

# MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Vol. LXXII

Beograd

No. 2/2020.

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

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# MEĐUNARODNI PROBLEMI

ISSN 0025-8555

UDK 327

MP, 72, (2020), br. 2, str. 303–460

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Beograd, Makedonska 25

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ČASOPIS INSTITUTA ZA MEĐUNARODNU POLITIKU I PRIVREDU

GODINA LXXII

BEOGRAD

BROJ 2/2020.

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A JOURNAL PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL  
POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

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No. 2/2020

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# **INICIJATIVA POJASA I PUTA U EVROPI**



UDK: 339.92(510:4-12)  
Biblid: 0025-8555, 72(2020)  
Vol. LXXII, No. 2, pp. 311–336

Original article  
Received 5 February 2020  
Accepted 17 February 2020  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2002311D>

# CEEC's-China Mechanism of Cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative: From Idea to Institutionalisation – Six Years Later

Duško Dimitrijević,<sup>1</sup> Nikola Jokanović<sup>2</sup>

**Apstrakt:** The paper analyzes the process of institutionalization of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination of state policies through the mechanism of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and China, known in the public as “16 + 1” (i.e., “17 + 1” starting in 2019). Through an eclectic picture of the development of contemporary international relations, the authors indicate in a methodologically accessible manner that this mechanism of cooperation is a significant impetus for the development of international relations. Since China has taken a dominant role in redefining the Global Management System, whose goals are balanced and sustainable international development, to achieve them, China has identified certain ideological frameworks that are present in its foreign policy through the *Belt and Road Initiative*. Through this Initiative, China seeks to achieve the broader goals of the New Silk Road development strategy, which not only determines the directions of China’s internal development, but provides guidance for its strategic cooperation with neighbouring countries as well as with countries on other continents. Consequently, the mechanism itself thus plays an important role in strengthening China’s foreign policy position, not only with respect to CEEC, but also with respect to other European countries, including the EU as a whole.

**Key words:** The “16+1” cooperation mechanism, the *Belt and Road Initiative*, the *New Silk Road*, development strategy, China, CEEC.

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2020”, financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

## Introduction

In the last three decades, China has been able to improve its industrial structure and increase the quality of economic growth since it promotes economic reforms through a series of policy decisions, reform measures and guidelines from five-year development plans, enabling it to assume one of the leading roles in the global economy. For the development of the modern world, the fact that China is the first trading power in the world with the highest purchasing power parity, the first country in foreign exchange reserves, and the second-largest country in terms of nominal GDP is insignificant.<sup>3</sup> It owns 33 percent of shares in global military pillars of "China-Russia and the United States", and in economic pillars of the "China-Europe-United States".<sup>4</sup> However, despite these positive indicators, China faces the consequences of the global financial crisis and industrial overcapacity that burden its economic model based on export-oriented economy and foreign direct investment. Hence, China needs to find new markets and preserve existing ones, and then provide participation in new forms of international economic cooperation, which would enable its balanced internal development. This new direction stems from the new international circumstances in which China is making great efforts to democratize international relations. This is best reflected precisely in its activities in the United Nations, where it stands for a multipolar international order and multilateralism in international relations in which the United Nations should play a primary role.<sup>5</sup> As a global political actor and permanent member of the Security Council, China is becoming an increasingly binding factor in achieving global development goals.<sup>6</sup> Respect for dignity and equality, solidarity and tolerance for China is an additional incentive to continue advocating for the realization of peaceful and harmonious global development which in particular means creating inclusive, harmonious, balanced and peaceful international society that is not only a "community of common interests", but also a "community of common destiny and responsibility", or to serve the well-known phrase of President Xi Jinping: a

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<sup>2</sup> China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing.

<sup>3</sup> "Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: China", *World Economic Outlook*, International Monetary Fund, April 2017.

<sup>4</sup> Wang Yiwei, *The Belt and Road Initiative, What will China Offer the World in its Rise*, New World Press, Beijing, 2018, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> "Efforts Urged to Implement Belt and Road Initiative", *China Daily*, 17 March, 2017.

<sup>6</sup> "Millennium Declaration", General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 55/2, 18 September 2000; "Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolution 70/1, 21 October 2015.

“Community of Shared Future for the Mankind”.<sup>7</sup> Starting from this new visionary paradigm, China, in fact, encourages the international community to address more resolutely the issue of humanity’s progress related to the regulation of the crucial problems in the economic and social sphere such as poverty, pandemics, natural disasters, environmental pollution, migrations, proliferation of weapons, terrorism, international crime, international and internal conflicts. Due to this proactive approach, China is identified in some foreign policy estimates as a “potential” or “emerging” super power.<sup>8</sup> However, for a long time, China has not perceived itself as such. Its political discourse has until recently explicitly emphasized that China is the largest developing country and a respectable regional power with increased global influence and soft power in international relations. This foreign policy direction is changing in the most recent period, and especially after the 19th National Congress of the CPC held in October 2017, when a new era of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the moderately prosperous socialist society in all aspects” was proclaimed.<sup>9</sup> Although China remained declaratively consistent in implementing the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, it made a certain manoeuvre after this Congress, as it came out with a much more confident position in international relations, demanding a more proactive role and place in the development and reform of the “Global Governance System”.<sup>10</sup> That was a sufficient sign that the previous “Low Key Strategy” (*Tao Guang Yang Hui*) was abandoned.<sup>11</sup> This change from the self-contained, passive, defensive and non-assertive China to an open, proactive, offensive and assertive China, followed gradually with the implementation of radical social and economic reforms, as well as with fundamental changes in international relations in the post-Cold War period

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<sup>7</sup> “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind”, Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva, 18 January 2017. [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c\\_135994707.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm), 20/03/2019.

<sup>8</sup> Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 70.

<sup>9</sup> “The full text of the Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Report of the 18th Central Committee”, 24 October 2017, [http://english.gov.cn/news/top\\_news/2017/10/24/content\\_281475919786014.htm](http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/10/24/content_281475919786014.htm), 31/03/2019.

<sup>10</sup> Duško Dimitrijević, “China’s New Silk Road: the Opportunity for Peaceful World Development”, in: Sergei Chizhikov, Andrei Dmitirev, Kabyliniski Boris (eds), *Development of Trade in Modern World: Innovation and Challenges*, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, North West Institute of Management, Publishing House NWIM, Saint-Petersburg, 2018, pp. 68-82.

<sup>11</sup> Feng Yujun, Alexander Gabuev, Paul Haenle, Ma Bin, Dmitri Trenin, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing”, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, Paper, 8 April 2019, <https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/04/08/belt-and-road-initiative-views-from-washington-moscow-and-beijing-pub-78774>, 23/8/2019.

in which the idea that China should cooperate with all the countries of the world regardless of their size, ideological and political orientation and the level of economic growth had matured.<sup>12</sup> It is no wonder, therefore, that the long-standing foreign policy guidelines of Deng Xiaoping that China should “hide capabilities and bide time” was overcome in the meantime by a more rational approach to the reality in which China should take a very important place of “responsible power” (*Fu Zeren De Daguo*) in the “New World Order”.<sup>13</sup>

## New Chinese positioning in international relations

According to the Chinese understanding transposed into important political documents, this new role of China would mean participation in the new international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice, and “win-win” cooperation. The ultimate goal of Chinese positioning as a “responsible power” would be to build “a community with a shared future for humanity characterized by an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity”.<sup>14</sup> It is, therefore, clear why China is today advocating for greater and more balanced cooperation between developed and developing countries, promoting cooperation in the South-South and South-North directions, and also working to fulfil its obligations on a global level. This positioning stems from a new foreign policy that presumes China’s active involvement in creating a good regional environment as a prerequisite for accepting the Chinese model of development on a global level.<sup>15</sup> On the ideological plane, this position is

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<sup>12</sup> Rush Doshi, “Hu’s to blame for China’s foreign assertiveness?” *Foreign Policy*, The Brookings Institution, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/hu-to-blame-for-chinas-foreign-assertiveness/>, 31/06/2019

<sup>13</sup> Yu Hongjun, “Sincere Dialogue for Conductive Cooperation”, In: *The Contemporary World Multilateral Dialogue*, China Centre for Contemporary World Studies, China Foundation for Peace and Development, Beijing, 2013, p. 9.

<sup>14</sup> “The full text of the Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Report of the 18th Central Committee”, op.cit.

<sup>15</sup> Such a foreign policy tactic, in practice, was accompanied by a gradual growth of Chinese “hard power” with an attractive narrative about the growth of “soft power”, which in the doctrine of international relations is explained by the premise that China, by “smart power”, seeks to convey the idea of its “peaceful rise” or of much more receptive “peaceful development”, in order to eliminate the possibility of a countervailing balance of power. See: Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, New York, 2011, p. 11; Wen Jiabao, “Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China’s Foreign Policy”, *People’s Daily*, 27

covered by a doctrine of a peaceful and harmonious world, which is a basic course of Chinese foreign policy and its response to the challenges and risks of globalization. Following this course, China has adopted the development strategy of the *New Silk Road*, whose framework is defined with the program ideas of the *Silk Road Economic Belt* and the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* colloquially named the *Belt and Road Initiative*.<sup>16</sup> Even if abstractly determined, with quite widely defined geographical, temporal, functional and institutional determinants, the *Belt and Road Initiative* does not accept a geopolitical approach but affirms a geo-economics one based on ideas of common and peaceful coexistence, “win-win” cooperation and comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development.<sup>17</sup> This approach steams from the priorities defined by the strategy of the *New Silk Road*, on establishing policy of co-ordination, connecting facilities, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds firstly with the countries of Asia, Africa and Europe, which in practice actually means the fulfilment of foreign policy guidelines for the all-round opening and enhancement of economic, financial, cultural, scientific and technological cooperation for the purpose of achieving global economic development, regional security and stability, and social prosperity and progress.<sup>18</sup> This approach, which is generally in line with the purposes and principles of the UN

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February 2007. A very interesting vision of China’s New World Order is given in the study: Randall L. Schweller, Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”, *International Security*, vol. 36, no. 1, 2011, pp. 41-72.

<sup>16</sup> “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 28 March 2015, Beijing, [http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330\\_669367.html](http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html), 31/03/2019; “Action Plan for Harmonisation of Standards along the Belt and Road (2015-2017)”, National Development and Reform Commission, 22 October 2015, Beijing, <http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-ews/article/One-Belt-One-Road/Action-Plan-for-Harmonisation-of-Standards-Along-the-Belt-and-Road-2015-2017/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A443L.htm>, 31/03/2019; Duško Dimitrijević, Nikola Jokanović, “China’s New Silk Road Development Strategy”, *Review of International Affairs*, vol. LXVII, no. 1161, 2016, pp. 21-44.

<sup>17</sup> “Promote Friendship between Our People and Jointly Build Silk Road Economic Belt”, *Peoples Daily*, 8 September 2013; “Join Hands to Write a New Chapter of China-Indonesia Relations, and Works together to create a Bright Future of China-ASEN Community of Common Destiny”, *Peoples Daily*, 3 October 2013. In essence, the New Silk Strategy seeks to overcome the weaknesses of the current global economic order and accelerate the revitalization of a large part of the world that covers a wider area with more than 4.6 billion people with a production capacity of 21 trillion US dollars (almost one-third of world GDP). See: Aleksandar Janković, ‘New Silk Road – New growth engine’, *Review of International Affairs*, vol. LXVII, no. 1161, 2016, p. 6.

<sup>18</sup> Hu Yi, “China’s ‘One Belt/One Road’ Policy Is Open to All Nations”, *Executive Intelligence Review*, 20 March 2015, [https://larouchepub.com/other/2015/4212hu\\_yi\\_spch.html](https://larouchepub.com/other/2015/4212hu_yi_spch.html), 31/03/2019.

Charter, does not deny the use of existing bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation in favour of wider integration and connectivity with the existing development initiatives of regional organizations and political structures.<sup>19</sup> Also, this approach does not exclude the engagement of the participating countries to the activities of international and regional financial institutions, primarily in the activities of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the (BRICS) New Development Bank (NDB), the China, Central & Eastern Europe Investment Co-operation Fund (CEEFund) and the Silk Road Fund (SRF), which represent an equivalent to the transatlantic monetary system carried out by the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).<sup>20</sup> In this respect, it is important to mention such a position does not rule out the possibility of establishing innovative models of cooperation between states or between states and international organizations in order to participate in the *Belt and Road Initiative*, which represents dynamic framework of the *New Silk Road* development strategy. After all, this is illustrated by the example of the formation of the “16+1” mechanism between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and China, which covers various areas of cooperation, starting with infrastructure, finance, trade, transport, agriculture, energy and telecommunications, to scientific, technological, cultural, educational and medical cooperation and people-to-people exchange.<sup>21</sup> In the next part of the study, we will analyze the evolution of the “16+1” cooperation mechanism and the concrete effects of summits held at the highest state level between China and the CEEC.

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<sup>19</sup> In this regard, it does not exclude cooperation with existing organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), ASEAN plus China, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), the Asia-Pacific Dialogue (APD), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, the Strategic Dialogue between China and the Gulf Cooperation Committee, the Economic Community of Brazil, Russia, India, China and the South African Union (BRICS).

<sup>20</sup> Helga Zepp-LaRouche, “The New Silk Road Leads to the Future of Mankind!” In: *The New Silk Road Becomes the World Land-Bridge*, E.I.R. News Service Inc., Washington, 2015, pp. 3, etc.

<sup>21</sup> Duško Dimitrijević, “CEEC-China 16+1 Mechanism of Cooperation and Chinese Investments in Serbia”, in: *From 16+1 to One Belt One Road Initiative – Cooperation, Development and Win-Win*, Institute of Russian, East European & Central Asian Studies, Beijing, Shanghai University, CASS, Beijing, 2017, pp. 94-112.



## Evolution of the CEEC-China mechanism for cooperation

### *Initial proposals for improving mutual cooperation*

From the aspect of the official Chinese foreign policy discourse, cooperation between China and the CEEC within the “16+1” mechanism is an important factor for strengthening the Chinese partnership with the EU.<sup>22</sup> This is first indicated after the opening of a transregional platform with an identical name officially announced by the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the China-CEEC Economic and Trade Forum held on 25 June 2011 in Budapest.<sup>23</sup> Promoting the so-called “five proposals” to enhance China’s cooperation with the CEEC, Chinese Premier provided an alternative to these countries to restart their economies after the 2008 crisis. Starting from the foreign policy position that all European countries should be treated equally regardless of their size and economic and political strength and that their legitimate national interests must be respected in relations with China, Premier Wen emphasized in the first of the five-point proposal the importance of further enhancing trade cooperation based on mutual interest and trust. At that moment, trade between China and the CEEC was less than 4 percent in their total foreign trade, which was less than 10 percent in trade between China and the EU. Given that China and the EU were strategic partners, while China was the EU’s second-largest trading partner and the EU was China’s biggest trading partner, it was clear that the former Chinese Premier will come up with constructive proposals, primarily with the ones related to greater market opening, reduction of customs and non-tariff barriers and the establishment of customs cooperation, better logistics and free movement of people, goods, services and capital. His second proposal is precisely the supposition of this suggestion, as it insists on improving two-way investments. Considering China and the CEEC have to work intensively on improving legal regulations on two-way investments and removing investment barriers of various types, he insisted on actively engaging in diversified forms of activities to promote different types of mutually profitable investment

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<sup>22</sup> Jasminka Simić, “The New Silk Road and the Role of 16+1 in Creating a New Economic Miracle for Europe”, in: Marcia Merry Baker, Michael Billington, Dennis Small, Ronald Kokinda and Megan Beets (eds), *The New Silk Road Becomes the World-Land Bridge: A Shared Future for Humanity*, Schiller Institute, vol. II, 2018, pp. 249-250.

<sup>23</sup> “China proposes more cooperation with Central, East European Countries”, *People’s Daily*, 26 June 2011, <http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90883/7420628.html>, 01/02/2020; “Joint Statement Deepening the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit”, [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/2649\\_665393/t1145387.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1145387.shtml), 01/02/2020.

projects. In the third proposal, the Chinese Premier insisted on strengthening co-operation in the construction of infrastructure, which should establish a logistics network to facilitate the flow of goods and peoples. In the fourth proposal, he pledged to deepen fiscal and financial co-operation, which would provide a greater flow of capital and higher forms of business cooperation. Finally, in the fifth proposal, Premier Wen stressed the two sides should expand the people-to-people exchange in areas such as education, culture, health, sports, tourism, and science.

## CEEC-China Summits

### *The first Warsaw Summit in 2012*

During the first Summit of the leaders of China and the CEEC held in Warsaw (Poland) on 26 April 2012, Wen's "five proposals" were transformed into the so-called "12-point Initiative".<sup>24</sup> With this new Initiative, so-called *China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries*, the leaders of the participating countries agreed that the "16+1" platform has to grow into an official mechanism for multilateral and bilateral cooperation and policy coordination.<sup>25</sup> In this respect, the first of the 12 proposed points of the Initiative is indicative as it foresees the establishment of a Secretariat for Cooperation between China and the CEEC, which was officially inaugurated in September 2012 in Beijing. Its competence includes the coordination of activities between China and the CEEC, which, among other things, includes preparing the summit of leaders, preparing economic and trade forums and other gatherings, and the implementation of adopted decisions, directives, and guidelines. The Secretariat is managed and coordinated by the Secretary-General, the Executive Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General. It consists of 24 member units, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Secretariat office is located in the Department of European Affairs of China's Foreign Ministry.<sup>26</sup> The remaining

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<sup>24</sup> "China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries", [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/topics\\_665678/wjbispg\\_665714/t928567.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/wjbispg_665714/t928567.shtml), 01/02/2020.

<sup>25</sup> Anastas Vangeli, "China's Engagement with the Sixteen Countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative", *China & World Economy*, vol. 25, no. 5, 2017, pp. 101-124.

<sup>26</sup> "Introduction of the Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries", Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, [http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/msc\\_1/mscjj/t1411097.htm](http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/msc_1/mscjj/t1411097.htm), 02/02/2020.

points of this Initiative regulate *inter alia* the issue of granting a special credit line of a 10 billion US\$ for the needs of the CEEC.<sup>27</sup> It is interesting that through this path, China has enabled the CEEC to directly address its financial organizations and banks such as Bank of China, the National Development Bank of China, the Export and Import Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, China CITIC Bank, etc. The Initiative also contain points about setting up an Investment Cooperation Fund between China and the CEEC with the goal of raising 500 million US\$ in the first stage; increase of the total trade volume between China and the CEEC to 100 billion US\$ by 2015; stimulation of Chinese enterprises to invest in special economic and technology zones in the CEEC; exploration of potential financial cooperation such as “currency swap, local currency settlement for cross-border trade and establishment of bank branches in each other’s countries”; establishment of an expert advisory committee on the construction of a transportation network between China and the CEEC; expansion of cultural cooperation; establishment of a Tourism Promotion Agency and the Research Fund and hosting of the first Young Political Leaders Forum of China and CESEE in 2013.<sup>28</sup>

### ***The second Bucharest Summit in 2013***

The second Summit of Heads of Government of China and the CEEC was held in Bucharest (Romania) on 26 November 2013. The Summit participants formulated the “Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and the CEEC“. The Guidelines are focused on the theme of the “win-win“ cooperation, which implies increased investment and trade volumes, as well as increased cooperation in the fields of science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and energy (especially in the matter of nuclear power, wind power, hydropower, solar power and other sources of clean power). The document promotes people-to-people exchanges and cultural exchanges and cooperation. Special emphasis is given to infrastructure development. The Guidelines encourage China and the CEEC to build an international railway transportation corridor connecting China with the CEEC; along this railway corridor, distribution centres will be established to build a new logistics passage

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<sup>27</sup> Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “China’s Charm Offensive in Central and Eastern Europe: The Implementation of Its ‘12 Measures Strategy’”, *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of International Affairs*, no. 106, 2013, pp. 1, etc.

<sup>28</sup> Anastas Vangeli, “Beijing via Warsaw: The growing importance of China – CESEE relations”, *Perspectives Internationales*, vol. 5, 2012, <http://perspectivesinternationales.com/?p=511,12/02/2020>.

between China and Europe. The document particularly supports the establishment of mutual cooperation in the area of free movement of capital and financial services. The document also welcomes the official launch of the Investment Cooperation Fund, as well as the establishment of contractual cooperation between the National Bank of China and CEEC central banks.<sup>29</sup> For the purpose of further coordination and institutionalization, the participants insisted on the more frequent maintenance of investment and scientific forums and the establishment of chambers of commerce of China and the CEEC, which can be joined by the Member States voluntarily. The summit announced the establishment of several new forums in the field of science and education, such as China-CEEC high-level symposium of think tanks, China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum, the Education Policy Dialogue, etc. Finally, the Summit participants agreed on the need to establish coordination centres in different fields of cooperation.

### ***Third Belgrade Summit in 2014***

At the third Summit between China and the CEEC held in Belgrade (Serbia) on 16 December 2014, the Heads of Government announced the "Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation".<sup>30</sup> According to the Guidelines, the parties will expand trade, investment and economic cooperation and deepen cooperation in science, technology, innovation, environmental protection, and cultural exchange.<sup>31</sup> The Guidelines invites parties to fully utilize 10 billion US\$ in special loans and other financing tools provided by China for the promotion of trade and economic cooperation. At the same time, the formation of a new Chinese fund that would

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<sup>29</sup> "The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries", Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 29 November 2013. [http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz\\_1/t1410594.htm](http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1410594.htm), 12/01/2020.

<sup>30</sup> "The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries", Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 26 January 2015, [http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz\\_1/t1410596.htm](http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1410596.htm), 12/02/2020.

<sup>31</sup> "China Boosts Investment in Central and Eastern Europe", *EurActiv*, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/china-boosts-investment-central-and-eastern-europe-310997>, 02/02/2020; "China, CEE Countries Outline Blueprint for Further Economic Cooperation", *Xinhua*, 17 December 2014; Duško Dimitrijević, Nikola Jokanović, "Chinese Investment in Serbia-joint Pledge for the Future of the New Silk Road", in: Huang Ping, Liu Zuokui (eds), *China-CEEC Cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative*, Institute of European Studies Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 2017, pp. 64-85; "The importance of Chinese investments in the One Belt, One Road Initiative", in: Duško Dimitrijević, Huang Ping (eds), *Initiatives of the New Silk Road - Achievements and Challenges*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade 2017, pp. 360-390.

finance business projects with the CEEC was announced. In this regard, an emphasis was put on the project related to the modernization of the Belgrade-Budapest line, considered to be of key importance for further linking with the routes towards Macedonia and Greece and the inclusion in the *China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line*.<sup>32</sup> The significant success of the Belgrade Summit is further institutionalization of the mechanism “16+1” that has been reflected in encouraging the establishment of the Executive Office of the Business Council in Warsaw, the Secretariat of the Contact Mechanism for Investment Promotion Agencies in Beijing and Warsaw, the Consortium for Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation in Sofia, the Tourism Promotion Agency in Budapest, the Association on Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation in Belgrade and Think Tanks Exchange and Cooperation Centre.

### ***The fourth Suzhou Summit in 2015***

At the fourth Summit held in Suzhou (China) on 24 November 2015, the CEEC and China expressed their readiness for “a new starting point, new fields and a new vision” in the development of their mutual cooperation.<sup>33</sup> They stated their readiness to formulate the Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation with the aims to improve the “16+1” cooperation mechanism by setting out directions and priorities from 2015 to 2020. Calling for efforts to realize the shared goal of building a new type of open inclusive and “win-win” partnership, China gave a proposal for six priority areas of cooperation that should include the roadmap for fostering mutual cooperation. In this regard, the Summit participants supported the Chinese Initiative for the *Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation* and the implementation of the earlier planned project for the construction of the *China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line*. Also, the Summit participants supported the existing synergy in national development strategies and the establishment of new models of cooperation.<sup>34</sup> Chinese proposal resulted in the signing of a series of important

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<sup>32</sup> Duško Dimitrijević, “New Silk Road: Achievements & Prospects Of Serbia-China Economic Cooperation”, *Executive Intelligence Review*, vol. 45, no. 28, 2018, pp. 34-38; “Capacities for Development Serbia’s Cooperation with China”, *Working Paper*, China-CEE Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Budapest, no. 4, 2017, pp. 1-14; Wendy Zeldin, “China: New Guidelines for Cooperation Signed with Central and Eastern European Countries”, *Global Legal Monitor*, 29 December 2014, [http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc\\_news?disp3\\_l205404250\\_text,03/02/2020](http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205404250_text,03/02/2020).

<sup>33</sup> Zhang Lirong, “The “Sixteen plus One” Cooperation will take China-EU relations to a New level”, *EU Observer*, 25 October 2015, Brussels, <https://euobserver.com/stakeholders/131270>, 13/02/2020.

<sup>34</sup> Ivona Lađevac, Branislav Đorđević, “Possibilities for promoting interconnectivity between China and Central and Eastern European countries”, *Review of International Affairs*, vol. LXVII, no. 1161, 2016, p. 75.

agreements, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Improvement of the Initiatives of the “New Silk Road”. Also, the parties adopted the “Suzhou Guidelines” in which the CEEC and China gave attention to further deepening of cooperation within the “16+1” mechanism.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, they identified the importance of relations with the EU, since the EU-China Connectivity Platform also reaffirmed the importance of cooperation within the *Belt and Road Initiative*. Hence, it should not be surprising that the documents highlight the link between the *Belt and Road Initiative* and national development strategies. The Medium-term Agenda for Cooperation therefore anticipated, *inter alia*, the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and EU-China Agenda 2020 as guidelines for the future development of their mutual relations.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Fifth Riga Summit in 2016***

At the fifth Summit held in Riga (Latvia) on 5 November 2016, the Heads of Government of CEEC and China adopted the “Riga Guidelines”.<sup>37</sup> The focus of the Guidelines was on “connectivity, innovation, inclusiveness and common development”. In that way, the cooperation under the format “16+1” should foster closer cooperation in the new different fields. Cooperation should be developed in synergy between the “16+1” and the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including the EU-China Connectivity Platform. Recognizing the facilitating role of the Medium-Term Agenda, participants also supported the further coordination and institutionalization of the “16 + 1” mechanism by setting up a Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation with the Virtual Information Platform in Riga. At the Summit, it was decided that Latvia would be the coordinator for organizing the first meeting of China-CEEC Transport Ministers in 2017 in Riga.<sup>38</sup> Further institutionalization of mutual cooperation was expressed through the establishment

<sup>35</sup> “The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 24 November 2015, at: [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/zxxx\\_662805/t1318039.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1318039.shtml), 21/04/2019.

<sup>36</sup> Dragan Pavličević, “China’s New Silk Road Takes Shape in Central and Eastern Europe”, *China Brief*, vol. XV, issue 1, 2015, p. 12.

<sup>37</sup> “The Riga Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 6 November 2016, [http://english.gov.cn/news/international\\_exchanges/2016/11/06/content\\_281475484363051.htm](http://english.gov.cn/news/international_exchanges/2016/11/06/content_281475484363051.htm), 09/09/2019.

<sup>38</sup> “Riga Declaration on Closer Cooperation in Logistics will foster integrated transport corridors development between Europe and China”, <http://www.ceec-china-logistics.org/en/events/riga-declaration-on-closer-cooperation-in-logistics-will-foster-integrated-transport-corridors-development-between-europe-and-china/01/02/2020>.

of the Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects in Romania, the Technology Transfer Centre in Slovakia, the Coordination Mechanism on Forestry Cooperation in Slovenia and the Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland, which should be the main institutional support in the realization of the previously promoted Initiative of the *Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation*.<sup>39</sup> The Summit also gave a significant impetus to the various forms of cooperation that should take place under the auspices of institutional entities and forums such as the Inter-Bank Association, the Association of Provincial Governors, the Higher Education Institutes Consortium, the Culture Cooperation Forum, and the Association on the Promotion of Health Cooperation. In that sense, the participants of the Summit expressed their readiness to make concerted efforts to develop synergies between the *Belt and Road Initiative* and the relevant EU Initiatives such as the Trans-European Networks (TEN-T). Therefore, it is not surprising that the participants in the Summit provided adequate financial support for the realization of the planned goals by promoting a new China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund.

### ***The sixth Summit in Budapest in 2017***

The sixth Summit of the Heads of Government of CEEC and China was held in Budapest (Hungary) on 27<sup>th</sup> November 2017. The Summit adopted the “Budapest Co-operation Guidelines”, which insist on further deepening economic, trade and financial co-operation in order to achieve “win-win” development.<sup>40</sup> The document underlined the importance of the established cooperation mechanism of the “16+1” and increasing readiness of the CEEC to continue to cooperate within the *Belt and Road Initiative* through mutual consultations within the mechanism. In this regard, the Guidelines emphasized the future cooperation within the mechanism should not serve as a geopolitical instrument, but rather as an incubator for transregional cooperation, which would improve mutual relations and foster multilateralism and the openness of a global economy respecting international legal standards and the goals of the UN Charter.<sup>41</sup> This has led to

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<sup>39</sup> “Riga Declaration”, The meeting of Heads of Government of Central and Eastern European countries and China, Ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Latvia, [http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zyxw\\_4/t1414325.htm](http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zyxw_4/t1414325.htm), 03/09/2019.

<sup>40</sup> “The Budapest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 28 November 2017, at: [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/2649\\_665393/t1514534.shtml](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1514534.shtml), 01/04/2019.

<sup>41</sup> “Li Keqiang Attends Sixth Summit of Heads of Government of China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, [http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw\\_1/2016lj\\_1/tpxw/t1518685.htm](http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw_1/2016lj_1/tpxw/t1518685.htm), 11/12/2019.

demands for a faster interconnection of land, sea and air, and the application of new business potential to the “16 + 1” framework and the Initiative “Made in China 2025”. Support was also given to further institutionalize the activities of the “16 + 1” mechanism through the formation of new bodies, associations and forums in various fields (for example, in the area of finance, the establishment of the Silk Road Fund, the China-EU Co-Investment Fund, the Secretariat and the Coordination Centre of the Inter-Bank Association; in the field of trade, the establishment of the Economic and Trade Officials Exchange Mechanism, the Trade Facilitation National Inspection Examination Area and the “16+1” e-Commerce Logistics Hub; in the field of aviation, the CEEC-China Civil Aviation; in the field of higher education and science, the establishment of the Secretariat of the Higher Education Institutions Consortium, the Joint Laboratory between CEECs and China for research, innovation and technology; in the field of culture, health and people-to-people exchange the establishment of the Coordination Centre for Cultural Cooperation, the Human Resources for Health Cooperation Network, the Health Policy Research Network, the Association of Publishing Houses, the Youth Development Centre and the Sports Cooperation Mechanism, etc).

### ***Seventh Sofia Summit in 2018***

The seventh annual Summit of the Heads of Government of CEEC and China took place in Sofia (Bulgaria) on 6 and 7 July 2018. The Summit welcomed the participation of third country observers and institutions and their potential willingness to engage in the cooperation mechanism based on prior consultations and consensus.<sup>42</sup> The Summit also reaffirmed its adherence to the UN Charter, as well as the principles of mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation and building an open world economy. Facing the challenges of the growing deficit in mutual trade relations, the participants stressed the need for a more balanced economic partnership and the fulfilment of previously undertaken commitments.<sup>43</sup> This approach was also confirmed by the “Sofia Guidelines on Cooperation”, which

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<sup>42</sup> Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, “Prospects for CEE-China Relations after the Sofia Summit”, *Bulletin of the Polish Institute of International Affairs*, no. 91, 2019, p. 1162, <http://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-91-1162,01/02/2020>.

<sup>43</sup> The six-year history of relations between China and the CEEC consists of growing trade exchange in favor of China in combination with relatively small Chinese investments in the CEEC (approximately \$ 10 billion), and negligible investments of the CEEC in China (about \$ 1.4 billion). See: Bartosz Kowalski, “What’s Next for the China-CEE 16+1 Platform?”, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/whats-next-for-the-china-cee-161-platform/>, 02/01/2020.



expressed the intention of the parties to fulfil the commitments from the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, within the applicable norms of international and internal law, and in line with EU standards and policies vis-à-vis the CEEC countries that are also members of this organisation. The Guidelines confirmed again the importance of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of peace, growth, reform and civilization and the EU-China Agenda 2020, including their active participation in the pilot projects in the framework of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, the Investment Plan for Europe, the extended Trans-European Network (TEN-T) and the Agreement on Investment between the EU and China. By supporting trade cooperation, investment and connectivity, the representatives of the participating countries supported the further development of balanced economic cooperation through the respect of the WTO rules, based on principles of the level-playing field and equal opportunities. They also supported progress in regional projects and initiatives (first of all, in building the Belgrade-Budapest railway and expanding cooperation within the *Three Seas Initiative*). Finally, they supported progress in the area of investment in infrastructure projects, transport and civil aviation, as well as progress in public procurement and enhanced cooperation and customs clearance facilitation.<sup>44</sup>

### ***Eighth Summit in Dubrovnik in 2019***

The eighth Summit of the Heads of Government of CEEC and China was held in Dubrovnik (Croatia) on 12 April 2019. The Summit welcomed the accession of Greece as a full participant in the “16 + 1” cooperation mechanism (since then in the so-called “17 + 1” cooperation mechanism).<sup>45</sup> The Summit adopted the Dubrovnik guidelines for cooperation between China and the CEEC, reaffirming their commitment to nurturing sustainable global economic development and a multilateral trade system based on WTO rules.<sup>46</sup> The Guidelines express a firm commitment to the goals of economic globalization outlined in strategically important documents such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the

<sup>44</sup> “The Sofia Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, Xinhua, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/16/c\\_137328408.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/16/c_137328408.htm), 22/02/2019.

<sup>45</sup> Emilian Kavalski, “China’s ‘16+1’ is dead? Long Live the ‘17+1’”, *The Diplomat*, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/13/WS5cb15f54a3104842260b5ff3\\_1.html](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/13/WS5cb15f54a3104842260b5ff3_1.html), 16/08/2019. <https://the-diplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171/>

<sup>46</sup> “The Dubrovnik Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, *China Daily*, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/13/WS5cb15f54a3104842260b5ff3\\_1.html](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/13/WS5cb15f54a3104842260b5ff3_1.html), 12/12/2019.

Paris Agreement, the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of peace, growth, reform and civilization and EU-China Strategic Agenda 2020 for Cooperation. As in the previous Guidelines, the Dubrovnik Guidelines emphasize the need to establish effective cooperation mechanisms in the area of connectivity first (starting from the spirit of the *Belt and Road Initiative* and the EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia, and in compliance with international and European standards). Cooperation in this regard should be developed through the promotion of the digital economy, efficient transport connectivity and smart, sustainable, secure and secure mobility. Achieving these goals will require that all stakeholders comply with the objectives announced in the Investment Plan for Europe, the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), and the EU-China Connectivity Platform. In this area, the Guidelines further emphasize that participants should promote railway and infrastructure investment projects, participate in fostering the development of joint administrative cooperation in customs matters, and in achieving the EU-China Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation. They welcome important progress made by China, Serbia and Hungary on the Belgrade-Budapest railway project and its possible extensions to the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Baltic Sea (*Three Seas Initiative*). They also support moving forward practical cooperation in the development of the *China–Europe Land-Sea Express Line*.<sup>47</sup> The Dubrovnik Guidelines also encourage the further work of existing institutional structures of “16+1” cooperation between China and the CEEC and recommend the establishment of brand-new ones (for example, the Customs Information Centre in Hungary, the Youth Development Centre in Albania, the Coordination Mechanism for Sports in CEECs, the Information and Communication Technology Coordination Mechanism in Croatia, the Energy Cooperation Dialogue, the Smart City Coordination Centre in Romania, the Block chain Centre of Excellence under the leadership of Slovakia, the Creative Hub in Montenegro, etc.).

## General Conclusions

The idea of the “16+1” cooperation between the CEEC and China was initially at the level of the transregional platform on cooperation between equal participating States. This idea was subsequently, systematically and successively transformed into one, in the international relations a little-known institutional

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<sup>47</sup> Senada Šelo Šabić, “China in Southeast Europe: Detecting the Trend”, in: Chen Xin, He Zhigao (eds), *16+1 Cooperation and China-EU Relationship*, China-CEE Institute, Budapest, 2018, p. 214.

mechanism for multilateral and bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. This mechanism was shaped by many structural dimensions and operational layers manifested through various institutional actions at the vertical and horizontal level. Thus, it is noticeable the mechanism serves to achieve connectivity and coordination between China and the CEEC through the engagement of heads of government through the holding of annual summits dedicated to enhancing mutual cooperation. These multi-level exchanges include also top-down political contacts and meetings among ministers and ministries officials and local government officials. When analyzing all effects of all these annual summits, it can be concluded that the “16+1” mechanism arises from common political will and mutual demand for closer cooperation in different social fields. The cooperation covers various areas ranging from finance, trade, transportation, agriculture, energy and telecommunication to scientific, technological and cultural cooperation. It covers different multi-track means of policy coordination and people-to-people exchanges. In this regard, state authorities have developed multi-fields activities which include, *inter alia*, different kinds of conferences, forums, symposiums, exhibitions and dialogues (for example, the high-level conference on transport, logistics and trade routes connecting Asia with Europe, the Customs Cooperation Forum, the Cultural Cooperation Forum, the high-level symposium of think tanks, the Young Political Leaders’ Forum, the Education Policy Dialogue, etc.).<sup>48</sup> Generally elaborating, China and the CEEC have simultaneously established connectivity using existing administrative capacity or by forming new administrative and coordinating bodies as was the case with the establishment of the Secretariat which was officially inaugurated in September 2012 in Beijing, in the presence of the National Coordinators of all 16 European countries and China.<sup>49</sup> The Secretariat operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and its competence includes the coordination of activities between China and the CEEC, which, among other things include preparing the summit of leaders, preparing economic and trade forums and other gatherings, and the implementation of adopted decisions, directives and guidelines. The participants of the “16 + 1” mechanism encourage the Secretariat to conduct cooperation consultations in China and the CEECs through bilateral and multilateral activities. To further institutionalize the

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<sup>48</sup> Long Jing, “Cooperation between China and CEE countries: features, significance and prospect”, *Diplomacy Journal*, January 2015, <http://diplomacy.bg/archives/1438?lang=en>, 25/04/2016.

<sup>49</sup> National coordinators are appointed by the CEEC to be responsible for coordination with the Secretariat and to jointly promote China and CEEC cooperation. Interconnection between the national coordinators takes place at the annual meetings organized by the participating states of the mechanism.

mechanism of cooperation between China and the CEEC, there has been some interregional and sectoral cooperation. In this respect, already existing institutional capacities have been used at various levels ranging from steering and management committees to professional associations such as chambers of commerce, inter-bank association, higher education institutes consortium, and association on the promotion of health cooperation. This approach has led to the establishment of numerous multilateral executive and coordinated bodies, such as the Executive Office of the Business Council in Warsaw, the Secretariat of the Contact Mechanism for China–CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies in Beijing and Warsaw, the Consortium for Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation in Sofia, the Tourism Promotion Agency in Budapest, the Association on Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation in Belgrade, the Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation with the Virtual Information Platform in Riga, the Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects in Romania, the Technology Transfer Centre in Slovakia, the Coordination Mechanism on Forestry Cooperation in Slovenia, the Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland, the Think Tanks Exchange and Cooperation Centre, etc. In certain very important sectoral areas of cooperation such as financial cooperation, the “16+1” mechanism has established the Silk Road Fund, the China-EU Co-Investment Fund, the Secretariat, and the Coordination Centre of the Inter-Bank Association. In the field of trade, the establishment of the Economic and Trade Officials Exchange Mechanism, the Trade Facilitation National Inspection Examination Area and the 16+1 e-Commerce Logistics Hub has been also supported. In the area of higher education and science, a proposal was made to establish the Secretariat of the Higher Education Institutions Consortium, the Joint Laboratory between CEECs and China for research, innovation and technology and the Coordination Centre for Cultural Cooperation. Also, in the field of culture, health and people-to-people exchange, the “16+1” mechanism supported the establishment of the Coordination Centre for Cultural Cooperation, the Human Resources for Health Cooperation Network, the Health Policy Research Network, the Public Health Cooperation Network, the Association of Publishing Houses, the Youth Development Centre in the CEECs and the Sports Cooperation Mechanism, etc.

A new approach to the “16+1” cooperation marked the new direction of China’s foreign policy toward the CEEC and its geo-economic influence in this European region. At the same time, this was a stepping stone for the CEEC itself, as this mechanism could be linked not only to China but also to other important countries of the world, primarily those involved in the *Belt and Road Initiative*, which significantly influenced the optimization of their foreign policy position. Hence, the transformation of the idea of transregional cooperation into the institutional mechanism of cooperation “16+1”, intended primarily for the implementation of

the *Belt and Road Initiative* within the frameworks of the development strategy of the “New Silk Road”, represents one inventive endeavour of China and the CEEC in creating the multilateralism in international relations. In this regard, although the “16+1” mechanism of cooperation between the CEEC and China is in some way a reminiscence of international organizations, this is not because it represents a completely new form of international cooperation resulting from one, primarily a Chinese political vision formulated through the *Belt and Road Initiative* that gives significant emphasis to international connectivity, sustainable development, harmonization and coordination of public policies and global economic governance. In the future period, the “16+1” (today “17+1”) mechanism may serve as a catalyst which would bring some new approaches to development and strategic partnership in various productive spheres between China and the CEEC. The mechanism framework could help in mutual understanding and then to facilitate business contacts, build social networks, and make business decisions easier. Thus, the mechanism is in line with China’s goal of being a strategic partner with the EU, while its relationship with countries in Central and Eastern Europe can manifest itself as a positive driving force within the relationship between China and the EU. China believes that, by enhancing the overall level of its relations with the CEEC, it will be in a position to promote a more stable and healthy China-Europe relationship as well. Such an approach presupposes harmonization with the CEEC national development strategies, respecting their internal legal framework and then also respecting the competences, rules and standards of the EU as well as the obligations accepted in political and legal documents concluded with the EU such as the China-European Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, the EU-China Connectivity Platform, the Investment Plan for Europe and the Agreement on Investment between the EU and China.<sup>50</sup> The lack of any of these alignments can lead to justifiable international concerns, making it difficult to meet the set goals from the stated China-EU program documents and to the suspicion of the sustainability of the achieved results of cooperation within the mechanism. Also, it is possible that lack of mutual synchronization on one of the mentioned grounds can lead to a division between the EU member states that are also participants in the mechanism of cooperation with other EU member states. This possible divergence between the EU member states has become indicative with the introduction of the most recent EU legal framework establishing a screening mechanism for FDI in areas of vital interest for

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<sup>50</sup> Dragan Pavličević, “China’s New Silk Road Takes Shape in Central and Eastern Europe”, *China Brief*, vol. XV, issue 1, 2015, p. 12; “The Sofia Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, op. cit.

the EU which in many cases covers individual economic and market interests of the member states.<sup>51</sup> For coordinated relations between China and the EU, the problem may also be the change in the previous position of the candidate countries for EU accession in terms of full harmonization of domestic legislation with EU legislation, which has recently become very indicative, and which can additionally burden the harmonious and comprehensive development of Sino-European relations.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, the happy circumstance for development of mutual relations is the existence of institutional synergy that can lead to the enhancement of cooperation and strategic partnerships within the China-EU-CEEC triangle as was noted after the recent meetings of the Chinese President Xi Jinping with the leaders of Italy and France at the annual Summit in Dubrovnik.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> “Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union”, *Official Journal* L 79, 21 March 2019; Liu Zuokui, “Europe’s Protectionist Position on the Belt and Road Initiative and Its Influence”, *China International Studies*, September/October 2018, pp. 145-165.

<sup>52</sup> Marcin Przychodniak, “The “EU effect”: How European Union influences state’s involvement in the “16+1” China-Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC) Initiative”, *Working Paper*, China-CEE Institute, Budapest, no. 16, 2018, p. 4.

<sup>53</sup> Shannon Tiezzi, “Xi Jinping in Europe: A Tale of 2 Countries”, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/xi-jinping-in-europe-a-tale-of-2-countries/>, 12/12/2019; Liu Zuokui, *Europe and the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Responses and Risks*, Chinese Social Science Press, Beijing, 2016, pp. 88, etc; Gu, Hongfei, *Reconstructing China-EU Relations: Institutional Dilemma of “16+1” Cooperation Mechanism*, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2018, pp. 1-8; Dragan Pavličević, “A Power Shift Underway in Europe? China’s Relationship with Central and Eastern Europe Under the Belt and Road Initiative”, in: Li Xing (ed.), *Mapping China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative*, International Political Economy Series, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019, pp. 268, etc.

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Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Nikola JOKANOVIĆ

**MEHANIZAM SARADNJE CIE-KINA I INICIJATIVA POJASA I PUTA:  
OD IDEJE DO INSTITUCIONALIZACIJE – ŠEST GODINA KASNIJE**

**Apstrakt:** U radu se analizira proces institucionalizacije međuvladine saradnje i koordinacije državnih politika kroz mehanizam saradnje zemalja Centralne i Istočne Evrope (CIE) i Kine poznatiji u javnosti kao "16+1" (odnosno, kao "17+1" počev od 2019. godine). Kroz eklektičku sliku razvoja savremenih međunarodnih odnosa, autori na metodološki pristupačan način ukazuju da ovaj mehanizam saradnje predstavlja značajan podsticaj za razvoj međunarodnih odnosa. S obzirom da je Kina preuzela dominantnu ulogu u redefinisaju „Globalnog sistema upravljanja“ čiji su ciljevi uravnotežen i održiv međunarodni razvoj, za njihovo ostvarenje Kina je utvrdila određene ideološke okvire koji su prisutni u njenoj spoljnoj politici kroz *Inicijativu pojasa i puta*. Kroz ovu Inicijativu, Kina nastoji postići šire ciljeve strategije razvoja *Novog puta svile* koja ne samo da određuje pravce unutrašnjeg razvoja Kine, već daje smernice za njenu stratešku saradnju sa susjednim zemljama kao i sa zemljama na drugim kontinentima. Sledstveno, i sam mehanizam "16+1" (danas "17+1"), na taj način dobija važnu ulogu u ojačavanju kineske spoljnopolitičke pozicije i to, ne samo u odnosu na CIE, već i u odnosu na ostale evropske zemlje, uključujući i EU u celini.

**Ključne reči:** Mehanizam saradnje „16 + 1“, Inicijativa pojasa i puta, razvojna strategija Novog puta svile, Kina, CEEC.

UDC 339.923:061.1EU  
327(497.11)(061.1EU:510)  
Biblid: 0025-8555, 72(2020)  
Vol. LXXII, No. 2, pp. 337–355

Original article  
Received 20 February 2020  
Accepted 7 March 2020  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2002337V>

# European Union integration and the Belt and Road Initiative: A Curious case of Serbia

Mihajlo VUČIĆ<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** The topic of this article is the Serbian foreign policy between its main strategic aims – membership in the European Union, and cooperation with China in the framework of the Belt and Road initiative. Serbia bases its foreign policy upon four pillars – the accession process to the EU and three strategic partnerships with great world powers – China, the United States of America, and Russia. However, the accession process to the EU requires from Serbia to strictly follow its obligations from the Stabilization and Association Agreement, Treaty Establishing the Transport Community, and other treaties signed with the EU which might sometimes conflict with project activities from the Belt and Road partnership process. These obligations relate mostly to competition and environmental protection. The author gives the analysis of the main points of possible conflict and indicates a double standard in the EU approach to the Belt and Road initiative. Then he presents arguments that indicate the Belt and Road can serve as a bridge between candidate countries and the EU internal market. The author concludes that although there exist some structural justifications to EU's skepticism towards the Belt and Road, the best way to overcome them is to insist on political dialogue on many existing levels between the EU and China, with the aim to exchange information between them on EU rules, policies and standards to make sure Chinese investments and other financial activities in Serbia are in accordance with its accession obligations.

**Keywords:** European Integration, Serbia, the Belt and Road Initiative, Foreign Policy.

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project “Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2020”, financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

## Introduction

The Republic of Serbia's position in international relations can be compared with a pendulum. It always somehow oscillates between the opposite poles. Sometimes, however, this oscillation can be found to be aligned with its national interest, since its geographical position as a bridge between the East and the West simply conditions it to look both ways in the formulation of its foreign policy.

The Serbian foreign policy priority since the change of regime in October 2000 has been the path towards membership in the European Union. Evidence of this foreign policy orientation can be found in the "Resolution on Accession to the European Union" (2004) and "National Strategy for Serbia's accession to the European Union" (2005). Both these documents confirm the accession to the EU is a strategic choice of Serbia and that this strategic direction has an advantage over other pillars of the Serbian foreign policy<sup>2</sup>. The crown of the accession process so far has been the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement as a step in which Serbia and the EU connected economically and established a legally binding treaty relationship. The essence of the Agreement is about economic matters and the development of economic relations between the parties. Its key provisions deal with periods for the transition process and the tempo of liberalization of trade in industrial and agricultural products, as well as the harmonization of Serbian law with EU law in the field of free-market functioning. After fulfilling some conditions concerning negotiations with Kosovo, Serbia was given a candidate status by the European Council in 2012.

At the time of this writing, almost 19 years have passed since the Serbian proclamation of the accession process as a foreign policy priority, and the membership door still remains just slightly opened. In the meantime, Serbia has tried to advance its position in building partnerships with other powerful actors on the global level. In accord with this line was the proclamation of four foreign policy strategic pillars – the accession process to the EU and three strategic partnerships with great world powers – China, the United States of America and Russia<sup>3</sup>. At around the same time, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proclaimed.

As it is well known, the BRI is the short form for the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a huge China's foreign policy project which

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<sup>2</sup> Dejan Orlić, *Evropska unija kao strateški pravac Srbije – stanje i perspektive odnosa Srbije i EU*, 2012, in M. Rašević, M.M. Marković, *Pomeraćemo granice*, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, str. 200.

<sup>3</sup> Dragan Živojinović, Dragan Đukanović, „Strateška partnerstva Republike Srbije”, *Godišnjak Fakulteta političkih nauka*, br. 6, Beograd, 2011, str. 300.

consists of policy coordination, connectivity of infrastructure and facilities, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people ties (a five-pronged approach). It focuses on eight fields -infrastructure connectivity, economic and trade cooperation, industrial investment cooperation, energy resources cooperation, financial cooperation, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, ecological and environmental cooperation, and maritime cooperation, and aims at the construction of six Economic Corridors and two key directions. The Belt and Road Initiative is a systematic project, which should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road. Since infrastructure is the priority area of the Initiative, Chinese enterprises are likely to face challenges in the rule of law, environmental protection, labour, human rights, charity, and anti-corruption in states where they initiate and operate BRI investments.<sup>4</sup>

Serbia was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of cooperation with China in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from its inception. Formally, it is included in the Cooperation format 16+1, which encompasses several Central and Eastern European countries and 9 Balkan countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Before the inclusion into the process, Serbia was cooperating with China on a bilateral basis, but the 16+1 process has accelerated this cooperation. Currently, Serbia is at the forefront in terms of quality of its relationships with China, the number and types of projects agreed upon between the two states, whether they have already been realized or have just started. Interstate relations are on the highest level, and the strategic partnership that has existed since 2009 was broadened firstly in 2013 when the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Serbia signed the Memorandum of Understanding in which they indicated mutual wishes to achieve sustainable development goals through political relations, economic complementarity and cooperation and at the same time create an economic cooperation framework to secure peace and prosperity in the region. Finally, in 2016 the partnership between Serbia and China reached a level of an "all-encompassing strategic partnership, which means that highest state officials (chiefs of states, prime ministers, presidents of parliaments and ministers), have been on a mutual visiting streak lately."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Shang, H., *The Belt and the Road Initiative: Key Concepts*. Singapore: Springer. 2019, pp. 11-13.

<sup>5</sup> Žarko Obradović, „Pojas i put na Balkanu i Srbiji (izazovi saradnje)”, in: Cvetković V (ed.), *Novi put svile: evropska perspektiva: bezbednosni izazovi/rizici unutar Inicijative 16+1*, Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2018, str. 167.

This paper concentrates on the question of whether these two foreign policy pillars of Serbia, one nominally higher in the hierarchy (EU integration) but lately becoming stagnant and other developing rapidly and expansively (strategic partnership with China) can conflict, and if they can what is the way to evade this potential conflict. The paper offers a review of potential points of conflict expressed in reservations of the EU official policy towards the BRI initiatives undertaken in the 16+1 framework, particularly concentrating on the consequences of the Chinese economic breakthrough in the Serbian market on Serbia's obligations towards EU law (part I). Then it explains that the solutions for these points of conflict must be sought on the bilateral EU-China level since even the member states of the EU have an interest and indeed are realizing this interest in economic cooperation with China.

## **EU critical stance towards the 16+1 process**

The EU has been closely following the course of relations between Serbia and China. The EU has participated from the very beginning in the 16+1 process through the member states that have become part of it. However, at the first summit in Warsaw (2012), there were no official representatives from EU institutions present, while later only Slovakia and Croatia sent their respective ministers to Beijing to the formation of the Cooperation Secretariat. From the sixth summit held in Budapest in 2017, the EU has attained an observer status. With the practical start of projects in the framework of 16+1, the European Commission has several times raised a question of the compatibility of procedures for their realization with EU law.<sup>6</sup>

In its reports on the Serbian accession process, the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee presented the relationship between Serbia and China by focusing on primarily financial support and assistance, trade, direct foreign direct investments (FDI), security and defence.<sup>7</sup> Most notably, with the Chinese acquisition of the Serbian steel production factory in Smederevo through the Hesteel Group, the Commission reviewed the acquisition to see if it endangers production and prices of steel on the internal market.<sup>8</sup> The report indicated no

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., str. 164.

<sup>7</sup> Miša Stojadinović, Violeta Rašković-Talović, „Serbia and China: The Geopolitical and Economic Importance of Mutual Cooperation for Serbia”, *China-CEE Institute Working Paper* No. 39, 2018, str. 5.

<sup>8</sup> Žarko Obradović, „Pojas i put na Balkanu i Srbiji (izazovi saradnje)”, op.cit., str. 165.



reasons for worry. However, other investments also came under scrutiny. The treaty to reconstruct and build Belgrade-Budapest railroad signed between Hungary, Serbia and China was the next case of Commission's investigations. Hungary, as a member country, was requested to observe EU regulations in the public tendering process for the realization of the project. Again, an investigation to review the accordance of the process with EU competition regulations was conducted.

The EU points out various challenges to Serbian accession obligations that are presented by its cooperation with China. It indicates that financial support in the form of loans represents a burden for the Serbian economy. Furthermore, it fears the Chinese approach of using cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries (16+1 Cooperation) as a springboard to place its products in the EU internal market, using free trade agreements of these countries with the EU and simultaneously bypassing various forms of EU regulation.<sup>9</sup> It has already been noted elsewhere that aspiring members for EU membership will attract additional Chinese investments as they are progressing on their membership journey.<sup>10</sup>

In general, within "money for influence" and "divide and conquer" paradigms, China is understood to be accumulating leverage over the CEE countries by making them to a high degree dependent on the Chinese economy through the financing of strategic projects, the extension of loans for these, and growing trade and investment. In return for such economic benefits, the CEE countries are feared to be prone to "repay" them by following China's line on issues of concern to Beijing. These critical suggestions conclude, therefore, that China's approach to CEE should be understood as designed to ensure and result in the CEE countries' alignment with and support for China's policies and values.<sup>11</sup>

On the back of these narratives, the EU has resorted to using behind-the-door pressures on the CEE countries, hostile rhetoric, and legislative instruments to slow down the development of China-CEE ties.<sup>12</sup> On an official level, it has mostly

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<sup>9</sup> Miša Stojadinović, Violeta Rašković-Talović, „Serbia and China: The Geopolitical and Economic Importance of Mutual Cooperation for Serbia”, op.cit. str. 10.

<sup>10</sup> Danijela Jačimović et al, „The role of Chinese investments in the bilateral exports of new E.U. member states and Western Balkan countries”, *Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja* 31:1, 2018, str. 1195.

<sup>11</sup> Dragan Pavličević, „A Power Shift Underway in Europe? China's Relationship with Central and Eastern Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative”, In Xing L. (ed.) *Mapping China's 'One Belt One Road' Initiative Cham*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 260.

<sup>12</sup> James Reilly, „Leveraging Diversity: Europe's China Policy”, *EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2017/33, European University Institute, 2017.*

ignored the 16+1 initiative, while it has simultaneously withheld official support for the BRI initiative.

Continuing close cooperation between the PRC and the CEE countries, as well as the Southern European economies, created new frictions and inner-EU tensions. In April 2018, 27 EU member states, with only Hungary abstaining, compiled a critical report on China's BRI stating that this initiative "runs counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade and pushes the balance of power in favour of subsidized Chinese companies." However, Hungary and later also Greece decided to conclude bilateral treaties with Beijing on the BRI-based cooperation. In March 2019, as the first G7 economy, Italy officially became a cooperation partner of China's "New Silk Road".<sup>13</sup>

## EU double standards concerning cooperation with China

The EU has a kind of a double-standard view of its cooperation with China sometimes. On the one hand, it seeks to establish connections, both through its common institutions and through individual initiatives of member countries, especially in key BRI fields such as energy and infrastructure, where Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are among the leaders.<sup>14</sup> China responded well to this offer and joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2016 (EBRD) with a purpose to upgrade cooperation with this EU backed bank in several fields including joint financing and policy coordination.<sup>15</sup> The UK, Germany, France and Italy have gone in the opposite direction and joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; a Chinese backed bank established for financing the BRI infrastructural projects.<sup>16</sup>

Cooperation through common institutions is visible in the Memorandum of understanding between the European Commission and the Chinese government

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<sup>13</sup> Nele Noesselt, "Sino-EU Cooperation 2.0: Toward a Global "Green" Strategy?" *East Asian Community Review*, 2019, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Liu Zuokui, L, „Saradnja 16+1” u kontekstu Inicijative Pojas i put” in *Novi put svile: Balkanska perspektiva političko-bezbednosni aspekti*, Beograd, Fakultet bezbednosti, Čigoja štampa, 2016, str. 50.

<sup>15</sup> Yiwei Wang, „The Belt and the Road Initiative – What will China offer the world in its Rise”, *Beijing: New World Press*, 2016, p. 63.

<sup>16</sup> Yiwei Wang, „The Belt and Road Initiative – What will China offer the world in its Rise”, op.cit. p. 77.

that initiated cooperation on the Platform to connect the EU and China. European infrastructural development plans, that is, the realization of Juncker's plan of investments for Europe from 2015 were welcomed by China, and China promised to financially back them. Hence, China became the first non-European country to be included in this EU plan.<sup>17</sup> The benefits of cooperation are obvious from sheer facts of the economic importance of China for the EU and *vice versa*. China is the second-largest economy and the world's biggest trading nation. Trade between the EU and China is the second-largest economic partnership in the world. China has become one of the fastest-growing markets for European exports and the EU's biggest supplier.<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, there are attempts by the EU to control the access of Chinese companies to its internal market. Leading EU countries have initiated legislation motions to evaluate and therefore authorize or ban foreign direct investments. Furthermore, additional legislation has been introduced to protect the European market from cheap Chinese imported goods. The EU strategic approach towards Chinese initiative added up to some of its border countries' bilateral relations but strived to retain control and direction from common institutions in Brussels, which allows the EU to have a flexible position in the sense of undertaking responsibility for results of strategic cooperation.<sup>19</sup>

This double-standard approach was nominally covered by the adoption of The "EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation" which outlined win-win cooperation opportunities in select fields such as "peace and security," "prosperity," and "sustainable development." In addition to bilateral projects, the agenda stressed coordination and consultation within international organizations and multilateral frameworks. However, such an agenda remained only a rather abstract and vague formal confirmation of both sides' willingness to engage in dialogue and exchange.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Aleksandar Janković, "New Silk Road – New Growth Engine", *Review of International Affairs* 67, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2016, p. 8.

<sup>18</sup> Ivona Lađevac, Branislav Đorđević, „Possibilities for Promoting Interconnectivity between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, *Review of International Affairs* 67, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2016, p. 70.

<sup>19</sup> Marko Nikolić, „Central-Eastern European Countries' (CEEC) and Serbia's Perspective and Position towards Chinese "One Belt, One Road" Initiative—A Geo-Political Overview”, *Review of International Affairs* 67, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2016, p. 54.

<sup>20</sup> Nele Noesselt, „Sino–EU Cooperation 2.0: Toward a Global "Green" Strategy?", *op. cit.*, p. 10.

## The 16+1 process as a bridge between the Belt and Road Initiative and EU membership

It has been pointed out that the 16+1 cooperation successfully fills in the gaps left by the EU's partial withdrawal from the CEE countries and connects economic markets of the candidate countries into one wider regional market, therefore pushing them closer to the idea of the EU internal market and strengthening EU-China cooperation by building a sort of a Euro-Asian economic bridge. In this framework, the potentially pivotal role of Serbia can be observed, as it should become an important hub of air, rail and water traffic<sup>21</sup>. In the words of one author:

“In terms of project implementation, Serbia stands out once again as Beijing's key partner in the region. China has already invested more than \$1 billion, mostly in the form of loans, to finance the building of transport infrastructure and energy projects in the country. For example, the Chinese and Serbian Friendship Bridge across the Danube in Belgrade was a highly symbolic and visible project completed in 2014 to the tune of \$260 million. The acquisition by the Chinese Hebei Iron and Steel Company (now the Hesteel Group) of a steel plant in Smederevo for €46 million was the largest foreign investment in Serbia in 2016, and Beijing has also signed an agreement for the construction of a Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway<sup>22</sup>.”

Since, therefore, Serbia represents for China one of the key partners in the Southeast European region, as well as an active factor on its path of connecting with the EU, whose internal market of high purchasing power can be an ideal space for its investments and product exports, China is willing to support Serbian aspiration for membership in the EU and incite its transition to an open economy.<sup>23</sup>

The main strategic BRI infrastructural project related to Serbia is a true bridge for transportation of Chinese goods from port terminals in Greece to rich Central European markets. The Budapest-Belgrade-Skopje-Piraeus (BBSP) corridor defines a transportation axis running in both directions and connecting Southwest Germany, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, Belgrade, Priština, Skopje, Thessalonica or Piraeus in Greece. Either through the Suez Canal or via the Gibraltar Strait, the sea

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<sup>21</sup> Miša Stojadinović, Violeta Rašković-Talović, „Serbia and China: The Geopolitical and Economic Importance of Mutual Cooperation for Serbia”, op.cit. str. 13.

<sup>22</sup> Plamen Tonchev, „China's Road: into the Western Balkans”, *European Union Institute for Security Studies* (EUISS), 2017, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Duško Dimitrijević, „Odnosi Srbije i Kine na početku 21. veka”, *Međunarodni problemi* 60(1), Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2018, str. 64.

lines of communication are designed to reach major seaports into the Mediterranean Sea, such as Piraeus-Thessaloniki (Greece), Marseille (France), Benghazi (Libya), Tunis (Tunisia), Livorno-Venice (Italy), and Barcelona (Spain). The BBSP is designed to make possible the linkage between supply and demand sides of markets, decreasing the travel time between the Serbian and Hungarian capitals down from eight to three hours, and facilitating the movement of goods from the Greek port of Piraeus into the heart of Europe. However, for the BBSP to become a true economic bridge – an economic corridor, to borrow the term from Brunner (2013, 9), not just a land-sea express passage composed of a high-speed rail line (the central infrastructure), but a geographically co-located set of mechanisms to facilitate the interaction between economic agents as part of a cross-border network, the integration in the EU of all its transitory countries is necessary. And with Serbia slowing down on its negotiation path and Macedonia being a candidate for the accession since 2005, but not yet entering into the accession negotiations, this could be a far-fetched wish.<sup>24</sup>

But is the EU willing to let Serbia continue accepting Chinese investments and all other types of strategic cooperation even if it can benefit its economy in the long-term? Doubts have recently been raised about the EU's willingness to use Serbian obligations towards the *acquis communautaire* in the fields of especially competition and environmental protection and in some measure also subsidies and public procurement to prevent further Chinese economic breakthrough in this part of its sphere of influence, and therefore at the same time to prevent Chinese indirect access to its internal market. These doubts are curious since Serbia is still a candidate country, and the standards in its economic relations with other partners are less restrictive than for EU members, both for project assignment and realization.

On the other hand, if the EU itself is willing to cooperate with China and turn a blind eye towards its lenient economic practices on the rule of law and media freedoms, then again we come to a double standard policy. Finally, one should not diminish the importance of Serbian gratitude for Chinese political support for its position concerning the status of Kosovo, and that there are still member countries in the EU who have an understanding for this gratitude, whether they have recognized or not the self-proclaimed independence of this autonomous region.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Francisco José Leandro, "Combining the "Belt" with the roads in heart of Europe: Geopolitics of the BBSP Corridor", *Megatrend Review* 15, 2018, p. 214.

<sup>25</sup> Dragan Živojinović, Dragan Đukanović, „Strateška partnerstva Republike Srbije”, op. cit., p. 310.

## Structural reasons for EU's critical stance towards Serbian participation in the 16+1 process

The fears of EU administration about Chinese encroachment of candidate countries and through them of the internal market are caused in large measure by an oversimplification of decision-making procedures in the Chinese foreign policy. It is usually perceived that China is an authoritarian state where policy is simply dictated from the top. This perception may have been valid under Mao, but is certainly no longer the case in contemporary China.<sup>26</sup> The BRI was designed primarily for reasons of domestic origin, to consume China's excessive industrial capacity, to secure its long-term energy supply, and in terms of internal security to stabilise the troublesome western borders that have been threatened by Islamic extremists. It seems that EU officials cannot disengage from its traditional view of China as an opportunity for European service-oriented economies and, at the same time, a threat to jobs in European manufacturing sectors.<sup>27</sup> Of course, this is not to say that China itself is completely stripped of political realism, it smartly uses a *divide et impera* strategy in its dealings with the EU member states, and does not choose partners based on their difference in market capacity or political weight.

Conflicting perceptions in the EU about China's strategy are also largely based on the differences in the creation and implementation of their respective foreign policies. Since China bases its foreign policy on issue-oriented national interests, it can easily conflict with the type of value-based relationship most preferred by the EU.<sup>28</sup> However, China is changing its approach progressively. This can be inferred from its recent more proactive participation in global governance projects, such as membership in the WTO, climate change initiatives, foreign aid, and international financial governance. Proactive participation on the international level is coupled with domestic initiatives to improve existing environmental regulation. For example, the "national ecological accounting and auditing scheme" (NEAS), represents the latest national-level endeavour destined to tackle the "grand challenge" of the degradation of the environment in China.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Jie Yu, „The belt and road initiative: domestic interests, bureaucratic politics and the EU-China relations”, *Asia Europe Journal* 16, 2018, p. 224.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p. 231.

<sup>28</sup> Tiejun Zhang, „Sino-European relations: from the height to the width”, In: Gaens B, Jakela J, Linnell E. (eds) *The role of the European Union in Asia*, Ashgate, Farnham, 2009, p. 123.

<sup>29</sup> Xiaorui Wang, „China's Approach to Environmental Governance and the Role of the EU in Market-Induced Reforms”, *East Asian Community Review* 2, p 10, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s42215-019-00019-z>.

These differences notwithstanding, through content analysis of China's policy documents, some authors have shown that the BRI offers a very little substantive challenge to liberal economic order championed by the EU in its norms and values. The initiative explicitly seeks to defend and deepen existing trade and investment relations, extend globalization, and collaborate with and through existing multilateral organisations, while promoting very little institutional innovation. Although the BRI expresses pluralist values, these do not amount to anything approaching an alternative "model" towards liberal governance.<sup>30</sup>

Environmental regulation, often cited by the main point of conflict between the BRI and EU norms is perceived sometimes as the "green barrier", or "green protectionism" by Chinese scholars.<sup>31</sup> Their point is that various regulative and legislative thresholds created by some developed countries for others entering their home markets, by imposing a higher environmental quality standard than that of developing countries, are in its essence an imports restriction that leads to protectionist trade policies "unwittingly and legitimately".<sup>32</sup> This does not necessarily have to be a case since trade between the EU and China, which is developing ever faster especially in the context of the growing rivalry between the USA and China,<sup>33</sup> motivates Chinese exporters to meet the standards by providing support in a variety of ways, especially in the field of energy, environment and climate change, so as to maintain and strengthen the strategic partnership between the two.<sup>34</sup> China and the EU entered into a substantive and continuous convergence evoked in the EU–China Partnership on Climate Change since the 2005 EU-China Summit,<sup>35</sup> and in various governmental and non-governmental cooperative projects revolving around environmental issues, such as the EU–China Environmental Sustainability Programme (2017), the EU–China

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<sup>30</sup> Lee Jones, „Does China's Belt and Road Initiative Challenge the Liberal, Rules-Based Order?" *Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 12, 2019, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup> Fang Liu and Bill Peters, „Green trade barriers: A nightmare and a blessing to developing countries", *LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, Riga*, 2011.

<sup>32</sup> Xiaorui Wang, „China's Approach to Environmental Governance and the Role of the EU in Market-Induced Reforms", *op.cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> Andrew B. Kennedy and Darren J. Lim, „The innovation imperative: technology and S-China rivalry in the twenty-first century", *International Affairs* 94(3), 2018, p. 560.

<sup>34</sup> Pietro De Matteis, „EU-China cooperation in the field of energy, environment and climate change", *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 6(4), 2010, p. 460.

<sup>35</sup> Giulia C. Romano, „The EU–China partnership on climate change: Bilateralism begetting multilateralism in promoting a climate change regime?" *MERCURY*, E-paper No. 8, 2010.

Sustainability Leadership Platform (2018) and so forth.<sup>36</sup> The extensive EU-China dialogue at all political levels obliges them to cease the zero-sum game and move forward towards a win-win situation, where the EU's higher standards for imports would serve as "green targets" for the two partners to achieve in cooperation through extensive dialogue, educational and technological exchanges, as well as negotiation of trade terms.<sup>37</sup>

What is important to note for our purposes is that a candidate country such as Serbia should not worry about its dealings with China if the EU policy also goes in the direction of accommodating cooperation between the EU and China. We have previously indicated that already several member states have pledged their support for the BRI. Examples such as German and Polish railway connections, a historical route linking Venice to the ancient Silk Road, and the use of the Piraeus port in Greece as the European receiving line of the Maritime Silk Road further testify to this. Even in the UK, traditionally suspicious against any power gaining the upper hand on the European continent, there were talks about setting up a Renminbi Internationalisation centre in London's financial city, with an exclusive focus on the BRI infrastructure projects.

### **Political debate between the EU and China as an instrument of the Serbian foreign policy balancing**

As it is seen from the previous discussion, the Serbian position relating to its participation in the BRI and aspiring for EU membership is both delicate and comfortable at the same time. Delicate, because the EU constantly puts under scrutiny the Chinese BRI projects in 16+1 countries and, therefore, might use its leverage in the negotiation process with Serbia to prevent it from realizing projects related to its territory on the basis that they are not following EU law. However, since the EU itself is very divided on this issue, and not only its 16+1 member states, but also other, so to say "core EU members" (primarily Italy, but France, Germany and the UK not far away) are themselves willing to engage with China in the BRI initiatives, it is hard to perceive this EU stance as anything but a double standard. Although double standards in other areas of the EU members policy, such as

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<sup>36</sup> Xiaorui Wang, „China's Approach to Environmental Governance and the Role of the EU in Market-Induced Reforms", op.cit., p. 15.

<sup>37</sup> William McDowall et al, "Circular economy policies in China and Europe", *Journal of Industrial Ecology* 21(3), 2017, p. 655.



minorities protection have obligated Serbia to grant legal protection to minorities otherwise not present in EU member states,<sup>38</sup> in the field of economic projects, which the BRI essentially is, the same level of scrutiny might not be expected since economic integration of the Western Balkans region might be a long-term policy choice for the EU if it fails to integrate it due to its internal complications. Therefore, the smooth implementation of the BRI initiatives is necessarily helped by the relationship and the debate between the EU and China themselves, as a way to integrate the local BRI initiatives with wider EU-China connections and thus create a win-win situation for all the actors – the EU, China, and the Chinese BRI partners on their way to membership in the EU, such as Serbia. This is why the Serbian position is at the same time comfortable, since being a candidate for membership with an unclear perspective in the future period, it can play a role of a bridge between the EU and China and profit from both at the same time.

The constructive political debate between elites in China and the EU increases chances for the accommodation of interests and integration of the BRI into the EU normative framework. This debate would require the devotion of more resources to understanding China and its ever-changing complex bureaucratic decision-making process, but this is the same thing China has been doing with the EU in the recent past. For one, China has sought to soothe the EU's concerns, repeatedly emphasizing that 16+1 is "part and parcel" of China–EU relationship in its official documents, the speeches of its top-level officials and diplomats, and "second track" diplomatic mechanisms. On a strategic level, Premier Li explicitly called for the 17 countries participating in the 16+1 format to "align our respective mid- and long-term development goals and the China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation".<sup>39</sup> On an operational level, there are calls for the Chinese entities pursuing opportunities in the CEE region to abide by the EU regulations, enlist the cooperation of EU companies, and pursue a strategic three-party framework, while addressing the EU's "doubts" and "concerns" and seeking cooperation. New rules should be put forward only if they are "acceptable to both sides" and if they "satisfy the needs of Europe". At the project level, China has been promoting tri-partite cooperation with the EU and CEE, advocating that China and the EU should jointly and strategically identify and deliver projects in the CEE region. The fact China adjusted its approach to a couple of flagship projects under the 16+1 initiatives to

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<sup>38</sup> Mihajlo Vučić, Miloš Jončić, „Legal Rules of European Countries in Minority Protection – Tracing the Double Standard”, *Review of International Affairs, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade*, 64, 2013, p. 130.

<sup>39</sup> Dragan Pavličević, "China's Railway Diplomacy in the Balkans", *China Brief* 4(20), 2014, p. 10.

comply with the EU's regulations and preferences, testifies that Beijing seeks engagement and accommodation, not conflict.<sup>40</sup>

In December 2018, China released a third policy paper on its relationship with the EU. Officially, the policy paper stressed that "the year 2018 marked the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the China-EU Summit" and engaged in a retrospective evaluation of past achievements and fields of future cooperation. However, a closer look at the topics and terminology used reveals the policy paper mainly served the purpose of integrating novel key terms and core concepts of the Chinese foreign policy coined by Xi Jinping into China's refined foreign strategy. The paper explicitly highlighted the complementarities between the BRI and the EU's connectivity roadmaps and outlined overlapping interests in issues of global governance.<sup>41</sup>

The contribution of Chinese funds to the Juncker Plan, the establishment of the so-called Connectivity Platforms between some EU countries and China, as well as other cooperative arrangements, testify the important stakeholders within the EU recognize the commonalities and space for constructive engagement between China and the EU, as well as that China seeks cooperation rather than competition with the EU in the CEE region. This viewpoint is often articulated in the official documents and statements on both sides, as well as in authoritative and influential policy briefs, reports, and commentaries in the EU.<sup>42</sup> Avenues for this debate are multiple and ever-growing. Some authors suggest it is necessary to inject new life into the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), which has worked for many years and can be an important communication platform for the BRI projects between China and the EU or to pursue further negotiations on a single bilateral agreement on investment which would replace the existing individual agreements between the EU member states and China.<sup>43</sup> Surely, since the regions involved in the scope of the potential treaty have a great geopolitical and economic importance, the treaty and its provisions will have a large influence not only on the political and economic systems of the partner states, and consequently on their citizens, workers, and businesses, but also, it will serve as a benchmark that third

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<sup>40</sup> Dragan Pavličević, „A Power Shift Underway in Europe? China's Relationship with Central and Eastern Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative”, op.cit., p. 269.

<sup>41</sup> Nele Noesselt, „Sino-EU Cooperation 2.0: Toward a Global “Green” Strategy?”, op.cit., p. 16.

<sup>42</sup> Gisela Grieger, „One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China's Regional Integration Initiative”, *Briefing*, European Parliament Research Service, July 2016.

<sup>43</sup> Sanja Arežina, „The New Silk Road — China's Nexus to Europe”, *Review of International Affairs* 66, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, pp. 44–45.

countries can follow or distance themselves from in their respective future negotiations.<sup>44</sup> This is particularly important given the findings of some experts that the overall assessment of Chinese international investment agreements is insufficiently sustainable development-compatible, although progress has been made, especially in recent years. Besides, although up to the present no sustainable development-sensitive dispute relying on Chinese international investment agreements has been initiated against China, it would not be surprising that such cases may appear soon.<sup>45</sup> The same is valid for Serbia as well.

In addition to the EU's presence at the 16+1 summits as an observer, and the adoption of agreed 2016 EU strategy for China, all these developments outline the principles that underpin the EU's engagement with China (such as reciprocity, a level playing field, and transparent public tenders) and all EU Member States have endorsed it. In the framework of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, set up in 2015, a list of infrastructure projects both in the EU and in China has been identified for potential implementation. A June 2018 own-initiative report on EU-China relations by the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, debated in plenary in September 2018, stresses among other things that Member States' participation in the 16+1 format must enable the EU to speak with one voice in its relationship with China.<sup>46</sup>

## Conclusion

The Serbian foreign policy tries to balance the priorities - on the one hand, there is nominally the primary strategic goal of the EU membership accession process, on the other search for beneficial strategic partnerships that can provide its economy with much sought after investment. The BRI has come as a perfect opportunity for such an investment, and Serbia eagerly took the chance. However, some other Chinese investments can conflict with Serbian obligations towards EU law. So far,

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<sup>44</sup> Flavia Marisi, Qian Wang, „Drivers and Issues of China– EU Negotiations for a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment”, in Chaisse J. (ed.) *China's International Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Law and Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p.

<sup>45</sup> Chi Manjiao, „Addressing Sustainable Development Concerns through IIAs - A Preliminary Assessment of Chinese IIAs”, in Chaisse J. (ed.) *China's International Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Law and Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 110.

<sup>46</sup> Gisela Grieger, „China, the 16+1 format and the EU”, *Briefing*, European Parliament Research Service, September 2018.

there has been just a declaratory expression of reserves by the EU bodies lacking any formal legal action that might prevent Serbia from realizing its part of the investment deals with China. The situation is similar with the EU members who have participated so far in other or the same BRI projects. This does not automatically mean the EU would not try to use its political leverage to influence the Serbian foreign policy and make it abandon some projects which the EU finds particularly threatening for its economic supremacy in the region. This double standard of the EU policy that creates a paradox of stricter scrutiny for candidates than for members has been practiced in the past as well. However, the BRI projects might serve as an economic bridge that connects the region of Western Balkans more closely and prepare it for future integration into the EU's internal market. Structural differences in the approach on investments between the EU and China, such as administrative traditions, values and norms, environmental regulations, competition practices, all serve as obstacles to the creation of this bridge but have been progressively overcome with the maturing of the Chinese outward investment policy. At the end of the day, the Serbian curious case will be solved as a part of a larger package of agreement between the EU and China themselves, whether through cooperation in the existing avenues of dialogue, whether through the creation of additional instruments for the accommodation of structural differences in policies, such as a mutual investment treaty. Until then, Serbia should use all the possibilities of the BRI projects and, at the same time, observe its regulations on foreign investments, competition and environmental protection. If possible conflicts arise between any new EU legislation and the BRI projects, Serbia should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to see if its national interest is better served in abandoning such a project or delaying the implementation of such legislation. Any other policy choice which would give priority to one or the other, no matter the economic benefits, would be devoid of political reality. The Serbian foreign policy is currently in the position in which it must balance the need to attract investments and continue with its EU integration process, waiting for the moment when the deal between the EU and China on the BRI solves its curious case, one way or the other.

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### Mihajlo VUČIĆ

#### INTEGRACIJA U EVROPSKU UNIJU I INICIJATIVA POJAS I PUT: INTERESANTAN SLUČAJ SRBIJE

**Apstrakt:** Tema ovog članka je srpska spoljna politika između njenih glavnih strateških ciljeva - članstva u Evropskoj uniji i saradnje sa Kinom u okviru Inicijative Pojas i put. Srbija svoju spoljnu politiku zasniva na četiri stuba – procesu pridruživanja EU i tri strateška partnerstva sa velikim svetskim silama – Kinom, Sjedinjenim Državama i Rusijom. Međutim, s obzirom da proces pristupanja EU zahteva da Srbija striktno poštuje svoje obaveze iz Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, Ugovora o uspostavljanju transportne zajednice i drugih ugovora potpisanih sa EU, oni su ponekad u sukobu sa projektnim aktivnostima iz procesa partnerstva Pojasa i puta. Najčešće je to slučaj u odnosu na konkurenciju i zaštitu životne sredine. Autor daje analizu glavnih tačaka mogućeg sukoba i ukazuje na dvostruki standard u pristupu Evropske unije Inicijativi Pojas i put. Zatim iznosi argumente koji ukazuju na to da Pojas i put mogu poslužiti kao most između zemalja kandidata i unutrašnjeg tržišta EU. Autor zaključuje da, iako postoje određena strukturna opravdanja za skepticizam EU prema Pojasu i putu, najbolji način da se on prevaziđe je insistiranje na političkom dijalogu na mnogim postojećim nivoima između EU i Kine, s ciljem razmene informacija između njih o pravilima, politikama i standardima EU kojima se osigurava da kineske investicije i druge finansijske aktivnosti u Srbiji budu u skladu sa obavezama pridruživanja.

**Ključne reči:** evropske integracije, Srbija, Inicijativa Pojasa i put, spoljna politika.

UDC 327::911.3(510:497)  
339.5/.9(510:497)  
Biblid: 0025-8555, 72(2020)  
Vol. LXXII, No. 2, pp. 356–376

Review article  
Received 10 February 2020  
Accepted 28 February 2020  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2002356S>

# China's 21st Century Geopolitics and Geo-economics: An Evidence from the Western Balkans

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**Abstract:** This article advocates the thesis that the People's Republic of China, in accordance with a strong geopolitical strategy, is using geo-economics tools in the context of reshaping global powers' influence in diverse parts of the world. One of these spatial dimensions of Chinese emerging domination refers to the Western Balkans, primarily through the economic presence of China in this region. To address this issue first will be considered concepts of geopolitics and geo-economics, followed by highlighting China's presence in the Western Balkans region and flourishing infrastructure projects in the domain of transport and energy. The research is conducted by relying on the existing databases on China's economic involvement in different economy sectors worldwide, mainly from *China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT)* and *AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset* for the WB countries in the period 2013-2018. Special attention is given to China's benefits in terms of realizing those projects, even though the Western Balkans countries' market is not attractive *per se*. Finally, some concluding remarks have been made in terms of the potentials of China's strategy to reconsider political and security dynamics in the Western Balkans.

**Keywords:** the People's Republic of China, the Western Balkans, geopolitics, geo-economics, the Belt and Road Initiative, the 16+1 Initiative<sup>2</sup>, infrastructure projects.

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The paper presents findings of a study developed as a part of the research project "Serbia and challenges in international relations in 2020", financed by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, and conducted by Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade.

<sup>2</sup> In 2019, the Initiative welcomed Greece, so the official name of this cooperation is the 17+1 Initiative. However, considering the period analyzed within this paper (from 2013 to 2018), the term 16+1 is more appropriate.



## Introduction

The world is witnessing various changes nowadays. In today's geopolitics "new relationships are emerging among the main world powers, the US, Russia, the EU, Japan and China and their 'backyards', in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America".<sup>3</sup> The dominant position of the United States of America has become increasingly questionable with the economic strengthening of the People's Republic of China (PRC). With its growing economy, China is pushing back against the geopolitical settlement of the Cold War, thus trying to revise consisting *status quo*, on both the global and regional scenes.<sup>4</sup>

The Western Balkans (WB) is one of the regions where we could observe the end of the unipolarity of one superpower and the start of the emerging multipolarity. Today's political and security dynamics of the WB countries is the outcome of the crises in the West, the comeback of Russia, and an enormous rise of China.<sup>5</sup> IR scholars are increasingly agreeing on the emerging multipolarity that introduces "big players" into the international arena, seriously threatening to shake up the prevailing dominant position of the United States.<sup>6</sup> In such power constellation, the (geo) political position of weak states and states in transition is largely determined by the interests of great powers. The traditional USA/EU and Russia's zone of interest – the Western Balkans – nowadays seems to be reshaped in the context of China's growing presence (primarily in economic terms). With its growing economy with geopolitical consequences, the PRC is questioning the existing balance of (economic) power and is changing deliberation of competition in the international arena.

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<sup>3</sup> Aad Correlje and Coby Van der Linde, "Energy supply security and geopolitics: A European perspective", *Energy policy*, Vol. 34, No. 5, 2006, p. 533.

<sup>4</sup> Barry Naughton, *Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform, 1978-1993*, Cambridge university press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 1-392; Walter Russell Mead, "The return of geopolitics: The revenge of the revisionist powers", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 3, 2014, pp. 69-79.

<sup>5</sup> Milan Balažić, "Geopolitics of the Western Balkans 25 Years after the Breakup of Yugoslavia", in: Vladimir N. Cvetković (ed.), *The One Belt, One Road: the Balkan Perspective – Political and Security Aspects*, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, 2016, pp. 173-174.

<sup>6</sup> Nevena Šekarić, "Neke karakteristike geopolitičkog okruženja Republike Srbije – bezbednosno-odbrambeni aspekti", *Vojno delo*, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2019, p. 7.

## From Geopolitics to Geo-economics

Considering the key element of classical geopolitics – how to use space to increase the power of a state – nowadays, it is obvious that states are using all available means to achieve that goal. Today, China is projecting its economic and political power worldwide – especially in geographical terms, broadening its cooperation with different developed and developing countries in Asia, Europe and Africa, thus making geo-economics “a new edition of the old rivalry between the states”.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it is not an unusual opinion that China’s goal is to challenge the existing balance of power to increase its power and improve its role in the international system.

The most used argument for the recent reaffirmation of geo-economics in the academic literature is that “the remarkable economic rise of China and the determination of its leaders to turn this material power into political and even ideational influence take some explaining and geo-economics offers a persuasive way of doing so”.<sup>8</sup> In today’s circumstances of emerging multipolarity and changing the discourse of the USA’s dominance in the international arena, the implementation of economic tools is specifically accented.<sup>9</sup> Intellectual post-Cold War milieu, broadening the concept of security and the declining significance of traditional military power, gave new forms and content to the state’s means of influence in terms of the economic ones.

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<sup>7</sup> Blagoje Babić, “Geo-economics – Reality and Science”, *Megatrend revija*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2009, p. 43.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Beeson, “Goeconomics with Chinese characteristics: the BRI and China’s evolving grand strategy”, *Economic and Political Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2018, p. 245.

<sup>9</sup> The usage of economic tools in the context of achieving the state’s geopolitical goals is not novel. Namely, during the Cold War period, the USA and the SSSR were employing “grand strategies” and using technologies and financing allied countries in order to redesign territories according to their geopolitical interests and ideologies. Specific example in the context of reshaping postwar Europe (and in the context of this research) was Yugoslavia, where the USA and the SSSR were competing over the investing in Yugoslavia’s economy and infrastructure (Tim Cullen, *Yugoslavia and the World Bank*, World Bank, September 1979, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/717881468759857058/pdf/multi-page.pdf>, 20/8/2019; Per Högselius, Arne Kaijser and Erik Van der Vleuten, *Europe’s infrastructure transition: Economy, war, nature*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015; Vincent Legendijk and Frank Schipper, “East, west, home’s best: the material links of cold war Yugoslavia, 1948-1980”, *Icon*, 2016, pp. 28-54), thus trying to contain each other in this zone of interests.

Considering key features of the geo-economics' concept<sup>10</sup> – “the methods of commerce are displacing military method”<sup>11</sup>, e.g. considering geo-economics as “the relationship between economic policy and changes in national power and geopolitics”<sup>12</sup> or “the economic consequences of trends in geopolitics and national power”<sup>13</sup> – one could say that China's geo-economics is at the service of its geopolitics. In other words, geo-economics presents at the same time the purpose and tool of geopolitics' practice in the changing world. This is somewhat logical because of the interlinked nature of politics and the economy and the fact that politics has always been led by economic interests. Talking about the economy as a factor of reshaping the existing relations between states, Huntington stressed out: “ (...) It is, indeed, probably the most important source of power and in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states”.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, geo-economics puts the economical choice and goals of a state within the framework of a strategy aimed at increasing the state's ability in the global competition.<sup>15</sup> When talking about key differences between geopolitics

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<sup>10</sup> There is no consensus about the content of the geo-economics' concept. For some authors, geo-economics is part of a traditional form of great power politics, e.g. the continuation of war by other means. Hence, geo-economics is “applying economic instruments to advance geopolitical ends” (Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 8). For some others, it presents the “conception of space, power and security, which sees geopolitical forms recalibrated by market logic... geo-economics *recasts rather than simply replace geopolitical calculation*” (Cowen, Deborah and Smith, Neil, “After geopolitics? From the geopolitical social to geoeconomics”, *Antipode*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2009, pp. 24-25). While some consider geo-economics exclusively as an analytical tool that can be used for explaining competition between Western states (Edward N. Luttwak, “From geopolitics to geo-economics: Logic of conflict, grammar of commerce”, *The National Interest*, No. 20, 1990, pp. 17-23; Edward. N. Luttwak, *Turbo capitalism: winners and losers in the global economy*, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 1999), others do not limit its applicability territorially, considering it as a global phenomenon.

<sup>11</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, “From geopolitics to geo-economics: Logic of conflict, grammar of commerce”, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>12</sup> Sanjaya Baru, “Geo-economics and Strategy”, *Survival*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2012, p. 47.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, “Why international primacy matters”, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993, pp. 71-72.

<sup>15</sup> This strategy is understood as the state's operation aimed to provide its enterprises and its economy with a maximum competitive advantage in relation to other state enterprises and economies (Blagoje Babić, “Odnosi Kine i Evropske unije: Geo-ekonomska osovina u razvoju”, *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. 62, No. 3, 2010, pp. 422-423). Namely, when the state uses classical

and geo-economics, Wigell and Vihma pointed out that “Geopolitical power projection, as an offensive foreign policy operation, is typically overt, conducted by military means and its operational logic is confrontation. Geo-economics power projection, on the other hand, is more covert, conducted by economic means and its operational logic is selective accommodation. These operational differences, in turn, translate into diverging tendencies in the target country or coalition”.<sup>16</sup> Put all previously mentioned differently, the rivalry between the powers did not end with the end of the strategic suppression of the superpowers – it goes forward from the military and strategic area to the economic field. However, this should not be understood as breaking up with military means and relying exclusively on economic tools of a state. Namely, the reality of geo-economics is “inextricably intertwined with traditional military and diplomatic strands of foreign policy”.<sup>17</sup> In the view of these two authors, China is offering “the best available lens to understand how geo-economics tools operate in practice” primarily because of its endowment with the capabilities of usage of geo-economics tools.<sup>18</sup> The economic rise supported by foreign trade has provided China with new forms of geopolitical influence.<sup>19</sup> With its reopening to the world and the state’s support to the economic elite, the PRC is revitalizing the entrepreneurial spirit of its citizens, thus reshaping mechanisms of global governance and economic influence worldwide. Hence, the Chinese economic strategy and transformation of the social system provided it with international prestige and a significant economic position on both regional and global scenes.

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economic activities that are inherent to enterprises such as investments, researches, development and technology, then we have geo-economics in the act because goals are not only commercial – they have deeper, political sense.

<sup>16</sup> Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma, “Geopolitics versus geo-economics: the case of Russia’s geostrategy and its effects on the EU”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 3, 2016, p. 605.

<sup>17</sup> Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means*, op. cit., p. 36. This logic underlies the statement that China “incorporates economic and nontraditional concerns with traditional military and political interests” in articulating its “grand strategy” (Wang Jisi, “China’s search for a grand strategy: A rising great power finds its way”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2011, pp. 68-79).

<sup>18</sup> Mikael Wigell and Antto Vihma, “Geopolitics versus geo-economics: the case of Russia’s geostrategy and its effects on the EU”, op. cit., p. 93.

<sup>19</sup> Being in the right place at the right time has shown as the key to success in the case of China. In accordance, the full integration of the PRC into the global capitalist economy (where the most important event was China’s joining the WTO in 2001) was followed by the transformation of its domestic structures (Mark Beeson, “Goeconomics with Chinese characteristics: the BRI and China’s evolving grand strategy”, op. cit., p. 5).

While traditional geopolitical actors in the Western Balkans - the EU, Russia, the United States and Turkey - face many internal and external challenges, China's economic presence in the region has been increasing.<sup>20</sup> The WB countries turn to be a new strategic dimension of China's foreign policy resulting in establishing the PRC as an important and influential source of diverse forms of their financing. Within the "Belt and Road" Initiative (BRI) and, specifically, the 16+1 Initiative, the People's Republic of China is using its chance, mainly through economic involvement in various economic sectors of the given WB countries, thus making a significant geo-economics influence. Contemporary instruments of power include leadership in productivity and efficiency, high-quality products and services, market control, establishing competitive infrastructure, and financing new knowledge and technologies' projects where geo-economics goals seem to be achievable. On the one hand, through its geo-economics conception, China is increasing its import into the European countries and, on the other, it increasingly imports energy resources and agricultural products needed for its development.<sup>21</sup>

IR scholars strongly advocate that the Chinese "Belt and Road" Initiative has the potential to reshape relations between powers on both regional and global levels. Namely, "China has begun to exert a form of 'geo-economics' influence that is changing the way we think about both the nature of international relations in the 21st century and about the precise uses China's policymakers will put their growing power into".<sup>22</sup> By financing regional infrastructure projects within the "Belt and Road" Initiative countries, China wants to accelerate the establishment of a network of ports and logistics centers connected by land, river and sea routes to facilitate the distribution of its products. Presented seems to be achievable, especially when bearing in mind the rising number of BRI countries.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Antonina Habova, "China: The New Geopolitical Actor on the Balkans?", in: Vesselin Mintchev, Nikolay Nenovsky and Xavier Richet (eds), *Western Balkans and the European Union. Lessons from Past Enlargements, Challenges to Further Integrations*, Economic Research Institute, Sofia, 2015, p. 267.

<sup>21</sup> Dušan Proroković, "Geoekonomski aspekti kineske koncepcije OBOR i pozicija Srbije, Crne Gore i BiH", *Nacionalni interes*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2016, p. 42.

<sup>22</sup> Mark Beeson, "Geoeconomics with Chinese characteristics: the BRI and China's evolving grand strategy", op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> The number of the BRI countries continues to expand, from 75 at the end of June 2018 to 117 by the mid-October 2018 (Cecilia Joy-Perez and Derek Scissors, "Be Wary of Spending on the Belt and Road", *American Enterprise Institute*, 14 November 2018, <http://www.aei.org/publication/be-wary-of-spending-on-the-belt-and-road/>, 19/8/2019).

## China's Presence in the Western Balkans<sup>24</sup>

Although geographically set, the Western Balkans consists of countries that have not been integrated into the EU by the treaties from 2004 and 2007. Hence, the Western Balkans comprises “former Yugoslavia countries minus Slovenia plus Albania”.<sup>25</sup> This “formula” actually refers to the political and discursive designation of this region with its strong historical, cultural and political and security bonds, rather than its geographical determination. The complex regional scene reflects the involvement of the WB countries in the Berlin Process aimed at improving regional cooperation and political stability. Besides, diverse political and security concerns resulted with EU membership of Croatia and with the integration of the WB countries into NATO (except for Serbia, which declared neutrality, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but showing strong commitment to NATO membership), while Russia still has significant influence in this region “mainly because most countries of the region remain dependent upon Russia gas delivery”.<sup>26</sup>

When Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the “Belt and Road” Initiative in 2013, the main goal was to ensure a continuous increase of trade in Eurasia. Today, cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the WB countries is the most prominent in the field of the economy, based on the “Belt and Road” Initiative. Part of this development strategy is the so-called 16+1 Initiative that gathers sixteen states of Central and East Europe, formed in order to develop and promote cooperation between China and these countries. In that sense, the Balkans is often seen as a “geopolitical bridge between the Western world and wider Eurasia”, i.e., as a gateway to Europe.<sup>27</sup> Although some of the phenomena are endemic characteristics of the Balkans (such as the division of the peninsula in

<sup>24</sup> The Cold War period was an initial period of China’s interest for the Balkans, primarily for Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania, due to their societies based on communist ideology (David A. Andelman, “China’s Balkan strategy”, *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1979, pp. 60-79).

<sup>25</sup> The Western Balkans was formally set in 2003 during the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki that gathered six WB countries and confirmed their pathway towards EU membership (“The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans – Moving Towards European Integration, No. C/03/163”, European Council, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Plamen Tonchev, “China’s Road: into the Western Balkans”, *Working Paper*, No. 3/2017, 2017, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), [https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/EUISS-Brief\\_3\\_China\\_Western\\_Balkans.pdf](https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/EUISS-Brief_3_China_Western_Balkans.pdf), 25/8/2019, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> Vuk Vuksanović, “The Unexpected Regional Player in the Balkans: China”, *Texas National Security Review*, 29 November 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/unexpected-regional-player-balkans-china/>, 25/8/2019.

terms of political issues, Kosovo's problem, traditional quarrels of Balkan people due to their past, corruption, etc.), China has left political issues on the margins and developed cooperation based on economic issues and investments. Therefore, Chinese logic is based on the so-called *win-win* solutions, of which both the PRC and the WB countries would benefit mutually.<sup>28</sup>

What is the Chinese advantage regarding the Western Balkans is the fact that China respects differences in ideology and values in the WB countries, their commitment to diverse actors within the regional and global scenes. In accordance, China is welcomed in the Western Balkans over other "traditional" actors because its Initiative allows Balkan countries, for the first time in their history, to become "a full, not only a 'younger' partner or not a partner at all" to one powerful country whose power does not imply a military presence.<sup>29</sup> Besides, the Western Balkans is a place of transit and has the potential to attract Chinese companies with overcapacity to produce, primarily in the domains of construction of the motorway and railway infrastructure and energy facilities likewise. Although the WB countries express a strong attitude towards EU membership, there are some evident dilemmas when it comes to funding. Namely, "access to large EU structural funds for candidate countries is not possible until they join the EU, but in order to make progress towards accession, countries need to improve infrastructure and transport links both within their borders and with neighbors".<sup>30</sup> Besides, with the need to catch up with the rest of the European Union by boosting investment in the WB region, the need to improve trade relations, exploitation of the region's energy resources and revitalization of transport infrastructure have become a priority. Hence often slow processes of project preparation, other institutional obstacles regarding the EU funds, and the needs of the WB countries in terms of growth drivers make the WB countries more ready to open towards China as someone who could provide them with quick solutions.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Dušan Proroković, "Geoekonomski aspekti kineske koncepcije OBOR i pozicija Srbije, Crne Gore i BiH", op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>29</sup> Vladimir N. Cvetković, "Chinese Power and Geopolitics of the Balkans – 'One Belt, One Road' – a Realist Approach", in: Vladimir N. Cvetković (Ed.), *The One Belt, One Road: the Balkan Perspective – Political and Security Aspects*, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, 2016, pp. 40-41.

<sup>30</sup> Oleg Levitin, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey, "China and South-Eastern Europe: Infrastructure, trade and investment links", *EBRD Working Paper*, July 2016, Department of Economics, Policy and Governance, <https://www.ebrd.com/news/2016/ebdr-papers-highlight-potential-of-southeastern-europe.html>, 25/8/2019, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Chinese economic involvement in WB countries is often presented as "financing on favorable financial terms relative to most alternatives" (Ibid. p. 3). In most cases, financing comes in the form of loans with a long maturity period and low-interest rates.

After conducting the high-level political summit in Warsaw (2012) between China and 16 Central and Southeast European countries (CEE countries), China established a credit line of 10 billion USD to support its own business operations, followed by the establishment of the China-CEE Investment Fund (1.5 billion USD) for supporting private investments and a further 2 billion USD support for financial institutions from CEE countries to access China bond markets.<sup>32</sup> The focus of the following work will be on China's presence in the Western Balkans through the prism of its investments (including direct investments, loans and credits) in the WB region in the period 2013-2018. Presented data are driven from the *China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT)*. However, considering that this database is tracking investments from the Chinese state-owned companies exclusively, gaps will be fulfilled with data gathered from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset and information from the literature review, policy papers and media articles as well.<sup>33</sup> The research is based on the most prominent WB countries in terms of Chinese investments, and only on those projects with the status of the official commitment stage, projects in the implementation and completed projects.

### ***Flourishing Infrastructure Projects***

China's presence in the WB countries is primarily reflected through providing financial resources to states' economies, which are more than welcomed by the finance-hungry countries such as the WB states. In this regard, it is worth to mention the fact that trade relations between the PRC and the WB countries are increasing in the last few years. For instance, China's export to the WB countries

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<sup>32</sup> Oleg Levitin, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey, "China and South-Eastern Europe: Infrastructure, trade and investment links", op. cit.; Plamen Tonchev, "China's Road: into the Western Balkans", op. cit., p. 1; Katarina Zakić and Bojan Radišić, "Influence of the 'Belt and Road' Initiative on Chinese Investments in Europe Case Study: Balkan Countries", in: Liu Zuokui and Ivona Lađevac (eds), *The Cooperation between China and Balkan Countries under the "Belt and Road" Initiative*, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 2019, pp. 27-53; Aleksandar Kovačević, *Towards a Balkan gas Hub: the interplay between pipeline gas, LNG and renewable energy in South East Europe*, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford, 2017, pp. 60-61.

<sup>33</sup> N. B. According to the dataset authors' recommendation, the research took into account only the "recommended\_for\_research" field, e.g. only those projects with the status of the official commitment stage, projects in implementation, and completed projects (Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange and Michael J. Tierney, "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset", *AidData Working Paper*, No. 46, 10 October 2017, AidData at William & Mary, Williamsburg, <https://www.aiddata.org/publications/aid-china-and-growth-evidence-from-a-new-global-development-finance-dataset>, 20/8/2019).



more than doubled in the period 2004-2014, while imports from these countries increased sevenfold in the same time frame.<sup>34</sup> Reviewing previously mentioned databases, reports and articles on Chinese investments in the WB countries through 6-year period resulted in the notion that the highest involvement of China in the WB countries is through loans intended for construction infrastructure, while the interest for Chinese direct investments within the WB countries is rising. Besides, the most prominent receiving sectors when it comes to China's economic involvement in the WB countries are transport and energy.

By investing in infrastructure projects in the WB countries, China is making huge progress in terms of its development that have a strong geo-economics' dimension.<sup>35</sup> So far, Chinese direct investments are present in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, primarily in the field of energy (and in the form of Greenfield investments). In Croatia in 2018, the Norinco Chinese Company invested 220 million USD in the domain of alternative energy, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, China Poly Group and Sinomach invested 310 million USD in the coal energy subsector.


When it comes to Chinese investments in terms of comprehensive financing infrastructure projects (direct investments, loans and credits), the main receiving sectors of the WB countries are transport and energy. Graph 1 presents Chinese investments according to CGIT database and projects labeled as construction contracts and Chinese investments in the form of loans for those projects with the status of the official commitment stage, projects in the implementation, and completed projects according to the AidData.

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<sup>34</sup> Jacopo Maria Pepe, "China's Inroads into Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe: Implications for Germany and the EU", *SSOAR Working Paper*, No. 2/2017, March 2017, DGAP, Berlin, [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/56045/ssoar-2017-pepe-Chinas\\_Inroads\\_into\\_Central\\_Eastern.pdf?sequence=1](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/56045/ssoar-2017-pepe-Chinas_Inroads_into_Central_Eastern.pdf?sequence=1), 20/8/2019, p. 4.


<sup>35</sup> Proroković sees this trend as a continuation of XIX century metropolis' strategies that were linking them with colonies through maritime routes and building infrastructure in some parts of the world (Dušan Proroković, "Geoekonomski aspekti kineske koncepcije OBOR i pozicija Srbije, Crne Gore i BiH", op.cit., pp. 36-37).

*Graph 1: Chinese economic presence in form of loans and credits in WB countries' economies (total amounts are presented in millions USD)<sup>36</sup>*



The main host country for Chinese, either direct investments or investments in terms of loans, is the Republic of Serbia (Graph 2).

*Graph 2: Chinese economic presence in form of DI and loans in Serbia's economy (total amounts are presented in millions USD)<sup>37</sup>*



<sup>36</sup> Source: Author, based on CGIT and AidData.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

The main receiving sector when it comes to Chinese financing of the WB countries, either in the form of direct investments or loans, is the sector of transport. Hence the biggest percentage of planned, realized or projects under construction is referring to the transport/communication sector.<sup>38</sup> This is not surprising, especially when bearing in mind that motorways and railways under construction link the Far East to Europe and shorten existing trade routes between China and Western Europe, thus reducing the costs of trade. In other words, the so-called Balkan Silk Road establishes a transport connection from the Greek port of Piraeus and the EU markets, through the Western Balkans.<sup>39</sup>

The domain of energy is another significant sector when it comes to China's economic involvement in the WB countries.<sup>40</sup> Namely, Chinese interest for the energy sectors of the WB countries ranges from coal-based thermal power plants to renewables, making Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia the main host countries.<sup>41</sup> The 1990s fragmentation of the Balkan energy market, caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the civil war, resulted in disruptions of supply to some

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<sup>38</sup> For instance, the bridge over the Danube in Belgrade (the so-called Pupin's Bridge) was the first realized transport project in the region in 2014. Other significant Chinese-lead transport projects refer to establishing a high-speed railway between Belgrade and Budapest, (re)construction of some sections of the European motorway XI in Serbia and Montenegro, motorways in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia and ports in Croatia as well.

<sup>39</sup> The backbone of the Balkan Silk Road is the revitalization of existing Corridor X linking Central Europe with the Aegean Sea via Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary and modernization of the railway between Belgrade and Budapest likewise (Oleg Levitin, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey, "China and South-Eastern Europe: Infrastructure, trade and investment links", op. cit., p. 2).

<sup>40</sup> In terms of energy geopolitics and energy governance, it is of utmost importance to stress out that the WB countries are part of the European Energy Community established in 2006 in order to create harmonization of national legislation with the EU *acquis communautaire* in the domain of energy and integrate European energy market.

<sup>41</sup> For instance, China is already financing the reconstruction of units of Stanari and Tuzla thermal power plants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the strength of 300 MW and 450 MW (Oleg Levitin, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey, "China and South-Eastern Europe: Infrastructure, trade and investment links", op. cit., p. 3; Ljiljana Stević and Miloš Grujić, "Bosna i Hercegovina na Novom putu svile: Strategija, stanje, perspektive i pozicioniranje u skladu sa novom kineskom strategijom u zemljama CIE", *Politeia*, Vol. 5, No. 10, 2017, pp. 56, 69, 73). The first very big Chinese loan in Serbia's energy sector refers to the revitalization of the Kostolac B Power Plant (strength of 350 MW), provided by the Chinese Export-Import Bank, in the amount of USD 608 million (Dragan Pavličević, *Chinese Infrastructure Investments in Serbia: Between Politics and Profit*, Council for European Studies, New York, 2015, p. 11), and construction of Block 3 of Nikola Tesla B Thermal Power Plant in Obrenovac (strength of 744 MW) and pit mine Radljevo as well (Duško Dimitrijević, "Chinese investments in Serbia—a Joint pledge for the future of the new Silk road", *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2017, p. 75).

EU members and jeopardized key connections with Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern oil and gas reserves.<sup>42</sup> This kind of condition, together with old and unreliable energy infrastructure, made urgent the need for power plants' revitalization, where China was welcomed with its rehabilitation programs. On the other hand, in accordance with its commitment to take the lead in clean energy race, China pays special attention to the WB countries' renewable energy sectors.<sup>43</sup> This trend is also intensified by the fact that a common characteristic of the WB countries is unused potentials in the domain of renewable energy, which is actually a very attractive field for Chinese companies in terms of opportunities to achieve faster development. Also, several memoranda of understandings were signed between China and the WB countries in the domain of renewables (mostly including the construction of wind turbines and plants that produce electricity from waste).<sup>44</sup> Of course, benefits from planning and realizing renewable energy projects are mutual – while it helps China within a clean energy race, the WB countries, in terms of its status of EU candidates, have committed themselves to undertake necessary measures in the field of clean energy production in a certain period.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Loïc Poulain, "China's New Balkan strategy", *Central Europe Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2011, p. 4. This is especially important when bearing in mind that, in terms of energy, Southeastern Europe (SEE) is the only geographical area in Europe that hosts three overlapping EU energy corridors: Central/Southeastern Electricity Connection, North-South Gas Interconnections & Oil Supply and Southern Gas Corridor (Aleksandar Kovačević, *Towards a Balkan gas Hub: the interplay between pipeline gas, LNG and renewable energy in South East Europe*, op. cit., p. 1).

<sup>43</sup> China's need for promoting and investing in renewable energy is a part of its wider strategy of establishing domination in different political and economic areas. Thus, we are witnessing new "green energy race" (Joel B. Eisen, "New Energy Geopolitics: China, Renewable Energy, and the Greentech Race", *Chi.-Kent L. Rev.*, Vol. 86, No. 9, 2011, p. 11) nowadays with China's replacing the USA in the position of the top investor in the green sector (Borislav Korkodelović, "Kina postaje lider u borbi protiv globalnog zagrevanja", *Danas*, 14 June 2017, <https://www.danas.rs/svet/kina-postaje-lider-u-borbi-protiv-globalnog-zagrevanja/>, 20/8/2019; Pablo Pareja-Alcaraz, "Chinese investments in Southern Europe's energy sectors: Similarities and divergences in China's strategies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain", *Energy Policy*, Vol. 101, 2017, pp. 700-710). A strategy that allows the PRC taking this place is materialized via China's becoming the world's largest producer, exporter and installer of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and electric vehicles.

<sup>44</sup> "Investicijski probaj Kine u državama regije", *Aljazeera Balkans*, 29 November 2015, <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/investicijski-proboj-kine-u-drzavama-regije>, 20/8/2019; Borislav Korkodelović, "Infrastruktura i obnovljivi izvori", *Danas*, 11 July 2016, <https://www.danas.rs/ekonomija/infrastruktura-i-obnovljivi-izvori/>, 20/8/2019.

<sup>45</sup> The strong commitment of the WB countries to integrate into the EU is followed by their structural adjustments with the EU *acquis communautaire*.

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In percentage terms, Chinese FDI in the region is low and concentrated in just a few countries. However, the WB countries have enormous investment needs in many sectors that they cannot provide on their own. The Chinese so-called “infrastructure diplomacy” Richet explains as follows: “after signing contracts for the construction of roads, motorways, ports and railway lines on favorable terms, Chinese provincial firms from other sectors are invited and encouraged to invest in other sectors”.<sup>46</sup> Consequently, the net of interested Chinese companies participating in the economic fields of the WB countries is spreading, which is more than positively accepted from the region’s states.

### ***China’s Benefits***

At first glance, the Western Balkans is not a particularly attractive market *per se* – the WB states are of limited size and lack purchasing power. However, there is a usual attitude that the openness of the CEE market and the lack of financial resources allow China and other countries concerned to invest in the development of particularly WB countries’ economies under favorable conditions.<sup>47</sup> In other words, it seems reasonable the statement that “China develops Balkan infrastructure that the EU won’t build”.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the WB countries as transit states provide great opportunities for the economic maneuver of China in the Balkan region in the context of the exploitation of natural resources, its production capacities, and its designation as a major transport corridor. Besides, the Western Balkans, due to its geographical position, traffic and energy communications with the East and the West, presents a very important link with other subjects of the BRI Initiative.<sup>49</sup>

In an economic (and potentially political) sense, Chinese economic presence in the region of the Western Balkans is “a wise investment into what one day maybe

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<sup>46</sup> Xavier Richet, “The 16+ 1 Format: Chinese presence in fragmented markets on the periphery of Europe”, in: Chen Xin and He Zhigao (eds), *16+1 Cooperation and China-EU Relationship*, China-CEE Institute, Budapest, 2018, p. 8.

<sup>47</sup> Loïc Poulain, “China’s New Balkan strategy”, *op. cit.*, p. 5; Duško Dimitrijević, “Chinese investments in Serbia—a Joint pledge for the future of the new Silk road”, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>48</sup> Dean Andromidas, “China Develops Balkan Infrastructure That the European Union Won’t Build”, *Executive Intelligence Review (EIR)*, Vol. 40, 2013, pp. 33-39.

<sup>49</sup> Liu Zuokui, “China’s Investment in the Balkans under the Belt and Road Initiative: A Chinese Perspective”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2019, pp. 91-105.

one-fifth of the enlarged EU in terms of the number of members”.<sup>50</sup> With financing construction of the WB countries’ transport and energy infrastructure, China is showing its strong effort to support global trade. Hence, this kind of China’s economic maneuver could be considered as a part of its greater geo-economics performance with a strategic, long-term significance.

Talking about some advantages for China within its 16+1 Initiative, Long Jing pointed out four of them: solid political foundation, previous experience based on cross-border projects, proactive and supportive attitude of the WB countries to the 16+1 Initiative, and pre-existing cooperative mechanism which can be relied on.<sup>51</sup> At the same time, it is clear that China is pursuing broader objectives related to the BRI in the Western Balkans. Infrastructure projects in the region enable Chinese construction companies to acquire a track record in Europe, mitigate their overcapacity challenges, and create jobs for Chinese workers.<sup>52</sup>

## Concluding Remarks

The significance of the geopolitical position of the WB countries is reflected through its linkages with the Far East and West Europe. Namely, the most important energy and communication routes pass through the space of the Western Balkans, thus connecting resources-rich countries of the Caucasus and the Middle East region with highly developed Western countries, which are one of the largest importers of energy products. All WB countries are clearly interested in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, perceiving this collaboration as an element for the improvement of their economic development. In addition, the benefits are mutual – while China’s economic involvement in the economies of the WB countries strengthens the economies of these countries and makes them an

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<sup>50</sup> Oleg Levitin, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey, “China and South-Eastern Europe: Infrastructure, trade and investment links”, op. cit., p. 1. Apropos, the European Commission published a new enlargement strategy document in 2018 to strengthen the WB’s accession process. It qualified the Western Balkans integration into the EU as a “geostrategic investment” (“A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans, COM (2018) 65 final”, European Commission, Strasbourg, 6 February 2018, p. 1).

<sup>51</sup> Long Jing, “The Future of Cooperation Between China and the Balkans and its Opportunities Within the 16+1 Cooperation and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative”, in: Vladimir N. Cvetković (ed.), *The One Belt, One Road: the Balkan Perspective – Political and Security Aspects*, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade, 2016, pp. 17-20.

<sup>52</sup> Plamen Tonchev, “China’s Road: into the Western Balkans”, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

indispensable part of the overall development strategy of China, the land and sea part of the economic belt of the New Silk Road allows China to increase its presence in Europe (and worldwide).

What is important to the WB countries is that the 16+1 Initiative does not represent infrastructure projects exclusively but deepening and improving bilateral relationships with the People's Republic of China as well. Accordingly, starting from the assumption that the Chinese infrastructure projects towards the WB countries are perceived as projects for introducing foreign resources into the economies of the WB countries, it is clear that the governing structures will endeavor to support such projects and investments. On that track, it is important to note that it is unlikely that the climate and positive attitudes towards the Chinese economic presence will change with the possible changes of the governing structures in the countries analyzed. Chinese "Belt and Road" Initiative has become a political, cultural, and economic reality able to redefine the consisting geopolitical picture of the region. With the notion that geo-economics is new geopolitics replacing traditional, military geopolitics from the past, China has a strong geopolitical vision supported by the geo-economics' strategy that enables it to develop international economic impact worldwide.

Together with its political system's stability and cultural-identity dimension of Sino civilization, possibly the most deserving moment for China's economic boom is its openness to the world market – affirmation of the capitalism concept and support to free entrepreneurship and development strategy based on those assumptions have determined the path of China's economic growth and strengthen its geo-economics' dimension. Thus, China's *new geopolitics and geo-economics* are in the context of reshaping old meanings of land and sea power, colored by the economic means of emerging domination. While the USA's and Russia's geopolitics in the Western Balkans was traditionally successful, China is making huge (silently?) progress in establishing its dominance in the Balkan region. Another part of the coin consists of welcomed China's presence in the WB countries. Or, in the geo-economics terms, the established economic cooperation between China and the Western Balkans states highlights consistencies of geo-economics and geopolitical strategies of the PRC through the prism of "Belt and Road" Initiative. The process of overturning world setting in the Cold War aftermath will not be peaceful – consequences of China's increasingly geopolitical and geo-economics dynamics are still expected, but their influence in the region should not be neglected so far.

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Nevena ŠEKARIĆ

**KINESKA GEOPOLITIKA I GEOEKONOMIJA 21. VEKA:  
DOKAZ SA ZAPADNOG BALKANA**

**Apstrakt:** Osnovna teza ovog članka je da Narodna Republika Kina, u skladu sa snažnom geopolitičkom strategijom, koristi geoekonomska sredstva u kontekstu preoblikovanja uticaja globalnih sila u različitim delovima sveta. Jedna od tih prostornih dimenzija kineske dominacije odnosi se na Zapadni Balkan, prvenstveno kroz ekonomsko prisustvo Kine u ovom regionu. U članku se najpre razmatra pitanje koncepata geopolitike i geoekonomije, a potom i prisustvo Kine u regionu Zapadnog Balkana i procvat infrastrukturnih projekata u domenu transporta i energetike. Za istraživanje su korišćene postojeće baze podataka o ekonomskoj uključenosti Kine u različitim sektorima ekonomije širom sveta, uglavnom China Global Tracker Investment (CGIT) i AidData Global, službene kineske baze finansijskih podataka za zemlje Zapadnog Balkana u periodu 2013-2018. Posebna pažnja je posvećena koristima koje Kina ima u pogledu realizacije tih projekata, iako tržište zemalja Zapadnog Balkana po sebi nije privlačno. Najzad, iznete su i neke zaključne primedbe u pogledu potencijala kineske strategije za preispitivanje političke i bezbednosne dinamike na Zapadnom Balkanu.

**Ključne reči:** Narodna Republika Kina, Zapadni Balkan, geopolitika, geoekonomija, Inicijativa Pojasa i puta, saradnja 16+1, infrastrukturni projekti.

# ČLANCI



UDC 355.48(497.115)"1999"

341:327.51(1-622NATO)(497.115)

Biblid: 0025-8555, 72(2020)

Vol. LXXII, No. 2, pp. 379–403

Review article

Received 14 February 2020

Accepted 28 February 2020

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2002379H>

# Twenty Years after the NATO Armed Intervention: The Kosovo case and Remedial Secession

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**Abstract:** The NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia took place twenty years ago, triggering several important consequences not only regarding the Kosovo case but also on the global level. This paper concentrates on the issue of the relevance of the Kosovo Case for the concept of remedial secession. The main argument of the paper is that the Kosovo Case is of the utmost importance for the above concept because it has motivated numerous states to officially accept the existence of remedial secession in international law. Several decades ago, this was hardly imaginable. Even though the Kosovo Case has not motivated states to change the formal sources of international law in this regard, it could change the way international actors behave when they make decisions about secession. Therefore, one of the conclusions of the paper is that, after Kosovo, the genie of remedial secession could not be put back in the bottle.

**Keywords:** Kosovo, remedial secession, self-determination, international law, *sui generis* thesis, the International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence.

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The article is a result of the work on the University of Belgrade – the Faculty of Political Science scientific research project “Political Identity of Serbia in Local and Global Context” (ref. number 179076), financed by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia. A paper bearing the title *Kosovo Case and Remedial Secession: Is it Possible to put the Genie back in the Bottle?* was presented at the EISA Conference 2019 (Section: *Assessing the Impact of Kosovo Twenty Years On*, Panel: *Recognition and Contested Statehood*).

## Introduction

The NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia happened twenty years ago. The intervention has triggered important consequences not only regarding the contested legal status of Kosovo but also regarding the nature of the international legal order.<sup>2</sup>

This paper focuses on the influence of the Kosovo case on the acceptance of the concept of remedial secession in international law. Remedial secession, as it will be explained in greater detail below, is not strongly supported by the formal sources of international law. However, the support of international law scholars for this concept and – as we will see – of some of the states, is increasing.

The main argument of the paper is the following: the Kosovo case is of the utmost importance for the concept of remedial secession because it has motivated numerous states to officially accept the existence of this concept in international law (regardless of the fact that this has not provoked the change of formal sources of international law in this field.). Several decades ago, this was hardly imaginable. After the Kosovo case, it is almost impossible for these states to deny the existence of the concept of remedial secession in international law (they could deny the applicability of the concept to some specific situation, but not its existence). Therefore, after the Kosovo case, the genie of remedial secession could hardly be put back in the bottle, as confirmed by the analysis of some recent case studies used in this paper.

The paper consists of five main sections. After the introduction, the second section focuses on the general concept of remedial secession in international law. The third is dedicated to the relevance of the said concept for the Kosovo case. The fourth deals with the *sui generis* thesis, as many actors insisted that Kosovo should not be analysed as a case of remedial secession but as a *sui generis* case. The final section considers the possibilities of using the Kosovo “precedent” of remedial secession for future cases. Final remarks are provided at the end of the paper.

## The concept of (remedial) secession in international law doctrine

Secession is possible without the invocation of the principle of self-determination – it is just “the most dramatic form of assertion of self-determi-

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<sup>2</sup> In the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the official name of Kosovo is Kosovo and Metohija.



nation”.<sup>3</sup> Since the focus of this paper is on the concept of remedial secession, the relationship between secession and the principle of self-determination is very important and will be assessed at the beginning. This relationship (as viewed by the advocates of the restrictive and progressive approach) can be best illustrated by comparing the positions taken by the Committee of Jurists and the Committee of Rapporteurs in the context of Aaland case<sup>4</sup> (Table 1):

*Table 1: Restrictive and liberal view on the scope of self-determination rule*

<p><b>The restrictive view on the scope of self-determination rule taken by the Committee of Jurists</b></p>	<p>“Positive International Law does not recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognises the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted.”<sup>5</sup></p>
<p><b>The progressive view taken by the Committee of Rapporteurs</b></p>	<p>“The separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.”<sup>6</sup></p>

However, this difference between the two standpoints of the respective Committees is actually oversimplified. Namely, the Committee of Jurists had already opened the door to a more liberal view on the issue of foreign involvement in the event of a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power:

<sup>3</sup> Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations of International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 332.

<sup>4</sup> The comparison was previously made and used by many authors such as: Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples, A Legal Reappraisal*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; Milena Sterio, *The Right to Self-determination Under International Law, “Selfistans”, Secession, and the Rule of Great Powers*, Routledge, New York, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> “Report of the International Committee of the Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the task of giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question”, *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Special Supplement No. 3, October 1920, 5.

<sup>6</sup> “The Aaland Islands Question”, LN. Doc. B7.21/68/106, 1921.

The Commission, in affirming these principles, does not give an opinion concerning the question as to whether a manifest and continued abuse of sovereign power, to the detriment of a section of the population of a State, would, if such circumstances arose, give to an international dispute, arising, therefore, such a character that its object should be considered as one which is not confined to the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned but comes within the sphere of action of the League of Nations.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, the Committee of Rapporteurs did stipulate that the principle of self-determination was “...not, properly speaking, a rule of international law”.<sup>8</sup>

Be that as it may, these two reports triggered the question about the scope of the self-determination principle (whether it includes the right of secession or not, and if the answer to the question is yes, who the right-bearer is), and that dilemma is still open among scholars. The international law is arguably more conservative than political theory regarding the “right to secede”.<sup>9</sup> Even the strongest advocates of the right to (remedial) secession usually speak about the need to *reform* the international legal order which *should* incorporate this right.<sup>10</sup>

The notion of secession is used by international law scholars, both broadly and strictly. The broad concept includes “all cases of separation of States in which the predecessor State continues to exist in a diminished territorial and demographic form”,<sup>11</sup> while the more restricted one refers to “the creation of a new independent entity through the separation of part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent of the latter”.<sup>12</sup> Since there is no consent of the Republic of Serbia to Kosovo’s independence, the restricted notion of secession will be used in this paper.

One can speak about at least five alternative answers to the question of (il)legality of secession in international law (Table 2):

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<sup>7</sup> “Report of the International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the task of giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question”, *op.cit.*

<sup>8</sup> “The Aaland Islands Question”, *op.cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Christopher Heath Wellman, *A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 157.

<sup>10</sup> Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations of International Law*.

<sup>11</sup> See Marcelo G. Kohen, “Introduction” in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.), *Secession, International Law Perspectives*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3; See also James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 375. (Secession “...may be defined as the creation of a State by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign...”).

*Table 2: Five alternative answers to the question of (il)legality of secession in international law<sup>13</sup>*

Five alternative answers to the question of (il)legality of secession	Main characteristics of the approach
1. All forms of secession outside of the colonial context are prohibited by international law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Respect of the territorial integrity of states is a key principle of international law</li> <li>- It is prohibited to use force to help secessionist movements</li> <li>- It is prohibited to help secessionist movements by any other means</li> <li>- External self-determination exists <i>only</i> in the colonial context</li> </ul>
2. All forms of secession are in accordance with international law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The territorial integrity of states has a very limited importance</li> <li>- There is an obligation to help secessionist movements, even by use of force</li> <li>- Mostly noticeable in normative approach and primary rights theory and not international law strictly speaking</li> </ul>
3. There is only a remedial right to secession in international law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Secession is allowed only when one part of the population is severely discriminated or a victim of international crimes</li> <li>- The territorial integrity of states is an important principle of international law, but it is not the absolute one and it is created for interstate relations</li> <li>- The international community (or even individual states) has an obligation to help (even by use of force) people who are victims of international crimes</li> </ul>
4. International law does not regulate the issue of secession	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The classical, positivistic approach</li> <li>- Statehood (and secession) is a matter of fact</li> <li>- International law does not prohibit or allow secession: the territorial integrity of states is granted only in relations between states</li> <li>- A foreign intervention aimed at helping secessionist movements is prohibited</li> <li>- Underlined importance of the principle of effectiveness</li> </ul>
5. International law regulates only certain types of secession	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International law does not regulate attempts of peaceful secessionist movements</li> <li>- International law regulates only those violent secessionist attempts which can be classified as a threat to peace</li> </ul>

<sup>13</sup> The table is partially based on considerations made in: Marcelo G. Kohen, "Introduction" in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.), *Secession, International Law Perspectives*.

There is no room here for a detailed analysis of each of those alternative answers.<sup>14</sup> This paper argues that no alternative answer is completely satisfying, although most international law scholars assert that secession is neither prohibited, nor allowed by international law (approach no. 4 in Table 2). Firstly, there are some situations in which attempts of secession are prohibited by resolutions of the UN Security Council. Secondly, even if we agree that the sources of international law do not regulate secession per se, human rights law and international humanitarian law do regulate situations which accompany attempts of secession (e.g., demonstrations, armed conflicts, etc.) That actually means that even though international law in most of the cases does not regulate the *outcome* of secession attempt, it regulates the process. Hence, the author of this article finds the fifth answer to the dilemma in reference to (il)legality of secession in international law to be the most satisfying.

In his analysis of the relationship between the principle of self-determination of peoples and the act of secession, Christian Tomuschat, for example, underlines the importance of the notion of 'people'.<sup>15</sup> He then concludes that "...the presumed premise – the existence of an unlimited right of secession for every ethnic group – must be wrong".<sup>16</sup> Apparently, Tomuschat rejects the possibility of the second alternative option from Table 2. On the other hand, in his analyses of *opinio juris* as part of customary international law in this field, Tomuschat finds that "GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) emphasises the principle of national unity, *departing from that proposition in view of instances only where the government of the country concerned does not represent the entire people...*"<sup>17</sup> and adds that "...exceptional circumstances are capable of sustaining a claim for secession – circumstances which may roughly be summarised as a *grave and massive violation of the human rights of a specific group in a discriminatory fashion. This is a situation which Lee Buchheit has called 'remedial secession...'*".<sup>18</sup> This is a confirmation of the third alternative answer presented in Table 2, and a significant part of this paper will be dedicated to the analysis of the concept of remedial secession in international law.

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<sup>14</sup> It is important to note that the third alternative answer could be seen as part of the fifth. We decided to keep both because the third alternative answer may be crucial for this article.

<sup>15</sup> Christian Tomuschat, "Secession and self-determination", in Marcelo G. Kohen (ed.), *Secession, International Law Perspectives*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35, (emphasis added).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

According to Tomuschat’s above argumentation, the right to remedial secession is primarily based on the so-called *a contrario* interpretation of the ‘safeguard clause’ in the part of GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) that deals with the self-determination of people as a general principle of international law.<sup>19</sup> Namely, the Resolution expressly stipulates that:

“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States *conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour*”.<sup>20</sup>

A *contrario* interpretation of this clause stipulates that the territorial integrity is guaranteed only to those states whose *governments represent all the people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour*. If that is not the case, parts of the population severely discriminated (or as we shall see, are victims of serious international crimes) do have the right to secede. Some authors have concluded that the relationship between the principle of territorial integrity and self-determination of people “...should be resolved by embracing a remedial right to secession to ensure that a minority may exercise its right to self-determination where its surrounding state violates its fundamental rights”.<sup>21</sup>

One of the most quoted references concerning the remedial right of secession is probably the one from Karl Doehring’s contribution to Bruno Simma’s UN Charter Commentary.<sup>22</sup> After stating arguments for *a contrario* interpretation of the safe clause, Doehring also states that “[i]t seems to be clear that not every kind of

<sup>19</sup> However, see e.g. Antonio Cassese, *Self-determination of Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 302-312.

<sup>20</sup> “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, [www.documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement), visited on 30 December 2019, (emphasis added). These words are carefully restated in some other important documents such as the *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action* adopted on 25 June 1993, [www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx), visited on 30 December 2019.

<sup>21</sup> Evan M. Brewer, “To Break Free from Tyranny and Oppression: Proposing a Model for Remedial Right to Secession in the Wake of the *Kosovo* Advisory Opinion”, *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, vol. 45, no.1, 2012, p. 248.

<sup>22</sup> Karl Doehring, “Self-Determination”, in: Bruno Simma (ed.), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, Oxford University Press, vol. I, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition., Oxford, 2002, para. 29.

discrimination can legitimise a secession...” However, he also adds that “... a right of secession could be... recognised if the minority discriminated against is exposed to actions... which consist in an evident brutal violation of fundamental human rights...”<sup>23</sup> Doehring also mentions one more condition for the application of the remedial right of secession: “[t]he right of secession may be excessive if the expectation still exists that the state authorities are prepared to stop the discrimination or if legal remedies and protection by tribunals are available”.<sup>24</sup>

On the other hand, a great number of authors reject the existence of the remedial right of secession in international law. Marcelo Kohen, for example, accepts Tomuschat’s approach in which he underlines the importance of the notion of *people* in the self-determination right. However, the difference between these two authors starts with an understanding of who has a right to be called *people*. Kohen concludes that there is “...only one people where there exists a State”.<sup>25</sup> For him, there is a logical consequence of this conclusion: minorities are not *people*. He further rejects the existence of the remedial right of secession:

“...the interpretation of the safeguard clause as allowing ‘remedial secession’ would lead, as a consequence of the violation of the internal dimension of self-determination, to the loss of the territory of the State... This is tantamount to saying that when a national, religious or linguistic minority is seriously discriminated against, then it becomes a ‘people’. It seems that the more appropriate way to address the issue of serious violations of human rights, either collective or individual, is rather through the restoration of the respect of such rights”.<sup>26</sup>

This tension between the concept of *people* and a remedial right on secession is also recognised by other authors. Namely, James Summers speaks about two dimensions of self-determination – inherent and remedial: “A preliminary issue in discussions of the dimensions of self-determination is whether it is held inherently (or primarily), attaching to certain groups simply because they are peoples, or remedially, to provide redress for situations of oppression or discrimination”.<sup>27</sup> Summers relates this classification to the perspectives of nationalism and liberalism.<sup>28</sup> He first notes that liberalism is supporting the territorial integrity of states, but that:

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Marcelo G. Kohen, “Introduction”, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>27</sup> James Summers, *Peoples and International Law*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2014, p. 55.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

“[l]iberalism’s support for the territorial integrity also implies a possibility of secession. If a state is unrepresentative and excludes or persecutes part of its population, then that population might legitimately secede to establish a more representative government. This is the idea of remedial independence, perhaps still best expressed in the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. International instruments and courts and other bodies have implied such a right in their support for the territorial integrity, but to what extent is there actual support for such a right itself?”<sup>29</sup>

After a vigilant analysis of the legal documents and practice in this area, James Summers draws a solid and balanced conclusion: “[r]emedial independence has weak support from formal sources. Nonetheless, it runs to the heart of statehood and reflects liberalism’s deep roots in the state and by extension international law...”<sup>30</sup> Some other authors, like Jure Vidmar, confirmed this conclusion by stating that the theoretical foundation of the concept of remedial secession is rather weak.<sup>31</sup> In addition, Vidmar concluded that the Kosovo case did not support the general use of remedial secession in international law.<sup>32</sup>

The situation in which there is increasing support for the concept of remedial secession in the doctrine of international law and weak support in the formal sources of international law has its own consequences. There is no consensus about what the remedial right on secession (if that right exists at all) actually stands for – *who* has the right of remedial secession (who can be subsumed under the notion of *people* and whether only *people* have the right of remedial secession), *when* that subject has the right of remedial secession (discrimination, violation of some basic human rights, or international crimes such as crimes against humanity or genocide), or *what the additional conditions* for its application are (*e.g.*, at which moment we can claim that negotiations about internal self-determination are no longer fruitful).

Therefore, states as primary law-makers in the international legal order (some would even say exclusive law-makers) need to resolve the above-mentioned controversies if they want to have clear normative guidance in this field. That is the reason why one needs to analyse their positions concerning remedial secession very closely. Since their submissions to the adjudicating bodies are among the most

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 517.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 521.

<sup>31</sup> Jure Vidmar, “Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice”, *St. Antony’s International Review*, Vol. 6, Number 1, 2010, pp. 37-56.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* This aspect will be analysed in the next section.

important means of expressing their position on a certain topic, the Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo may be the crucial source for such an analysis.

## Use of the concept of remedial secession in the advisory opinion on Kosovo

When it comes to the issues of statehood, self-determination and secession, arguably the most quoted academic source is James Crawford's book *The Creation of States in International Law*.<sup>33</sup> Crawford notes: "[a]t least it is arguable that, in extreme cases of oppression, international law allows remedial secession to discrete peoples within a State, and that the 'safeguard clauses' in the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration recognises this, even if indirectly".<sup>34</sup> Interestingly enough, Crawford did not explain in detail his argumentation for this standpoint. He just continued to analyse the *Quebec Secession Case* and its relevance for the concept of remedial secession.<sup>35</sup> It is, however, interesting to note that Crawford also commented on the recent developments in respect of greater inclusiveness of the term *people* (not limited to the people of the state as a whole), and that he made an argument that "...these developments are still tentative (*de lege ferenda*), and they do not affect the established rules and practices with respect to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states".<sup>36</sup>

James Crawford was indeed an important figure in the Kosovo case before the ICJ. Not only was he a Counsel and Advocate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland before the Court, but his above-mentioned book on the creation of states in international law was also the most quoted source in the written proceedings and oral statements in this case.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>37</sup> The book *The Creation of States in International Law* was cited more than 50 times by 15 parties in their written proceedings in this case. The most interesting thing is that this book was cited by both supporters and opponents of Kosovo's independence. That was also noted by Crawford himself in the oral submission of the United Kingdom: "during the course of these proceedings, a number of governments have cited my work on secession in support of what you will already have realised are apparently contrasting conclusions". (Footnote omitted), [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15734.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15734.pdf), 30/12/2019.



The presence of experts such as James Crawford, Martti Koskenniemi (representative of Finland), Malcolm Shaw and Marcelo Kohen (Counsels and Advocates of Serbia), Sir Michael Wood and Sean Murphy (Counsels of Kosovo or *authors of the declaration*, which was the official name before the ICJ in this case), Jochen Frowein (Legal Advisor of Albania), Jean d'Aspremont (representative of Burundi), Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick (Counsel and Advisor of Cyprus), Ole Spiermann (Advisor of Denmark), Allain Pelle (representative of France) and Niels Blokker (representative of the Netherlands) is an indicator of how important this case was for a number of states. Other signs that reveal the importance of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion are: the number of states involved (the case was second on the list of cases in the Court's history, just behind the *Wall* case), the fact that all permanent members of the Security Council actively participated, etc.<sup>38</sup>

Unfortunately, the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo did not meet the high expectations of international law doctrine.<sup>39</sup> Namely, it did not provide crucial answers regarding the scope of general principles of international law, such as self-determination of peoples or its relationship with other principles such as the territorial integrity of states or prohibition of the use of force in international relations. Nevertheless, the relevance of the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo is based *inter alia* on the fact that it revealed the positions of a number of states in reference to certain important issues such as the concept of remedial secession. It was expected that those states that were claiming the illegality of Kosovo independence would not embrace this concept.<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, some of the states that were defending the legality of Kosovo independence (or, at least, claiming that the Declaration of Independence did not violate international law) relied on the concept of remedial secession, while others did not (Table 3).

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<sup>38</sup> This author already dealt with issues such as the relevance of the Kosovo Case and especially the relationship between self-determination of peoples and the territorial integrity of states in statements of states before the ICJ in: Miloš Hrnjaz, "Odnos prava naroda na samoopredeljenje i teritorijalnog integriteta država: podnesci povodom Savetodavnog mišljenja o Kosovu", in: *Srbija u evropskom i regionalnom kontekstu* (ed. Radmila Nakarada, Dragan Živojinović), Belgrade, 2012, pp. 191-212.

<sup>39</sup> See e.g. Marko Milanovic, Michael Wood (ed.), *The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.

<sup>40</sup> However, see the important exception of the Russian Federation which accepted the theoretical possibility of remedial secession which was not, according to its opinion, applicable to the Kosovo Case: written proceeding of Russia, pp. 30-32, [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15628.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15628.pdf), 30 December 2019.

*Table 3: The list of states that used remedial secession as an argument for Kosovo independence<sup>41</sup>*

<b>States that supported Kosovo independence before the ICJ</b>	
States that were relying on the concept of remedial secession	States that were <i>not</i> relying on the concept of remedial secession
1. Albania	1. Sierra Leone
2. Denmark	2. Japan
3. Finland	3. France
4. Estonia	4. United States of America
5. Germany	5. Austria
6. Latvia	6. Luxembourg
7. Ireland	
8. Holland	
9. Poland	
10. Switzerland	
11. United Kingdom	
12. Czech Republic	
13. Slovenia	
14. Maldives	
15. Norway <sup>42</sup>	

It is, however, important to note that there are some more subtle differences between the states. For example, Norway and Maldives did not explicitly refer to the concept of remedial secession, although they did provide arguments that could be recognised as part of the concept. Other states did mention the concept but made no thorough argumentation about its relevance to the Kosovo case or any other case.<sup>43</sup>

In the end, the Court concluded that the question posed by the UN General Assembly was limited to the question of (il)legality of the Declaration of

<sup>41</sup> Miloš Hrnjaz, "Odnos prava naroda na samoopredeljenje i teritorijalnog integriteta država: podnesci povodom Savetodavnog mišljenja o Kosovu", op. cit., str. 198.

<sup>42</sup> Majority of authors who cope with this topic name 11 states plus authors of the Declaration. The reason for this difference is that some states did not openly advocate the applicability of the concept of remedial secession, but their arguments relied on it.

<sup>43</sup> See e.g. Written Statement of UK, [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15638.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15638.pdf), pp. 92-93, 30 December 2019.

Independence as a legal act, and that: “[i]t does not ask about the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognised it as an independent State”.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, the Court did not comment in detail on the issue of (remedial) secession. However, it did mention something that could be important for the evaluation of the legal nature of the concept of remedial secession in international law:

“Whether, outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-determination confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right to separate from that State is, however, a subject on which radically different views were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and expressing a position on the question. *Similar differences existed regarding whether international law provides for a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what circumstances. There was also a sharp difference of views as to whether the circumstances which some participants maintained would give rise to a right of “remedial secession” were actually present in Kosovo.* The Court considers that it is not necessary to resolve these questions in the present case”.<sup>45</sup>

By emphasising *radically different views* of states regarding the international law of self-determination and especially “remedial secession”, the Court arguably stated that *there was no customary international law governing the remedial right to secede*.<sup>46</sup> Just as a short reminder, in its jurisprudence, the ICJ underlined the importance of the *general* belief in or acceptance of some rule of behaviour as a condition for the existence of a customary rule:

“Two concepts have crystallised as customary law in recent years arising out of the *general consensus* revealed at that Conference. The first is the concept of the fishery zone, the area in which a State may claim exclusive fishery jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea; the extension of that fishery zone up to a 12-mile limit from the baselines appears now to be *generally accepted*”.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup> In accordance with the International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403, para. 51.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 82, 83, (emphasis added).

<sup>46</sup> It is interesting to note in this regard that the Court used the name of the concept with quotation marks.

<sup>47</sup> *Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland)*, ICJ, Merits, Judgment, [1974] p. 23, [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5977.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5977.pdf), 30/12/2019. (emphasis added). See also: *Colombian-Peruvian asylum case*, ICJ, [1950], p. 277 [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/13/1933.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/13/1933.pdf), 30 December 2019.

If the condition of general consensus and acceptance is not fulfilled, then there is no international customary rule and, accordingly, no customary rule on remedial secession was established in this case. Probably the best argument for this statement can be found in the famous *dictum* from the *Legality of Use of Nuclear Weapons* case:

“...several of the resolutions under consideration in the present case have been adopted with *substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions*; thus, although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they still fall short of establishing the existence of an *opinio juris* on the illegality of the use of such weapons”.<sup>48</sup>

Radically different positions of states have further implications for the future development of the concept of remedial secession. Namely, those radically different positions illustrate the fact that not only there is no consensus in international law doctrine, as we have already demonstrated, but that there is also no consensus among states. Therefore, advocates of this right in international law doctrine need to take a moderate stand if they want success - more progressive views on this concept hardly have any chance of success among states. Additionally, one must bear in mind a well-known fact that seems to be overlooked more often than not - the content of submissions before adjudicating bodies could reflect the vision of future international (legal) order shared by states as its primary subjects.

### **The Kosovo Case: Remedial secession or *sui generis*?**

As previously noted, the argument of remedial secession was used only by some states before the ICJ.<sup>49</sup> And even for those states, remedial secession was not used as a primary argument for Kosovo’s statehood (a fact recognised by the ICJ):

“A number of participants in the present proceedings have claimed, although in almost every instance *only as a secondary argument*, that the population of Kosovo has the right to create an independent State... pursuant to what they described as *a right of “remedial secession”* in the face of the situation in Kosovo”.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, 8 July 1996, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, para. 71, [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf), 30/12/2019. (emphasis added). *But see* Written statement of United States of America in *Kosovo* case, footnote 211 on page 52 [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf), 30 December 2019.

<sup>49</sup> See Table 3 of this article.

<sup>50</sup> *Kosovo* case, para. 82. (emphasis added).

Since one of the main arguments of Serbia<sup>51</sup> (both in the political and legal sense) and some other countries such as Cyprus<sup>52</sup> was that Kosovo could be a dangerous precedent for secessionist movements across the globe, states that have recognised Kosovo did their best to demonstrate that Kosovo was not a precedent – they instead argued that Kosovo was a unique, *sui generis* case.<sup>53</sup> It should be stated here that it is not always easy to differentiate between political and legal justifications for the recognition of Kosovo. States usually prefer using political arguments over “technical” legal argumentation when they decide to recognize an entity as a state.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, it could be argued that the *sui generis* argument in the case of Kosovo was not legal but political. Nevertheless, states which were advocating Kosovo’s independence before the International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Declaration of Independence used this argument as a part of their *legal* argumentation.<sup>55</sup> This paper argues that the used *sui generis* thesis is not supported by the international legal framework and that proponents of the legality of Kosovo’s statehood must rely on some other legal basis (remedial secession being one of the most important among them).

One should, therefore, start with the following question: What does it mean to set a precedent? Perhaps this would be the right place to remind of one basic fact – international law, at least formally speaking, is not a precedent law.<sup>56</sup> However, as already noted by some eminent scholars, this rule should be viewed in a more nuanced way.<sup>57</sup> Hence, although international law formally speaking is not a precedent law, adjudicating bodies do their best to have a coherent jurisprudence, as the international rule of law would be jeopardised if similar cases had different

<sup>51</sup> See Written Statement of Serbia, [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15642.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15642.pdf), 30 December 2019.

<sup>52</sup> See Written Statement of Cyprus, [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15609.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15609.pdf), 30 December 2019.

<sup>53</sup> See, e.g.: James Summers (ed.), *Kosovo: A Precedent*, Brill, Leiden, 2011; Peter Terem, Peter Rosputinský, “Legal and Political Aspects of the Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence”, in: *Kosovo: Sui Generis or Precedent in International Relations* (ed. Dušan Proroković), Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2018, pp. 91-118.

<sup>54</sup> Confirmation of this argument can be found in the Kosovo case too: S. F. van der Driest, *Remedial Secession: A right to external self-determination as a remedy to serious injustices*, Intersentia, 2013, p. 242.

<sup>55</sup> See, e.g.: Milos Hrnjaz, “Odnos prava naroda na samoopredeljenje i teritorijalnog integriteta država: podnesci povodom Savetodavnog mišljenja o Kosovu”, 2012; S. F. van der Driest, *Remedial Secession: A right to external self-determination as a remedy to serious injustices*, 2013.

<sup>56</sup> See e.g. article 59 of ICJ Statute (as an illustration of this fact): “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”.

<sup>57</sup> Mohamed Shahabuddeen, *The Precedent in the World Court*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.

outcomes. Most of the proponents of the unique case thesis in the case of Kosovo actually wanted to demonstrate that the different legal outcome of the Kosovo case (statehood) is a consequence of the different factual background.

This is the right moment to underline that a *sui generis* case means ‘one of a kind’.<sup>58</sup> There are two different aspects of a *sui generis* thesis: political and legal.<sup>59</sup> The focus of this paper is on the latter. But what, in the legal sense, makes something *one of a kind*? Normally, general rules are applicable to factual circumstances *similar enough* (not identical but similar enough because identical circumstances are very rare, especially in international relations). However, if we accept the *sui generis* thesis, then there is the following consequence: general rules of international law are not applicable to that case; it falls within a sort of a *grey zone of international law* and, therefore, there is enormous room for political discretion.

Different factual circumstances *per se*, however, should not be sufficient for accepting a *sui generis* thesis. We need to find out what it is that is so different in a concrete case, in a *legal sense*, which makes it *one of a kind*. Some countries insisted on three main characteristics of the Kosovo case that made it *one of a kind*: the specific constitutional position of Kosovo within Yugoslavia, the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, and the international administration of Kosovo based on UNSC Resolution 1244.

Although Kosovo truly held a specific constitutional position in Yugoslavia, that fact was not enough for the Badinter Commission to conclude that it had the right of external self-determination in the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.<sup>60</sup> The specific constitutional position of Kosovo could be relevant for the application of the right of remedial secession, but it is hardly relevant for the *sui generis* thesis.

The conflict of Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 has been used as an argument for a *sui generis* thesis because there had been gross violations of human rights and war crimes, especially during the NATO intervention in 1999 in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, it is difficult to see why this should be a valid argument for a *sui generis* thesis. Namely, revoking humanitarian intervention as the basis for a

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<sup>58</sup> Anne Peters, “Has the Advisory Opinion’s Finding that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to International Law Set an Unfortunate Precedent?”, in Marko Milanovic, Michael Wood (ed.), *The Law and Politics of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 291-317.


<sup>59</sup> There is, of course, certain overlapping between the political and legal aspects, and we will explore it below.

<sup>60</sup> See e.g. Gulara Guliyeva, “Chapter 9 Kosovo’s Independence: Re-Examining the Principles Established by the EC Badinter Commission in Light of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion”, in: James Summers (ed.), *Kosovo: A Precedent*, Brill, Leiden, 2011, pp. 279-303.

*sui generis* thesis could not be valid if for no other reason than because this was not the only case in which some international actors claimed that the use of force was justified to stop gross violations of human rights or war crimes and genocide. The other option is to see gross violations and war crimes against Kosovo Albanians as an argument for gaining independence; however, this could also be an argument for remedial secession, and it does not make the situation one of a kind at all.<sup>61</sup>

The third argument in favour of the *sui generis* thesis was that it was the international administration of Kosovo, based on UNSC Resolution 1244, that made the Kosovo case *one of a kind*. First of all, it should be noted that the UNSC Resolution was adopted based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter and that it, therefore, represented a *lex specialis* compared to the norms of general international law. However, as the ICJ underlined in the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, this Resolution was adopted in order to establish an interim legal regime in Kosovo so as to avoid being viewed as authorising Kosovo's secession.<sup>62</sup> Kosovo certainly is not the only territory under the UN Administration, and it would thus be very difficult to claim that this fact alone makes it a *sui generis* case.

Therefore, these claims, at least when viewed separately, are not convincing arguments for a *sui generis* thesis. Anne Peters notes that the only possible argument for a *sui generis* thesis could be to take all these arguments together.<sup>63</sup> This seems fair because it resembles most of the arguments made by states that are proponents of a *sui generis* thesis before the ICJ. The argumentation could be then presented as follows:



<sup>61</sup> For example, In its written submission before the ICJ, Finland mentioned East Timor and Bangladesh as cases in which the concept of remedial secession was used prior to the Kosovo case.

<sup>62</sup> *Kosovo case*, para. 94-100.

<sup>63</sup> Anne Peters, "Has the Advisory Opinion's Finding that Kosovo's Declaration of Independence was not Contrary to International Law Set an Unfortunate Precedent?", *op. cit.*

Notwithstanding the fact that this diagram is factually questionable, even if it is completely factually correct, it is probably not sufficient to sustain the *sui generis* thesis. After all, the diagram itself illustrates the fact that Kosovo is an example of secession. As already stated, it cannot be seen as the final chapter of Yugoslavia's dissolution for a number of reasons. This means that Kosovo is not a *sui generis* case and that general rules of international law need to apply to this case as well, which brings us back to the five alternative answers to the question of (il)legality of secession in international law.<sup>64</sup>

If we exclude two extremist views – that international law prohibits all secessions (after all, the ICJ did pronounce that respect of the territorial integrity of states is applicable only in relations between states) and that all forms of secession are allowed under the rules of international law (this argument is reserved almost exclusively to the field of normative political theory and not international law), we are left with two main positions: that there was a remedial right of secession of the Kosovo people (this position was part of our previous considerations), and the classical positivists' view that international law does not regulate the issue of secession (secession is a question of fact). In the case of Kosovo, we could hardly say that secession is a question of fact. Namely, proponents of this thesis are claiming that a parent state has a right to defend its constitutional order (accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law), and Serbia could not do that in 2008 because of the application of UNSC Resolution 1244.<sup>65</sup> Hence, we can conclude that either Kosovo had a remedial right of secession or that international law prohibits/allows secession of territories under the UN Administration from previous parent states.<sup>66</sup> Whichever of the two positions that we take, it is applicable also to the Kosovo case.

Of course, there were various other attempts to circumvent this dilemma concerning the legal basis of Kosovo's contested statehood (probably having in mind the relatively weak theoretical foundation of the concept of remedial

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<sup>64</sup> See Table no. 2.

<sup>65</sup> On the issue of how UNSC Resolution 1244 created a "framework" for Kosovo's secession see: J. Summers, "Kosovo: from Yugoslav Province to Disputed Independence", in J. Summers (ed.), *Kosovo: A Precedent?*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011, pp. 48-51.

<sup>66</sup> The ICJ pronounced that the aim of UNSC Resolution 1244 was to establish an interim regime, but the World Court was silent in giving response to the question of whether this means that unilateral attempts to resolve the issue of the status of Kosovo would, therefore, be allowed. Unfortunately, this was probably the only opportunity for us to obtain an authoritative interpretation of this situation, as it is not realistic to expect a UNSC consensus on this issue (at least at this point).



secession). One such proposal was to use the concept of “earned sovereignty” in the Kosovo Case.<sup>67</sup> This concept is defined “by three core elements: shared sovereignty, institution building, and a determination of final status”.<sup>68</sup> Determination of final status as the last phase of earned sovereignty is understood as finding acceptable options ranging from substantial autonomy to full independence.<sup>69</sup> By doing this, some authors are actually chronologically placing the concept of earned sovereignty after the concept of remedial secession (remedial secession was invoked in the Kosovo case in 1998 and 1999, and earned sovereignty after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244 and unsuccessful negotiations prior to the promulgation of the Declaration of Independence). However, the concepts of earned and remedial sovereignty both described the political process and reasons why some states decided to recognise Kosovo as an independent state, and not the *legal basis* of the contested Kosovo’s statehood.

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that Kosovo could not be a *sui generis* case in a legal sense and that the *sui generis* thesis could not be the legal basis for Kosovo’s independence. We can even say that the *sui generis* thesis is not legal at all. This thesis could be viewed as a political one, with a strong political argument in its essence: one should recognise Kosovo as an independent state because Kosovo is politically a unique case. Therefore, one should not do the same in any future similar cases. In addition, this practice of recognition of Kosovo should not be seen as part of the process of making a customary law in this field.

### **Kosovo as a *sui generis* case of remedial secession?**

It is fair to say that prophecies made by Serbia and some other countries concerning the possible effects of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence were not completely fulfilled. There has been no explosion of cases of (remedial) secession in the world. However, some recent examples of secessionist attempts and foreign interventions in support of secessionist movements do show that it is difficult to sustain a *sui generis* thesis in international law and avoid criticism regarding the so-called double standards. The situations in Crimea, Georgia and Kashmir illustrate

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<sup>67</sup> Grace Bolton, Gezim Visoka, “Recognizing Kosovo’s Independence: Remedial Secession or Earned Sovereignty”, South East European Studies at Oxford, Occasional Paper no. 11/10, 2010.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

this fact and the Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol opens with the following statement:

“We, the members of the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Council, with regard to the charter of the United Nations and a whole range of other international documents and taking into consideration *the confirmation of the status of Kosovo by the United Nations International Court of Justice on July, 22, 2010, which says that the unilateral declaration of independence by a part of the country doesn't violate any international norms...*”<sup>70</sup>

In addition, the President of the Russian Federation used the Kosovo case to justify Russian official policy towards Crimea.<sup>71</sup> Many authors warned that, although there are obvious factual and legal differences between the Crimea and the Kosovo case, it is not easy to avoid double standards, both on the side of Russia and the West.<sup>72</sup> It should be recalled in this regard that international law provides an opportunity for actors to use international legal arguments to legitimise their behaviour in the international arena. As noted by Ian Klabbbers, all actors use various justifications for their behaviour, and the Kosovo case provided an additional argument for states and non-state actors in the international arena even though, as Klabbbers also noticed, that does not mean that all justifications are equally persuasive.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, it is important to see whether the Kosovo case encouraged the use of remedial secession as a justification of political aspirations and acts of state and non-state actors even though remedial secession has weak support in the formal sources of international law.

The case of eventual Kurdish independence is arguably most illustrative. In February 2015, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström, ruffled some feathers when she stated in the Swedish Parliament that “[w]e as the Social Democratic Party have had a clear policy toward the case of Palestine, and I want Sweden to change its foreign policy toward the Middle East as it is the right time to discuss Kurdish independence.”<sup>74</sup> She did not, however, provide any details regarding legal grounds for eventual Kurdish independence. Approximately one

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<sup>70</sup> Available at: <https://www.voltairenet.org/article182723.html> (accessed on 30 December 2019), emphasis added.

<sup>71</sup> S. F. van den Driest, “Crimea’s Separation from Ukraine: An Analysis of the Right of Self-Determination and (Remedial) Secession in International Law”, *Netherlands International Law Review*, vol. 62, no. 1, 2015, p. 330.

<sup>72</sup> See e.g. interview with Bruno Simma in Spiegel: Von Dietmar Hipp, ‘Der Westen ist sheinheilig’, *Der Spiegel*, 7 April, 2014.

<sup>73</sup> Jan Klabbbers, *International Law*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, p. 22.

year later, Mr. Hemin Hawrami, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Kurdistan region, delivered remarks on Kurdish independence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.<sup>75</sup> In the course of that meeting, Hawrami explained why he believed the Kurdish people should have their own state:

“Under the Iraqi central government, Kurdistan lost 4,500 villages, was subject to chemical weapons attacks, and experienced the Barzani genocide. Prior to 1991, only one percent of Iraq’s industry was located in Kurdistan, and there was only one university there. Iraqi Kurds originally hoped that post-2003 Iraq would be based on power sharing, federalism and constitutionalism, but federalism has failed. A new formula is needed.”<sup>76</sup>

The President of the Kurdistan region at the time, Masoud Barzani, had no intention of giving up a referendum on the status of Kurdistan. He mentioned self-determination as a legal basis for independence more than once: “... [s]elf-determination is an indisputable right of the people of Kurdistan. Change is ahead. The people of Kurdistan have not been the reason for those changes and massacres; rather, they have always been the victims.”<sup>77</sup> The fact that Kurdistan officials are talking about alleged genocide, numerous civilian casualties and the use of weapons of mass destruction is not accidental. The purpose of this discourse is to create a resemblance with some earlier attempts at secession such as the one of Kosovo. More precisely, these arguments looked like the arguments made in the context of a remedial right to secede. Of course, these arguments probably would have been used even without the Kosovo case, but this time they sounded more convincing because some states openly supported the legality of remedial secession in world politics.<sup>78</sup>

However, there are more subtle ways by which invoking remedial secession in the case of Kosovo could influence world politics. After Kosovo, secessionist movements know the path to independence. They need to prove not only that there is some form of discrimination in the parent state, but also that there are

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<sup>74</sup> H. Abdulrazaq, ‘Swedish Foreign Minister: It’s time for Kurdish Independence’, *Basnews*, 14 February 2015, [www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/126915](http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/126915), 30 December 2019.

<sup>75</sup> Hemin Hawrami, *The Future of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Mosul, Economic Crises, and Self-determination*, [www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/Hawrami20160208-transcript.pdf](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/other/Hawrami20160208-transcript.pdf), 30 December 2019.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Statement of President Masoud Barzani on Self-determination Right, *Hawler Times*, 3 February 2016, [hawlertimes.com/2016/02/03/statement-from-president-masoud-barzani-on-self-determination-right](http://hawlertimes.com/2016/02/03/statement-from-president-masoud-barzani-on-self-determination-right), 30 December 2019.

<sup>78</sup> In the end, the referendum was held in 2017, but Kurdish people in Iraq did not gain independence.

crimes committed against members of the movement (usually some minority). If there are no crimes as of yet, governments should be provoked to commit them. The next step is to gain support from international actors (this is the crucial step that is missing in most cases such as Kurdistan at the moment) for independence based on the argument of remedial secession. Of course, governments are also aware of these possible steps. They will try to prove that they are representing entire populations, without discrimination and in democratic conditions. Additionally, they will try to prove that they did not commit any crimes at all. In less powerful states, governments will also look for international support for their own cause or “fight against terrorism”. But, regardless of who wins those concrete (diplomatic) battles, the concept of remedial secession will remain in the background of the disputes.

## Concluding remarks

Numerous states offered two legally relevant explanations for their positions on Kosovo’s statehood: remedial secession and the *sui generis* thesis. This article argued that the *sui generis* thesis should be abandoned for a number of reasons. It should be treated as a political explanation as to why someone decided to recognise Kosovo as an independent state, and not as a legal argument for Kosovo’s statehood in a strict sense. There is nothing sufficiently unique in the case of Kosovo to justify treating it as a *sui generis* case; and even if it is unique today, no one can guarantee that it will remain unique in the future.

Therefore, the only valid legal justification for the position in favour of Kosovo’s statehood is the applicability of the concept of remedial secession. This argument should be taken seriously because it has serious political and legal implications. There is increasing support for the applicability of the remedial secession concept in the doctrine of international law, but there is rather weak support for it in the traditional sources of international law. Hence, the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo was an important opportunity for states to demonstrate their positions regarding the concept of remedial secession. Although states’ submissions before the ICJ, in this case, demonstrated a lack of proof that there was a customary law on the remedial right of secession, there were definitely some states that have endorsed the use of this concept.

It is going to be interesting to see the reactions from states to different secessionist movements in the future. There is no doubt, and the Kurdish example illustrates this very well, that the Kosovo case is going to be used as an example of

how to gain one's own state. On the other hand, the case of Crimea illustrated once more why even liberal states are still cautious about the use of remedial secession concept - there is still much room for its misuse.

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Miloš HRNJAZ

**DVADESET GODINA POSLE ORUŽANE INTERVENCIJE NATO:  
SLUČAJ KOSOVA I METOHİJE I KOREKTIVNA SECESİJA**

**Apstrakt:** NATO vojna intervencija u Jugoslaviji dogodila se pre dvadeset godina, što je izazvalo nekoliko važnih posledica ne samo po pitanju Kosova i Metohije, već i na globalnom nivou. Ovaj se rad koncentriše na pitanje važnosti slučaja KiM za koncept korektivne secesije. Glavni argument rada je da je slučaj KiM od najvećeg značaja za gore navedeni koncept, jer je motivisao brojne države da zvanično prihvate postojanje korektivne secesije u međunarodnom pravu. Pre nekoliko decenija ovo bi bilo teško zamisliti. Iako slučaj Kosova nije motivisao države da promene formalne izvore međunarodnog prava u tom pogledu, to bi moglo da promeni način ponašanja međunarodnih aktera kada oni donose odluke o secesiji. Prema tome, jedan od zaključaka rada je da, nakon Kosova, duh korektivne secesije ne može biti vraćen u bocu.

**Ključne reči:** Kosovo i Metohija, korektivna secesija, samoopredeljenje, međunarodno pravo, teza *sui generis*, Međunarodni sud pravde, Savetodavno mišljenje o Deklaraciji o nezavisnosti.

UDK: 327.39(4-672EU:4-11)  
Bibliid: 0025-8555, 72(2020)  
Vol. LXXII, br. 2, str. 404–426

Originalni naučni rad  
Primljen 1. aprila 2020.  
Odobren 10. maja 2020.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2298/MEDJP2002404J>

# Inicijativa Evropske unije za saradnju sa susedima u Istočnoj Evropi i Južnom Kavkazu: ciljevi, ograničenja i izazovi politike integracije bez članstva

Ana JOVIĆ-LAZIĆ<sup>1</sup>

**Apstrakt:** Nakon proširenja Unije, novi susedi u Istočnoj Evropi i Južnom Kavkazu postali su od velikog značaja za stabilnost Evrope, zbog čega je EU formulisala Evropsku susedsku politiku i Istočno partnerstvo. Imajući u vidu da Rusija posmatra ovo područje kao sferu sopstvenog uticaja, postala je važna i njena politika, kao i reakcije na inicijative Unije u ovom regionu. Ovaj geopolitički kontekst Istočnog partnerstva postao je očigledan izbijanjem ukrajinske krize. Pored toga što je ukazala na ograničenja često tehnokratskog pristupa EU, ova kriza je jasno pokazala da postoji sukob ciljeva Evropske unije i Ruske Federacije u zajedničkom susedstvu i postavila pitanje bezbednosnih i geopolitičkih implikacija ove inicijative. Takođe, politike i interesi Evropske unije i Ruske Federacije utiču ne samo na Ukrajinu već, u većoj ili manjoj meri, na razvoj prilika u svim ostalim zemljama koje su uključene u Istočno partnerstvo EU – Gruziju, Moldaviju, Belorusiju, Jermeniju i Azerbejdžan.

**Ključne reči:** Evropska unija, Evropska politika susedstva, Istočno partnerstvo, Ruska Federacija, Ukrajina, Belorusija, Moldavija, Gruzija, Jermenija i Azerbejdžan.

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Rad je nastao u okviru projekta „Srbija i izazovi u međunarodnim odnosima 2020. godine”, koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, a realizuje Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu tokom 2020. godine.



## Uvodne napomene

Jedan od spoljnopolitičkih ciljeva Evropske unije je uspostavljanje snažnog prisustva u susedstvu. Ovaj cilj je prvi put pomenut u Evropskoj strategiji bezbednosti 2003. godine uz isticanje važnosti susedstva za bezbednost Unije. Tako se navodi da proširenje Uniju približava problematičnim oblastima, kao i da Evropi stvaraju probleme „susedi koji učestvuju u nasilnim oružanim sukobima, slabe države gde cveta organizovani kriminal, ili nefunkcionalna društva”.<sup>2</sup> U tom kontekstu se navodi da je zadatak Unije da „promoviše prsten dobro uređenih država, na istoku od EU i na obalama Mediterana”, sa kojima može da sarađuje i održava bliske odnose. Ubrzo, 2004. godine EU je ustanovila Evropsku politiku susedstva (EPS) kao politiku koja bi trebalo da joj omogući da se okruži prijateljskim državama koje bi, prihvatanjem demokratskih normi i evropskih vrednosti, stvorile uslove da Unija bude bezbedna i sigurna.<sup>3</sup> Pet godina kasnije Unija je pokrenula Istočno partnerstvo (IP) kao inicijativu kojom je susedima na postsovjetskom prostoru ponudila bliže institucionalne, političke i ekonomske odnose, ukoliko sprovedu sveobuhvatne reforme.<sup>4</sup> Činjenica da je Istočno partnerstvo pokrenuto pre više od decenije pruža priliku za kritičko preispitivanje i sagledavanje rezultata i posledica ove inicijative.

Cilj članka je da osvetli složenu prirodu politike EU prema susedima u Istočnoj Evropi i Južnom Kavkazu, analizirajući dinamiku koja dovodi do toga da ona ima ograničen legitimitet i efekte na terenu. Polazeći od ideje, koncepta i principa Istočnog partnerstva, ukazuje se na unutrašnje slabosti ove inicijative, koje proizilaze iz nespremnosti postsovjetskih država da se bliže usklade sa normama i standardima EU, kao i činjenice da države članice nedovoljno podržavaju pristup Unije susedstvu. Pored toga razmatraju se spoljni izazovi u kontekstu prirode samih država koje su u nju uključene, kao i uticaja i interesa Rusije u ovom regionu. Ukrajinska kriza pokazala je da se Istočno partnerstvo ne može posmatrati samo kao tehnički instrument Evropske unije, već bi trebalo imati u vidu njegov širi

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<sup>2</sup> “A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy”, Brussels, 12 December 2003, [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/78367.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/78367.pdf), 22/01/2020, pp. 7-8.

<sup>3</sup> Vizija koju je Evropska unija predstavila u okviru Evropske politike susedstva odražava njen sveobuhvatni pristup bezbednosti, koji obuhvata nevojničke pretnje i povezuje sigurnost, stabilnost i prosperitet. Laure Delcour, *The EU and Russia in their ‘contested neighbourhood’: Multiple external influences, policy transfer and domestic change*, Routledge, 2017, p. 43.

<sup>4</sup> Cristian Nitoiu, “The European Union’s ‘Ideal Self’ in the Post-Soviet Space”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Routledge 2018, pp. 1-2.

geopolitički kontekst. Fokusirajući se na multilateralne ugovore i pravne sporazume u cilju sprovođenja reformi u susedstvu, Unija je, očigledno, potcenila rusko shvatanje takvih inicijativa na postsovjetskom prostoru. Tim pre što Moskva ima svoj projekat ekonomske integracije koji promovise u susedstvu, Evroazijsku ekonomsku uniju (EEU).<sup>5</sup> Nakon događaja u Ukrajini, postalo je jasno da Istočno partnerstvo zahteva spremnost Unije da se uključi u otvoreno geopolitičko nadmetanje sa Rusijom oko država koje se geografski nalaze između njih. One su postale svojevrsan poligon rivalstva između EU i Rusije, njihovih konkurentskih projekata i vizija sveta.<sup>6</sup>

Istražuju se i načini na koje se interesi i odnosi Unije i Rusije prelamaju i utiču na države uključene u Istočno partnerstvo. Iako su stavovi i politika Moskve prema državama postsovjetskog prostora bili jasni, ukrajinska kriza pokazala je spremnost Rusije da upotrebi silu kako bi se usprotivila onome što vidi kao svojevrsni geopolitički instrument kojim EU nastoji da stekne komparativnu geopolitičku prednost u „njenom dvorištu”.<sup>7</sup> Analizira se kako su se različite države postavile u ovom procesu i ukazuje na to da su prilično oprezno reagovala, preispitujući svoje spoljopolitičke orijentacije i ekonomske odnose, kako sa Rusijom, tako i sa EU. Iako su njihove reakcije na ponuđene izbore veoma različite, postavlja se pitanje – da li ove države zaista imaju izbor? Takođe, s obzirom na sukobe, nestabilnosti i konkurenciju moći i uticaja EU i RF u ovim državama, postavlja se pitanje kolika je sposobnost Unije da se afirmiše i deluje kao stabilizirajući faktor u regionu?

## **Motivi i ciljevi Evropske unije za formulisanje posebne inicijative prema susedima u Istočnoj Evropi i južnom Kavkazu**

Padom Berlinskog zida 1989. simbolično je završen hladni rat i blokovska podela u Evropi i u svetu. Skoro pedeset godina ideološke isključivosti, vojne konfrontacije

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<sup>5</sup> Videti više u: Ana Jović-Lazić, Ivona Lađevac, „Blisko inostranstvo u integracionim inicijativama Ruske Federacije: slučaj Evroazijske ekonomske unije”, u: *Integracioni procesi u Evroaziji*, Dušan Proroković i Ana Jović-Lazić (ured.), Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2019, str. 253-285.

<sup>6</sup> Esther Ademmer, Laure Delcourc, Kataryna Wolczuk, “Beyond geopolitics: exploring the impact of the EU and Russia in the ‘contested neighborhood’”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 57, No. 1, 2016, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> David Cadier, “The Geopoliticisation of the EU’s Eastern Partnership”, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2019, p. 71.

i podele određivale su situaciju u Evropi i stroge granice mogućeg širenja EU. Pošto je Ugovorom o Evropskoj uniji predviđeno da ona može primati u članstvo evropske države, ubrzo po okončanju hladnog rata deset zemalja bivšeg Istočnog bloka podnelo je zahteve za prijem u EU. Nastojanja da se stabilizuje Istočna i Centralna Evropa, opredelila su EU da sa zemljama ovih regiona, kao potencijalnim kandidatima za članstvo, uspostavi saradnju kroz utvrđen proces pristupanja. Zbog velikih razlika u društveno-ekonomskom i političkom uređenju, navedene zemlje morale su ispuniti brojne kriterijume kako bi u početku mogle sarađivati sa EU, a zatim i postati članice. Pristupanje ovih država EU podrazumevalo je prihvatanje određenih vrednosti i normi društvenog uređenja, kao i usklađivanje pravnog sistema sa evropskim. U dosadašnjoj praksi Evropske unije politika prijema u članstvo pokazala se kao njen najefikasniji instrument, jer je bila snažan motiv susednim zemljama da se transformišu, usvajanjem evropskih vrednosti, normi i standarda.<sup>8</sup>

Povećanje broja država članica Evropske unije dovelo je do velikih društveno-političkih i ekonomskih promena u savremenoj Evropi. Iako je postala ne samo snažna ekonomska integracija, već i značajan politički činilac u svetu, Unija se suočila sa unutrašnjim izazovima koje je trebalo da prevaziđe kako bi otvorila perspektive daljeg sopstvenog razvoja. U tom kontekstu preovladalo je stanovište da bi, izuzev na zemlje koje su već definisale svoje odnose sa Evropskom unijom kroz perspektivu članstva, svako dalje proširenje moglo ozbiljno da ugrozi njeno funkcionisanje i dostignuti stepen integracije. Zbog toga je EU odlučila da zemljama koje su joj geografski bliske, a koje ostaju van njenih granica, ponudi odnose i saradnju na osnovama posebnog partnerstva. Tako je Evropska unija 2004. pokrenula Evropsku politiku susedstva (EPS) čiji je cilj bio da se u susedstvu sprovedu određene reforme i tako osiguraju bezbednost, stabilnost i prosperitet na evropskom kontinentu.<sup>9</sup>

Zbog različitih očekivanja i percepcija zemalja koje su uključene u EPS sve više stručnjaka i političara predlagalo je da se ova politika, kako bi bila što efikasnija, dalje razradi da bi se prilagodila specifičnostima istočnih i južnih suseda.<sup>10</sup> Za vreme francuskog predsedavanja Unijom 2008. u okviru EPS stvorena je Mediteranska unija kao okvir za bližu saradnju sa zemljama južnog Sredozemlja i Bliskog istoka. Drugi faktor koji je EU podstakao da pokrene Istočno partnerstvo bio je rusko-gruzijski oružani

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<sup>8</sup> Ana Jović-Lazić, „Gde su istočne granice Evropske unije”, *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. LVIII, br. 4, 2006, p. 447.

<sup>9</sup> Ana Jović-Lazić, „Politika Evropske unije prema susednim zemljama”, *Međunarodna politika*, Vol. LIV–LVII, br. 1120–1121, 2006, str. 30–37.

<sup>10</sup> Marcin Łapczyński, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Perspectives”, *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3 (2), 2009, p. 144.

sukob 2008. koji je ukazao na velike bezbednosne rizike u regionu. Proces uvođenja Istočnog partnerstva ubrzali su i sporovi Rusije i Ukrajine oko gasa koji su imali negativne posledice po Evropsku uniju.<sup>11</sup> Godinu dana kasnije na samitu u Pragu, kao sastavni deo Evropske politike susedstva, formulisano je i Istočno partnerstvo kojim je uspostavljen osnov za čvršću saradnju sa susedima Istočne Evrope i Južnog Kavkaza.

Današnji susedi EU u Istočnoj Evropi i Južnom Kavkazu, iako veoma različiti, međusobno su povezani ekonomski, politički i društveno i imaju slične probleme, jer su pola veka bili u sastavu SSSR-a. Istočno partnerstvo je predvidelo da bi Unija susednim zemljama trebalo da pruži neophodnu finansijsku i tehničku pomoć, kao i da im, nakon primene političkih, ekonomskih i institucionalnih reformi i usaglašavanja zakonodavstava sa pravnim sistemom EU, pruži mogućnost učešća na jedinstvenom evropskom tržištu. Ponudu Istočnog partnerstva Delkor (Delcour) sumira kroz tzv. četiri stuba: sporazume o pridruživanju, zonu slobodne trgovine, viznu liberalizaciju i intenziviranje sektorske saradnje, od kojih je jedna od najznačajnijih ona u oblasti energenata.<sup>12</sup> Saradnja sa EU zavisi od poštovanja evropskih vrednosti, principa tržišne privrede i usklađivanja zakonodavstva sa pravnim tekovinama EU, tj. od interesa i sposobnosti svakog suseda da se angažuje. Za razliku od država kandidata, od država Istočnog partnerstva se ne zahteva potpuno pravno usklađivanje, međutim predviđeno je da će EU dati više političke, finansijske i tehničke podrške onim susedima koji u većem obimu sprovedu preuzete reformske obaveze. Dakle, ono sadrži i elemente politike uslovljavanja, koja bi trebalo da utiče na ove države da ispunjavaju dogovorene obaveze.

Realizacija ciljeva ove inicijative zahteva brojne aktivnosti kako u okviru politika koje spadaju u isključivu nadležnosti EU, tako i onih koje su još u nadležnost država

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<sup>11</sup> Natia Ejoshvili, "The Evolution of the European Union's Neighborhood Strategies: The Case of the Eastern Partnership", in: *Russia and the EU: Uneasy Relations a Look from Belgium*, Nina Belyaeva (ed.), 2009, p. 71.

<sup>12</sup> Još od raspada SSSR-a u osnovi politike EU prema post-sovjetskim državama bila je podrška sprovođenju unutrašnjih reformi (posebno u ekonomskim i socijalnim pitanjima). Međutim, Unija je postepeno jačala svoju ulogu u susedstvu, tako je institucionalni format međusobnih odnosa prošao kroz nekoliko faza. EU je prvo tokom 1990-tih potpisala sporazume o partnerstvu i saradnji sa svim zemljama (izuzev Belorusije), a zatim je pokrenula akcione planove EPS u periodu 2004-06, i konačno se prebacila na okvir Istočnog partnerstva (IP) 2009. Da bi dalje unapredili svoje odnose sa EU države uključene u IP mogu potpisati i nove sporazume o pridruživanju koji bi trebalo da stvore uslove za političko pridruživanje, ekonomsku integraciju, modernizaciju susednih zemalja i bezvizni režim. Drugim rečima, produbljivanje odnosa išlo je ruku pod ruku sa sve većim naglaskom na usaglašavanju sa normama i standardima EU. Laure Delcour, *The EU and Russia in their 'contested neighbourhood': Multiple external influences, policy transfer and domestic change*, Routledge, 2017, pp. 38-46.

članica. Dakle, u osnovi je koncept koji nastoji da angažuje različite norme i instrumente Evropske unije kako bi se u susedstvu postigli sigurnost, stabilnost i prosperitet.<sup>13</sup> Unija polazi od toga da će se troškovi realizacije Istočnog partnerstva isplatiti, jer negativne posledice zbog različitih opasnosti iz nestabilnog susedstva mogu biti dalekosežne. Činjenica je da je većina suseda zavisna od pristupa tržištu EU, nedovoljno ekonomski razvijena, kao i da se suočava sa brojnim oblicima organizovanog kriminala i korupcije. Pored toga, pet od šest država pogođeno je zamrznutim ili tinjajućim konfliktom. Zbog toga puna realizacija ove inicijative zahteva sprovođenje suštinskih reformi. To je veliki izazov i veoma složen zadatak zbog karakteristika suseda i činjenice da Istočno partnerstvo i sporazumi o pridruživanju koje ova inicijativa predviđa ne otvaraju perspektivu članstva, tako da njihovo potpisivanje ne menja značajno suštinu njihovih odnosa sa EU.

## **Kritike i unutrašnje slabosti politike EU prema susedstvu i Istočnog partnerstva**

Maners (Manners) opisuje Evropsku uniju kao svojevrsnu zajednicu vrednosti i normativnog aktera, koji oblikuje i aktivno „izvozi” norme na međunarodnu arenu.<sup>14</sup> Na ovom konceptu Panke (Pänke) zasniva svoje viđenje EU kao liberalne imperijalne sile, čija „normativna moć” predstavlja sredstvo za izgradnju i konsolidaciju konsenzusa država članica i jačanje ukupne legitimnosti integracionog projekta „eksternizacijom” zajedničkih normi i vrednosti. On ukazuje na dvosmislenost „normativne moći” EU i tenzije između njenog „emancipacijskog” i imperijalističkog kvaliteta.<sup>15</sup> Haukala (Haukkala) navodi da Uniju možemo posmatrati i kao regionalnog normativnog hegemonu koji koristi uticaj kako bi izgradio veoma asimetrične bilateralne odnose koji omogućavaju aktivno prenošenje evropskih normi, vrednosti i institucionalnih praksi susedima. U tom kontekstu ističe da je spoljna politika EU opterećena normama i vrednostima, kao i da Unija ima svojevrsan monopol nad njihovim definisanjem čime određuje i utvrđuje okvire normalnog i evropskog. Haukala istovremeno ukazuje da je u osnovi

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<sup>13</sup> Bart Van Vooren, *EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood Policy*, Routledge, New York, 2012, p. 73.

<sup>14</sup> Ian Manners, „Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 238-239.

<sup>15</sup> Julian Pänke, „Liberal Empire, Geopolitics and EU Strategy: Norms and Interests in European Foreign Policy Making”, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 100-123.

spoljne politike EU meka moć, kao i da Uniji, kao svojevrsnoj regionalnoj integraciji, „objekti” meke moći teže da se pridruže zbog čega pokazuju spremnost da prihvate njene vrednosti i standarde. Dakle, normativna moć Unije nalazi se u delikatnoj vezi privlačnosti, prisile i legitimiteta.<sup>16</sup> Međutim, EPS i Istočno partnerstvo, kao njen deo, ne nude članstvo u EU, već političko pridruživanje i ekonomsku integraciju, dok od partnerskih država traži da se usklade sa evropskim normama i liberalizuju svoje tržište. U tom kontekstu Kentchadze (Kentchadze) ovu inicijativu vidi kao još jedan pragmatičan odgovor Unije na „umor od proširenja”, koji bi trebalo da joj omogući da, bez obaveze da im ponudi članstvo, poveća uticaj u državama istočnog susedstva.<sup>17</sup>

Berg (Berg) ističe da je za Uniju istočno susedstvo svojevrsna tampon zona između unutrašnje stabilnosti i haotičnog spoljnog okruženja koje pretilo ilegalnim migracijama, organizovanim kriminalom, bolestima i siromaštvom. Zajedno sa pokušajima da se ti problemi otklone Unija ima za cilj, kako dalje ističe, da promovise svoje vrednosti i stil upravljanja, dok se u nastojanjima da organizuje granične oblasti i odnose sa „drugima” usredsređuje na kvazi-imperijalistički način, pri čemu njena projekcija moći uključuje različite stepene uslovljavanja i spoljnog upravljanja.<sup>18</sup> Iako sankcionisanje podrazumeva, pre svega, odlaganje dobijanja očekivanih benefita, to ne umanjuje očiglednu asimetriju u moći između EU i država uključenih u Istočno partnerstvo. Ovako pokroviteljski pristup Unije zasnovan na jednosmernom i bezuslovnom transferu pravila i normi u suprotnosti je sa dobrovoljnom idejom partnerstva. Korosteleva (Korosteleva) primećuje da „veličina” partnera, definisana njihovim političkim i ekonomskim uticajem u međunarodnim odnosima, služi kao merilo za operacionalizaciju partnerstva u EU. U prilog toj tvrdnji navodi izjavu komesara EU koji je napravio razliku između strateškog partnerstva i posebnih odnosa sa značajnim partnerima, koje Unija shvata ozbiljno i partnerstva u okviru Evropske politike susedstva i IP koje je namenjeno manjim državama.<sup>19</sup> S obzirom na ono što nudi zauzvrat, jasno je da ovo fleksibilno, ali navodno ravnopravno partnerstvo može zahtevati previše

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<sup>16</sup> Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 9, 2008, pp. 1606-1608.

<sup>17</sup> Thea Kentchadze, “The Promise of Eastern Partnership”, *ISPI Policy Brief*, No.136, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi, 2009, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Eiki Berg, “Do They Really Have a Choice?”, *Eastern Partnership States between the EU and Russia*, [http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-perspectives-pdf/The%20Vilnius%20Moment\\_PONARS%20Eurasia\\_March%202014.pdf](http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-perspectives-pdf/The%20Vilnius%20Moment_PONARS%20Eurasia_March%202014.pdf), 13/02/2020.

<sup>19</sup> Elena Korosteleva, *The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a More Ambitious Partnership?*, Routledge, 2012, p. 27.

političke posvećenosti od strane uključenih država, koje na kraju neće biti dovoljno motivisane da sprovedu reforme. Eberhard (Eberhardt) ističe da za postizanje ciljeva koji su postavljeni Istočnim partnerstvom nisu obezbeđena finansijska sredstva koja bi bila u skladu sa političkim ambicijama ove inicijative. Takođe razlog neuspjeha traži i u činjenici da je u određenju prioriteta odnosa sa susedima EU često nekonzistentna i podijeljena, da joj nedostaju kredibilitet i efikasni instrumenti, kao i traženi nivo fleksibilnosti da odgovori na zahtevne i različite izazove svake države pojedinačno.<sup>20</sup> Meister (Meister) primećuje da na atraktivnost EU i njenu sposobnost da deluje u susedstvu utiču i unutrašnja kriza EU zajedno sa rastućim populizmom.<sup>21</sup>

Polazeći od toga da je Istočno partnerstvo osmišljeno da veže istočne susede za Uniju, drži Rusiju izvan regiona, kao i da pitanje njihovog eventualnog članstva u EU stavi van dnevnog reda, Jarabik (Jarabik) zaključuje da su ovi ciljevi postignuti u veoma ograničenoj meri, a da region nije postao ni stabilniji niti sigurniji.<sup>22</sup> Sličan stav iznose i Nilson (Nilsson) i Silander (Silander) koji ukazuju da bi na sukobe u regionu Istočnog partnerstva, između ostalog, trebalo gledati kao i na rezultat neuspjeha ambicije Unije da kroz susedsku politiku proširi svoje demokratske norme i vrednosti na istok.<sup>23</sup> Sa druge strane Kornel (Cornell) naglašava da su ovi sukobi, pre svega, rezultat ruske težnje da očuva ključni uticaj u regionu. Zbog toga postavlja pitanje kako EU nije predvidela da će Rusija biti spremna da upotrebi vojnu silu kako bi sprečila Ukrajinu da joj se približi. Iako ne krivi EU za rastuću nesigurnost u susedstvu, ukazuje na to da je nejasno kako evropski lideri nisu shvatili političke i ideološke posledice Istočnog partnerstva koje su postepeno gradili.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Adam Eberhardt, "The Semblance of Partnership: On the Eastern Policy of the European Union: A Bureaucratic Project", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, No. 2, 2017, p. 109.

<sup>21</sup> Stefan Meister, "Eastern Partnership 2.0 – Upgrading the ambitions and impact on the neighborhood", 2019, Heinrich Boell Foundation, <https://ge.boell.org/en/2019/09/13/eastern-partnership-20-upgrading-ambitions-and-impact-neighborhood>.

<sup>22</sup> Balazs Jarabik, "Analysis, Eastern Partnership at 10. Rhetoric, resources and Russia", *New Eastern Europe*, Issue 3-4, 2019, <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/05/02/eastern-partnership-at-10-rhetoric-resources-and-russia/>, 17/02/2020.

<sup>23</sup> Martin Nilsson and Daniel Silander, "Democracy and Security in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood? Assessing the ENP in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine", *Democracy and Security*, 2016, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 52.

<sup>24</sup> Svante E. Cornell, "The European Union: Eastern Partnership vs. Eurasian Union", in: *Putin's Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents*, Singapore, 2014, pp. 180-181.

## **Spoljašnji izazovi: interesi i uloga Ruske Federacije u regionu Istočnog partnerstva EU**

Rusija je evroazijska sila sa globalnim interesima i ambicijama, koja ima značajnu ulogu u očuvanju evropske bezbednosti i stabilnosti. Evropska unija je posmatra kao ravnopravnog partnera i aktera u međunarodnim odnosima, zbog čega je izostavljena iz Evropske politike susedstva i inicijative Istočno partnerstvo. U isto vreme i Moskva je sama odbacila ideju da bude stavljena u istu kategoriju sa ostalim, manjim susedima i zahtevala da bude tretirana kao strateški partner Unije.<sup>25</sup> Pored elemenata prestiža, ostali motivi Rusije da ostane uzdržana, kada je reč o ovoj politici, povezani su sa činjenicom da je razvoj Istočnog partnerstva u Moskvi shvaćen kao još jedan korak u nastojanjima EU da izgradi sopstvenu zonu uticaja u regionu koji pripada njenom „bliskom inostranstvu“.<sup>26</sup> Zabrinutost Rusije zbog gubitka uticaja na ovom području pokrenuta je obojenim revolucijama u Gruziji 2003. i Ukrajini 2004, a intenzivirana EPS i Istočnim partnerstvom koji su povećali prisustvo EU na postsovjetskom prostoru. Rusiju nije umirilo ni to što je prilikom pokretanja Istočnog partnerstva Unija otvoreno odbacila geopolitičke težnje, naglašavajući da je njen cilj razvoj ekonomskih i društvenih veza sa susedima, pri čemu su dva najvažnija elementa duboka i sveobuhvatna zona slobodne trgovine i bezvizni režim. Iako je Unija više puta otvoreno naglašavala da Istočno partnerstvo nije usmereno protiv Rusije, zvanična Moskva je ovu inicijativu shvatila vrlo oprezno. Tako je ministar spoljnih poslova Ruske Federacije Sergej Lavrov izjavio: „Optuženi smo da imamo sfere uticaja, ali šta je Istočno partnerstvo ako ne pokušaj da se proširi uticaj Evropske unije“.<sup>27</sup> Dan kasnije Dmitri Medvedev je izjavio da Rusija ne želi „da se Istočno partnerstvo pretvori u partnerstvo protiv Rusije“.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> S obzirom na značaj, Rusija nije stavljena u istu kategoriju sa ostalim susednim zemljama Unije, pa je na samitu EU i Rusije u Sankt Peterburgu 2003. godine postignut dogovor o stvaranju strateškog partnerstva dve strane. To partnerstvo uključuje saradnju u oblasti: ekonomije/energije, spoljne i bezbednosne politike, unutrašnje bezbednosti i sudstva, obrazovanja i kulture. Reč je o oblastima saradnje koje su slične onima koje su predviđene i u okviru politike prema drugim susedima.

<sup>26</sup> Andras Racz, "Russian Approaches to the 'Common Neighbourhood': Change or Preservation of the Status Quo?", *SPES Policy Papers*, Institut für Europäische Politik, 2010, pp. 7-8.

<sup>27</sup> Valentina Pop, "EU expanding its 'sphere of influence,' Russia says", *EU Observer*, Brussels, March 21 2009, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827>, 27/01/2020.

<sup>28</sup> "Russia alarmed over new EU pact", *BBC*, 22 May 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8061042.stm>, 27/01/2020.



Ove izjave su jasno ukazale da Moskva sve više posmatra Uniju kao aktera koji ugrožava ambicije Rusije u njenom susedstvu.

Želja Unije da igra ulogu mentora koji nastoji da artikuliše nacionalne interese država regiona Istočnog partnerstva da bi uticala na njihovu proevropsku orijentaciju, podseća na politiku Rusije koja pokušava da oblikuje nacionalne interese suseda kako bi ih uključila u evroazijsku integraciju pod svojim vođstvom.<sup>29</sup> Iako nije bilo eksplicitne veze između Istočnog partnerstva EU i aktivnosti Rusije u zajedničkom susedstvu, Evroazijska ekonomska unija (EEU) se može tumačiti kao konkurentna inicijativa koja bi trebalo da spreči ili ograniči ekonomsku i političku integraciju EU i država postsovjetskog prostora. EEU na taj način postaje sredstvo preko kojeg se Rusija uključuje u svojevršno „normativno rivalstvo” sa EU u „zajedničkom susedstvu”. To je zato što se ponude EU i Rusije za integraciju međusobno isključuju.<sup>30</sup> Ponuda EU za uspostavljanjem duboke i sveobuhvatne zone slobodne trgovine sa susedima kompatibilna je sa njenim ostalim sporazumima i tako onemogućava države potpisnice da istovremeno imaju takve sporazume sa Rusijom ili u okviru EEU. Pored zabrinutosti da će se integracijom sa tržištem Evropske unije odvojiti od Rusije, postoji i bojazan da će integracija u evropsku energetska mrežu dovesti u pitanje postojeće energetske sporazume koje Rusija ima sa državama ovog regiona.<sup>31</sup>

Usvajanje Lisabonskog ugovora značajno je promenilo spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku Evropske unije, obezbedivši joj političke i vojne kapacitete da deluje kao bezbednosni akter na regionalnom i globalnom nivou. Ipak, za razliku od Rusije koja je klasična suverena država, EU je svojevrсна nadnacionalna organizacija sa *sui generis* procesom donošenja odluka, što umanjuje njenu sposobnost da u susedstvu efikasno sprovodi jedinstvenu politiku.<sup>32</sup> Ukrajinska kriza jeste na neki način pozicionirala EU kao geostrateškog aktera jer je potreba da se, u ime ukrajinskog proevropskog raspoloženja, suprotstavi ruskim aspiracijama dovela do retkog

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<sup>29</sup> Andrey Makarychev Andrey Devyatkov, “The EU in Eastern Europe: Has Normative Power Become Geopolitical?“, *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, No. 310, 2014, p. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Marina T. Kostić, „Isključiva priroda evropskih, evroatlantskih i evroazijskih integracija i previranja na evropskom postsovjetskom prostoru“, *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. LXXI, br. 4, str. 498-526.

<sup>31</sup> U poslednje vreme EU nastoji da objedini rizike uvozne zavisnosti stvaranjem potpuno integrisanog i konkurentnog evropskog energetskeg tržišta, koje nastoji da proširi ne samo na nove države članice, već i na susedne zemlje Istočne Evrope i Južnog Kavkaza.

<sup>32</sup> Procesi donošenja odluka u EU kombinuju međuvladine i nadnacionalne aspekte, promovišu civilne i normativne pristupe u međunarodnim odnosima i ostaju posvećeni principijelnom multilateralizmu. Heidi Maurer & Licinia Simao, “From regional power to global power? The European Neighbourhood Policy after the Lisbon Treaty”, in: *Global Power Europe – Policies, Actions and influence of the EU’s External Relations*. Astrid Boening, Jan-Frederik Kremer & Aukie van Loon. (eds), Springer, 2013, p. 95.

perioda evropskog spoljnopolitičkog jedinstva. Međutim, Unija ne igra značajniju ulogu u regionalnim bezbednosnim pitanjima. Sa druge strane, za Rusiju je jedan od osnovnih spoljnopolitičkih prioriteta očuvanje uticaja u državama nastalim na prostoru nekadašnjeg Sovjetskog Saveza, koji pripada sferi njenih tradicionalnih i vitalnih interesa. U poslednje vreme Rusija je postala još odlučnija i akumulirala je više resursa i sredstava kako bi se aktivno suprotstavila procesima demokratizacije i vesternizacije na ovom prostoru i potvrdila ulogu regionalnog hegemonu.

Iako je na neki način Istočno partnerstvo bilo i odgovor na rusko-gruzijski oružani sukob, Unija je godinama ignorisala ulogu Rusije u odnosima sa državama uključenim u ovu inicijativu. Ukrajinska kriza postala je ključna tačka u odnosima dva aktera koja je ukazala na nepomirljive razlike u njihovim regionalnim politikama i pristupima prema zajedničkom susedstvu. Neka vrsta prekretnice koja je jasno stavila do znanja da je Rusija značajan faktor u regionu zbog čega njen interes mora da se uzme u obzir. Istovremeno, krizu u Ukrajini možemo posmatrati kao simptom sistemskih promena u međunarodnom poretku, kojim se globalna ravnoteža snaga pomera dalje od Zapada.

## **Države regiona Istočnog partnerstva između Evropske unije i Rusije**

Rastuća geopolitička konkurencija i tenzije između Evropske unije i Ruske Federacije najviše su pogodile države koje se fizički nalaze između njih i pripadaju tzv. zajedničkom susedstvu. Smeštene između Evropske unije i Rusije, one su reagovale veoma oprezno na ukrajinsku krizu ne pridružujući se niti sankcijama EU, niti kontra-sankcijama Rusije. Zbog svoje geopolitičke ranjivosti, bez obzira da li su članice Istočnog partnerstva i Evroazijske ekonomske unije, one su izložene svojevrsnoj „unakrsnoj vatri sankcija”.<sup>33</sup> U takvim okolnostima, pokušavaju da se prilagode geopolitičkoj i ekonomskoj stvarnosti i sve nastoje da vode multi-vektorsku spoljnu politiku.<sup>34</sup> Čak je i A. Lukašenko, izjavo da Belorusija ne želi da se nađe na novoj liniji raskola civilizacija, usred neslaganja između zapadnog i istočnog bloka.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> U susedstvu su se Belorusija i Jermenija pridružile Evroazijskoj ekonomskoj uniji, dok su Gruzija, Moldavija i Ukrajina zaključile sporazume o pridruživanju i dubokoj i sveobuhvatnoj zoni slobodne trgovine.

<sup>34</sup> Maria Shagina, In the Crossfire: The Impact of West-Russia Tensions on Post-Soviet States, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 2019, p. 2.

<sup>35</sup> Izjava Aleksandra Lukašenka na diskusionom panelu „Odnosi Istok-Zapad“, na sastanku osnovne grupe Minhenske bezbednosne konferencije održane u Minsku 1. novembra 2018, “Eastern Europe: State(s) of Uncertainty”, in: *Munich Security Report 2019: The Great Puzzle: Who Will Pick*

„Zajedničko susedstvo” sastoji se u najvećoj meri od država sa slabim ekonomskim, institucionalnim i drugim kapacitetima što u velikoj meri stvara uslove da budu osetljive na uticaje i EU i Rusije. EU i Rusija su u mogućnosti da primenjujući meku moć utiču na politička kretanja u ovim državama. Pod tim se podrazumeva njihova sposobnost da, predstavljajući svoje političke modele vrednim oponašanja, nerepresivnim sredstvima oblikuju unutrašnja i spoljnopolitička kretanja u regionu. Kao i Evropska unija, Rusija aktivno nastoji da privuče nove članice u EEU ili barem odvrati potencijalne članice od bliže ekonomske integracije sa EU. U tom kontekstu, legitimizacijom suprotstavljenih vizija političkog upravljanja, EU i Rusija su direktno i indirektno uticale na politički put Ukrajine.<sup>36</sup>

Da bi uticala na unutrašnja političko-ekonomska kretanja država postsovjetskog prostora, Rusija za razliku od EU ne promovise nužno svoja pravila ili obrasce politika, već koristi i druge instrumente.<sup>37</sup> Pored meke moći Rusije koja je ukorenjena u zajedničkoj kulturi, religiji i istoriji, njena politika prema susedima ogleđa se u nastojanjima da aktivnim ekonomskim, političkim, diplomatskim i vojnim merama ostvari svoje strateške interese. One danas uključuju i elemente doktrine „hibridnog rata”, kojom su „informativni rat”, obmana, lažne operacije i sl. neprimetno integrisani u vojnu doktrinu u cilju izazivanja unutrašnjih poremećaja.<sup>38</sup> Imajući u vidu da ruska vojna i ekonomska moć daleko prevazilaze ukupnu snagu država ovog regiona, ovaj „asimetrični” karakter odnosa omogućava Rusiji da utiče na njihovu unutrašnju i spoljnu politiku. Iako za većinu suseda čvršća saradnja sa Rusijom nije previše privlačna opcija, Moskva nastoji da ih zadrži u svojoj „sferi uticaja”.<sup>39</sup>

Ipak, dešavanja u regionu pokazuju da države postsovjetskog prostora nisu samo pasivni primaoci politika Unije i Rusije, već da aktivno reaguju i na kompleksan način oblikuju spoljne uticaje. Tako države koje učestvuju u Istočnom partnerstvu imaju različite stavove i očekivanja od same inicijative i predviđenog stepena saradnje i

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*Up the Pieces?*, 2019, [https://securityconference.org/assets/02\\_Dokumente/01\\_Publikationen/MunichSecurityReport2019.pdf](https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/MunichSecurityReport2019.pdf), 26/02/2020, p. 36.

<sup>36</sup> Gergana Noutcheva, “Whose legitimacy? The EU and Russia in contest for the eastern neighbourhood”, *Democratization*, Vol. 25, Issue 2, 2018, p. 313.

<sup>37</sup> Esther Ademmer, Laure Delcourc and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Beyond geopolitics: exploring the impact of the EU and Russia in the ‘contested neighborhood’”, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> Ova doktrina izložena je u članku načelnika Generalštaba Vitalija Gerasimova iz 2013, a primenjena je u praksi na Krimu i u istočnoj Ukrajini. Peter Rutland & Andrei Kazantsev, “The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’”, *Journal of Political Power*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2016, p. 408.

<sup>39</sup> Stefan Meister, “Eastern Partnership 2.0 – Upgrading the ambitions and impact on the neighborhood”, op. cit.

integrisanja sa Evropskom unijom. Gruzija, Moldavija i Ukrajina su zainteresovane za dalji razvoj odnosa i približavanje Evropskoj uniji. One su sredinom 2014. potpisale sporazume o pridruživanju i dubokoj i sveobuhvatnoj zoni slobodne trgovine. Ovi sporazumi trebalo bi značajnije da prodube političke i ekonomske veze Moldavije, Gruzije i Ukrajine sa Unijom i omoguće njihovim privrednim subjektima slobodan pristup jedinstvenom tržištu EU. To bi trebalo da stvori nove poslovne mogućnosti i donese više standarde roba, usluga i doprinese povećanju konkurentnosti njihovih privreda. EU se obavezala da će raditi sa vladama i preduzećima navedenih država kako bi se sprovele reforme i pružila pomoć prilikom usklađivanja sa evropskim standardima.<sup>40</sup> Takođe, Moldavija, Gruzija i Ukrajina imaju sporazume o viznoj liberalizaciji, koji im omogućavaju da u EU putuju bez viza. To je veliki iskorak u odnosu na ranije vizne olakšice, što je bio ključni podsticaj za ove države da usvoje norme i standarde EU u ovoj oblasti. Pored toga, Moldavija, Gruzija i Ukrajina učestvuju u misijama zajedničke bezbednosne i odbrambene politike Evropske unije, a članice su i programa Partnerstvo za mir NATO-a.

Iako je dugogodišnji multivektorizam ovih država zamenjen zaokretom prema Zapadu, Rusija je i dalje ključni politički i ekonomski faktor u regionu. Takođe, EU igra beznačajnu ulogu u regionalnim bezbednosnim pitanjima. Zbog toga ne treba zaboraviti činjenicu da sve tri države trpe velike posledice geopolitičke konkurencije EU i Rusije. Ovo se posebno odnosi na „zamrznute” sukobe koji i dalje predstavljaju veliki izazov stabilnosti i sigurnosti za države koje su se opredelile za proevropsku spoljnu politiku. Potpisivanje sporazuma o pridruživanju EU i Moldavije pokrenulo je reakcije Rusije, kao i reakcije Pridnjestrovlja koje je zatražilo bliže odnose sa Rusijom. Došlo je do intenzivnih razgovora lidera Rusije i Pridnjestrovlja, što je rezultiralo ekonomskim paketima, trgovinskim sporazumima, jačanjem međusobnih vojnih odnosa i toga da Rusija 2015. održi vojnu vežbu u Pridnjestrovlju.<sup>41</sup> Tokom krize u Gruziji, kasnijeg rata i procesa rešavanja sukoba, jedan od osnovnih ciljeva Rusije bio je da nedvosmisleno pokaže da je Južni Kavkaz oblast od njenog posebnog interesa koji zadire u rusku bezbednost. Ukrajinska kriza pokazala je da su ljudski, ekonomski i politički troškovi koje plaća ukrajinski narod zbog svog proevropskog opredeljenja ogromni.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> “EU forges closer ties with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova”, European External Action Service, [http://eeas.europa.eu/top\\_stories/2014/270614\\_association\\_agreement\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/270614_association_agreement_en.htm), 27/02/2020.

<sup>41</sup> Martin Nilsson & Daniel Silander, “Democracy and Security in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood? Assessing the ENP in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine”, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>42</sup> Miloš Petrović, *Nastanak ukrajinske krize: od političke iluzije Evropske unije do bitke za postsovjetsku Evropu*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2019.

Iako je razvoj događaja u Ukrajini iznenadio Uniju, šaljući nejasne i nedorečene poruke, zvaničnici EU i pojedinih članica podgrejali su nerealna očekivanja da bi ova država mogla uskoro da postane deo EU. Unija nema interesa i kapaciteta da uključi Ukrajinu u svoje članstvo, ipak ne želi da dozvoli Rusiji da dodatno jača svoj položaj i uticaj u ovoj državi. Istovremeno, iako je ruski stav prema proevropskom pravcu Ukrajine bio jasan, evropski lideri su pretpostavili da će Rusija, pre svega zbog ekonomskih interesa, u svojoj spoljnopolitičkoj praksi ostati pragmatična.<sup>43</sup> Međutim, potpisivanje sporazuma o pridruživanju sa EU postalo je opasnost da države postsovjetskog prostora usvoje norme i standarde EU, što bi umanjilo uticaj Ruske Federacije na njih. Imajući u vidu da Rusija ima interes da sačuva tzv. tampon zonu kako bi se zaštitila od Zapada, aneksiju Krima videla je kao neophodan korak za očuvanje Sevastopolja, strateški značajne baze na Crnom moru.<sup>44</sup>

Pored ove grupe država, Istočnim partnerstvom obuhvaćena je i Jermenija. Ona je specifičan slučaj jer je pod pritiskom Rusije odustala od potpisivanja sporazuma o pridruživanju sa EU o kome je godinama pregovarala i odlučila da se pridruži Evroazijskoj ekonomskoj uniji. Odustajanje Jermenije bio je svojevrstan izazov za EU kao zajednicu vrednosti, koja se po prvi put suočila sa političkim ograničenjima svog normativnog projekta. EU nije ranije iskusila da susedi odbiju da idu dalje u procese dublje saradnje i integrisanja. Međutim, ako se ima u vidu da je Jermenija članica Organizacije dogovora o kolektivnoj bezbednosti, kao i da se oslanja na bezbednosne garancije Rusije kada je reč o mogućim pretnjama iz Azerbejdžana i Turske, ova odluka nije tako neočekivana.<sup>45</sup> Pretnja Rusije da će povući podršku Jermeniji kada je reč o „zamrznutom sukobu” u Nagorno-Karabahu odigrala je ključnu ulogu u spoljnopolitičkom zaokretu Jermenije.<sup>46</sup> Iako odustajanje Jermenije

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<sup>43</sup> Kristi Raik & Sinikukka Saari, “Mapping the geostrategic context of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood”, in: *Key Actors in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood Competing perspectives on geostrategic tensions*, Kristi Raik & Sinikukka Saari (eds.), Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016, pp. 13-14.

<sup>44</sup> Keith B. Payne & John S. Foster, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict”, *Comparative Strategy*, 36:1, 2017, p. 15.

<sup>45</sup> Na teritoriji Jermenije raspoređena je 102. ruska vojna baza, a zvanični Jerevan saradnju sa Rusijom u vojnoj oblasti vidi kao način da se osigura bezbednost države i stabilnost na Južnom Kavkazu. Takođe, Rusija je najznačajniji ekonomski i trgovinski partner Jermenije. Rusija i Jermenija su 1997. potpisale Sporazum o prijateljstvu saradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći, a 2000. Deklaraciju o savezničkom delovanju u XXI veku. Takođe, ruski Gazprom je krajem 2013. dobio potpunu kontrolu nad jermenskom mrežom za distribuciju gasa. “Bilateral Relations with Russia”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, <https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/ru>, 10/03/2020.

<sup>46</sup> Situacija u Jermeniji veoma je složena, u priličnoj meri kao posledica sukoba koji je početkom devedesetih godina izbio u azerbejdžanskoj provinciji Nagorno-Karabahu, pretežno naseljenoj Jermenima.

od potpisivanja Sporazuma o pridruživanju onemogućava liberalizaciju njene trgovine sa EU, ova država je novembra 2017. potpisala Sveobuhvatni sporazum o ekonomskom partnerstvu sa EU. On ne predviđa uspostavljanje oblasti slobodne trgovine, ali je formulisan na osnovu prethodno pripremljenog sporazuma tako da bi njegova primena trebalo da rezultira sveobuhvatnijom i tešnjom saradnjom i odnosima EU i Jermenije.<sup>47</sup>

Što se tiče preostale dve države, Azerbejdžana i Belorusije, one su mnogo skeptičnije prema bilo kakvoj složenijoj integraciji sa Evropskom unijom i učešću u Istočnom partnerstvu. U praksi, vlasti u Bakuu i Minsku pokazale su otvorenost za neke oblike ekonomske saradnje, ali su odbile bilo kakav politički dijalog o evropskim vrednostima i normama kao što su vladavina prava ili poštovanju ljudskih prava itd. Dakle, Belorusija i Azerbejdžan se selektivno odnose prema Istočnom partnerstvu i biraju oblike saradnje sa EU koji im najviše odgovaraju. Kao rezultat toga, razvoj saradnje između ovih država i EU moguć je samo u kontekstu odabranih sektorskih politika, a ne bilo kakve integracije na političkom nivou.

Iako su odnosi sa Belorusijom napredovali kroz novoosnovanu koordinacionu grupu u okviru Istočnog partnerstva, ova država ima institucionalno najslabiji odnos sa Unijom.<sup>48</sup> Belorusija nema čak ni okvirni sporazum sa EU, koja je njen drugi najveći trgovinski partner. Istovremeno ova država je članica Evroazijske ekonomske unije, Zajednice nezavisnih država i Organizacije dogovora o kolektivnoj bezbednosti u kojima ključnu ulogu ima Ruska Federacija. Promene u geostrateškoj doktrini Rusije koje su, između ostalog, postale očigledne kroz sukob sa Ukrajinom, u određenoj meri su uticale na odnose Minska i Moskve. Naime, primetno je da je Rusija od 2015. godine, u više navrata preispitala odnose sa Belorusijom, smanjujući nivo subvencija

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<sup>47</sup> "Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, European Commission", Brussels, 25.9.2017, //eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017JC0037, 16/02/2020.

<sup>48</sup> Koordinaciona grupa EU-Belorusija održava sastanke dva puta godišnje u Minsku i Briselu. Otvoreni su sektorski dijalozi u oblasti ekonomije i finansija, trgovine, carine i zaštite životne sredine. Sankcije EU su smanjene, dok je intenzivirana kreditna i investiciona saradnja. Kao deo širenja investicione saradnje Belorusije sa EU potpisani su sporazumi sa Evropskom investicionom bankom za rekonstrukciju deonice autoputa M7 Minsk - Vilnius i kontrolnog punkta Kamenni Log u iznosu od 110 miliona evra i modernizaciju sistema za prečišćavanja vode u iznosu od 66 miliona evra. Završeni su i pregovori Belorusije sa EU o sporazumima o viznim olakšicama i readmisiji. "Annual Review of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Belarus and Activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2019", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, <http://mfa.gov.by/en/publications/reports/d747de45de70a9dc.html>, 26/02/2020.

i zahtevajući od nje dublju političku, vojnu i ekonomsku integraciju.<sup>49</sup> Istovremeno, došlo je do približavanja Minska i Brisela, pre svega, zbog pozicije beloruskog rukovodstva kada je reč u ukrajinskoj krizi, što je uključivalo odstupanje od zvaničnog narativa Kremlja, demonstraciju proukrajinske orijentacije i angažovanje u mirovnim pregovorima. Zbog svega toga, tradicionalna usredsređenost EU na sankcionisanje beloruskog autoritarnog režima postala je manje hitna stvar.<sup>50</sup>

Azerbejdžan se razlikuje od ostalih država Istočnog partnerstva po tome što vlada otvoreno osporava nedostatak jednakosti i insistira na dijalogu na ravnopravnoj osnovi, umesto da se jednostavno usklađuje sa zahtevima EU. Takođe, Azerbejdžan ne želi političko partnerstvo sa Unijom, već saradnju u tehničkim i ekonomskim oblastima, dok promovisanje evropskih vrednosti vidi kao „mešanje u unutrašnje stvari”. Imajući u vidu da zahteva ravnopravniji odnos sa EU zasnovan na partnerstvu i reciprocitetu, Azerbejdžan nije zainteresovan za potpisivanje sporazuma o pridruživanju, koje je predviđeno Istočnim partnerstvom.<sup>51</sup> EU i Azerbejdžan su se 11. jula 2018. dogovorili o novim prioritetima partnerstva koji, kako se navodi, odražavaju interese oba partnera, poštujući jednakost na kojoj će se zasnivati uzajamni politički dijalog i saradnja.<sup>52</sup> Pored toga što odbacuje bližu integraciju sa Unijom, Azerbejdžan je jedinstven u regionu po tome što ne želi ni bližu integraciju sa Rusijom. On računa na to da će mu energetske resursi omogućiti da izdrži političke i ekonomske pritiske i tako održi nezavisni kurs.<sup>53</sup> Zbog političkih sporova sa Rusijom i povremenih prekida isporuke u tranzitnim državama, uloga Azerbejdžana kao alternativnog snabdevača Unije energentima sve je značajnija. EU je postala važan kupac azerbejdžanske nafte i nafte koja se kroz ovu državu transportuje. Takođe, Azerbejdžan ima značajnu ulogu u Južnom gasnom koridoru koji, dovođenjem gasa iz Kaspijskog mora, doprinosi bezbednosti snabdevanja evropskih tržišta.<sup>54</sup> Azerbejdžan ima dobre odnose i sa Ruskom Federacijom. Prema procenama ruskih

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<sup>49</sup> Arseny Sivitsky, “Belarus-Russia: From a Strategic Deal to an Integration Ultimatum”, *Russia Foreign Policy Papers*, The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2019, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> Alena Vieira & Syuzanna Vasilyan, “Armenia and Belarus: caught between the EU’s and Russia’s conditionalities?”, *European Politics and Society*, Vol. 19, Issue 4, 2018, p. 483.

<sup>51</sup> Eske van Gils, “Differentiation through bargaining power in EU–Azerbaijan relations: Baku as a tough negotiator”, *East European Politics*, Vol. 33, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 391-392.

<sup>52</sup> “Partnership Priorities between the EU and Azerbaijan reinforce the bilateral agenda”, [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/48244/partnership-priorities-between-eu-and-azerbaijan-reinforce-bilateral-agenda\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/48244/partnership-priorities-between-eu-and-azerbaijan-reinforce-bilateral-agenda_en), 27/02/2020.

<sup>53</sup> Svante E. Cornell, “Azerbaijan: Going It Alone”, in: *Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents*, op. cit., p. 154.

<sup>54</sup> Videti više u: Marco Siddi, “The EU’s Botched Geopolitical Approach to External Energy Policy: The Case of the Southern Gas Corridor”, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2019, pp. 124-144.

i azerbejdžanskih zvaničnika, njihov odnos može se opisati kao strateško partnerstvo. Ekonomska, trgovinska i energetska saradnja su u središtu pragmatičnog karaktera partnerskog dijaloga. Stabilan i snažan Azerbejdžan je važan za Rusiju, jer predstavlja prirodnu barijeru od pretnji koje bi mogle doći sa juga.<sup>55</sup>

## Zaključne napomene

Pokrenuto pre više od deset godina, Istočno partnerstvo najavilo je novi oblik odnosa sa susedima koji je trebalo da, podsticanjem političkih i ekonomskih reformi u susedstvu, doprinese stabilnosti, bezbednosti i prosperitetu u regionu, ali i na evropskom kontinentu u celini. U osnovi je bila težnja da se odgovori na bezbednosne izazove koji bi iz nestabilnog susedstva mogli da se preliju na samu Uniju. Dakle, Unija je spremna da se dodatno angažuje u istočnom susedstvu jer polazi od toga da su stabilnost i prosperitet u ovim zemljama ključni za sigurnost i ekonomsku budućnost čitavog evropskog kontinenta. U tom kontekstu, Istočno partnerstvo ima za cilj da smanji ekonomski i socijalni jaz između Unije i njenih istočnih suseda. Ovo bi trebalo da se realizuje, pre svega, podsticanjem razvoja ekonomske saradnje i integracije i stvaranjem institucionalnog okvira koji bi bio svojevrsni forum za rešavanje pitanja od zajedničkog interesa. Međutim, zbog činjenice da Istočno partnerstvo ne otvara perspektivu članstva ono je, u poređenju sa politikom proširenja EU, pokazalo značajno manju sposobnost da dovede do značajnijih promena u državama na koje se odnose.

Pored toga, Istočno partnerstvo suočilo se sa velikim izazovima u međunarodnom kontekstu. Aneksija Krima i rat na istoku Ukrajine aktuelizovali su pitanje uticaja Rusije i širih geopolitičkih efekata ove inicijative. Postalo je jasno da su države smeštene između EU i Rusije postale predmet otvorenog sporenja i nadmetanja između Brisela i Moskve. Imajući u vidu brojne ekonomske, političke, kulturne i druge veze Rusije i država regiona Istočnog partnerstva, postalo je jasno da se ova problematika ne može posmatrati van konteksta ruske politike i interesa. Rusija ima velike ambicije u tzv. bliskom inostranstvu, tako da će EU teško moći da ostvari sveobuhvatnu saradnju sa susedima bez adekvatnog uključivanja Moskve u taj proces. Uniji će svakako biti teško da ubedi Rusiju kako njene veze sa bivšim sovjetskim republikama nisu usmerene protiv nje i da veze EU sa ovim državama

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<sup>55</sup> Stanislav Chernyavsky, "Azerbaijan and Russia: Present and Future", in: *Evolution of Post-Soviet Space: Past, Present and Future*, I. Timofeev, T. Makmutov, I. Sorokina (eds), Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow, 2017, pp. 20-21.



treba posmatrati kao pitanje od zajedničkog interesa. Budući da Istočno partnerstvo posmatra kao još jedan plan Zapada da je „opkoli”, može se očekivati da će Rusija nastaviti da vrši ekonomski i politički pritisak na države uključene u ovu inicijativu.

Saradnja EU i Rusije u traženju odgovora na savremene bezbednosne pretnje, posebno ukoliko je reč o njihovom zajedničkom susedstvu, nije stvar izbora, već nužnosti, razlike u njihovim stavovima i interesima su i dalje velike. Evropska unija i Rusija načelno se zalažu za poštovanje međunarodnog prava i rešavanje sukoba političkim sredstvima, ali često imaju različite politike i pristupe rešavanju otvorenih regionalnih problema. Razmimoilaženja su prisutna ne samo kada je reč o optimalnim načinima rešavanja ukrajinske krize, nego i ostalih „zamrznutih sukoba” u Južnoj Osetiji i Abhaziji, Nagorno-Karabahu i Pridnjestrovlju. Unija i Zapad uopšte, smatraju da je u osnovi ovih razmimoilaženja činjenica da Rusija ima imperijalne ciljeve u „bliskom inostranstvu” i da pokušava da obnovi uticaj na širem međunarodnom planu. Rusija osnovni problem vidi u nastojanjima Zapada da ostvari dominantan uticaj na postsovjetskom prostoru, tj. u njenom „dvorištu”. Međutim, bez obzira na ove različite pristupe neosporno je da i EU i Rusija imaju posebne interese, kao i da su u određenoj meri u mogućnosti da projektuju svoju moć u „zajedničkom susedstvu”, zbog čega imaju i odgovornost da ovim državama pomognu da se, bez ugrožavanja suvereniteta, uspešno razvijaju. Takođe, bez obzira na sve izazove, trebalo bi imati u vidu da su države uključene u Istočno partnerstvo presudne za sigurnost, stabilnost i prosperitet Evropske unije. Zbog toga će ova inicijativa ostati visoko na evropskoj agendi. U suprotnom postoji rizik da ekonomske i socijalne razlike, koje postoje između Unije i njenih istočnih suseda, vremenom generišu negativne političke i društvene snage i tendencije koje bi neizbežno uticale i na samu EU, koja se već suočava sa velikim brojem pretnji iz nestabilnog susedstva.

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Ana JOVIĆ-LAZIĆ

**THE EUROPEAN UNION INITIATIVE FOR COOPERATION WITH NEIGHBOURS  
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: OBJECTIVES, LIMITATIONS  
AND CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP**

**Abstract:** Following the enlargement of the Union, new neighbours in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus became of great importance for the stability of Europe, which is why the EU formulated the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. Bearing in mind that Russia views this area as a sphere of its own influence, its policy has become of great importance as well as its reactions to the Union's initiatives in this region. This geopolitical context of the Eastern Partnership became apparent with the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. In addition to the indicated limits of an often technocratic approach to the EU, the crisis has clearly shown there is a conflict of objectives of the European Union and the Russian Federation in the common neighbourhood and raised the issue of the security and geopolitical implications of this initiative. Also, the policies and interests of the European Union and the Russian Federation affect not only Ukraine but to a greater or lesser extent the development of opportunities in all other countries involved in the EU's Eastern Partnership – Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

**Keywords:** European Union, European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

# **PRIKAZI KNJIGA**





## Asimetrično rivalstvo

Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia and America: The Asymmetric Rivalry*, Polity Press, Cambridge & Medford, 2019, 245 pp.

Šesta po redu naučna monografija Andreja Cigankova, profesora iz San Franciska, donosi najsvežije uvide u savremene rusko-američke odnose. Iako se ovim odnosima Cigankov bavio u svim svojim knjigama, ovo je prva u kojoj je to učinio na sveobuhvatan način. I to u pravom trenutku – kako bi obuhvatio i period administracije Donalda Trampa, koji će uneti nove kontroverze u odnose dveju sila. Sam autor kaže da je knjigu o Rusiji i Americi rešio da napiše na predlog izdavača, i da se u njoj nadovezuje na prethodnih petnaest godina bavljenja ovom temom. Kao i kada je počinjao, i sada ističe da je vođen istom nadom – da će Rusija i SAD pre ili kasnije moći da prevaziđu svoje nesuglasice i uspostave saradnju u zajedničkom interesu, kao i interesu globalne stabilnosti.

Sušтина knjige, ujedno i Cigankovljevog razmišljanja o rusko-američkim odnosima, leži u naslovu prvog poglavlja „Rivali, ne neprijatelji”. Autor smatra da, uprkos svemu što stoji u osnovi permanentne krize u odnosima Rusije i SAD, i dalje ne može da se kaže da su dve zemlje neprijatelji, na način na koji su to bile u toku Hladnog rata. Ključni razlog zašto se po njemu ipak radi o rivalstvu, a ne o neprijateljstvu, jeste drugačiji kontekst u odnosu na onaj iz vremena Hladnog rata. To više nije ideološka konfrontacija komunizma i kapitalizma, već pre ekonomskih i političkih ideja liberalizma i nacionalizma, koja se sada vodi u okviru Zapada (Trump predstavlja ovu drugu), dok zemlje poput Kine i Rusije (paradoksalno) brane očuvanje globalne liberalne ekonomije. To više nije ni simetrična bipolarna borba za svetsku prevlast, već pre nastojanje nezapadnih rivala, među kojima je i Rusija, da asimetričnim putem ugroze slabe tačke i dalje dominantnih Sjedinjenih Država. Rivalstvo Rusije i SAD je, dakle, asimetrično, gde Rusija više ne nastoji, kao nekada Sovjetski Savez, da izazove Ameriku u borbi za svetsku prevlast u ime alternativne ideologije, već nastupa defanzivno, sa željom da „poremeti” američku dominaciju u meri koja će ovu navesti da Rusiju prizna kao veliku silu sa pripadajućom odgovornošću u upravljanju međunarodnim poretkom, teritorijalnom sferom uticaja i nezavisnom spoljnom i unutrašnjom politikom, te kulturnim obrascem.

Prema Cigankovu, današnji svetski poredak nalazi se u tranziciji, što zbog relativnog opadanja američke moći, što zbog brojnih spoljnopolitičkih grešaka Vašingtona. Sve to je uticalo i na podizanje tenzija u rusko-američkim odnosima, jer su SAD, umesto da svoju politiku prema Rusiji prilagode izmenjenom odnosu snaga i okolnostima, zadržale isti kurs, na šta je Rusija odgovorila asertivno, u odbranu svog nacionalnog suvereniteta i interesa. U tom pogledu ništa se nije popravilo sa dolaskom Trampa na položaj predsednika SAD, naprotiv. I pored izvesne ideološke sličnosti Trampa i ruskog predsednika Putina, ispostavilo se da ih je njihova sklonost da na međunarodnoj ravni nastupaju sa pozicija snage, u kombinaciji sa nerešenim međusobnim spornim pitanjima i – još više – pritiscima na (naročito Trampovoj) domaćoj političkoj sceni – odvela ka još žešćem rivalstvu. Razočarana u Trampa (kome je navodno pomogla da bude izabran), Rusija nastavlja sa svojim asimetričnim izazovom u više oblasti: vojnoj, ekonomskoj, vrednosno-medijskoj i diplomatskoj.

Autor analizira ovo rivalstvo, polazeći najpre od različitih svetskih regiona u kojima se ono odvija. Suština rusko-američkog spora oko evropske bezbednosti leži u nespremnosti Zapada da Rusiji prizna ulogu u bezbednosnoj arhitekturi Evrope kakvu ova želi, uključujući i pravo na posedovanje odgovarajuće sfere uticaja na zapadnoj granici, što je kulminiralo u ukrajinskoj krizi (Ukrajina i dalje ostaje ključno područje na kome je moguća eskalacija rivalstva Rusije i Zapada). Asimetrični pokušaj Rusije da potkopa američko globalno vođstvo se, možda više nego igde, vidi na Bliskom istoku, gde je Rusija (pre svega intervencijom u Siriji) ojačala uticaj koristeći višegodišnje američke greške u tom regionu, uključujući i Trampovu ambivalentnu politiku (čas najava povlačenja, čas robusnije angažovanje). Po pitanju Azije i pre svega Kine, SAD su se pod Trampom upustile u rivalstvo sa Rusijom i Kinom istovremeno, što je stvorilo uslove za pojačanu rusko-kinesku ekonomsku i vojnu saradnju, čije domete i prepreke Cigankov naširoko analizira. Nakon regionalnog, autor zauzima tematski pristup, te razmatra rusko-američko asimetrično rivalstvo u oblasti vrednosti i informacija, nuklearne i sajber bezbednosti, te energetike i pitanja ekonomskih sankcija. Na kraju, Cigankov utvrđuje tri scenarija daljeg rivalstva Moskve i Vašingtona: spoznaju zajedničkih interesa i uspostavljanje saradnje u globalnom upravljanju (malo verovatno); eskalaciju ekonomskih sankcija i trke u naoružanju, koja bi iscrpela Rusiju; nastavak asimetričnog rivalstva uz ograničenu saradnju (najverovatnije).

U ovoj knjizi će čitaoci zainteresovani za odnose Rusije i SAD pre svega moći da „obnove gradivo”, jer na sumaran način nudi pregled svega što treba znati o ovim odnosima u posthladnoratovskom periodu, uključujući i najnoviju Trampovu eru. Moći će, uz to, da steknu i nove uvide, a pre svega one koji proizlaze iz specifičnog Cigankovljevog posmatranja tranzicije svetskog poretka i posledica koje asimetrični

odnos snaga ima na ponašanje država/velikih sila. Ono što, međutim, čitaoci neće moći da nađu u knjizi jesu konačni i nedvosmisleni odgovori na dileme koje proizilaze iz rusko-američkih odnosa. Dok se knjiga čita stiče se utisak da autor, i kada nudi objašnjenja zašto su odnosi dveju sila tu gde jesu, te povremeno kritikuje i jednu i drugu stranu za to, ne nameće čitaocu svoj stav, ali mu zato nudi obilje informacija iz kojih ovaj, primenom nekog drugog modela zaključivanja, može da dođe i do potpuno suprotnih nalaza. Isto važi i za pomenute scenarije – projekcije za budućnost. Dodatni kvalitet knjige je što nije komplikovana za razumevanje, lako se čita, a njen sadržaj lako „upija“, te je svakako valja pročitati dok je još „vruća“, tj. najdalje do novih predsedničkih izbora u SAD.

*Vladimir TRAPARA*

## Bliski istok između metafizičkog kruga istorije i vrtloga savremene politike

Slobodan M. Janković, *Bliskoistočna kriza: rat bez mira*, Catena Mundi i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2020, 397 str.

Nakon dugogodišnjeg proučavanja istorijskih procesa i praćenja aktuelnih političkih dešavanja na Bliskom istoku, dr Slobodan Janković se pojavljuje kao autor naučno izuzetno vredne, obuhvatne i sistematične studije posvećene rasvetljavanju složenih uzroka, determinanti, dinamike i perspektive razvoja bliskoistočne krize. Knjiga sadrži pet poglavlja, sačinjenih od nekolicine predmetno povezanih podnaslova, dok se na samom kraju studije nalazi vredan i pregledan prikaz najvažnijih dokumenata i ugovora iz ove oblasti.

Pored imanentne relevantnosti predmeta istraživanja, rastuće naučne potrebe za razumevanjem bliskoistočne „jednačine“ i činjenice da u okviru domaće naučne zajednice izuzetno dugo nije objavljena slična studija posvećena ovoj problematici, naučni značaj Jankovićevog spisa zasnovan je i na sistematičnom metodološkom pristupu, preciznom i razvijenom kategorijalno-pojmovnom aparatu i konciznim naučnim zaključcima.<sup>1</sup>

Istraživanje dr Slobodana Jankovića utemeljeno je na istorijskom pristupu koji primarni značaj daje procesima dugog trajanja, strukturnim činionicima i faktografskim elementima za razliku od velikog broja savremenih teorijskih, a naročito postmodernih pristupa u nauci o međunarodnim odnosima.<sup>2</sup> Iz tog razloga, ova studija pružiće zagovornicima teorijskog pristupa osnovu za upućivanje snažne kritike zbog izostanka ili nedovoljne razvijenosti teorijske dimenzije predmeta istraživanja, dok će autori bliski istorijskom pristupu biti oslobođeni od samodovoljnih i često besciljnih teorijskih rasprava i maglovitih i amorfnih misaonih konstrukcija koje ih prate.

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<sup>1</sup> Autor pruža opsežan, sistematičan i kritički pregled literature, u okviru koga navodi različite i suprotstavljene stavove vodećih autora i tumača bliskoistočne krize (str. 59–78). Takođe, u uvodnim delovima studije posebna pažnja posvećena je definisanju ključnih pojmova, u okviru koga je otvoren niz značajnih pitanja i dilema vezanih za njihovo određenje (str. 17–28).

<sup>2</sup> Važno je napomenuti da je autor dobro upoznat sa osnovnim postavkama teorijskih tradicija i škola mišljenja, ali da u odnosu na ovaj predmet istraživanja ne uviđa njihov eksplanatorni značaj. Činjenica da se autor u pojedinim delovima studije poziva na teorijske koncepte i mislioce (npr. orijentalizam Edvarda Saida), ne utiče značajnije na opštu ocenu o (ne)zastupljenosti teorije u ovoj studiji.

U paradigmatском smislu, čitavu studiju prožima autorova težnja za uspostavljanjem kritičkog pristupa i samostalne pozicije u odnosu na ključne procese, dimenzije, činioce i aktere bliskoistočne krize. Ova namera dolazi do izražaja kod složenog metodološkog procesa razotkrivanja motiva i strateških interesa aktera bliskoistočne krize, ali i prilikom demistifikacije dominantnih konstrukcija i uvreženih pojmova namenjenih političkom imenovanju, označavanju i upotrebi više nego nepristrasnom određenju.<sup>3</sup> Razvijajući osnovne pravce svoje misli, autorov pristup i naracija neretko poprimaju karakteristike tzv. politički nekorektnog mišljenja i njemu svojstvenog pojmovnog aparata, posredstvom koga Janković na direktan i legitiman način dovodi u pitanje brojne „istine” i dominantne diskurse o bliskoistočnom prostoru i njemu imanentnoj krizi.

Stiče se takođe utisak da autor u uvodnim poglavljima studije postepeno i diskretno, a zatim i nešto otvorenije zauzima pristrasniji stav u odnosu na pojedine aktere, koji do izražaja dolazi u delovima posvećenim politici SAD i Izraela na Bliskom istoku. Iako, na širem planu, autor nije na provizoran i neutemeljen način „zauzeo stranu”, primetni su pojedini momenti u kojima kroz kritiku politike i delovanja ovih aktera na Bliskom istoku provejava određena doza subjektivnosti i pristrasnosti.

Svakako, jednu od najvećih vrednosti ove studije predstavlja njen udžbenički karakter kome doprinosi ne samo autorov višedimenzionalni pristup, težnja za sveobuhvatnim razumevanjem problema istraživanja i spoznajom istorijskih procesa dugog trajanja, stvarnih uzroka i prenebregnutih činilaca bliskoistočne krize, već i izuzetna preglednost pri opisivanju i objašnjenju složenih procesa i događaja koju prati osobena jednostavnost i konciznost izražavanja. Pored toga, udžbenički karakter ogleda se u utemeljenosti studije na opsežnoj, relevantnoj, uticajnoj i savremenoj literaturi, uključujući i malo poznate jedinice literature. Iznetu argumentaciju i čitavu studiju prati i mnoštvo raznovrsnih izvora, istorijskih, demografskih i ekonomskih podataka i kartografskih prikaza. U ovom segmentu do izražaja dolazi autorovo poznavanje italijanskog i ruskog jezika, koje doprinosi obogaćenju izvora saznanja, razvoju fonda literature, proširenju kritičke perspektive, a samim tim i povećanju kvaliteta izvedenih naučnih zaključaka.

U stilskom aspektu, knjigu odlikuje naracija osobena istorijskoj nauci koja u određenim momentima poprima odlike esejističkog izražavanja, što dvojako utiče na karakter same studije. Sa jedne strane, ona doprinosi jasnoći i pristupačnosti

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<sup>3</sup> Autor na više mesta preispituje i osnovano dovodi u pitanje brojne konstrukcije povezane sa bliskoistočnim pitanjem i krizom, od parageografskog i političkog određenja regiona Bliskog istoka do političke i taktičke prirode i upotrebe termina mirovni proces.

dela, kao nažalost sve ređoj pojavi u okviru nauke, dok ujedno omogućava pogodan, razumljiv i sazajno bogat pristup čitaocima bez obzira na stepen njihovog saznanja o samoj materiji. Sa druge strane, u pojedinim delovima studije provejava, pa čak i dominira esejističko izražavanje, koje prirodno odstupa od rigidnog naučnog pristupa i formalne naučne aparature, što načelno posmatrano ne utiče značajnije na udžbenički potencijal studije.

Osnovna istraživačka pitanja Jankovićeve studije ispituju istorijske i savremene, unutrašnje i spoljne uzroke, političke, ekonomske i demografske determinante i bitne činioce bliskoistočne krize, uključujući razmatranje ključnih regionalnih problema i sporova, kao i motiva, strategija i delovanja regionalnih i vanregionalnih aktera. Iz navedenih pitanja provejava osnovna istraživačka dilema koja razmatra perspektive razvoja bliskoistočne krize i osnovne prepreke uspostavljanja trajnijeg i stabilnijeg mira na jednom od najznačajnijih regiona u svetu.<sup>4</sup>

Sasvim razumljivo, centralnu poziciju u studiji zauzima izraelsko-arapski sukob, u okviru koga autor detaljno istražuje geopolitički kontekst i strateški okvir, ali i identitetske osnove i druge unutrašnje aspekte ove krize, od političkih podela do ekonomskih i demografskih činilaca, ukazujući pritom na složenost ključnih aktera, a samim tim i na višedimenzionalnost i kompleksnost ukupne bliskoistočne jednačine.<sup>5</sup> Posebna pažnja, posvećena je principima, ciljevima, delovanju i nosiocima cionističkog pokreta, ali i snazi koju izraelski lobi poseduje u procesu donošenja (spoljno)političkih odluka u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama.

Mada autor polazi od nesumnjivog sakralnog značaja Jerusalima i čitavog prostora Bliskog istoka i postojane religijske dimenzije ukupnog problema, Janković uspostavlja adekvatan istraživački balans između religijskog i političkog polja, koji prožima, a ne potčinjava međusobno ove aspekte jedan drugom.

Najzad, neophodno je naglasiti da se pored istorijske dimenzije, istraživanje i spoznaja bliskoistočne krize proteže i na savremeni momenat, u okviru koga najveću pažnju, sa punim pravom, privlači složen fenomen od prvoklasnog naučnog značaja – Arapsko proleće – kojem je autor posvetio čitavo poglavlje svoje studije (str. 141–161). Strukturnu analizu dinamike Arapskog proleća, koga je, imajući u vidu njegove razorne posledice, autor sa pravom preimenovao u Arapsku zimu, prati koncizno,

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<sup>4</sup> U delovima posvećenim istoriji bliskoistočne krize, mirovnim inicijativama i pregovorima, strategijama velikih sila i dominantnim procesima na Bliskom istoku – od kolonizacije Palestine do izuzetno značajnog i zanemarenog pitanja pijaće vode i vodnih kapaciteta i resursa – na najočigledniji način do izražaja dolazi istorijski i udžbenički karakter studije (str. 80–141).

<sup>5</sup> U tom kontekstu vredna saznanja pružaju delovi studije posvećeni ideološkim podelama i narastajućim ekonomskim i socijalnim nejednakostima unutar arapskog i izraelskog nacionalnog korpusa.

pregledno i hronološko objašnjenje njegovih važnih odlika, ključnih uzroka i složene regionalne konjunktura. Analiza unutrašnjih i spoljnih uzroka, geopolitičkih motiva, strategija i delovanja regionalnih i vanregionalnih aktera zaokružena je ukazivanjem na regionalne i šire posledica ovog procesa.

Ukazujući na opterećujuću istorijsku dimenziju, nerešene sporove, akutne regionalne probleme, unutrašnje političke, ekonomske i demografske tendencije i nepomirljivost strategija regionalnih i globalnih aktera na ovom prostoru, Janković zauzima izuzetno pesimistično stanovište u pogledu mogućnosti uspostavljanja stabilnijeg i trajnijeg mira na jednom od istorijski i geopolitički najznačajnijih regiona za svetsku politiku.

*Vuk LAZIĆ*





# **IN MEMORIAM**



## Dr Brana Marković

Nedavno nas je u 85. godini života zauvek napustio dr Brana Marković, redovni profesor Univerziteta, naučni savetnik, dugogodišnji naučni radnik Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu i svetski afirmisani stručnjak za međunarodne odnose. Brana Marković je bio istaknuti politikolog i istraživač međunarodnih odnosa, posebno međunarodnih političkih pokreta, a rezultati njegovog naučnog i pedagoškog rada ostaće trajno upamćeni i svedočiti o jednom izuzetno uspešnom profesionalnom putu.

Nakon diplomiranja na Pravnom fakultetu Univerziteta u Beogradu 1958. godine Brana Marković se zaposlio u beogradskom Institutu za izučavanje radničkog pokreta – kasnije preimenovanom u Institut za međunarodni radnički pokret, a nakon raspada SFRJ u Institut za evropske studije. Od početka 1974. godine, posle pripajanja Istraživačkog centra za međunarodni radnički pokret Institutu za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, bio je do penzionisanja u radnom odnosu u tom institutu.

Doktorat je stekao na Fakultetu političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu disertacijom *Politika dohodaka i sindikati u Velikoj Britaniji – 1964–1970*. Na tom fakultetu bio je angažovan kao predavač na redovnim i posle diplomskih studijama i kao član komisije za odbranu magistarskih radova. Za redovnog profesora na tom Fakultetu izabran je 1999. godine za predmet „Međunarodni politički pokreti”.

Naučni opus Brane Markovića je impresivan. Objavio je 14 knjiga, preko 50 studija i članaka u domaćim i stranim časopisima, oko 40 priloga u više enciklopedijskih publikacija, i više stotina kraćih priloga u časopisima, dnevnim i nedeljnim listovima. U njegova najznačajnija dela ubrajaju se sledeće knjige: *Politika dohodaka i sindikati, iskustvo Velike Britanije 1964–1970* (Beograd, 1972); *Transnacionalne korporacije, radnička klasa i strategija sindikata* (Beograd, 1981); *Socijaldemokrati i socijalisti između hladnog rata i detanta* (Beograd, 1986); *Nove tehnologije, radnička klasa i sindikati: iskustvo razvijenih kapitalističkih zemalja* (Beograd, 1989); *Socijaldemokrati i socijalisti u devedesetim godinama – šta nude novi programi* (Beograd, 1991); *Kolektivno pregovaranje – iskustvo šest zapadnoevropskih zemalja* (Beograd, 1992); *Jugoslovenska kriza i svet – hronologija događaja, januar 1990–decembar 1995*. (Beograd, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, prvo izdanje na srpskom i tri izdanja na engleskom jeziku), *Savremena socijaldemokratija*

– *karakteristike, uticaj, programska i politička opredeljenja* (Beograd, 2007) i *Socijaldemokratija i socijaldemokratske stranke* (sa prof. dr Zoranom Stojiljkovićem, Beograd, 2007).

Najveći deo svog istraživačkog rada Brana Marković je posvetio teoriji međunarodnih odnosa i izučavanju političkih pokreta u svetu, posebno u razvijenim zemljama Zapadne Evrope. Predmet njegovog naučnog interesovanja su bili sindikalni pokreti, socijaldemokratske partije, socijalna politika Evropske unije, kolektivno pregovaranje, transnacionalne korporacije, razvoj novih tehnologija i njihov uticaj na industrijske odnose, nacionalni problemi u svetu, i, pred kraj radnog veka, problematika političkih odnosa na Balkanu i na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije. Njegova glavna naučna preokupacija su bile političke partije i pokreti leve orijentacije, socijaldemokrati i socijalisti, koji su, svugde u svetu, a naročito u razvijenim zemljama Evrope, tokom svoje programske evolucije neprekidno pokušavali da se legitimišu kao politička snaga koja nastoji da prevaziđe slabosti i protivrečnosti liberalnog kapitalističkog poretka. U svojim radovima tragao je za odgovorima na pitanje da li ove i ovakve partije i pokreti mogu da ostvare društvene preobražaje kojima će se uspešno uhvatiti u koštac sa ekonomskim, socijalnim i drugim problemima tog poretka, kao alternativa građanskoj i konzervativnoj desnici. U svojim radovima je pokušavao da sagleda uzroke slabljenja levice u svetu nakon pada Berlinskog zida, pred naletom konzervativnih, nacionalističkih i desno orijentisanih partija i pokreta.

Brana Marković je bio visoko cenjen i van granice Srbije i nekadašnje Jugoslavije. Pored studijskih boravaka u Velikoj Britaniji (Univerzitet u Oksfordu), SAD i Australiji, učestvovao je na velikom broju naučnih skupova, okruglih stolova, na kongresima i konferencijama u zemlji i inostranstvu (Velika Britanija, Irska, Švajcarska, Belgija, Austrija, Norveška, Grčka, Portugalija, Poljska, Mađarska, Rusija, Liban i dr.), na kojima je podnosio referate, saopštenja i učestvovao u raspravama. Održao je više desetina predavanja u Velikoj Britaniji, SAD, Indiji i Australiji na univerzitetima, političkim i sindikalnim skupovima.

Bio je glavni i odgovorni urednik časopisa *Međunarodni radnički pokret* od 1977. do 1986. godine, a od 1991. godine i čitavu deceniju nakon penzionisanja glavni i odgovorni urednik referentnog naučnog časopisa Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu *Međunarodni problemi*. Visoki kriterijumi koje je kao urednik postavljao autorima i beskompromisno održavanje najvišeg kvaliteta priloga, na kojima je insistirao, značajno su podigli ugled i čitanost ovog časopisa.

Najveći doprinos Marković je dao razvoju i afirmaciji svoje matične kuće, Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, u kome je obavljao više rukovodećih i poslovnih funkcija. U periodu 1972–1974. bio je upravnik Istraživačkog centra

za međunarodni radnički pokret, a od 1977. do 1980. bio je direktor Sektora naučnoistraživačkih delatnosti Instituta. Više puta je biran za predsednika Saveta i Naučnog veća Instituta. Nakon penzionisanja 1999. godine prenosio je svoje znanje mladim istraživačima Instituta.

Brana Marković se isticao naprednim i prosvেćenim pogledima na aktuelna pitanja savremenog sveta. Demokratski, proevropski i antiratno orijentisan, tokom svog radnog veka uvek je bio pronicljivi autor najboljih profesionalnih rešenja u istraživanju savremenih međunarodnih fenomena, kao i u upravljanju procesom istraživanja.

Ono što ga je naročito krasilo i po čemu će velikom broju svojih kolega i prijatelja ostati u trajnoj uspomeni su, pored istraživačkog talenta, njegova nepokolebljiva čestitost, principijelnost i odsustvo svakog oportunitizma. Zbog toga je uživao opšte poverenje i poštovanje. Izvesno je da će se svi bivši i sadašnji saradnici Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu koji su ga poznavali složiti sa konstatacijom da je Brana Marković bio istovremeno sjajan naučni radnik, izvanredan kolega i saradnik i, povrh svega, častan čovek bez mrlje na sjajnoj karijeri.

Beograd, 20. maj 2020. godine

*Dr Vatroslav VEKARIĆ*



## UPUTSTVO ZA AUTORE

*Međunarodni problemi* su najstariji naučni časopis na Balkanu posvećen međunarodnim odnosima. Prvi broj je objavljen u aprilu 1949. godine, samo godinu dana nakon osnivanja njegovog izdavača – Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu iz Beograda.

Uređivačka politika prati osnovne istraživačke oblasti Instituta: političke, bezbednosne, ekonomske i pravne aspekte međunarodnih odnosa, sa posebnim težištem na razmatranju kontroverznih pitanja savremene teorije i prakse međunarodnih odnosa. *Međunarodni problemi* objavljuju originalne naučne radove, pregledne radove i prikaze knjiga i naučnih skupova.

Časopis izlazi četiri puta godišnje i kategorisan je kod resornog ministarstva kao vrhunski časopis nacionalnog značaja (M51). Čitalačka publika obuhvata brojne naučne institute, univerzitete, biblioteke, te domaća i strana diplomatska predstavništva u zemlji i inostranstvu.

### **Autori su dužni da se u pripremi rukopisa pridržavaju sledećih uputstava:**

1. Rukopisi na srpskom ili engleskom jeziku treba da budu obima 6000–8000 reči (uzeto bez spiska referenci) u *Word*-u (.doc i .docx). Obim prikaza knjiga i skupova može da bude 1000–1500 reči.
2. Rukopise treba pisati latiničnim pismom, fontom *Times New Roman* veličine 12, prored *Single*, sa paginacijom u donjem desnom uglu.
3. Naslov treba što vernije da opiše sadržaj članka i poželjno je korišćenje reči prikladnih za indeksiranje i pretraživanje. Naslov pisati velikim slovima, zadebljano (*bold*), veličina slova 14. Ispod naslova teksta stoji ime i prezime autora članka *Italic*-u.
4. U fusnoti koja stoji uz ime i prezime, autor navodi naziv institucije u kojoj je zaposlen, njeno sedište i svoju elektronsku adresu. U ovoj fusnoti autor može da navede naziv projekta u okviru kojeg je sačinjeno istraživanje ili da ukaže

čitaocima da pojedini pogledi izneti u članku odražavaju njegov lični stav, a ne institucije u kojoj je zaposlen.

5. Ispod naslova stoji apstrakt na srpskom jeziku obima 150–200 reči, koji treba da jasno prikaže osnovne hipoteze, predmet, cilj, metod i rezultate istraživanja, te krajnji nalaz istraživanja. Ispod apstrakta autor prilaže do 10 ključnih reči na srpskom jeziku koje najbolje opisuju sadržaj članka. Podsećamo da je dobar izbor ključnih reči preduslov za ispravno indeksiranje članka u referentnim periodičnim publikacijama i bazama podataka.

#### **NAPOMENA:**

**Originalan naučni rad** predstavlja rezultate naučnog istraživanja sa jasnim doprinosom u vidu širenja i/ili produbljanja postojećeg naučnog saznanja o predmetu istraživanja, a mora da sadrži sledeće elemente:

- teorijski okvir;
- postavljene hipoteze ili istraživačko pitanje;
- obrazloženu svrhu sprovedenog istraživanja;
- primenjen naučni metod;
- dobijene rezultate i njihovo tumačenje;
- zaključak sa odgovorom na postavljene hipoteze ili istraživačko pitanje.

**Pregledan rad** pruža sveobuhvatan sažetak dosadašnjih naučnih istraživanja na određenu temu i/ili sistematičan uvid u trenutno stanje naučne discipline, tako što ukazuje na otvorena istraživačka pitanja i moguće pravce daljeg razvoja obrađene tematike ili naučne discipline.

6. Osnovni tekst i prateće fusnote treba da budu poravnati u skladu sa opcijom *justify*, dok podnaslovi treba da budu napisani izborom opcije *centre*.
7. Podnaslovi se pišu podebljanim slovima, dok se pod-podnaslovi pišu malim slovima u *italic*-u; u oba slučaja veličina slova je 12.
8. Nikako ne uvlačiti početni red u pasusima.
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10. U tekstu moraju biti data puna imena, nikako inicijali. Strano ime i prezime treba pisati u srpskoj transkripciji, s tim što se prilikom prvog pominjanja u tekstu mora u zagradi navesti kako glase u originalu. Imena i prezimena koja potiču iz naroda koji ne koriste latinično pismo treba navesti u latinizovanoj transkripciji (npr. kineska, japanska ili arapska imena i prezimena).



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Ukoliko se navodi više stranica koristi se srednja crta bez razmaka pre i posle (npr. str. 123–245; pp. 22–50).

#### Primeri:

Džon Rols, *Pravo naroda*, Alexandria Press i Nova srpska politička misao, Beograd, 2003, str. 107.

Vivienne Jabri, *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2007, pp. 59–62.

#### b) *Članci u zbornicima radova*

Puno ime i prezime autora, naslov teksta (pod znacima navoda), naziv zbornika radova (u *italic-u*), izdavač, mesto izdanja, godina izdanja, str. (ili pp.) od–do. Kada se navodi zbornik radova na srpskom jeziku koji je priredila jedna osoba, iza imena priređivača se u zagradama stavlja (ur.) ili (prir.), a kada ima više urednika stavlja se (urs), bez tačke. Kada se navodi zbornik radova na engleskom jeziku koji je priredila jedna osoba, iza njenog imena se stavlja (ed.), a kada ima više urednika stavlja se (eds), bez tačke.

#### Primeri:

Zlatko Isaković, „Međunarodni položaj Makedonije”, u: Momir Stojković (ur.), *Savremeni procesi i odnosi na Balkanu*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu i Centar za međunarodne studije Fakulteta političkih nauka, Beograd, 1997, str. 123–124.

Michael Herman, "Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001", in: Len V. Scott and Peter D. Jackson (eds), *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, p. 180.

#### c) Članci u naučnim časopisima

Puno ime i prezime autora, naslov teksta (pod znacima navoda), naziv časopisa (u *Italic-u*), broj toma, broj izdanja, str. (ili pp.) od–do. Brojevi stranica se odvajaju srednjom crticom (–), bez razmaka.

##### Primeri:

Boris Krivokapić, „Etničke manjine u Finskoj”, *Međunarodni problemi*, vol. L, br. 3–4, 1998, str. 489.

Astrid H.M. Nordin and Dan Öberg, "Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2015, pp. 402–403.

#### d) Članci u dnevnim novinama i časopisima

Navesti ime autora (ili inicijale ukoliko su samo oni navedeni), naslov članka pod znacima navoda, ime novine ili časopisa (u *italic-u*), datum arapskim brojevima, broj strane.

##### Primer:

John Gapper, "Investor votes should count", *The Financial Times*, 17 April 2006, p. 9.

#### e) Navođenje dokumenata

Navesti naziv dokumenta (pod znacima navoda), član, tačku ili stav na koji se autor poziva, časopis ili službeno glasilo u kome je dokument objavljen (u *italic-u*), broj toma, broj izdanja, mesto i godinu izdanja.

##### Primeri:

"Resolution 1244 (1999)", Security Council of the United Nations, 10 June 1999.

"Single European Act", Articles 118A and 118B, 130A-130E, in: *Community Social Policy*, Current Status 1 January 1996, European Commission, Brussels, Luxembourg, January 1996, pp. 2–4.

„Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine”, *Službeni list APV*, br. 17/91, 18. jun 1991, str. 12.

*f) Navođenje izvora sa Interneta*

Za izvor pronađen na Internetu treba navesti tačan datum kada mu je autor pristupio, pošto se adrese sadržaja povremeno menjaju.

Primeri:

“The role of the Ombudsman in future Europe and the mandates of Ombudsmen in future Europe”, speech by the European Ombudsman, Nikiforos Diamandouros, to the 9th Round Table meeting of European Ombudspersons and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 31 March 2005, Copenhagen, [www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2005-03-31.htm](http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2005-03-31.htm), 01/03/2019.

Guri Rosén, “Secrecy versus Accountability: Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Security and Defence Policy”, *ARENA Working Paper*, No. 1/2014, February 2014, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, [www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2014/wp1-14.pdf](http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2014/wp1-14.pdf), 24/12/2018, p. 3.

Kristof Clerix, “Ilkka Salmi, the EU’s spymaster”, *Mondial Nieuws*, 4 March 2014, [www.mo.be/en/interview/ilkka-salmi-eu-s-007](http://www.mo.be/en/interview/ilkka-salmi-eu-s-007), 20/05/2018.

*g) Ponavljanje ranije navedenih izvora*

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Primeri:

Astrid H.M. Nordin and Dan Öberg, “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2015, op. cit., p. 408.

*Ibid.*, p. 409.

14. Članak može sadržati tabele i druge priloge (poput geografskih karata, grafikona, i sl.) s tim što je neophodno da se navede njihov broj i potpun naslov. Ukoliko je prilog preuzet od nekog drugog autora ili iz nekog dokumenta neophodno je ne samo navesti izvor, već i dobiti pisanu saglasnost za objavljivanje priloga.
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Primer:

Andelman, David A., "China's Balkan strategy", *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1979, pp. 60-79.

Navedene bibliografske jedinice se razvrstavaju u tri kategorije: I) naučne monografije i članci; II) dokumenti; III) izvori sa interneta (sve vrste medijskih sadržaja).

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16. Nakon spiska korišćene bibliografije autor daje rezime na engleskom jeziku obima oko 300 reči i ključne reči. Molimo autore da obrate pažnju na pravopis i stil engleskog jezika jer se tekstovi sa rezimeima pisanim na engleskom ispod akademskog jezičkog standarda neće prosljeđivati na recenziranje.

**Posebne obaveze autora rukopisa**

17. Autori garantuju da priloženi rukopis predstavlja njihov originalan doprinos, da nije objavljen ranije i da se ne razmatra za objavljivanje u drugoj publikaciji. Autori takođe garantuju da nakon objavljivanja u *Međunarodnim problemima*, rukopis neće bez saglasnosti Instituta kao vlasnika autorskih prava biti objavljen u drugoj publikaciji na bilo kom jeziku.

18. Autori garantuju da prava trećih lica neće biti povređena i da izdavač neće snositi nikakvu odgovornost ako se pojave bilo kakvi zahtevi za naknadu štete. Autori snose svu odgovornost za sadržaj priloženih rukopisa i moraju da pribave dozvolu za objavljivanje podataka od svih strana uključenih u istraživanje. Autori koji žele da u rad uključe slike ili delove teksta koji su već negde objavljeni dužni su da za to pribave saglasnost nosilaca autorskih prava i da prilikom podnošenja rada dostave dokaze da je takva saglasnost data. Materijal za koji takvi dokazi nisu dostavljeni smatraće se originalnim delom autora.

19. Autori garantuju da su sve osobe koje su značajno doprinele sadržaju rukopisa navedene kao autori. Autori se moraju pridržavati etičkih standarda o naučnoistraživačkom radu, a rukopis ne sme da sadrži neosnovane ili nezakonite tvrdnje i da krši prava drugih.

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21. Upozoravamo autore da se za svaki rukopis proverava da li je plagijat, odnosno da li sadrži:

- doslovno ili gotovo doslovno preuzimanje ili smišljeno parafraziranje (u cilju prikriivanja plagijata) delova tekstova drugih autora bez jasnog ukazivanja na izvor ili obeležavanje kopiranih fragmenata (na primer, korišćenjem navodnika);
- kopiranje jednačina, slika ili tabela iz tuđih radova bez pravilnog navođenja izvora i/ili bez dozvole autora ili nosilaca autorskih prava za njihovo korišćenje.

Ako se ustanovi da je rad koji je objavljen u časopisu *Međunarodni problemi* plagijat od autora će se zahtevati da upute pisano izvinjenje autorima izvornog rada.

Rukopisi za koje se ustanovi da sadrže plagirane delove biće automatski odbijeni i autorima će biti trajno zabranjeno da objavljuju u časopisu.

**Rukopisi koji nisu usaglašeni sa navedenim smernicama neće biti uzeti u postupak recenziranja.**

Rukopise slati na elektronsku adresu: [srdjan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs](mailto:srdjan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs)

Uređivački odbor



## UREĐIVAČKA POLITIKA

*Međunarodni problemi* su najstariji naučni časopis na Balkanu isključivo posvećen objavljivanju rezultata naučnih istraživanja u oblasti međunarodnih odnosa. Prvi broj je objavljen u aprilu 1949. godine, samo godinu dana nakon osnivanja njegovog izdavača – Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu iz Beograda.

Premda časopis prati osnovne naučnoistraživačke oblasti Instituta – političke, bezbednosne, ekonomske i pravne aspekte međunarodnih odnosa, Uređivački odbor daje prednost naučnim člancima posvećenim analizi kontroverznih pitanja savremene teorije i prakse međunarodnih odnosa. U prioritetne tematske celine ubrajamo:

- Preobražaj prirode svetske politike u ranom 21. veku;
- Fenomenologija i praksa transnacionalnosti i kosmopolitizma;
- Problemi institucionalizacije međunarodnih odnosa;
- Različita teorijska tumačenja aktuelnih globalnih procesa;
- Kontroverzna pitanja upotrebe spoljnopolitičkih instrumenata vodećih globalnih aktera;
- Uticaj naprednih tehnologija Četvrte industrijske revolucije na oblikovanje međunarodnih odnosa u 21. veku;
- Civilizacija, religija i identitet u kontekstu svetske politike i globalizacije;
- Konceptualni i metodološki iskoraci izvan tradicionalnog epistemološkog okvira naučne discipline međunarodnih odnosa.

*Međunarodni problemi* objavljuju neobjavljene originalne naučne radove, pregledne radove, naučne polemike, osvrtne prikaze knjiga i naučnih skupova na srpskom ili engleskom jeziku. Časopis izlazi četiri puta godišnje i kategorisan je kod resornog ministarstva kao vrhunski časopis nacionalnog značaja (M51). Zahvaljujući naučnoj objektivnosti i stečenom ugledu, čitalačka publika obuhvata brojne naučne institute, univerzitete, biblioteke, te domaća i strana diplomatska predstavništva u zemlji i inostranstvu.

### **OBAVEZE IZDAVAČKOG SAVETA, UREDNIKA I UREĐIVAČKOG ODBORA**

Izdavački savet je savetodavno telo koje aktivno doprinosi razvoju časopisa. Zadaci i dužnosti članova Saveta su: podrška razvoju časopisa, promocija časopisa, podsticanje stručnjaka u naučnom istraživanju političkih, bezbednosnih, ekonomskih i pravnih aspekata međunarodnih odnosa da se uključe u rad časopisa kao autori i/ili recenzenti, pisanje uvodnika, recenzija i komentara o radovima.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik *Međunarodnih problema* donosi konačnu odluku o tome koji će se rukopisi objaviti. Prilikom donošenja odluke glavni i odgovorni urednik rukovodi se uređivačkom politikom vodeći računa o zakonskim propisima koji se odnose na klevetu, kršenja autorskih prava i plagiranje.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik i njegov zamenik zadržavaju diskreciono pravo da primljene rukopise procene i odbiju bez recenziranja, ukoliko utvrde da ne odgovaraju sadržinskim i formalnim standardima pisanja naučnoistraživačkog rada i tematskim zahtevima uređivačke politike. Radovi koji ne zadovoljavaju tehničke standarde propisane Uputstvom za autore, čak i u slučaju da je sadržaj korektan, biće vraćeni autorima na usklađivanje. U redovnim okolnostima, redakcija obaveštava autora o tome da li je prihvatila tekst i pokrenula postupak recenziranja u roku od sedam dana od datuma prijema rukopisa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da budu u bilo kakvom sukobu interesa u vezi sa rukopisima koje razmatraju. Iz postupka izbora recenzenata i odlučivanja o sudbini rukopisa isključuju se članovi Uređivačkog odbora kod kojih postoji sukob interesa. Ako takav sukob interesa postoji, o izboru recenzenata i sudbini rukopisa odlučuje glavni i odgovorni urednik. Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i članovi Uređivačkog odbora su dužni da blagovremeno prijave postojanje sukoba interesa.

Glavni i odgovorni urednik, njegov zamenik i Uređivački odbor dužni su da sud o rukopisu donesu na osnovu njegovog sadržaja, bez rasnih, polnih/rodnih, verskih, etničkih ili političkih predrasuda.

Urednici i članovi Uređivačkog odbora ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznete u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju da se koriste za sticanje lične koristi.

Urednici i članovi redakcije dužni su da preduzmu sve razumne mere kako bi identitet recenzenata ostao nepoznat autorima pre, tokom i nakon postupka recenzije i kako bi identitet autora ostao nepoznat recenzentima.



## **OBAVEZE AUTORA**

Autori garantuju da rukopis predstavlja njihov originalan doprinos, da nije objavljen ranije i da se ne razmatra za objavljivanje na drugom mestu. Istovremeno predavanje istog rukopisa u više časopisa predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda. Takav rukopis se momentalno isključuje iz daljeg razmatranja. Autori takođe garantuju da nakon objavljivanja u časopisu *Međunarodni problemi* rukopis neće biti objavljen u drugoj publikaciji na bilo kom jeziku bez saglasnosti nosioca autorskih prava.

U slučaju da je poslati rukopis rezultat naučnoistraživačkog projekta ili da je, u prethodnoj verziji, bio izložen na skupu u vidu usmenog saopštenja (pod istim ili sličnim naslovom), detaljniji podaci o projektu, konferenciji i slično, navode se u fusnoti na samom početku teksta. Rad koji je već objavljen u nekom časopisu ne može biti preštampan u *Međunarodnim problemima*.

Autori su dužni da se pridržavaju etičkih standarda koji se odnose na naučnoistraživački rad. Autori garantuju da rukopis ne sadrži neosnovane ili nezakonite tvrdnje i ne krši prava drugih. Izdavač neće snositi nikakvu odgovornost u slučaju ispostavljanja bilo kakvih zahteva za naknadu štete.

Nakon prihvatanja rukopisa, a pre objavljivanja, autori uplaćuju na račun izdavača kotizaciju u iznosu od 3000 dinara (25 EUR za uplate iz inostranstva).

### ***Sadržaj rada***

Rad treba da sadrži dovoljno detalja i referenci kako bi se recenzentima, a potom i čitaocima omogućilo da provere tvrdnje koje su u njemu iznesene. Namerno iznošenje netačnih tvrdnji predstavlja kršenje etičkih standarda. Prikazi skupova i knjiga moraju da budu precizni i objektivni.

Autori snose svu odgovornost za sadržaj predatih rukopisa i dužni su da, ako je to potrebno, pre njihovog objavljivanja pribave saglasnost svih lica ili institucija koje su neposredno učestvovala u istraživanju koje je u rukopisu predstavljeno.

Autori koji žele da u rad uključe ilustracije, tabele ili druge materijale koji su već negde objavljeni obavezni su da za to pribave saglasnost nosilaca autorskih prava. Materijal za koji takvi dokazi nisu dostavljeni smatraće se originalnim delom autora.

### ***Autorstvo***

Autori su dužni da kao autore navedu samo ona lica koja su značajno doprinela sadržaju rukopisa, odnosno dužni su da sva lica koja su značajno doprinela sadržaju rukopisa navedu kao autore.

Ako su u bitnim aspektima istraživačkog projekta i pripreme rukopisa učestvovala i druga lica koja nisu autori, njihov doprinos treba pomenuti u napomeni ili zahvalnici.

### **Navođenje izvora**

Autori su dužni da ispravno citiraju izvore koji su bitno uticali na sadržaj istraživanja i rukopisa. Informacije koje su dobili u privatnom razgovoru ili korespondenciji sa trećim licima, prilikom recenziranja prijave projekata ili rukopisa i slično, ne smeju se koristiti bez izričite pisane dozvole izvora.

### **Recikliranje teksta**

Recikliranje teksta, odnosno situacija u kojoj isti autor upotrebljava istovetne delove teksta u dva ili više svojih objavljenih radova, predstavlja kršenje naučne i izdavačke etike. Uredništvo procenjuje ukupni obim recikliranih delova teksta, značaj mesta gde se oni pojavljuju u rukopisu (da li su deo uvoda, odeljka o primenjenoj metodologiji, diskusije tj. glavnog dela članka ili zaključka), da li je naveden prethodni izvor recikliranog teksta i da li postoji povreda autorskih prava.

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Plagiranje, odnosno preuzimanje tuđih ideja, reči ili drugih oblika kreativnog izraza i predstavljanje kao svojih, predstavlja grubo kršenje naučne i izdavačke etike. Plagiranje može da uključuje i kršenje autorskih prava, što je zakonom kažnjivo. Plagijat obuhvata sledeće:

Doslovno ili gotovo doslovno preuzimanje ili smišljeno parafraziranje (u cilju prikriivanja plagijata) delova tekstova drugih autora bez jasnog ukazivanja na izvor ili obeležavanje kopiranih fragmenata (na primer, korišćenjem navodnika);

Kopiranje slika ili tabela iz tuđih radova bez pravilnog navođenja izvora i/ili bez dozvole autora ili nosilaca autorskih prava.

Rukopisi kod kojih postoje jasne indicije da se radi o plagijatu biće automatski odbijeni i autorima će biti trajno zabranjeno da objavljuju u časopisu.

Ako se ustanovi da je rad koji je objavljen u časopisu plagijat, isti će biti povučen u skladu sa procedurom opisanom pod *Povlačenje već objavljenih radova*, a autorima će biti trajno zabranjeno da objavljuju u časopisu.

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Autori su dužni da u radu ukažu na finansijske ili bilo koje druge sukobe interesa koji bi mogli da utiču na iznesene rezultate i interpretacije.

### ***Greške u objavljenim radovima***

U slučaju da autori otkriju važnu grešku u svom radu nakon njegovog objavljivanja, dužni su da momentalno o tome obaveste urednika ili izdavača i da sa njima sarađuju kako bi se rad povukao ili ispravio.

Predavanjem rukopisa redakciji *Međunarodnih problema* autori se obavezuju na poštovanje navedenih obaveza.

### **OBAVEZE RECENZENATA**

Recenzenti su dužni da stručno, argumentovano, nepristrasno i u zadatim rokovima dostave uredniku ocenu naučne vrednosti rukopisa.

Recenzenti evaluiraju radove u odnosu na usklađenost teme rada sa profilom časopisa, relevantnost istraživane oblasti i primenjenih metoda, originalnost i naučnu relevantnost podataka iznesenih u rukopisu, stil naučnog izlaganja i opremljenost teksta naučnim aparatom.

Recenzent koji ima osnovane sumnje ili saznanja o kršenju etičkih standarda od strane autora dužan je da o tome obavesti urednika. Recenzent treba da prepozna važne objavljene radove koje autori nisu citirali. On treba da upozori urednika i na bitne sličnosti i podudarnosti između rukopisa koji se razmatra i bilo kojeg drugog objavljenog rada ili rukopisa koji je u postupku recenzije u nekom drugom časopisu, ako o tome ima lična saznanja. Ako ima saznanja da je isti rukopis razmatra u više časopisa u isto vreme, recenzent je dužan da o tome obavesti urednika.

Recenzent ne sme da bude u sukobu interesa sa autorima ili finansijerom istraživanja. Ukoliko postoji sukob interesa, recenzent je dužan da o tome momentalno obavesti urednika.

Recenzent koji sebe smatra nekompetentnim za temu ili oblast kojom se rukopis bavi dužan je da o tome obavesti urednika.

Recenzija mora biti objektivna. Sud recenzenata mora biti jasan i potkrepljen argumentima.

Rukopisi koji su poslani recenzentu smatraju se poverljivim dokumentima. Recenzenti ne smeju da koriste neobjavljen materijal iz predatih rukopisa za svoja istraživanja bez izričite pisane dozvole autora, a informacije i ideje iznesene u predatim rukopisima moraju se čuvati kao poverljive i ne smeju se koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

### **POSTUPAK RECENZIJE**

Primljeni radovi podležu recenziji. Cilj recenzije je da glavnom i odgovornom uredniku pomogne u donošenju odluke o tome da li rad treba prihvatiti ili odbiti i da kroz proces komunikacije sa autorima poboljša kvalitet rukopisa.

Recenzije su dvostruko anonimne – identitet autora je nepoznat recenzentima i obrnuto. Identitet recenzenata ostaje nepoznat autorima i obrnuto pre, tokom i nakon postupka recenzije. Urednici garantuje da će pre slanja rukopisa na recenziju iz njega biti uklonjeni lični podaci autora (pre svega, ime i afilijacija) i da će se preduzeti sve razumne mere kako bi identitet autora ostao nepoznat recenzentima. Tokom čitavog procesa, recenzenti deluju nezavisno jedni od drugih. Recenzentima nije poznat identitet drugih recenzenata. Ako odluke recenzenata nisu iste, urednici mogu da traže mišljenje drugih recenzenata.

Rok za okončanje postupka recenziranja je 30 dana od datuma kada recenzenti prime rukopis.

Izbor recenzenata spada u diskreciona prava glavnog i odgovornog urednika i njegovog zamenika. Recenzenti moraju da raspolažu relevantnim znanjima u vezi sa oblašću kojom se rukopis bavi i ne smeju biti iz iste institucije kao autor, niti to smeju biti autori koji su u skorije vreme objavljivali publikacije zajedno (kao koautori) sa sa bilo kojim od autora podnesenog rada.

Urednici šalju podneti rukopis sa obrascem recenzije dvojici recenzenata koji su stručnjaci za naučnu oblast kojom se rad bavi. Obrazac recenzije sadrži niz pitanja na koja treba odgovoriti, a koja recenzentima ukazuju koji su to aspekti koje treba obuhvatiti kako bi se donela odluka o sudbini jednog rukopisa. U završnom delu obrasca, recenzenti moraju da navedu svoja zapažanja i predloge kako da se podneti rukopis poboljša.

Tokom postupka recenzije urednici mogu da zahtevaju od autora da dostave dodatne informacije (uključujući i primarne podatke), ako su one potrebne za donošenje suda o naučnom doprinosu rukopisa. Urednici i recenzenti moraju da čuvaju takve informacije kao poverljive i ne smeju ih koristiti za sticanje lične koristi.

U slučaju da autori imaju ozbiljne i osnovane zamerke na račun recenzije, urednici će proveriti da li je recenzija objektivna i da li zadovoljava akademske standarde. Ako se pojavi sumnja u objektivnost ili kvalitet recenzije, urednici će tražiti mišljenje drugih recenzenata.

### RAZREŠAVANJE SPORNIH SITUACIJA

Svaki pojedinac ili institucija mogu u bilo kom trenutku da urednicima i/ili Uređivačkom odboru prijave saznanja o kršenju etičkih standarda i drugim nepravilnostima i da o tome dostave neophodne informacije i dokaze.

- Glavni i odgovorni urednik će u dogovoru sa Uređivačkim odborom odlučiti o pokretanju postupka koji ima za cilj proveru iznesenih navoda i dokaza;
- Tokom tog postupka svi izneseni dokazi smatraće se poverljivim materijalom i biće predloženi samo onim licima koja su direktno uključena u postupak;
- Licima za koja se sumnja da su prekršila etičke standarde biće data mogućnost da odgovore na iznete optužbe;
- Odluke u vezi sa utvrđenim kršenjem etičkih standarda donosi glavni i odgovorni urednik u saradnji sa Uređivačkim odborom i, ako je to potrebno, grupom stručnjaka. Predviđene su sledeće mere, a mogu se primenjivati pojedinačno ili istovremeno:
- Objavljivanje saopštenja ili uvodnika u kom se opisuje slučaj kršenja etičkih standarda;
- Slanje službenog obaveštenja rukovodiocima ili poslodavcima autora/recenzenta;
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- Autoru se trajno zabranjuje da objavljuje u časopisu *Međunarodni problemi*;
- Upoznavanje relevantnih stručnih organizacija ili nadležnih organa sa slučajem kako bi mogli da preduzmu odgovarajuće mere.

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U slučaju kršenja prava izdavača, nosilaca autorskih prava ili autora, povrede profesionalnih etičkih kodeksa, tj. u slučaju slanja istog rukopisa u više časopisa u isto vreme, lažne tvrdnje o autorstvu, plagijata, manipulacije podacima u cilju prevare, kao i u svim drugim slučajevima grubog kršenja etičkih standarda, objavljeni rad se mora povući. U nekim slučajevima već objavljeni rad se može povući i kako bi se ispravile naknadno uočene greške.

Standardi za razrešavanje situacija kada mora doći do povlačenja rada definisani su od strane biblioteka i naučnih tela, a ista praksa je usvojena i od strane časopisa *Međunarodni problemi*.

### **AUTORSKA PRAVA**

Autori prenose sva autorska prava na časopis *Međunarodni problemi*. Kada je rukopis prihvaćen za objavljivanje, autori prenose autorska prava na izdavača. U slučaju da rukopis ne bude prihvaćen za štampu u časopisu, autori zadržavaju sva prava. Spisak prava koje autori prenose na izdavača detaljno je uređen Ugovorom o prenosu autorskih prava, koji autor potpisuje nakon što je članak prihvaćen za objavljivanje.

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MEĐUNARODNI problemi = International problems :  
časopis Instituta za međunarodnu politiku i privredu /  
glavni i odgovorni urednik Srđan Korać. - Latinično izd. -  
God. 1, br. 1 (apr. 1949)- . - Beograd : Institut za  
međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1949- (Beograd :  
Donat graf). - 24 cm

Tromesečno. - Drugo izdanje na drugom medijumu  
: Međunarodni problemi (Online) = ISSN 2406-0690  
ISSN 0025-8555 = Međunarodni problemi  
COBISS.SR-ID 6012674




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
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