideological organisation of the continent, unravelling the geopolitical order that had shaped Europe in the post-war era and ushering in new period of uncertainty, as well as opportunity, for the countries of both Western and Eastern Europe. Debates in the European Parliament reflected the climate of confusion that characterised the months immediately following the Eastern European revolutions of 1989-1991, and the soul searching that defined much of the 1990s up to the turn of the Twenty-first century.

The European Community was to a large extent a product of the post-war order: it may have claimed to represent ‘European values’ that reached beyond the Iron Curtain in time as well as space, but its exclusively Western European membership and its political and economic orientation placed it firmly and conclusively within the West. The US encouraged the integration process since its inception and the EC’s political self-image was firmly opposed to the Eastern European dictatorial system — as exemplified by the emphasis on democracy and human rights in the development of the Community’s political identity. When Eastern European peoples tore down their communist regimes and the new democratic governments started clamouring for their nations’ right to ‘return to Europe’ and queuing up for EC membership, the EC had to suddenly come to terms with German re-unification, the ‘moral obligation’ to open its doors to its ‘lost’ neighbours, and the need to maintain economic and political stability within its own borders and, more hopefully, across the continent.¹¹ The very concept of a ‘return to Europe’ used by Central and Eastern European intellectuals from the late 1980s, claiming that their countries’ rightful historical place was among the countries of Western Europe rather than with the non-European East, challenged the division into Western and Eastern Europe in the name of a prior shared history.¹² Gorbachev’s Common European Home rhetoric, although not directly quoted by MEPs, may also have facilitated the emergence of a strong discourse based on the idea of a ‘united Europe’. What do you make of that? Moreover, the wars in Yugoslavia acted as a powerful reminder of pre-Cold War European history of national and ethnic conflict and


re-awakened fears of Europe falling back into its historical pattern of confrontation and war. The re-emergence of such concerns with historical legacies of the pre-Cold War era would become an important feature in the EP’s discourse on the Eastern enlargement.

The membership requests from the countries of the former Eastern block flowed into the existing debate on the rationale and goals of the European integration process. After the revival of the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Union had already entered a phase of introspection and self-questioning, brought on by the economic challenges of rising unemployment and coping with globalisation, combined with the strategic and geopolitical challenges of the end of the Soviet Union and Europe’s role in a changing global arena. Previous considerations for further integration and institutional reform within the EC itself would manifestly need to be adjusted to the new circumstances. The 1990s were therefore to a large extent a decade of soul-searching for the newly named European Union, which faced dealing with new institutional developments and further plans for reform via the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties, while at the same time finding itself called to respond to complex political developments, with the violent break-down of Yugoslavia and the consequent European debacle as perhaps the most symbolic example of the new challenges facing the EU. The preparation from 1997 to 2004 of the most numerous enlargement ever experienced by the Union was an important catalyst for a new reflection on the deeper meaning of European integration, which accompanied the development of the Union well into the first decade of the new millennium until the accession of ten Eastern and Southern European countries in 2004, and its coda three years later with the entry of Bulgaria and Romania.

The EP debated what would become the fifth enlargement round at length, not just in discussing the yearly Commission’s Progress Reports on each candidate country starting in 1998, but also in preparatory discussions before and after Council meetings or ‘State of the European Union’ debates. This enlargement would become a defining issue for the European Union, and MEPs explored both the broader political aspects of accepting so many countries that were new to democracy and market economics, and the minute details of accession, from fisheries to agricultural subsidies, to the candidates’ overall readiness to implement the acquis communautaire. The EP also pushed for

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15 See, for instance, debate of 27 May 1998, “Preparation of European Council Meeting in Cardiff.”

16 See, for instance, debate on the “State of the European Union” of 18 September 1996.
negotiations to start with all the candidate countries at once and for the date of accession to be set for 2004 and was keen to highlight how the Council and Commission later adopted its suggestions, as German EPP representative and future EP President Hans-Gert Pöttering proudly pointed out in April 2003, during the debate on the ratification of the accession treaty:

“it was our House that demanded a timetable for the negotiations — which the Commission and the Nice Summit accepted — so that they could be completed in time, enabling the countries capable of doing so, and their people, to take part in the 2004 elections to the European Parliament. It was our House that did that! That is what we should be telling people, and it is something of which we can be proud, for it helps to make democracy real in Europe and to give the people of the ten countries the opportunity to send freely-elected representatives to the European Parliament. Let us rejoice in that!”

With the acceleration of the enlargement process after the beginning of accession negotiations, the EP’s related activities also increased: debates were more frequent, meetings with the representatives of the parliaments of the candidate countries intensified, and the EP’s presidents visited the candidate countries increasingly often.

Discussions of the fifth enlargement also intensified because at the turn of the millennium it was becoming more necessary than ever to explain enlargement to EU voters: disillusion with European integration, increasing talk of the EU’s democratic deficit, and widespread preoccupation with the citizens’ disaffection with the Union all highlighted in the mind of their European representatives the need to strengthen the legitimacy of the integration process in general and of enlargement in particular, in the eyes of the European public.

There was, among MEPs, a perceived need to justify the intake of ten new Eastern European countries. A renewed recourse to history and Europe’s past was a means for providing just such legitimisation.

Throughout the fifth enlargement debates, the ‘return to Europe’ slogan resonated with European parliamentarians and fuelled their reflections on the idea of Europe, intended as the project of European integration but also more broadly as a community of peoples that shared the European geographical, political and cultural space beyond the borders of the EU. Enlargement provided new stimuli for this debate: perhaps more than any other enlargement round before it, the enlargement round of 2004, provided the context for a prolonged

18 See for instance the debate of 3 October 2000, especially contributions by Pat Cox and Miguélez Ramos (PSE) on the need to engage with the public on enlargement. MEPs also discussed polls on public attitudes to enlargement in September 2001.
and open-ended discussion on the origins, progress, and ultimate aims of the process of European integration embodied by the EU.

The historical themes that emerge more frequently in European parliamentary discourse form a series of interconnected myths: the first is the myth of the ‘founding fathers’ and of European integration as reconciliation, which is elaborated in opposition to a broader, negative foundation myth of Europe’s heritage of conflict and bloodshed prior to the first integration initiative of 1950. These myths are very closely intertwined and constitute the basis for legitimisation of the European Union as a whole — and have been present in parliamentary and Community discourse ever since the launch of the Schuman Plan in 1950. Furthermore, in order to justify widening this process to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, MEPs emphasised a new set of historical references in their enlargement debates: the idea of a common European heritage and an undivided Europe before the Cold War trumping the ‘artificial’ separation superimposed by the post-Second World War confrontation between East and West.

The myth of European reconciliation and its ‘founding fathers’

European Parliament discourse after the end of the Cold War was characterised by ubiquitous references to the history of European integration and to the ‘founding fathers’ of the European Union. Besides the official commemorations such as the anniversaries of the Schuman declaration, MEPs often referred to the ‘founding fathers’ when they wanted to stress the positive moral, idealistic and yet pragmatic and innovative origins of the process of European integration. This was a recurrent need when debating the fifth enlargement. For instance, during the December 1997 debate on Agenda 2000 and enlargement, similar references were made by speakers on behalf of all the main party groups: Dutch Liberal Democrat Gijs De Vries highlighted that “the historical responsibility for our generation is to do for the whole of Europe as the generation [of] Adenauer, Beyen, Monnet and Spaak did for France and Germany: to build one communal house, a joint framework within which power

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20 An earlier version of this section was published in “Historical Narratives and the European Parliament’s Discourse on the Fifth Enlargement: The Foundation Myths of European Integration,” in Marloes Beers and Jenny Raflik (eds), National Cultures and Common Identity: A Challenge for Europe?, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussels, 2010, pp. 135–146.
is subordinate to the law.”21 He was echoed to the right of the political spectrum by Italian Alleanza Nazionale MEP Gastone Parigi:

“the coming enlargement is the direct and logical consequence of that revolutionary act which was the foundation of the construction of Europe – I refer to the Schuman Plan — revolutionary because it has weakened the nationalist culture which had been laid down over the centuries, east and west of the Rhine, giving rise to wars and tragedies with monotonous regularity.”22

This even resonated with those on the left as reflected by the German socialist, and former European Parliament President, Klaus Hänsch:

“a final point which I shall phrase in very general terms: the generation of politicians of the 1950's had the courage and the foresight to remove the thousand-year-old antagonism between France and Germany in a European Community. Our generation of politicians will have to develop the courage and foresight to give the whole continent, for the first time in a thousand years, an organization of peace and cooperation.”23

Irrespective of the different political affiliations, policy prescriptions, and nationalities of the three speakers, they all referred to the founding fathers of the European Union in a remarkably similar way: they credited them with creating a community for European nations on the Western side of the Iron Curtain and for having extraordinary vision in finding a creative and peaceful solution to conflictual relations among former enemies. The lexicon associated with the myth of the founding fathers always revolved around ‘vision’, ‘courage’, ‘foresight’, ‘inspiration’.24 These references to a ‘generation of leaders’ constituted part of a positive myth that was accepted by MEPs from mainstream political groups across the political spectrum.25 Moreover, when speaking to outside audiences on behalf of the EP, Presidents have used this myth whenever they needed to emphasise the ‘rightness’ of the European project, its implied

25 There were, of course, exceptions to this consensus, mainly on the far-right and far-left of the political spectrum, who are against integration per se. See, for instance, Bruno Gollnisch, Non-attached (Front National), France, “EP Debates: Enlargement – Agenda 2000,” 3 December 1997.
‘moral superiority’ over what came before, and its unique place in history. Pat Cox for instance spoke repeatedly of the “generation of European leaders […] who had the courage of their European convictions,”26 of the ‘vision’ and ‘indispensable’ leadership of Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, de Gasperi and Spaak.27 The general thrust of his references to the founding fathers is well condensed in this extract from a speech he delivered on 5 February 2004 in front of the Cercle Gaulois on “2004: Towards a Union of 25, towards a European Constitution, towards the European Elections:”

“In Western Europe, with the Second World War barely over, certain individuals had the courage to think big. People like Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak, Alcide de Gasperi and others, who took the time, who had the authority, the will and the political and personal determination to think in the long term and to think big: not to lose themselves in mean-minded trivia, but to pull themselves out of the ashes and ruins of war, and see hope where there was despair, see an opportunity in the midst of economic collapse, and see the European project in terms of the ideal of reconciliation: a project which offered possibilities which would make those men a generation different from any other generation that Europe had ever known.”28

His predecessors in the role of European Parliamentary President also used similar sets of references. In 1998, José María Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado quoted directly from Jean Monnet’s memoirs in his speech entitled “The Europe We Are Building” to legitimise the ‘new philosophy’ of cooperation above national interest, which he saw as the underpinning of the integration process.29 Nicole Fontaine also referred to the founding fathers as examples of extraordinary leadership: “What the founding fathers of the European Economic Community achieved with six states in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Socialism, we are now prompted by contemporary developments in the world to achieve in our turn, and for the same reasons, for the whole of the continent of Europe.”30 Klaus Hänsch used very similar words during the enlargement debate of 9 April 2003:

“I am cautious about drawing historical comparisons, but it is appropriate to do so today. A generation of politicians in the Fifties — Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Alcide De Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak and others — had the courage and the vision to establish a European Community that would overcome a thousand years of antagonism between Germany and France and begin the unification of Europe in the West. We, the present political generation, have the opportunity, for the first time in a thousand years, to bring the continent together by peaceful means and on a voluntary basis into a European Union, a union of freedom, peace and prosperity. If we do not seize this opportunity, we will be failing in our historic mission.”

The allusion implied in Hänsch’s words remains fairly vague: it is in fact unclear whether the thousand years he refers to pertain to the Holy Roman Empire, to the Roman Empire, or perhaps to Charlemagne — a figure often considered a precursor of attempts to unify Europe. Nevertheless, the quote is exemplary of the way in which MEPs used historical references when discussing ‘Europe’ during the fifth enlargement: the abundant allusions to an unspecified historical time when Europe was allegedly unified served as one of the legitimising arguments for the ‘re-unification’ of the continent, lacking any chronological specificity but creating a sense of historical inevitability that permeated much of the fifth enlargement discourse.

The myth of the founding fathers greatly emphasised the idealistic aspect of the integration process. It was often embedded in an interconnected and yet wider theme of European integration, as ‘reconciliation’ and as a ‘peace process’. European integration was described as a ‘communal house’ based on principles of ‘solidarity’ and ‘cooperation’ between former enemies. The MEPs deemed it “the only concrete idea for achieving peace and prosperity” in Europe, based on “the brilliant, but historically unusual, idea of bringing people together at the negotiating table instead of through trench warfare.” This was an image of Europe as the historical embodiment of new values: “peace as our rule and a shared destiny as the solution.”

33 Klaus Hänsch, “Rekindling the European Flame,” speech given at Leyden University, 21 February 1996.
reconciliation was extended to the Eastern and Southern European candidate states during the highly symbolic ‘extraordinary debate on enlargement’ held by the European Parliament with the representatives of the candidate countries on 19 November 2002. Therein MPs from the ten candidate countries due to accede in 2004 participated in a session of the EP and sat with their future colleagues in their respective political groups. The debate itself was meant as a symbol of how reconciliation finally embraced Eastern Europe, marking “a truly continental-scale act of reconciliation and healing.”

MEPs gave little or no consideration to figures that had developed ideas about European integration before 1950, such as Aristide Briand or Richard Coudenove-Kalergy. The history that they chose to speak about was very much the history of the Europe embodied by the European Union, with its Treaties and its institutions, as in debating the enlargement of the European Union to new member states. MEPs were concerned with legitimising a specific conception of ‘Europe’ realised in the institutional system originated by the Treaties of Rome in 1957, and not with alternative conceptions of Europe or any might-have-beens.

The founding fathers thus became the principal characters in the wider positive myth that underpinned the discourse on European Union: the myth of the inherent moral ‘goodness’ of the integration process, intended as a historical process of reconciliation among former enemies. Moreover, enough time had passed between 1950 and the first decade of the twenty-first century that any partisan allegiances to Christian Democracy or Socialism, Atlanticist or non-Atlanticist tendencies, or even nationalities to which Schuman or Monnet may have made politically charged references were effectively neutralised. Referring to more recent figures such as Helmut Kohl or François Mitterand, whose role in European politics and within the Community could have been considered just as significant, would have been much more likely to introduce an unwelcome partisan or national element to a discourse whose goal was essentially the construction of a common interpretation of the origins and evolution of the European Union of the present. The ‘founding fathers’ thus became more than merely the political leaders who initiated the integration process: whether their choice to initiate the integration process aimed to meet the geopolitical or economic needs of their nation states was no longer an important or determining factor in the way they were portrayed five decades later. What mattered instead was the fact that politicians working at the heart of the integration process in the 1990s used their very names, words, and choices as a legitimating myth for the continuation of that process, and that by doing so they chose to emphasise the ideals underpinning the process rather than national interest per se.

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This narrative of reconciliation as the historical uniqueness of European integration reverberated throughout the fifth enlargement discourse and inherently legitimised both the need to continue along this path of integration and the necessity to allow candidate states to become involved in it as full members. The possibility of referring to a generation of leaders that had initiated this process five decades earlier gave this theme the strength of a historical myth: in the 1990s, European integration was no longer a new initiative but a reality whose fifty years of institutional existence and success guaranteed its place in European history. The fact that this was a particular kind of integration based on the establishment of common institutions and that other ideas had existed, for instance in the interwar years, and still floated around about different methods of integration, remained largely outside of parliamentary debates. On the other hand, the figures who had launched this particular kind of integration in the 1950s had in some cases, for instance Jean Monnet’s, already acquired a ‘larger than life status’ within the ‘integration story’: Monnet had a whole education programme dedicated to him in 1989, which included the establishment of Jean Monnet chairs and Centres of Excellence for the study of European integration — this meant that their names could be used to provide the European Union with a set of wise figures from the past. Moreover, at the turn of the twenty-first century, with arguably four decades of successful integration under the Union’s belt, MEPs were no longer talking just about a recent political phenomenon with an uncertain future. They could now claim that what had been born as a risky political initiative had consolidated its rightful place in history over four decades of institution building. By the time the enlargement process to the Central and Eastern European countries began in earnest in 1999, the integration process itself was ripe for use as a myth in itself, and the source of legitimacy for continuing along the path indicated fifty years earlier by the founding fathers.

‘Breaking with history’: the European project defies historical legacies

The European Parliament’s historical narrative of Europe inserted the positive myths of the founding fathers and of reconciliation highlighted above into a wider narrative depicting Europe’s history as a negative and dark past that needed to be contrasted and overcome through an integration process whose primary aim was to “break with Europe’s history.” The idea had in fact been present in European discourse since the inception of integration. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, this came to form the tenets of a complex

historical narrative in which the old negative myth of conflict was interwoven with the newer myth of reconciliation embodied by the European Union as a primary theme in the legitimisation of the fifth enlargement. This historical narrative was based on the claim that Europe must reject its history prior to 1950: the negative myth of Europe’s long-term historical experience provided a broad frame for the positive myth of reconciliation and cooperation. Europe’s dark past served to legitimise the integration process as the only tool capable of providing reconciliation among European nations and cooperation as the basis for peace and prosperity. Whilst the reconciliation myth was essential for the legitimisation of the European Union and for its enlargement to the wider European continent, its essence was entirely rooted in the historical legacies of Europe’s experiences prior to the launch of the integration process in 1950.

The discourse of the European Parliament presented the idea of reconciliation and of European integration in general as a ‘break with history’, a “historical absurdity […] that was gradually consolidated and came to change the face of history,”40 a project initiated to defy Europe’s historical legacy and to ‘go against’ history. Europe’s past of war and violence culminating in the two world wars is the negative historical myth that underpins the whole European construction. Paradoxically, it was this very historical myth that legitimised the idea that in order to achieve peace and prosperity Europe must free itself of its historical legacy and project its political vision into the future, denying a past that led to so much bloodshed.

Throughout the fifth enlargement debates, MEPs and EP Presidents acknowledged that the roots of European integration were to be found in war:

“out of the ashes of destruction and hate of two world wars came a Union of the European peoples. War between the member states, despite centuries of rivalry and conflict, is now unthinkable. Europe can be a force of peace throughout the continent,”41 and that “the original challenge was twofold: first, through close cooperation, to subdue an historic hostility which tears our continent apart in order instead to build friendship and understanding, and secondly to provide political and economic strength and thus the confidence in our system based on democracy and market economy, which was necessary to be able to resist the external threat which the Soviet Empire posed on the dark horizon. Through its successes the EU has changed the path of world history.”42

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41 Klaus Hänsch, PSE, Germany, “Address to the National Assembly of Slovenia,” Ljubljana, 2 April 1996.
Yet the historical roots of European integration also meant that Europe needed to break away from its past and create a new system that was to be completely detached and opposed to the previous one: not just to ‘overcome history’ but “not to allow a triumph of the dead over the living not to let history dominate our future.”

The myth of post-war Europe as a ‘peace process’ based on reconciliation and cooperation was thus based on a mirror historical narrative of the violence and nationalist antagonism that dominated Europe until the culmination of the Second World War. Many MEPs emphasised how historical attempts to unify Europe had been carried out by force and how only the European Union embodied the peaceful and voluntary unification of the continent: for instance, in 1996 Italian EPP representative Antonio Graziani argued, referring to historical legacies and the rights of minorities in Slovenia, that a Europe assigning blame for past events “would not be a Europe of today, far less of tomorrow, but the Europe of the civil wars of the recent and more distant past.” A year later, his Danish colleague in the EPP Frode Kristoffersen, speaking in his role as rapporteur for Lithuania, also talked about the need to bring Europe together after centuries of violent struggle:

“the idea is to get this Europe repaired and bind it together again. A characteristic of this part of the world is that for centuries, at regular intervals, we have bashed each other over the head, and time and again Europe has been dismembered [...] but now at the end of this century the important thing is to organise relationships in this part of the world and to repair the damage that was done in the first half of the century.”

Spanish Socialist and former EP President Enrique Barón Crespo argued on 19 November 2002 that enlargement would finally bring an end to the shameful trail of war and blood left by the Twentieth century and that Europe would go back to being a geographical union and would be born again as a political unit:

“Con ello [enlargement] conseguiremos, simbólicamente en Grecia, que Europa se liebre del rapto del Minotauro, que la ha tenido tanto tiempo presa. Porque, cuando en 2004, se abran las puertas para los nuevos socios,

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43 Klaus Hänsch, “Address to the National Assembly of Slovenia,” Ljubljana, 2 April 1996. This was both a reference to national antagonisms that had led to conflict and world war and to the resurgence of nationalist conflict in the former Yugoslavia.


Europe volverá a ser una union geográfica desde el Atlántico hasta el Báltico y desde la Laponia hasta Chipre, y atrás quedarán las ignominias de un siglo XX en el que las guerras y repartos de botín rasgaron los Estados, destrozaron a los pueblos y trazaron fronteras a sangre y fuego [...] Europa [...] renacerá como una unidad política.”

Swedish Liberal Democrat Cecilia Malmström reiterated during the enlargement debate of April 2003 that “for the first time, we are uniting almost the whole of the continent by peaceful means — through agreements, compromises and treaties, rather than through war and conquest.” Pat Cox came back to this idea time and again in his speeches in front of the Parliaments of the candidate countries:

“For the first time in millennia on the continent of Europe, we are creating a common space of prosperity, reconciliation and peace. We are not creating that space at the point of a sword or from the barrel of a gun, but, as I said earlier, by the free will of a free people. It is that which gives the depth and strength to the European process of reconciliation.”

This negative foundation myth was predicated on the need to break with history, by creating and advancing a new, ‘ahistorical’ principle of organising political and economic relations among the peoples of Europe and thus breaking free from the dominant legacy of the past. The image of Europe constructed through the use of these historical narratives was therefore one in which Europe, intended as the contemporary framework of supranational institutions and close cooperation between member states, was the child of a unique generation of leaders who decided to reject the legacy of Europe’s past and on the basis of this rejection created a new system of relations based on the shared commitment to reconciliation. Europe, in this sense, is therefore to this day a historical process of reconciliation — one that stemmed from the history of this continent and yet projects its identity into the future and rejects the image of Europe embodied by the past.

This historical narrative had at its very heart a contradiction that could in the long term undermine the whole construction of a historical foundation myth for

48 Enrique Barón Crespo, PSE, Spain, “EP Debates: Extraordinary Debate on Enlargement,” 19 November 2002 (“With this we will achieve, symbolically in Greece, that Europe free herself from the Minotaur’s abduction, which kept her prisoner for so long. When in 2004 the doors open for the new members, Europe will return to being a geographical union from the Atlantic to the Baltic and from Lapland to Cyprus, and so the ignominies of the twentieth century will cease, the wars and booties that tore apart states, strangled peoples and traced frontiers with blood and fire [...] Europe [...] will be reborn as a political unit.”)


50 Address by Pat Cox (Liberal Democrat Group, Ireland) to the Saeima’s Plenary Session (Latvian Parliament), Riga, Latvia, 28 May 2002. He used the word ‘reconciliation’ 28 times in his speeches over his two years as EP President.
the European Union. By selecting only a very specific and very short historical experience as the positive foundation of the modern European polity, and attributing a wholly negative connotation to the course of European history before 1950, the European Parliament effectively denied legitimacy to historical references attempting to go further back in time to the much richer and longer history of Europe before 1950. Moreover, in identifying the experience of European integration after WWII with the only positive historical experience that Europe could refer to in constructing its identity and advocating the need to break with all previous history, parliamentary discourse attributed a positive value to an experience that had been shared only by Western European countries on the basis of economic integration and, to a much smaller extent, political cooperation. This created problems on two levels: it excluded Central and Eastern European countries from the Union’s positive historical narrative and it deprived even Western Europe itself of the possibility of finding positive shared experiences beyond the beginning of the integration process — rejecting as part of that negative past, cultural and political experiences that could otherwise provide additional content to a positive foundation myth. It excluded centuries of shared political, cultural and social experiences that were actually considered by many Europeans as the most important aspect of their common heritage. This contradiction is all the more striking considering that MEPs used this historical narrative the most in their discussions of Central and Eastern Europe, countries with whom the members of the European Union had in fact not shared the experience of institutional and economic integration of the previous decades. In light of the division between East and West during the Cold War, the MEPs’ choice of founding their historical narrative on the exclusion of the experiences prior to the Second World War is in fact quite puzzling: justifying the fifth enlargement would thus entail a difficult balancing act between a double narrative of recent exclusive experiences and previous, unspecified common experiences of alleged European unity before the Cold War.

Justifying the fifth enlargement: a common history before the Cold War

The European Parliament’s debates on the fifth enlargement saw MEPs engaging with the double challenge of providing legitimacy to the European integration process as a whole, and justifying the expansion of membership to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that throughout the East-West bloc confrontation had constituted the Community’s political ‘other’. Geopolitical and economic reasons were of course paramount, yet a historical theme also came into play: Central and Eastern European countries had the right to be part of the integration process because, according to the historical narrative of
‘Europe’, before the Cold War had forced them on the “wrong” side of the Iron Curtain, the CEECs were part of Europe and thus shared a long, if at times far from peaceful history with Western European countries. The theme of ‘breaking with history’ was vividly used in the justification of enlargement, when it was combined with the idea of the Cold War as the historical ‘kidnapping’ of the Eastern half of the European ‘whole’.51

Before the end of the Cold War, Western Europe had defined itself politically in stark opposition to the communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe. After 1989 its political identity could not be changed — in fact, it was strengthened by an increased emphasis on ‘European’ values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.52 Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe was predicated on the need to support these countries’ political re-orientation towards adherence to these same political/politico-cultural values.53 However, this in itself was not sufficient to legitimise enlargement. After all, none of the former Warsaw Pact countries were yet fulfilling the political and economic criteria of membership and would not come close to Western European standards throughout the 1990s.

With the fifth enlargement, however, MEPs clearly felt the need to go beyond the traditional political identity to provide a historical one alongside it as a foundation myth of the European integration process embodied by the EU. The European Parliament largely justified widening EU membership to Central and Eastern European countries on the basis of a moral duty stemming from a twofold reading of history as having ‘robbed’ these countries of their ‘rightful place’ in Europe through the Cold War and of an earlier, shared historical heritage cutting across the Iron Curtain. This shared history made the accession of Central and Eastern European countries ‘natural’.54 The fifth enlargement would bring together centuries of common ‘history, culture and art’, and overcome the division imposed by Yalta and Munich.55 These two historical moments symbolised the two different aspects of the historical division of Europe: Munich was considered by many to be the moment in which Western

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52 That such values may just as accurately be deemed to be ‘Western’ did not seem to alter the course of MEPs’ words much: only a few individuals pointed this out, or tried to engage with the prickly question of what can in fact be deemed to be the difference between the ‘Europeanness’ and the ‘Westerness’ of certain political values.
Europe had abandoned Eastern Europe to National Socialist aggression, and Yalta was seen as the imposition of an artificial geopolitical and ideological division that would then be cemented by the hardening of the Cold War. In both cases, MEPs claimed that the way in which these countries had been abandoned to their fate now imparted upon the European Union a ‘moral obligation’ to accept their membership applications.\textsuperscript{56} Enlargement would mark the final end of the Cold War division and “ensure that the old iron curtain is not replaced by a velvet one, excluding part of the continent from the benefits of belonging to the European family.”\textsuperscript{57} It was also “an act of moral justice: European countries, countries which are just as European as those which are already part of the Union but which, by a twist of fate, found themselves, through no fault of their own, on the wrong side of an artificial line drawn across our continent, are coming back to Europe, coming back to us.”\textsuperscript{58} The lexicon in sentences such as the one above moreover shows how by using ‘history’ as a somehow external or superior force that imposed the Cold War division MEPs also partly absolved Western European countries and their most powerful ally, the US, from responsibility for the division of the continent.

Europe had, of course, never been unified in the first place, and so such talk of ‘re-unification’ constituted at best a very benevolent view of European history before the world wars and the onset of the Cold War. Wolff’s study of the invention of the idea of Eastern Europe in the Eighteenth Century provides but one example of the fact that the distinction between East and West had already been present in the European consciousness for centuries, and that Western Europe had a long tradition of excluding Eastern European countries from its political and even ‘civilisational’ self-image.\textsuperscript{59} The concept of Mitteleuropa is another instance of the many different concepts of ‘Europe’ and potential ways of subdividing its countries and peoples by grouping them according to different cultural, political and geographical criteria — and one that did not really make an appearance on parliamentary enlargement discourse.\textsuperscript{60} Futhermore, what the MEPs’ alleged ‘common history’ actually amounted to was never specified. While

\textsuperscript{56} Otto von Habsburg, EPP, Germany, “EP Debates: Applications for Membership,” 14 April 1999. He was referring specifically to the Baltic states.


this was pointed out by some MEPs, such remarks remained isolated and did not influence the main thrust of parliamentary discourse. European parliamentarians seemed, on the contrary, to prefer instead a reading of history that was more in line with that put forward by East-Central European intellectuals in the 1980s, from Kundera to Havel. In fact, Vaclav Havel himself became an important point of intellectual reference for many MEPs, who quoted his words time and again during plenary debates. His ideas about the ‘dream’ of uniting the European continent made their way into the enlargement discourse of the European Parliament and EP President Pat Cox constantly quoted Havel’s 1990 speech to the EP when visiting the candidate countries:

“Without dreaming of a better Europe we shall never build a better Europe. To me the twelve stars of the European flag do not express the proud conviction that we will build heaven on this earth — there will never be heaven on earth — I see these twelve stars as a reminder that the world could become a better place, a better place that in time and from time to time if we had the courage to look up at the stars.”

Increasingly, MEPs and EP Presidents talked not merely of ‘enlargement’, but of ‘re-unification’: the word reunification appeared sixteen times in the October 2000 enlargement debate, twice in September 2001, eleven times in the 19 November 2002 debate (not the extraordinary debate of the morning, but the standard debate on the progress by the candidate countries in the afternoon), and nine times in the final enlargement debate before the official accession of the new member states on 9 April 2003. Pat Cox used the word ‘reconciliation’ sixty three times in the official speeches he gave outside plenary over his two-year term as EP President between 2002 and 2004.

Parliamentary discourse on the fifth enlargement also built upon the idea of the European project as a break from history by defining the need for enlargement as the need to ‘amend history’ and to ‘finally turn the page’ on


62 Pat Cox was referring to the speech by Vaclav Havel to the European Parliament, 16 February 2000. Speech by Pat Cox to the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu), Tallinn, Estonia, 15 April 2002.

63 As Enrique Barón Crespo put it: “As citizens of the European Union we now have the historic opportunity to transcend Munich — to reverse the events of 1939 when the people of central and eastern Europe were abandoned — and this must be done on the basis of what we have built. I think it is a question of amending history, and we should welcome the opportunity to do so” (Enrique Barón Crespo, PSE, Spain, “EP Debates: Enlargement — Agenda 2000, 3 December 1997).

the ‘cruel division of Europe’ imposed by the Cold War. The accession of the Eastern European countries was therefore also the symbolic closure of the period of division and signified that the Berlin Wall had finally been torn down. Enlargement was thus “an opportunity because it [was] an occasion to reunite what the tragedies of recent history had torn apart.” The mere use of the word ‘re-unification’ provided the fifth enlargement with significant historical and moral legitimisation: “enlargement itself is not the correct name – it is the coming together again of our old continent of Europe, it is a reunification, a re-birth of sorts, a renaissance of the European idea.” Upon the signature of the Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003, Cox stated that the history had finally been corrected and its legacy overcome: “Today we consign our fractured past to the history books.”

The narrative constructed by MEPs remained fairly superficial and the rhetoric highlighted above was really the whole extent of their elaboration of a historical discourse. They refrained from trying to define the actual contents of this alleged common history and created a narrative that could perhaps work within the specific circumstances and emotional connotations of the fifth enlargement, but would prove difficult to extend, as with the example of Turkey.

**Contested histories: unresolved debates on the European past**

The dominant historical narrative of parliamentary discourse on the fifth enlargement remained fairly general and rarely touched upon unresolved debates about the past that were still relevant for contemporary politics in the acceding states. A compelling illustration is provided by the way in which the European Parliament tried to tackle the issue of the Beneš Decrees, the controversial piece of Czech legislation at the centre of the debate on the political requirements for EU enlargement. MEPs were not in agreement over the interpretation of the Beneš Decrees in history and eventually a consensus emerged not to discuss them as a historical issue, which would have led to a much wider debate on reprisals and possibly on forced migration throughout

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69 Address by Pat Cox, Liberal Democrat Group, Ireland, President of the European Parliament at the Ceremony of the Signature of the Treaty of Accession, Athens, 16 April 2003.
Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. Instead, they mainly confined them to the realm of the past, as exemplified by the words of German EPP representative Jürgen Schröder: “This is not some sort of attempt to rewrite history on our part. There is no question of that. It is Today and, more importantly, Tomorrow, which are at stake.”70 In addition, his fellow group member Elmar Brok stressed:

“Our task is not to examine the past from a legal perspective, but to ensure that no discrimination arises as a result of the current application of the law […] there is no attempt to use issues of history as new combat instruments in the European Union; instead, we must ensure that we learn from history to prevent the suffering, expulsions, murders and wars which occurred in the past from ever happening again.”71

British PSE member Simon Murphy was in agreement: “Questions of history are important but questions of history are exactly that, historical questions […] they are not conditions for accession to the European Union.”72 As was fellow British and Liberal Democrat Graham Watson: “[the] Liberal Democrats deplore the abuse of enlargement negotiations to reopen old wounds and animosities. The infamous Beneš Decrees are a good example of this. It serves no useful purpose to inflame tensions on this issue.”73

The European Parliament, however, remained divided on its judgment of the Beneš Decrees and, more broadly, on how to address and deal with certain consequences of the Second World War in candidate countries. Many MEPs eventually argued that the controversy was unnecessary because the decrees were a historical occurrence and should bear no consequence for Czech eligibility for EU membership, as entry would project this country into a common future and a ‘community of justice’74 that would ensure the respect of human and minority rights. They also argued that the Czech willingness to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria was evidence enough of their allegiance to the principle of reconciliation, the ‘moral foundation of integration’.75 Reconciliation was thus used as a blanket concept that could also include the Czech case: by joining the EU the Czech Republic would embrace the principle of reconciliation as the founding principle of European integration, and other EU members would in turn extend this ‘spirit’ to the Czech Republic.

75 Ibid.
and ensure, as a community, that the discriminatory nature of the Beneš Decrees would remain confined to the past.

This was a means to overcome the obstacle without dealing with the deeper historical issues inherent in the adoption and maintenance of the Decrees in the Czech legal system. It allowed the MEPs a way out of the debate on the treatment of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe after the war, and it also allowed for the continued use of the general narrative of integration as reconciliation, glossing over the more controversial aspects of the past and its consequences, without delving into the actual complexities of specific historical events, and even relegating them to a past that was ‘closed’ and far away as opposed to a past that still had contemporary relevance. Even if references to such events may have been more relevant to contemporary politics and hence they could arguably have stimulated greater interest and possibly identification among Europe’s citizens, there could be no agreement across the political spectrum and national divides on the ‘correct’ interpretation of such histories, and thus they were left out of the dominant narrative.

**Conclusion**

The EP’s historical narrative for the fifth enlargement followed many strands, weaving together the three historical myths: that of the founding fathers and reconciliation, that of Europe’s dark past, and that of a shared history prior to the Second World War and the Cold War — all the while using the idea of reconciliation as a common thread. Parliamentary discourse built up these myths within its debates. In the EP’s image of Europe, the European Union itself became the embodiment of the myth of the European peace process, and was presented in constant opposition to the historical tradition of violence. The recent positive myth was anchored in the myth of the long history of conflict and legitimized as a decisive rupture with Europe’s historical legacy and as the dawn of a new era. In justifying the fifth enlargement, however, Parliament also reintroduced the idea that there was in fact a positive shared history between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe and that this constituted the basis of a ‘reunification’ of the continent: enlargement was thus transformed into the rightful return of the kidnapped East to the common European fold.76

To what extent, however, did this narrative resonate with those very Central and Eastern Europeans who were acceding to the EU and for whose accession the narrative was developed? Did they, entirely or in part, buy into the historical

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identity discourse articulated by MEPs, refer to the same foundation myths or at least use similar historical references? The first encounter between MEPs and representatives of the CEEC candidate countries, on the occasion of the November 2002 debate in which the doors of the EP were opened for participation to colleagues from the future member states, seem to suggest that there was little if any desire among the latter to share the historical narrative developed by MEPs. The myth of the founding fathers was used by some of the candidates’ representatives, with a Slovak speaker referring to Schuman as ‘the father of Europe’, Slovenia’s representative referring to both Schuman and Adenuer, but the overwhelming majority did not refer to them, or indeed to any other elements of the historical narrative developed by MEPs thus far.

The absence of a common historical discourse upon this occasion, however, may well have derived from a preoccupation on the part of the candidates with the very real political and economic requirements of membership, trumping for the time being the need for a full development of a common identity beyond compliance with formal entry requirements. The question that remains is whether there was in fact a convergence onto a common discourse, and specifically a common historical narrative, in the enlarged European Parliament after the new countries’ entry in May 2004. This would show that new MEPs from Central and Eastern European shared the same interpretation of the EU’s historical identity, or at the very least that they were socialized into a common way of thinking and talking about Europe and European identity. The persistence of this discourse would also show that the historical narrative developed to justify the fifth enlargement could in fact be applied to other circumstances, rather than remain confined to a very specific time and context and thus failing to provide a universally, or at least more widely usable basis for a shared identity.

A preliminary exploration of enlargement debates between 2004 and 2007, when the enlarged EP debated the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, does not however seem to corroborate this hypothesis. On the contrary, very little mention was made of historical references, and the potent historical discourse that permeated enlargement debates between 1999 and 2004 was largely absent between 2004 and 2007. The idea of reconciliation, for instance, which was at the heart of the narrative before 2004, was mentioned once in the December 2004 debate on Romania’s progress towards accession, in relation to the “historic reconciliation between Romania and Hungary.”

The immediately subsequent

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77 Figel (MPC-SK), Internet: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/nov2002/verbatim report.pdf. Cyprus’ representative also referred to the myth of the founding fathers, namely Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, as ‘visionaries’.

discussion on Bulgaria did not even have that token reference — although the German Van Orden did state that “the European Union’s enlargement to the east and south-east marks a momentous change in Europe. We have finally put an end to the hostilities and the divisions of the Cold War.”

The debate on both Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession on 12 April 2005 fared slightly better: Hungarian Socialist MEP Dobolyi stated: “We are ready to welcome the people of Bulgaria into the association to which they have always belonged, since they share our history, culture and values. In so doing, we mark the end of an artificially created break, just as in the case of Romania.” Her Polish colleague Libcki also recalled the idea of the artificial division imposed upon Europe during the Cold War: “The accession of these two countries will mean that the divisions created by the Yalta agreement, and that ran counter to European culture, tradition and justice, will at last be totally erased from the map.”

These were meagre offerings, however, for the nearly three years that passed between the enlargement of May 2004, and its completion with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007. Debates over this enlargement were held every few months, and yet no other examples of MEPs reprising the historical narrative of the previous five years were present. This may have been the result of a very simple change: as eight Central and Eastern European countries had already joined the EU in 2004, the urgency to justify the mere fact that they had in fact the right to join had lost most of its potency — and this would reflect on the debate on Bulgaria and Romania, whose accession could largely be seen as an extension of the 2004 enlargement. However, this seems only a partial explanation for the sudden disappearance of a discursive strand that had until then been so pervasive — indeed, the Bulgarian and Romanian accessions would have been the perfect occasion for reiterating and consolidating this discourse, and showing its applicability beyond the specific circumstances of the fifth enlargement. This, however, was not the case. There is therefore another reason that strikes the observer as the root of history’s disappearance from the enlargement discourse: the narrative developed prior to 2004 was not shared by the new post-communist states that had joined the EU. The strong Western European slant with which the historical construction had been drawn made it exclusive, rather than inclusive, because it justified the entry of Central and Eastern European countries on essentially Western terms.

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MEPs had shaped their historical discourse in the image of their own historical experiences and contemporary political concerns. MEPs in the 1990s were widely concerned with the public’s increasing disaffection with the European project. They were also aware of the fact that the recourse to images of war and bloodshed risked not having any resonance with the new generations of European citizens: precisely because the reconciliation process had been so successful, MEPs in the 1990s grew increasingly aware of the fact that young Western Europeans had only ever experienced ‘peace and prosperity’.

Images of war in Europe no longer worked in the same ways as they had in the Cold War decades: despite the outbreak of war on European territory with the prolonged conflict in the former Yugoslavia, crucially, the new generations did not have any direct experience of the world wars and nor, increasingly, did their parents. The European Union had made the idea of war among the member states such an alien concept that it now became difficult to conjure up the myth of reconciliation as the primary factor of legitimisation for the Union. At the same time when they were constructing this myth, MEPs were also increasingly aware of the fact that it would not be sufficient to stimulate strong allegiances to the enlarged European Union among its citizens: the myth of reconciliation may have been consolidated during the fifth enlargement debate and used to justify the accession of Central and Eastern European countries, but whether it would survive as a legitimating tool for the future remained open to question.

Almost as significant was the fact that the myth of European integration was constructed on the basis of largely superficial, and even artificial, historical references: MEPs rarely, if at all, chose to venture into the complexities of European history, nor did they seek to provide an accurate understanding of the intricacies of the common historical experiences that they referred to. This was due to the very nature of their historical discourse, which revolved around the creation of a foundation myth for the contemporary needs of their political project. Their political use of history was part of a rhetorical arsenal aimed at defining ‘historical’ Europe in terms of the concerns of contemporary European politics: a simplified version of history was essential to the successful creation of a legitimising myth. To an extent, the intricacy of European history, both in terms of its divided and violent nature and in terms of the political, cultural, and social interconnection of European societies dating back long before the beginning of political and institutional integration defied the attempts by Europe’s elected representatives to provide a simplified version of ‘the common European history’ that could be fully convincing to its citizens and to future member states. The European narrative remained composed of different myths.

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and the need to justify the fifth enlargement compelled MEPs to bring back references to yet another set of pre-war experiences to overcome the Cold War division. This undermined the coherence of the myth of post-war integration, and the attempt to use ‘reconciliation’ as the key concept bridging the gap between Western and Eastern Europe fell short of its target when Cypriots failed to resolve their own division and in the controversy surrounding the Beneš Decrees in the Czech Republic, for instance, also remained frozen and both countries joined the European Union in May 2004 without any progress on these issues. The fact that the historical narrative was largely absent from enlargement debates post-2004 does not necessarily mean, however, that the EP’s identity discourse abandoned history altogether. On the contrary, the late 2000s were characterised by a surge in activity within the European Parliament on questions of memory and history, exemplified for instance by the adoption of resolutions on the occasion of anniversaries such as the end of the Second World War or the Schuman Declaration, the designation of 23 August as the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, and of 11 July as the Day of Commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide. The EP also took the highly controversial decision in December 2008 to set up a ‘House of European History’ in Brussels, a museum whose mission is “to bring Europe’s history alive […] and help promote an awareness of European identity.”

History and memory thus remained very much at the heart of EP activities and discourse, and their absence in the 2004-2007 enlargement debates is not therefore an irrefutable indication of the end of the EP’s historical narrative. What the absence did mean, however, was that the legitimating function of the historical narrative applied to the fifth enlargement was not easily transferable to other enlargement rounds. Its specificity certainly made it difficult to apply to Turkey, for instance, and its marked Western European character meant that MEPs who joined the assembly from the new member states did not find it representative of their own historical experiences, rendering it unusable in their own elaborations of the identity embodied by the EU.

The historical narrative of reconciliation remained limited to the unique circumstances of the Eastern European enlargement, and would hardly be applicable to cases such as the Turkish one, for example. More importantly, it was based on a Western European experience of the post-war years that was not, and could not be, shared by the Central and Eastern European partners — and their reluctance to even broach the subject after their entry was evidence of the gulf in both the experience and perception of history.

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Bibliography


**EU-related documents (in chronological order)**

This article seeks to take a historical and sociological view of the current European debt crisis. In particular I take a critical view of the rise of neoliberalism across Europe and seek to return to a consideration of the displaced tradition of European liberal socialism. Here I argue that liberal socialism contains many progressive ideas that can be linked back to the European Enlightenment and offers answers to the current wave of market-led globalisation. Here I argue that the idea of critical memory remains crucial to Europe’s future and its ability to be able to sustain a sense of citizenship and above all freedom for its people. Further I seek to link debates about consumerism and citizenship to the growing sense of resentment and anger that is currently spreading across Europe.

Key words: citizenship, resentment, consumerism, symbolic violence, liberal socialism.

Introduction

In the summer of 2011 a sense of crisis pervaded Europe’s media. The economic crisis in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, Italy and Ireland and the responsibilities of fellow European’s dominated the headlines. The banking and now broader financial crisis led to the slashing of the public sector, privatization and economic uncertainty across Europe. Demonstrations across the continent pictured ordinary citizens and grass roots social movements seeking to preserve their way of life and standard of living. This situation was made even more precarious with rising fuel, energy and food prices encouraging many citizens
to take to the streets. However this crisis has been taken by many to indicate evidence of the faltering European project. Many are now proclaiming the future heralds the break-up of the European Union and the return to nationalist politics and more aggressive free market capitalism.\footnote{Martin Kettle, “The Nationalists Have Won: Europe’s Dream Is Over,” The Guardian, 24 June 2011, p. 35.} In addition there are also fears that the Greeks (and others) may default leading to the end of the Eurozone. As the German tabloids have been asking why, indeed, should their citizens pay for the pension plans of Greek public sector workers?\footnote{John Lancaster, “Once Greece Goes…,” London Review of Books, Vol. 33, No. 14, 2011, pp. 3–7.} The idea of a social Europe that seeks to correct the excesses of globalisation while granting citizens a common citizenship, employment, job security and strong welfare states is increasingly under pressure. Across Europe, right-wing political parties have promoted neoliberalism, increasing inequality and the fear of immigrants. It is this more regressive vision of Europe that currently seems to be dominant. If the broader sense of crisis reminds many Europeans of its internal reconstruction at the end of the Second World War, then we need to maintain a sense of perspective. According to historian Mark Mazower,\footnote{Mark Mazower, “Any New Marshall Plan Will Founder in the Minds of Europe’s Hesitant Leaders,” The Guardian, 6 July 2011, p. 12.} during the 1940s state planning and international aid (the Marshall plan) enabled post-war prosperity, but today’s politicians are more used to a world run by the market. Europe currently seems to have little sense of an ‘alternative’ to the dominant policies of neoliberalism that involve privatization, job insecurity, increasing inequality, a reduced public sector, and anti-trade union laws. If we add to this a growing sense across the continent that multiculturalism has been a failure, and the ending of the Schengen agreement that allowed free mobility across borders, then clearly we are in a period of transformation. The European financial crisis is not purely about economics but involves social and cultural dimensions as well. If there are deep anxieties within political elites and some publics about Europeans being out flanked by the rising economic powers of China and India there are other perhaps more pressing dangers. David Marquand has caught the dominant mood by arguing that European societies currently risk descending into “a big pool of resentment.”\footnote{David Marquand, The End of the West: The Once and Future of Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p. 52.} This resentment has a mobile focus against the poor, immigrants, Muslims, rich people, politicians and the European Union. If the post-war development of the European Union, national democracy, and treaties on human rights were meant to address the
problems of ethnic nationalism then we currently seem a long way from the
dream of the inclusive European citizenship of the post-war era.

The historical emergence of European cultural identity has been the subject of
a considerable amount of debate.\(^6\) Indeed the idea of Europe first emerges through
the notion of Christendom as opposed to non-civilised barbarians. The idea of
Europe as an essentially Christian civilisation is of course still with us today but
makes little sense in the context of more contemporary forms of cultural and
religious pluralism. However the historian Jacques Le Goff,\(^7\) building on the
scholarship of Marc Bloch,\(^8\) has argued that the common experience of European
feudalism made Europe imaginable as an idea in the middle-ages. This was a
Europe built upon the dominance of the church and village life, the power of
the nobility and a warrior class as well as ideas of chivalry, monogamy and courtly
love. However twelfth century Europe could also be seen as an intolerant and
hateful society given Christianity’s role in persecuting heretics, Jews and Muslims
in the Crusades. We can see perhaps that this idea (albeit in a reinvented form)
lives on today in the rise of Right wing anti-immigrant and especially anti-Muslim
political parties after 9/11. The classical sociologist Max Weber argued however
that it was Protestantism that was to lay the foundations for European
distinctiveness.\(^9\) The dominance of science and technical rationality and states
governed by law and bureaucratic procedures were mostly enhanced within the
European setting. Weber argued that the rationalism of Western culture had
religious origins within ascetic Protestantism. The European Reformation then did
not end the influence of religious ideas within Western modernity but instead
helped develop a particular ethic that was necessary for the development of
capitalism. This ethic rejected the enjoyment of life and hedonism more generally
for devotion to work and accumulation. These features are recognised as ‘cultural’
by Weber and were used to dislodge the ‘leisureliness’ of traditional business
practices.\(^10\) The spirit of capitalism (as it developed within the European context)
was driven less by consuming and more by earning. The Protestant ethic could be
recognised through a ‘job well-done’, honesty, and a lack of ostentation. These
characteristics, which are of course still in evidence today, demanded that citizens
attach themselves to the duty of work and rational calculation. If more postmodern
times have made us critical of master-narratives like those provided by Weber, he

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York, 1958.

\(^10\) Ibid., p. 67.
continues to remind us of the central importance of both capitalism and religion to any wider ideas of European modernity. We might equally remember that medieval European societies can be characterised as “the rigorous economic subjection of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men.” Ideas of rank, hierarchy and control of the lower orders (that stopped short of slavery) were all a marked features of the medieval world. These features, as we shall see, are every bit as significant in shaping European modernity as Weber’s notion of the Protestant ethic.

The idea of democracy and human rights in the European setting has done a great deal historically to contain what Dennis Smith has described as “the honour code.” This is the capacity of elites to use their power to inflict their will upon others, to bring them to submission and to humiliate them. We are humiliated and generally feel deep resentment when we lack freedom, are denied agency, and feel insecure while being dismissed as a second-class citizen. If European imperialism was the source of the first wave of humiliation then the second has been provided by globalisation. As Hannah Arendt has argued ‘race’ thinking is characteristic of European imperialism and totalitarianism. If imperial and totalitarian rule could be justified by refusing to recognise the humanity of the ‘Other’ then the honour code can be found alive and well in imperial and totalitarian Europe. However, it suffers a set-back in post-war society given the emphasis placed upon human rights, social justice and democracy. These advances have been thrown into question more recently as neoliberal forms of globalisation have helped foster a culture of humiliation, disrespect and resentment amongst ordinary people. If democracy, human rights and social justice offer the possibility of building humane European societies then neoliberal forms of globalisation have brought this into question. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has accurately recognised the extent to which neoliberal globalisation arises less through the opposition of economics and the state than through state policy. Globalisation then is less the rule of corporations, as the changing dynamics of capital and state power. The retreat of the social state since in the 1980s, the development of part-time and temporary employment, the downgrading of trade unions, and the encouragement of more flexible labour markets have all helped shape the social and economic conditions for the humiliation of the working-class population. Here European

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workers are increasingly being told not only that they are in competition with locations that do not place social restrictions upon the operation of capital and that there is ‘no alternative’ to this state of affairs. European welfare states in this setting are increasingly being reconstructed through ideas of employability and activation. This has meant a situation where citizenship is less of a status than a contract that is built upon the responsibility to take an enterprising view of the self. The public sphere, in this setting, is no longer simply a place where views are exchanged, but also where behavioural norms are modified in ways that stress individual responsibility to secure employment.18 Missing from this contract is any discussion of the kinds of employment being made available, the persistence of poverty, unemployment and inequality, skill and wage levels and employment conditions more generally.

Globalization has acted as the justification for neoliberal policies that aim to produce an insecure and anxious citizenry in an increasingly unequal world.19 If the liberal socialism of the post-war era is currently in retreat it continues to exist as a social memory for many European citizens. In particular, Western European societies after the end of the Second World War experienced a different kind of politics that aimed to construct a society that connected the virtues of both freedom and security. Here I want to argue that it is imperative that historians and sociologists become involved in a critical politics of memory. If it is an exaggeration to argue that postmodern consumer culture seeks to institute a culture of the ‘perpetual present’ it undoubtedly places any alternative social movement at a considerable disadvantage.20 In the context of this article, I want to actively remember the politics of this period in terms of its hopes and aspirations. This is not because I think social science should be involved in producing objectivist history, but because of the need to expand the horizons of the present. This is to recognise along with Gadamer that any excursion into history is necessarily a means of attempting to form an interpretative dialogue between past and present.21 Further, that the temporal tension between past and present can be a source of moral creativity as we seek to explore the possibility of different narratives and alternatives emerging in the future.22 The dialogue

with the past is essentially a poetic encounter where different identities and existential possibilities may begin to emerge.

**Remembering European Liberal Socialism**

The historians Donald Sassoon\(^2\) and Eric Hobsbawm\(^2\) both recall what they refer to as a golden period for capitalism and the development of welfare after 1945. This was partially motivated by a fear of communism, but also recognised that ‘planning’ was required to save capitalism from its own contradictions. The era of welfare capitalism was both an attempt to rescue capitalism and to provide a bulwark against Communism, but also represented a very real victory on the part of organised labour. This was a period when the political Left and more generally the labour movement were in the ascendancy. For Norberto Bobbio the European Left wished to reduce inequalities whereas the Right has either sought to defend or preserve them.\(^2\) If egalitarians tend to view inequality as socially and culturally created as well as unjust then anti-egalitarians view them as natural or as serving other values. The Left’s preference for equality has meant that it has sometimes been involved in complex trade-offs against other values such as freedom and liberty. However one of the twentieth century’s most powerful ideological forces sought to press the case for equal rights for citizens that sought to expand both equality and liberty for all. For the Left equality and liberty go together as they have historically been motivated to find an alternative to the massive social divisions created by unregulated capitalism. If the Left has not been exclusively concerned with class relationships it has historically sought to struggle for a society where capitalism did not dominate. Geoff Eley argues that since the 1850s this search has involved ideas of citizenship that preferred a society built on co-operation rather than competition and where a genuine democracy could only take root if the power of private property was regulated.\(^2\) In the European setting the Left were to progressively abandon a revolutionary model of social change for one that sought to utilise state power to follow egalitarian ends. Instead of seeking to replace society with the state the Left sought to connect an egalitarian society with a deeper model of democracy. If the socialist politics

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after the second world war was built upon the labour movement this began to falter after the 1970s as it became clear that the old working-class was in decline. This was not a society where class did not matter, but where the fragmentation of identities, the rise of the New Right and the decline of class solidarities plunged notions of the Left into a long crisis. If the Left was built on the ideals of public service, trade union power and the idea of progressive improvement these were all increasingly subject to scepticism during the 1980s. The Left after the assault of neoliberalism and the decline of the labour movement suffered a crisis of identity that continues today.

There are of course disputes about the extent to which liberal socialist parties in power were able to deliver a programme of increased democratisation and equality, but these were undoubtedly part of the aims of the Western European labour movement. If socialists gradually gave up on the idea of ending capitalism the democratic socialist model of development was often strongly contrasted with the United States that endured higher levels of inequality and many more of the social problems evident with unrestrained capitalism, such as higher levels of infant mortality, crime, and drug addiction. If unregulated capitalism produced a form of barbarism by producing extreme inequality, competition and commodification the Left could present itself as a force for civilisation. However missing from these recollections is the argument that liberal notions of socialism also sought to expand the freedom of the whole community. These ideas can be traced back to the European Enlightenment that sought to question the established ideas of traditional hierarchies. In particular the Enlightenment sought to emphasise the rule of law, constraints being placed upon power and individual autonomy. The extent to which liberal versions of socialism were connected to the Enlightenment could be traced through ideas of progress. Here ‘reason’ was to be used to question authority, criticise dogmatic beliefs and promote critical reflection. If the notion of progress seems out of date after postmodernism, the holocaust and imperialism, it did not seem that way to many of the liberal socialists of the period. As both Stephen Bronner\(^\text{27}\) and Tzvetan Todorov\(^\text{28}\) argue, the critical spirit of the Enlightenment is best captured by the demand for democratic and discursive forms of inquiry rather than the legitimation of totalitarianism. This tradition then is better understood through a discussion of the history of liberalism rather than the shoring up of more authoritarian regimes. It was the liberal emphasis placed upon universal rights, law, and of expanding freedom more generally that meant it could not be equated with totalitarian rule. For democratic socialists the liberal tradition was


more than the idea that it simply legitimated the rule of elites, but instead offered the possibility of bringing similar freedoms to the working class population that had been enjoyed previously by elites. For example, the Italian socialist Carlo Rosselli argues in the 1930s that the European social democracy emerging across Europe is actually a renewed form of liberalism. This is not the Marxist struggle for a utopian society without a state, but the attempt to build a society on a rights based citizenship that emphasises individual freedom. Rosselli’s vision is of a society where citizens are free to develop themselves no longer ‘enslaved’ by the daily humiliation of poverty and inequality. For Rosselli “socialists postulate the end of bourgeois privilege and the effective extension of the liberties of the bourgeoisie to all.” This meant that it was the labour movement who were the heir to liberalism as only they had the capacity to spread the principles of individual liberty throughout society. Later Bobbio would similarly argue for a liberal version of socialism that was built upon the rights of the individual and the democratisation of society more generally.

Like Rosselli, Bobbio seeks to redefine socialism as concerned with the spread of liberty and democracy throughout society thereby offering a distinctive vision to that offered by Soviet Marxism. The Italian liberal socialism of Rosselli and Bobbio was born out of the fight against fascism while at the same time wishing to criticise ideas of direct democracy. The defining ethos of liberal socialism being the combination of the values of liberty, democracy and equality holding in check the power of elites from below through democratic processes and procedures.

If Rosselli and Bobbio identified the Italian problem as one of allowing ordinary people the possibility of experiencing a life of liberty then, as I have indicated, this has its historical roots in the European Enlightenment. For Bronner, the liberal legacy of the Enlightenment offered the working-class movement a dual purpose. This was the struggle for citizenship whereby they were able to reconcile the idea of liberty for all with social rights. Progressive liberalism was precisely the tradition that would be rejected by totalitarian regimes. Tzvetan Todorov identifies totalitarian thought as being evident where “the I of the individual must be replaced by the we of the group.” Totalitarian thought in both its Nazi and Soviet form seeks to cancel the freedom of the individual. The deliberate de-humanisation of the enemy and disavowal of pluralistic ideas are also evident here. It was the liquidation of the capacity of

30 Ibid., p. 86.
32 Ibid., p. 60.
the individual for dissent by the totalititarian state that inspired many liberal socialists. If unregulated capitalism produced massive inequalities and unfairness then the state was capable of crimes against humanity and of producing a mass society.

George Orwell’s liberal socialism can be seen as operating along these contours. The nightmare vision of a state controlled society that has eliminated memory, authenticity and dissent is issued as a warning. However Orwell’s liberal socialism sought to connect liberty and justice in new ways. Like many in the liberal socialist tradition a great deal of emphasis is placed upon the role of education. A free society depends on people who are not afraid to be free. Freedom is unlikely to be experienced as a value if the education system is reduced to training for employment, but by engaging with unusual ideas individuals are offered the possibility of developing a questioning and critical life. Orwell hoped that such democratically inspired individuals are unlikely to be satisfied with a society that was overly totalitarian or “organised like a beehive.” Ultimately, for Orwell, this did not mean a perfect or utopian society but rather one where economic security and liberal freedoms could be preserved while keeping more overtly authoritarian solutions to social problems at bay. Similarly Dewey and Tawney place a great deal of emphasis upon education as the place where freedom could be learned. Freedom here is less an idea and more a learned practice that needs to be apparent in our daily lives. The idea that education is the place where we learn to be authentic by developing our own ideas and identities can of course also be traced back to Enlightenment ideals.

The liberal socialist tradition in the context of totalitarian Europe sought to extend the idea of liberty to everyone, not simply through the formal expression of rights but to make liberty part of everyday life, and to curb the worst excesses of capitalism. The collapse of capitalism in the 1930s and the state control of ‘actually existed socialism’ not surprisingly made this tradition of thinking one of the major benefactors of the post-war settlement within Europe. However this ‘golden period’ of Western European socialism was to come to end in the 1980s. Western European liberal socialism had largely been based upon the recognition by the state of working-class institutions like trade unions and the need to build a progressive public culture. Social democratic citizenship was a compromise

between capital and labour that helped support a politics that gave expression to the establishment of the welfare state and the idea that all citizens were entitled to develop the self through education. The political parties of this period were more than election winning machines and were largely based upon the progressive middle class and the organised working class. Of course not all of the parties and citizens of this period could be described as liberal (more conservative strains of thought were certainly evident) however my argument is that that it was an important strain within the internal debate. For example, many of the films and much of the literature about British working-class life in the 1960s demonstrates a sense of both rising expectation and of citizens wanting to experiment with the new freedoms of class mobility and artistic expression. Freedom here was not expressed simply a means of earning more money, but crucially was understood as an opportunity to expand educational horizons and to improve the self. Such a project of self-education was built through alternative organisations as well as dominant institutions and reflected a new confidence amongst many working-class people. If Orwell had wondered whether intellectual freedom would ever be valued as much as job security by working class people an affirmative answer was beginning to be felt by the end of the 1960s. The liberal socialist struggle for a civilised society could be broadly understood as the struggle for a dignified life for everyone. As Tawney argued, if “to lead a life worthy of human beings is confined to a minority, what is commonly called freedom would more properly be described as privilege.”

Of course we would need to recognise that liberal socialism was indeed dependent upon a world when capital was more rooted to the spot than is currently evident. Here my I do not simply to argue for the reaffirmation of the politics of a previous period or that globalisation is wholly a myth. However, there is a need to remember the politics of a previous period where it seemed reasonable to connect a politics of the state not simply to enhanced rationalisation and bureaucratisation but to a project of democratisation and enhanced liberty for ordinary citizens. This is a project that can be recast in new times.

The European Dream?

Jeremy Rifkin has recently sought to identify what he calls the European dream that rivals that of the American dream. This dream provides an

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alternative to the dysfunctional cutthroat capitalism of the United States and instead emphasises welfare provision, well-being, and quality of life. While this dream might be more distant from reality in light of the recent economic crisis, we need to remember that the European Union contains a high degree of social and cultural variety, from the relatively egalitarian and strong welfare states of the Scandinavian countries to some of the small state, low taxation countries located in Eastern Europe. Indeed Perry Anderson and Pierre Bourdieu argue that many intellectuals failed to grasp the reality that Europe is more responsive to business elites than it is to democratic pressures from below. If the European Union began as soldering together human rights, democracy and prosperity, it might today more accurately be said to resemble a neoliberal model. This is the Europe of a central bank and bureaucracy that offers little in the way of democratic accountability. By expanding EU membership into Eastern Europe it has allowed European capital access to the low wage economies of the East. Here we find the gradual erasure of the difference between so called free-market America as opposed to a social Europe. If Europe ultimately failed to stand up to the United States in respect of the ‘war on terror’ the same might be said in respect of the neoliberal evolution of poor wages, poverty and social exclusion. European imperatives to ‘reform’ nearly always mean a retrenchment of the welfare system and usually the opposite of the initiatives that led to the setting up of the social state after the Second World War. Here we are compelled to ask what has changed? Why did liberal European socialist ideals seem so compelling in the middle of the twentieth century but now risk being over taken by events? Here we might point to the development of a new kind of capitalism more driven by technological change, less tied to particular places and the internationalisation of the capitalist economy more generally. This has pushed individual nation-states to focus on supply side economics, seeking to make themselves attractive to large conglomerates and inward investment.

Further we might also talk of the transformation of what Max Weber called the ‘spirit’ of capitalism. If European capitalism was built upon a Protestant spirit devoted to accumulation rather than enjoyment this is no longer the case within the context of consumer-oriented societies. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the dominant ethos of the system is no longer the refusal to engage in hedonistic activity. A meaningful life is now a life built around the desire for commodities and consumption. These dimensions had been previously outlined by the

46 Max Weber, op. cit.
sociologist Daniel Bell who argued that the Protestant ethic originally identified by Weber had been replaced by a world of credit cards and instant gratification.\textsuperscript{48} If the dominant character structure of the nineteenth century depended upon restraint and self-discipline then by the 1960s this was being replaced by a restless ethic of consumption. In terms of citizenship the duty to sacrifice for the good of the community has been replaced by the individual right to pleasure. The central contradiction of capitalism today is between a work place culture that demands hard work as opposed to a consumer culture that emphasises hedonism and play. If Weber found the origins of the spirit of capitalism in religion from where did the consumerist ethic emerge? In other words, and to return to Weber’s problem, if we can argue that the structures of the capitalist economy have moved from a mostly national based level to a globally organised consumer economy based upon disposability and fast turn over, this posits a suggestion as to why people wish to consume. This question is not really dealt with even if we recognise the increasing value that is placed upon the design process, niche markets and branding more generally.\textsuperscript{49} Colin Campbell argues that the answer to this puzzle lies less within the rationality of the Enlightenment than within Romanticism.\textsuperscript{50} The mostly pleasurable associations of consumption that place emphasis on the imagination and fantasy can be located within the Romantic Movement. The desire for new sensations, novelty and fashion begins with a change in Christianity in the seventeenth century and ends with the Romantic emphasis that beauty and the imagination are the main principles of life. The Romantic emphasis upon the right to pleasure and upon emotionality become the central features of consumer capitalism.

More recently Boltanski and Chiapello argue that the new ‘spirit’ of capitalism is not simply focused upon consumer ‘rewards’ but that work itself takes on the language of creativity.\textsuperscript{51} The ‘spirit’ of capitalism is now provided by management gurus and the idea of the enterprising self. The Romantic ethic is no longer opposed to the capitalist system but has been systematically been incorporated into its structures. However the ‘down-side’ of this more flexible and innovative world (for some) is the fear of being rejected as a market failure. Intense feelings of anxiety and uncertainty in a world of short-term commitments inevitably undermine the bonds of solidarity necessary for citizenship. The idea of the global market produces a world of frantic information workers all looking over their shoulders surviving in a world

without the security of a decent welfare state. Here exclusion takes on a new meaning in that being excluded from the labour market is not simply to be looked down on as a second class citizen, but it is also to be excluded from the world of consumption through which many modern citizens imaginatively live their lives. If the everyday world of consumer capitalism can be said to have ‘democratised luxury’ then any attempt to curtail the rights and freedoms to enjoy this world of consumer pleasure begins to sound like a return to more puritanical attitudes.\textsuperscript{52} This is perhaps important in the current context, for if social liberalism is to be revived then a renewed emphasis would need to be placed upon social responsibility as well as freedom. The call for freedom has become the freedom to consume and enjoy lifestyles of hyper-consumption that can be easily connected to the rise of neo-liberalism and the reluctance to pay high levels of taxation. The moral commitment to a shared community and the common good as well as freedoms beyond those of consumption need to be at the fore of creating a new European liberal socialism. While some of the literature on responsibility has simply dismissed concerns with freedom as exemplifying capitalist individualism, it seems that a new contract between freedom and responsibility is required at this juncture.\textsuperscript{53} The balance between the freedom to follow a life of your own choosing while maintaining a sense of responsibility for children, nature, and vulnerable others is a good place to start. The ethical life then needs to recognise both the mutual importance of freedom and responsibility in the European setting. Nevertheless we need to be careful and should not simply follow a number of communitarian writers in insisting upon the rules of community as opposed to liberty of the self.\textsuperscript{54} Here there is a tendency to suggest that ‘bad behaviour’ is the result of the breakdown of the social order and morality more generally. Along with globalisation and neoliberalism there comes a renewed emphasis on the moral policing role of the state and anti-liberalism more generally. However as I have argued communitarianism in seeking a renewed emphasis upon morality (which has a tendency to become repressive and illiberal) neglects some of the broader economic and social transformations necessary to understand European modernity.

Globalisation, on this reading, has been good for capitalism but disastrous for the creation of the common bonds of citizenship. Deindustrialisation, regime shopping, out-sourcing, anti-trade union laws, and labour market flexibility are among the features that have promoted a new culture of capitalism. If the old


welfare capitalism needed to keep workers ready and able to work then flexible
capitalism can either import workers from abroad or find new investment
opportunities. Further the development of Right-wing political parties since the
1980s have appealed to moderately affluent voters by offering to slim down
taxes, cut welfare bills and, of course, to restrict the flows of immigrants. All of
these aspects have effectively played upon the fears of voters and ended up
demonising the poor. The possibilities for the cultural development of working-
class people have been severely restricted during this period. If the 1960s was a
period of rising levels of optimism and inclusive citizenship this has largely
been replaced by uncertainty, consumerism and the use of vicious stereotypes.
Entrenched poverty has been dealt with through much tougher penal policies
and welfare-to-work schemes that are aimed at forcing the unemployed into
increasingly poorly paid forms of employment.55

The new capitalism also has implications for the culture of politics more
generally. Richard Sennett has argued that the more uncertain world of global
competitiveness, consumerism and supply side economics undermines the
careful ‘craft’ of citizenship.56 Firstly political platforms appear to be
increasingly similar being pro-business and anti-immigrant which in itself leads
those in charge of ‘spinning’ political messages to overstate the differences
between the parties. Also, there is an increasing amount of emphasis placed
upon ‘character’ and questions of ‘competence’ which again serves to mask the
basic similarities between the political parties. Politics has become more
consumerist with the demand for ‘instant’ changes where a sense of
disconnection amongst the electorate means that increasingly smaller numbers
of people follow and participate within the broader democratic culture. While
these changes from the past can be over-stated and are more in evidence in some
countries rather than others, they are clearly not without relevance. In more
general terms Colin Crouch describes this condition as post-democratic.57 Here
the formal rituals and procedures of citizenship are in place but are increasingly
controlled by powerful business elites. As the egalitarian emphasis of liberal
socialism has gone into decline so capitalism has increasingly gained control
over the political process. It is under the conditions of post-democracy that the
common bonds of citizenship are downgraded, trade unions are marginalised,
and the poor are treated with contempt. Citizenship becomes generally
weakened as elites have enhanced their control of the political process and the

55 Loïc Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, Duke
56 Richard Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT,
meaning of life is redefined by harsher labour conditions, consumerism, and a slimmed down welfare state. If in the past European democracy was contrasted with European totalitarianism today this comparison has fallen into disuse. If under liberal socialism the aim was the construction of a relatively egalitarian society and individual freedom then today we are more likely to hear of the moral failings of the poor and the need to create a new entrepreneurial spirit amongst the population more generally. Instead, the most common contrast drawn is between those states that have managed to successfully ‘modernise’ their welfare regimes and those that remain bureaucratic and uncompetitive.

Finally, as we have seen, liberal socialism placed a great deal of emphasis upon the need to educate the self. This was not only a matter of gaining educational qualifications, but of discovering the authentic path of the self. The idea that all citizens have their own unique potential and that the point of life is to discover our own direction dominated the educational philosophies of this period. This emphasis has now been displaced by league tables, teaching to test and other features all used to focus attention on results. The market here has not however reversed the considerable educational inequalities and advantages of middle class children to succeed. If, in the past, the concern was with educational freedom then in the current setting freedom in relation to schooling is more concerned with the promotion of private institutions and the break-up of the state. Here my argument is that while accepting the considerable pleasures of consumption they are mostly (although not all) fleeting and are no match for discovering more ‘authentic’ passions of the self. The problem here is that as consumer culture has grown it has converted education into the means to market success thereby displacing some of the troubling questions that educators sought to pose. As Erich Fromm knew all too well, more authentic ideas of freedom actually sit uncomfortably with ideas of market freedom. The freedom of the self is more concerned with ‘being’ than it is with ‘having’. Such a view can be traced back to the Enlightenment and beyond and suggests that we are only truly awake when we are realising our own unique selves in a supportive community.

Therefore, in this context, can we still speak of a European dream that is distinctive from the rise of a consumer society and the promotion of free-market individualism? Manuel Castells has argued convincingly that the European project is now perhaps best understood in the context of globalisation. The fact that most European trade remains within the European Union means that more socially progressive reactions to neoliberalism remain a possibility. An alternative

European identity would need to be found beyond mostly technocratic elites and the considerable appeal of reactive racism and nationalism. What Castells refers to as a ‘project identity’ would of course need to complement rather than replace national, local and regional identity. However, the massacre of Norwegians by a right-wing extremist in the summer of 2011 highlighted the continuing threat from an explicitly European far right. Brevik’s mission was widely reported to ‘save’ Europe from Muslims and cultural Marxist supporters of multiculturalism. Here, the concern is perhaps less that there may be others like him, but more that the rhetoric he used on his web-pages of indignation, intolerance, and hatred closely mirrors that of the more mainstream European Right. Whether Europeans still have the capacity to imagine a more inclusive social and cultural identity (a genuine ‘project identity’) remains to be seen. The new world of informational capitalism (of globalisation’s both real and imagined) has yet to pursue a political project of the substance similar to that which has allowed capitalism to transform itself in the age of technology and consume identities. As Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck argue, if the European Union remains one of the most significant and successful pieces of institution building since the end of the Second World War then it needs to be reimagined in the context of the present. It can only do so, however (a point not made by Beck and Giddens) if it recognises the threat of a new fundamentalism.

**Market Totalitarianism?**

If the transition of citizenship has come from above in respect of business and political elites rather than pressure from below what does this tell us about the ways in which European citizenship is being remade? Michael Mann has convincingly argued that that the social citizenship of the post-war period reflected the balance of power between ruling elites and the organised working class. If this balance of power has now shifted (as it seems to have done) how might we understand the emergent form of citizenship in the European context? What remains important about Mann’s reflections is the importance he places upon the power of elites, but also how their rule needs to be negotiated through compromise, consent and other features. For the historian Tony Judt, the European social democracy of the post war period was built upon the idea that

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61 Ibid., p. 333.
the state and citizens had a responsibility for each other and that this could be demonstrated through access to common services, public provision and inclusive notions of community. The welfare state required relatively high rates of taxation, but became legitimate to the extent to which it delivered a more equal society and bound members of society together in a common community. However, since the 1980s, the idea of there being a common good has come under pressure as notions of the public became devalued. The rise of gated communities, the privatisation of space and consumerism, and the downgrading of welfare have all pushed society into a more market driven direction. For Judt, the Left need to reject radicalism for a progressive conservatism that becomes focused on questions of security, prudence and stability. While this argument can be pushed too far, it is true that questions of freedom and security need to be held in balance. Notable in Judt’s account is the emphasis placed on the discursive aspect of politics and how this has become reconfigured. One of the major achievements of social democracy through the welfare state was the bonding of both the middle and working class to democratic institutions. In other words, Judt’s account recognises the extent to which ideological constructions need to relate to class positions more generally. For Judt, this retreat from common forms of citizenship is especially evident in the idea that a sense of progress and upward mobility, experienced by many in the 1960s, was dependent upon the state. As Zygmunt Bauman comments, the welfare state is partly a victim of its own success in producing generations of well looked after citizens who no longer think they need a safety net. The poor become the ‘Other’ in the consumer society precisely because they are a constant reminder of what can happen in our insecure world.

Elsewhere Tony Judt goes as far as to argue that the that the dominance of market driven solutions currently grip the common sense of elites and intellectuals in a similar fashion to the way that Marxism dominated the minds of many intellectuals in the 1930s. Here Judt refers to the classic work of Polish intellectual Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*. Milosz’s text describes how a generation of intellectuals across Europe became gripped by a ‘new faith’. These intellectuals were largely motivated by a doctrine that aimed to produce a perfected mankind arriving at some point in the distant future. Doctrinaire

66 Ibid., p. 34.
70 Ibid., p. 3.
Marxism offered a kind of anti-Enlightenment culture as it was driven by a desire to regulate and control thought. Herein the liberal traditions of the West were dismissed as doctrinaire, evil, elitist and hostile to the needs of ordinary people. The book stands as a criticism of Left authoritarianism and has a great deal in common with the earlier warnings that Orwell had made in respect of a form of Marxism that knew more about doctrine than it did of the truth. For Judt the contemporary market like authoritarian Marxism has a circle of true believers, is dogmatic, and produces a certain blindness to its short-comings. As Judt argues “the thrall in which an ideology holds a people is best measured by their collective inability to imagine alternatives.”

The critical component of Judt’s historical thinking is quite simply to reveal that in recent times that Europeans have seen a world quite different to that of the present where politics was mainly concerned with developing security and freedom for all after the market failures and authoritarian politics of the 1930s. The introduction of market rationality not only corrodes a shared sense of fraternity and community but also feeds a more general sense of resentment. A common form of citizenship only becomes possible if we learn to rethink the state as the only mechanism available to reduce the power of markets and act in the common good.

Missing from Judt’s account is the role played by political elites in justifying the status quo and the war against social citizenship. In general, Judt’s account places too much on the liberation struggles of the 1960s which are read in an overly conservative manner. For Judt it was the rampant individualism of the 1960s that has led to the rampant individualism characteristic of market driven societies. While there is perhaps a flicker of truth in this account, it should have been more carefully located in some of the problems experienced by social democratic governments in the 1980s. Further ‘progressive’ social movements including feminism, black politics, ecology and gay rights all emerged out of the 1960s. Judt is nonetheless right to argue that market rationality is becoming the new political common sense amongst European elites. Here we perhaps need to consider the role of elites and questions of symbolic power. Returning to the sociological analysis of Pierre Bourdieu, if globalisation is often used as a cover for a top down strategy of neoliberal domination then we need to understand how this particular view of reality has become imposed on the citizenry. Here Judt is partially correct in seeking to remember when ideas of freedom were understood somewhat differently during social democratic periods of dominance, but we need to understand more precisely how this definition of common sense has come to dominate the political field. With this in mind, Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant argue that neoliberalism acts as a form of

71 Tony Judt, The Memory Chalet, op. cit., p.179.
72 Ibid.

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cultural imperialism. By which they mean that it “has the power to universalise particularalisms linked to a singular historical tradition by causing them to be misrecognised as such.” Neoliberalism as a form of cultural logic grew up in the context of the United States and is fast becoming a global logic that aims to judge, assesses, and ultimately displaces other modes of development like social democracy. This should be recognised as an export from a particular world region (namely the United States) that addresses not only the interests of global elites, but has built into it a set of historical understandings that take the experience of the United States as the norm. The effect of this migration of ideas not only de-historises other traditions like European social democracy, but creates a false universalisation through ideas of Westernisation. The West becomes the site of multiple forms of development that historically have attached themselves to different territories, and in different ways.

If neoliberalism acts as a particular form of symbolic domination then it should be understood as a form of class power. Michael Mann argues that wherever neoliberal policies are implemented they end up favouring the wealthy. This does not mean however they are simply the expression of the global business class although these interests tend to be the ‘back-seat driver’ and can nudge or cajole the driver of the vehicle (the political class) in a particular direction, but they are not in full control of the direction of travel. However, as I have argued throughout, if the global economy can push policy in this direction, it is ultimately the state that makes or breaks neoliberalism. It has been the considerable symbolic power of political elites that have normalised these policies. Here we need to develop what might be called “a political economy of symbolic violence.” We need a cultural sociology that seeks to explain how systems of media and education solidify the rule of elites through the construction of knowledge and information. Here we could also point to the role that education plays in constructing elites through education while trying to pass off their success through ideas of a meritocracy. Further ruling elites are granted other symbolic resources through the increasing domination of European media by a limited number of conglomerates. Much of the scholarly talk of ‘globalisation’ has served to mystify the extent to which particular media patterns are largely the result of state policy. The decline of public service broadcasting and the arrival of more commercial television systems across Western Europe has

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75 Ibid., p. 49.


gathered apace since the 1980s.\textsuperscript{78} The growth in the dominance of television as a provider of news and entertainment (despite the arrival of the Internet) has concentrated power in the hands of private corporations that seek to control the media for reasons of profit and influence.\textsuperscript{79} This then hands considerable power to elites to press particular views of ‘reality’ that go increasingly unchallenged in a world where the labour movement has lost power. While the circuits of elite power are inevitably more complex and contradictory than this argument suggests, they remain historically unprecedented.

Neoliberalism then is not only a set of practices but is equally a form of symbolic domination. Critical intellectuals and social movements have a special responsibility to interrupt the educative project of neoliberalism by talking of its hidden costs, but also to provide alternative interpretations and means of understanding. For Bourdieu, what is required in the first instance is a cultural politics that recognises the “the social costs of economic decisions” in terms of the development of inequality, uncertainty and humiliation along with widespread indignation, fear of losing status and, of course, outright resentment.\textsuperscript{80} The other call is to try and defend the social aspect of the state by improving health care, reducing working hours, and improving social protection more generally. The problem is however that all of these features are likely to take a profound battering due to the down-sizing of the social state and the politics of privatisation that has broken out across Europe due to the impact of the broader financial crisis with which this paper began.

The Search for Utopia?

In this setting we need to ask what a feasible alternative might look like? In terms of the critical politics of memory I am advocating here that the question might be reconstituted through the question what do European’s need to remember to avoid the problems of the past? If part of the ‘hidden’ costs of globalisation is a downward spiral of social protection, increased competition and uncertainty then what can be done to address these issues? Here European’s should be urged to remember some of the historical consequences of living in a society where many saw themselves as victims. Omer Bartov argues that it was a widespread sense of humiliation, defeat and victimhood that historically brought so much destruction in its wake. The sense of being a victim tends to blunt citizens’ sense of their own destructiveness.\textsuperscript{81} Victimhood encourages citizens to focus upon their own pain and

troubled circumstances. This is a social setting that does not encourage citizens to take responsibility for the Other or the wider community. The totalitarian regimes of Europe’s past sought to rid of unwanted Others often by blaming ‘minorities’ for past humilations and defeats. This was a Europe of suffering that, according to historian Timothy Snyder, saw totalitarian regimes murder 14 million people between 1933 and 1945.82 Indeed most of these victims did not die in the camps, but were more often the result of state driven policies of deliberate starvation. Europeans need reminding that the feeling of humiliation and defeat can lead to the need for revenge and hatred. The Europe after the end of the Second World War followed a path of human rights, democracy, and social responsibility designed to contain (or at least constrain) these destructive feelings by building a world where everyone’s freedom and security mattered. If a socially liberal society could be built based upon rising levels of prosperity, economic security and rights to self-development, while always likely to be imperfect, then this would hold in check some of the destructive politics of the past that were forged on the anvil of war and economic misery. This is the European story that needs to be remembered in the context of the present.

Such a memory would require a more cosmopolitan set of co-ordinates than usually exists when it comes to viewing the past. From this we may take a sense of history as aiding public self-reflection to apply critically to a changing sense of the present. Indeed, such features have been argued to be one of the central characteristics of European modernity.83 Here there have been three main intellectual avenues pursued to save Europe from the indignation that dominated the past and threatens to be revived in the future. The first is Habermas’s view of a social Europe where European integration is deepened in order to prevent European nations from descending into vicious forms of nationalism.84 The state here is caught in a dilemma that if it raises taxes to underwrite programmes of welfare and inclusion that increasingly footloose capital can more easily move elsewhere. The problem with such a solution of course is that it seems increasingly unrealistic in the context of the present. Anthony Giddens’s idea of a progressive third way agenda for Europe’s centre left parties, which places as much emphasis upon responsibilities as rights, has lost ground in the global recession and for its failure to develop a sufficiently critical language of the market.85 In practice, the third way often tends to


emphasise the responsibilities of the poor rather than the wealthy and more elite interests. However, in the context of the present, the aim to rethink the liberal socialist tradition while recognising the importance of ideas of responsibility cannot be under-estimated. Finally there is the idea that Europe requires a European-wide grass roots movement from below seeking to construct a people’s Europe. However European citizens, despite considerable resistance, have yet to display the appetite for the social struggles that might turn these aspirations into a reality.

Here we need to remember that the prospects for a social and liberal Europe were bolstered by the collective experience of catastrophe. The need to construct a Europe based upon freedom and social solidarity undoubtedly had its roots in the politics of the 1930s. The reshaping of the continent was both a European as well as a national form of politics. While Anthony D. Smith has argued it is only nations that have memories, here it is important to point to more cosmopolitan constructions of the past. Such views are at best misleading if we follow Ulrich Beck’s ideas about the possibility of a second modernity. If the first stage of modernity was one of self-contained nation-states then globalisation moves into a contemporary era with a more enhanced sense of interconnection. While this does not necessarily bring with it a more developed sense of being European or indeed of European responsibilities as the recent debt crisis bears out, cosmopolitanisation at least introduces the possibility of memories that flow across previous established borders of nationhood. If the routes towards a social Europe are less than certain we are at least granted the imaginative possibility of talking about differences and similarities across cultural borders. If Europe is now the site of an insecure and increasingly anxious citizenry who fear downward mobility without the protection of the social state then perhaps now is the time to have a closer look at our shared history. Given the continued power of the nation-state, the argument here is that there cannot simply be a post-national Social Europe. National identities, despite the problems of the past, as the histories of liberal socialism demonstrated, remain for many one of the few remaining sources of solidarity. Here we need to give up opposing cosmopolitanism and nationalism and look for ways in which they might work together. As we have seen, cosmopolitanism in the case of the European Union is not necessarily more

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progressive than nationalism. The recovery of the idea of bringing liberalism home for the majority of citizens is not one that can be exercised exclusively at the national or post-national level. There is nothing exclusively European about liberal socialism, yet we do need to think quite carefully about how the historical gains of a previous (and now fading) period can be held onto and revived in the increasing indignant culture of the present. These problems are enough to cancel any idea of the end of history or the equally misleading idea that human societies (like human-beings) can escape their own pasts. Instead the remembered past is part not only of our collective experience, but also part of the cultural resources that we will need to face the challenges of the future. The attempt to dispense with the past (or even put it on hold) only risks storing up problems for us in the near future. Globalisation in this sense is one part fiction (justifying neoliberal reform) and one part reality pointing to new challenges to Europeans, hoping to keep the memories of their progressive solutions alive. As Norman Birnbaum argues, most children who have benefited from the social reforms of the past (both European and American) lack any sense of what this has given them.\(^9\) The development of the media of mass communication as the dominant educators of the consumer age can hardly be relied upon to communicate this sense. If European socialist parties continue to argue for the protection of the public reforms that increased the quality of our common lives, they have perhaps not paid enough attention to their own history. The question remains: “how are the hopes of citizenship to find a sense of moral purpose outside of the lessons of history?” Could the citizens of today find new meanings in the present through an engagement with the politics of the past? Unless we are prepared to sacrifice collective ideas of freedom and security to the uncertainties of the market, then the past contains lessons to learn. This does not of course mean that all of our answers can be found by simply returning to the philosophical and political traditions of the past. As I have indicated, questions of globalisation and the ecological crisis should be enough to persuade us that there are genuinely new challenges for European modernity. However a return to the past could yet encourage us to remember not only European tragedy and suffering, but a sense of hope as well.

Bibliography


The Idea of a European Identity as an Escape Forward: A Historical Perspective on the Present Euro Crisis

ABSTRACT

The idea of a European identity was launched as an attempt to hide the failure to link the social and the economic in the Werner Plan. It was an escape from political action and responsibility in a situation of economic and political crisis in the 1970s. In the 1990s, the identity concept was linked to the economistic internal market language. The European identity and the subsequent European demos would emerge through European citizens performing on and driven by the market. The emerging identity through the market would provide the preconditions of a European demos and a European democracy. Today the concept of a European identity has lost meaning due to the neglect of the social.

Key words: European identity, democratic EU, euro crises, Werner Plan.

The intensified discussion about Europe over the last 30 years has, to a large extent, been organised around the concept of identity. As such it is a debate about a concept charged with a highly ideological content. European identity is usually seen in relation to national identity, either in tension-filled opposition to it, that is, as an alternative which might replace the nation, or in a relationship where it overlaps and supplements the nation. The structure of national identity is ‘projected’ onto the European identity, and this projection has an ideological underpinning, for no projection is ever non-interested/non-ideological.

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The formal definition of identity is the state of being equal or identical. Identity means sameness. This can only make sense as a belief, a myth, or an identification with something, that is, as a projection of the ego onto something else and the symbolic representation of this ‘something else’. European identity is not a phenomenon in an essentialist sense, in which the task would be to investigate its content and forms of expression. Rather, European identity was discursively shaped in a specific historical situation, and the task is to investigate under which circumstances this formation took place, and to reflect on the fact that an obsession with ‘integration’, the buzz word in the 1950s and 60s, was replaced in the 1970s, and increasingly from the 1980s, by the obsession with ‘identity’.

Europe is with reference to identity connected to an idea and normative centre rather than a precisely formed territory. Europe is a discourse which is translated into a political and ideological project. Europe does not have an essence beyond one which is shaped by language. If Europe has a meaning, it is as a political programme. In this sense the declaration on a European identity at the European Commision (EC) summit in Copenhagen in 1973 was very successful, although the development of the concept took directions different from those envisaged by its architects. A political programme does not mean the political programme. It is, rather, something under continuous negotiation and re-negotiation. Both as politics and ideology, Europe must be seen in the plural, always contested and contradictory.

Luisa Passerini has argued for Europe as a cultural, intellectual, and even emotional programme, as opposed to a political project. Her Europe is an imagined territory, which is the locus of shortage, absence, and doubt, critical to pompous and declamatory versions. Europe is also ambivalent in her view. In order to create this Europe considerable intellectual energy of constructive criticism must be invested. In this way the painful historical connections between Europe and violence will not be forgotten but dismantled and uprooted. Luisa Passerini’s emphasis is in her approach on Europe as a self-reflecting critical culture of identification and not identity.3

Identity is a problematic and fuzzy concept. If taken literally, it means equality, sameness, the quality of being identical. It is a concept used to construct community and feelings of cohesion and holism, a concept to convey the impression that all individuals are equal in the imagined community. The launching of the idea of a European identity occurred in a situation of an experienced lack of such a phenomenon. Utopian dreams of community, cohesion and holism which are all contained in the concept of a European identity were mobilised precisely in a situation where there was a lack of such feelings. Identity thus becomes a problem when there is no feeling of cohesion and community, and

this is particularly the case in situations of crisis and turbulence when established
ties of social cohesion are eroded or broken down. Political management of
economies (‘political economy’) went unquestioned during the first decade of
European integration, and the idea of a European identity no more came to mind
than the idea of unemployment. At that time, European integration in political
practice was understood in terms of the political co-ordination of national
economies rather than as an identity project. The EC did not stand for the
European Community but for ‘Communities’ in the plural. Integration was the
concept of the 1950s and 60s which was used in the Cold War context to conjure
up images of European unity. At that time, integration was the key concept for
translating Europe into a political project. It was when integration failed as an
instrument of mobilisation that identity came to be promoted.

In what precise situation then, did the idea of a European identity become
politically mobilised? In 1970, with the experience of the previous European
deadlock in the 1960s through de Gaulle’s obstruction politics and veto against
British membership to the EEC, and against the backdrop of growing tensions
to the USA after 1965 in financial and security political terms, the second
generation of European leaders rose to the occasion when de Gaulle had been
forced to step down in 1969. They saw the possibility to once more raise the
horizon of expectations through decisive institutional steps towards a federal
Europe. The federalist language became more concrete with a clear institutional
design. As soon as de Gaulle had been forced to step down, the decision was
taken at the summit in The Hague in December 1969 to both intensify (tighten,
deepen) the co-operation in the fields of security politics and economic and
monetary politics, and to enlarge the membership from six to nine.

Deepening implied the drawing of outlines of an economic and monetary
union, based on both economic and monetary politics as the basis of a shared
currency, and a security and political union: the Werner and Davignon Plans.
The Werner Plan was brave in its architecture since it attempted to merge the
economic and the social. It was a clear step in a federal direction. The Werner
Plan was ambiguous in seeing the economic and monetary controls given
wholly over to the aegis of Community-level government.

A major problem was that a federal budget and financial capacity besides
the monetary dimension of the European economic and monetary union,
outlined in the Werner Plan, necessarily brought the question of a European
democracy to the fore. Initially, the European integration project, as it was
designed in the Paris Treaty in 1951 on a European Coal and Steel Community
and in the Rome Treaty in 1957 on a European Economic Community was not
thought of in terms of a European democracy. On the contrary, the experience
that marked the European leaders after 1945 was the fact that democracy could
be dangerous. Nazism had seized power within a democratic order. The aim of
Konrad Adenhauer, Robert Schuhman, Alcide de Gasperi, Jean Monnet and the governments of the Benelux countries was to create an organisation that kept them safe from excesses in the name of democracy. What later became the Commission was in the Paris Treaty called the High Authority and had a capacity to impose its will on the member states of the community. The High Authority was a supranational body standing above the member state governments rather than the sum of these. European integration was meant to place constraints on nation-state democracy, in order to keep them democratic, through unelected European institutions.4

The European integration on the basis of the Paris and Rome treaties functioned as a distribution of labour between the European and the national levels. Brussels was the guardian of the market order based on free trade within a customs union which would provide economic wealth for the member states to distribute in order to buy allegiance and legitimacy in the electorates. The Community level was responsible for the economic integration and the member state level for the social issue and the distribution of the yields from the growing economy. Integration historian Alan Milward called this distribution of labour the European rescue of the nation state.5

The emerging model was the substitute of more ambitions US plans after World War II in order to make the European continent more peaceful. These plans laid out the United States of Europe, USE, as a blueprint of the USA. The European leaders in the late 1940s objected the American intentions vehemently. What emerged from the negotiations were the Treaties of Paris and Rome.

Ideologically the emerging distribution of labour between the European and the national levels was underpinned by two political scientists who had escaped Nazism through emigration to the USA in the 1930s: Karl Deutsch and Ernst Haas. Their neo-functionalist theory described how the integration, through the spread from the customs union for commodities to ever more areas of cooperation, such as communication and labour markets, would become ever tighter. There was an implicit understanding of a development towards a final federal goal, although the precise way there was not outlined. The imagination of a self-propelling machine towards ever higher levels of European integration was propagated. The Werner and Davignon Plans in 1969 should be seen in this framework.

The Werner Plan for a European Economic and Monetary Union and the Davignon Plan for a European Security and Foreign Political Union were

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launched in December 1969 as a response to De Gaulle’s blockade of the European integration under the label of l’Europe des patries. However, they were also in a sense a fulfilment of De Gaulle’s politics, more precisely his politics versus the USA. In the 1960s he had built up a growing tension to the USA in the area of monetary and security politics. The US Dollar hegemony was challenged and the doubts became ever stronger that the USA would be prepared to protect Europe under its nuclear weapon umbrella in the case of a war with the Soviet Union. De Gaulle’s solution to this situation was a strong Europe dominated by France. The solution by the European leaders after De Gaulle was a strong Europe through new steps of integration.

In August 1971 the Dollar collapsed and the international order established at the end of World War II at Bretton Woods broke down. The US American financial burdens against the backdrop of the Vietnam War made the commitments about the stability of the Dollar and the guarantee of its value in relation to gold impossible. The oil price shock in October 1973 emphasised the continued break down of the international order. This could have been a European moment where the tension-ridden relationships to the USA since the 1960s could have been transformed into a more independently performing Europe with the Werner and the Davignon Plans as instrument.

The declaration on European identity looks at first glance like a brave new step in a federal direction after the Werner and Davignon Plans, but the framework of the statement hinted rather on the limits of the federal step. Caught between the Yom Kippur War and the oil price shock, the initiatives from December 1969 began to lose momentum. Already in April 1973, the Commission warned that the dynamics were evaporating from the two plans. This was before the oil price shock. The determined commitment to establish a European alternative to the US American global hegemony in financial and military political terms was easier in argument than in action.

Jean Monnet, now 85 years old, felt that the principle of delegation of national competences to the supranational institutions was fast approaching its limits. In the summer of 1973 he proposed to Edward Heath and Willy Brandt, his old companions, and to Georges Pompidou that the chiefs of government and state of the Nine form a provisional European government committed to implement the Paris declaration from 1972 with the aim of establishing a European Union with a European government and a directly elected Parliament. Heath and Brandt supported Monnet’s idea, but Pompidou only in part. In particular, the French President was against a European government. Under the impression of the oil price shock, Monnet increased his pressure on the three leaders and proposed a small meeting between them and their six colleagues of the EC 9 before the end of the year. Monnet thought of an informal meeting without a formal agenda at which all questions could be brainstormed without protocol, prestige and final
communiqué. The Commission and the prime ministers of the smaller member states as well as the foreign ministers feared being sidestepped and Monnet’s idea was transformed into a big formal summit meeting.

Monnet’s plan for a very small inner circle of leaders to take decisive steps failed. The summit in Copenhagen in December 1973 failed to agree on anything — including the periodicity of the summits. In this situation the idea of a European identity came in as a face-saving tool. The declaration on a European identity was an escape route — nothing more and nothing less.\(^6\)

The idea of a European identity was introduced as an instrument to stabilise the situation after the break down of the international order and to support the Werner and Davignon Plans. The idea of identity was based on the principle of the unity of the Nine — this was just after the first enlargement — on their responsibility towards the rest of the World, and on the dynamic nature of the European construction. The meaning of “responsibility towards the rest of the World” was expressed in a hierarchical way. First, it meant responsibility towards the other nations of Europe with whom friendly relations and co-operation already existed. Secondly, it meant responsibility towards the countries of the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East. Thirdly, it referred to relations with the USA, based on the restricted foundations of equality and the spirit of friendship. Next in the hierarchy was the narrow co-operation and constructive dialogue with Japan and Canada. Then came détente towards the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. At the bottom of the list came China, Latin America, and, finally, a reference was made to the importance of the struggle against underdevelopment in general.\(^7\) The fact that the USA was mentioned after the Middle East must be understood in the framework of the prevailing oil price shock and the fact that President Nixon since 1971 refused to let the Dollar guarantee the Bretton Woods order. Refused is perhaps not the right word. He could not. The Vietnam War had overstretched the Dollar to the edge of collapse, but already de Gaulle had begun to undermine the confidence in the American substitute for the gold standard by his repeated threats to change his Dollar reserves for gold.

The identity concept was, despite its nine tiers, vague and full of diverging interpretations. It was not quite new at the time of the Copenhagen summit in December 1973 and had been discussed for some time. The Paris summit in October 1972 had agreed that Europe must be able to make its voice heard in


\(^7\) Luisa Passerini, “The Last Identification: Why Some of Us Would Like to Call Ourselves Europeans and What We Mean by This,” in Bo Stråth (ed), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, PIE-Peter Lang, Brussles, 2000, pp. 45–65.
world affairs and affirm its own views in international relations. François-Xaviers Ortoli, the newly appointed President of the Commission, argued in a statement to the European Parliament in February 1973 that the Paris agreement meant a decision to establish a European identity, which needed to be comprised of “a heartfelt desire, shared by all our peoples, to differentiate ourselves from the rest of the world.” A few weeks later Ortoli gave a speech in London entitled “Towards a European Identity” where he defined the concept: Europeans are a people [sic! In the singular. BS] who have a common cultural background, a history often divided, who react more or less the same way before events, who have more or less the same mode of life, the same level of development.8

The outline of the identity concept referred, by implication, to Western Europe. It was made in a time which did still not know the European motto of unity in diversity. In April 1973, Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, suggested a Year of Europe in a speech in which he lamented the perceived European practice of how each country asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others. He argued for a new balance between self-interest and common interest. The Nine had not been consulted by the Americans before the Year of Europe was launched and the European leaders did not conceal that they would have preferred an American approach that was less precipitate, dramatic and demanding. The EEC foreign ministers met in July in an effort to establish a common European approach and a common identity when dealing with the USA. In September three draft papers by the British, Irish and French governments were discussed at a committee meeting in Copenhagen.

The British Paper was entitled “The Identity of the Nine vis-à-vis the United States.” The paper discerned two alternative approaches. One would be to identify the common values and historical heritage of European civilisation and distinguish those which are shared with the Americans. The second approach would consider the identity of the Nine in terms of the specific issues likely to be foremost in the discussion with the USA during the coming months. The paper emphasised the second more pragmatic approach and found it difficult to distinguish between European and American identities apart from the fact that historical associations linking Europe with the Middle East, Africa and other overseas territories and Europe’s lack of raw materials would require her to seek special relations with these countries.

The Irish paper emphasised the difference between a European identity and a Community Identity. The latter was only part of the wider European identity. Like in the British paper the main reason for attributing attention to a European Community identity was linked to the American Year of Europe initiative and the anticipated visit to Europe by President Richard Nixon towards the end of 1973 (which never occurred, however). The Irish paper concluded that the Community should adhere to the present dimension of its identity, i.e. its competences under the treaty and its progress so far in political cooperation. To go further would be an error.

The French paper went exactly in the direction that the Irish memorandum warned against striving to direct the European identity to the rest of the world and not just the USA. As opposed to the British and Irish papers, the French paper had no difficulty in describing Europe’s differences with the US. The Nine were the inheritors of a common civilisation that expressed itself in a rich variety of national cultures. They were aware of sharing in common a certain number of legal, political and moral values that they wanted to preserve. As in the British paper, emphasis was placed on the role of Europe’s natural resources. Europe had interests that derived from its history, its geographic position, its state of natural resources and its exchanges with the rest of the world. The French paper did not place the USA but the African and Mediterranean peoples first in its discussion of the identity in terms of external relations.

The attempted leap ahead in Copenhagen in December 1973 developed the neo-functionalist understanding of Europe as a self-propelling machine in new directions towards a federation based on a European demos rather than economic and political integration. Neo-functionalism had lost credibility under De Gaulle at the cost of new theoretical understandings of the European integration under the term intergovernmental. Through the identity concept, neo-functionalist thoughts about a final federal goal came back.

The identity language underpinned a mythical imagination of a European progressive teleology. The idea of a European identity and a European demos lead to the question of a European democracy. The question emerged as to how democratic power could be transferred from the member states to the European level. This was the question about the democratic deficit. Such a transfer would mean a clash with the ideas of the founding moment of the European post-1945 project, ideas which had received intentional expression in the High Authority.

The European Parliament got a new setting in 1979 when it for the first time was elected directly by the national electorates. However, this innovation was not the solution to the problem of the European democratic deficit that it might have pretended to be. In its self-understanding, the directly elected Parliament was the expression of the will of a European people that did not, however, exist. The
problem was not the way in which it was elected but its role in the institutional framework in Brussels. The enactment of a people’s will in democratic societies emerges not in terms of consensus, as is so often erroneously argued, but through contention, debate and compromise. (Compromise is enforced rather than voluntary consensus). Since the French Revolution political conflict has been measured along a right-left scale. The social issue is thereby a key dimension. This right-left dimension is the core axis that has been institutionalised in national parliamentary democracies. In the European Parliament, however, it is much less developed. The institutional setting from the early 1950s is, in this respect, still in operation. National sovereignty was not transferred to the European Parliament but to the High Authority/the Commission. The years since the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 have certainly meant an expansion of its prerogatives under growing contention with the Council. However, the point of departure has been a kind of consensus in the European Parliament in an institutional confrontation with the Council and the Commission much more than a legitimating political confrontation about various alternatives within the Parliament. Therefore, the European Parliament is different from the national parliaments of the member states.

Instead of a politicisation of the European Parliament, a step was taken in the opposite direction when a government conference was called to prepare a new integrative step under the presidency of Jacques Delors. The deeper integration meant the expansion of the customs union for commodities to an internal market with free movements also for capital, services and persons. The intergovernmental conference ended up in the Single European Act about the internal market in 1987. The idea formulated in Milward’s expression “the European rescue of the nation state” was reinforced. The European politics was about the economic integration whereas the social problems in the wake of economic integration were referred to as issues within the member states.

Instead of a linkage of the idea of a European democracy to social achievements and guarantees of certain social standards, as in the national democracies, the idea of a European democracy implicit in the identity language was connected to the European market with individual European citizens as the intermediaries. From now on, the identity discourse shifted meaning from more homogenous understandings of a European demos through a European identity. The free and sovereign European citizens with driving licences, a European anthem and other symbols would reinforce the internal market and through feed-back be reinforced as citizens. The market was made compatible with a European people. It was not as in the member states wherein the state that

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provided the framework of democracy and citizenship and the core of the European democracy was not about guaranteeing social standards. The market would solve the problem of the democratic deficit and provide the European institutions with the missing European people. In retrospect this was a bypass operation around the real problems, those about the connections between the economic and the social, but the effects of this circumvention were only fully visible twenty years later.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War 1989-91 provided incitements for new integrative steps. Already before the fall of the wall in November 1989, plans for an economic and monetary union were elaborated as an extension of the internal market. These plans gained momentum when the question of a German reunification emerged on the political agenda. President Mitterand was frightened by the reunification perspective, and he had good historical reasons to be so. However, his resistance could not break the US American and British preparedness to accept the Wiedervereinigung. In that situation he saw a common European currency as a guarantee. In a similar vein to the way in which Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, in the Paris Treaty of 1951 on the European Coal and Steel Community, had used coal and steel as the instrument to reinforce Western Germany, and at the same time control its strength, Mitterand used the German D-Mark by transforming it into the euro.

A common currency was an integrative dimension which also had a clear link to the identity language. The Maastricht Treaty was about a monetary union, among other things, and the name shift from the European Communities to the European Union, signed in December 1991, again conjured up imaginations of a European federation. However, due to in particular British resistance the treaty did not contain a strong social dimension as Jacques Delors wanted, and as to the monetary dimension, which the UK refused to enter, it did not want the Werner Plan 20 years earlier to contain a fiscal dimension. Instead of strong institutional instruments for common financial politics, the Growth and Stability Pact with a lower legal status was signed. The lack of a financial capacity to match the monetary focus and the big productivity differences between North and South in the euro area has today become an existential problem that threatens the whole integration project. At the beginning, the problem was ignored in the general market euphoria and the new globalization and end of history language that followed on the collapse of the Soviet system. The market would, in the long run, provide the European federation and the European identity that the name shift from community to union suggested. The market became the motor of the self-propelling European machine. The European democracy would emerge through the market. The problem of social disintegration in the wake of economic integration, which had been the major
issue and bone of contention in nineteenth century nation state building, and which had erupted in the Great Depression of the 1930s under the name of national socialism, was played down or ignored.

However, instead of a European people unified in a supranational EU managed by a strong Commission, as the Maastricht Treaty and the shift of name from European Economic Community to European Union indicated, the European political practice, as it developed after Jacques Delors’ powerful leadership with the aim to establish the internal market, meant a migration of power from the centralised level of the Commission to the member state governments assembled in the Council. The enlargement from EU 12 to EU 15 in 1995, with Austria, Finland and Sweden inaugurated as new members, hardly increased the commitment for a deeper integration of Europe. Two kinds of accelerating tensions reinforced one another: between federal European Monetary Union and European Political Union rhetoric in the wake of Maastricht and the institutional cover of this rhetoric, and between deepening and enlargement. Here, quite obviously, was a parallel to the 1970s. The regulative framework since the 1950s based on compelling directives, with the pretension of a supranational law *sui generis*, was gradually being transformed into intergovernmental agreements in the so-called open method of co-ordination process. Instead of a tighter political union and a higher level of integration, in comparison to the economic free trade unification, the trend since the 1990s is towards a looser kind of intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordination, from hard law to soft law and from harmonisation to co-ordination. The European summits in Luxembourg 1997 and Lisbon 2000 outlined this transformation from the image of a Europe beyond the nations to a Europe of the nations. High politics in Europe had to recognise that the nation had returned on the European scene and had to find political responses to this fact. Not even modest claims and expectations to intergovernmental coordination of the responses to the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 were redeemed.

Against the backdrop of the breakout of the general market euphoria initiated by the fall of the Soviet system, the concept of European identity no longer serves a purpose. The image of a European people, as it was designed in the framework of the Cold War and as it was re-designed through the market linkage after the end of the Cold War, seems to be more distant than ever. The political agenda today deals with national identity, nationalism and populism. The present state of the common currency, which potentially could have been a strong identification instrument, underpins this disintegrative development. Germany and Greece have become the symbols in the growing nationalistic language used to refer to the euro crisis. Mitterand’s euro strategy of controlling the strong German economy through a common currency seems to have failed.
The problem with the identity concept, however, began before the 2008 financial collapse. The distribution of European labour between the economic and the social, between the European centre in Brussels and the member states got new problematic preconditions in 2004. The non-binding identity language was against the backdrop of the enlargement from EU 15 to EU 25 and was a language transformed by a new key concept: the constitution. The insight grew that the enlargement required an institutional consolidation and a stronger legal framework which would set the rules for majority decisions in a number of policy areas. The quadrature of the circle in the political implementation of the growing insight dealt with the small state claim that all member states were equal and the big state claim that the size of the population must be considered. For example, Luxemburg and Cyprus could not have the same vote weighting as Germany. It was easy to agree on the principle justification of these two claims but much more difficult to translate them into figures and degrees of influence. Owing to this, the Nice summit in December 2000 ended in a fiasco. The intergovernmental constitutional convenant for a constitution decided in Laeken one year later nevertheless managed to find a formula that solved this and other problems. This was elaborated on to become a constitution which was signed in Rome in October 2004 and in the following ratification process became the subject of referendums in each of the member states. The European Constitution was the tool that would give the identity language legal and institutional coverage and substance.

The signing of the constitution and the referendums occurred just after the big enlargement to EU 25 on 1 May, 2004, which provoked strong feelings about dramatically growing social inequalities between the old and the new member states. Here is not the place to discuss the material substance of such feelings. The mechanism that worked was the perceptions of growing inequalities and of threats of social dumping when cheap labour flooded the labour markets in the West and the industry moved to the East. The Polish plumber who took the jobs from the domestic workers played an important role as a symbol that personified these perceptions in the French referendum campaign. The no votes by the French and the Dutch electorates in May and June of 2005 shook Europe. The European left had failed to imagine and build up a European solidarity, but continued to think and act in national terms when it came to social politics and welfare arrangements. This failure brought the market escapism and the dreams of an identity without a social dimension to an abrupt end.

The financial crisis in 2008 and the euro crisis in 2011, which quite obviously are connected into one major global crisis with an epicentre in Europe, have triggered debates in two different directions: more nationalism and populism versus a stronger European capacity to react politically to what is argued to be the dictates of the market forces. Here there must be an
appreciation of the fact that the view on the market forces as a dictator reduces the perceived scope for political action.

The idea of a European identity has disappeared in these processes and the same is true for the dreams of a European constitution. The present more narrow debate deals with the question whether and how the complex Lisbon Treaty, decided in December 2007 and rejected by the Irish voters in a referendum in 2008, thought of as a substitute of the failed constitution, can be amended. This debate is closely connected to the question whether the EU will split between its euro core and the rest. In substantial terms there seem at the end of 2011 to be two alternative solutions to the economic problem: first, to let the European Central Bank act as a lender of last resort and issue Eurobonds (favoured by most countries but opposed by Germany) and, second, to impose discipline in order to avoid inflation and to prevent the imposition of South European economic politics in the euro area.

In the wake of the search for a viable political strategy in response to the ongoing financial crisis since 2008 the democracy question has replaced the identity question. What does democracy mean when the financial authority of the nation parliaments is undercut repeatedly and systematically? Is it possible to imagine a European democracy as a compensation for the national democratic deficit? Would a European democracy based on the power of coordinated financial politics require a federal solution? What would the implications for the question of a European identity be?

The prevailing economic crisis is as much a political crisis. The arguments for a political union with a fiscal capacity have grown, but the question that remains unanswered so far is how a political union can get democratic legitimacy. The conventional view since the 1990s is that the Commission in Brussels must be controlled by the national governments and parliaments as the only way to reconcile the requirements of European integration with democratic legitimacy. The current crisis is likely either to stretch such understandings of democracy or to over-stretch the euro. However, the German drive for a stronger fiscal rigidity aims at discipline with automatic sanctions of infringements which does not provide a scope for politics. If this solution is passed then there is a high probability that the euro will face the same destiny as once the gold standard in the 1930s when the social protests overruled the political attempts to maintain monetary rigidity. Only with a considerable scope for European fiscal politics, legitimacy and popular support can be expected.

The stretch of the prevailing understandings of democratic legitimacy means that Europe is in a situation where what Joseph Weiler has called “constitutional tolerance” has become problematic. The term refers to a broad European culture of compromise where member states voluntarily have submitted to and expanded
EU law and at the same time been tolerant for exception clauses or even vetoes when some members have felt that vital national interests or even identities have been at stake.\textsuperscript{10} The financial crisis requires concerted action in more determined forms by all members of the euro zone.

The problem here is that this approach probably will split Europe, between the actual and the candidate member states with euro and those who prefer to remain outside the common currency, in a complex mix of European law and conventional international law. On the other side, the crisis might provide the European constitutional moment, which quite obviously was not there in 2005, although it might be a constitutional moment for only a limited number of EU member states.

Jürgen Habermas poses the idea of trans-nationalization of popular sovereignty against the backdrop of the massive resistance against a European federal super state. Individual European citizens and member states would divide constituent power equally and should understand themselves as co-authors of a new European constitution.\textsuperscript{11} Habermas understands democratic sovereignty in Europe as being located in two interdependent and asymmetric fields of sovereignty: the individual sovereignty of each citizen and the collective relations between the citizens in a nation state. The two fields check and delimit one another. This kind of curtailing self-restriction is inherent in democratic constitutions but has a much longer history that goes back to political theories by Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes and others. The point that Habermas is making is that these two fields can expand separately institutionally as well as politically, and that this is what is happening within the EU. In the EU the citizens of Europe are unified in two different participating roles, as individual union citizens and as national members of the member states. As individual EU-citizens they elect directly the European Parliament, as citizens of the member states they control indirectly the “executive federalism” of the EU located in the Council rather than the Commission. On this basis the democratic division of sovereignty is also true of the EU. The dual sovereignty constitutes not only the member states but also the EU. The EU is the ideal typical continuity of the national democracies with other means in the view of Habermas. However, this continuity is so far an ideal type when the question of how far this from the constitutional reality of the union is legitimately posed.

The conclusion of Habermas, on this ideal typical ground, is that the solution must not necessarily be perceived in terms of a federal United States of Europe, but that the member states can remain as democratic nation states. The


\textsuperscript{11} Jürgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas. Ein Essay, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main, 2011.
interplay of the two citizen roles, the individual European and the collective national, provides the transnational equilibrium between the asymmetric sovereignty parts.

The planned fiscal pact no doubt encroaches upon the European sovereignty concept, but not because it can enforce the rigid budget rules against the national parliaments, but because the coercive measures are not covered by a real fiscal union. Only if the tax, social and economic politics were sufficiently coordinated at the EU level, like in the never realised Werner Plan, would fiscal interventions into the member states be legitimate. Integration rather than disciplining is the key to the democracy question in the framework of the euro crisis.

This does not mean that other answers to the crisis could not be conceived from the viewpoint of democracy. Influential voices argue for reinforcing nation-state-based legitimacy while at the same time restricting the freedom of nation-states. By contrast, political theorist Jan-Wedrner Müller argues that a grand constitutional bargain, with meaningful participation from European publics, seems preferable. However, much will depend on the details, and the smaller member states are unlikely to be happy with an even more democratic Europe, which they equate with being outvoted by the more populous countries. What might look like a real continent-wide democracy on paper, as in the theory of Habermas, could exacerbate the democratic disconnect within Europe: people might accept supranational democracy in theory, but cannot see it as part of their lives, and particularly not when it comes to the democratic substance of hard fiscal realities. Alternatively, for Müller, Europeans might come to see the crisis as the moment when they were forced to realize what has been true for some time: they really share each other’s fate. The special nature of the EU could well remain political union without overarching statehood. But Europeans might ultimately push harder for true fiscal integration, which could include a genuine European treasury.¹²

The idea of a European identity was launched as an attempt to hide the failure to link the social and the economic in the Werner Plan. It was an escape from political action and responsibility in a situation of economic and political crisis in the 1970s. The escape meant an investment of hopes and expectations in the European project as a self-propelling machine towards a distant federal goal circumventing the question of political management for reconciling the tension between economic integration and social disintegration. The European teleology continued in new forms in the 1990s when the identity concept was, in a biased way, linked to the economistic internal market language. The

European identity and the subsequent European demos would emerge through European citizens performing on and driven by the market. Social cohesion would occur automatically through the new market economy. The emerging identity through the market would provide the preconditions of a European demos and a European democracy. Historically, in the nineteenth century construction of national identities, the social as much as the economic integration constituted the core dimension of the identity concept, but economic integration did not automatically mean social integration. Often the relationship was the opposite. The omission of the social became a major problem with the big EU enlargement in 2004. Today the concept of a European identity has lost meaning due to the neglect of the social.

One potential solution for the future, which ever more stands out in bold relief against the solution of the 1970s, would be immediate political action for a democratic response to the market terror, where the issue of identity is seen in a more relaxed way and its importance is played down. The insight is getting widespread and escapism today as in the 1970s, by means of the identity concept, would be an existential threat to the European integration. The escapism with the identity language today occurs in the member states, where nationalism grows. This nationalist escapism is a serious threat to the European integration. Democracy and political management of the economy, the economy as a polity, is the issue at stake, not identity. There certainly exists a connection between politics and identity, but this time the sequence must be the opposite and therefore more realistic, political action first and then possibly an emerging European identity. This is an optimistic scenario. The pessimistic version of collapse is not less realistic.

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Dora Kostakopoulou

Political Alchemies, Identity Games and the Sovereign Debt Instability: European Identity in Crisis or the Crisis in Identity-Talk?

ABSTRACT

Is it possible to talk about European identity amidst the turbulence the Eurozone faces? Given the prominence of European identity during the last two decades, the absence of European identity claims in the present era raises questions about its relevance and political functionality. It may be interesting to go beyond questions such as ‘what is Europe’s identity?’ or ‘how can a European identity be more than a thin overlay of deeply rooted national identities?’, and to examine why political arguments are framed in ways that prioritise European identity in time t, while disregard it in t+1. In other words, what does ‘European identity’ do when it is invoked and validated by certain political actors or forces at a certain historical and political conjunctures?

Key words: European identity, EU citizenship, discourse, national identities, power games.

Introduction

Is it possible to talk about European identity amidst the turbulence the Eurozone faces? If it is, what kind of meaning would one attribute to European identity now that questions of ‘survival’ — be they related to foiling the fragmentation of the Eurozone, overcoming counties’ decelerated...
economic performance and/or recession, or even safeguarding citizens’ dreams for a decent future for themselves and their families — have made the pursuit of existential quests a luxury? And further, why is it that European identity, which was supposed to be a shield against not only events threatening to destabilise the EU but also cycles of popular enthusiasm and disenchantment, has not been mobilised? I believe that any observer of the unfolding events in Europe would find it interesting that questions of economics (taming sovereign debt without undermining economic growth), politics (possible models for enhancing fiscal supervision in the EU and enshrining this in primary law and further political union) and the price of the lack leadership (Europe’s politicians have not acted promptly and decisively), have completely overshadowed what may be termed ‘identity-talk’.

If in such periods of turbulence or, to use the institutionalist language, in such critical junctures, European identity appears to be almost irrelevant to both the political protagonists and to ordinary people, the question that needs to be raised is whether it has ever really been relevant at all, notwithstanding its prominence on discursive agendas and in policy priorities at both the supranational and national levels since the late 1970s. This question has important implications for the future, too, since any reappearance of identity narratives would not escape the critique that they may be just veneers seeking to mask or to promote certain political claims which may, in fact, be unrelated to identity issues.

The relevance of European identity is my main focus in this paper. True, readers may find my quest for the explication of the role and political functionality of European identity deeply problematic. While the latter would be understandable given the innumerable pronouncement that have been made as well as the efforts, policies, discourses and research programmes that have been devoted to it during the last two decades, critics would hopefully agree with me that this question has not been asked very often and that the absence of

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3 The concept of identity appears in social science in the second half of the 20th century. Its appeal has much to do with Erik Erikson and Fromm’s psychoanalytic work on individual personality. Erikson was concerned about the crises of ‘personal identity’ in the post second world era and influenced by Freudian ideas and cultural anthropology which became entangled with American national policy in the 1950s and 1960s and the development of ‘area studies’, designed to map the ‘national character’ of countries, in American universities. For a wonderful explication of the origins of ‘identity’ and ‘identity theory’, see William J. M. Mackenzie, Political Identity, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1978. Words are not as innocent as they appear to be.
European identity claims in the present era is puzzling. In this respect, it may be interesting to go beyond questions such as ‘what is Europe’s identity?’ or ‘how a European identity can be more than a thin overlay of deeply rooted national identities?’ or ‘what is the meaning of European identity?’, and to instead examine why political arguments are framed in ways that prioritise European identity in time t, while disregard it in t+1. In other words, what does ‘European identity’ do when it is invoked and validated by certain political actors or forces at a certain historical and political conjuncture?

Before proceeding to address these questions, it should be stated at the outset that I distinguish subjective identifications with the EU, which are invariably evolving and shifting, in the same way, that any personal self-identification evolves, changes and develops in response to events and the external environment (the personal world), and to the collective ‘projects’ about European identity formation which have public and institutional manifestations and political consequences (the political world). The subsequent discussion centres on the latter, thereby leaving room for perceptions about ‘Europe’, in general, or the European Union, in particular, to exist freely as states of mind and for individuals to weave their personal stories and identifications concerning fellow Europeans or the European institutional configurations without any impediment. Subjective identification with Europe is thus disentangled from public narratives and political claims relating to European identity and projects for Europe or the Member States (MS) in this paper.4

The subsequent discussion explores the above mentioned questions on the basis of five steps. First, I examine the dichotomy of national identities and European identity, which has dominated the academic literature and the public agenda in an attempt to uncover the political functions of this dichotomy. I question whether the conditions are right for the possible emergence of a European identity given the view that the EU allegedly lacks the homogenising elements that have underpinned the formation of national identities has been in the main a ‘home-made’ (MS) distinction. Accordingly, it projects concerns and political arguments existing in the MS. Secondly, I discuss ways of conceptualising the EU and the possible types of a European identity. This discussion leads me to argue that the relation between national identities and European identity is not conditioned by the identifiable qualities or meanings entailed by these two distinct entities, as it is often assumed in the literature, but by discursive constellations which are time and space specific. In other words,

4 Margaret Somers has distinguished between public narratives and self-understandings that are shaped by stories which may be shared or not (Margaret R. Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach,” Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 5, 1994, pp. 605–49.)
antinomic or symbiotic relations are projections of specific discursive articulations (Step 3). This is attested by the Euro-zone turbulence and the present constellation (Step 4). If European identity, as produced in and by historically specific articulations for certain political purposes and functions, should be the main focus of our attention, then the question is what is left, if anything, of European identity. This question is examined in the last section of the paper.

**Step 1: On Identity Games, Politics and Imperfect Equilibria**

Having set out the foundations and the regulative framework for the common market and against the background of political battles and the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the European Community was searching for a new vision in the 1970s. A narrative on European identity seemed to be the missing ingredient that could reinvigorate European integration by eliciting peoples’ interest in and support for European affairs. The Werner Report on European Monetary Union in 1970, and the launch of European Political Cooperation in the same year, had provided impetus for the political development of the Community, but the latter process, unavoidably, needed ‘Europeans’, too. And ‘Europeans’ would only lend support to the political development of the Community, if the ‘market Europe’ became transformed into ‘a people’s Europe’. Accordingly, the 1973 Copenhagen summit furnished a ‘Declaration on European Identity’ which was to be built by coordinated action, both internally and externally. The internal face of the European identity required a predominantly political public narrative which would champion critical legal and political principles, such as respect for the rule of law, social justice, human rights and democracy, as well as the award of special rights for Community citizens while the external one would highlight the role and responsibilities of the nine Member States vis-à-vis the rest of the World. In December 1974, the Paris Summit Conference endorsed the declaration and laid down the foundations for direct elections to the European Parliament and the incremental development of a Citizens’ Europe. Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister who was instructed by the Paris conference to articulate concrete proposals for strengthening citizens’ rights, produced a report which advocated the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, consumer rights for European citizens and the protection of the environment. The establishment of common European rights would bring ‘European close to its citizens’, create a feeling of identification with the Union as a whole, in order to make ‘a people’s Europe’ a reality.

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4 Margaret Somers has distinguished between public narratives and self-understandings that are shaped by stories which may be shared or not (Margaret R. Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 5, 1994, pp. 605–49.
Nevertheless, the Tindemans ‘report did not capture the national executives’ political imagination, its recommendations did not have sharp edges; they merely furnished the basis for a soft identification with the EU. The proposed reforms cannot be viewed as undermining the national frames of reference or threatening the Member States’ sovereign powers in the fields of citizenship and migration regulation, thereby upsetting their categorisations and established identities. Unlike the Tindemans’ report, however, the Commission’s invocation of the concept of ‘a passport Union’ in its report on ‘Towards European Citizenship’ (1975) which entailed the adoption of a uniform passport, harmonisation of the rules affecting aliens and the abolition of controls at internal frontiers, entailed the prospect of changing radically political realities, framing perceptions and shaping citizens’ orientations. The replacement of national passports by a uniform passport was seen by Community institutions as establishing a definite connection between individual Europeans with the Community and ensuring equality of treatment for all passport holders by non-member countries irrespective of their nationality. But Member States detected in this proposal the questioning of their powers of categorisation of the population under their jurisdiction. And by ‘confirming the Community as an entity visa v is the rest of the world’ and eliciting popular feeling of belonging to that entity, it appeared to clash with national identities and feelings of belonging to distinct nation-states.

Further reforms at the turn of that decade, such as the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, the introduction of uniform passport in 1981, the prospect of the abolition of internal frontier controls coupled with the Commission’s draft directive on residence of Community nationals in the territory of host Member States in 1979, and its proposal to grant local electoral rights to Community nationals residing in host Member States, appear to recast established conceptions of community membership and intra-Community migration away from the Member States’ classificatory and regulatory matrix. The discourse of European identity served to legitimise such developments in the same way that the discourse on national identity had served to legitimise state-building in the previous century. Community officials tapped into

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7 Bull. EC, Supplement 7/75.
8 OJ EC, 278, 8/10/77: 1-11.
9 Bull. EC, 10-1972.
historical processes of state-building and sought to utilise the symbolisms and ‘consciousness raising’ initiatives (such as a European flag, a European anthem, stamps and so on) that had accompanied the formation of nation-states. By borrowing existing tools, resources and established mythomoteurs, they foreclosed the possibility of innovative solutions and pre-empted antagonistic reactions by the Member States.

The Member States opposed the relaxation of the national citizenship requirement for franchise in the 1970s thereby forcing the Commission to shift its attention from political rights to establishing local consultative councils for migrant workers in the host Member States. And, in the mid-1980s, although the Adonnino report explicitly recommended in addition to local electoral rights voting rights at European Parliament elections in the Member State of residence as well as a number of other reforms designed to strengthen citizens’ involvement in and identification with the Community, the Member States continued to remain unconvinced. Yet, the ‘People’s Europe’ problematique was gaining momentum and the absence of progress in the grant of special right to mobile Community citizens was seen to undermine attempts to construct a European identity by making European decisions and affairs relevant to the lives of ordinary Europeans and the developing practice of European citizenship.

The narrative about the formation of European identity and the political reforms that sustained it clearly created interference patterns in national executives’ regulatory and governmental powers. They also threatened to superimpose a different notion of citizenship upon the prevailing notion of national citizenship, since Commission officials in the 1970s and 1980s did not merely see the emerging notion of Community citizenship to be simply additional to national citizenship but envisaged that the latter would eventually become subordinate to the former. The gestures towards the creation of a soft identification with the EU were gradually seen to implicate a harder European identification narrative which would have an internally equalising effect since Community nationals would be assimilated to state nationals and enjoy complete equality of treatment and a coercive external categorisation.

The Draft Treaty on the European Union proposed by the European Parliament in 1984 echoed Spinelli’s belief that the Second War II reduced “the habitual respect of citizens for their states and their myths and opened the way to the united

12 Pietro Adonnino chaired the ad hoc Committee for a People’s Europe in line with the mandate given to it by the Fontainebleau Council in 1984.
14 Bull. EC 12-1972, point 1104; Bull. EC Supplement 7/75.
European transformation”¹⁵ and recommended the formal establishment of European Union citizenship conditioned on the possession of Member State citizenship. Although the draft treaty did not have a formal institutional impact in the sense of its provisions finding their way into the concrete articles of the Single European Act it did, however, provide important normative and ideational resources which would be utilised at Maastricht and beyond. In fact, it may be argued that DTEU’s provisions on Union citizenship, the Adonnino Committee’s work,¹⁶ coupled with the Commission’s determination to expand the personal scope of free movement beyond active economic actors, which was also reflected in the 1985 Paper on Completing the Internal Market,¹⁷ and the formal adoption of the three 1990 Residence Directives (on students, pensioners and self-sufficient European citizens provided that they had medical insurance and sufficient means so as to avoid becoming a burden on the welfare system of the host state),¹⁸ led to the constitutional framework on Union citizenship at Maastricht. And although the European citizenship discourse had somewhat subsumed the European identity narrative in the late 1980s, with emphasis placed on citizens as participants in politics at Community and national levels, the latter was resurrected in the early 1990s as national delegations were justifying their approval of Union citizenship on the grounds that it would enhance feelings of belonging to a single entity,¹⁹ thereby enhancing the creation of a citizens’ Europe.

The Maastricht Treaty gave constitutional status to Union citizenship by pronouncing “every person holding the nationality of a member state a citizen of the Union” and supplementing the pre-existing Community rights to free movement and residence (Article 8a EC) with local and EP electoral rights in the MS of residence, consular and diplomatic protection when travelling abroad and non judicial means of redress, such as the right to petition the European Parliament and to apply to the Ombudsman. It is true that the Maastricht framework included a limited set of rights and many of the Commission’s proposals were omitted from the final text. It is also true that the normative

¹⁵ Spinelli cited in Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2007, p. 120.
¹⁷ COM(85)310.
¹⁸ Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 90/366, which was replaced by Directive 93/96. The European Parliament and Council Directive of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their Family Members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (2004/38/EC), which repeals the above mentioned Directives, introduces three separate categories of residence rights and establishes an unqualified right of permanent residence after five years of continuous legal residence in the host Member State; OJ 2004 L 158/77 (30 April 2004).
potential of Union citizenship was not fully appreciated at that time. Concerns about making Europe a tangible reality in the lives of European citizens thereby increasing the Union’s social legitimacy by promoting identification with it as well as addressing its democratic deficit were predominant. Indeed, the Commission successfully linked the progressive implementation of the citizenship agenda with the enhancement of the democracy in the EU which would in turn lead to the reinforcement of the political dimension of the Union, while national executives preferred to view ‘Europeanness’ or European identity as a key step towards a more coordinated foreign policy.20 However, European identity politics was not wholly subsumed by the discourse on democratic participation and the social legitimacy deficit of the EU.21

**Step 2: Point, Counterpoint**

The establishment of the new institution of Union citizenship gave rise to the prospect of the dilution of national citizenship and fears about divided loyalties and allegiances in some national arenas. While the Commission and the European Parliament welcomed innovative templates on citizenship and membership which superseded troubled national pasts and national loyalties and granted non-national EU citizens political rights in national arenas, certain Member States were concerned about what they saw as the narrowing of the parameters of national states’ policy choices. This was the case in spite of the fact that the Maastricht Treaty explicitly affirmed that the Union is obligated to “respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy” (F.1 TEU) and must contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while also respecting their national and regional diversity (Article 128 EC) at that time. Similarly, in an attempt to appease national sensitivities and anxieties, the Declaration on the Nationality of a Member State, annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty on European Union, expressly stated that “the question [of] whether an individual possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.” Similar declarations were adopted by the European Council at Edinburgh and Birmingham. The Birmingham declaration confirmed that, in the eyes of national executives, Union citizenship constitutes an additional tier of rights and protection which is not intended to replace national citizenship — a

20 See the TEU’s Preamblic reference (9) to ‘reinforcing European Identity’ in the context of defence policy.

21 Compare Wiener’s insight that the citizenship discourse in the early 1990s showed that “the focus shifted from creating a feeling of belonging to establishing the legal ties of belonging” (Antje Wiener, op. cit., p. 295).
position that found concrete expression in the amended Article 17(1) at Amsterdam.\footnote{Bull. EC 10-1992 I 8.9. The Amsterdam Treaty added the statement that “Union citizenship shall complement national citizenship” to Article 8(1) EC (Article 17(1) on renumbering).}

Notwithstanding these pronouncements about the ‘added value’ and enriching character of EU citizenship, however, the promise of constructive politics entailed by Union citizenship unsettled national political actors. Denmark decided to opt out from the TEU’s Union citizenship provisions, stating that “nothing in the TEU implies or foresees an undertaking to create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of the nation-state. The question of Denmark participating in such a development does, therefore, not arise.”\footnote{Danish Declaration, OJ C348/4, 31/12/94.}

On the discursive chessboard of the 1990s, European citizenship and the construction of a European identity were not merely portrayed as ‘dangerous supplements’,\footnote{Dora Kostakopoulou, “Nested ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Citizenship in the European Union: Bringing Forth the Complexity,” Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999, pp. 389–413.} but also as part of ‘either (European)/or (national)’ dualisms. Although such a discursive articulation reflected nationalist preferences for overriding and undivided national-statist loyalties and deeply rooted state-centred identities which were resistant to change, it was, nevertheless, premised on questionable assumptions and politics as well as on misinformation about the European developments. As we shall see below, it also foreclosed the promotion of more collaborative, open and inclusive practices of citizenship at both national and European levels in the 1990s. The new function of a reconstructed discourse about a super-added European identity, as a threat to national identities, was to shield domestic rules, policies and practices from unwanted change and to stifle a debate about their adaptation to new circumstances and developments (processes of Europeanisation) by cultivating anti-European sentiments among the population.

The national identity game unfolded in the 1990s and exhibited three distinct patterns: first, it was used to sustain implicitly or explicitly a reifying view of national identities and citizenship practices since it simply asserted their historicity, primacy and importance without mentioning their continuing change and adaptation to the realities of a globalised economy and more mature and multifaceted European Union decision-making process. Second, it focused on the ‘thingness’ of national identities, that is, their existence and reification, and not on their substance, that is, their meaning and consistency, which are often quite difficult to define. Third, it served to reinforce the simplistic view of European integration as both a process entailing the eventual demise of the state which had to be resisted thereby ignoring the complex realities of every-day permeation of European laws.
and judicial decisions into national arenas and multilevel governance as well as a deficient one since it lacked the ‘ethnic mythomoteurs’, that is, myths, symbols, memories and tradition\textsuperscript{25} that had been instrumental to nation-state building. The European identity/national identities dichotomy was thus a discursive articulation which moved progressively backwards and thrived on essentialism and the selective remembering of a past, thereby ultimately thwarting a debate about weaknesses in democratic representation, inclusive and equal political membership and citizenship policies at both the national and European levels. Oddly enough, the alleged identities’ clash seemed to be mutually reinforcing of established nationalities at the domestic level and of the alignment of the novel institution of European Union citizenship to such standards of nationality, thus effecting no change to the cognitive template of citizenship cum nationality.

The flawed fiction about the opposition between a European identity and national identities was entirely ‘home-made’, that is, constructed in national arenas. English nationalism underpinned the Conservative Party’s opposition to TEU’s ‘ever closer Union’; as Wallace wrote in 1995, “the Conservative Party’s discourse is instinctively that of national identity.”\textsuperscript{26} British Euro-sceptics argued that national sovereignty and identity had to be defended against a ‘Federal Europe’ seeking to undermine democracy and erode the sense of nationhood of the Member States. Fears about the prospect of a European federation were also expressed in France, despite the fact that the two intergovernmental pillars of the Treaty on European Union confirmed the crucial role of the Member states in determining the pace of the European integration process. To such fears, Hoffmann added the prospect of “a Baroque or Gaudiesque construction, multilevel and multispeed, manipulated above all by Germany.”\textsuperscript{27}

Through such narratives, Member States sought to validate domestic arrangements, reassert statist power and galvanise popular opposition to ‘Europe’ thereby stifling political dynamics for change at the European and national levels. Realities, such as ‘system interaction’ and ‘system change’ through the every day processes of policy making at European Level, the ECJ’s expanding case law which ensured both the amplification of the four fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services and capital) and the MS implementation of Community legislation were conveniently ignored by circumstantialist political discourses. The terminology and symbols associated with a language of the past were used in order to reassert the nation-state as a relevant organisational concept.


\textsuperscript{27} Stanley Hoffmann, “Thoughts on the French Nation Today,” \textit{Daedalus} 122, No. 3, 1993, pp. 63–79.
and to react against perceived threats of erosion of state power owing to the shift to qualified majority voting in certain areas, the increase in the competences of the EU, the establishment of EU citizenship and the abolition of internal border controls. National identity-talk invoked unspoken assumptions and qualities that are meant to merit our automatic approval thereby transfiguring issues and developments into matters of survival of ‘what we hold dear’.

Academic writing at that time seemed to lend support to such narratives either by positing system effectiveness at the European level as antithetical to democracy which was aligned to national governance in a perfect and unquestionable way, the absence of a ‘European demos’ to sustain the construction of a European polity, the embryonic stage of a European public sphere and Europe’s lack of deeply rooted myths and memories, that is, the essential material required for the formation of collective identities. By pinpointing the ‘impossibility’ of constructing the European Union polity and the improbability of generating a sense of pride, trust and a shared identity among the peoples of Europe, they sought to highlight the validating logic of statism, thus reaffirming the homogenising impulses of national identities and providing self-justificatory strategies for ideological and political positions. The issue of national identity and its continued survival in light of the trends towards greater and deeper integration and globalisation came the foreground for the generation of interests and political claims while in reality the maintenance of these interests and claims were the reason for the appearance of the national identity discourse and the alleged threat that a singular ‘Europe’ posed. The success of this narrative hinged on its ability to project national identity as the main reason for national worries and concerns — as opposed to a veneer camouflaging vested interests. This was a clever move since the main focus would have to be on understanding and taking into account identity issues and not on analysing the deeper interests and the political claims involved in ‘national-identity talk’. Accordingly, the desired resolution would have to be based on an acknowledgement by European officials of the resilience of national identities and on less ‘Europe’, in the sense of a less active Commission and a less active Court. By starting from an a priori assumption about deep-rooted national identities that provided the ultimate locus of political authority, the home-made dualism between national and European identities thus obtained a symbolic force which therefore precluded an engagement between the democratic credentials of the forces invoking it and the substantive merits of their claims.

Step 3: Disconnecting the Dots

The oppositional discourse on identities was underpinned by two tactics; namely, treating identities, be they national or European, as unified concepts and simplifying what such categories may stand for. In this respect, they left very little room for individuals’ multiple identifications as well as the shifting meaning and importance that each of them may acquire in certain contexts. Reflecting the ideology of nationalism, national identities were depicted as unambiguous, integrated, monistic and overarching, thereby overlooking the shared interests that may exist among citizens belonging to different countries with respect to certain issues as well as individuals’ propensity to prioritise an identity other than their national one, in certain situations. The abstraction of the nation could not accommodate multiple identifications and the individuals’ freedom to shift in and out of subject positions and to call upon different identity options in different contexts for different purposes.31 Yet people cultivate affinities and identify with groups, communities and organisations which extend beyond and across state borders and it is this journeying in multiple worlds that makes us who we are and creates political options for us. In other words, ‘I’ is the product of many ‘We’s’32 and a given political identity is simply one narrative to realise a sense of common purpose.

Interestingly, the fixity, monism and inflexibility characterising national identities were also grafted onto the European level without any attempt to rethink and adjust the theory of identity to the institutional peculiarities of the Union and the historical as well as political indeterminacy of Europe. As regards the latter, a cursory look at the literature can reveal the many ‘faces’ of Europe or the many ‘Europes’ within Europe; namely, the Europe of the Greek mythology, the Hellenistic Europe, the Roman Europe, the medieval Europe, the Christian Europe, the Europe of Enlightenment, the Colonial Europe, the racialist Europe, the capitalist Europe, the ‘Kidnapped’ Europe,33 the brainwashed Europe which was able to redeem its cultural identity after the fall of communism and so on. Indeed, all the above narratives circulated in the public space in the later 1980s and 1990s. In addition, right-wing discourses have always appealed to a selective ‘European heritage’ and ignited racism and xenophobia by culture-baiting ethnic and religious minorities as ‘others’ and threats to the alleged ethnocultural homogeneity of Europe. Indeed, GRECE (Groupement de recherché et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation Europeenne), the cultural wing of the French ‘New Right’, sought to

32 See William J. M. Mackenzie, op. cit.
empty Europe from the “Judeo-Christian elements of egalitarianism” and notions of humanism and universalism in an attempt to revive an ‘original’ European identity which would not incorporate the European Union’s migrant and multicultural population.34

As regards the institutional peculiarities of the European Union, Habermas identified the possibility of severing ethnos and demos and fashioning a political identity at the European Union level which would promote the flourishing of equally legitimate cultural forms of life.35 On this account, democratic citizenship would be the integrating device of the new polity and the foundation for the formation of a European public sphere that would be separate from the national spheres. Constitutional patriotism would thus complement national patriotism without displacing it. Weiler and Bellamy and Castiglione36 articulated variants of the Habermasian approach seeking to accommodate “non-rational political loyalties” that exist at national level and to gradually correct them. In addition, to a “corrective European identity,” functional and constructive European identity options emerged as candidates for the formation of a European political identity within a system of nested and interacting tiers for governance. By creating a diverse map of European identity pathways, the above accounts showed that Eurosceptic discourses about the incompatibility between national and European identities concealed completely what has always been so, that is, the reality of multiple identities, and what might have been, the symbiosis among identities.

The discussion thus far has sought to sketch out the multiple games implicated in the invocation of a European identity for more than three decades and the modalities of power involved. One cannot but be impressed by the variety and diversity of the political configurations of European identity and the political strategies underpinning them. Although it has not been my intention to construct an all-encompassing theory of European identity that would account for all of them, the discussion has intimated that we need a more thorough investigation of the various uses of European identity or of the politics of ‘European identity’ talk.

In this respect, it would be incorrect to view European identity as antithetical to national identities. For such an opposition, an either/or dualism, is not the by-product of a relation among two distinct entities having their own intrinsic

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qualities and differing implications, but the artificial projection of a process as well as context seeking to justify certain political claims and arguments by depicting them as antithetical. Crucially, as the discussion has unravelled, this process and the context on which it is based were conditioned by time and the discursive games played by political actors. And discursive games at time (t) are a function of circumstances, perceptions, information and prevailing political interests. It is thus the constellation of time, space and discourse within which nodes of power operate that determine both European identity and national identity ‘talks’. One could easily envisage a different constellation of time, space and discourse in which the same relation (European and national identities) could be depicted quite differently or could even be seen to be of no relevance at all. Hierarchies of power or forces of antipower may or may not have an interest to make ‘identity’ a central issue or to combine identities in so many different ways that enhance the pluralisation of individuals’ energies and their channelling into processes of democratic transformation.

**Step 4: Instability in the Eurozone**

We have seen that the dualism between a European identity (A) and national identities (B) was not essentially an issue of the relation between A and B, since A and B as well as their relation (AB) were projections of context C which infused them with particular meanings designed to justify political claims and/or to motivate or limit political action. This process has been time bound; it is the political context in time t that gives A, B as well as AB their specific meanings and fixes their relation. For it is plausible that in time t+1, the same relation which was depicted as antithetical (AvB) could be perceived to be symbiotic (AB) or could even be degraded to an unproblematic or irrelevant relation (-AB). By choosing the Eurozone crisis as the crucial t+1 moment, I wish to reveal the contingency, artificiality and inherent limitations of claims concerning identity and thus the unavoidable plasticity characterising all political contexts and discursive configurations.

Interestingly, one would have expected a proliferation of identity claims in a period such as this which requires sacrifices on the part of some members for

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the interest of the whole; after all, identifications with a polity, be this a national or a European level, are meant to elicit popular support in times of crises. In this absence of sustained attention to European identity and its relation to national identities since 2009, I discern not only the artificiality of the debate on national identities and European identity, but also the possibility of less ideological politics sustained by the realisation that what was taken for granted in the past was the by-product of a set of historically situated political choices and a circumstantialist environment that was receptive to such choices.39

It is noteworthy that when the extent of Greece’s debt exposure was revealed and austerity measures contemplated, the population did not feel the pull of national identity in order to rally behind the government. Instead, discord, narrow party political interests, opportunistic agendas by party leaders and strategies of blame attributing and blame shifting predominated. Indeed, events not only in Greece, but also in Spain, Portugal and Italy during the last two years have shown that the presence of an allegedly strong sense of collective identity does by no means make people less critical of the status quo and more willing to support it in times of crisis. National identities have little to offer when it comes to concrete and acute economic problems. While populist forces may seek to exploit the former in order to mobilise the peoples against the EU, there is a widespread acceptance that the sovereign debt problem is ‘home-created’ and that their governments would still have to put their own economic affairs in order, whether the country is within or outside of the Eurozone.

Similarly, high levels of ‘Europeanness’ in specific countries provide little guidance in terms of predicting whether a particular country will welcome a fiscal Union or be prepared to grant bail out packages to its debt ridden European neighbours. This is not only because peoples’ subjective identifications fluctuate so unpredictably, that being a winner or a loser in time t provides almost no guarantee that one will display a positive or negative attitude towards European integration, respectively, in time t+1.40 It is also due to the fact that valuations change,

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identifications evolve and even fade away, and this is owing to a range of endogenous as well as exogenous factors. This is, perhaps, one of the important lessons we have learnt from the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone area. Despite being winners, German citizens did not welcome further bail out packages in the Eurozone or the French proposals about a closer economic union, with a centralised authority coordinating taxation and expenditure, even though they are aware of the severe economic — as well as political — costs associated with either the collapse of the Euro or the fragmentation of the Eurozone.41

Similarly, the EU has finally embarked upon a closer economic and fiscal union because this is seen to be the only credible option to solve the economic crisis in an effective way and to avert a Euro collapse which would endanger European integration in its entirety. In a speech delivered on the 28th of November 2011, the Polish Foreign Minister, Mr Radoslaw Sikorski, reminded Germany that its has been the biggest beneficiary of the single currency and thus had a responsibility to display leadership in resolving the crisis.42 Accordingly, not only does the sovereign debt crisis make notions of national or European identity less relevant, but also shows that ‘Europeanness’, indexes of Europe’s populations, may have very little to offer in particular settings which require concrete measures, imaginative solutions and credible policy ideas in order to respond to crises effectively. In such circumstances, peoples’ loyalty cannot be assumed; it has to be earned by political leaders. And trust in politicians, institutions, systems, be they political or economic, is not an objective quality brought about as a result of the tag of nationality we all carry, but it has to be cultivated, nurtured and sustained through the adoption of the right policies, credible attempts to root out systemic problems, corruption and irresponsible spending and the avoidance of inefficient policy-making decisions. As the details of the new European fiscal contract are being negotiated, ‘Europe’ has finally come once again to the ‘rescue’ of the state,43 that is, of its solvent and financially undisciplined members. Seen from this perspective, further and closer European integration does not appear to be consonant with winning ‘game, set, and match’ for either national identities or a European identity, but with the very preservation of a political experiment that enables such identifications to be invoked and reconstructed, to circulate, flow and to interact.

The present economic crisis thus exposes the fallacy of a normative commitment to identity as an end goal that holds statal polities together or the glue

42 Cited in Camilla Cavendish’s article “We’re crippled by a risk we can’t even quantify,” The Times, 1 December 2011, p. 35.
that will unite the European Union. It also demonstrates the optionalist or circumstantialist character of invocations of identity, be it national or European. For instance, Mr Cameron’s decision to shield the city of London from the unwanted European financial transaction tax can hardly be amenable to claims about a shared national identity given popular discontent about the banking elite that is held responsible for the 2008 economic crisis and Britain’s public sector debt. At the same time, a European identity cannot be mobilised at a time when Europe has been so deeply divided about identifying comprehensive solutions to the economic crisis, be they permanent rescue funds and the issuing of joint Eurobonds or measures to regain market confidence, as well as the institutional pathways of implementing them. At the present conjuncture, therefore, national identities cannot be mobilised to construct subjects and/or electors for states. Nor can European identity be utilised in order to prop up the Euro. Political elites can derive neither arguments nor answers from them that suit them. They know this as well as that European publics are in an anti-‘politics as usual’ mood.

**Step 5: What is Left of European Identity? Mapping Possibilities**

Identities, be their personal or collective, are stories, that is, narrative constructions which not only enable us to make sense of our existence within, and entanglement with, particular social worlds but also to take part in them as political actors as well as subjects. They are thus necessarily situated in time; they belong to time and are subject to the waves of change. Constructivist perspectives have convincingly demonstrated that, contrary to primordialist and ethnocultural accounts of nationalism, national identities are not expressions of timeless essences. Being historically conditioned, but also constructed, narrated and reinterpreted in myriad ways, identities are infinitely plural and complex. The same realisation should accompany the examination of their relations (which often take the form of oppositions) to other identities, be they subnational or European. This relation, too, is the product of political imagination and history and is thus subject to differing articulations and interpretations. In this respect, it is important to refrain from bracketing identity issues from the historically specific political context and ideological tableau within which political actors invoking them act. Seeking to find ontological realities would not be a wise pursuit. The same applies with respect to European identity and the discussion above charted its emergence and evolution during almost three decades (1970–1995) as well as its fading in the era of the sovereign debt crisis. National and European identity constructions have an almost fractal quality and are made salient or less relevant depending on the political...

context with claims about clashing identity dualisms seemingly more prescient than games of simplification can camouflage political claims and assumptions. Therefore the question that needs to be addressed at this point is: what is left of European identity? Should we abandon it as a concept and category of analysis? Or could it be utilised in progressive ways to foster or accentuate political developments in the European Union that enhance human welfare?

Evidently, the above question refers to European identity as a collective narrative. For individuals in the EU remain free to use it as subjective identification which could be made to fit with so many rich, complex and diverse personal experiences. It is thus bound to remain a floating resource entering individuals’ lives intentionally or unexpectedly, being subject to cultural or political articulations and rearticulations, being invoked and then set aside as individuals shift in and out of environments in time specific contexts. In this evolving narrative cycle of self-identification, a European identity can still have an important role to play. But recognising our freedom to ‘draw’, ‘construct’, ‘represent’ and ‘imagine’ the world we call ‘our own’, to choose to remember, champion, forget or make irrelevant our connections with the European space does not give us the licence to worship essentialist constructions of European identity and false dualisms. Subjectivised narratives must be ethical. Individuals have an ethical duty to refrain from severing the European space from the world and the values of humanism by closing off connections, cultivating resentment and hatred towards the other and erecting arbitrary boundaries among different nationalities, religions, races and ethnic origins. More importantly, we need to show our distaste and objections to racialist, exclusivist and homophobic notions of European identity which clearly forget that ‘creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’ has been a project in healing Europe from the evils of cruelty, war and inhumanity, imagining a better world and making it possible since the very beginning.

But what could it be said about European identity as a collective story? Could it be used as the basis of social and political action? Could it nurture progressive collective self-understandings? Or should it be made an appendix? I would argue that an acknowledgement of political uses of European identity does not necessarily make European identity obsolete. It may well provide an argument for less identity-centred politics, but still leaves enough room for identity narratives in politics. In my earlier work I have defended a constructivist option of European identity nourished by an inclusive European Union citizenship and an open and principled European migration and asylum policy. Such a mode of European identity does not rely on hegemonic ‘identifiers’, that is, political units categorising, distinguishing and positioning ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, but emerges as a result of the institutional openings it creates and the empowering trajectories for co-creating social life it gives rise to. By
resisting fixed and essentialist readings, European identity becomes the pure locus of the possible; that is, of writing a different future, opening up opportunities for institutional arrangements that enhance freedom and equality, creating opportunities for new and more enriched life experiences and encouraging multifarious connections among peoples and collectivities. European identity could thus be seen as the space of political possibility. A space that is sustained by subversive memory, hope, and a willingness to find solutions to common problems that exist, and emerge unpredictably from within as well as from a rapidly changing and volatile external environment. Unlike national narratives which can only make national identities credible, unified and homogenous by bracketing the violence associated with the historical matrix that shaped the formation of the nation-state and socialising citizens into similar acts of forgetting, European identity relies on memories and the remembrance of the human suffering that has accompanied its past. In this sense, a collective European identity can only be an actionist and subversive identity.

By the latter, I mean an identity that utilises the memories of the past in order to push a vision for humanity forward and gives freedom to believe that another world is possible. And by constantly reminding us that polities can be built by design and dissimilitude with state formations, that political realities are changed, changing and changeable and that it is possible to transgress the boundaries that have made and make national identities not only visible but also singular and exclusive, it opens up possibilities for modifications in institutions, policies and cultures and for alternatives. In this account, European identity can only be experimental, transformative, enigmatic, diffuse, fluid, transitional and ambivalent. Should this fill us with trepidation? I do not believe so. As Berger, Berger and Kellner observed in 1974 with respect to a different context, ‘stable identities (and this also means identities that will be subjectively plausible) can only emerge in reciprocity with stable contexts (and this means contexts that are structured by stable institutions)’. But, as we all know, stability is simply an illusion.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FROM IDEA TO FREEDOM


The first chapter under the title “The New Land,” offers the readership a historical background of the American Revolutionary War, the main topic of the book. The author presents us the story about the discovery of the American continent, the British settlement of the new territories, the Thirteen Colonies, and the biographies of seven Founding Fathers that played the most important role in the revolution and statehood building. “The discovery of America was a historical mistake,”1 a rather controversial and intriguing sentence, is the opening statement of the first chapter that makes the reader immediately highly interested in the content of the book. In this chapter, the author rightfully claims that “the contemporary civilization would not have been the same in any aspect, had the War of Independence had a different outcome.”2 The author also emphasizes that the creation of the United States of America was a revolutionary phenomenon in the times when it took place, as much as it is nowadays. According to the author, the certain elements of the American statehood were shaped much prior to the War for Independence, and these elements are explained, explored and interpreted in the following chapters. The importance of this historical event and its influence on the rest of the world is so big that the general lack of knowledge about the creation of the United States of America it is quite unusual, claims the author.

In the second chapter, “From Vassals to Free Men,” the author elaborates on the thirteen years prior to the beginning of the American War of Independence which represented the period during which the opinions, positions and ideas pertaining to the major political issues were consolidated. According to the

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1 Gordana Bekčić Pješčić, Od ideje do slobode, Most Art, Zemun, 2011, p. 11.
2 Ibid, p. 17.
The author, the natural, social, economic and political conditions in the colonial America were so different from the ones which existed in the British Monarchy that they represented a unique experience and laid ground for the big changes that took place prior to and during the War of Independence. The main four differences that laid the ground for the creation of a republic in the American soil were the absence of the immediate king’s rule, hereditary aristocracy, strict division of classes, and the centralized bureaucratic apparatus. The author argues that the revolution happened in the people’s minds before the battles and bloodshed, and offers the readership a learned journey through events, discussions and argumentation that led to the revolution and founding of the American republic.

The author dwells on the deep economic reasons for the conflict with the British Monarchy in the fourth chapter entitled “The Forged Liberty”. The taxes imposed on the colonists by the British Crown were the main reason for the uprising against the Monarchy. The colonial period in America was the time of the first industrial revolution which set the foundations for today’s global economic and trade influence, as claimed by the author. The author refers to Adam Smith’s book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations” in order to explain the theory of economic liberalism which has had the most fruitful application in the United States of America since the colonial times. The individual freedom represents the most important precondition for the economic liberalism enabling people to create business associations and make profit. The theory of economic liberalism also implies the complete absence of the political influence on the economy which directly creates conditions for the growth of the national wealth. In the spirit of economic liberalism, the business culture and entrepreneurship were highly developed in the colonial America much before the revolution took place. The author claims that the economic interests of the people in the Thirteen Colonies represented the basis for the economic liberalism which, since those times, has acted as a major driving force of the United States of America and its global economic advance through 20th century until present days. This chapter reviews the tax laws imposed on the Colonies by the British Monarchy, including The Molasses Act, The Quartering Act, The Stamp Act, and The Tea Act which finally led to the “Boston Tea Party” and the revolution that followed.

“A City Upon a Hill,” the third chapter, represents an in-depth analysis of the importance of religion in both the colonial America and the United States of America. The author notes that the religious practice shaped the American political culture to such a degree that the United States of America might not even exist today if it were not for various faiths and beliefs, especially the Puritan Protestantism. “The foundations of American political culture are based upon religious principles, primarily the Puritan ones. However, the vigor and
strength of these principles were not in their canonical value, but in the fact that the main theological principles spilled over into the everyday life.”³ And strangely enough, although religion is usually considered a retrograde force by the prevailing secular stream of thought, in the case of the United States of America, it has played a particularly progressive role in the creation and evolution of the country, as argued by the author. Except for the puritans who originally inhabited Massachusetts, the author also elaborates on other religious groups that participated in the American experiment — Quakers from Pennsylvania, Anglicans from Virginia, The Great Awakening movement, and Catholics from Maryland.

The fourth chapter entitled “The Builders” offers a completely new aspect of looking at the American Revolutionary War. The role of Freemasons and their basic principles of personal, political, economic, religious and social liberty in the founding of the United States of America are topics rarely researched and studied by scientists, even in America. In this chapter, the readership can find out that the majority of Founding Fathers were also members of the Freemasons, among them George Washington, Samuel Adams, Benjamin Franklin, James Monroe, and Alexander Hamilton. The author skillfully and convincingly dispels the widespread prejudices about a secret, powerful society that pulls the strings of the world. “Freemasonry is not a secret society, but a discreet society with its secrets.”⁴ The author explains that a Freemason is a man searching for the truth about himself and the world that surrounds him. By presenting a short history of the Freemasonry, the structure of the Freemasons’ society, and their basic principles, values and ideas, the author offers a background for the analyses of the role of Freemasons in the American Revolutionary War. The author also argues that the Freemasons’ principles, values and ideas, such as the personal liberty, the respect for the moral laws, and the respect for the faith of the other, were shared by the settlers of the Thirteen Colonies. The Freemasonry represented a form of civic education that had already been accepted and practices before the American Revolution, and that represented the main difference between the American and European Freemasonry, according to the author. In the pre-revolutionary period, the Freemasonry was the sole American inter-colonial organization which served as a communication channel for the like-minded people across the Colonies. During the Revolutionary period, claims the author, the Freemasonry also served as a uniting force within the American Continental Army, which had been quite disorganized and divided. The symbols and principles of the Freemasonry continued to play an important role in the life of the United States

⁴ Ibid, p. 98.
of America to the present days, as noted by the author. This chapter also contains a short text about the Freemasonry in Serbia and the part it played in the Serbian constitutional history, a fact little known to the broader public in Serbia.

In the fifth chapter, “The Structure of Freedom,” the author elaborates on the theoretical and philosophical foundations of the American political thought, and in that respect on the influence of John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu and Thomas Hobbes’ work and theories. The Declaration of Independence, as pointed out by the author, testifies that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,”\(^5\) and it fully reflects Locke’s theory of natural law. The separation of powers and the “trias politica” principle, as formulated by Baron de Montesquieu, were applied by John Adams and James Madison in shaping the institutional establishment of the American republic. Alexander Hamilton, influenced by Thomas Hobbes’ thoughts about the social and political order, was a crucial figure in writing the Constitution of the United States of America and in establishing the First Bank of the United States. By explaining and analyzing the theoretical background of the American political thought, the author skillfully pictures the institutional structure of the United States of America, as established by the Founding Fathers more than two centuries ago, and the continuous success in functioning of the American democracy since those times.

The last chapter of the book, “The New Order,” summarizes the previous chapters and presents concluding thoughts of the author about the contemporary position of the United States of America in the international arena. All through the previous five chapters the author successfully demonstrated the dialectical contradictions the United States of America were based upon, as well as the present status and role of this country in the globalized world. These contradictions include the Americanexceptionalism rooted in the ideas about the “empire of liberty” which retained slavery for a long time after gaining independence from the British Monarchy, the powerful religious aspect which allowed an ultimate religious tolerance, and the federal structure of the country that at the same time presents itself as a national country. “The creation of the United States of America is an event that divides the history into the one before and the one after. The American Revolution is an incident that leaped out of the time algorithm breaking off the historical continuum.”\(^6\) In this chapter, the author also reviews the current international standing of the United States of America.


\(^6\) Gordana Bekčić Pješčić, Od ideje do slobode, Most Art, Zemun, 2011, p. 147.
America on the global, regional and bilateral levels which brings us to the opposed and contradictory attitudes toward America by the rest of the world.

*From Idea to Freedom* was originally the author’s magisterial thesis defended in April 2011 at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade. The book offers findings and an in-depth analyses of the creation of the United States of America exploring the roots and origins of core values and ideas America was born from. Gordana Bekčić Pješčić rightfully claims that the United States of America, as a key player in the international arena today, is a country special and different from other countries in many aspects, and that the comprehension of the American history and its origins is essential to everybody who deals with today’s only global superpower.

The book represents a well-researched and deftly executed study of the events and decisions that led to the American Revolutionary War of Independence, and the ideological and legal framework the United States of America were created within. The author propagates the overarching theme that the American Revolution, represents a “black swan” among world revolutions — although “every revolution is a historical precedent.”7 According to the author, the legacy of the American Revolution — the United States of America, is a global political, social and cultural model in today’s world. And indeed, the United States of America is a country created on the idea of freedom, a country created according to the needs of a man as an individual, and not according to the needs of a ruler.

In addition to the main theme of the book, the author explores a number of very interesting and somewhat intriguing subthemes, such as the findings that the American continent was not settled by the people from the margins of the British society, as claimed by many critics. The author devoted a whole chapter to the role that the Freemasons played in the American Revolution and their influence on the creation and the development of the American democracy. Exploring and studying the topic of Freemasonry is a rare enterprise and a rather controversial one, and Gordana Bekčić Pješčić deserves an acclaim for taking up this bold feat.

The book is very well written and highly readable, and it is appropriate for both those who are well acquainted with the American history in general and the American Revolution in particular, and for those with little prior knowledge of the historical, political, economic and societal aspects of the creation of the United States of America. Thus, the book can be read as a scientific paper, a textbook or a novel depending of the previous knowledge and personal interest of the reader. The paper and print are of high quality which enables the reader

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to fully enjoy pictures and reprints of paintings, original documents and maps. Quotes and short texts offering additional explanations about particular events, documents, and personalities support the main theme and the author’s view of the subject. The final section of the book, the Chronology of Events, printed on a folded throwout paper makes it possible to have an easy overview of the historical period covered by the book.

Taking into consideration the current position of the United States of America in the world politics and international relations, and the widespread negative attitudes towards the world’s only superpower, especially in Serbia, it is not easy to write a book that expresses a moderate opinion about America. The author skillfully presents, interprets and analyses enough evidence and examples to make the readership contemplate about the United States of America without being emotionally engaged despite the controversy this country creates.

Jelena PUTRE JAKOVLJEVIĆ
WASHINGTON RULES: AMERICA’S PATH TO PERMANENT WAR

Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University and retired career officer educated at West Point, contributed in past decade to American historical literature with several significant books.¹ As a former professional soldier, highly academically educated in US diplomacy history, he found his field of expertise in the area of contemporary foreign relations, from the end of Second World War up to Obama’s administration. The curiosity of his perspective is analytical and sharp approach to dialectical, rather controversial link between proclaimed American principles in the area of foreign affairs and the reality of situation on the ground — overstretched military engagement because of growing threats to national security recognized by Washington.

In his recent work, named “Washington Rules,” Bacevich analyzes in-depth the contradiction between US basic ideological principles in the sphere of international relations (belief that America is called and destined to “to lead, save, liberate and ultimately transform the world”)² and problematic, contradictory and irritating way in which the implementation of those principles has been carried out since 1945 (global military presence, global power projection and global interventionism). Set of ideas and principles author named as American credo, while the global US engagement in terms of power and force he framed with a lucid expression shaded with cynicism — sacred trinity, which represents a general war doctrine carried out from Harry Truman to Barack Obama. Belief that good intentions and basic principles ensure US from any quilt in foreign affairs in this book has been ruthlessly put into question. Assumption that US policy makers have the very deed to the truth is one of the ideological stereotypes sold to American public as a mainstream narrative about freedom and democracy, which US is entitled to spread worldwide.

Author’s intensions with this book were to trace the origins of Washington rules, to subject the resulting consensus to critical inspection, to explain how those rules are perpetuated, to emphasize that those rules have lost whatever utility they may have and to rethink them in attempt to offer new approaches to US foreign affairs.³ The very core of his analysis is a phenomenological

³ Bacevich, p. 16.
paradox in which American society has fallen, caused especially by US military engagement abroad, fact that the gap between reality and official narrative of foreign policy has been increasing with passage of time. Nothing is as it seems and contemporary history should be re-evaluated for the benefit of the nation and the country, emphasizes the writer.

Breaking point in this shift between reality and its presentation was the end of Second World War. In the paranoid atmosphere of Cold War and global nuclear threats symbolized in USSR, United States found itself in a condition of permanent danger. New world order dictated change in national security policy: US must defend its own borders in Europe at the first place, but also in all other areas where it was possible to expect collision of interests of two superpowers. This mindset, as Bacevich explains, created the situation of semiwar which has been established as permanent framework of the US military engagement ever since. In the name of keeping America safe and global peace preserved, semiwarriors in US military and intelligence insisted, “nothing should impede U.S. preparations for war”. Hence, the origin of the belief that everyone is arming in order to preserve peace, but this assumption was reserved exclusively for the United States investment in military power. Every other country was carefully observed in such actions. In order to preserve peace, United States has launched series of interventions on small and large scale. With the passage of time and administrations, America’s aspiration for peace was guarded with constant annual growth of military budget.

According to Bacevich, everything started with Allen Dulles, director of CIA (1953–1961) and Curtis Le May, founder of Strategic Air Command (SAC). With first covert operations in early 1950’s, with operation Tpajax and overthrow of Mohhamad Mosaddegh in Tehran, new structures of power and influence, uncontrolled by civil authorities, emerged in Washington. The problem was not, Bacevich argues, existence of CIA or military structures, but lack of public observation upon this organizations. Simultaneously with the Agency growth, Le May developed SAC in such extent that by the end of 1950’s he commanded over 200 000 people, operating in 55 bases worldwide, establishing of Strategic Air Command a kind of state for its self. In the early days of Cold War, Dulles and Le May made a framework of US foreign military engagement as a “national first principle and so laid the foundation for what became the Washington consensus”.

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4 “Semiwar defines a condition in which great dangers always threaten the United States and will continue doing so into the indefinite future”, Bacevich, p. 28.
5 Bacevich, p. 28.
6 Ibid, p. 56.
Thanks to aspiration of secrecy, privilege and prestige among high offices in CIA and SAC, and power promptly created and accumulated back in the 50’s, this framework have never been actually changed or significantly reshaped. From Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson all the way to Clinton, Bush and Obama, sacred trinity have prevailed all presidential changes and new programs, regardless of personal aspirations, intentions and wishes of president elected. It turns out that Washington is much stronger than any chief executive is. Author emphasizes that Washington is less geographic term but much more a peculiar and dense net of number of institutions, which create a specific power structure, the structure that lies behind all top decision making processes in the area of foreign affairs. It emerges as a hydra with hundred heads, threatening legitimacy of American values abroad. However, one and only institution lay behind what Washington represents, author claims, United States Army.

First official warning of this threat can be found in Dwight Eisenhower’s Farewell Address in which departing president warns his fellow Americans regarding industrial — military complex.\(^7\) Time has shown that this warning was based on reality. Thanks to high profit and various interests of vast number of people involved in the machinery called Washington, the primary principle set since the time of Dulles and Le May was avoiding control of any kind as much as possible — civil, political or any other supervision. Administration by administration, with some cosmetic changes, status quo continued to exist based on the set up made in early 1950’s. Searching through period of sixty years, author explores a number of interventions, decisions and their consequences, pointing out on two things: a well-established conduct in matters of military presence and a complex interdependence of those acts on wider time scale.

Bacevich has found no exception in acceptance of Washington Rules for any of the Eisenhower’s successors in the Oval Office. Quite contrary, all of them he found insufficiently bold and determined to make a change and to face with the failure of taken approach when the damage already has been done, with Vietnam as the most disastrous example. Pushing painful issues and requests at the margins of political life is a part of politics itself. Problem arises, however, with permanent pushing aside all negative experience blindly, refusing even to reconsider whether something wrong with declared principles (American credo) or with the means and the ways they are used (sacred trinity). Avoidance to see, to admit mistake and to draw lessons from experience, leaves only one option in the process of conclusion — something about the world is seriously wrong.

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\(^7\) “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist,” Dwight Eisenhower”, “Farewell Address to the Nation”, January 17, 1961, cited from http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm, accessed March 15, 2012.
Approach of this kind implemented on the individual leads to paranoia. If the same pattern we apply to a state, positive conclusion about it would be highly questionable. Repealing the outcome of the Vietnam was exit strategy for Washington rules. Representing Vietnam case as an anomaly was refusing to consider in what extent this war had been “but a symptom of a far deeper malady within the American spirit”. All Washington players had been engaged in order to preserve consensus about sacred trinity and the outcome of the Vietnam disaster was actually vanishing this episode from the official mainstream political discourse from the top.

In his diachronic and complex analysis Bacevich takes to face with the greatest mainstream narrative of American political culture — the presidential narrative. Regardless their broad executive prerogatives, U.S. presidents in last sixty years seem to be not in position of crucial decider in Washington. Idea that “occupant of the White House defines the age” seems far from reality. According to Bacevich, presidents are no more than the mediums for manifestation of the power and decisions made somewhere else. For each president since JFK, thanks to his failure in Bay of Pigs, image of tough guy has became a part of job description, but the position of Decider has been only a role to play in contemporary presidency, without real meaning and significance, and “the greatest irony of all” is the fact of unchanged priorities within sacred trinity in current office.

Inability of learning from history and experience is one of the main Washington characteristics and of those at the top of the government. Long list of controversial action, from adventures with Cuba up to complete misunderstanding of Afghan culture and necessities of local people, represent one of the obstacles of US military engagement as a whole. American approach to modern political crisis and military presence in crisis areas suffers from narrow sight to strategic problems of the other side, thus ensuring always a losing position for US one way or another.

Having in mind the assumption that US not only misjudged them, but also even worse misjudged itself, willingness to approach others in radically different way is the first step toward real learning and education. On behalf of this author offers to American public and political elite proposal of possible new trinity, which can be read as a message that follows — America and Americans should mind their own business. It would be radical change in deployment of military force from dissemination of American credo around the globe to defense of the US as a top priority; primary duty station of US soldiers is at the

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9 Bacevic, p. 30.
American soil; finally yet importantly, using military force only as a final and exclusively self-defend option. Bacevich suggest fundamental revision of American soldier identity and its return to the image created during the struggle for American independence in late XVIII century — from contemporary professional warrior to the citizen-protector, legendary Minuteman who had won a war against England as the most powerful country of the age.

However, those fundamental changes require one and only thing missing in Washington — alert and knowledgeable citizenry, because only that power “can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together”. The main threat to American credo in reality of American society lies in the following — Founding Fathers dream of minimal government reversed during past sixty years in its diabolical opposite, reality of minimal citizenship. Washington suffers from a lack of citizen engagement and control, which allows it wide latitude of employing military power. While Founding Fathers views to foreign affairs and international position of United States have prevailed as mainstream approach for majority of American citizens even in 21st century, Washington rules would be impossible to exist if those views have been preserved as political and ideological imperative, which dictates the direction of foreign policy.

Andrew Bacevich challenges Washington rules exactly in the Founding Fathers ideological framework, having in mind that those fundament pillars of the Republic has to be pulled out and refreshed “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” Advocating with such passion and in-depth understanding of foreign affairs behind the curtain, Andrew Bachevich wrote remarkable book, which breaks mainstream narrative about US contemporary foreign affairs. Writing in simple and readable style, able to connect events easily with clear explanation of presented views, author succeeds to deal with heavy and painful issues in a lightweight manner, which allows possible social impact of his study to be much broader than would otherwise be expected from the literature of this kind. Because of all that has been said, this book is a kind of a challenge to Washington and its rules, a glove thrown in to the face of steady habits, assumptions, traditional and crusty US statecraft discourse.

Gordana BEKČIĆ PJEŠČIĆ

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CONFERENCE REVIEW

INSTITUTE FOR CULTURAL DIPLOMACY — LEADERS FOR TOMORROW

Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (ICD)\(^1\) is an international and non-governmental organization founded in United States in 1999. Based in Berlin, with headquarters in Washington, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Ecuador, ICD represents a global network of organization involved in public and private sector, individuals and distinguished persons from all areas with the same goal and idea — promoting interconnections between people and culture in order to exchange knowledge, experience and ideas. The ultimate ICD goal is to promote global peace by strengthening social and cultural interactions between people interested with and involved in the field of cultural diplomacy.

A starting definition of cultural diplomacy is offered by the American political scientist and author, Milton C. Cummings, in his description of cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, values, systems, traditions, beliefs, and other aspects of culture, with the intention of fostering mutual understanding”. As such, cultural diplomacy existed through centuries, in every peaceful touch of different cultures, through individual travelers and explorers, like Marco Polo, or within overlapping of different civilizations in their mutual influence.

Even though it seems that contemporary world, having been already interconnected, is easy-going area for mutual understanding and intercultural respect, necessity for active cultural diplomacy is bigger than ever. Technological development does not imply elimination of cultural barriers between people and societies. Unfortunately, it seems that this process is inversely proportional to the technical and technological progress of humankind. If we look at the world map and try to count all local conflict and crises, it would be more than depressing conclusion that most are in some extent caused by cultural conflict.

Globalization processes which have been reshaping the world for last few decades placed in front a request for new approach to the people as human beings and to culture as a framework in which each individual exist. In globalized and interdependent world with such huge and complex set of problems and challenges, from military interventions, social movements, religious and ethnic

\(^1\) For more information see: http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org.
hostilities up to climate and environmental issues, culture seems to be condemned to periphery. Nevertheless, proliferation (sic!) of cultural opening, understanding and overcoming of cultural stereotypes and assumptions emerges as a very first step towards more possible success in searching solutions for those difficult issues numbered above.

In promoting the field of cultural diplomacy, ICD organizes programs that target the development of awareness and understanding of the practice of cultural diplomacy. The aim of the ICD programs is to gather young scholars from all parts of the world, to encourage and support them to explore the field of cultural diplomacy according to their interests and field of expertise and, if it is possible, to subsequently initiate independent projects of their own. Senior lecturers who participate in ICD events are members of long list of distinguished names from academic, political, military, public diplomacy and civil society areas. Among many various means and methods in promoting cultural diplomacy, ICD uses institution of international conference. During one calendar year, number of conferences, lectures and panel discussions is impressive. All of them are divided in specific section, regarding the main topic argued at the event. Some of them are Annual Conference of Cultural Diplomacy, A World Without Walls, The Language of Art of Music, Young Leaders Forums, Europe Meets Russia etc...

 Having in mind a lack of serious research in the field of cultural diplomacy, the ICD actively encourages and supports cultural diplomacy as an academic discipline and as a more widely accepted tool in the practice of foreign policy. That is the main reason of heavy schedule organized by ICD. Development of research field is necessary and important because of better optimization of cultural diplomacy initiatives currently in existence and opening of new possibilities in the prediction processes in the future.

One of the forums among Young Leaders Forums is US Meets Europe (USAME), a network of young, influential people from both sides of the Atlantic who have an interest in supporting the relationship between the United States and Europe. Held twice a year, this forum is sometimes organized in Washington DC within some broader conference, as was the case last year in the mid of May. In the building of German Marshall Fund in Washington The International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy in the USA 2011 was held for five days. The main topic discussed and evaluated during the event was the roles and the responsibilities in a changing world order (evaluating the political, economic and cultural dimensions).

Conference brought together over sixty participants from US, Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Sudan, Serbia and nearly forty speakers — professors from US universities, former and current ambassadors from various countries, military experts, UN representatives, prominent journalist, former high governmental
officers and public diplomacy representatives. In a hard working atmosphere from early morning until 8pm speakers took turns and panel discussions were opened. From various angles and perspectives, according to their background and field of expertise, ICD participants together with lecturers talked and evaluated contemporary issues and responsibilities of US and EU as the most developed parts of the world and therefore most responsible political structures in contemporary political and social changes that hit the world — changes in Arab World, proliferation of nuclear weapons, global terrorism threats, climate change. In order to understand and evaluate significance of all changes humankind faces with, cultural diplomacy as an interpersonal and intergovernmental communication has been perceived as significant tool of implementing soft power in more than complex international relations as a whole. Panel discussions after lectures gave opportunity to participants (students and young scholars) who are just entering the public arena of cultural diplomacy to discuss the topics offered, giving their observations and exchanging views with colleagues from other cultures. Additional encouragement, which is official ICD policy in nurturing future scholars and public diplomacy activists, was the presentation of participant’s papers regarding cultural diplomacy in their research field. After five intensive days offered participants to exchange experience and personal impressions in a closing session, with the suggestion for further activity in cultural diplomacy in each person country, as a part of individual and professional growth.

Conference review by
Gordana BEKČIĆ PJEŠČIĆ
DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

(Copenhagen, 14 December 1973)

Caption: At the Copenhagen European Summit of 14 and 15 December 1973, the Heads of State or Government of the nine Member States of the enlarged European Community affirm their determination to introduce the concept of European identity into their common foreign relations.


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DOCUMENTS*

Declaration on European Identity

(Copenhagen, 14 December 1973)

The Nine Member Countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe.

Defining the European Identity involves:

— reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community,

* In view of fact that the text in this section are an official nature, no alternations of any kind have been made to them by the editor of the Review of International Affairs.
— assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this,
— taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification.

I. The Unity of the Nine Member Countries of the Community

1. The Nine European States might have been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests. But they have overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common.

The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity. The Nine believe that this enterprise corresponds to the deepest aspirations of their peoples who should participate in its realization, particularly through their elected representatives.

2. The Nine have the political will to succeed in the construction of a united Europe. On the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome setting up the European Communities and of subsequent decisions, they have created a common market, based on a customs union, and have established institutions, common policies and machinery for co-operation. All these are an essential part of the European Identity. The Nine are determined to safeguard the elements which make up the unity they have achieved so far and the fundamental objectives laid down for future development at the Summit Conferences in The Hague and Paris. On the basis of the Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports, the Nine Governments have established a system of political co-operation with a view to determining common attitudes and, where possible and desirable, common action. They propose to develop this further. In accordance with the decision taken at the

Paris conference, the Nine reaffirm their intention of transforming the whole complex of their relations into a European Union before the end of the present decade.

3. The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in
common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United
Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism.

4. The construction of a United Europe, which the Nine Member Countries of
the Community are undertaking, is open to other European nations who share
the same ideals and objectives.

5. The European countries have, in the course of their history, developed close
ties with many other parts of the world. These relationships, which will
continue to evolve, constitute an assurance of progress and international
equilibrium.

6. Although in the past the European countries were individually able to play a
major rôle on the international scene, present international problems are
difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and
the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very
small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak
increasingly with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper
rôle in the world.

7. The Community, the world’s largest trading group, could not be a closed
economic entity. It has close links with the rest of the world as regards its
supplies and market outlets. For this reason the Community, while remaining
in control of its own trading policies, intends to exert a positive influence on
world economic relations with a view to the greater well-being of all.

8. The Nine, one of whose essential aims is to maintain peace, will never
succeed in doing so if they neglect their own security. Those of them who are
members of the Atlantic Alliance consider that in present circumstances there
is no alternative to the security provided by the nuclear weapons of the United
States and by the presence of North American forces in Europe: and they
agree that in the light of the relative military vulnerability of Europe, the
Europeans should, if they wish to preserve their independence, hold to their
commitments and make constant efforts to ensure that they have adequate
means of defence at their disposal.

II. The European Identity in Relation to the World

9. The Europe of the Nine is aware that, as it unites, it takes on new international
obligations. European unification is not directed against anyone, nor is it
inspired by a desire for power. On the contrary, the Nine are convinced that
their union will benefit the whole international community since it will
constitute an element of equilibrium and a basis for co-operation with all
countries, whatever their size, culture or social system. The Nine intend to
play an active rôle in world affairs and thus to contribute, in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to ensuring that
international relations have a more just basis; that the independence and
equality of States are better preserved; that prosperity is more equitably shared; and that the security of each country is more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy.

10. As the Community progresses towards a common policy in relation to third countries, it will act in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The Nine, acting as a single entity, will strive to promote harmonious and constructive relations with these countries. This should not however jeopardize, hold back or affect the will of the Nine to progress towards European Union within the time limits laid down.

(b) In future when the Nine negotiate collectively with other countries, the institutions and procedures chosen should enable the distinct character of the European entity to be respected.

(c) In bilateral contacts with other countries, the Member States of the Community will increasingly act on the basis of agreed common positions.

11. The Nine intend to strengthen their links, in the present institutional framework, with the Member Countries of the Council of Europe, and with other European countries with whom they already have friendly relations and close co-operation.

12. The Nine attach essential importance to the Community’s policy of association. Without diminishing the advantages enjoyed by the countries with which it has special relations, the Community intends progressively to put into operation a policy for development aid on a worldwide scale in accordance with the principles and aims set out in the Paris Summit Declaration.

13. The Community will implement its undertakings towards the Mediterranean and African countries in order to reinforce its long-standing links with these countries. The Nine intend to preserve their historical links with the countries of the Middle East and to co-operate over the establishment and maintenance of peace, stability and progress in the region.

14. The close ties between the United States and Europe of the Nine — we share values and aspirations based on a common heritage — are mutually beneficial and must be preserved. These ties do not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity. The Nine intend to maintain their constructive dialogue and to develop their co-operation with the United States on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship.

15. The Nine also remain determined to engage in close co-operation and to pursue a constructive dialogue with the other industrialized countries, such as Japan and Canada, which have an essential rôle in maintaining an open and balanced world economic system. They appreciate the existing fruitful co-operation with these countries, particularly within the OECD.
16. The Nine have contributed, both individually and collectively to the first results of a policy of détente and co-operation with the USSR and the East European countries. They are determined to carry this policy further forward on a reciprocal basis.

17. Conscious of the major rôle played by China in international affairs, the Nine intend to intensify their relations with the Chinese Government and to promote exchanges in various fields as well as contacts between European and Chinese leaders.

18. The Nine are also aware of the important rôle played by other Asian countries. They are determined to develop their relations with these countries as is demonstrated, as far as commercial relations are concerned, by the Declaration of Intent made by the Community at the time of its enlargement.

19. The Nine are traditionally bound to the Latin American countries by friendly links and many other contacts; they intend to develop these. In this context they attach great importance to the agreements concluded between the European Community and certain Latin American countries.

20. There can be no real peace if the developed countries do not pay more heed to the less favoured nations. Convinced of this fact, and conscious of their responsibilities and particular obligations, the Nine attach very great importance to the struggle against under-development. They are, therefore, resolved to intensify their efforts in the fields of trade and development aid and to strengthen international co-operation to these ends.

21. The Nine will participate in international negotiations in an outward-looking spirit, while preserving the fundamental elements of their unity and their basic aims. They are also resolved to contribute to international progress, both through their relations with third countries and by adopting common positions wherever possible in international organizations, notably the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

III. The Dynamic Nature of the Construction of a United Europe

22. The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. They are convinced that building up this policy will help them to tackle with confidence and realism further stages in the construction of a United Europe thus making easier the proposed transformation of the whole complex of their relations into a European Union.
AGREEMENT
between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia
establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of
Serbia in European Union crisis management operations

THE EUROPEAN UNION,
of the one part, and

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
of the other part,
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Parties’,

Whereas:
(1) The European Union (EU) may decide to take action in the field of crisis
management.
(2) The European Union will decide whether third States will be invited to
participate in an EU crisis management operation. The Republic of Serbia
may accept the invitation by the European Union and offer its contribution.
In such case, the European Union will decide on the acceptance of the
proposed contribution of the Republic of Serbia.
(3) Conditions regarding the participation of the Republic of Serbia in EU crisis
management operations should be laid down in an agreement establishing a
framework for such possible future participation, rather than defining those
conditions on a case-by-case basis for each operation concerned.
(4) Such an agreement should be without prejudice to the decision-making
autonomy of the European Union, and should not prejudge the case-by-case
nature of the decisions of the Republic of Serbia to participate in an EU crisis
management operation.
(5) Such an agreement should only address future EU crisis management
operations and should be without prejudice to any existing agreements
regulating the participation of the Republic of Serbia in an EU crisis
management operation that has already been deployed,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Decisions relating to the participation

1. Following the decision of the European Union to invite the Republic of Serbia to participate in an EU crisis management operation, and once the Republic of Serbia has decided to participate, the Republic of Serbia shall provide information on its proposed contribution to the European Union.

2. The assessment by the European Union of the Republic of Serbia’s contribution shall be conducted in consultation with the Republic of Serbia.

3. The European Union shall provide the Republic of Serbia with an early indication of the likely contribution to the common costs of the operation as soon as possible with a view to assisting the Republic of Serbia in the formulation of its offer.

4. The European Union shall communicate the outcome of this assessment to the Republic of Serbia by a letter with a view to securing the participation of the Republic of Serbia in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

Article 2

Framework

1. The Republic of Serbia shall associate itself with the Council Decision by which the Council of the European Union decides that the EU will conduct the crisis management operation, and with any other decision by which the Council of the European Union decides to extend the EU crisis management operation, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and any required implementing arrangements.

2. The contribution of the Republic of Serbia to an EU crisis management operation shall be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the European Union.

Article 3

Status of personnel and forces

1. The status of personnel seconded to an EU civilian crisis management operation and/or of the forces contributed to an EU military crisis management operation by the Republic of Serbia shall be governed by the agreement on the
status of forces/mission, if concluded, between the European Union and the State(s) in which the operation is conducted.

2. The status of personnel contributed to headquarters or command elements located outside the State(s) in which the EU crisis management operation takes place, shall be governed by arrangements between the headquarters and command elements concerned and the Republic of Serbia.

3. Without prejudice to the agreement on the status of forces/mission referred to in paragraph 1, the Republic of Serbia shall exercise jurisdiction over its personnel participating in the EU crisis management operation.

4. The Republic of Serbia shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the participation in an EU crisis management operation, from or concerning any of its personnel. The Republic of Serbia shall be responsible for bringing any action, in particular legal or disciplinary, against any of its personnel in accordance with its laws and regulations.

5. The Republic of Serbia undertakes to make a declaration as regards the waiver of claims against any State participating in an EU crisis management operation in which the Republic of Serbia participates, and to do so when signing this Agreement.

6. The European Union undertakes to ensure that European Union Member States make a declaration as regards the waiver of claims, for any future participation of the Republic of Serbia in an EU crisis management operation, and to do so when signing this Agreement

Article 4

Classified information

1. The Republic of Serbia shall take appropriate measures to ensure that EU classified information is protected in accordance with the EU Council’s security regulations, contained in Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations[1] and in accordance with further guidance issued by competent authorities, including the EU Operation Commander concerning an EU military crisis management operation or by the EU Head of Mission concerning an EU civilian crisis management operation.

2. Where the EU and the Republic of Serbia have concluded an agreement on security procedures for the exchange of classified information, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context of an EU crisis management operation.

SECTION II

PROVISIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

Article 5

Personnel seconded to an EU civilian crisis management operation

1. The Republic of Serbia shall ensure that its personnel seconded to the EU civilian crisis management operation undertake their mission in accordance with:
   (a) the Council Decision and subsequent amendments as referred to in Article 2(1);
   (b) the Operation Plan;
   (c) implementing measures.

2. The Republic of Serbia shall inform in due time the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Council of any change to its contribution to the EU civilian crisis management operation.

3. Personnel seconded to the EU civilian crisis management operation shall undergo a medical examination, vaccination and be certified medically fit for duty by a competent authority from the Republic of Serbia. Personnel seconded to the EU civilian crisis management operation shall produce a copy of this certification.

Article 6

Chain of command

1. Personnel seconded by the Republic of Serbia shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the EU civilian crisis management operation in mind.

2. All personnel shall remain under the full command of their national authorities.

3. National authorities shall transfer operational control to the European Union.

4. The Head of Mission shall assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the EU civilian crisis management operation at theatre level.

5. The Head of Mission shall lead the EU civilian crisis management operation and assume its day-to-day management.

6. The Republic of Serbia shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as European Union Member States taking part in the operation, in accordance with the legal instruments referred to in Article 2(1).
7. The EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over EU civilian crisis management operation personnel. Where required, disciplinary action shall be taken by the national authority concerned.

8. A National Contingent Point of Contact ("NPC") shall be appointed by the Republic of Serbia to represent its national contingent in the operation. The NPC shall report to the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission on national matters and shall be responsible for day-to-day contingent discipline.

9. The decision to end the operation shall be taken by the European Union, following consultation with the Republic of Serbia if it is still contributing to the EU civilian crisis management operation at the date of termination of the operation.

**Article 7**

Financial aspects

1. The Republic of Serbia shall assume all the costs associated with its participation in the operation apart from the running costs, as set out in the operational budget of the operation. This shall be without prejudice to Article 8.

2. In case of death, injury, loss or damage to natural or legal persons from the State(s) in which the operation is conducted, the Republic of Serbia shall, once its liability has been established, pay compensation under the conditions foreseen in the applicable status of mission agreement referred to in Article 3(1).

**Article 8**

Contribution to operational budget

1. The Republic of Serbia shall contribute to the financing of the budget of the EU civilian crisis management operation.

2. The financial contribution of the Republic of Serbia to the operational budget shall be calculated on the basis of either of the following formulae, whichever produces the lower amount:

   (a) the share of the reference amount which corresponds proportionately to the ratio of the Republic of Serbia’s GNI to the total GNIs of all States contributing to the operational budget of the operation; or

   (b) the share of the reference amount for the operational budget which corresponds proportionately to the ratio of the number of personnel from the Republic of Serbia participating in the operation to the total number of personnel of all States participating in the operation.
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, the Republic of Serbia shall not make any contribution towards the financing of per diem allowances paid to personnel of the European Union Member States.

4. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the European Union shall, in principle, exempt the Republic of Serbia from financial contributions to a particular EU civilian crisis management operation when:

(a) the European Union decides that the Republic of Serbia provides a significant contribution which is essential for the operation; or

(b) the Republic of Serbia has a GNI per capita which does not exceed that of any Member State of the European Union.

5. An arrangement on the payment of the contributions of the Republic of Serbia to the operational budget of the EU civilian crisis management operation shall be signed between the EU civilian crisis management operation Head of Mission and the relevant administrative services of the Republic of Serbia. That arrangement shall include, inter alia, the following provisions:

(a) the amount concerned;

(b) the arrangements for payment of the financial contribution;

(c) the auditing procedure.

SECTION III
PROVISIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

Article 9
Participation in an EU military crisis management operation

1. The Republic of Serbia shall ensure that its forces and personnel participating in an EU military crisis management operation undertake their mission in accordance with:

(a) the Council Decision and subsequent amendments as referred to in Article 2(1);

(b) the Operation Plan;

(c) implementing measures.

2. Personnel seconded by the Republic of Serbia shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interest of the EU military crisis management operation in mind.

3. The Republic of Serbia shall inform the EU Operation Commander in due time of any change to its participation in the operation.
Article 10

Chain of command

1. All forces and personnel participating in the EU military crisis management operation shall remain under the full command of their national authorities.

2. National authorities shall transfer the Operational and Tactical command and/or control of their forces and personnel to the EU Operation Commander, who is entitled to delegate his authority.

3. The Republic of Serbia shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of the day-to-day management of the operation as participating European Union Member States.

4. The EU Operation Commander may, following consultations with the Republic of Serbia, at any time request the withdrawal of the Republic of Serbia’s contribution.

5. A Senior Military Representative (SMR) shall be appointed by the Republic of Serbia to represent the Serbian contingent in the EU military crisis management operation. The SMR shall consult with the EU Force Commander on all matters affecting the operation and shall be responsible for the day-to-day discipline of the Serbian contingent.

Article 11

Financial aspects

1. Without prejudice to Article 12, the Republic of Serbia shall assume all the costs associated with its participation in the operation unless the costs are subject to common funding as provided for in the legal instruments referred to in Article 2(1), as well as in Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)²[2].

2. In case of death, injury, loss or damage to natural or legal persons from the State(s) in which the operation is conducted, the Republic of Serbia shall, once its liability has been established, pay compensation under the conditions foreseen in the applicable status of forces agreement referred to in Article 3(1).

Article 12

Contribution to the common costs

1. The Republic of Serbia shall contribute to the financing of the common costs of the EU military crisis management operation.

2. The financial contribution of the Republic of Serbia to the common costs shall be calculated on the basis of either of the following two formulae, whichever produces the lower amount:

(a) the share of the common costs which corresponds proportionately to the ratio of the Republic of Serbia’s GNI to the total GNIs of all States contributing to the common costs of the operation; or

(b) the share of the common costs which corresponds proportionately to the ratio of the number of personnel from the Republic of Serbia participating in the operation to the total number of personnel of all States participating in the operation.

Where the formula under point (b) of paragraph 2 is used and the Republic of Serbia contributes personnel only to the Operation or Force Headquarters, the ratio used shall be that of its personnel to that of the total number of the respective headquarters personnel. In other cases, the ratio shall be that of all personnel contributed by the Republic of Serbia to that of the total personnel of the operation.

3. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the European Union shall, in principle, exempt the Republic of Serbia from financial contributions to the common costs of a particular EU military crisis management operation when:

(a) the European Union decides that the Republic of Serbia provides a significant contribution to assets and/or capabilities which are essential for the operation; or

(b) the Republic of Serbia has a GNI per capita which does not exceed that of any Member State of the European Union.

4. An arrangement shall be concluded between the Administrator provided for in Decision 2008/975/CFSP and the competent administrative authorities of the Republic of Serbia. This arrangement shall include, inter alia, provisions on:

(a) the amount concerned;

(b) the arrangements for payment of the financial contribution;

(c) the auditing procedure.
SECTION IV

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 13
Implementing arrangements

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 8(5) and 12(4), any necessary technical and administrative arrangements in pursuance of the implementation of this Agreement shall be concluded between the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Serbia.

Article 14
Non-compliance

Should one of the Parties fail to comply with its obligations under this Agreement, the other Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement by serving notice of one month.

Article 15
Dispute settlement

Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by diplomatic means between the Parties.

Article 16
Entry into force

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the first month after the Parties have notified each other of the completion of the internal procedures necessary for this purpose.

2. This Agreement shall be provisionally applied from the date of signature.

3. This Agreement shall be subject to regular review.

4. This Agreement may be amended on the basis of a mutual written agreement between the Parties.

5. This Agreement may be denounced by either Party by written notice of denunciation given to the other Party. Such denunciation shall take effect six months after receipt of notification by the other Party.

Done at Belgrade, this eighth day of June in the year 2011 in two copies, each in the English language.

For the European Union
Vincent Degert

For the Republic of Serbia
Vuk Jeremić
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSOCIATES

The Review of International Affairs is a quarterly published in January, April, July and October every year.

The periodical publishes evaluated articles and conference and book reviews in the field of international relations, foreign policy, international public law and international economics.

In writing all contributions for The Review of International Affairs authors are kindly asked to respect the following rules.

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1. Author contributions (articles) should not be longer than 10 single-spaced pages (single) in Word format (up to 28000 characters with spaces).

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3. The title of the article should be written in capital letters, in Bold, font size 14. The title is separated from the text with – spacing before 18 pt. Below the title is given the author’s forename, middle name and surname (including his title, possibly), the name of the institutions he works for as well as its seat. These data are given in Italic.

   Example:
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5. The Abstract should contain not more than 100 words, presenting the most significant hypotheses the work is based upon. Below the Abstract the author puts up to 12 Key Words. Both the Abstract and Key Words are given below the title of the article and they should be separated from the rest of the text by applying the option Paragraph-Indentation.

6. The Summary written in the language of the paper (e.g. Serbian) should be placed after the text. The author should give a concise contents of the paper and the most significant hypothesis his work is based upon.

7. The basic text and footnotes should be justified by applying the option justify, while titles should be centred by applying the option center.

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9. The first line in every paragraph should by no means be indented by applying tabulator – option `tab`.

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11. Only the following form of quotation marks should be put in the text – “ and ”. In case the additional quotation marks are to be put within these ones it should be done in the following way: “Establishing a Serbian Orthodox Monastic Community in Kosovo, as an integral part of comprehensive ‘final status’ settlement”.

12. Footnotes should be written on the bottom of the page (option `Footnote`), and their marks are solely to be put at the end of the sentence.

The details on the quoted bibliographic unit in footnotes should be given in conformity with the following suggestions:

a) Monographs

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the monograph (*in Italic*), publisher, place of publishing, year of publishing, p. if one page of the quotation in English is cited, pp. if several pages are quoted. In case several pages are quoted En Dash is applied with no space before and after the numbers (for example 22–50).

When the proceedings in English are quoted and they were edited by more than one editor, then there should be put (eds) in brackets with no full stop after the names of the editors. If there is only one editor then (ed.) is put, including a full stop inside the brackets.

*Examples:*


b) Articles in Scientific Journals

The author’s full forename and surname, the title of the paper (with quotation marks), the title of the journal (*in Italic*), the number of the volume, the number of the publication, pp. from–to. The numbers of pages are separated by En Dash (–), with no space. If some data are incomplete it should be clearly stated.

*Examples:*


c) *Articles in Daily Newspapers and Journals*

There should be given the author’s name (or his initials, if they are the only ones given), the title of the article – with quotation marks, the title of the newspapers or the journal (*in Italic*), date – in Arabic numerals, the number of the page/pages.

*Example:*

d) *Document quotation*

There should be given the title of the document (with quotation marks), the article, item or paragraph the author refers to, the title of the journal or official gazette containing the document (in *Italic*, the number of the volume, the number of the publication, the place of publishing and year of publishing.

*Example:*

e) *Quotation of sources from the Internet*

It should contain the author's name, the title of the contribution or article, a full Internet Website that enables to access the source of quotation by typing the mentioned site, the date of accession to the Web page, page number (if there is one and if presented in PDF format).

*Example:*

f) *Repeating of the previously quoted sources*

Ibid. or ibidem is applied only if quoting the previous source in the text, with the page number, and in case the new quotation belongs to the same source (e.g. ibid., p. 11).
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13. The article may contain tables or some other supplements (such as maps, graphs, and the like). It is necessary to give their number and full title (e.g. *Table 1: Human Development Index among EU members* or *Figure 2: State-Building or Sovereignty Strategy*). If the supplement is taken over from the contribution of some other author or a document its source should necessarily be given.

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2. The bibliographic details should be given at the beginning of the review in accordance with the rules prescribed for monographs in footnotes, and with the total number of pages given at the end (e.g. p. 345).
3. Book and conference reviews must not contain footnotes, while all possible remarks should be put in brackets.

4. The author may also write subtitles of the book or conference review in capital letters – font size 14, although this is subject to changes on the part of the editorial staff.

5. Font size, font and justification of the text should be in conformity with the previously mentioned suggestions on writing of articles.

6. The name of the author of the review is given at the end; it should be in *Italic*, while the whole surname should be written in capital letters (e.g. Žaklina NOVIČIĆ).

* * * * *
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