

# MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

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THEME:

**Strategic deficiencies?  
From the EU's revised enlargement methodology  
to the development policy**

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Emperor's New Clothes As the New Iron Curtain Falls in Europe*

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


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# MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI

ČASOPIS INSTITUTA ZA MEĐUNARODNU POLITIKU I PRIVREDU

GODINA LXXIV

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## Strategic deficiencies? From the EU's revised enlargement methodology to the development policy

During an international scientific roundtable organized in October 2021 by the Institute of International Politics and Economics in conjunction with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, several academicians from different countries deliberated on the purpose and perspectives of the revised EU enlargement mechanism in the Western Balkans (IPE 2021).<sup>1</sup> In a non-linear fashion, the panelists reflected on the perceived benefits of the altered approach for the candidates and for the EU, while also pointing out to persisting challenges: the role of veto actors (both within the EU and in the WB), the reduced institutional capacities of the Union, democratic underperformance in the region, inhibitions to the Europeanization efforts in different domains, and so on.

While the altered enlargement methodology has been attempting to increase the dynamics, predictability and overall credibility of the stagnant enlargement policy, it hasn't brought significant changes neither regarding the bureaucratic tools, nor the actual political practice. On one hand, no new instruments have been introduced; the reversibility clause, the Union's disclaimer regarding its absorption capacity (Kovačević 2020, 143)<sup>2</sup>, the balance provision and the need for more credible and more responsible conditionality have for many years been embedded in the *acquis*. On the other hand, the revised approach hasn't been put in force throughout 2020 and 2021 due to either lack of progress of the leading candidates or bilateral disputes as seen in North Macedonia-Bulgaria case. The pandemic *force majeure* has only exacerbated the previously visible difficulties in the Western Balkans and their open-ended accession undertakings (Petrović and Vučković 2021, 294).<sup>3</sup> In addition, the inclusion of

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<sup>1</sup> IPE. 2021. "Overview of the application of the EU's revised enlargement methodology in the Western Balkans". Institute of International Politics and Economics. Accessed 10 June 2022. <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/en/2021/10/14/overview-of-the-application-of-the-eu-s-revised-enlargement-methodology-in-the-western-balkans/>.

<sup>2</sup> Kovačević, Maja. 2020. *Evropska diferencirana unija*. Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka, p. 143.

<sup>3</sup> Petrović, Miloš, Vladimir Vučković. 2021. „Kovid 19 – remetilački činilac u bližem povezivanju Evropske unije sa regionom Zapadnog Balkana“. In: *Razvojni pravci Evropske unije nakon pandemije Kovid 19*, edited by Nevena Stanković, Dragana Dabić i Goran Bandov, p. 294. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

several eastern partners into the enlargement policy in the context of the military assault on Ukraine, however (generally) strategically-rational, does not necessarily need to translate positively into the Western Balkans' protracted EU accession, as per some previous articles in this journal.<sup>4</sup> The altered strategic circumstances shall likely require additionally modified enlargement policy mechanisms (apart from adaptation of other policies, as elaborated in closer detail by Nikolina Herceg Kolman M.A. and prof. Goran Bandov PhD).

Having in mind the abovementioned, the revised approach's transformative capacities should not be overestimated; despite somewhat sharpening the focus of the accession procedure, its improved technical-bureaucratic character do not seem to match the faulty political aspects of the process. Considerations of these aspects prompt other questions whether these changes have so far been at all conducive for the Western Balkans' accession ambitions, which challenges would need to be addressed on the EU side in order to additionally advance trustworthiness of the process, and whether the increased differentiation might result in more flexible forms of integration. As a Guest-Editor, I am very pleased that (some of our) panelists have agreed to present their valuable academic insights in this edition of "International Problems", specifically dedicated to the purpose and perceived impact of the EU's revised approach in the Western Balkans.

In her original paper for this Journal, prof. Maja Kovačević PhD points out to the inadequacy of the revised enlargement mechanism when it comes to addressing the chief challenge on the EU side, which is the lack of strategic decisiveness, coupled with the complicated decision-making procedures. By deploying a metaphor "Emperor's New Clothes" (a suitable reference to the old folktale), prof. Kovačević sheds a critical light not solely on the revised approach, but on various instruments and phenomena which decrease the effectiveness and credibility of the EU enlargement policy as such. The other authors also point out to the necessity to elevate the enlargement policy's credibility.

Helena Bauerová PhD analyzes the role of Czechia, an EU member state, in the context of theory of roles. The author argues that member states profoundly influence the direction of the enlargement policy, even more so than the EU as a supranational entity; however, the role of member-states is bounded by the external role prescriptions. EU and its member states should use the elements of the revised enlargement methodology to make the policy goals more attainable in the foreseeable future.

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<sup>4</sup> Petrović, Miloš. 2022. "European Union and Ukraine: the strategic partnership leading to (some)where?" *Međunarodni problemi* LXXIV (1): 90.

The research by Ivana Radić Milosavljević PhD and Spasimir Domaradzki PhD<sup>5</sup> argues that the bifurcated national preferences continue to impede the articulation of EU's *raison d'état* in the Western Balkans. Apart from not addressing this fundamental challenge, the authors find that the revised methodology has the potential to disrupt the already complicated consensus procedures and result in regression, rather than progress towards membership. In spite of the geopolitical narrative, the enlargement domain has still not been become an EU priority.

Prof. Ana Bojinović Fenko PhD and Faris Kočan PhD examine the pertinence of European Union's normative power in the Western Balkans, which, according to the authors, could be advanced both from within the EU institutional elements and through sharpening of its cross-border tools. While the altered enlargement mechanism might be conducive for partial integration concepts and unlock certain membership benefits ahead of accession, such logic should be used carefully – to encourage further reforms and steps towards joining (rather than holding these benefits against the candidates, as part of negative conditionality).

The manuscript written by Nikolina Herceg Kolman M.A. and prof. Goran Bandov PhD focuses on the challenging *solidarity-interest instrumentalization* dichotomy of EU development policy, which crosses beyond boundaries of security and climate strategies. While the troublesome Western Balkan EU accession formally falls outside of scope of development domain, the authors rightfully recognize that effects of development policy in aspects of values, standards and peace constitute a common denominator with the enlargement policy. In other words, conditioning the respect of EU norms and values abroad (as per Bojinović Fenko and Kočan), according to Herceg Kolman and Bandov, doesn't apply solely to the enlargement policy, but also to development policy and all other aspects of EU as an international actor. It also resonates in the context of the Ukrainian geopolitical crisis, which has been profoundly affecting the continent.

Whereas EU's policies have historically been motivated by geostrategic aspects, its cross-border activities have in practice frequently been driven by individual national interests, rather than by some grand strategy acts. Inability to overcome the (mis)use of veto powers in domain of enlargement policy and the inclusion of bilateral issues (sometimes unrelated to European integration) in the accession procedure are damaging for the reputation and goals of the European Union in the Western Balkans. Apart from some potential benefits like the possibility of gradual accession to some policy domains, it would be highly damaging if the altered enlargement mechanism would be used to provide an additional

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<sup>5</sup> The authors cooperate through an international academic network UACES (University Association for Contemporary European Studies).

space for the unfavorable bilateral tendencies or strengthen the logic of negative conditionality, instead of focusing on paving the way for EU membership.

Considering the aforementioned, I would like to convey my sincere gratitude to the Institute of International Politics and Economics for this opportunity, as well as to commend the authors on their valuable academic contributions to this thematic issue of “International Problems/Međunarodni problemi”.

*Miloš Petrović PhD*

*Guest Editor*

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# EU's Revised Enlargement Methodology: Emperor's New Clothes As the New Iron Curtain Falls in Europe

Maja KOVAČEVIĆ<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** The nature of the European Union (EU) as a global actor has long been the subject of academic debate. Proponents of understanding the EU as a normative, civilian force agree that its greatest transformative power lies in its enlargement policy, which allows it to shape reforms in countries that wish to become its members through strong conditioning. It is in this context that we will analyse the new methodology of accession negotiations, with the basic premise that it represents a debatable attempt of the EU to preserve its transformative power in relation to candidate countries despite the crisis of the enlargement policy and to further strengthen the already strong mechanisms of conditionality that accompany this process. Two years have passed since the new methodology was adopted, yet there have been no significant changes. Meanwhile, the dramatic change in the geopolitical situation, caused by the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022, has led to a sudden fall of the new Iron Curtain on the continent, creating additional controversies regarding the enlargement policy: Will it apply also to Eastern European countries in the future, and will it become part of a differentiated integration? Also, the question of whether the EU can act strategically towards establishing new relations in Europe is being raised once again.

**Keywords:** European Union, enlargement, transformative power, Western Balkans, revised enlargement methodology, Eastern Europe.

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## Introduction

As a result of the deep economic crisis and the constant need for reforms in the EU itself, enlargement fatigue began to influence this policy in a decisive fashion. The preferences of some EU Member States towards future enlargements changed significantly since the great enlargement of 2004. The best example of this is France, where the constitutional changes of 2005 and 2008 introduced the obligation to hold a referendum on any subsequent enlargement after the accession of Croatia, and where, in the absence of a referendum, it is only possible to approve such a decision at a session of both houses of the Parliament if there is a three-fifths majority (Zhelyazkova *et al.* 2019, 26–27). According to a 2019 survey, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and France are showing the least support for admitting the Western Balkans to the EU in the next decade (Dennison 2019, 18). Combined with numerous problems that exist in the area of the Western Balkans and the ubiquitous stability-democratisation dilemma (Kovačević 2018), more than twenty years of enlargement policy have not confirmed the transformative power of the EU, which – instead of an idea that was widely accepted – has now become a controversial concept (part one). Although the EU has been in crisis for years, enlargement methodology upgrades were recently introduced, in 2005–2015 (part two) and in 2020 (part three). We posit that the revision of the 2020 enlargement methodology represents a debatable attempt by the EU to preserve its transformative power in relation to candidate countries despite the enlargement policy crisis, and to further strengthen the already strong mechanisms of its conditionality in this process. There is no agreement among the Member States on the perspective of enlargement, while the dramatic change of geopolitical circumstances caused by the outbreak of war in Ukraine threatens to bring new challenges for the enlargement policy (part four) by opening additional questions: Will it apply also to Eastern European countries in the future, will it become part of a differentiated integration, or will it be reduced to the Cold War alignment once the Iron Curtain falls in Europe once again?

## Controversies Related to the Transformative Power of the European Union

In both academic debate and policy discourse, the EU has traditionally been viewed as a distinctly different type of international actor. Introducing the idea of the EU as a normative power, Ian Manners (2002) described it as a foreign policy

actor intent on shaping and diffusing rules and values in international affairs through noncoercive means. Tuomas Forsberg distinguished four different mechanisms by which normative power can be used as a means of influence: by persuasion, by activation of international norms, by shaping the discourse, and by setting an example for others to follow (2011, 1184). The key to understanding the EU's normative power is its capacity to shape 'what is considered normal' in international politics based on its internal 'substantive normative principles' such as peace, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Noutcheva 2009, 1068).

The discourse of the EU as an ideal model/normative power contributes not only to its relevance in world politics, but also provides legitimacy in conditioning countries that strive to achieve closer relations with it (Vukasović 2021, 21). The most obvious influence on third parties has been the enlargement policy, the primary vehicle for the Union's normative power in Europe. The EU has often used enlargement as an instrument for locking its neighbours into stable and democratic transition by establishing, or rather imposing, an EU order in Europe through the transference and diffusion of EU norms, values, rules and regulations (Haukkala 2011, 47). There is ample evidence from earlier enlargement rounds demonstrating that the transformative power of the Union lies in the credible commitments made to candidate states, accompanied by a strong conditionality designed to 'democratise', 'Europeanise' and 'modernise' external states in advance of their accessions: EU incentives are meant to reward progress and publicise shortcomings, creating significant leverage for Brussels within domestic reform processes (O' Brennan 2014, 234). The external incentives model confirms that the credibility of incentives stands out as a crucial condition for the success of EU conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2020), but the EU's most significant credibility problem in the Western Balkans stems from the fact that the Thessaloniki promise of membership is no longer sufficient to counter the currents of enlargement fatigue which pervade the process on the EU side (O' Brennan 2014, 237).

As Börzel and Lebanidze (2017) pointed out, when it comes to democratisation, two conditions are necessary for the EU's consistent application of democratic conditionality: the absence of the stability-democratisation dilemma and the presence of pro-democratic reform coalitions. If neither of these conditions is present, the EU is more likely to act as a *status quo* rather than as a transformative power prioritising (authoritarian) stability over uncertain (democratic) change. By prioritising, for security reasons, effective government instead of democratic governance in the Western Balkans, the EU has helped stabilise non-democratic and corrupt regimes rather than transform them (Pomorska and Noutcheva 2017; Börzel 2015). Another consequence of this trade-off was the inconsistent use of

conditionality which, in turn, contributed to the decline of EU's transformative power in the region (Kovačević 2018, 11).

Also, it was not just the Western Balkans. The EU has faced a general crisis of its actions in the world, which has led it, instead of trying to transform the environment according to its own image, to reduce its political ambitions and direct them towards stabilising the environment. According to the EU's 2016 Global Strategy (Shared Vision 2016), external action will be guided by principled pragmatism, which is conceived as a balance between realistic assessment of the current strategic environment and an idealistic aspiration to achieve a better world. Resilience is defined as the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises. Sven Biscop (2016) views principled pragmatism as a return to Realpolitik, since the Global Strategy places emphasis on reducing the fragility of third states rather than on changing their regimes. However, the Global Strategy is not without significant tensions between pragmatic and principled foreign policy, which has left the EU open to the same criticisms about inconsistencies and double standards in its external action (Juncos 2017). The decline in ambition in the EU's external action was evident also in its enlargement policy.

## **Crisis of the Enlargement Policy and the Enlargement Methodology Upgrades 2005-2015**

The EU's enlargement policy functioned for years based on the model of business-as-usual, but it was not possible to conceal the fact that it was placed low on the political agenda. When the then European Commission was inaugurated back in 2014, the announcement of its President Jean-Claude Juncker – that there would be no new enlargements during his five-year term (EC Press Release 2014) and that the EU would instead turn to its own consolidation – made it clear that the policy was in great crisis. In addition, the Directorate-General Enlargement, which has existed since 1999, ceased to be independent, having become part of the Directorate for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations in 2014. The institutional message was clear, and the region was left to the Berlin Process initiative, which was launched the same year to create a sort of illusion of the dynamics of the integration process. At annual summits, this process brings together leaders of the Western Balkans, representatives of Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Slovenia and Croatia, as well as representatives of the European Commission and international financial institutions. The goals include solving



bilateral problems, improving economic governance, considering social issues, cooperating with the civil society and improving the position of youth. However, not all EU Member States are involved in the process, and it remains only a political initiative for improving cooperation in the region, rather than an enlargement mechanism (Kovačević 2019). The political marginalisation of the Western Balkans was only occasionally interrupted in times of crises, such as the one of 2015 that involved the opening of the so-called Western Balkan migration route.

Federica Mogherini, the then High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy, visited the region no earlier than in 2017, which is when she realised the extent of the reduction of EU influence. The need to prevent the expansion of Russian and Chinese influence in the region contributed to the European Commission's 2018 enlargement strategy unexpectedly setting the year 2025 for eligible Western Balkan countries as a possible deadline for enlargement (EC COM [2020] 57 final). This was supposed to create a major stimulus as an instrument of transformative power of the EU. However, just 10 days after the adoption of the Strategy, at their February 2018 Gymnich meeting in Sofia, EU Foreign Ministers expressed reservations regarding the strategy on the Western Balkans that was put forward by the Commission (Zalan 2018; Euractiv 2018). Member States had different assessments of the readiness of some of the Western Balkans to join the EU at a date either earlier or later than 2025. Hungary was of the opinion that the two frontrunners – Montenegro and Serbia – should join as early as 2022, while Slovenia believed that 2025 was not realistic and that more time might be needed to meet the criteria and settle disputes. Germany was highly reluctant, pointing to rule-of-law shortcomings in the recent arrivals – from Romania and Bulgaria, to Poland and Hungary. In addition, several Member States, including France, stressed the importance of conditionality and compliance with the accession criteria. Poland, Italy and Austria were among other EU countries that were in favour of stepping up efforts to open the bloc to the region experiencing growing Russian and Chinese influence.

Confusion regarding the enlargement prospective continued. Just a year and a half after the 2018 European Commission's Enlargement Strategy, the October 2019 meeting of the European Council and the French veto over opening negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia revealed a far less optimistic scenario: a change to the enlargement methodology. As French President Macron said:

“We need to reform our membership procedures as they no longer fit the purpose. They are not strategic. They are not political, are too bureaucratic and are not reversible” (*Economist* 2019).

We do not agree that accession procedures were not reversible. First of all, by their very nature, the negotiations are an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand (General EU Positions: Montenegro 2012 para. 2 and Serbia 2014, para. 20). Besides that, since the 2004 enlargement, the European Commission has produced three enlargement methodology upgrades (in 2005, 2012 and 2015) prior to the most recent one of February 2020.

The upgrade of 2005 introduced several important novelties. In case of serious and persistent breach by the negotiating country of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, accession negotiations may be suspended (General EU Position Turkey; Croatia Negotiating Framework 2005). In addition, the analytical examination ('screening') was introduced as a step that precedes negotiations. Once a chapter has been screened, the EU will decide, upon a proposal from the Commission, whether it can be opened, or which benchmarks needed to be met prior to doing so. Also, the Union will specify benchmarks for the provisional closure of a chapter.

To address weaknesses of democracy and rule of law, the EU adopted another change to the Strategy in 2012, emphasising the political criteria related to democracy, rule of law and human rights: those issues should be tackled early in the accession process (EC COM/2012/0600 final). The emphasis on the EU's political criteria was strengthened by the introduction of interim benchmarks and the fact that two inter-related chapters could not be provisionally closed until the end of the negotiations. In October 2015, the EU redesigned its Regular Reports on candidates to make them more easily comparable (EC COM(2015) 611 final), using clear language and indications regarding the level of progress a candidate has reached in comparison with others. The following year, the report of the European Commission thus stated that several countries in the region were continuing to show clear symptoms and various degrees of state capture: companies, institutions or powerful individuals were using unlawful practices to influence and shape policies, the legal environment and the economy to fit their own interests (EC COM(2016) 715 final, 3). The clearer vocabulary started to provoke reactions, as shown in the case of Serbia, whose officials did not hide their dissatisfaction with the report of the European Commission (EC SWD (2019) 219 final, 3), which, in the part that dealt with the political criteria, pointed to the boycott of parliament by opposition parties and the anti-government protests that demanded media freedom and free and fair elections (FoNet, Beta, Tanjug 2019).

After the negotiations with Croatia, EU introduced a new rule and later stipulated it in the Negotiating Frameworks with Montenegro and Serbia (General EU Positions: Montenegro 2012 para. 4 and Serbia 2014, para. 22). In the case of a serious and

persistent breach by Montenegro/Serbia of the values on which the Union is founded, the Commission would, on its own initiative or upon the request of one third of the Member States, recommend suspension of negotiations and propose conditions for their eventual resumption. Having heard the arguments of Montenegro/Serbia, the Council would then decide, by qualified majority, whether to suspend the negotiations and what the requirements would be for their resumption.

On top of this, the so-called “balance clause” was introduced in the cases of these two countries. Should progress in the chapters “Judiciary and Fundamental Rights” and “Justice, Freedom and Security” significantly lag behind the progress made in the overall negotiations, the Commission would, on its own initiative or upon the request of one third of the Member States, propose to withhold its recommendations to open and/or close other negotiating chapters until the disbalance was addressed. The Council would decide on such a proposal by qualified majority (General EU Positions: Montenegro 2012 para. 6 and Serbia 2014, para. 24). The same procedure would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, should progress in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo\* significantly lag – due to Serbia failing to act in good faith – behind that which was achieved in the overall negotiations, in particular in the implementation of agreements reached between Serbia and Kosovo\* (para. 25). A unique feature was also introduced into the negotiation process with Serbia. It refers to Chapter 35, which usually covers issues such as the new *acquis* that entered into force in various chapters after the negotiations were temporarily suspended, access to various special bodies of the EU, etc. In the case of Serbia, however, this Chapter has been turned into a mechanism for monitoring all the agreements – both those already made and those to be achieved in the future – concluded as a result of the dialogue on the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Priština (Mišćević and Mrak 2017, 197).

To summarise, the entire enlargement process is now subject to numerous veto points, which the Revised Methodology of 2020 did not change. A country’s status as a candidate is granted unanimously by the Council of the EU, following the opinion from the Commission and subject to endorsement by the European Council, and the same procedure applies to the decision to open negotiations. Based on the Commission’s proposal, the EU Council unanimously decides on opening negotiations on a given chapter. For each chapter, the Council of the EU adopts the Common Position, in which it may set the opening, interim or closing benchmarks for each chapter. Opening of negotiations on chapters for which opening benchmarks have been set can begin only after the EU Council decides that the candidate country has fulfilled said benchmarks. In most cases, the EU will conclude that the level of alignment does not allow chapters to be temporarily closed, and that the EU will determine the closing benchmarks the candidate

country will have to fulfil before the chapter will be allowed to be closed. For particularly significant chapters (e.g. 23, 24 and 35), the EU will determine temporary or interim benchmarks, and the closing benchmarks will be defined only once these are fulfilled. The benchmarks are becoming so numerous that Montenegro, for example, currently has twice more interim benchmarks in Chapters 23 and 24 than Croatia had *in total* at the time of its own EU accession negotiations. Each step taken in the negotiating process is now far more difficult, and more politicised than ever (Mišćević and Mrak 2017, 197).

No negotiations on any individual chapter can be closed until each EU government is satisfied with the candidate's progress in the relevant policy field, as analysed by the Commission. Furthermore, chapters are considered temporarily closed pending the conclusion of the accession negotiations, meaning that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed". The negotiations on EU accession are deemed concluded once the EU and the candidate country reach an agreement on all 35 chapters, and all is confirmed by the European Council. Prior to this, it is still possible to reopen chapters if the candidate country fails to deliver on the commitments it has assumed. Finally, according to the constitutional rules, the accession treaty is not binding until it wins the support of the EU Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, and until it is signed by the candidate country and representatives of all the existing EU countries, and ratified by the candidate country and each individual EU country.

### **What's New in the New Methodology: The (Im)Possible Strengthening of the Conditionality Policy**

Despite the existing mechanisms of conditionality, a revised accession negotiation methodology was adopted in 2020 and presented as a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans that will make the process more dynamic (EC COM (2020) 57 final). As for the technical aspect of the negotiation methodology, the negotiating chapters are organised into thematic clusters, and negotiations on each cluster are to be opened as a whole, rather than on a chapter-by-chapter basis. According to the new methodology, the timeframe between opening a cluster and closing the individual chapters should be limited, lasting preferably one year and fully depending on the progress of the reforms. What remains the same is the individual closure of chapters. In our opinion, however, the political dimension is far more important. It envisages a high level political and policy dialogue with the countries, through regular EU-Western Balkans summits and

intensified ministerial contacts, especially in areas where alignment is progressing well and key criteria are being met. This is an important novelty, because only four EU-Western Balkans Summits have been held till May 2022: in Zagreb in 2000, in Thessaloniki in 2003, in Sofia in 2018, and in Zagreb in 2020. For comparison, since 2012, China has engaged 16 central and eastern European countries, including 11 EU Member States and five Western Balkan countries, under the 16+1 cooperation and the yearly summits format, which it has portrayed as an innovative approach to regional cooperation (Grieger 2018). According to the new methodology, such increased engagement could lead to countries participating as observers in key EU meetings on matters of substantial importance to them. Besides this, country-specific Inter-Governmental Conferences should take place after the publication of the Commission's annual reports on each country, providing the fora for political dialogue on reforms and for taking stock of the overall accession process setting out the planning for the year ahead, including opening and closing of chapters/clusters of chapters and possible corrective measures. If a country manages to make sufficient progress in the reform priorities that were agreed in the course of the negotiations, this could lead to its closer integration with the EU and its accelerated integration and "phasing-in" in EU policies, market and programmes, as well as to the increased financial support and investments. Apart from participation in EU programmes, which is already a common practice, the announced "phasing-in" of individual EU policies and the EU market represents one of the biggest novelties, but is also the least elaborated part of the new methodology – namely, it is unclear how gradual inclusion would take place in practice, in which areas it would take place, what the rights and obligations of the candidate country would be, and so on.

Another significant change relates to the application of the balance clause and implies a much easier suspension of the negotiations. Let us compare the previous and current procedure provided for such a situation. According to the previous procedure, the activation of the balance clause was possible upon the proposal of the Commission or 1/3 of the Member States (at least 9) and had to be adopted by the Council with qualified majority voting (QMV). Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, this requires at least 15 out of 27 Member States, and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union, while the blocking minority must include at least four Council members representing more than 35% of the EU population. According to the new procedure, in serious cases the Commission may submit a proposal at any time, on its own or at the request of any (one) Member State in order to ensure a quick response to the situation by use of – where relevant – simplified procedures, including reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV). In essence, RQMV is a rule that allows for minority

decision-making: for a proposal to be approved, it suffices that it is supported by a coalition as large as a blocking minority, representing at least 35% of the EU population (or said proposal could be turned down with QMV: 15 out of 27 member states). According to Eurostat, Germany has the largest population among the EU Member States (83.2 million residents) accounting for 18.6% of the total EU. It is followed by France (67.1 million or 15.0%), Italy (60.2 million or 13.5%), Spain (47.3 million or 10.6%) and Poland (38.0 million or 8.5%). Fourteen Member States have a share of between 1% and 5% of the EU population, while eight have a share below 1% (Eurostat 2020). This means that, for example, RQMV could be achieved by Germany, France, Netherlands and Denmark, which in 2020 represented 38.8% of the EU population.

As it essentially implies minority decision-making, the RQMV is rarely used in the EU, and its introduction into the enlargement policy suggests easier procedures for the application of sanctions for candidate countries that do not meet the set conditions. But what could these sanctions be? Member States could decide to have negotiations put on hold in certain areas or, in the most serious cases, suspended altogether. Chapters that are already closed could be re-opened or reset if issues need to be reassessed. The scope and intensity of EU funding could be adjusted downward, with the exception of support to civil society and benefits of closer integration, e.g. access to EU programmes. Also, unilateral concessions for market access could be paused or withdrawn. There are numerous dilemmas related to the balance clause. One of them stems from the fact that said clause has never been formally implemented to date. The EU did send diplomatic signals by e.g. not opening chapters in the negotiations, but it had never formally initiated procedures for the implementation of this clause. Also, what is the purpose of the balance clause if there are already numerous veto points in the process? The veto power, as well as its abuse, has been shown by the example involving the start of accession negotiations with North Macedonia. Bulgaria had imposed a veto invoking historical and identity issues, the key among them being, as Sofia claimed, the ethnic and linguistic engineering that had taken place in North Macedonia since World War II (Georgievski 2020). This abuse of the veto power for issues that have nothing to do with the criteria and conditions with which each candidate country must comply highlights the inherent weakness and hypocrisy of the EU's decision-making process in relation to its enlargement policy (Fouéré 2022, 1). Finally, why facilitate the procedure for applying the balance clause, which suggests that the issue was considered but a qualified majority was not reached? The introduction of the RQMV makes it easier for several larger and most determined countries to halt the process depending on their political assessments, which may differ to a considerable extent.

As already discussed, there are also differences regarding the opening of negotiations with candidates. They are quite obvious from the question that was posed by French President Macron:

“How am I to explain to my constituents that most asylum seekers are coming from Albania, yet many EU ministers believe that Albania is improving and that we should launch EU accession talks?” (Crowcroft and Ristani 2021).

Although visas for Albanian citizens were abolished at the end of 2010, Albanians were the most numerous asylum seekers in France in 2017 and second – after the Afghans – in 2018 (Le Parisien 2019). It is therefore not surprising that the issue of unfounded asylum applications was among the conditions Albania had to meet prior to the first intergovernmental conference, along with electoral reform, judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime (Council of the EU 2020, 5).

Regardless of the general stalemate of the enlargement policy, the step that was taken in December 2021 showed that not everything had ceased: negotiations with Serbia were opened in Cluster 4 – Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity. The opening of negotiations in itself should send a positive message to the region, preventing it from falling into the state of complete “EU indifference”, while on the other hand it should allow the EU to have a stronger influence in policies that involve a strong geopolitical dimension – those related to transport, energy, trans-European networks and environmental protection. Even before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, EU was seeking to reduce the influence of Russia and China in the region in the areas of energy policy and connection with trans-European networks. However, as it seems more and more probable that a new Iron Curtain will soon fall in Europe, the issue of energy is taking the form of alignment into Cold War-era blocs. Still, the opening of negotiations on Cluster 4 shows that it was not realistic to expect negotiations on an entire cluster to be completed within a single year. Experience shows that the field of e.g. environmental protection happens to be one of the most extensive and costly chapters in the negotiations.

Changes in the methodology have also brought back a sharper tone to the EU’s communication with the countries of the region. Thus, for example, the following was stated in the report of the European Commission for Serbia for 2020:

“The Serbian government continued to declare European integration as its strategic goal. However, several statements were initially made by high-ranking officials in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, which were not in line with this strategic commitment. Notwithstanding its latest more positive signals towards the EU, the Serbian authorities overall need to place more emphasis on objective and unambiguous positive communication on the EU, which is Serbia’s

main political and economic partner” (EC Report on Serbia SWD(2020) 352 final).

A similar message was sent via the report for 2021 (EC Report on Serbia SWD(2021) 288 final), this time as a result of open criticism from Serbia against the first restrictions on the export of medical equipment from the EU:

“European solidarity does not exist. It was a fairy tale on paper. I sent a special letter to the only country that can help, and that is China”.

Vučić said this on 15 March 2020, the day when Serbia declared a state of emergency because of the coronavirus pandemic (Simić 2020). The crisis in the relationship was painfully obvious. In April of the same year, the EU proposed macro-financial assistance for dealing with the COVID-19 situation and its consequences, but Serbia was the only country that refused it. Serbia’s president openly questioned the effectiveness of such assistance, saying that the country did not need it and that it was too expensive (Stojanović 2020).

The request to change communication regarding the EU in the countries of the region was also included in the Brdo Declaration from the EU-Western Balkans summit, held in Slovenia in October 2021:

“The EU is by far the region’s closest partner, main investor and principal donor. The unprecedented scale and range of this support must be fully recognised and conveyed by the partners in their public debate and communication” (Brdo Declaration 2021, statement no. 3).

In its 2020 Report, the Commission for the first time assessed the overall balance in the accession negotiations with both Montenegro and Serbia (EC COM(2020) 660 final, 20, 21), concluding that it was ensured in both cases. The same assessment was also repeated in 2021 (EC COM(2021) 644 final). The separate annual assessment of the overall balance heralded a stronger political dimension of the EU enlargement policy, aimed at the Union no longer being seen as an accomplice in the widely criticised legitimisation of stabilocracies in the region (BIEPAG 2017). However, the question remains as to whether EU member states will be ready to sufficiently dedicate themselves to the problems in the region and take more decisive steps, especially with regard to the process of democratisation. Despite signals that indicated the existence of such an intention, it is almost impossible to expect it at the time when there is a war on the European continent, i.e. when the stability and alignment of the region on the Western side are becoming even more important than before.

Despite official statements from the EU institutions and periodic summits between the EU and Western Balkan leaders, the EU’s enlargement agenda has barely moved in the past few years and has lost almost all credibility (Fouéré 2022,



1). The changes in terms of the addition of opening, interim and closing benchmarks, the change of order of negotiation chapters, and the renewed emphasis on fundamental reforms in rule of law, democracy and economic governance are not likely to help bring about major reforms required from the states of the Western Balkans. The main reason for this is the diminished credibility of the EU's conditionality, linked with the declining public support for enlargement in the existing Member States (Dimitrova 2016, 3). On the other hand, accession fatigue in the Western Balkans is quite evident, and the region now views the advantages of EU membership mostly in economic (rather than democratic/political) terms (Stratulat *et al.* 2021, 6).

## **Enlargement towards the East: Ambivalence Reloaded**

The hitherto unclear prospect of enlargement is now further complicated by the fact that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have applied for EU membership in late February and early March of 2022. As part of the Eastern Partnership under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), these countries were encompassed by a contradictory EU policy that was supposed to make a special contribution to stability and good governance in its immediate neighbourhood and contribute to the creation of a circle of well-governed states in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and the Mediterranean. In the first ten years of implementation of the ENP – which essentially implies the EU's bilateral relations with each of these countries – the EU used instruments similar to those of its enlargement policy. Thus, the Commission prepared country reports in which it assessed the political and economic situation as well as institutional and sectoral development, evaluating possible ways to strengthen relations with a particular country. The reports were submitted to the Council, which then decided whether or not to proceed to the next level of relations. A special action plan (the ENP Action Plan) was negotiated with each country, defining priorities for a period of three to five years. Priorities included political reforms, economic and social cooperation and development, trade issues, market and regulatory reforms, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs and sectoral policies (transport, energy, environment, information society, etc.) (Kovačević 2020, 160-161). The incentives that were offered included greater participation in EU programmes, financial assistance and easier access to the market.

From the very beginning, one of the contradictions of the ENP was the issue of potential membership. Unlike the Union's relationship with the Western Balkans,

which includes the membership perspective, the ENP represented everything *but* membership, where the EU's goal was to halt the wave of enlargement when it comes to countries in the eastern neighborhood that might be aspiring to become members, while simultaneously convincing its new "partners" to embrace liberalisation, democratisation and alignment with its *acquis* (Edwards 2008, 46). In other words, the neighborhood was offered "enlargement lite", i.e. a diluted version of the original partnership without the promise of accession. The ENP experience has shown that the EU has not in fact been very successful in projecting its normative power in cases where full membership was not on the agenda: the EU's expectations of normative convergence and harmonisation in Europe are viewed as legitimate and warranted only when the incentive provided by accession is on offer. Once it is not available, the situation is radically altered and the EU's capacity to act as an anchor for reforms is proven to be severely limited (Haukkala 2011, 48). Despite the above, the EU has continued with its policy of strategic ambiguity towards the Eastern Partnership.

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia stand out in the Eastern Partnership because they have already openly stated that their goal is full membership in the EU, and because all three have signed ambitious Association Agreements with the EU in 2014. As President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy said in 2013, these were the most advanced agreements of their kind ever negotiated by the European Union (European Council 2013). Political aspects of the association include rapprochement in foreign and security issues, strengthening of democratic institutions, rule of law and good governance, cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security – a sort of political integration without membership. One of the innovations of these Association Agreements is its integral part – "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements" (DCFTA), which aims to create conditions for strengthened economic and trade relations that would lead to gradual integration into the internal EU market. In addition to mutual abolition of customs duties, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have pledged to gradually harmonise their technical rules and standards with those of the EU, and to harmonise their legislations in the area of e.g. public procurement services, adopting all existing and future EU *acquis*. The EU's key interest lies precisely in extending the *acquis communautaire* to trade and investment sectors and in eliminating non-tariff barriers through regulatory alignment in areas such as protection of intellectual property, the right to competition, product origin rules, labour market standards and environmental protection. Such a wide scope of integration soon started to be called 'enlargement-lite' (Hug 2015, 9) or shadow membership, as it led to harmonisation with the *acquis communautaire* without formal membership (Kovačević 2020, 156).

Same as with the Western Balkans, the EU kept sending contradictory messages to Eastern Europe. For example, in 2014, the Council of the EU “expressed its conviction” that the Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in the EU-Ukraine cooperation (Council of the EU 2014, 8). On the other hand, the very signing of the Agreement was controversial. The consultative referendum held in the Netherlands in April 2016 (See more in Van der Loo 2016) refused to ratify the Association Agreement with Ukraine, which led the European Council to adopt, in December 2016, a decision that was legally binding on the Member States of the EU and could be amended or repealed only by common accord of their Heads of State or Governments:

“While aiming to establish a close and lasting relationship between the parties to the Agreement based on common values, the Agreement does not confer on Ukraine the status of a candidate country for accession to the Union, nor does it constitute a commitment to confer such status to Ukraine in the future” (European Council 2016).

Other elements of this decision also reveal controversies that could be opened – like the Pandora’s box – especially by the candidacy of Ukraine: the Association Agreement does not contain an obligation for the Union or its Member States to provide collective security guarantees or other military aid or assistance to Ukraine; does not grant to Ukrainian nationals or Union citizens, respectively, the right to reside and work freely within the territory of the Member States or Ukraine; and does not require additional financial support by the Member States to Ukraine. Also, it is stressed that respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and respect for the principle of the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, are the essential elements of the Agreement. Each Party is allowed to take appropriate measures in case of non-fulfilment of obligations. As a last resort, such measures may include suspension of any rights or obligations provided under the provisions of the Agreement.

The dilemmas highlighted by the Netherlands have not been resolved. In fact, the submission of candidacy for membership has brought the enlargement policy into a new context and has opened up controversy over the possible response of the EU. At its Versailles summit, the EU declared that “Ukraine belongs to the European family”, extending an invitation to the Commission to produce an opinion on the matter (Versailles Declaration 2022). However, contradictory signals are once again coming from the EU. Immediately after Ukraine submitted its candidacy, presidents of 8 central and eastern European countries called on EU Member States to immediately grant Ukraine a candidate country status and open membership talks (*Reuters* 2022a). President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced in April that “it will not, as usual, take years to form this opinion, but

rather weeks” (*Euronews* 2022), but only a month later French President Emmanuel Macron said that he favoured a new type of European political community, warning that the process of Ukraine’s accession would take several years, probably even decades (Reuters 2022b).

On the other hand, one can already hear opinions that DCFTA provides an opportunity for accelerated opening of membership negotiations with Ukraine (Emerson *et al.* 2022). Emerson *et al.* are of the opinion that Ukraine’s accession process would not start from scratch because all the chapters of the enlargement process are featured in commitments Ukraine has already made in the Association Agreement including DCFTA and are part of the regular evaluation of the implementation of the Agreement. Unlike the case of Serbia, whose condition for accession is the normalisation of relations with Kosovo\*, the position here is that the EU cannot let its enlargement procedures be taken hostage by Russia, and that territorial issues should be resolved separately. It remains to be seen how this will be applied in practice, but it would obviously constitute a policy of double standards. On the other hand, Ukraine’s candidacy and the possible EU response are now reviving the long-standing ideas about possible forms of differentiated accession to the EU (See more: Kovačević 2020, 197-214).

As regards the application of the methodology for accession negotiations, Emerson *et al.* proposed in October 2021 to revive the process by elaborating the possibilities provided by “phasing-in” individual EU policies and the EU market, which would consist of four phases: initial accession, intermediate accession, New Member State and conventional membership, where each phase would involve meeting the appropriate conditions and realising a certain scope of rights by the acceding country (Emerson *et al.* 2021). Gradual integration concepts propose very specific integration levels that are compatible with the revised methodology approach, as they contain all the EU-required elements: the merit-based system, focusing on the fundamentals, increased credibility through greater predictability of positive and negative conditioning, as well as very tangible benefits for the candidates earlier, ahead of the full membership stage (Petrović 2022, 316). These proposals, however, require a strategic EU response, rather than reactive forced responses.

## Conclusion

The war in Ukraine and its application for membership have created a “perfect storm” for the enlargement policy. Tired of enlargement and internal crises, the EU has left the Western Balkans on its periphery, dominated by interests of stability.

The political and strategic approach, which should have underpinned the EU's policies towards the Western Balkans from the start, has over the years been sidelined in favour of an excessively bureaucratic and technical process that prioritised form over substance (Fouéré 2022, 2). An attempt to return to a more determined conditionality via the revised methodology could be used for applying pressure aimed at geopolitical alignment, and it therefore looks like democratisation and the establishment of the rule of law in the region will be sacrificed once again – before, it was done for the sake of stability, while this time it will be done for the sake of creating an anti-Russian bloc.

The key problem is still the absence of a strategic vision of relations on the European continent and the EU's role in establishing them. The entire process of spreading 'Europeanisation' outside the EU is inspired by the ambivalent and conflicting geopolitics that the Union applies as a strategic instrument, creating an image of friends, special friends, and the hesitant, inferior neighbourhood that needs to comply with EU standards as soon as possible (Boedeltje and van Houtum 2011, 130–131). This approach of the EU has sacrificed the policy of enlargement, turning its most successful transformative foreign policy instrument into a means of short-term and medium-term influence in certain European countries. We should recall the now all-but-forgotten case of Turkey, which constituted a precedent in the enlargement policy because a country whose candidacy was controversial from the beginning was given the status of a candidate, followed by accession negotiations (Nugent 2007). The Member States' different views of enlargement have always existed, but they mostly referred to the timeline of the enlargement, the conditionality, and the protection of their own interests in this process. What set the case of Turkey apart is that the EU opened the negotiations by clearly stating in its Negotiating Framework that the outcome of the negotiations does not necessarily have to be full membership:

“While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” (General EU position Turkey 2005, 1).

In addition, it provided that long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture. The EU practically offered Turkey “discriminatory membership minus” (Karakas 2013, 1057) and, with the discreet charm of hypocrisy, most European countries would in fact

like Turkey to remain in the limbo between being an insider and an outsider (Aydintasbas, 2018).

President Macron also pointed out the need to design new EU relations with other European countries, presenting the idea of creating a European political community. The proposal was once again EU-centric: the new European organisation would enable democratic countries that share EU values to achieve cooperation in the areas of politics, security, energy, transport, investment, infrastructure and the movement of people, especially the young. Membership would not prevent future accession to the Union, nor would it exclude Great Britain. This proposal is in line with the idea of a Europe of concentric circles that Macron has advocated for several years (Initiative pour l'Europe 2017). In May 2022, he reiterated his commitment to reform the Lisbon Treaty, expand the use of the majority in decision-making, and further differentiate integration (Présidence française 2022). The project of concentric circles could actualise the phasing-in envisaged in the Revised Methodology, but it requires the development of new models of integration. Much like in 2017, Macron's proposal was not elaborated in detail and was presented as individual. Rapid support came from the President of the European Council, who proposed reform of the enlargement policy and the establishment of the European Geopolitical Community (*European Western Balkans* 2022). He admitted that the problem with the current enlargement process lies in the fact that it is based on "all or nothing", and that the process should be faster, gradual and reversible. Once a country meets the necessary standards in a given sector, it would be allowed to actively participate – with an advisory vote – in the work of the Council of Ministers, depending on the agenda. The country would also be gradually integrated into EU actions. He also announced increased financial support to countries that manage to achieve certain benchmarks. The organisation would be managed by heads of state or governments of the participating countries, who would be meeting at least twice a year. Foreign ministers would join the EU Foreign Affairs Council on a regular basis, while other formations of the Council could follow the same example.

It is likely that gradual integration will become the new model of accession that would resolve dilemmas over the candidacies of Eastern European countries and provide the EU with a "middle ground" solution that would apply to both Turkey and the Western Balkans. On the one hand, this proposal is realistic and could improve cooperation between the interested countries and the EU. On the other hand, however, Michel announced that foreign policy would be a major area of cooperation within this Community, which could bring new challenges for Serbia. The adoption of the exclusionary approach, which would condition Serbia to impose sanctions on Russia in order to become a member of this organisation,

could lead to destabilisation. For years now, regional public opinion polls have been showing that Serbian population is the least interested in EU enlargement (Stratulat *et al.* 2021, 4), while EU accession has become Serbia's controversial foreign policy goal since most EU member states recognised Kosovo's\* independence (Kurek and Obradović 2019; Đukanović 2015; Gajić 2014; Mladenović 2019). The long-standing ambivalent attitude of the governing structures in Serbia towards the question of what is implied by “the comprehensive normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo\* in the form of a legally binding agreement by the end of Serbia's accession negotiations” will become less and less applicable under pressure. This would expose the paradox of the process of Serbia's accession to the EU. Namely, as Serbia progresses in fulfilling the conditions from the negotiating Chapter 35, its foreign policy orientation could come into conflict with its own constitutional order and national interests (Stanković 2021, 187). A public opinion poll conducted in May 2022 shows that 84.7% of Serbian citizens are against recognising Kosovo's\* independence in exchange for EU membership, while 82% are against imposing sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine (NSPM 2022).

Establishing an organisation aimed at consolidating the new Cold War division on the continent cannot have a long-term perspective, and it is difficult to expect e.g. Turkey to become a member of such an organisation. In other words, what is needed is a strategic response from the EU, rather than another missed opportunity to significantly affect relations on the continent. Let us recall that, in the speech made on 31 December 1989, French President Mitterrand presented the idea – which was quickly rejected at the time and is completely forgotten today – of Europe which should go back to its own home and geography, through the establishment of a European confederation that would include all the countries of the continent (Dumas 2001). Had this or a similar proposal been accepted and further elaborated, it is quite possible that we would not have a war in Europe today.

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Maja KOVAČEVIĆ

**IZMENJENA METODOLOGIJA POLITIKE PROŠIRENJA EU:  
CAREVO NOVO ODELO DOK NOVA GVOZDENA ZAVESA PADA PREKO EVROPE**

**Apstrakt:** Priroda Evropske unije (EU) kao globalnog aktera dugo vremena predstavlja predmet akademske debate. Zastupnici razumevanja EU kao normativne, civilne sile slažu se da njena najveća preobražajna moć leži u politici proširenja, dozvoljavajući joj da oblikuje reforme u zemljama koje žele da postanu članice putem snažnog uslovljavanja. Upravo u tom kontekstu analiziraćemo novu metodologiju pristupnih pregovora, polazeći od osnovne premise da to predstavlja upitan pokušaj EU da zadrži svoju preobražajnu moć spram kandidata za članstvo uprkos krizi politike proširenja, i da dalje ojača ionako snažan mehanizam uslovljavanja. Dve godine po usvajanju nove metodologije izostaju značajne promene u tom pogledu. U međuvremenu, dramatične izmene geopolitičke situacije, uzrokovane izbijanjem rata u Ukrajini 2022. godine, vodile su naglom padu nove Gvozdene zavese preko kontinenta, stvarajući dodatne kontroverze u pogledu politike proširenja: da li će se ubuduće odnositi i na istočnoevropske zemlje, ili će postati deo diferencirane integracije? Pored toga, iznova se rađa pitanje da li EU može da deluje kao strateški akter u pravcu uspostavljanja novih odnosa u Evropi.

**Ključne reči:** Evropska unija, proširenje, preobražajna moć, Zapadni Balkan, izmenjena metodologija politike proširenja, Istočna Evropa.





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# Enlargement Policy and the Western Balkans – the Role of the Czech Republic and the EU in the Context of the New Enlargement Methodology

Helena BAUEROVÁ<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** The presented text analyzes the role of the EU and the Czech Republic (CR) in the Western Balkans in the context of enlargement policy, which has been revised through the new methodology. The research is based on a case study covering a defined period of time. The research premise states that the role of the EU and the Czech Republic in the Western Balkans is shaped by internal and external influences, rather than the specific situation and challenges in the Western Balkans region. The argumentation is based on the role theory and verifies the extent to which the Czech Republic acts as a mediator and regional-subsystem collaborator or bridge within the EU to WB. In the future EU should set out clear and concrete changes that candidate states should make; should clearly define benefits that the state will receive after meeting the requirements and identify clear disadvantages or losses that will follow non-compliance. The author finds that both the EU and the Member States should have a stronger and more dynamic role in the accession process of the candidate countries.

**Keywords:** Western Balkans, EU enlargement, Czech Republic, role theory, presidency.

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## Introduction

Enlargement policy has been pervading the integration process since the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. The enlargement process is an example of EU foreign policy, which is difficult to predict and has many specificities. All the more so in connection with the region of the Western Balkans (WB), which combines many cultural, political and geographical specifics (Bauerová 2014, 8-9). The issue of EU enlargement to WB offers a wide field for research (see for example Bieber (eds.) 2017; Kmezić 2018; Džankić, Keil, Kmezić 2019). The adoption of a new methodology for EU enlargement has opened up more scope for analysing the influence of Member States on the overall enlargement process. The text of the article responds to the EU policy towards WB and contextualizes it with the action of one selected member state – the Czech Republic (CR).

Although the relationship between the EU and the WB (in the context of enlargement policy) dates back to the beginning of the new millennium, it cannot be said that it is nearing a successful conclusion in terms of EU accession. Therefore, the question arises: Why is the enlargement process to the Western Balkans not completed? The answer is so broad that it is not possible to include it in one article. The following text is therefore based on two levels of analysis. 1) the level of the EU's role as a key player in influencing enlargement policy; 2) the level of the selected member state – the role of the Czech Republic in the enlargement policy.

The analysis of the role of the EU and the Czech Republic is based on the theory of roles, specifically on the study of the concept of the national role and the transcription of the role. The reason for choosing both perspectives is the effort for a comprehensive analysis of the formation of the Czech role towards the countries of the Western Balkans in the context of enlargement policy. The analysis will include external and internal influences that affect the formation and change the role of the state. There will be monitored the role of the CR in the process of EU enlargement to the WB. The EU will be analysed as a leading player in the enlargement process. The author is aware of the breadth of the topic, and therefore it will be verified to what extent the CR indeed acts as a mediator and regional-subsystem collaborator or bridge within the EU to WB (Holsti 1970).

The text aims to analyse the role of the CR and the EU in the enlargement policy in the geographical area of the Western Balkans. In terms of time, the analysis includes the period from 2009, i.e. the first Czech presidency of the EU to the present, i.e. half of June 2022. The period was chosen in terms of topicality because it will reflect the changes that significantly shape enlargement policy in recent years. Specifically, it is the impact of the migration crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Special attention is paid to the new enlargement methodology, as it changes the role of both the EU and the Member States in the enlargement process.

From a theoretical point of view, the text is based on the concept of role theory, which is associated with two levels of influences shaping foreign policy. The first is the national level at the state level; the second level is the international or supranational environment. The analysis of Czech foreign policy will include both aspects. The author believes that the role of the state is shaped both by the reality within the political system and by the influence of the state's surroundings. There will be monitored the influence of the EU on the formation of Czech foreign policy.

The text poses the following research questions: Does the external environment affect the formation of the Czech Republic's foreign policy (the role of the state) towards ZB countries? Does the Czech Republic act as a mediator between ZB and the EU in the field of enlargement policy? Is it possible that the new methodology will allow states to influence enlargement policy in the context of the roles they currently have? The initial hypothesis of the text is the claim that the role of a Member State has a greater influence on the course of enlargement policy than the role of the EU. The text is divided into two main parts. The first presents the theoretical and methodological assumptions of the use of role theory in the analysis of EU and Czech foreign policy. Subsequently, in the second part, the text analyses the role of the CR and the EU in the process of accession of the WB countries to the EU.

## **Role theory as a theoretical and methodological basis for studying foreign policy**

The presented text is based on the theory of roles, which is used as a conceptual and theoretical framework that applies to the analysis of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic (Beneš 2010, 73) and the EU toward the WB region. The theory of roles concludes foreign policy from an analysis of the shared ideas of elites about the right role and purpose of any state as a collective in the international arena. It is possible to say that role theory is a source of ideas about the role of states in the world. The foreign policy of the EU and the Czech Republic towards the selected region (WB) will be the subject of analysis. An analysis of the national context (e.g. history, political influence), external expectations and other structural factors will be included in the analysis.

The analysis is based on the basic definition introduced by Holsti. Holsti (1970) defines a national role conception: "A national role conception includes the

policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional system. It is their 'image' of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment" (Holsti 1970, 245-246). Holsti also puts into the theory of roles the influence of the external environment, which shapes the role of the state. Specifically, he states: "National role conceptions are also related to, or buttressed by, the role prescriptions coming from the external environment" (Holsti 1970, 246). He also talks about the influence of the international system, regional international organizations.

The text perceives the external environment as an area of the EU, not of the whole international system. The analysis includes two levels – a) the EU level as an actor influencing EU enlargement policy, as well as the behaviour and actions of the Member States and countries seeking to join its structures. b) level of the CR, where the areas of formation of the Czech role in foreign policy will be examined. The level of national policy is expressed by official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CR, the Office of the Government of the CR and the President of the CR.

The applied part of the text will monitor the function of the CR and the EU in the WB, which is formed in connection with the enlargement policy. Holsti identifies 17<sup>2</sup> role conception. Due to the topic of the text, only selected roles will be verified. Specifically, it will be the role of a regional-subsystem collaborator. The role is associated with long-term activity in a certain subsystem, region and leads to mutual, especially political and economic, cooperation in the regions. Furthermore, the role of the mediator-integrator can resolve conflicts or differences between states, in terms of diplomatic role (Holsti 1970, 265). Given that the analysis also examines the influence of the Czech Republic on the EU, the role of the bridge is also included, in which the state operates mainly in terms of communication. The analysis uses Holsti's analogy that the state acts as "acting as a translator" (Holsti 1970, 267).

The theory of roles will be used for the analysis of Czech foreign policy in connection with the perspective of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. The issue will be seen in the light of changes in Czech positions in the context of the

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<sup>2</sup> Specifically, these are the following roles: Bastion of revolution-liberator, Regional leader, Regional protector, Active Independent, Liberation supporter, Defender of the faith, Mediator-integrator, Developer, Bridge, Faithful ally, Independent, Example, Internal Development, Isolate, Protectee, Regional-subsystem collaborator.

first and second Czech presidencies of the EU. The reason for choosing the time period is the statement that the presidency of states can be perceived as a space where it is possible to promote national interests and also to defend them (Kaniok, Smekal 2010).

The analysis is based on the assumptions of the existence of a prescription for a role that has its source in the external environment. The analysis, therefore, takes into account the influence of national influences that shape the position of the Czech Republic. At the same time, the external influences shaping the Czech foreign policy towards the EU enlargement policy and the Western Balkans are also included. The analysis will take place on two levels: 1) involves a purely national level of action; 2) includes the external environment shaping Czech foreign policy.

In connection with the creation of the national role, it is necessary to solve questions about its formation. In the text, we admit that the role of the state changes over time. The role of the state is influenced by the past, either to oneself or to others (Beneš 2019, 18). The fact is that the current role of the state is influenced by the past. The role of states is influenced by the so-called others, with whom the state comes into contact. However, not all others have the same influence on the state. Therefore, in role theory, a distinction is made between significant other, generalized other. When creating the role of the state, it is necessary to follow the context of various variables. It is possible to agree with Hollis and Smith's conclusions: "roles are a two-way process between structure and actor" (Hollis and Smith 1990, 167). Politicians are affected by the internal (domestic) and external (international) environment in creating the role of the state. External stimuli in the form of changes in the international system can be a stimulus to gain public support for a role (Aras, Gorener 2010, 76-77).

## **EU and Western Balkans**

The Western Balkans are key areas for the EU, especially in terms of security, defence and energy policy (AMO 2020). Interest in the Western Balkans region has been evident since the 1990s. However, several key moments can be identified when the EU has shown interest in WB in the context of enlargement policy. The Thessaloniki Summit (2003) was the first in which the WB states were promised a European perspective. In particular, the conclusions of the meeting state that: "... support the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the established criteria" (Council of the European Union 2003, 12). In the same year, the Thessaloniki Agenda for the

Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration was published. The general statements are repeated here, namely the EU's cooperation with WB (for more see Council 2003). Subsequently, at the 2006 Brussels Summit, the EU 'only' confirmed the future of the WB in the EU if it fulfilled its obligations under the Stabilization and Association Agreement (EU Council 2007, 3). Another key document referring to EU accession is from 2018 – Strategy for the Western Balkans.

Before we turn to the latest Strategy, we need to ask ourselves what changes have taken place since 2008 that led to a slowdown in the EU's engagement in the Western Balkans? It is not possible to talk about weakening the influence in connection with the economic point of view. EU investment in the WB region has been steadily increasing since 2006. Trade between the EU and the WB has also increased. More than 80 % of WB exports go to the EU (Euractiv 2018a). In 2020, the countries of the Western Balkans exported 81,5 % of their exports to the EU and imports from the EU accounted for 61 % of all imports in the region (European Commission 2021). In addition, the EU has launched a Stabilization and Association Process with all WB countries, which means access to the EU's internal market. At the general level of enlargement policy, a decline in interest can be observed, especially in the context of the enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania. The EU has begun to be more careful. The year 2013, when Croatia joined the EU, can be considered the imaginary culmination of the active enlargement policy towards the WB. In the following period, it is possible to observe a departure of the EU from the region in terms of an active policy that openly supports accession. Access processes are at a standstill. We can interpret the EU's interest in the WB as *purposeful*, often associated with solving its security problems. A clear example was the economic and migration crisis in 2015 and 2016. The EC set aside € 30 million to support the World Bank's border capacity and migration management. Confidence in the EU was not supported by the coronavirus pandemic. Although the EU has set aside € 3 billion to fight the pandemic and provided the region with € 41 million worth of medical equipment. However, the EU has failed to distribute vaccines to WB quickly enough. Compared to the activities of the Russian Federation and China,<sup>3</sup> deliveries were very slow and inefficient (Merheim-Eyre 2021, 74-75).

It can be said that the EU's role is weakening after 2013, as enlargement policy has not been a priority area for integration. On the one hand, the EU promised accession, but at the same time did not provide sufficient incentives, did not

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<sup>3</sup> For example, Serbia launched a vaccination program three days before the EU (Niksic, Stojanovic 2021) because it received vaccines from Russia, China and the USA.

encourage local states to be willing to follow it in meeting the accession criteria. The weakening influence of the EU has been exploited by third players who have become competitors for the EU. Russia, China and Turkey are establishing separate partnerships in the region. Their interests and policies in the region are often more effective and targeted. The EU supports the region stably and more massively, but the timing of aid did not meet local needs (Strážay 2021, 4; cf. Factor 2021). Third countries are therefore EU rivals who can frustrate Europe's role, interests and needs in the WB. The EU has a clear advantage in terms of financial assistance in the area and the prospect of operating in the European market. The membership offer is currently losing its appeal because it has been delayed for a long time. Europe is currently interested in changing the direction of enlargement policy to a more dynamic form.

At the Sofia Summit (2018), the EU returned to the Thessaloniki talks, where it reiterated the perspective of the WB countries in the European Union. At the same time, the EU has responded to the problems that significantly link it to the Western Balkans. Firstly, the effort to create an Energy Community and cooperation in the fight against illegal migration. Furthermore, the EU mentioned, in particular, the problems that block the fulfilment of the rules of the accession process, *i.e.* the dominant dysfunction of the rule of law and corruption. Part of the document is the setting of Sofia priorities, which very vaguely set out the activities that need to be done by both the EU and the WB (see EU-Western Balkans Summit, 2018). On the one hand, the Sofia summit can be interpreted as a return to a more active policy. On the other hand, there is clear scepticism about the enlargement process stemming from Donald Tusk's comment: "Today we have not tried to pretend that everything is clear and beautiful. Scepticism in the EU about enlargement as a political phenomenon is clear" (Euractiv 2018b). The facts are clear. The EU needs WB countries; faces the risk of third-country influence in the region while insisting on pre-accession conditions, plus it must take into account the views and interests of the Member States.

The change is offered by the Strategy for the WB from 2018, which can be described in retrospect as an awareness of the importance of the WB for European integration. In the Western Balkans Strategy, the EU already openly acknowledges the need to pay more attention to the region than in the past. EC President Jean-Claude Juncker said (2018) that: "... Investing in the stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans is an investment in the security and future of our Union" (European Commission 2018). The European Partnership takes the form of a pledge that begins and ends with the implementation of the accession rules. The aim of the new methodology is: "... to be more dynamic and more politically steered" (Popović 2021). In connection with the new EU methodology, it makes explicit

reference to: "... own political, security and economic interests" (European Council, Council of EU 2021). The new methodology should be a new impetus for enlargement policy. An instrument that overcomes scepticism about the EU's passive role in the WB. The new methodology as stated by the European Parliament: "makes the accession negotiations more credible, more predictable, more dynamic and guided by a stronger political steer" (Stanicek 2020, 1). The EU believes that the new approach will restore confidence in the enlargement process and lead to dynamic changes again.

The EU is aware of the importance of the current situation, which is not moving towards enlargement. The EU makes it clear that the enlargement process has not been dynamic enough. The question is, to what extent is and will the EU's role be active and convincing? How can the EU motivate the countries of the Western Balkans to lean towards it? Despite the new methodology, it is clear that the EU continues to require compliance with the rules formulated in the previous period. A novelty is an effort for enhanced cooperation on a ministerial basis and to speed up the accession process. The enlargement process is supposed to be: "... more credible, more dynamic and subject to stronger political steering" (European Council, Council of EU 2021). From the point of view of role theory, it is an essential element, the so-called strong political leadership, which presupposes the strengthening of the dialogue between the EU Member States and the acceding countries. Member States are key to the final approval of enlargement, and therefore a more active dialogue could potentially have the effect of removing or removing obstacles to enlargement by the Member States (EU Council 2021, 5).

However, more dialogue is to be expected, as the basic methodology scheme provides for at least one ministerial meeting per year (others as needed). The question is, therefore, how often will the meetings be and how effective will they be? In particular, the role of Member States in the methodology is specified as: "The Member States will continue to be able to contribute more systematically to the accession process, including via monitoring on the ground through their experts, direct contributions to the annual enlargement package and sectoral expertise" (Rada EU 2021, 6). "Member States should be able to contribute to this process by requesting the Commission to react in case of any stagnation or serious backsliding in the reform process" (Rada EU 2021, 10). The example of North Macedonia and Albania has shown the strength of the influence of the Member States. First, France (2019) refused to open accession talks with Northern Macedonia and Albania, even though they met the necessary conditions. Subsequently, Bulgaria blocked the opening of negotiations with North Macedonia (2020) (AMO 2020). Also problematic is the relationship with Kosovo, whose secession has not been recognized by Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain (Scazzieri 2021). The question is how and if at



all, it is possible for the new methodology to shift and change the problematic relationship between some EU Member States and the countries of the WB.

The confidence or inclination of the Western Balkans towards the EU was not strengthened even by the evaluation reports issued by the EC in 2020. According to the report, Northern Macedonia and Albania have made more progress than Serbia and Montenegro. Nevertheless, accession talks have not been opened with them (North Macedonia and Albania). The question is, what shapes the EU's position towards the countries of the Western Balkans? Here it is possible to agree with Stojić's thesis:

“The current EU enlargement policy appears to be less about the candidates' genuine domestic reforms and more a reflection of wider geopolitical rivalries in the region and particular interests of the most influential EU members to hasten or hinder this increasingly ill-suited policy” (Stojić 2020, 7).

A certain solution to the enlargement policy crisis outlined above may be a new methodology to respond to developments in the potential/candidate country and to take the path of real benefits if the state fulfils the conditions for accession. However, the question is, to what extent will the accession process be affected by the separate interests of the EU Member States? Respectively, how can the EU apply the conclusions of the methodology in practice and how the EU's geopolitical and security interests will be reflected in the European approach, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. Accession to the EU alone has not been enough as a reward for meeting the conditions. Reform steps and rewards should be phased in so that partial successes and rewards are an incentive for further change. The motivation for change should be more tailored to the specific Western Balkans. The Russian example shows that partial incentives can be more effective than a long-term but difficult-to-achieve vision of full EU membership. The EU's role is weakening in the Western Balkans and its actions are not being taken seriously by political elites or the public (Stojic 2020, 9). The analysis of the situation in the individual countries of the Western Balkans is not the subject of analysis. However, it should be noted that the EU's efforts also run into the problems of local states, where often political elites formally agree to the rules of access but do not implement them in practice (see Strážay 2021).

The new methodology can be assessed positively as a new direction of enlargement policy (see e.g. Nechev, Tilev, Marović, Çela 2021, 8). The drive for greater links between the Member States and pre-accession countries can be seen as positive. Of course, given the frequency of conferences and the use of the possibility to draw attention to the lack of accession negotiations by the Member States. The following text, therefore, has the ambition to respond to the influence of

the Member States on the accession process. Due to the scope of the text, one case study related to the Czech Republic is used. The text follows the role of the Czech Republic in a longer time perspective so that it is possible to monitor a possible change in the role. The role will be monitored on the basis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, and the President of the Czech Republic.

## **The Czech Republic and the Western Balkans**

In general, it can be stated that within the EU there is a group of Member States supporting the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans to the EU. In addition to the Czech Republic, these are the Visegrad Group countries – Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as Austria, Croatia and Slovenia (Noyan 2021). From a long-term perspective, the interests of Czech foreign policy overlap with the interests of the V4 platform. The Visegrad interest is the European perspective of the Western Balkans in the EU. In addition, it should be noted that the V4 is the only regional organization at the EU level that supports the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU. Its role is therefore irreplaceable and Czech foreign policy also reflects the interests of this group. The V4 talks state that the V4 states will convince their partners in Europe of the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU (Vláda ČR 2019). In February 2020, the Visegrad Group countries signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the Western Balkans Fund and the International Visegrad Fund (Havlíček, Svobodová, Jungwirth 2020). Regional cooperation between the V4 and the Western Balkans could be an appropriate model for cooperation for EU action in the region.

From the point of view of role theory, it is necessary to perceive the fact that these are new EU member states and states that are rather small or medium-sized. Due to these characteristics, they may face the challenge of asserting their interests in the Western Balkans within the EU.

If we focus on the Czech Republic's foreign policy, it is evident that the interest in the Western Balkans region is long-term. As early as the first half of the 1990s, it was associated with conflict resolution in the region. In general, it can be said that the Czech Republic has the Western Balkans as one of the priorities of long-term foreign policy. Monitoring the development of the relationship with the region since 2009, it is clear that the Western Balkans were already clearly enshrined in the presidency's agenda and were a priority area. In particular, the Czech Republic supported Croatia's accession to the EU and supported the acceleration of the

Stabilization and Association Process. Croatia was to set an example for other countries in the Western Balkans. The presidency's program mentioned cooperation efforts with Kosovo, Macedonia; harmonization of relations between Belgrade and Priština. The Western Balkans have been linked to security issues, the fight against terrorism and enlargement policy (Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU 2009). However, the program was very general and broad in the section on the Western Balkans. It can be said that the program of the Czech Presidency corresponded to the foreign policy of the Cabinet of M. Topolánek, whose program statement did not mention the Western Balkans in the area of foreign policy priorities. After all, the subsequent governments of Fischer and Rusnok (after 2013) did not similarly mention the Western Balkans. The presidency's program, therefore, represented a certain continuity in the Czech Republic's foreign policy, which focuses on the Western Balkans, but this is not an absolute priority (Dopita 2012, 189). As Tesař states, Czech foreign policy lacks a solution to specific current Balkan issues. The public is not sufficiently informed about the situation in the region and has no relation to it (Tesař 2010, 227, 237). The Czech Republic's role in enlargement policy has been supportive of the Western Balkans. The Czech Republic supported visa liberalization and the continuation of the Stabilization and Association Agreements. However, we cannot talk about a specific or active policy within the EU. Rather, it was a matter of following the EU's priorities in the Western Balkans.

Subsequent government cabinets (Sobotka's [2014-2017] and Babiš's [2017-2021]) combined foreign policy toward the Western Balkans with a more proactive approach. The program statements mention the Western Balkans in connection with EU enlargement (Vláda ČR 2014; Vláda ČR 2018). Increased interest in the Western Balkans was driven by efforts to protect the Schengen area from the influx of refugees. The Western Balkans were associated with European security and the issue of resolving the migration crisis (Vláda České republiky 2018). The fact that the Balkans became a buffer zone for migration towards the Schengen area resonated in Czech foreign policy. The Western Balkans have begun to be linked to the protection of external borders and the closure of the Balkan migration route.

In the case of Czech foreign policy, it is necessary to take into account the double-track system resulting from the influence of the President of the Czech Republic. As early as 2008, it was evident that President Klaus was open to negotiations with Belgrade, but did not support Priština's international recognition (Tesař 2010, 234). Even the current President Zeman supports the withdrawal of such recognition.<sup>4</sup> On the contrary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been

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<sup>4</sup> For example: President Zeman "... promised to try to persuade his country to withdraw its diplomatic recognition of Kosovo, granted in 2008." (Zivanovic 2019).

continuously supporting the declared independence since 2008 (Vláda ČR 2008). These facts cast a sign of inconsistency on the Czech role in the Western Balkans. We can agree with the statement that the approach of the Czech Republic is rather ambiguous (Tesař 2010, 237). The general approach to the Western Balkans is well demonstrated by President Zeman's statement during the EU enlargement to Croatia in 2013. Zeman said that he considered "the enlargement of the Union to be a 'nice thing', but the EU should... deepen its integration mechanisms" (Euractiv 2013). The polarization of the Czech Republic's foreign policy was evident in 2016. The Chamber of Deputies and the President were against cooperating with the authorities in Kosovo, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported it (Dopita 2016, 204). Therefore, it was not possible to ratify the bilateral agreement between two sides. The agreement has been negotiated since 2014 and has been postponed eight times until 2016 (Dopita 2016, 209). The tensions arising from the disunity of Czech foreign policy resonate in Serbia's accession process, because without the normalization of relations with Priština, there will be no shift in Belgrade's accession negotiations. The divergent position of Czech foreign policy towards Kosovo generally reduces the credibility of Czech foreign policy in the Western Balkans.

If we return to the general level of Czech foreign policy, then its basic starting points are based on the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic (its updates from 2011, 2015 and 2019 in the period under review). The concept from 2011 identified the Western Balkans as a neighbouring region, where the Czech Republic is willing to engage and support integration efforts on a bilateral basis and within the EU (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí 2011, 16). The new Foreign Policy Concept of 2015 identifies the Western Balkans as an area of security interest and refers to political, historical and cultural ties. The support of Serbia in joining the EU and other countries of the Western Balkans, in general, is explicitly mentioned. However, EU membership is linked to the fulfilment of pre-accession conditions. The Czech Republic rejects additional conditions for joining the EU (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR 2015, 13-14). The latest concept from 2019 largely copies the previous concept. A certain shift can be observed in the communication that: "... will seek to address bilateral issues between Member States and EU candidate or potential candidate countries outside enlargement policy" (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí 2019). The Czech Republic is finding a partnership in fulfilling this goal in Austria and within the Visegrad Group platform. The concept seems to follow the intention of the new enlargement methodology and the current problems of enlargement policy, albeit at a very general level.

The not very proactive policy towards the Western Balkans is evidenced by the fact that the only text on the Czech Republic's foreign policy towards the Western Balkans region is available on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this

one is from 2013. (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí 2013). There are no updates that would correspond to the changes in the region. In this respect, the role of the Czech Republic is very weak. The Czech arbitrator of foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has not issued an updated version of foreign policy towards the Western Balkans in the last nine years. This fact is striking given the statement of Czech politicians about the priority interests of the Czech Republic in the Western Balkans. The 2013 Program states that: “The Czech Republic has a strong, long-term policy towards the Western Balkans, based on clearly defined interests and going across the political spectrum. Enlargement support is a positive agenda based on the premise that countries meet the criteria and implement internal reforms responsibly on the road to the EU. On the other hand, it is necessary to actively contribute to reaching a consensus within the EU. This policy brings positive points and has no negative effects inside or outside the Czech Republic. The continuation of the current strong, but not unilaterally presented support for the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU remains beneficial for the Czech Republic” (Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí 2013, 17). The statement shows that the Czech Republic is aware of EU membership and partnership with the Western Balkans. However, the question is which area of activities will be implemented, whether to the EU, ie the use of the potential to present WB in a good light. Or the Czech Republic will launch a more active policy directly with the countries of the Western Balkans.

The development of recent years suggests that the Czech Republic has chosen a rather active policy at the EU level. The Czech Republic has been involved in developing a new methodology, actively supporting the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. Czech foreign policy perceives the adoption of the new methodology as a revitalization of confidence in enlargement policy (Havlíček, Svobodová, Jungwirth 2022). Activities within the V4 continue (see above). At the summit in Sofia (2018), the Czech Republic supported the agreed conclusions, but at the same time demanded the setting of a specific date for accession to the EU, which would act as an effective motivation for the countries of the Western Balkans. Foreign Minister Petříček (2019) stated that: “Enlargement policy is the best instrument for ensuring stability, prosperity and economic growth in the Western Balkans. A clear perspective of future membership in the European Union is key for further transformation, reconciliation and promotion of the values, rules and standards of the Union” (Petříček 2019). In 2020, the Czech Republic opposed making the opening of accession talks conditional on issues of national self-determination. Foreign Minister Kulhánek, together with the ministers from Austria and Slovenia, called on EU member states not to delay the accession process (in response to the Bulgarian negotiations) (Merheim-Eyre 2021, 74). At the time of the Coronavirus

pandemic, the Czech Republic was in a group of 13<sup>5</sup> Member States that supported the allocation of part of the vaccines to the Western Balkans. However, this request has not been heard at the EU level. At present, Czech foreign policy is shaped by a new government cabinet, which was established after the parliamentary elections in 2021. The government statement mentions the Western Balkans rather marginally, in connection with the support of the enlargement policy to the countries of the Western Balkans (Vláda ČR 2022).

The real role of the new government vis-à-vis the Western Balkans can be seen in the case of shaping the program for the Czech Presidency, which will take place in the second half of 2022. From a long-term perspective, it was clear that the Western Balkans will be one of the priority areas during the presidency. The new cabinet does not necessarily follow the original plan, not only from an ideological point of view. It is necessary to perceive some external variables that affect the role of the Czech Republic in the position of mediator. On the one hand, this is a problematic situation in the Western Balkans region itself. In particular, the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, tensions in Montenegro or between Belgrade and Priština (Čermák 2022). The impact of the conflict in Ukraine cannot be ignored, as it largely overshadows the original agenda that the Czech Republic planned to address during the presidency (Muni TV, 2022).

When planning the Czech Presidency, it seemed that the Western Balkans region would be a clear priority area of the Czech Republic's foreign policy. It provided an opportunity to develop an EU-based debate on the accession of the Western Balkans to its structures, and there was a presumption that an EU-Western Balkans summit would take place. The role of the Czech Republic is all the more crucial because the next presiding states (Sweden and Spain) have no interests in the WB region (Reilly 2022).

With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the agenda underwent a significant change. Because the content of the program of the Czech Presidency (May 2022) is not known at the time of writing, it is not possible to analyse Czech priorities directly. At present, it seems that the WB area will be rather neglected. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the main topics will be Russian aggression in Ukraine, digital transformation, energy security or strengthening of democratic institutions is currently available (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 2022).

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<sup>5</sup> Specifically, these countries were: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden.

## Conclusion

The Western Balkans are linked to the political, security and economic interests not only of the EU and its Member States, but also of non-European actors. Overall, the Western Balkans have a strategic position. The EU is aware of this by trying to use enlargement policy as a specific foreign policy tool. The EU's role has not always been consistent in the Western Balkans. It is possible to observe a period of increased interest, especially at the beginning of the millennium. The Thessaloniki Summit formulated the perspective of the Western Balkans in EU structures. Through its enlargement policy, the EU has begun to support an overall transformation aimed at meeting entry conditions. Following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (2007) to the EU, it is possible to observe a gradual slowdown or slowing down of interest in further enlargement. The exception was Croatia, whose entry was followed by a departure from an active enlargement policy. Although the economic partnership with the WB continued after 2013, the EU's role in the area began to be weakened mainly by making entry conditional on strict entry conditions. The EU's role at the WB was shaped by: 1) an internal environment that has not been in favour of further expansion. In terms of sub-issues between the EU Member States and the WB States; 2) The Migration Crisis (2015), as an external influence shaping the EU's role, demonstrated the importance of the Western Balkans in ensuring the EU's internal security. Nevertheless, it is not possible to say that the EU's role at the WB has changed. The prospect of further enlargement has been repeatedly questioned by the EU, leading to growing scepticism about EU integration among the public and politicians in the Western Balkans. In addition, the coronavirus pandemic has fully exposed the growing influence of third countries in the Western Balkans. The involvement of Russia, China and Turkey in the region has encouraged the EU and some Member States to pursue a more active policy linked to the renewed prospect of EU accession.

The result is the adoption of a new enlargement methodology, which promises new mechanisms and dynamics for the pre-accession period. The EU's role seems to have remained broadly the same, ie to monitor pre-accession and entry conditions and to declare interest in enlargement, which is often motivated by the EU's security and geostrategic interests. The new methodology gives the Member States a greater role. In general, Member States' influence on enlargement policy remains crucial. The question is how the Member States will make use of the new opportunities, and whether the negative attitude of some EU Member States outweighs the accession of the Western Balkans.

In analysing the role of the Czech Republic in the enlargement policy of the Western Balkans, it is possible to draw several conclusions in the context of role theory. The Czech Republic has undeniably long-term interests in the WB region, which correspond to the role of a regional subsystem collaborator. Specifically, these are political, economic, cultural and historical ties with the countries of the Western Balkans. These ties include the Czech Republic in the group of countries that support the accession of the countries of the Western Balkans to the EU. However, this is a role linked rather purely to the interests of the Czech Republic as such and does not overlap with enlargement policy. If we want to apply the role of mediator, there is more room for analysis of Czech foreign policy within the EU. At the level of the Government of the Czech Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is an obvious effort to mediate the relationship between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans were mentioned in official documents, but it was not about setting out specific policies or activities. The general references linking the WB to EU integration prevailed. The change in role was a) prompted by a change in the composition of the government cabinet after the 2014 elections. It was dominantly a reflection of the migration crisis, the solution of which in the Czech environment was associated with securing the Western Balkans route. Despite the above-mentioned pro-WB direction of the Czech Republic's foreign policy, it is not possible to say that it would play a purely mediator or bridge role. The first reason is that the government's programs and foreign policy concepts of the Czech Republic are very general towards the Western Balkans. The issues of the Western Balkans are not addressed at all in public discourse. In addition, the last concrete concept for the Western Balkans was issued in 2013 and has no updates. The second is the inconsistent direction of foreign policy, because it is formed on two levels. In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this is the influence of the president. The president cannot, from his position, formulate a foreign policy. Nevertheless, in the last more than ten years, presidential administrations have been associated with formulating their views and attitudes on foreign policy. Due to internal disagreements regarding the recognition of Kosovo, Czech foreign policy appears inconsistent.

We can observe the role of the bridge in recent years, when the Czech Republic's EU-based policy is becoming more active. The Czech Republic supported the adoption of a new enlargement methodology, the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania. Alternatively, an active policy towards the WB at the level of the Visegrad Group can be seen.

Currently, it is necessary to take into account the influence of the new political representation, which formulates the program of the Czech Presidency of the EU. The Western Balkans were to be one of the priorities of the Czech Presidency.



However, in the context of the war in Ukraine, it seems that the region of the Western Balkans will be addressed rather marginally, although the presidency's program is not yet officially known. Partial priorities have already been formulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Western Balkans are absent.

In the context of the new methodology, the role of the Czech Republic should be more active, for several reasons. 1) the long-term foreign policy goal to the Western Balkans would be symbolically met; 2) the agenda of the Western Balkans should not be neglected precisely because of the more pressing issue (solving the war in Ukraine). On the contrary, given the growing influence of the Russian Federation in the Western Balkans, changes were to be made to accelerate the rapprochement of the Western Balkans with the EU; 3) the strategic position of the Western Balkans and its importance for European security should be taken into account.

If we are to assess the importance of the methodology for the future of the enlargement process, it must be said that the EU should take a more proactive approach to enlargement policy. 1) It should set out clear and concrete changes that individual states should make. 2) It should clearly define the rewards or benefits that the state will receive after meeting the requirements. 3) Also identify clear disadvantages or losses that will follow non-compliance. In general, the role of the EU should be more motivating. The role of the Member States should be more active in enlargement policy and focus in particular on sceptical states such as Bulgaria or France. This could fulfil the goal and purpose of the new methodology – to speed up the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU.

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**POLITIKA PROŠIRENJA I ZAPADNI BALKAN – ULOGA ČEŠKE REPUBLIKE I EU  
U KONTEKSTU REVIDIRANE METODOLOGIJE PROŠIRENJA**

**Apstrakt:** U ovom istraživanju analizira se uloga EU i Češke na Zapadnom Balkanu u kontekstu politike proširenja, koja je promenjena usvajanjem revidirane metodologije. Istraživanje se zasniva na studiji slučaja u okviru definisanog vremenskog intervala. Polazi se od premise da je uloga EU i Češke na Zapadnom Balkanu oblikovana od strane unutrašnjih i spoljnih aspekata, pre nego specifičnom situacijom i izazovima samog tog regiona. Argumentacija se zasniva na teoriji uloga i potvrđuje opseg delovanja Češke Republike kao posrednika i regionalnog saradnika između EU i Zapadnog Balkana. Ubuduće bi EU trebalo da definiše: jasne i konkretne promene koje se zahtevaju od kandidata; precizno odredi benefite koji će kandidatima sledovati nakon ispunjavanja kriterijuma i identifikuje posledice ili gubitke koji će uslediti u slučaju neispunjavanja uslova. Autorka nalazi da i EU i njene države-članice treba da preuzmu snažniju i dinamičniju ulogu u pristupnom procesu kandidata za članstvo.

**Ključne reči:** Zapadni Balkan, proširenje EU, Češka Republika, teorija uloga, predsedavanje.





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# The EU's *raison d'état* in the Western Balkans: Can the new enlargement methodology help?

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**Abstract:** By employing the concept of *raison d'état*, the article questions the European Union's role in the so-called Western Balkan region. While the region continues to be covered by the EU's enlargement policy, we argue that the policy has been in paralysis. We explore whether the heightened geopolitical tensions in Europe have brought the EU to a turning point at which it would use its enlargement policy decisively to pursue its strategic interests in the region. We start with a theoretical discussion of *raison d'état* and its instrumentalization in the context of the European Union as a non-state actor. Then, we use the conceptual benchmarks of the *raison d'état* to analyze its empirical implementation through the EU's relations with Western Balkan countries. We explore the EU's available enlargement policy tools and the diverging positions within the EU towards enlargement. We pay special attention to the "New enlargement methodology" devised by the Commission in 2019. We argue that despite the Commission's efforts to promote the EU's common interest in the region framed in a geopolitical narrative, the diverging national interests still preclude the EU from aggregating its own and pursuing its *raison d'état* towards the region. The "new methodology" does nothing to overcome this situation. What is more, by insisting on a "stronger political steer" and by further facilitating the reversal of the accession process, the document pushes the Union further away from a common ground regarding the enlargement.

**Keywords:** *raison d'état*, Western Balkans, EU enlargement, geopolitics, European perspective, new enlargement methodology.

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## Introduction

This paper examines the EU – Western Balkans relations through the prism of *raison d'état*. While being aware of the provocative nature of this approach, we do not tend to argue for the existence of EU *raison d'état*. Instead, we want to take advantage of the concept's explanatory potential to identify the place of the EU-Western Balkans relations in the EU's priority list and the EU's capacity to act according to these priorities.

Our research interest was sparked by our uncertainty about the role and place of enlargement policy in the hierarchy of EU priorities. On many occasions, the EU reiterated its commitment to the Western Balkans region's "European perspective." Still, at the same time, the enlargement process has been in an obvious impasse, with alternative proposals proliferating recently. Also, the (potential) enlargement to the Western Balkans would be (geo)political rather than economic, reflecting the EU's repeatedly stated interests in the region. Geopolitical reasoning behind the possible EU's decision to enlarge more promptly has become ever more present since the strategic competition between the EU and other global actors (i.e., Russia, China, or Turkey) intensified in the region. In that context, we raise the question of whether the enlargement would be a *raison d'état* of the European Union since it is often indicated as a principal reason for action in EU officials' statements.

We have created a two-tier methodological sequence. Firstly, based on deductive reasoning, we frame the explanatory potential of the concept of *raison d'état*. Secondly, based on an overview of the EU enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans and inductive critical analysis of the new EU methodology, we will be able to juxtapose the framed *raison d'état* benchmarks with our findings and thus assign the place of EU enlargement in the hierarchy of EU priorities. The paper is divided into two parts. The first one is devoted to the theoretical problem of *raison d'état* and its instrumentalization in the context of our research. The second part will analyze its empirical implementation through the EU's enlargement policy and its relations with the Balkan countries. The EU enlargement policy has long been considered one of its major foreign policy instruments, used for practicing its soft power with its nearest neighbors and for reshaping Europe's geopolitical scenery, spreading peace and security (Moravcsik 2010, 91, 92, 93). Once a successful instrument, the enlargement policy no longer fits the purpose, even though it would be expected to deliver a similar result in a contemporary era of heightened geopolitical tensions. We examine whether this new geopolitical reality that culminated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine would be a sufficient justification for a potential EU decision to fast-track the

Western Balkans to enlargement to safeguard its primary interests in the region – security and stability. In addition, we discuss whether the EU has the capacity to act in such a way, keeping in mind the available policy tools and diverging positions of the EU member states towards enlargement.

### **Conceptualizing *raison d'état***

While discussing the various methodological approaches for our research, we decided to rest on the logic applied by Zygmunt Bauman (2007) in his inspiring “Consuming life”. Bauman relies on Max Weber’s models as “indispensable for any understanding, and indeed for the very awareness of the similarities and differences, connections and discontinuities that hide behind the confusing variety of experience (2007, 24). Weber’s ‘ideal types’, as Bauman puts it aptly, “(if properly constructed) are useful, and also indispensable, cognitive tools even if (or perhaps because) they deliberately throw light on certain aspects of described social reality while leaving in the shade some other aspects considered to be of lesser or only random relevance to the essential, necessary traits of a particular form of life. ‘Ideal types’ are not descriptions of reality: they are the tools used to analyze it. They are good for thinking; or, arguably though paradoxically, despite their abstract nature they make empirical social reality, as available to experience, describable (Bauman 2007, 27).”

While we have a far less ambitious goal than creating an ideal model of *raison d'état*, we want to follow this Weberian logic and frame *raison d'état* benchmarks against which we can compare the EU enlargement policy. As Koenig-Archibugi (2004, 149), we also acknowledge the *raison d'état* usefulness as an interpretative lens about European integration.

#### ***The raison d'état benchmarks***

The term *raison d'état* is strongly associated with the power of the state. The modern term (Rzegocki 2021) evolved with the time from the classical association with the absolutist ruler, associated with N. Machiavelli, G. Botero, or C. Le Bret, to the acknowledgment of the contemporary pluralist form of state organization. Thus, it has become more complex and, in a sense, vague as it is no longer an emanation of a monarch’s will but a sublime expression of polity’s superior priorities. Not only do states and polities need to act according to democratic principles within their own communities, but they also need to consider the universally accepted

international norms of behavior in a contemporary globalized world when pursuing their national or community interests. As Burchill (2005, 28) argues, “they have obligations to humanity which override their national concerns”. Despite these modern-era limitations, states and polities still make efforts to arrange their foreign policy actions in autonomous way following their defined interests.

The comprehensive approach to the definition of *raison d'état*, taken by Joanna Sanecka-Tuczyńska (2015), aims at elucidating the specific features of the term from theoretical and methodological perspectives, provided us with a sufficiently rich toolbox from which we extract the needed *raison d'état* benchmarks.

Firstly, while it is a state-centric category, we recognize the specificity of the EU context. Whereas the EU is not a state, it aspires to be treated as such in rhetorical and political terms. Simultaneously, the European institutions already possess a decision-making autonomy, even if flawed. Whereas in the context of enlargement policy, the final decision rests with the member states, the European Commission has the capacity to produce political dynamics. Hence, leaving aside the endless debate about the nature of the EU, the application of the *raison d'état* can provide a constant cognitive perspective. Secondly, following Józef Kukułka's (2000, 222) argument, *raison d'état* includes the state's primary, superior, most important or universal interests. This statement remains at the center of our research, while this claim is also our research question. To explore whether the EU enlargement policy contains the features of *raison d'état* and for the sake of terminological clarity, we will treat the EU as a political system (Hix 1999) willing and capable of setting its own foreign policy priorities, defining its interests and taking decisions that affect both its own and other, third-party subjects.

Following Sanecka-Tuczyńska (2015), we rely on the ascertainments that: (1) *raison d'état* specifies the hierarchy of political objectives and means of achieving them, including those that cannot be negotiated with foreign entities. (2) It constitutes permanent and overriding interests and is implemented in an uncompromising way (2015, 52-54). Finally, (3) the presupposition that the term itself is associated with legal and moral relativism, namely, that in the name of *raison d'état*, it is admissible to violate laws and can serve as a moral justification (2015, 56).

### ***EU enlargement as a raison d'état***

The enlargement is an intrinsic part of European integration. The sole idea of European unification evolving throughout the centuries relies on its regional/continental inclusiveness. Even if often envisaged as a successful formula against external threats, it also contained hope for the peaceful settlement of

European disputes and tensions. Within the ideas on United Europe, meticulously collected by Kazimierz Łastawski (2011), of kings, scholars, intellectuals, revolutionaries, and politicians, two indispensable elements endure: the hope for a unified polity and a rally around shared rules.

Whereas these ideas differed profoundly in terms of geographical outreach, proposed structure, dominant powers, or reasons for unification, they all contained the spark of hope for a more predictable and peaceful future based on mutual recognition and shared interests. Within the essence of these assumptions, the ideas of European integration developed in the aftermath of World War II.

The inception of the integration process with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community was grounded in the open-access model. At least in principle, every European state has the right to join. (Emmert and Petrović 2014, 1350) Ever since the ECSC, the following treaties expanding the European integration process reconfirmed and encouraged the process of enlargement. As art. 49 of the Treaty on the European Union states, “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union (TEU 2016, Article 49).”

Within the last seventy years, the enlargement has become an indispensable part of the integration with a solid experience. The need to draw clear lines of who and when can become a member appeared already in the early 1960s in the relations with the south European authoritarian regimes. De Gaulle’s obstruction of the UK membership framed the habit of reconciliation of national and integration priorities in the relations with third countries. The membership of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the 1980s underlined the unanticipated democratizing role of the accession process. The end of the Cold War and the Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEECs) quest for membership provided a unique opportunity to unify the whole continent around a shared vision. At the same time, the enlargement faced the unprecedented challenge of simultaneous political, economic and social democratization and adjustment to EU’s *acquis*, as well as Europeanization of norms, habits, and social organization. This task went way beyond the enlargement’s preliminary role. This expanding nature of the EU enlargement went beyond the narrow process of accession to a complex process of interaction with external players and with internal implications, for the integration process itself has become the *raison d’être* of the EU (CJEU Opinion 2/13, para. 173). Even if we accept that the EU is not a state and still resembles Jaques Delors’s “unidentified political object” (CVCE n.d.) or, as Simon Hix (1999) sees it, a stateless political system, the enlargement constitutes the *raison d’état* of the EU.

### ***EU enlargement policy and geopolitical rivalry***

As Barbara Lippert (2021) argues, the EU “is predisposed to enlargement by its treaties (Art. 49 TEU), history (seven enlargement rounds) and political ambition (Global Strategy)”. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU enlargement policy turned into a goal and a major foreign policy tool that the EU has been using to exert influence in its nearest vicinity (Moravcsik 2010; Sedelmeier 2015, 411). By mixing conditionality and financial and technical assistance, the EU sought to transform the former eastern bloc countries (some of which had just gained their independence from the Soviet Union) into democracies and market economies. This transformation was regarded as a precondition to peace and security in Europe (European Council 2003). Thus, enlargement has had the objective of reshaping political order in Europe (Sjursen and Smith 2004, 126-127). Judging by the fact that twelve countries became EU members in 2004 and 2007, it could be assumed that the EU’s endeavor was relatively successful. The enlargement served the economic and geopolitical interests of both the “old” and “new” member states as it expanded the internal market and increased security and stability in Europe (Vachudova 2014, 122; 2019, 65). After accession, these countries were considered out of Russia’s zone of influence.

However, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements left the EU’s and Russia’s new common neighborhood in limbo and thus a playing field for both sides interests’ competition. Consequently, the EU framed its “renewed consensus on enlargement” of 2006. It rested on four Cs principles. The first would be consolidation, meaning avoiding new political commitments to European non-candidate countries, mainly aiming at the countries later embraced by the Eastern Partnership. The second principle was conditionality, which elevated the Copenhagen criteria to a quasi-constitutional principle. The third one, communication, to shore up public support (Lippert 2021) and the fourth one – the capacity of the EU to enlarge (Council 2007). Within the European Neighborhood Policy, the EU started promoting its European Partnership approach in 2008. Russia, on the other hand, sought to widen its Eurasian Union to the region once covered by Soviet influence (DeBardeleben 2013).

Similar geopolitical tensions started to unfold in the Balkans, where the EU initiated its Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999 with the view to influence the economic, political, and institutional processes in the region and eventually integrate these countries. At the same time, Russia pursued its own economic and political interests – in some of the region’s countries more successfully than in others. For some time, the two global actors tolerated each other’s presence. However, the geopolitical and geo-economic competition has

become less friendly after the financial crisis hit the EU in 2008. This one and the crises that followed (e.g., Ukraine in 2014, refugee crisis in 2015, Brexit) pushed the EU to deal more with its own domestic problems and neglect the Balkan enlargement countries (Panagiotou 2020), leaving the empty space to be filled with the influence of other global actors, such as China and Russia.

The trend peaked after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The geopolitical tensions in the Balkans gained more dramatic tones with the reemerging concerns about destabilization in the region, pushing the EU to double its forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR 2022). For the Balkan countries, “doing business” simultaneously with the EU and Russia became nearly impossible. The pressure has been felt particularly in Serbia due to the country’s close ties with Russia. The EU started insisting more strongly on aligning the country’s foreign policy with the EU’s position towards Russia and its several packages of sanctions (European Council 2022). Immediately after the war started, Ukraine and two other countries, Georgia and Moldova, filed their official EU membership applications, forcing the EU and its member states to take positions on further enlargements.

Thus, the EU enlargement policy was brought to a turning point. The expectations have risen that the EU should take decisive steps. From this point further, two broad options could be imagined. The EU could continue indefinitely keeping the Balkan countries in the enlargement process by endlessly reiterating their “European perspective,” or it could once again use its enlargement policy decisively as a tool for reshaping the continent’s geopolitical landscape. To answer this dilemma, we look more deeply into the approach and the instruments that the EU has been developing in its relations with the Balkan countries, and we critically analyze the suitability of the latest changes made to its enlargement methodology.

### ***EU enlargement policy governance***

Before we start our analysis of the EU’s policy tools in its relations with the Western Balkans, it is important to emphasize the evolving and complex nature of the enlargement policy since we consider it to be determining the Union’s capacity to engage decisively in the region. The EU enlargement policy has always been intergovernmental despite the formal roles envisaged for the supranational institutions, the Commission and later the European Parliament. Over time, as a consequence of its heightened intricacy combined with the so called “enlargement fatigue”, the enlargement policy in practice came to represent a case of an “intensive intergovernmentalism” (Wallace and Reh 2015, 109-111). Although the (supranational) Commission closely monitors the process, recommends measures,

or gives opinions on the candidates' progress, and it influenced largely the contents of enlargement conditionality, the (intergovernmental) Council takes decisions unanimously on each, even the minor step of the process. It decides whether to grant a country a candidate status, start and end accession negotiations, adopt negotiating frameworks, open negotiating clusters (earlier chapters) with or without setting the opening (sometimes even interim) and closing benchmarks, etc. There are many steps upon which all the EU member states need to agree; in other words, many veto points are on the way toward EU accession. Needless to say, with 27 member states (28 before Brexit), decision-making has become increasingly difficult, and finding common ground on further enlargements has become close to impossible. Thus, contrary to Wallace and Reh's findings that "intensive intergovernmentalism" has been a "vehicle towards more extensive cooperation" (2015, 110) in some policy areas, the enlargement policy so far produced mixed outcomes.

Over time, the enlargement policy has become increasingly complex, developing from a policy with almost no rules and conditions back in the 1960s to one with a highly complicated procedure and a huge set of very detailed criteria to be met by aspiring candidates. New conditions and procedures have been added during the rich experience of several enlargement waves. Still, the most visible changes have happened during the so-called "big bang" enlargement process between the early 1990s and 2004. Due to considerable differences between the "old" and "new" Europe, the EU had to engage in a huge transformational endeavor using the enlargement perspective as its main tool (Commission 1992: 9-10, 18-20). Thus, in order to reshape the central and eastern parts of the continent, the EU had to build up its own instruments simultaneously, so the EU formulated the enlargement criteria for the first time. The so-called Copenhagen criteria were set to achieve in the candidate countries the "...stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy ... the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" as well as the "ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union" (European Council 1993).

With the enlargement agenda spreading to the countries of former Yugoslavia, the policy has become even more complex. The enlargement strategy and procedure have changed on several occasions, each time becoming harder to comprehend. The conditions for enlargement piled over time, becoming ever more detailed and technical, not contributing to the speedy progress of the (potential) candidates. The Commission had a prominent role in these



modifications, playing its part in shifting the accent from the goal of membership to the process as such (Anastasakis 2008). Some observers noted the “link between the declining enthusiasm for enlargement and the growing entrepreneurship of the Commission” (Gateva 2015,157).

## **EU enlargement policy and the Western Balkans**

Since 1999, the EU enlargement policy encompassed the region that became known as the Western Balkans. The name has been used to denote countries emerging from former Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic – SFRY), adding Albania but skipping Slovenia since the country was already considered for membership with the CEECs. A unique approach to the region was developed – the Stabilization and Association Process – to account for the specificities of the post-conflict region and its weak states. This new approach that the Commission proposed in its 1999 Communication was supposed to replace the so-called Regional approach and contribute to the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe (Commission 1999). Claiming that the EU was facing “geopolitical challenges requiring the development of new policies, and instruments, towards a group of countries,” the document emphasized both the EU’s responsibility and interest in the region’s immediate stabilization and integration in the longer term (*ibid.*).

Thus, in the Commission’s view, what the EU had to do to serve its interests was to adopt the SAP that opened the way for the region’s EU-assisted incremental transformation and integration. The Commission’s initiative arrived in the immediate Yugoslav post-conflict period, while the Kosovo conflict was still fresh in the EU leaders’ minds, providing for the right geopolitical moment and enabling the EU member states to agree to tie the region closer to the EU. This had to be done even though no less than 13 countries were already queuing for EU membership at that time, and the EU still had to finish its internal reforms to accommodate enlargement started in 1997/1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam.

At its meeting at Santa Maria de Feira in 2000 (under the agenda heading “External Relations,” not “Enlargement”), the European Council endorsed the SAP, declared that all the Western Balkan countries are considered potential candidates for EU membership, and proposed holding of a joint EU-WB summit (European Council 2000). At the EU-WBs summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, in an atmosphere of optimism created after the signing of accession treaties with ten candidates at the time (eight CEECs and Malta and Cyprus), the EU leaders expressed their

“unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries” (Council EU 2003).

However, the European perspective for the WBs was not that bright. On the road towards EU membership stood not only numerous EU conditions they had to fulfill but many domestic and regional issues these countries had to face (weak economies still in transition, state-building, identity and territorial issues, high levels of corruption and organized crime, to name only a few). In addition, the EU, on its side, had to deal with its own absorption capacity, which became “an important consideration in the general interest of ... the Union” emphasized at the Copenhagen summit ten years earlier (European Council 1993). By the time of Bulgarian and Romanian accession in 2007, the “enlargement fatigue” spread, and concerns about the EU’s capacity to integrate new members started to grow (Börzel, Dimitrova and Schimmelfennig 2017, 157-158). In addition to the slow “digestion” of the previous “big bang” enlargement, the enlargement fatigue has been additionally enhanced by the subsequent crises that have been hitting the EU since 2008 bringing the process to a “political paralysis” (Ferreiro-Turrión 2015, 24) or even apt for a ‘life support’ (O’Brennan 2014, 223).

Despite the apparent enlargement paralysis, the EU’s and many member states’ positions officially and declaratively remained pro-enlargement. On so many occasions, officials of both the EU institutions and the member states reiterated their support for the “European perspective” for the Western Balkans, although nobody dared to promise the exact entry dates. In other words, among the EU member states, there has been no consensus on officially dropping the enlargement agenda for the Western Balkans, but neither on speeding up the process that obviously got into some sort of a crisis. The fatigue created the environment in which individual member states have been silently allowed to block the enlargement process upon bilateral issues with specific candidate countries pursuing their own national interests under the umbrella of conditionality policy, which has been observed in the academic literature as “nationalisation” of the enlargement policy (Hillion 2015, 24). The Greek-North Macedonia name issue was just one case in point. Other member states, like France, blocked the enlargement process based on the general concerns about the Union’s internal coherence and unity and offered ideas for reforming the enlargement agenda. Recently, Bulgaria saw the prospective beginning of the negotiation process as a chance to exert pressure in order to resolve bilateral historical and identity issues. So far, the Council of the EU has managed to reach a consensus only on the Commission’s proposal to (vaguely) modify the accession negotiations methodology but not to change the existing logic of enlargement strategy substantially, even though this might have been the original idea of France

who initiated the change in 2019 after president Macron blocked North Macedonia's and Albania's start of accession negotiations.

The intensification of the war in Ukraine since 2022 has deepened the West-Russian divisions, bringing to the geopolitical necessity of mitigating the Russian power and influence in the WBs. The new geopolitical situation increased the need to tie the region closer to the EU immediately, but there has been no clear idea on how to do it. While some observers argue for either preserving the current mode or speeding the EU enlargement to the region as a whole (European Movement Serbia 2022), others propose the means different than the (failed) enlargement policy. French proposal of a "European political community" (Council 2022a) and the similar Charles Michel's offer of a "European geopolitical community" presented in May 2022 (European Western Balkans 2022) represent the initiatives that should run in parallel if not as an alternative to the enlargement process. President Macron argued for the abandonment of enlargement as a Union's geopolitical tool because it is contrary to preserving the EU's internal unity. In his words, "We have ... the historic duty, not to do what we have always done and say the only solution is accession ... but rather to open up a historic reflection commensurate with the events we are experiencing, on the organization of our continent" (Council 2022a). When it comes to enlargement, both Macron and Michel advocate for a reformed enlargement approach that does not entail granting full membership rights to the current candidates. France has been openly pursuing counter-accession program visible in many official statements and documents. Most notably, the position is present in Emmanuel Macron's idea of a "staged accession" (Politico 2019) instead of full membership, which would not interfere with his "sovereignty agenda" for the EU (Council 2022b). The proposal for a "renewed approach to the accession process" through a "staged accession" was circulated in a non-paper (Politico 2019) and the Commission was tasked with developing a detailed plan.

***"New enlargement methodology"***  
***– what was feasible but not what had to be done***

In February 2020, the Commission presented its proposal "Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans," claiming it to be a blueprint for a more dynamic, predictable, credible process with a stronger political steer (European Commission 2020). Coming after President Macron blocked further accession process in 2019 and subsequently proposed a change of the enlargement approach, the Commission's proposal was supposed to work as a damage control tool and get the enlargement process back on track.

The “new enlargement methodology”, as it quickly came to be known, was the Commission’s attempt to reconcile the diverging member states’ national interests with the EU’s indisputable general interest in stabilizing the region, preserving the EU’s soft power, and saving the enlargement policy from disgrace. However, the result is insufficient and at risk of underperforming since the Commission did not do what had to be done (i.e., substantially change the approach towards WBs), but did what it considered possible at the moment and acceptable to many.

At the very beginning of the document, by putting the EU’s strategic interest in the region to the fore, the Commission tries to set the common ground and remind the member states of the reasons for engaging with the Western Balkans:

“This firm, merit-based prospect of full EU membership for the Western Balkans is in the Union’s very own political, security and economic interest. In times of increasing global challenges and divisions, it remains more than ever a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united Europe. A credible accession perspective is the key incentive and driver of transformation in the region and thus enhances our collective security and prosperity.”... “Maintaining and enhancing this policy is thus indispensable for the EU’s credibility, for the EU’ success and for the EU’s influence in the region and beyond – especially at times of heightened geopolitical competition.” (European Commission 2020; emphasis in the original)

Continuing with its “strategic” discourse, the Commission (2020) points out the importance of tackling a “malign third country influence” in the region, thus emphasizing one of the EU’s biggest common concerns.

In the remaining part of this six-pager, the Commission sets the main aims of the “new methodology” and some general ideas on how to reach them. Most of these ideas are not really new (Kovačević 2020) nor precisely developed, and the existing association/accession framework has already allowed for most of the proposed solutions to be practiced. For example, to return the credibility to the process, the Commission restates the obvious – the necessity for the candidates to fulfill obligations and the need for the EU and the member states to move forward with the accession process after the candidates meet the objective criteria. Another emphasis on the so-called negotiating fundamentals (the rule of law, democratic institutions, regional cooperation...) is made, and the dependency of closure of any of the negotiating chapters upon the progress in these areas repeated, which has been the rule applicable for several years already. The Commission calls for stronger political steering of the process and argues for the necessity of more frequent high-level meetings. However, the Commission did not propose any new venues for dialogue but called for the more frequent use of

the existing fora, such as the EU-Western Balkans summits or the Stabilization and Association Councils provided for in the Stabilization and Association Agreements with the WB countries.

According to the Commission's proposal, the enlargement policy remains in a unanimous voting regime as a general rule. Nevertheless, whereas the progress of a country in the accession process continues to be endorsed unanimously, the possible reversal of the process (principle of reversibility) would be decided through a simplified procedure, namely the reverse qualified majority vote (European Commission 2020). In this way, the Commission makes it easier to block the process of enlargement than to push it forward, thus pleasing the enlargement-skeptic member states.

The most visible, although not substantial change, was grouping the 35 negotiating chapters into six "thematic clusters" aiming at an arguably more dynamic process providing for opening a whole cluster instead of individual chapters. However, the new solution offers no guarantee that the process will be speeded-up since the number of opening benchmarks to be fulfilled by a country can still remain the same despite organizing them in clusters. This is precisely the case with the Serbian and Montenegrin accession process, as the EU negotiating framework with these countries was kept unchanged despite the new methodology.

Although the aim was to work out a plan based on Macron's non-paper (Politico 2019), the Commission's proposal differs on a couple of important points. In contrast to Macron's approach, the Commission's proposal remains within the confines of the current enlargement strategy in two important respects. First, the Commission aims to preserve the "Enlargement perspective" not only by keeping up with the full membership as an endpoint but also by insisting on keeping the accession negotiations with the countries that already started these (i.e., Montenegro and Serbia) within the existing negotiating frameworks. This is understandable because new negotiating frameworks would have to be adopted by the Council unanimously and might be another opportunity for dissent among the EU member states. Second, by "clustering" the negotiations process, the Commission's proposal dilutes Macron's idea of a "staged accession" that envisages an exact sequence of accession steps and participation of a candidate country in certain EU programs and policies before full accession. The Commission (2020) also mentions the opportunity of "'phasing-in' to individual EU policies, the EU market and EU programmes" for countries achieving the agreed priorities. But participation would be a reward on their otherwise unchanged EU integration path and not a part of their membership in a defined accession stage that could lock the country in-between the associated and full membership status indefinitely.

## Conclusions

Our research confirms the dominant enlargement rhetoric of the European Commission, which has been actively promoting the EU's common interest in the Balkans. This interest has been framed in strategic, geopolitical terms emphasizing the Union's security and stabilizing concerns and the need for political dominance competition in the region with other global actors. Highlighting the EU's geopolitical interests has become more prominent as the EU enlargement policy in the Western Balkans has come to a stall. The Commission has used it to mobilize the EU member states' interest in further enlargement. In a new geopolitical context, we explored whether the EU was able to act following its primary interests, in other words, to pursue further enlargement that would be justified by its interest in an overall stabilization of the region. Our conclusion is obviously negative. However, our research provides a much more variegated picture of the EU approach toward the region. While some of the findings seem obvious, others require a second thought.

Following our benchmarks, *raison d'état* includes primary, superior, most important, or universal interests of the state. In the case of the EU, it would mean a primary interest of the political system (*raison du regime politique*), transcending all other, first of all, national interests. Until recently, the EU enlargement was treated as a policy with no alternative and as a cure to all political, security, or economic problems. After its experience-based modifications, it has become a piece of institutionalized machinery grounded in a shared consensus by all stakeholders, countries, and EU institutions alike. Whereas disruptions are possible regarding the member states' veto power, the policy principles, logic, and application were not questioned. Even more, as the example of the "New Methodology" revealed, changes focus on nuances in its application rather than profoundly challenge the logic of enlargement. In this sense, the policy remains officially high in the hierarchy of political objectives of the EU.

The second part of our first benchmark is more questionable since the question of non-negotiability in the EU context is more complex. On the one hand, the enlargement policy's content, logic, and structure are not negotiable with foreign entities. The EU does not make concessions in its foreign policy but draws rather clear lines of its application horizon through the existence of different approaches, e.g., the European Neighborhood Policy. This division was clear until February 24, 2022, when the next phase of the Russian aggression in Ukraine pushed Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia to submit official applications for membership, thus blurring the line between neighborhood and enlargement policies.

Simultaneously, negotiations are an indispensable feature of the enlargement policy both with candidate countries and within the decision-making process in the EU. However, these technical dimensions of policy making do not question the enlargement process's strategic importance and logic. Still, we cannot ignore the practical implications of the member states' vetoes, which impact the reliance and effectiveness of the enlargement policy and the EU itself. To be able to aggregate and pursue its primary interest, a political community should be able to speak with one voice (Burchill 2005, 13). Hence, we identify a structural problem within the enlargement policy stemming from the "constitutional" specificity of the European Union that undermines its *raison d'état*.

This conclusion has an impact on our second benchmark related to the implementation in an uncompromised way. Indeed, the process is applied in an uncompromised way towards the candidate countries to the extent that there is a dominant argument about the piling of requirements for every next candidate. However, this external determination is not supported by internal consistency. The internal disagreements and veto determine the pace and nature of the "enlargement fatigue" used as an excuse for the EU's inconsistent approach.

Our third benchmark, legal and moral relativism, reveals a deep misfit with the EU enlargement policy. The evolution of the EU enlargement requirements and the mastering of its institutional supervisory mechanisms lead to a situation contrary to the enlargement *per se*. The conditional nature of the enlargement and the cumulated experience followed by increased requirements were aptly identified by Othon Anastasakis (2008, 365) as shifting the accent from the goal to the road. In the EU context, the multifaceted reasons for this shift (enlargement fatigue, internal crises, candidate states' reluctance to conduct necessary reforms, or internal political matters) and their tangible impact on the enlargement policy strip the latter of its *raison d'état* position.

In the case of our research, if we accept that the EU's primary interest is to preserve security and stability in the WBs (its courtyard), making a decision to fast-track the enlargement to the whole region would be an action justified on the basis of the currently unstable geopolitical situation. That would go against the rules and procedures of the enlargement policy since it would mean accepting countries that do not fulfill all of the criteria, but it could be justified on the basis of an urgent geopolitical situation. At the same time, despite the EU's official enlargement agenda towards the WBs set more than two decades ago and almost an emergency geopolitical situation created with the war in Ukraine, the EU enlargement policy remains in paralysis while alternative offers (e.g., European (geo)political community) appear. Also, the new methodology does nothing to overcome this situation. What is more, by insisting on a "stronger political steer" in the document

and by making it easier to reverse the process than to push it forward, the Commission drives the Union further away from a common ground regarding the EU's enlargement to the Western Balkans. Even if the task of the Commission was to provide for something new, invigorating, and unifying at a moment when many member states were not willing to move away from the status quo, and some were even arguing for alternatives to full accession, the outcome was a clear expression of the widespread enlargement fatigue rather than an instrument for overcoming it. Since we see not only stable but even further elevation of the accession criteria, it is obvious that the policy is exposed to a complex set of interactions way beyond the primary geopolitical or geostrategic goals.

The *raison d'état* test tells us that despite the EU rhetoric, the enlargement is not a primary interest of the EU. The reasons for that are manifold, but most important being the diverging national and institutional interests combined with the EU's complex decision-making process and the dominant role of political criteria, which served not only as a tool for rapprochement with the candidate states but also as a mechanism to keep them at a distance.

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**RAISON D'ÉTAT EVROPSKE UNIJE NA ZAPADNOM BALKANU:  
DA LI JE NOVA METODOLOGIJA PROŠIRENJA OD POMOĆI?**

**Apstrakt:** Koristeći se konceptom *raison d'état*, u članku se preispituje uloga Evropske unije u regionu poznatom kao Zapadni Balkan. Iako se još uvek primenjuje na ovaj region, politika proširenja je u stanju paralize. U članku se ispituje da li su uvećane geopolitičke tenzije u Evropi dovele EU do prekretnice na kojoj će svoju politiku proširenja iskoristiti za odlučno ostvarivanje svojih interesa u ovom regionu. Članak počinje teorijskom analizom koncepta *raison d'état* i njegove upotrebe u istraživanju delovanja Evropske unije kao nedržavnog aktera. Zatim, koristimo se konceptualnim merilima pojma *raison d'état* kako bismo analizirali njegovu empirijsku primenu u odnosima EU sa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, posmatrajući instrumente politike proširenja dostupne Uniji i divergentne pozicije unutar EU prema pitanju proširenja. Posebna pažnja posvećena je "novoj metodologiji proširenja" koju je razvila Komisija 2019. godine. U članku se tvrdi da uprkos naporima Komisije da, koristeći se geopolitičkim narativom, promovise zajednički interes EU u regionu, divergentni nacionalni interesi i dalje onemogućavaju EU u agregaciji sopstvenog interesa i sprovođenju svog *raison d'état* u ovom regionu. "Nova metodologija" ne donosi ništa čime bi se prevazišla ova situacija. Štaviše, insistiranjem na "snažnijem političkom vođenju" i daljem proceduralnom olakšavanju kočenja procesa pristupanja, dokument udaljava Uniju od mogućeg zajedničkog stava u vezi sa proširenjem.

**Ključne reči:** *raison d'état*, Zapadni Balkan, proširenje EU, geopolitika, Evropska perspektiva, nova metodologija proširenja.

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## Re-examination of EU normative power in light of the revised enlargement methodology towards the Western Balkans\*

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**Abstract:** The aim of this article is to re-examine the concept of “EU normative power” in the revised EU approach to enlargement policy announced in 2020. Drawing on conceptualisation of power in Foreign Policy Analysis the article applies the reading of the EU’s soft and hard power – both as capability and as influence – to EU normative power. The empirical part thus identifies above four elements within the EU’s promotion of its particular norms and within the EU’s strife for international normality via enlargement policy. The results show that the new enlargement methodology does offer change of EU normative power. The EU could more effectively condition the respect of its particular norms by an exemplary domestic practice assuring its own domestic and foreign policy legitimacy and in turn by developing and applying the needed capabilities for achieving attractiveness. Even though a plan of positive conditionality and better-defined conditions in direct negotiations carries such potential, a risk exists that the biggest novelty – the ‘phasing-in’ paradigm – would only explore EU’s norm-related hard market power capabilities by keeping the Western Balkans countries as candidates forever, thus undermining EU’s legitimacy and hard power influence of negative conditionality. To promote international normality, however, the EU needs to activate other elements of soft power influence, namely agenda setting and persuasion.

**Keywords:** European Union, normative power, hard and soft power, Western Balkans, revised enlargement methodology

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## Introduction

The European Union's (EU) power towards the Western Balkans countries has evidently changed during the last 20 years. After the EU ceased the immense opportunity in the post-conflict region and offered the Western Balkans states membership perspective in 2003, it established itself towards the region as the hegemon. At the time, other world powers were either uninterested or too weak to act towards the region in the context of their interest sphere. Elements of the EU's legitimate leadership were predominantly based on the EU's normative power. Since Manners' (2002) conceptualisation, many authors have evaluated the effects of EU's capability to be perceived as positive and morally good and to establish what is normal in international relations. Additionally, the particular persuasion and discourse-based method of EU's normative influence on prospective member countries was especially interesting for students of EU enlargement policy; either as conditionality via the golden carrot, either via norm transfer in the Europeanization process or even in terms of effect of positive presence of a peaceful, democratic, free and prosperous market and political community. The Croatian EU membership in 2013 was a significant achievement in demonstration of EU's power to transfer "EU normality" to the Western Balkans.

However, the two Brussels Agreements in 2013 and 2015 on normalisation of relations pertaining to official Belgrade and Pristina and Bosnian membership application in early 2016 seem to have been the last concrete positive outcomes of the EU's normative power in the Western Balkans. EU member states' challenges to effective free market and monetary union, undemocratic practices and disrespect of the rule of law and human rights, political radicalisation and a loss of a nearly 70-million EU citizens – nationals of the UK, caused the enlargement fatigue – whereby the model of liberal democracy and supranationality was being challenged from within. On the side of the Western Balkans countries accession fatigue emerged. The slow intra-state political and economic transition, a stalemate and severe backsliding in accession progress of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (named North Macedonia since February 2019) and re-emerging regional instability showed that the EU's strategy to prioritize and condition stabilization and post-conflict reconciliation as accession condition was ineffective *per se* and detrimental to democratization (Kmezić and Bieber 2017). Finally, challenges external to both the EU and the aspiring members in the form of several subsequent global crises additionally challenged the implementation of EU enlargement policy as they weakened the EU's normative power as such and additionally indirectly as they enabled an

establishment of a political market of world powers interested in Western Balkans region (Keil and Stahl 2022).

The European Commission has recognized above challenges to the EU enlargement policy and in February 2020 informed EU institutions of a document “Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkan” (EC COM(2020) 57final). This Communication aims to increase the “effectiveness of the accession negotiation process” (EC COM(2020) 57final, 1). It introduces three priority goals to reinvigorate the accession processes of Western Balkans states, namely “more credibility, a stronger political steer, more dynamic process and predictability, and positive and negative conditionality” (ibid.). The biggest novelty of the proposal is a possibility to include Western Balkans states into specific EU policies without them having met all membership conditions – a so called phasing-in (EC COM(2020) 57final, 5) or “accelerated sectoral alignment and integration” (EC COM(2020) 57final, 6). Yet, there are also negative sanctions provisioned, such as negotiations put on hold or suspended (ibid.) or negotiation chapters reopened if needed – this is named reversibility (EC COM(2020) 57final, 1). This “revised enlargement methodology” has not yet been implemented. This is due partially to COVID-19 recovery and mostly to a completely new challenge that preoccupies the EU, namely Russian aggression on Ukraine since February 2022. This severe threat to European peace and security has also apparently expanded the geographical focus of EU enlargement policy to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as indicated by European Council Conclusion (2022, Title III), but also furthered revised enlargement methodology for Western Balkans enlargement (European Council Conclusion 2022, Title IV, point 16).

The aim of this article is to re-examine the nature of EU normative power in light of above-mentioned revised EU approach to enlargement policy announced in 2020. It seems highly relevant to verify if EU’s move away from demanding strict attainability of conditions to offer high rewards (access to its policies) and its increased intention of negative sanctions and reversibility in case of a candidate’s backsliding would negatively affect EU’s normative power. Consequently, this will enable an ex-ante assessment of the effect that such a potentially changed EU normative power might have for Western Balkans countries’ EU accession. The structure of the article first entails a conceptualisation of power based on theoretical approach of Foreign Policy Analysis, which reads power in resource and in relational terms (Holsti 1995; Nye 2011). This binary understanding is then applied to EU’s normative power. The operationalization results in two conceptions of power, namely power as capability and power as influence. As in practice, both two definitions of power

can be utilized via two extreme applications, namely soft and hard power; the effect of this dichotomy on normative power Europe will also be explored. The third section then applies conceptual establishments to EU enlargement policy. It analyses European Commission designed revised enlargement methodology from the perspective of EU normative power in a two-step manner. First, it searches for soft and hard power capabilities and second it identifies type of (soft or hard power) normative influence the EU plans to use in the Western Balkans enlargement policy. In the Conclusion, the article answers the research question: What is the identified nature of EU normative power in the revised enlargement methodology? The answer to this question enables a concluding assessment of a potential effect that a changed EU normative power might have for Western Balkans countries' EU accession.

### **Conceptualisation of EU's normative power as capability and as influence**

In this section, we first present a short understanding of the now classical reading of EU's normative power. Then, we define power as capability and as influence, based on conceptions of power attached to states' behaviour in international politics. Afterwards, we apply this conceptualisation to the EU as a foreign policy subject and determine the particular understanding to its normative power through the capability-influence prism.

#### ***Classical reading of EU's normative power***

The particular initial lack of military capability and the use of predominantly economic instruments of external relations drove Duchêne in 1972 to define the EU as 'civilian power'. Yet in the 1990s, despite the evaluation of EU's capability being far away from expectations (Hill 1993), scholars estimated that the EU's identity could no longer be defined as civilian power, but that it has developed into a hybrid actor, which is torn between civilian and military power (Smith 2005, 73–74). Nevertheless, the most specific mark the EU has made in the world in the last 50 years has been its move away from the traditional notion of power in international politics. The EU has developed an alternative approach to power politics by shifting towards international law, rules, transnational cooperation and integration (Björkdahl 2004, 3), which Manners (2001; 2002) coined as Normative Power Europe. The EU "represents neither a civilian power



of an intergovernmental nature utilising economic tools and international diplomacy, nor a military power of a supranational nature using armed force and international intervention, but a normative power of an ideational nature characterised by common principles and a willingness to disregard notions of 'state' or 'international' (Manners 2001, 7). The precondition for such normative action is the EU's normative basis or image – what EU is in world politics, namely EU's normative identity. Manners (2001; 2002) identified five key norms that were institutionalized during the process of European integration, namely: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Both normative identity and normative power to act must be understood as the ability to shape or change behaviour to the point that something is accepted as 'normal' in international relations (Manners 2001, 10). With the idea of normative action, the author proposes that the EU is not merely formed on a normative basis, but that the definition dictates its action on the basis of norms in international relations. EU normative power thus means that the EU is conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system; the EU acts to change norms and it also should act to extend its norms into that system (Manners 2002, 252). This translates into EU redefining international norms in its own image with absence of obvious material gain from its interventions and even facing opposition from otherwise like-natured countries (ibid.). Above norms have become integrated into enlargement policy and make up an integral part of the criteria for EU membership (Del Sarto 2015). Enlargement linked to common values is a true manifestation of the EU's normative identity in international relations, aimed primarily at the democratization and Europeanisation of candidate countries. EU's normative identity is thus key to the debate on the EU's normative influence beyond its borders (Del Sarto 2015, 5). Critical evaluations of EU's enlargement policy have shown that it is precisely the normative justification of EU policies in the region that has triggered so called shallow Europeanization on the side of Western Balkans states (Noutcheva 2009, 165).


### ***Conceptualisation of power as capability and as influence***

Re-reading normative power Europe from the perspective of power in Foreign Policy Analysis first demands to accept a position that normative power Europe directly contradicts, namely, state-centrism. Foreign policy subjects have been countries therefore the EU external relations and foreign policy studies have developed particular approaches to understanding and analysing EU action in international scene, e.g. EU actorness (Sjöstedt 1974; Ginsberg 1989; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Yet with practically 65-year practice of what Lisbon

Treaty now calls external action, one can estimate that an intellectual exercise of applying understanding of power reserved to foreign policy of states also to the EU as a foreign policy subject. This has recently been recognized also by the most established students of EU's action in international politics, who re-establish the need to understand not only 'actor capability', but also 'actor behaviour' via a new concept of 'actor performance' (Rhinard and Sjöstedt 2019). We will refer also to this innovation in our reading of power as capability and influence.

This paper is not a rereading or critical evaluation of the concept of power in political science, European Studies or in IR. We thus concentrate on the application of the classical state-international behaviour related concept onto the EU's international behaviour. Nye (2011, 11) defines state's power as "the ability to affect others to produce preferred outcomes". Holsti (1995) has already recognized that power has a somewhat static element of 'capability' (i. e. ability to affect by Nye) and a relational element which is exercised via behaviour, called 'influence' (production of outcomes by Nye). This has been taken as a convention by other researchers and teachers as well (e.g. Hill 2016; Brighi and Hill 2012) and is also our departure. Power as capability refers to resources operationalized into foreign policy instruments available to be used. This is a resource definition of power (Nye 2011, 12). "Getting from resources to behavioural outcomes is a crucial intervening variable," estimates Nye (ibid.) and calls this 'power conversion'. Therefore the second aspect of power is no longer static possession of resources and instruments to act but rather the very application of these instruments in relations to other actors in international politics – power as influence.

*Picture 1: Reading of power in foreign policy*



Source: Adapted from Holsti (1995) and Nye (2011).

Most importantly, the definition of power as capability refers to the perspective from within the foreign policy actor; ontologically an actor-specific theory perspective of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (Hudson 2007). Conversely, power as influence refers to type of the actor's behaviour but also to its

outcomes in international politics, thus possibly applying a more actor-general (ibid.) International Relations (IR) structural view of power distribution in the international system (e.g. Barnett and Duval 2005; Berenskoetter 2007). Our focus is on the first, actor-specific view as we analyse EU's normative power.

Further concepts applied to power as capability and as influence refer to the type of capabilities possessed and developed by a foreign policy actor and types of influence the actor uses in the international community. Resources are classified into material, semi-material and human resources (Hill 2003) and foreign policy instruments into diplomacy, culture economic and military instruments (Brighi and Hill 2012; Hill 2016). This is not a universal classification, but despite several differences in naming foreign policy tools, they have been quite consistently classified as soft power and hard power instruments. This binary conception somehow follows international business studies of companies having tangible (hard) and intangible (soft) resources at their availability.<sup>3</sup> Foreign policy resources can thus be hard, such as natural resources like minerals, wood, water or oil, particularities of territory like wind power, island position, biodiversity, arable land. Soft resources are somehow on the opposite end of continuum, deriving primarily of human activity, such as scientific knowledge and excellence, type of political system, societal values, quality or openness of civil society, education and skills of diplomats, high arts and popular culture products. Somewhere in between are interpretations of history, productivity and competitiveness, ownership of world media. One therefore sees that classical positioning of military instruments as hard power capability is correct but in combination with technological development and scientific knowledge, it does include soft power capability as well. Similarly, a brand “made in EU” reflects hard power market capability of the EU but also a soft power capability of marketing the positive image of the EU. We refer more concretely to this in the following section, as this particular element of power that is problematic for the EU in the Western Balkans.


Specific measurement of soft power capabilities was developed, since soft power seemed to be prevalent in absence of a major international war after the end of the Cold War. Index of Soft power (McClory 2019) consists of “objective

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<sup>3</sup> Some of the original studies in international business and marketing are theory of the firm (Coase 1937; Penrose 1959), theory of the competitiveness of nation (Porter 1980) and resource based theory, (Barney 1991). Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm”. *Economica* 4 (16): 386–405. Penrose, Edith T. 1959. *The Theory of the Growth of the Firm*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Porter, Michael E. 1980. *Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors*. New York: Free Press. Barney, Jay. 1991. “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage”. *Journal of Management* 17 (1): 99–120.

data” in the form of six sub-indices, namely culture, enterprise, digital, government, education and engagement (McClory 2019, 28). The Culture subindex for example employs metrics that capture “high” culture like visual arts and “pop” culture like music and film, the annual number of international tourist arrivals, music industry exports, and international sporting success (McClory 2019, 27). The Education sub-index measures the number of international students in a country, the relative quality of its universities, and the academic output of higher education institutions. The Engagement sub-index measures includes the number of embassies/high commissions a country has abroad, membership of multilateral organisations, and overseas development aid contributions. The Enterprise sub-index relates to relative attractiveness of a country’s economic model, measuring attributes like ease of doing business, corruption levels, and capacity for innovation (McClory 2019, 28). “The Digital subindex aims to capture the extent to which countries have embraced technology, how well they are connected to the digital world, and their use of digital diplomacy through social media platforms” (ibid.). The Government sub-index assess a state’s political values, public institutions, and major public policy outcomes via metrics on individual freedoms, human rights, human development, violence in society, and government effectiveness (ibid.).

Picture 2: Hard and soft power capabilities




Source: Adapted from Hill (2016, 143–147) and McClory (2019).

Nye as the founder of the concept of soft power in FPA in 1990 has replied to critiques that his original work simply assumed that the nature of capability directly prescribes nature of its application. As this is untrue in practice, he improved the definition of power as described above. Power as influence is thus also understood as soft and hard, but this continuum relates to type of strategy used in state behaviour in the international community. Hard power is “the ability to get preferred outcomes through coercion and payment” and soft power means “the ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion and attraction” (Nye 2011, 16). Hill (2016, 147) presents the two ends of the continuum as hard power as the ability to compel other actors by force and deterrence and soft power as the ability to sway other’s decisions and persuasion and deference.

To summarize, one sees that power as influence comes in two extreme types, one being coercion and the other persuasion or attraction. Yet, it should be noted that soft power therefore comes in two faces. On the one side, in direct relations of agenda setting in international institutions and persuasion (or deference) in international negotiations. On the other side, soft power also means non-action by the analysed foreign policy actor as it exists on the side of other actors: “/.../ since attraction depends upon the minds of the perceiver, the subject’s perceptions play a significant role in whether given resources produce hard or soft power behaviour” (Nye 2011, 19). McClory’s index of Soft power captures this aspect via “subjective” data which measures “international perceptions of countries assessed according to the most common “touch points” through which people interface with foreign countries” via perception of cuisine, tech products, friendliness of a country, culture, luxury goods, foreign policy and liveability (McClory 2019, 28). This element is very relevant for the EU’s foreign policy as ‘presence’ is a particular element of EU’s actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 2006).

*Picture 3: Hard and soft power type of influence*



Source: Adapted from Hill (2016, 143–147) and Nye (2011).

### ***Conceptualising EU normative power as capability and as influence***

Now we apply above conceptualisation of power to the EU and particularly to the understanding of the EU's normative power. The term normative power and EU as a normative power (or normative power Europe) have both been referred to in the Introduction. The short literature review exposed that EU's normative power has two basic presuppositions (Požgan 2017). First, the EU is a unique international political entity in normative sense (*a sui generis* case) because in its foreign policy, it stands not only for its own particular interests but promotes universal norms and principles (listed above). Second, normative power as an approach to EU's foreign policy action assumes that the EU is capable of defining and changing what type of behaviour in international politics is understood as "normal" (Požgan 2017, 109–111).

In terms of power as capability, one usually presumes that normative power originates from intangible resources and is delivered via soft power capabilities, such as diplomatic service intelligence, information and media. Yet, up to the changes that Lisbon Treaty introduced to the Treaty on EU in force since 2009, these resources had been reserved only for EU member states. The European Economic Community developed mostly semi-material tangible capabilities, such as trade, industry, agriculture and technology. Additionally, the EU has operationalized these capabilities for external relations via instruments for economic sanctions and inducements in the form of trade agreements. The latter are definitely not military capabilities or instrument, yet they are closer to hard power capabilities and do not follow a conception of soft power. Additionally, in terms of power as influence, researchers established that "EU market power" in the form of trade agreements equally applies strategy of persuasion as well as strategy of force or manipulation (Damro 2012).

The application of above capability by the EU has not been called manipulation but rather conditionality. One therefore acknowledges that the EU's primary capability is positioned in between soft and hard power and its type of influence is both – soft and hard power. From the perspective of normative power, this seems a side note, but its relevance is in the normative conception of both liberal market – regional integration capability and international liberalism type of influence (international negotiations). The nature of EU's predominant capability (liberal market) and the nature of EU's strategy to apply influence based on this capability (conditioning performance of EU values to get access to EU market) are both normative. Therefore, it is not the ideational aspect of a norm that the EU has been initially exporting into international politics, but rather a material aspect of a norm called liberal market and economic cooperation via negotiations. The EU was also very successful in

achieving that this norm became a normality in international relations because third countries and regional organizations wanted to either become members of this market or have access to it via trade agreements.

It was only after the EU was founded and legally consolidated as a political community based on EU values that one can add the elements of liberal democracy as the political system, human rights observation, good governance, equality, social solidarity and sustainable development to EU's soft power capability. These EU values have had a double influence in world politics. On the one side, these norms bear influence via attraction – without EU's particular action. This type of soft power as influence has been specifically ascribed to the EU as presence. On the other side, the EU has managed to become a liberal hegemon, putting these norms on the international agenda in various multilateral forums where it can be/is present, thus defining its own norms as international and achieving even international consensus on their normality. The most obvious evidence of that is the G-7 decision in autumn 1989 to confer on the European Economic Community the responsibility for coordination of international financial aid by Group of 24 Western donors to Central and East European Countries (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 135).

Predominant instrument of norms-based soft power is of course diplomacy but it is not only applied via soft power influence (promotion and persuasion), but also via hard power influence in the form of above-mentioned negative conditionality. Another important conceptual finding is also that a crucial precondition for the EU to achieve preferred outcomes in international politics is not only to apply norms via an appropriately measured combination of conditionality (soft or hard power influence) but equally so to sustain the quality of norms on its own in order to condition them to third countries. Finally, EU also needs to sustain a generally positive international image which is an element of attractiveness as soft power influence. This can be achieved in several aspects of its domestic policies and politics, not necessarily directly related to EU's normative principles, objectives and institutions.

Recently, Rhinard and Sjöstedt (2019) have proposed an updated model of EU actorhood focusing more on the behaviour aspect not only on the capability. They introduce 'actor performance', "terms of how the EU carries out a transaction – *vis-à-vis* external parties in the international system" (Rhinard and Sjöstedt 2019, 15). Performance is defined as "kinds and quality of transactions originating from the EU system carrying a potential to shape addressees in the external environment" and is shaped by both internal conditions and external factors (*ibid.*). Most importantly, the authors note that "a transaction can take various forms, and is not limited to economic exchange (such as the sale of a weapons system or the offer of development aid) but could include the transfer of scientific knowledge,

agenda setting efforts, the promise of military assistance, or threats to sanction a third country on civil rights grounds” (Rhinar and Sjöstedt 2019, 15–16). Authors conceptualise as the actor the EU system which is a useful perception of the EU as a foreign policy subject to our discussion; EU system includes action of the EU commission in the name of the EU, action of a coalition of EU companies or individual EU member states. EU performance does not focus on the “mechanics” of carrying out transactions but rather on the performance effectiveness – “the extent to which a particular performance had an impact externally” (Rhinar and Sjöstedt 2019, 17). In this view, the concept is complementary to this article as in this study we do concentrate on the mechanics of EU’s foreign policy actions.

The below Table 1 offers a summary of application of the above typology of soft and hard power to EU’s norms-related capabilities and type of influence.

Following this, we establish that the EU can more effectively condition respect of norms in two aspects. The EU needs to practice its particular (*sui generis*) norms exemplarily within the EU political system, including towards its member states, to assure legitimacy in foreign policy. Yet, it can further strengthen this legitimacy by attractiveness via normative and non-normative (material) EU-integration specific achievements. The former are peaceful post-conflict reconciliation, liberal democracy, respect of human rights, effective governance and low corruption. The later are for example luxury goods, popular culture, student exchange, scientific cooperation and desire of non-EU nationals to visit, to live, work or study in the EU, EU’s economic model, innovation potential, cuisine, civilian power and trust in EU’s approach to international politics. Such soft power elements work “on their own” and raise EU’s legitimacy for positive and negative conditionality of EU-particular norms. Additionally, negative conditionality in this case can thus be much more legitimately used and more effective.

As for effectiveness of conditioning norms that EU wants to promote as a general normality in international relations, the EU cannot count only on its own legitimacy and attractiveness, but needs to activate other aspects of its soft power, namely agenda setting and persuasion. The latter should be first oriented towards like-minded states – other norm entrepreneurs, to achieve international legitimacy of the norm. Only afterwards, the EU can address third countries – recipients with this international norm as normality. In this case, EU’s hard power (negative conditionality) does not seem as an effective choice of influence. Rather, linking the international norm to EU’s domestic and foreign policy attractive material achievements related to this norm, seems like a better choice of influence. To achieve such attractiveness (soft power influence), the EU needs to develop capabilities of public diplomacy and propaganda to raise its own international visibility (presence) and thus “leave for” social, economic and political globalisation flows to raise EU’s positive international perception.



Table 1: EU normative power in terms of capabilities and influence

	PROMOTION OF EU PARTICULAR NORMS		PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS (INTERNATIONAL NORMALITY)	
	<i>Soft power</i>	<i>Hard power</i>	<i>Soft power</i>	<i>Hard power</i>
<b><i>Power as capability</i></b>	EU external action service, enabling access of third countries to particular EU policies and membership	prosperous regional economic integration – trade, agriculture, industry, technology, specific development aid programmes	EU external action service, education exchange and scientific cooperation programmes, EU memberships in multilateral organisations and participation in international conferences Necessary instrument: propaganda and public diplomacy	prosperous regional economic integration – trade, agriculture, industry, technology, development aid contributions, strength of Euro
<b><i>Power as influence</i></b>	/	negative conditionality – threat via negative economic and political sanctions in case of disrespect of EU values Necessary condition: legitimacy	agenda setting in international fora with like-minded countries on EU norms and normative objectives	/
	positive conditionality – persuasion on EU values in international negotiations via economic inducements		positive conditionality – persuasion on EU values in international negotiations via economic inducements	
	attractiveness of EU integration normative and material achievements		attractiveness of EU integration normative and material achievements	

Source: authors' findings.

## **EU normative power in revised enlargement methodology**

In this section, we apply above findings from the conceptual part, synthesized in Table 1, directly to EU's enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans countries by analysing EU's revised enlargement methodology. We seek to identify intended use of EU's normative power as capability and as influence and consequently estimate the expected effect for EU-Western Balkans relations.

### ***EU normative power in relation to the Western Balkan states regarding specific EU norms***

In EU enlargement policy, the EU needs to transfer its particular normative and material achievements onto new member states and assure their effective continuation. Treaty on EU (Art. 49) clearly states this in membership conditions, namely that future member states need to respect and promote EU values and achieve capacity determined by European Council via political, economic, legal and administrative criteria. Therefore, candidate countries need to achieve not only effective recognition but also de facto enactment of EU norms. This process has proven to be long and demanding for countries in which transition to liberal democracy and market needs not only proper inducements but mostly time to be acknowledged, practiced and potentially internalized. This is not only ideationally demanding but also materially challenging due to parallel processes based on the need for post-conflict reconstruction and economic development. On the other hand, the EU itself has not been legitimate in sustaining its own achievements with several troubles of monetary union, free flow of people, and non-observation of human rights and democracy in some member states.

We have established that the EU's strongest norm-related hard power capabilities stem from the regulation of its particular nature and achievements of economic integration. In the renewed enlargement methodology European Commission (EC COM(2020) 57final, 3) recognized the need to transform

*the Western Balkans into functioning market economies able to integrate fully into the EU's single market, to create jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities, to improve the business and investment climate, to promote the rule of law and to stop the brain drain from the region. These reforms are essential to boost the economies of the Balkans and to anchor them to the EU markets by accelerating the necessary convergence with the EU. The Commission will particularly consider how to bring forward investment, socio-economic integration, and the rule of law, enhance access to the EU single*

*market, strengthen connectivity as well as embrace the opportunities of the green economy.*

Capabilities newly designed to achieve this is enhanced forms of development aid specifically designed for candidate countries. This includes a possibility of accelerated alignment and integration in all EU policy areas (phasing-in) as mentioned above. Accelerated integration could be a significant soft power capability the EU can use to motivate aspiring countries for accepting EU norms (after having achieved progress as co-participating in EU policies). It is also important that aspiring countries are the ones who decide on the individual programmes they wish to integrate into earlier, for example, internal market and sustainable connectivity, which have rather low sensitivity for demanding political system or foreign policy reforms might be the first on many Western Balkans countries. The EU also recognizes a need to influence Western Balkans countries in terms of raising awareness of its achievements (specifically the material value of its norms) – the document calls this “strategic communication which will be instrumental” (EC COM(2020) 57final, 2). The EU needs to be careful how it will implement such communication, because soft power influence in terms of promoting its own model is more effective via attractiveness, meaning non-active EU engagement. Here, promotion of EU norms can be carried out legitimately by civic and market actors of the EU system (as noted by Rhinard and Sjöstedt via performance). In this regard, the document well plans to increase communication and information activities within EU member states (EC COM(2020) 57final, 7) and to invite member states’ to contribute more directly and actively via their experts (EC COM(2020) 57final, 4). The EU could pay attention specifically to individuals pertaining to a large diaspora of Western Balkans states who live in EU member states and use this soft power capability as well, yet, this is not planned in the document.

Since the EU cannot legitimately achieve attractiveness via propaganda by the EU external action service or the European Commission, these two institutions should focus on positive conditionality in direct negotiations. This is planned in the renewed enlargement methodology promising clear and better defined conditions for candidate countries from the outset (EC COM(2020) 57final, 6). As rewards for reforms in terms of positive conditionality, the EU plans closer integration mentioned above and increased funding investments and particularly by “clear and tangible incentives of direct interest to citizens” (ibid.). Another new soft power influence that EU plans via persuasion is for membership aspiring countries to “participate as observers in key EU meetings on matters of substantial importance to them” (EC COM(2020) 57final, 4). “A real political dialogue” to happen, also requires top politics representatives to

meet directly, thus Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs) are planned to “provide for stronger political steering of the accession negotiations process” (ibid.) and “country-specific IGCs should take place after publication of the Commission’s annual package” (EC COM(2020) 57final, 5). These new settings will enable the EU to deliver to Western Balkans countries either positive or negative conditionality more credibly.

Besides positive conditionality, the European Commission specifically updated possibilities to use hard power influence – the negative conditionality (EC COM(2020) 57final, 7):

*1) Member States could decide that negotiations can be put on hold in certain areas, or in the most serious cases, suspended overall. Already closed chapters could be re-opened or reset if issues need to be reassessed. 2) The scope and intensity of EU funding could be adjusted downward, with the exception of support to civil society. 3) Benefits of closer integration, e.g. access to EU programmes, unilateral concessions for market access could be paused or withdrawn.*

Negative conditions have up to now not worked too well, mainly because the EU was not applying them legitimately or with one voice. Most audible case is of course a more than 10-year stalemate in FRYOM/North Macedonia start of accession negotiations due to a single member state individual conditionality, unrelated to EU norms. This is a direct engagement of EU’s normative power in terms of influence because it moves away from the axiom of normative goals and actions without direct material benefit. Now, European Commission plans for the EU to become a more credible negotiator by speaking with one voice, building trust and enhancing credibility of the EU itself by enabling progress of aspiring countries after they have met demanded criteria (EC COM(2020) 57final, 2). Building trust with aspiring countries should increase EU’s legitimacy (specifically in case of negative conditionality) and increase commitment of the Western Balkans states (EC COM(2020) 57final, 3).

### ***EU normative power in relation to the Western Balkan states regarding international norms/normality***

This aspect of EU’s normative power is less directly relevant for enlargement policy. Mostly, it refers to EU’s demands for future member countries to align their foreign policies with EU foreign policy values, which are very much based on international law. Should the EU want to achieve observation of such norms which are yet to be established in the international community as normal it has

capability to achieve this via export of its technological, industrial and agricultural products and via the use of development aid. Such norms, particularly relevant for Western Balkans countries are for example climate change mitigation, green transition, sustainable connectivity, universality of human rights, freedom of religion, gender equality and social inclusiveness. For example, the EU's export of its Green Deal normative-based goals would be beneficial also for its attractiveness and would raise its positive international perception. Such a strategy is actually not so new, as the EU had been gradually phasing-in Western Balkans states into its education exchange and scientific research programmes. It is however highly relevant that the EU keeps its diplomatic representations in the countries of the region extremely apt, effective and professional. A corruption scandal among EU diplomatic staff in official Pristina in 2014 created more damage than EU's image of just and meritocracy-based market could have compensate for. Soft power capabilities to promote these norms are diplomacy, EU's educational and scientific cooperation programmes (already including several Western Balkans countries), and for example COVID-19 recovery cooperation/donations. For these capabilities to be effective, the EU needs to develop and strategically apply instruments of public diplomacy and propaganda.

EU can achieve influence on Western Balkans countries regarding promotion of international norms also via soft power. First, persuasion in international fora is very relevant, especially in case of norms which the EU cannot directly credibly condition due to lack of hard power capabilities. Such norms are for example respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs. In light of Russian aggression on Ukraine, this is extremely relevant for Western Balkans countries. The EU could make use of its representation in Council of Europe and individual member states in NATO and in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to show to aspiring members its power of agenda setting and strengthen legitimacy by its alignment with like-minded countries. Yet, in this regard, the EU needs to stay on the "universal good" side, not primarily seeking material interests for itself. Should the EU achieve prioritization of Western Balkans states' interests in international agenda setting, that would exert even stronger power on these countries.

Second, positive conditionality by the EU is crucial in promotion of universal values because negative conditionality is not recommended to achieve internalisation of newly establishing international norms. For respecting universal values, the EU could offer to Western Balkans states higher economic rewards compared to other EU's international partners. Additionally, these rewards need to be directly compared to other international donors interested in paying Western Balkans states with carrots. Not only as material costs and benefits to these

countries should be revealed but particularly effects of international donations on EU-integration specific norms and achievements need to be scrutinised and effectively communicated. In this regard, Western Balkans countries would gain ownership of and co-responsibility to safeguard EU norms even if “only” as candidate countries. Such developments directly refer to the competition of Russia, China, UK, USA and Turkey with the EU in Western Balkans countries which has increasingly intensified during the COVID-19 crisis (Požgan et al. 2021).

Third, it is equally important for the EU to sustain positive international image and achieve attractiveness for soft power influence regarding promotion of international norms. The EU needs to be perceived as a legitimate implementer of such norms. This includes cases when for example particular member state potentially do not follow international norms and the EU institutions have competence or other member states manifest common interest to regulate such a deviation from an international norm. Such action would show the effective functioning of the regional political community concerning the norm rather than try to achieve ultimate non-breaches of such norms. In regard, the EU needs to be careful not to set as membership conditions to Western Balkans countries effective observation of those international norms that the EU member states themselves are not capable of observing. A clear example of this is the conditioning of settlement of bilateral disputes originating from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. We estimate that as long as Slovenia and Croatia as EU member countries do not implement the legally binding settlement to their own border-related dispute from 2017, the EU is not only non-credible negotiator towards Western Balkans states but also loses attractiveness as the world’s most peaceful region of friendly, international law respecting countries.

## **Conclusion**

The aim of this article was to re-examine the nature of EU normative power in light of revised EU approach to enlargement policy announced in 2020. The latter is at the forefront of the article due to its potential for the recontextualization of the nature of the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans countries. This is possible because the revised EU approach to enlargement policy presumes – via high rewards and increased intention of negative sanctions and reversibility – moving away from demanding strict attainability. Such recontextualization (could) negatively affect EU’s normative power, one of the most important aspects of the EU’s legitimate leadership, which

facilitates the possibility of understanding the EU as a positive and morally good international actor with capabilities to establish what is normal in international relations. In doing so, the article explores the question regarding the identified nature of EU normative power in the revised enlargement methodology by making ex-ante assessment of the effect of the (potentially) changed EU normative power might have for Western Balkans countries' EU accession.

The analysis showed that the EU can more effectively condition respect of norms in at least two aspects. The first one is the practice of its particular norms exemplarily within the EU political system, including towards its members states, to assure legitimacy in foreign policy. Such strengthening can be done via normative and non-normative EU-integration achievements, such as peaceful post-conflict reconciliation, liberal democracy, respect of human rights, effective governance and low corruption. The second aspect is the effectiveness of conditioning norms that the EU wants to promote as a general normality in international relations. Here, the article showed that the EU cannot count only on its own legitimacy and attractiveness, but needs to activate other aspects of its soft power, namely agenda setting and persuasion. In order to achieve such attractiveness, the EU should develop capabilities of public diplomacy and propaganda to raise its own international visibility (presence). New enlargement methodology is designed in such way as it is focusing on positive conditionality in direct negotiations and on promise of clear and better-defined conditions for candidate countries from the outset.

In this respect, the biggest novelty (and potential) of the new enlargement methodology lies in the possibility to include Western Balkans states into specific EU policies without them having met all membership conditions. The so-called phasing-in or "accelerated sector alignment and integration" could – as the analysis showed – serve as an element of strengthening EU's credibility by focusing on positive conditionality paradigm. This in turn – even though it could further explore the norm-related hard power capabilities of the EU that stem from the economic integration aspect amidst the domestic-driven (economic) agendas such as the Open Balkans Initiative – inherently possesses certain risks. One of the most imminent ones being that the phasing-in process could pave the way towards 'Turkish scenario', meaning that it could become an instrument of keeping the Western Balkan countries as candidates forever by offering certain profits only in certain EU policies, such as the economic ones (e.g., customs union). In order to avoid such development, the EU should – via positive conditionality – put credibility in the forefront of all future actions within enlargement policy to (re)assure its status as normative power, both in the Western Balkans and international fora as such.

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#### PREISPITIVANJE NORMATIVNE MOĆI EVROPSKE UNIJE U SVETLU REVIDIRANE METODOLOGIJE POLITIKE PROŠIRENJA SPRAM ZAPADNOG BALKANA

**Apstrakt:** Cilj ovog članka ogleda se u preispitivanju koncepta normativne moći Evropske unije u kontekstu revidiranog pristupa politike proširenja iz 2020. godine. Polazeći od koncepta moći u okviru spoljnopolitičko-analitičkog pristupa, u ovom članku se tumači meka i tvrda moć Evropske unije (u formi sposobnosti, kao i uticaja) prema normativnoj moći EU. U empirijskom delu identifikuju se četiri elementa povezana sa promocijom određenih normi EU, kao i sa nastojanjem za "međunarodnom normalnošću" kroz politiku proširenja. Rezultati pokazuju da revidirana metodologija omogućava promene normativne moći Evropske unije. EU bi mogla da efikasnije uslovljava poštovanje svojih normi kroz unapređivanje sopstvene prakse, poput svog unutrašnjeg i spoljnopolitičkog legitimiteta i razvoja i primene neophodnih sposobnosti za postizanje veće privlačne snage. S jedne strane, agenda pozitivnog uslovljavanja i adekvatnije definisanih uslova kroz direktne pregovore sadrži takav potencijal. Međutim, postoji i rizik da najveća novina – paradigma „postepenog pristupanja” bude ograničena samo na tržišni deo normativne moći Evropske unije kroz trajno zadržavanje zapadnobalkanskih zemalja u svojstvu kandidata, što bi podrilo legitimitet i uticaj tvrde moći kao deo negativnog uslovljavanja. U cilju promovisanja "međunarodne normalnosti" Evropska unija bi kroz pristupe poput dnevnog reda i ubeđivanja mogla da aktivira i druge elemente uticaja u okviru meke moći.

**Ključne reči:** Evropska unija, normativna moć, čvrsta i meka moć, Zapadni Balkan, revidirana metodologija politike proširenja.

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## Evolution of the EU development policy – from altruism to the interest instrumentalism and beyond

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**Abstract:** The article examines the evolution of the European Union (EU) development policy, from the United Nations Millennium development goals (MDGs) and, first-ever, global attempt to end poverty, to the present day. It first gives an overview of the literature, noting it is heavily focused on the solidarity-instrumentalism dichotomy, then follows with analysis on how have major global crises, notably, climate crisis, Covid-19 pandemic, and Ukraine crisis, affected and shaped the EU development policy and its evolution. Based on that analysis and the literature, the article summarizes several categories of the factors that have influenced the EU development policy and concludes that the research must go beyond the solidarity-instrumentalism dichotomy and develop more encompassing research tools, to be able to grasp increasing complexities of the development policymaking in the contemporary world. A more appropriate analytical frame should focus on the dual role of the EU development policy, which serves as a bridge between foreign and domestic EU policy, and on its integration with other policies, especially climate, health, and peace.

**Keywords:** EU Development Policy, Development Cooperation, Millennium Development Goals, The 2030 Agenda, Climate Change, Covid-19, The War in Ukraine, Peace, Diplomacy, Stability, Security.

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## **Introduction – evolution of the EU development policy at a glance**

The EU is the world's largest official development aid (ODA) donor. Commitment to the international aid goes long way back to the very beginnings of the European unification. The development policy was first introduced at the European Union (EU) level of the policymaking at the Paris Summit in 1972, but first normative definition came twenty years later, with the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The Article 21, paragraph 2 of the TEU states that the EU will “foster the sustainable economic, social, and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty” (TEU 2012, Article 21, para. 2).

The more rapid development came with the 2000 United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals represented the first ever global sustainable development effort, which defined eight goals to be achieved by 2015: 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2. Achieve universal primary education, 3. Promote gender equality and empower women, 4. Reduce child mortality, 5. Improve Maternal Health, 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, 7. Ensure environmental sustainability, 8. Develop a global partnership for development (UNGA Res. 55/2). Ending extreme poverty and hunger was the primary objective of the Millennium development goals and this priority was also mirrored in the goals of the EU development policy. The first EU document that dealt specifically with the development policy, European Consensus on Development defined eradication of poverty as the primary goal, with the principle of partnership and ownership of the recipient countries as guiding principles for the EU development cooperation (EU 2006).

After the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 development policy has become an integral part of the EU foreign policy. The article 208 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) declares: „Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action. The Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other“ (TFEU 2012, Article 208). Furthermore, the Treaty puts poverty eradication at the very heart of the EU development policy: „Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries“ (TFEU 2012, Article 208). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

(The 2030 Agenda) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have introduced comprehensive sustainable development global plan (UNGA Res. 70/01) and the EU has become global frontrunner in the attempt to fulfil the Agenda's goals. The SDGs have been mainstreamed into every EU policy, including the development policy, and the progress towards the 17 goals and over 100 indicators is regularly monitored, evaluated, and published (see, e.g., Eurostat 2022).

The financial crisis of 2008 and the austerity response had put a lot of strain on both the EU and the member states' budgets, also affecting their respective development policies and international aid and cooperation. That was, however, only the first in the line of crises that would challenge the EU; migration crisis in 2015, Brexit, Covid-19 crisis, and finally Ukraine war have all since shaken the very core of the EU. Amid these immediate threats lies an ongoing crisis, which is, while low-intensity in comparison, the most perilous one – the climate change crisis. All these crises, as well as internationally adopted sustainable development documents, have shaped the EU development policy, both in approach and in scope. This article will examine that influence and offer conclusions on the evolution of the EU development policy and its motives in the face of crises, with suggestions for potential approaches and directions for further research.

## **Theorising the evolution of the EU development policy – from altruistic spirit of the Millennium development goals to the multi-facet instrumentalism in the face of crises and chaotic reality**

The literature identifies several groups of motives for the development aid. The first group includes altruistic motives, solidarity, and charity, with goals such as poverty eradication. The second group defines motives as driven by interest, which can be “enlightened” interests (promotion of human rights, democracy, peace) or political, strategic and security interests – political influence, economic interest, fight against terrorism (see Gupta and Thompson, 2010). The third group of motives is environmental, which can be of both altruistic and interest nature, driven by certain political, economic, or strategic interest (Gupta and Thompson, 2010). The discussion on the evolution of the EU development policy in literature follows that typology, and the debate is mostly concentrated on the dichotomy between “moral” and “selfish” motivation, or between “solidarity” and “instrumentality” (see, e.g., Furness et al. 2020; Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019; Delputte and and

Lighfoot 2019; Holden 2020; Szent-Iványi and Kugiel 2020; Babarinde 2019; Hadfield 2007).

The debate is focused on whether development assistance can be integrated with other policies and into certain domestic goals without compromising its central idea – helping the poor and achieving prosperity for everyone (Lumsdaine 1993). This dilemma, in other words, concerns the balance between solidarity (development aid) and instrumentality (other policy and goals) (Furness et al. 2020). Instrumentality is described as an approach to development policy which sees development aid as an instrument for achieving certain national interests or even some interests within the donor country (Asongu and Jellal 2016). Indeed, member states do have much interest in shaping the EU development policy and adjusting its goals to their national preferences (Orbie and Carbone 2016), and those interests can and do shape the EU level policy to a certain extent.

In any case, instrumentality in this sense is perceived as incompatible with development policy (Furness et al. 2020). However, every crisis the EU had to face brought its development policy closer to the instrumental understanding and further away from the core notion of the altruistic approach. Another aspect that followed this process was an increasing politicisation of the development policy, which means it became more and more a subject of the debate, polarised opinions and widening of the circle of actors involved in debates and decision making (Koch et al. 2021; Hackenesch et al. 2021). This evolution from domestically low-impact policy relevant to the small circle of EU development policy makers to policy that was more and more matter of debate and conflict also influenced the shift to more instrumentalised approach (Koch et al. 2021). For example, austerity measures after financial crisis in 2008 led to ODA cuts in almost all member states. Politicisation process led to further ODA cuts because of public debates on the justification for funding international development assistance in the situation of economic crisis and major domestic cuts (Koch et al. 2021).

At the EU level the process led to a debate on the reform of the EU development policy, predominantly on the idea to exclude middle-income countries from the EU aid recipient list (Koch et al. 2021). Another reform was underway, which introduced the conditions to meet certain political criteria to receive EU assistance (Faust et al. 2012). Agenda for Change, introduced by the European Commission in 2011, as a policy developed based on European Consensus on Development (2006), introduced stricter conditionality for recipient countries, linking development assistance to political criteria, especially with respect of human rights and good governance. Another novelty was the concept of differentiated development partnerships, which considered EU impact and

interest, giving priority to Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU Neighbourhood. (EC COM[2011] 637 final: 9).

Koch et al. (2021) noted that the Agenda for Change also reformed the scope of the development policy itself by shifting the focus from poverty to broader agenda aligned with EU foreign and security policy. Migrant crisis in 2015 prompted EU member states to use EU development policy to stop the flow of migrants and refugees, which shifted focus on the “root causes” of migration (Rozbicka and Szent-Iványi, 2020). This resulted in both geographical and programmatic shift in EU development policy goals and increased European ODA in 2015 and 2016 (Knoll and Sherriff 2017, 17).

Koch et al. (2021, 9) claim that this response to the migrant crisis led to the transformation of the EU development policy into “jack of all trades” covering a vast number of issues that were outside its traditional role, such as migration, conflict, corruption, and political repression. This process was furthered with the incorporation of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs into the EU development policy (Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019). The 2030 Agenda was unprecedented document in terms of its scope and ambition and it covered virtually every aspect of development. Many of the SDGs and its targets already had been a part of the EU development policy, especially those concerning environment, poverty, women and girls’ empowerment and education. Nevertheless, the EU incorporated the SDGs into its development policy, which resulted with the adoption of the New Consensus on Development: “Our world, our Dignity, our Future” (EU 2017).

The rise of populism in member states instigated by financial and migrant crises affected unfavourably many national and EU policies, including the development policy. This led some of previously very generous donors, such as Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark, to revisit and restrict their development policy, making it more interest driven (Elgström 2017). Illiberal governments in Poland and Hungary also had influence on the EU development policy, especially with their anti-immigration sentiments (Koch et al., 2021). Szent-Iványi and Kugiel (2020) analysed how Poland’s and Hungary’s populist governments changed their countries development policies and attempted to “upload” them to the EU level, especially during the 2015 migrant crisis. They argue that the growing instrumentalization of the EU development policy during that crisis might have been due to the policy’s relative weakness, given it is defined in the TFEU as a competency shared between the EU and the member states (Szent-Iványi and Kugiel 2020). This gives member states a lot of space to shape the EU development policy and to align it with their national interests (Szent-Iványi and Kugiel 2020). Holden (2020) also argued that the rise of illiberalism led to the use of development policy as a tool to meet political and economic interests. Holden examined how this shift influenced the

EU development policy observing that, although there is a development towards more instrumentalization, the EU is, nevertheless, less susceptible to this process than its member states, or other nation-states and that solidarity will remain an important feature of the EU development policy (Holden 2020).

Keijzer and Lundsgaarde (2018) argue that financial and migration crises prompted the EU to pursue “mutual benefit” in development policy, which represents a substantial shift from the proclaimed priority in the EU treaties – eradication of poverty. This shift is also evident in the 2017 New Consensus on Development: “Efforts will be targeted towards eradicating poverty, reducing vulnerabilities, and addressing inequalities to ensure that no-one is left behind. By contributing to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, the EU and its Member States will also foster a stronger and more sustainable, inclusive, secure, and prosperous Europe” (EU 2017, 4).

However, the literature also offers some differing points of view. Bergmann et al. (2019) discursive analysis showed that, even though the EU development policy was almost exclusively framed through a moral motivation during the 2000s, this was not the case before this decade. The analysis demonstrated that the EU development policy has always been framed through both moral and more self-centred frame, which means that growing instrumentalization does not mean breaking with the past, but rather making a “full circle” (Bergman et al. 2019). Bergman et al. (2019) further argue that the EU policy was originally framed as a supplementary policy, and that it operated mainly through financing. As the process of European integration moved forward, the development policy evolved into a self-standing policy (Bergman et al. 2019).

With the Lisbon Treaty, which incorporated EU development policy into the EU external action, there was a shift back to framing the development policy again as a policy facilitating other policy goals. Therefore, they conclude that policy framing in 2000s was a temporary phenomenon, and that the recent reforms represent, in fact, “the return to form” (Bergmann et al. 2019, 553). Discourse on sustainable development has opened a new space for instrumentalization of the development policy, especially with the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. SDGs have been mainstreamed into every EU policy, including development policy, which is now also perceived as a policy with task to contribute to the sustainable development (Bergmann et al. 2019).

There seems to be a consensus in the literature that with the end of 2000s the EU development policy has become increasingly more instrumental, especially since the Lisbon treaty. This evolution is thought to be mostly the result of the crises the EU faced, primarily financial and migrant crises. The global sustainable



policy and climate change efforts played an even more significant role in the evolution of the EU development policy, especially with the adoption of all-encompassing 2030 Agenda.

However, as Bergman et al. (2019) have demonstrated, EU development policy was exclusively justified morally only during the 2000s. This means that the EU development policy has always been, in fact, viewed as more than helping the poor out of the pure altruistic motives. It has, in fact, always been a tool for achieving goals in many policy areas, albeit not excluding the moral, altruistic component. In that light, Delputte and Lightfoot (2021) offer a different view on the evolution of the EU development policy, arguing that the debate in literature “suggests a false dualism between a ‘morally good’ and a realist ‘selfish’ approach to development “and call for a new critical perspective to „engage in a more profound assessment of how fundamentally EU development policy is really changing” (Delputte and Lightfoot 2021). They conclude that this ongoing dualism between solidarity and instrumentality has evolved EU development policy into highly complex arena of competing norms, practices, and institutions, which opens many questions for further research (Delputte and Lightfoot 2021).

## **EU development policy in current crises**

### ***Global Challenges***

#### ***Covid-19 pandemic***

The Covid 19 pandemic was arguably the biggest crisis that the EU and the world had to face since the World War II. To curb the detrimental effects of the virus to the public health, the EU countries, as well as others, had to implement extreme, never used measures. Economic activity had to be drastically limited, which caused existential threat to many EU citizens, all the while the pandemic put extreme pressure on health systems in all member states. The EU reacted promptly, in an unprecedented speed and consensus level, with trillions of euros worth emergency and recovery funds. The fact that the pandemic also had to be detained outside the EU, brought to front the EU development policy.

On 8 April 2020 the EU launched Team Europe package, as a support mechanism for partner countries in their fight against Covid-19. Team Europe gathered EU, EU financial institutions and member states in a joint effort to aid the fight against Covid 19 globally with joint priorities, a joint financial package, support

for global preparedness, and the promotion of global coordination and multilateralism (Burni et al. 2022). Through this mechanism the EU, EU member states and European financial institutions, have disbursed 46 billion euros to over 130 countries (EC 2021).

Most of the funds were allocated to the European Neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, and Western Balkans. Initially, 20 billion euros was pledged for this purpose, but this amount doubled by January 2021, and further increased to 46 billion euros (EC 2021). The focus of this support mechanism was on emergency response and immediate humanitarian needs, strengthening health, water, sanitation, and nutrition systems, and mitigating the social and economic consequences of the pandemic (EC 2021). Aside from this effort, the EU also took a leading role in setting up of the initiative for global fair distribution of vaccines, COVAX Facility. Team Europe contributed to the COVAX Facility with over 3 billion euros (EC 2021).

Team Europe was also a long-term strategy for EU international cooperation and aid, which was outlined in the letter addressed to the EU Delegations, member state embassies and the offices of EU development finance institutions and agencies and signed by European Commissioner for International Partnerships, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and 25 member states ministers in charge of the development policy (Burni et al. 2022). The letter entitled "Team Europe approach for COVID-19 and beyond" gave a vision of the long-term transformation of the Team Europe into EU action for green and sustainable recovery (Burni et al. 2022). Keizer et al. (2021) note rather unusual ability of the Commission to mobilise all EU institutions and member states for this cause and attribute this to less formal and less bureaucratic decision-making process, but also to the nature of the crisis itself, its profoundness and severity, which called for a swift and joint action.

The EU response to Covid 19 crisis in terms of development policy was quick and quite substantial. As far as motivation goes, it was without a doubt motivated by the need to contain the pandemic, which would, consequently, mean it was instrumental and guided by self-interest. Furthermore, discourse used to present Team Europe, especially the explanation of its long-term role, emphasized once again sustainable, green development. This further supports the claim that Covid crisis reinforced instrumental notion of the EU development policy, the one serving to the EU interests, and as supplementary to other policies, namely sustainability policy and the implementation of the European Green Deal. Burni et al. (2021) found another interesting motivation for the EU response to Covid 19 pandemic. They argue that the Team Europe was motivated by desire to strengthen

development policy cooperation between member states and EU institutions (Burni et al. 2021).

During the Covid-19 crisis, more than during any crisis before, interests were shared globally. Even more so is the case with the climate change crisis. Both crises prove that the research of the EU development policy must go beyond reductionist dichotomies and oversimplifications. As Delputte and Lighfoot (2021) rightly argue, a new critical approach is necessary to explain the EU development policy evolution in the complexity of the today's world, which seems to jump from one crisis to another, with profound effects on all area of human activity.

### *Climate change crisis*

In 2003 the European Commission presented a Communication on Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation (European Commission, 2003), which proposed an integrated strategy for climate change and poverty eradication and called for more effort for integrating the environment component into the EU development policy (Etty and van der Grijp 2010). The European Security Strategy (2003) also affirmed that global warming would exacerbate competition for natural resources, potentially spurring instability in vulnerable regions (Michel, 2021).

Strategy on Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation was also adopted in 2003, along with the Action plan 2004-2008. The Strategy stated: "Climate change is a risk to development. Adaptation strategies should seek to manage the risk, thereby supporting developing countries in building resilience to climate change impacts and protecting national and EU efforts to eradicate poverty" (EC COM [2003] 85 final). In 2007, the Commission proposed building a Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the EU and the poor, most vulnerable developing countries (Etty and van der Grijp 2010), while the Foreign Affairs Council called for "mainstreaming" climate into EU security, development, and humanitarian agendas at all levels (Michel 2021).

The 2017 Consensus on development set following goals for sustainable development and climate change in development policy: "addressing the lack of energy access; increasing energy efficiency and renewable energy generation to achieve a sustainable balance between energy production and consumption; and contributing to the global fight against climate change in line with the Paris Agreement and the related NDCs presented by the Parties" (EU 2017, 23).

As an answer to the climate change crisis, in late 2019 the EU launched the European Green Deal, the most ambitious and comprehensive EU plan to date, both in terms of planned achievements and investments. It is, first and foremost,

a green development plan for the EU and its member states, with the aim of climate neutrality by 2050. However, the stakes involved, and the fact that greenhouse gases emission need to be curbed everywhere in the world, not just the EU, make the European Green Deal a matter of both EU foreign and development policy. As Teevan, Medinilla and Sergejeff (2021) point out, there is no integral strategy that would combine all policies of concern to the European Green Deal - trade, foreign, and development. Council Conclusions on climate diplomacy offer some insight into the effect of the European Green Deal outside the EU and on climate in development policy (CoEU 2020). Conclusions mention Green Deal and European Climate Law, stating that the EU external climate efforts „rely on the strength to fit its domestic policies and innovative solution by EU industry and business“ (CoEU 2021, 3).

Conclusions also address climate in the EU development policy, recognizing lack of finance for „resilient and just“ energy transition in middle and low income countries and stating that „the EU will continue, amongst others through the Global Gateway, to provide a sustainable, green and positive offer to partners for the development of trusted climate resilient energy, transport and digital infrastructure, whilst at the same time contributing to a predictable investment environment and international stability“ (CoEU 2021, 7). Council invited EU institutions and member states to consider opportunities for partnerships for just transition with low and middle-income countries, especially those heavily reliant on coal. As with development policy in general, African, West Balkan and Neighbourhood countries are specially emphasised (CoEU 2021). Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (2021-2027) set a 30 percent target for climate finance, and additional 4 billion euro was committed by Commission (CoEU 2021).

Teevan, Medinilla and Sergejeff (2021) detected three approaches to climate and European Green Deal in foreign and development policy: a collaborative approach, a coercive approach, and a diplomatic approach. In most cases, EU uses the first approach, especially in development policy. Climate and Green Deal in development policy are implemented through regional strategies, financed by IPA and Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument Global Europe (NDICI) (Teevan, Medinilla and Sergejeff 2021). Strategy for the Western Balkans, and 8 billion euros Economic and Investment Plan and Green agenda for the Western Balkans include 5 pillars: climate action, circular economy, biodiversity, fighting air pollution and sustainable food systems (Teevan, Medinilla and Sergejeff 2021).

Long-term goals of the Team Europe, initially designed as a tool for Covid-19 support and relief, also include green transition and climate. Many of the so far

published initiatives for regions and countries include projects supporting green transition. As Teevan, Medinilla and Sergejeff (2021) observe, the EU is aiming to link the countries from Western Balkans, Neighbourhood and Africa to its own green transition as earlier as possible in the process. In the years to come Team Europe initiatives will be the most concrete EU external action for green transition through development policy.

The immediate neighbourhood, especially countries in the process of EU accession, are understandably, most involved, with largest overall investments. However, initiatives include countries around the world, from all the major regions (Teevan, Medinilla and Sergejeff 2021). This proves the EU commitment to green transition, both at home and abroad. Development policy in this case serves as the most important tool in the EU contribution to the global fight against climate change.

### ***Peace and stability***

#### *The war in Ukraine and future peace-building efforts*

Of all the crises mentioned, war in -e is the one that has shaken the EU the hardest. Aside from the most imminent threat to peace, the war caused many other crises and shocks, especially in energy and food supply. The war in Ukraine is far beyond development policy and out of its reach, considering geopolitical relations and the interests of the invading country, Russia. However, the fact that the war is happening once again on the European continent, after the Western Balkans in the 90s, will, without a doubt, urge EU to reconsider the approach to peace-building efforts both in its neighbourhood and beyond. Since the Russian aggression started the EU has mobilized 4,1 billion euros for Ukraine's economic and social resilience (EC 2022). In addition, The Commission has proposed to establish "RebuildUkraine Facility", a legal EU instrument which would financially support Ukraine (EC 2022). However, the EU has provided a substantial assistance to Ukraine for a long time before the Russian invasion, and, as we have witnessed, it hasn't secured long-term peace and stability. This is the area of external action where EU has traditionally been the least active and not very successful. External evaluation of the EU's support to conflict prevention and peace-building between 2013 and 2018 has shown that with substantial investment of 5,6 billion euros much more could be achieved with integrated approach to peace-building,<sup>3</sup> which would include all relevant policies, as well as conflict-sensitive approach (EC 2020).

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<sup>3</sup> Evaluation was conducted by Particip and ECDPM, commissioned by the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).

David Michel (2021) examines the link between climate change and peace-building. Michel (2021) notes that the 2016 EU Global Strategy recognizes that climate change cuts through all other security threats and acts like a “threat multiplier”. Thus, the effects of climate change negatively affect the social cohesion, cause population displacements, and generate instability which further fuels conflicts (Michel 2021). For this reason, the Global Strategy calls for integrative policy approach and use of all possible policy tools in alleviating climate change effects on developing countries (Michel 2021).

Another consideration and lesson from this conflict stems from the sluggish EU attitude towards the Western Balkan region and its EU accession. The never-ending process of EU accession has already put some of the countries from the region onto the road of dangerous regression and made them vulnerable to the outside influence and even aggression. The EU enlargement policy is separate from the EU development policy, however, its effects, with the EU values and standards’ implementation, are similar to the effects of the development policy. Yet, when the process of EU accession becomes a lapurlative exercise, all the development achieved is at risk of being reversed. One possible step in the right direction is the reform of veto system in the Council when it comes to the EU foreign policy, which has lately come into consideration with the Conference on the Future of Europe. However, that reform is not to be expected in the foreseeable future and the EU needs to find a way to fully integrate Western Balkan countries rather sooner than later. That is by far the most certain and effective way of securing long-term peace in that region.

The 2017 Consensus on Development put special focus on connection between development policy and peace and security policy, stating that the EU and members states will use all possible policies and instruments to help resolve crisis and build lasting peace (EU 2017, 34). This comprehensive approach “recognizes the nexus between sustainable development, humanitarian action, peace and security” (EU 2017, 34). Building on this connection, strengthening it, and coherently combining both policies, while also integrating other policies that address today’s pressing issues, especially environment and health, is the most daunting, but crucial task for the EU development policy in the future.

### ***Evolution of the EU development policy – main influences***

Three categories of influence on the evolution of the EU development policy can be derived from the discussion in the literature: 1. structural issues; 2. multilateral processes and documents; 3. crises and challenges.

*Structural issues.* The evolution of the EU development policy has been influenced by several structural challenges. The first one stems from its normative definition – the treaties define the development policy as a mutual competence between the EU and the member states. This definition gives member states a lot of influence on the creation of the policy, making the process itself highly complicated, with results often adjusted to national interests. It also brings other challenges, both during formulation and the implementation of the policy (Koch 2015). Second challenge concerns policy coherence, both in relation to other EU policies and to the policies of member states (Adelle and Jordan 2014; Carbone and Keijzer 2016; Furness and Gänzle 2017).

*Multilateral processes and documents.* During the 2000s the EU development policy was strongly influenced by the Millennium development goals and its commitment to the poverty eradication. This was mirrored in the EU development programs at that time, especially 2006 Consensus on Development and, subsequently in the Lisbon Treaty, which defined poverty eradication as the priority of the EU development policy. The 2030 Agenda and its comprehensive SDGs shifted the EU development policy from the position of self-standing policy concentrated on the poverty eradication to the multi-faceted policy, which serves as a tool for the achievement of the SDGs and policy goals in its many areas. As Fukuda-Parr and McNeill (2019) argue, this process made virtually any policy area relevant for development policy.

*Crises and challenges.* Crises have shaped the EU development policy both short-term and long-term. The biggest shift facilitated by crises, often debated in the literature, is the shift from altruistically motivated policy to more instrumentalised policy, guided by self-interest. There is a strong agreement in the literature that every crisis pushed EU development further in the direction of instrumentalism (see, e.g., Furness et al. 2020; Fukuda-Parr and McNeill 2019; Koch et al. 2021; Hackenesch et al. 2021; Keijzer and Lundsgaarde 2018; Burni, Erfort, Friesen et al. 2022). However, some studies demonstrated that altruistic framing of the development policy was short-term and lasted only through the 2000s (Bergmann et al 2019). Financial crisis in 2008 affected the development policy in the short-term by cutting the investments in that area.

However, it didn't last long, as investments returned to the pre-crisis level soon after. In the long-term, as a result of the crisis and austerity measures, development policy became politicised, the matter of dispute and often debated in the public. Similar long-term effects on the dynamics of the policy process of development policy were brought about by the migrant crisis in 2015 and the rise of populism in the member states (Szent-Iványi and Kugiel 2020; Holden 2020). Climate change crisis and Covid-19 crisis, to extent, have turned the development policy into the

supplementary policy, a sort of a “jack of all trades”, assigning it with many tasks, relevant to both the EU interests and international development (Koch et al. 2021).

***Beyond discussion on altruism and instrumentalization  
– crises as a roadmap for the EU development policy***

The debate in the literature on the dualism of altruistic development policy on one side and instrumentalised, interest-driven development policy on the other, is as oversimplified as is misleading (Delputte and Lightfoot, 2021). Interests and needs in the contemporary world are mutually interconnected, especially in major crises, which makes evaluations based on that criterion practically impossible. That is why any policy, especially development policy, cannot be reduced to such simple and rigid explanation based on altruism-interests dichotomy.

Likewise, not every display of interests and shift of development policy towards instrumentalism is the same and we can't put them all in the same basket. Hence, interests of Hungary's and Poland's populist governments in the wake of migrant crisis are in no way comparable to the EU and member states' interest to detain Covid-19 pandemic or to stop climate change. These are interests common to all mankind and one could argue that the EU is working in everyone's interest while taking care of its own interest to cut greenhouse gas emission. Therefore, a more suitable research framework for the EU development policy in today's circumstances should focus on how crises and challenges shape EU development policy beyond the narrative on altruism and self-interest and what challenges and opportunities they generate for that policy. In that sense, all three of the current crises offer much to work with, especially health and climate crises.

Climate change crisis has reshaped the EU development policy the most profoundly. The broader idea of sustainable development has been a part of all EU policies for a long time; it gained special prominence with Millennium development goals and even more so after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda. Both of those documents shaped the EU development policy in the long-term, giving it a new, more visible, more influential, and more successful face to the world and making more policies than ever relevant to the development.

The 2017 Consensus on Development incorporated the 2030 Agenda into the EU development policy and, thus, paved the way for that evolution. We argue that it was exactly that encompassing feature that gave the EU development policy more prominence. With this evolution the EU development policy became number one EU “export” product, dealing with many acute maladies of the developing countries, and on an unprecedented scale. And all those problems are simultaneously the result and the cause of poverty.



That role of the EU development policy became even stronger with the European Green Deal and the EU transition to the climate neutral economy. In the case of climate change crisis, the EU “self-interest” is to save the planet. No amount of investment and effort at home will do the trick unless the rest of the world follows. And it is exactly that self-interest that is the biggest motivation point for the EU to help the developing countries on the way to the green transition. In that process, the component of just transition to the green economy should be given a much more prominent place in the EU development policy. The Mechanism for just transition and the “no one left behind” principle should guide all EU international development projects. The next step for the EU development policy should also include a strategy for the implementation of the European Green Deal in the external action. The Team Europe initiatives are a good step in that direction, with many projects involving green transition. Another important step forward is also building stronger connection between development and security policy. Contrary to the belief that the development policy is becoming weaker and further away from its core values and tasks with more complexity and in nexus with other policies, it is exactly that feature that gives it what it takes to succeed, especially in the face of profound crises.

## **Conclusion**

The EU development policy has always been a bridge between foreign policy and internal EU policies. The adoption of the Millennium development goals and later the Treaty of Lisbon made this dual role the most prominent feature of the EU development policy. All major crises, from 2008 financial crisis, migrant crisis in 2015, and current health and security crises, have all served as a channel for further transformation of this twofold character. However, the crisis that has transformed and influenced the EU development policy the most profoundly is climate change crisis. Climate change policy has been mainstreamed into every other EU policy, including development policy.

In 2015 the EU adopted the New Consensus on Development and integrated the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals into its development policy. This document made clear that the EU development policy will in future be completely aligned with the 2030 Agenda goals, and many indicators measuring the implementation of the Agenda. Likewise, the 2020 response to the Covid-19 crisis, the Team Europe, also incorporated sustainable development and climate change goals into the long-term vision of recovery.

Global crises and the international response to those crises, have, thus, become, the primary factor for the transformation and the evolution of the EU development policy. This evolution has further strengthened the connection between the EU development, foreign and many domestic policies. The discussion in the literature is often focused on the moral justification of this evolution, questioning the authenticity of the development policy when it serves interests and goals that go beyond altruistic motivation to help the poor countries.

As discussed in this article, interests and needs in the face of major global crises have become highly interconnected and some of them run across even the most and the least developed countries. Furthermore, while fighting those crises has made the EU development policy function ever more as a means for attaining domestic goals, it has never swayed from its core role - aiding developing countries on their path to prosperity and stability.

The solidarity-instrumentalism dichotomy of the EU development policy, often theorised in the literature, is, therefore, ill fitted and of very limited use when considering all the complexity of the contemporary world. Research agenda for the EU development policy must, consequently, go beyond that dualism and focus on the dynamic role of the policy in general, and in any of the policy nexuses, especially climate, health, and peace. To address intricacies of today's world, the EU development policy must be integrated with all other relevant policies. This has especially become relevant after the adoption of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. Crucial question for tomorrow's research should, therefore, be how to make that entangled web of policies, interests, and needs a coherent, efficient meta-policy, equipped with all the tools for delivering sustainable development in today's chaotic reality.

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**Nikolina HERCEG KOLMAN, Goran BANDOVIĆ**

**EVOLUCIJA RAZVOJNE POLITIKE EVROPSKE UNIJE  
– OD ALTRUIZMA DO INTERESNE INSTRUMENTALIZACIJE**

**Apstrakt:** Rad ispituje evoluciju razvojne politike Evropske unije, od milenijumskih razvojnih ciljeva Ujedinjenih nacija i (prvog ikada) globalnog pokušaja iskorenjivanja siromaštva, do aktuelnog perioda. Najpre se u okviru prikaza literature konstatuje značajna fokusiranost na dihotomiju između solidarnosti i instrumentalizacije, nakon čega se prelazi na analizu na koji način su velike svetske krize – poput klimatske krize, pandemije Kovida-19 i ukrajinske krize - uticale i oblikovale razvojnu politiku EU. Na osnovu relevantne literature i analize, u članku se objedinjuje nekoliko kategorija faktora koji su uticali na razvojnu politiku Unije, uz zaključak da istraživanje treba da prevaziđe dihotomiju između solidarnosti i instrumentalizacije i razvije obuhvatnije analitičke alate, kako bi se adekvatnije razumeli pojačani izazovi pri kreiranju savremenih razvojnih politika. Radi unapređenja analitičkih okvira neophodno je fokusiranje na dvojnu ulogu razvojne politike Evropske unije koja služi kao most između spoljnog i unutrašnjeg domena, kao i na integraciju s drugim politikama, posebno onima u oblastima mira, klime i zdravlja.

**Ključne reči:** razvojna politika Evropske unije, razvojna saradnja, milenijumski razvojni ciljevi, Agenda 2030, klimatske promene, Kovid-19, rat u Ukrajini, mir, diplomatija, stabilnost, bezbednost.





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Johnson and Axinn (2013, 136) argue that killing with emotions is morally superior to killing without emotions, because military honour demands a clear will to assume a risk of sacrifice of health and life.

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(Jabri 2007, 59)

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Reference list entry:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. [https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc\\_2014\\_v2\\_p2.pdf&lang=ES](https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES).

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In-text citation:

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Reference list entry:

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In-text citation:

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Reference list entry:

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Kruszelnicki, Karl (@DoctorKarl). 2017. “Dr Karl Twitter post.” Twitter, February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. <https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl>.

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In-text citation:

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### **Doctoral dissertation**

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In-text citation:

(Rohrbach 2020)

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Reference list entry:

Oxford Library. 2012. "Library Strategy". Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. <http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html>.

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(Google Maps 2015) (IPE n.d.)

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Reference list entry:

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

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Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

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Časopis *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems* objavljuje sledeće kategorije radova:

**Originalni naučni rad** predstavlja rezultate naučnog istraživanja sa jasnim doprinosom u vidu širenja i/ili produbljanja postojećeg naučnog saznanja o predmetu istraživanja. On mora da bude strukturisan tako da jasno sadrži sledeće elemente: opšti kontekst i obrazložen cilj istraživanja; teorijski okvir (pregled literature) jasno određen u uvodnom delu članka; postavljene hipoteze ili istraživačko pitanje; primenjen naučni metod; predstavljanje dobijenih rezultata i njihovo tumačenje i zaključak sa odgovorom na postavljene hipoteze ili istraživačko pitanje.

**Pregledni rad** pruža sveobuhvatan sažetak dosadašnjih naučnih istraživanja na određenu temu i/ili sistematičan uvid u trenutno stanje naučne discipline, tako što ukazuje na otvorena istraživačka pitanja, disciplinarna (ne)slaganja i postojeće kontroverze. Pregledni rad utvrđuje praznine u naučnom znanju u posmatranoj oblasti ili problematici, odnosno koja istraživačka pitanja još uvek nemaju odgovore i pruža naznake mogućih pravaca daljeg razvoja obrađene tematike ili naučne discipline.

**Prikaz knjige** je sistematičan opis i/ili kritička analiza kvaliteta i značaja monografije, zbornika radova ili udžbenika. Prikaz knjige treba da pruži osnovnu biografsku belešku o autoru, sintetizovanu deskripciju teme ili problema koji obrađuje data naučna publikacija, sažetak iznete naučne argumentacije, uočen doprinos naučnoj disciplini i slabosti, te zaključak koji sažima mišljenje autora prikaza o analiziranoj publikaciji.

Autori su dužni da se u pripremi rukopisa pridržavaju sledećih uputstava:

## FORMAT

Sve kategorije članaka treba predati u *Word*-u i sačuvati u *.doc* ili *.docx* formatu.

Koristite ćirilčno pismo, font *Times New Roman* veličine 12, prored *Single*, a pasuse odvajajte jednim redom.

Paginacija treba da bude smeštena u donjem desnom uglu i da počinje na prvoj stranici članka.

## OBIM

Rukopisi treba da budu obima 6000–8000 reči (uzeto bez apstrakata i spiska referenci).

Obim prikaza knjiga može da bude do 1500 reči.

**JEZIK**

Razmatraju se rukopisi napisani na srpskom i engleskom jeziku. Molba je da se jezik upotrebljava dosledno, koherentno i adekvatno, imajući u vidu akademski opseg Časopisa.

**NASLOV**

Naslov napišite velikim podebljanim slovima veličine 14.

Naslov treba da bude koncizan i da što vernije opiše sadržaj članka, odnosno da odrazi osnovnu ideju predstavljenog istraživanja i naznači važnost dobijenih rezultata.

**IME I AFILIJACIJA**

Ispod naslova napišite ime i prezime sa pratećom fusnotom u kojoj navodite pun naziv institucije u kojoj ste zaposleni, njeno sedište, svoju elektronsku adresu i ORCID ID. Prezime treba da bude napisano velikim slovima. Pod afilijacijom podrazumevamo instituciju u kojoj je sprovedeno istraživanje čije rezultate predstavljate u članku.

U slučaju dva ko-autora, imena treba da budu napisana jedno do drugog, a svako od njih treba da sadrži fusnotu sa afilijacijom.

Premda rukopisi koji podrazumevaju više od dva ko-autora nisu uobičajeni, u retkim prilikama oni mogu da budu razmatrani, u zavisnosti od obima istraživanja, teme, osnovnih elemenata, strukture i mere usklađenosti sa Uređivačkom politikom.

U fusnoti navodite naziv projekta u okviru kojeg je sačinjeno istraživanje i izvor finansiranja ili drugu vrstu dobijene podrške. Ovde takođe možete da ukažete čitaocima ukoliko pogledi izneti u članku odražavaju vaš lični stav, a ne stav institucije u kojoj ste zaposleni.

**APSTRAKTI I KLJUČNE REČI**

Ispod vašeg imena i prezimena stavljate apstrakt na srpskom jeziku obima 150– 200 reči. Isti apstrakt preveden na engleski stavljate na samom kraju članka.

Kod originalnih naučnih članaka, apstrakt mora da prikaže predmet i cilj istraživanja, teorijski okvir, osnovne hipoteze ili istraživačko pitanje, korišćen metod, jasan opis najvažnijih rezultata istraživanja, te krajnji zaključak u jednoj rečenici.

Kod preglednih članaka, apstrakt mora da sadrži glavni cilj pregleda dosadašnjih naučnih istraživanja na određenu temu i/ili sistematičnog uvida u trenutno stanje naučne discipline, obrazloženje načinjenog izbora, osnovne rezultate pregleda i izvedeni zaključak, u kojem treba opisati implikacije za dalja istraživanja, primenu ili praksu.

Ispod apstrakta prilažete do 10 ključnih reči na srpskom jeziku koje najbolje opisuju sadržaj članka. Podsećamo da je dobar izbor ključnih reči preduslov za ispravno indeksiranje članka u referentnim periodičnim publikacijama i bazama podataka. Ključne reči ne smeju da ponavljaju reči sadržane u naslovu članka. Ključne reči dajete i na engleskom jeziku i prilažete ih uz apstrakt na engleskom jeziku.



## OSNOVNI TEKST

Poravnajte osnovni tekst u skladu sa opcijom *justify*.

Podnaslovi se pišu podebljanim slovima, dok se pod-podnaslovi pišu u *italic*-u; u oba slučaja veličina slova je 12.

Koristite samo tri nivoa podnaslova (svi treba da budu centrirani):

Prvi nivo: **Podnaslov**

Drugi nivo: ***Podnaslov***

Treći nivo: *Podnaslov*

Nemojte numerisati podnaslove.

Svaki novi pasus, uključujući i naslove, treba da bude „uvučen“, što se radi stavljanjem kursora na početak paragrafa i jednim pritiskom na taster *Tab*. To se jedino ne odnosi na apstrakt tj. sažetak. U tekstu moraju biti data puna imena, nikako inicijali. Strano ime i prezime treba pisati u srpskoj transkripciji, a prilikom prvog pominjanja u tekstu navesti u zagradi kako ona glase u originalu. Imena i prezimena koja potiču iz naroda koji ne koriste latinično pismo treba navesti u latinizovanoj transkripciji (npr. kineska, japanska ili arapska imena i prezimena). Isto važi za nazive različitih vrsta organizacija.

Rukopis mora da bude tehnički uredan, a jezički stil mora da bude jasan, čitljiv i usklađen sa pravopisom i gramatikom srpskog ili engleskog jezika. Rukopisi koji ne ispunjavaju ove zahteve neće biti uzeti u postupak recenzije.

Ukoliko želite da koristite skraćenicu, onda kod prvog pominjanja punog termina (bilo u apstraktu, bilo u samom tekstu) navedite željenu skraćenicu u zagradi i potom je koristite dosledno u ostatku teksta. Koristite skraćenice koje su opšteprihvaćene u domaćoj naučnoj i stručnoj literaturi.

Koristite samo sledeći oblik navodnika „“ , a kada se unutar ovih znakova navoda nalaze i dodatni navodnici onda koristite ’’.

Latinske, starogrčke i druge strane reči i izraze navodite u kurzivu (*italic*), npr. *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire* itd.

## NAVOĐENJE IZVORA

*Međunarodni problemi* koriste navođenje referenci shodno formatu „autor- datum“ zasnovanom na Čikaškom stilu – *The Chicago Manual of Style* (16th ed.), delimično dopunjenom shodno potrebama časopisa.

Izvore navodite u samom tekstu, i to tako što u zagradi dajete prezime autora, godinu izdanja i broj stranice (po potrebi). Pun opis izvora dajete u spisku korišćene bibliografije koji stavljate iza osnovnog teksta.

U samom tekstu, izvor uvek treba da stavite neposredno pre znakova interpunkcije. Kada ime autora pominjete u rečenici nije potrebno da ga ponavljate u zagradi, ali onda godinu i broj stranice navodite neposredno nakon pominjanja imena:

Johnson and Axinn (2013, 136) argue that killing with emotions is morally superior to killing without emotions, because military honour demands a clear will to assume a risk of sacrifice of health and life.

Kada je ime autora već u zagradi, koristite uglaste zagrade za navođenje njegovog rada: (opširnije o ovom konceptu videti kod Jovanovića [2013, 133–136]).

Kada u zagradi navodite više izvora, onda ih razdvojte tačkom i zarezom: (Jabri 2007; Herman 2004; Rohrbach 2020)

Kada u istoj zagradi navodite dva ili više rada istog autora, onda ne morate da ponavljate njegovo ime:

(Jabri 2007, 2011; Gregory 2014a, 2014b)

### **Knjiga**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Vučić, Mihajlo. 2019. *Korektivna pravda pred Međunarodnim sudom*. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou, and Anuradha Chenoy. 2007. *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

Vasquez, John A., Sanford Jaffe, James Turner Johnson, and Linda Stamato, eds. 1995. *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bentham, Jeremy (1907) 2018. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Reprint, London: Clarendon Press. [www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html](http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnthPML.html).

Dal Lago, Alessandro, and Salvatore Palidda, eds. 2010. *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society: The Civilization of War*. Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2011. *The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition*. Edited by Ronald Hamowy. Vol. 17 of *The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek*, edited by Bruce Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Vučić 2019, 59)

(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007)

(Vasquez et al. 1995) (Bentham [1907] 2018)

(Dal Lago and Palidda 2010)

(Hayek 2011, 258)

### **Članak u časopisu**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Nordin, Astrid H.M. and Dan Öberg. 2015. "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43 (2): 395–423.

Kostić, Marina T. 2019. „Isključiva priroda evropskih, evroatlantskih i evroazijskih integracija i previranja na evropskom postsovjetskom prostoru“. *Međunarodni problemi* LXXI (4): 498–526.

Adams, Tracy, and Zohar Kampf. 2020. "'Solemn and just demands': Seeking apologies in the international arena". *Review of International Studies*. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210520000261>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Nordin and Öberg 2015, 401)

(Kostić 2019, 500)

(Tracy and Kampf 2020)

#### **Članak u zborniku radova**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Herman, Michael. 2004. "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001". In: *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, edited by Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson, 567–581. London and New York: Routledge.

Zakić, Katarina. 2019. „Politika ekonomskih integracija Kine u Evroaziji“. U: *Integracioni procesi u Evroaziji*, uredili dr Dušan Proroković i dr Ana Jović-Lazić, 13–44. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Herman 2004)

(Zakić 2019)

#### **Rad izložen na konferenciji (ako nije objavljen u zborniku sa konferencije)**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Korać, Srđan. 2016. "Human Security and Global Ethics: Can International Organizations be Moral Agents?". Paper presented at the Third International Academic Conference on Human Security, Human Security Research Center (HSRC), Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, November 4–5.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Korać 2016)

#### **Prikaz knjige**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Firchow, Pamina. 2020. "Measuring Peace: Principles, Practices and Politics". Review of *Measuring Peace*, by Richard Caplan. *International Peacekeeping* 27 (2): 337–338.

Stekić, Nenad. 2018. „Tesna povezanost ljudske bezbednosti i međunarodnih odnosa u Arktičkom krugu“, Prikaz knjige *Human and societal security in the circumpolar Arctic – local and indigenous communities* Kamrul Hossain, José Miguel Roncero Martín & Anna Petrétei (eds). *Međunarodni problemi* LXX (4): 455–457.

Navođenje u tekstu: (Firchow 2020, 337)

(Stekić 2018, 455)

### **Pravni i zvanični dokumenti**

#### ***Međunarodni ugovori***

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[PTBT] Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. 1963. Signed by US, UK, and USSR, August 5. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20480/volume-480-I-6964-English.pdf>.

[TFEU] Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 2012. *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, October 26. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>.

[UN Charter] Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(PTBT 1963, Article III, para. 3)

(TFEU 2012, Article 87)

(UN Charter, Chapter X)

#### ***Dokumenti Ujedinjenih nacija***

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[UNSC] UN Security Council. Resolution 2222, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/RES/2222. May 27, 2015. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml>.

[UNGA] UN General Assembly. Resolution 67/18, Education for Democracy, A/RES/67/18. November 28, 2012. <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/RES/67/18>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(UNSC Res. 2222) (UNGA Res. 67/18)

#### ***Nacionalno zakonodavstvo***

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[Constitution RS] Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2006. *Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia*, No. 98/2006.

Homeland Security Act. 2002. United States of America, 107th Congress, 2nd Session (November 25). [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr\\_5005\\_enr.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf).

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Constitution RS 2006, Article 111)

(Homeland Security Act 2002)

### **Zvanični izveštaji**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[YILC] Yearbook of the International Law Commission. 2014. Vol. 2, Part Two. [https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc\\_2014\\_v2\\_p2.pdf&lang=ES](https://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_2014_v2_p2.pdf&lang=ES).

[The 9-11 Commission] U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Publication Office.

US Congress. 1993. Nomination of R. James Woolsey to be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 104th Congress, 1st session, February 2–3, 1993. <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/103296.pdf>.

[USAFH] United States Air Force Headquarters. 2014. United States Air Force RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts: 2013–2038.

[www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf](http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/news/USAFRPVectorVisionandEnablingConcepts2013-2038.pdf).

Navođenje u tekstu:

(YILC 2014, 321)

(The 9-11 Commission 2004, 437)

(US Congress 1993, 125)

(USAFH 2014)

### **Zakonodavstvo Evropske unije**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur). *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 295, 6 November 2013. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN>.

[EC] European Commission. 2010. The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, November 22. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0673&from=GA>.

Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 141, 5 June 2015. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849&from=EN>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Regulation [EU] No. 1052/2013, Article 11, para. 4)

(EC COM[2010] 673 final)

(Directive [EU] 2015/849)

### ***Odluke međunarodnih sudova i tribunala***

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

[ICJ] International Court of Justice. Accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, ICJ Reports. <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf>.

[ICJ Order 1999] *Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom)*. International Court of Justice, Order ICJ Rep. 1999 (June 2). <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/113/113-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>.

[ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A] *Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32-A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Indictment, 30 October 2000. <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/vasiljevic/ind/en/vasonly-ii000125e.pdf>.

*Costa v Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elettrica*, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61964CJ0006>. [CJEU Judgment T-289/15] *Hamas v Council*, Case T-289/15. Court of Justice of the

European Union, Judgment, 6 March 2019, ECLI:EU:T:2019:138. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?language=EN&critereEcli=ECLI:EU:T:2019:138>

[Opinion of AG Bobek] *Région de Bruxelles-Capitale v Commission*, Case C-352/19 P. Court of Justice of the European Union. Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 16 July 2020(1), ECLI:EU:C:2020:588. <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=485A5D9AC129179D3D2F2.EC571A384CD?text=&docid=228708&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5064004>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(ICJ Advisory Opinion 2010, 411)

(ICJ Order 1999, para. 3)

(ICTY Indictment IT-98-32-A)

(*Costa v ENEL*)

(CJEU Judgment T-289/15, para. 23)

(Opinion of AG Bobek C-352/19 P)

### **Novine i magazini**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Gibbs, Samuel. 2017. "Elon Musk leads 116 experts calling for outright ban of killer robots", *The Guardian*, August 20.

Power, Matthew. 2013. "Confessions of a Drone Warrior", *GQ*, October 22. <https://www.gq.com/story/drone-uav-pilot-assassination>.

*Economist*. 2015. "Who will fight the next war?" October 24. <https://www.economist.com/united-states/2015/10/24/who-will-fight-the-next-war>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Gibbs 2017, A10)

(Power 2013)

(*Economist* 2015)

### **Audio-vizuelni mediji**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Scott, Ridley. [1982] 2007. *Blade Runner: The Final Cut*. Directed by Ridley Scott. Burbank, CA: Warner Bros. Blue-Ray disc, 117 min.

*Future Weapons*. 2019. Waddell Media. Emitovano od 7. do 16. avgusta na kanalu Discovery Science HD, 3 sezone, 30 epizoda (svaka 43 minuta). <https://go.discovery.com/tv-shows/future-weapons/>.

Tech Legend. 2020. "Best Drones 2020 – Top 8 Best Drone with Cameras to Buy in 2020". Uploaded on February 7, 2020. YouTube video, 27:20 min. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6\\_4JU5Mspw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z6_4JU5Mspw).

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Scott [1982] 2007)

(*Future Weapons* 2019)

(Tech Legend 2020)

### **Društveni mediji**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

National Library of Australia. 2020. "National Library of Australia's Facebook Page". Facebook, August 1, 2020. <https://www.facebook.com/National.Library.of.Australia/>.

Kruszelnicki, Karl (@DoctorKarl). 2017. "Dr Karl Twitter post." Twitter, February 19, 2017, 9:34 a.m. <https://twitter.com/DoctorKarl>.

Trapara, Vladimir. 2018. „Pobeda ili ništa”. *Unwrapping the Essence* (blog). 29 maj 2018. <https://unwrappingtheessence.weebly.com/blog/pobeda-ili-nista>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(National Library of Australia 2020)

(Kruszelnicki 2017)

(Trapara 2018)

### **Doktorska disertacija**

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Rohrbach, Livia. 2020. *Beyond intractability? Territorial solutions to self-determination conflicts*. Doctoral dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Rohrbach 2020)

### **Izvor sa interneta**

U slučaju da navodite nedatirani dokument sa interneta, priložite datum kada ste pristupili tom elektronskom sadržaju i godinu pristupa računajte kao godinu objavljivanja tog izvora.

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Oxford Library. 2012. "Library Strategy". Oxford Library. Accessed 3 June 2012. <http://www.ol.org/library/strategy.html>.

Google Maps. 2015. "The British Library, London, UK". *Google*. Accessed February 5, 2015. <https://www.google.com.au/maps/place/The+British+Library/@51.529972,-0.127676,17z/data=!3m1!4m2!3m1!1s0x48761b3b70171395:0x18905479de0fdb25>.

0x18905479de0fdb25.

IMPP [Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu]. n.d. „Misija”. Pristupljeno 1. avgusta 2020. <https://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/misija/>.

Navođenje u tekstu:

(Oxford Library 2012)

(Google Maps 2015)

(IMPP n.d.)



### **Lična komunikacija**

Izvori iz područja lične komunikacije obuhvataju razgovore uživo, intervjue, materijale sa predavanja, telefonske razgovore, klasičnu i elektronsku prepisku. Izvore ove vrste navedite samo u tekstu, bez stavljanja u Bibliografiju, zato što je najčešće reč o podacima u koje čitalac nema uvid ili se zbog nematerijalnog oblika ne mogu naknadno proveriti:

... kao što je dr Slobodan Janković naveo u mejlu koji mi je poslao 10. decembra 2019. godine ...

Kada su objavljena u zbkama, pisma se navode prema godini izdanja, s tim što datum kada je poslato pojedinačno pismo navodite u samom tekstu:

U pismu koje je Univerzitet u Beogradu 13. maja 2017. godine uputio Grinovej (Green 2012, 34) ...

### **Sekundarni izvor (posredno navođenje izvora)**

Kada želite da navedete izvor koji ste pročitali u nekom drugom izvoru, uvek treba da ukažete na oba izvora – originalni i posredni:

Navođenje u tekstu:

U knjizi *Moć*, objavljenoj 1975. godine, Luman shvatanje moći pretežno zasniva na literaturi o društvenoj razmeni i moći zajednice (navedeno prema Guzzini 2013, 79).

Navođenje u Bibliografiji:

Guzzini, Stefano. 2013. *Power, realism, and constructivism*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

### **TABELE, DIJAGRAMI I GEOGRAFSKE KARTE**

Grafičke priloge (tabele, dijagrame, geografske karte, grafikone i sl.) numerišete i dajete im pun naslov:

***Tabela 1: Indeks ljudskog razvoja u zemljama članicama EU***

***Dijagram 2: Strane direktne investicije kineskih kompanija u Africi (u milionima dolara)***

***Karta 1: Nacionalne pomorske jurisdikcije i granice na Arktiku***

Ukoliko je grafički prilog preuzet od nekog drugog autora ili iz nekog dokumenta neophodno je ne samo navesti izvor, već i dobiti pisanu saglasnost za objavljivanje priloga pre podnošenja rukopisa na razmatranje Uredništvu časopisa *Međunarodni problemi*. Dobijena saglasnost se dostavlja uz rukopis.

### **BIBLIOGRAFIJA**

Na kraju članka, a pre apstrakta na engleskom jeziku, prilažete spisak korišćenih izvora naslovljen **Bibliografija**, koji sme da sadrži samo reference koje ste koristili u tekstu.

Bibliografske jedinice navodite prema prethodno predstavljenim pravilima za navođenje izvora, a ređate ih prema abecednom redosledu.

Ako imate dva ili više radova istog autora objavljenih iste godine:

U slučaju inostranih dela, uz godinu dodajte slova a, b, c, itd. i ređajte bibliografske jedinice po abecednom redosledu prvog slova naslova rada:

Gregory, Derek. 2014a. "Drone Geographies". *Radical Philosophy* RP 183: 7–19. Gregory, Derek. 2014b. "The Everywhere War". *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 238–250.

U slučaju dela na srpskom jeziku, uz godinu dodajete slova a, b, v, itd. i ređate bibliografske jedinice po azbučnom redosledu prvog slova naslova rada:

Lađevac, Ivona. 2020a. „Odgovor Kine na novi bezbednosni izazov“. U: *Čovek, prostor, tehnologije, ideje: međunarodna bezbednost u trećoj dekadi 21. Veka*, uredili dr Vladimir Ajzenhamer i dr Nebojša Vuković, 126-151. Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

**Rukopisi koji nisu usaglašeni sa navedenim smernicama neće biti uzeti u postupak recenziranja.**

Uređivački odbor

# UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

*Međunarodni problemi/International Problems* je najstariji naučni časopis u Srbiji i na Balkanu posvećen međunarodnim odnosima. Prvi broj je objavljen u aprilu 1949. godine, samo godinu dana nakon početka rada njegovog izdavača – Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu iz Beograda. Objavljuje se na kvartalnoj bazi i kategorisan je kod resornog ministarstva kao nacionalni časopis međunarodnog značaja (M24).

*Međunarodni problemi* objavljuju rezultate naučnih istraživanja iz oblasti međunarodnih odnosa, međunarodne bezbednosti, međunarodnog prava i studija globalizacije. *Međunarodni problemi* objavljuju originalne i pregledne naučne radove i prikaze knjiga, na srpskom ili engleskom jeziku, koji prethodno nisu nigde objavljeni niti se nalaze u postupku razmatranja za objavljivanje u nekoj drugoj publikaciji. *Međunarodni problemi* ne objavljuju stručne radove, analitičke komentare niti predloge javnih politika, pa Vas najljubaznije molimo da ne šaljete te vrste članaka.

Uređivački odbor daje prednost analizi kontroverznih pitanja savremene teorije i prakse međunarodnih odnosa uz poštovanje bogatstva disciplinarnih i sazajnih perspektiva. Bez zastupanja konkretnog političkog i teorijsko-metodološkog stanovišta, a sa namerom da podstakne obuhvatniji naučni dijalog o ubrzanim promenama u svetskoj politici u 21. veku, Uređivački odbor smatra da su prioritetne sledeće tematske celine:

- Preobražaj prirode svetske politike u ranom 21. veku;
- Fenomenologija i praksa transnacionalnosti i kosmopolitizma;
- Problemi institucionalizacije međunarodnih odnosa;
- Različita teorijska tumačenja aktuelnih globalnih procesa;
- Kontroverzna pitanja upotrebe spoljnopolitičkih instrumenata vodećih globalnih aktera;
- Uticaj naprednih tehnologija Četvrte industrijske revolucije na oblikovanje međunarodnih odnosa u 21. veku;
- Civilizacija, religija i identitet u kontekstu svetske politike i globalizacije;
- Konceptualni i metodološki iskoraci izvan tradicionalnog epistemološkog okvira naučne discipline međunarodnih odnosa.

## **OBAVEZE UREDNIKA, UREĐIVAČKOG ODBORA I IZDAVAČKOG ODBORA**

Izdavački savet je savetodavno telo koje aktivno doprinosi razvoju časopisa *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems*. Zadaci i dužnosti članova Saveta su: podrška razvoju časopisa, promocija časopisa, podsticanje stručnjaka u naučnom

istraživanju političkih, bezbednosnih i pravnih aspekata međunarodnih odnosa da se uključe u rad časopisa kao autori i/ili recenzenti, pisanje uvodnika, recenzija i komentara o radovima.

Članovi Uređivačkog odbora imaju zadatak da u akademskoj javnosti deluju kao svojevrсни ambasadori časopisa, da pruže doprinos u vidu preporučivanja kvalitetnih autora i rukopisa, podsticanja potencijalnih autora da podnose rukopise za objavljivanje u *Međunarodnim problemima*, te da recenziraju rukopise i pripremaju uvodnike i uredničke komentare.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik odgovara za objavljeni sadržaj i treba da teži stalnom unapređenju časopisa uopšte i procesa osiguranja kvaliteta objavljenog sadržaja, kao i zaštiti slobode izražavanja, integriteta i standarda naučnoistraživačkog rada od upliva političkih, finansijskih i drugih interesa. Glavni i odgovorni urednik treba uvek da objavi ispravku, objašnjenje, obaveštenje o povlačenju članka i izvinjenje.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik donosi konačnu odluku o tome koji će rukopis objaviti na osnovu: 1) ocene njegovog uklapanja u tematski okvir uređivačke politike, 2) ocene naučnog značaja, originalnosti, validnosti i disciplinarnе relevantnosti istraživanja predstavljenog u rukopisu, 3) ocene njegove usklađenosti sa zakonskim propisima koji se odnose na klevetu, kršenje autorskih prava i plagiranje. Glavni i odgovorni urednik zadržava diskreciono pravo da primljeni rukopis proceni i odbije bez recenziranja, ukoliko utvrdi da ne odgovara tematskim zahtevima uređivačke politike i opšteprihvaćenim standardima naučnoistraživačkog rada (tj. ako ne sadrži strukturne elemente originalnog ili preglednog naučnog rada). Radovi koji ne zadovoljavaju tehničke standarde propisane Uputstvom za autore, čak i u slučaju da je sadržaj korektan, biće vraćeni autorima na usklađivanje. U redovnim okolnostima, Uređivački odbor obaveštava autora u roku od sedam dana od datuma prijema rukopisa o tome da li se tema rukopisa uklapa u uređivačku politiku i da li je pokrenut postupak recenziranja.

Novi glavni i odgovorni urednik ne sme da preinači odluku svog prethodnika o objavljivanju rukopisa, osim ukoliko nisu utvrđene nove činjenice koje ukazuju na sporan kvalitet tog rukopisa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da budu u bilo kakvom sukobu interesa u vezi sa rukopisima koje razmatraju. Iz postupka izbora recenzenata i odlučivanja o sudbini rukopisa isključuju se članovi Uređivačkog odbora kod kojih postoji sukob interesa. Ako takav sukob interesa postoji, o izboru recenzenata i sudbini rukopisa odlučuje glavni i odgovorni urednik.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora su dužni da blagovremeno prijave postojanje sukoba interesa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i Uređivački odbor dužni su da sud o rukopisu donesu na osnovu njegovog sadržaja, bez rasnih, polnih/rodnih, verskih, etničkih ili političkih predrasuda.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane

dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznete u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju da se koriste za sticanje lične koristi.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora dužni su da preduzmu sve razumne mere kako bi identitet recenzenata ostao nepoznat autorima pre, tokom i nakon postupka recenzije i kako bi identitet autora ostao nepoznat recenzentima.

## **OBAVEZE AUTORA**

Autori garantuju da rukopis predstavlja njihov originalan doprinos, da nije objavljen ranije i da se ne razmatra za objavljivanje na drugom mestu. Predavanje istog rukopisa u više časopisa predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda koji se odnose na naučnoistraživački rad i takav rukopis se isključuje iz daljeg razmatranja.

Autori takođe garantuju da nakon objavljivanja u časopisu *Međunarodni problemi* rukopis neće biti objavljen u drugoj publikaciji na bilo kom jeziku bez saglasnosti Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu kao nosioca autorskih prava. Takođe, rad koji je već objavljen u nekom drugom časopisu ne sme biti podnet za objavljivanje u *Međunarodnim problemima*.

U slučaju da je poslati rukopis rezultat naučnoistraživačkog projekta ili da je, u prethodnoj verziji, bio izložen na skupu u vidu usmenog saopštenja (pod istim ili sličnim naslovom), detaljniji podaci o projektu, konferenciji i slično, navode se u fusnoti na samom početku teksta.

Autori su dužni da se pridržavaju etičkih standarda propisanih Kodeksom ponašanja u naučnoistraživačkom radu (Nacionalni savet za nauku i tehnološki razvoj, 2018). Autori garantuju da rukopis ne sadrži neosnovane ili nezakonite tvrdnje i ne krši prava drugih. Izdavač neće snositi nikakvu odgovornost u slučaju ispostavljanja bilo kakvih zahteva za naknadu štete.

## ***Sadržaj rada***

Rad treba da sadrži dovoljno detalja i referenci kako bi se recenzentima, a potom i čitaocima omogućilo da provere tvrdnje koje su u njemu iznesene. Namerno iznošenje netačnih tvrdnji predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda propisanih Kodeksom ponašanja u naučnoistraživačkom radu. Prikazi knjiga moraju da budu činjenično tačni i nepristrasni.

Autori snose svu odgovornost za sadržaj predatih rukopisa i dužni su da, ako je to potrebno, pre njihovog objavljivanja pribave saglasnost svih lica ili institucija koje su neposredno učestvovalе u istraživanju koje je u rukopisu predstavljeno.

Autori koji žele da u rad uključe ilustracije, tabele ili druge materijale koji su već negde objavljeni obavezni su da za to pribave saglasnost nosilaca autorskih prava i da ih dostave uz rukopis, a ne naknadno. Materijal za koji takvi dokazi nisu dostavljeni smatraće se originalnim delom autora.

### **Autorstvo**

Autori su dužni da kao autore navedu samo ona lica koja su suštinski doprinela sadržaju rukopisa, odnosno dužni su da sva lica koja su suštinski doprinela sadržaju rukopisa navedu kao autore. Navođenje kao jednog od autora rukopisa lica koje nije učestvovalo u izradi istraživanja sadržanog u rukopisu predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda koji se odnose na naučnoistraživački rad. Rukopisi sa više od dva autora neće biti uzimani u razmatranje, osim izuzetno ukoliko se proceni da rukopis predstavlja rezultate opsežnog empirijskog istraživanja.

Ako su u suštinskim aspektima naučnog istraživanja predstavljenog u rukopisu i/ili u samoj pripremi rukopisa učestvovali i druge osobe koje nisu autori, njihov doprinos mora da bude naveden u napomeni ili zahvalnici.

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Autori su dužni da ispravno navedu izvore koji su bitno uticali na istraživanje sadržano u rukopisu i na sam rukopis. Informacije koje su dobili u privatnom razgovoru ili korespondenciji sa trećim licima, prilikom recenziranja prijave projekata ili rukopisa i slično, ne smeju se koristiti bez izričite pisane dozvole izvora.

### **Recikliranje teksta**

Recikliranje teksta, odnosno situacija u kojoj isti autor upotrebljava istovetne delove svog teksta u dva ili više svojih objavljenih radova, predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda koji se odnose na naučnoistraživački rad i izdavaštvo.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik procenjuje ukupan obim recikliranih delova teksta, značaj mesta gde se oni pojavljuju u rukopisu (da li su deo uvoda, odeljka o primenjenoj metodologiji, diskusije tj. glavnog dela članka ili zaključka), da li je naveden prethodni izvor recikliranog teksta i da li postoji povreda autorskih prava.

Ukoliko je utvrđeno postojanje podudaranja teksta manjeg obima, od autora se može zatražiti da ponovo napiše sporan deo teksta i da navede prethodno objavljen izvor iz kojeg je taj deo teksta preuzet – ako to već nije učinio. Autor ne može da opravda recikliranje teksta samo na osnovu činjenice da je naveo izvor iz kojeg je preuzeo taj deo teksta. Podudaranje delova teksta u značajnom obimu predstavlja osnov za odbijanje rukopisa. Prilikom postupanja u slučajevima recikliranja teksta glavni i odgovorni urednik i Uređivački odbor rukovode se smernicama i preporukama Odbora za etiku u izdavaštvu (*Committee on Publication Ethics* – COPE, [https://publicationethics.org/files/Web\\_A29298\\_COPE\\_Text\\_Recycling.pdf](https://publicationethics.org/files/Web_A29298_COPE_Text_Recycling.pdf)).

### ***Sukob interesa***

Autori su dužni da u radu ukažu na finansijske ili bilo koje druge sukobe interesa koji bi mogli da utiču na iznesene rezultate i interpretacije.

### ***Greške u objavljenim radovima***

U slučaju da autori otkriju važnu grešku u svom radu nakon njegovog objavljivanja, dužni su da momentalno o tome obaveste urednika ili izdavača i da sa njima sarađuju kako bi se rad povukao ili ispravio.

Predavanjem rukopisa redakciji *Međunarodnih problema* autori se obavezuju na poštovanje navedenih obaveza.

### **OBAVEZE RECENZENATA**

Recenzenti časopisa *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems* su dužni da stručno, argumentovano, nepristrasno i u zadatim rokovima dostave uredniku ocenu naučne vrednosti rukopisa.

Recenzenti ocenjuju usklađenost teme rukopisa sa tematskim okvirom časopisa, naučnu relevantnost istraživane teme i primenjenih metoda, originalnost i naučni značaj rezultata predstavljenih u rukopisu, stil naučnog izlaganja i opremljenost teksta naučnom aparaturom.

Recenzent koji ima osnovane sumnje ili saznanja o kršenju etičkih standarda propisanih Kodeksom ponašanja u naučnoistraživačkom radu od strane autora dužan je da o tome obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika. Recenzent treba da prepozna važne objavljene radove koje autori nisu citirali. On treba da upozori glavnog i odgovornog urednika i na bitne sličnosti i podudarnosti između rukopisa koji se razmatra i bilo kojeg drugog objavljenog rada ili rukopisa koji je u postupku recenzije u nekom drugom časopisu, ako o tome ima lična saznanja. Ako ima saznanja da je isti rukopis razmatra u više časopisa u isto vreme, recenzent je dužan da o tome obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika.

Recenzent ne sme da bude u sukobu interesa sa autorima ili finansijerom istraživanja. Ukoliko postoji sukob interesa, recenzent je dužan da o tome momentalno obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika.

Recenzent koji sebe smatra nekompetentnim za temu ili oblast kojom se rukopis bavi dužan je da o tome obavesti glavnog i odgovornog urednika. Glavni i odgovorni urednik uvažiće zahtev autora da određeni pojedinac ne bude recenzent njihovog rukopisa ako proceni da je taj zahtev valjano obrazložen i praktičan.

Recenzija mora biti objektivna. Sud recenzenata mora biti jasan i potkrepljen argumentima. Uputstvo za recenzente detaljnije propisuje merila i smernice za ocenu rukopisa.

Rukopisi koji su poslani recenzentu smatraju se poverljivim dokumentima. Recenzenti ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznesene u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju se koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

## POSTUPAK RECENZIJE

Radovi koji se razmatraju za objavljivanje u časopisu *Međunarodni problemi/ International Problems* podležu recenziji. Cilj recenzije je da glavnom i odgovornom uredniku pomogne u donošenju odluke o tome da li rad treba prihvatiti ili odbiti i da kroz proces komunikacije sa autorima poboljša kvalitet rukopisa. U normalnim okolnostima, rok za okončanje postupka recenziranja je 30 dana od datuma prijema rukopisa.

Recenzije su dvostruko anonimne – identitet autora je nepoznat recenzentima i obrnuto. Identitet recenzenata ostaje nepoznat autorima i obrnuto pre, tokom i nakon postupka recenzije. Glavni i odgovorni urednik garantuje da će pre slanja rukopisa na recenziju iz njega biti uklonjeni lični podaci autora (prvenstveno ime i afilijacija) i da će preduzeti sve razumne mere kako bi identitet autora ostao nepoznat recenzentima. Tokom čitavog procesa, recenzenti deluju nezavisno jedni od drugih. Recenzentima nije poznat identitet drugih recenzenata. Ako odluke recenzenata nisu iste, glavni i odgovorni urednik može da traži mišljenje drugih recenzenata.

Izbor recenzenata spada u diskreciona prava glavnog i odgovornog urednika. Recenzenti moraju da raspoložu relevantnim znanjima u vezi sa oblašću kojom se rukopis bavi; oni ne smeju da budu iz iste institucije kao autori rukopisa niti smeju da sa njima imaju nedavno objavljene zajedničke radove.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik šalje podneti rukopis zajedno sa obrascem recenzije dvojici recenzenata koji su stručnjaci za naučnu oblast kojoj pripada tema rukopisa. Obrazac recenzije sadrži niz pitanja na koja treba odgovoriti, a koja recenzentima ukazuju koji su to aspekti koje treba obuhvatiti kako bi se donela odluka o sudbini rukopisa. U završnom delu obrasca, recenzenti moraju da navedu svoja zapažanja i predloge kako da se podneti rukopis poboljša.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik može da tokom postupka recenzije zahteva od autora da dostavi dodatne informacije (uključujući i primarne podatke), ako su one potrebne za ocenu naučnog doprinosa rukopisa. Glavni i odgovorni urednik i recenzenti moraju da čuvaju takve informacije kao poverljive i ne smeju ih koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

U slučaju da autor ima ozbiljne i osnovane zamerke na račun recenzije, glavni i odgovorni urednik će proveriti da li je recenzija objektivna i da li zadovoljava naučne standarde. Ako se pojavi sumnja u objektivnost ili kvalitet recenzije, glavni i odgovorni urednik će tražiti mišljenje dodatnog recenzenta.



## POSTUPANJE U SLUČAJEVIMA NEETIČNOG PONAŠANJA

Glavni i odgovorni urednik *Međunarodnih problema* je dužan da pokrene odgovarajući postupak ukoliko razumno sumnja ili utvrdi da je došlo do povrede etičkih standarda propisanih Kodeksom ponašanja u naučnoistraživačkom radu – bilo u objavljenim člancima ili u još neobjavljenim rukopisima. Svako može da u bilo kom trenutku prijavi glavnom i odgovornom uredniku sumnju o postojanju povrede etičkih standarda uz dostavljanje valjanih dokaza.

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
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
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
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